

Borderlanguage: Language Policy, Ideology and Identity in Ukraine

-Вы говорите: язык... Да разве существует малороссийский язык? Я попросил раз одного хохла перевести следующую, первую попавшуюся мне фразу: "Грамматика есть искусство правильно читать и писать". Знаете, как он это перевел: "Храматыка е выскусство правильно читаты ы писаты..." Что ж, это язык, по-вашему? самостоятельный язык? Да скорей, чем с этим согласиться, я готов позволить лучшего своего друга истолочь в ступе...

You say: language...as if the Little Russian language exists? One time I asked a [derogatory term for Ukrainian] to translate the following, the first phrase that came to me: "Grammar is an art of correctly reading and writing." Do you know, how he translated it: "Khrammar is the yrt of corryctly ryding and wrytyng..." What, that is a language, in your opinion? An independent language? Sooner than agreeing with that, I would pound my best friend in a mortar.

-Pigasiv, from "Rudin" by Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev

Introduction

The way an individual identifies himself is complicated, and is constantly being negotiated. Race, ethnicity, class, occupation, and a myriad of other factors play a role in the construct of identity; near the top of the list, as well, is language. For many people, language is not simply the way that they communicate, but a part of their very being. Scholars have long found language and identity to be inextricably intertwined, and this connection becomes clearest when a group of speakers feels that their language is being threatened; as one example, the debate over Spanish in American schools can become extremely heated, even in areas far from any borders and with a limited Spanish-speaking population. An attack on a language is felt, by many, to be an attack on identity itself.

While it is clear that there is a compelling connection between language and identity, the precise effect that language has on identity can be varying. In some situations, language can strengthen the bonds that a group has between its members, and in others, language may not be as important as other cultural factors such as race or religion in expressing identity. In order to

completely understand the linguistic situation in Ukraine, we must first fully examine how language and identity interact, and what aspects of the Ukrainian culture are relevant to this issue.

In this paper, I will be examining the theoretical framework of identity: how identity is defined, the scholarly framework of identity which is best suited for the purposes of this study, and the different ways that this framework has been applied by scholars, and how these ideas of identity and negotiation have played out in multilingual contexts. I will also look at the role that stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes have to strengthen and complicate the issue of language and identity, and explore how language and language attitudes affect identity formation and negotiation, both positively and negatively. Once these theoretical issues are understood, the motivations behind the current linguistic situation in Ukraine become much clearer.

Identity

Social identity theory

Identity theory has been studied for decades by sociologists, and through the 1970s, the primary focus of identity study was the individual. For many, this made intuitive sense; identity is defined by Merriam Webster as “the distinguishing character or personality of an individual: individuality.”¹ In the past few decades, though, it has become clear that an individual’s identity is dependent on more than simply the individual himself, and actually relies on both the individual and the social groups that the individual considers himself to be a part of. Since then, identity has been studied more as it pertains to the idea of the group (Cerulo, 1997). This idea of “social identity” is widely accepted in current studies of identity; simply put, social identity theory follows the idea that the behavior of an individual reflects the society of which the

¹ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity>, accessed on 15 August 2009.

individual is a part (Padilla & Perez, 2003: 42). In other words, the individual's identity is inextricably tied to the social group of which they are a part.

According to Padilla and Perez, social identity theory incorporates three important ideas: individuals are motivated to keep a positive self-concept, this self-concept comes from the identity of the individual within the group, and that people build their favorable social identity by comparing their group in a positive way against an out-group. The process of social identity thus allows for group members to construct their identity in a way that feels right, while alienating those from outside groups. It is perhaps as a result of this process of alienation that intergroup conflict often occurs, as viewing an outside group in an unfavorable way is an important part of the construction of identity.

The idea of intergroup conflict becomes more understandable when one takes into account the different needs of the individual. “[S]ocial identifications are guided by two core human motives: the need to be unique and the need to belong. Having a social identity (e.g., ethnic, religious, or national) satisfies individuals’ simultaneous needs for inclusion and differentiation. In other words, we need to simultaneously fill the need to belong to a social group (e.g., Latino) while maintaining our distinctiveness from another group (e.g., Jewish)” (Padilla & Perez, 43). Social identity theory does not simply explain why individuals may define themselves in terms of the group that they belong to, but it also helps to explain why members of outside groups are portrayed in a more negative light.

Brewer (2001) separates identity into four separate types of social identity: person-based social identities (how an individual fits into a group), relational social identities (how a small relationship group, such as a family, fits into a group), group-based social identities (the collective qualities of the group), and collective identities (the achievement of collective efforts,

such as shaping of a group identity, beyond what the group already has in common). In this way, even the idea of social identity is not as simple as it originally sounds, but rather, each member of the group is negotiating their own identity in a variety of ways as they construct their individuality and group membership. This particular way of looking at social identity can help to explain how social identity cannot be a simple concept; an individual is constantly negotiating their own identity in relation to the group as well as the group's identity in relation to society as a whole.

The application of social identity theory

As identity is being more completely understood, the application of social identity can be found in a variety of ways. It is important to understand exactly how current theories of social identity are being applied, especially as it pertains to linguistic groups, in order to see the big picture in Ukraine.

In the beginning, social identity was seen primarily as a collective identity. The members of a group were believed to internalize physiological, psychological, and regional traits of the group, which led to the idea of a unified group from which individuals derived their sense of self (Cerulo, 1997). The idea was that all members of a group retain essentially the same identity, and this identity was determined not by the members of the group, but by outside or higher forces. Cerulo mentions Nazi Germany as an example of this; the characteristics of the group were set, and the group members adhered to these characteristics.

This theory has been adapted in more recent times to reflect a more social view, known as Social Constructionism: "From this perspective, every collective becomes a social artifact – an entity molded, refabricated, and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centers of power" (Cerulo, 1997: 387). In this way, group dynamics interact with the identity of the

individual; each individual changes the identity of the whole group, just as belonging to the group changes the identity of each individual. Using this theory, the members of the group perpetuate the group identity by reinforcing the characteristics of the group. Cerulo cites gender studies to illustrate this theory, stating that belonging to a male or female group does not, in and of itself, result in male or female stereotypical behaviors, but the members of society and reinforce those stereotypes, perpetuating the identity of the group.

When it comes to national identity, “[a] rich collection of sociohistorical works on commemoration, narrative, and symbolization chart the ways in which actors, particularly elites, create, manipulate, or dismantle the identities of nations, citizenships, allies, and enemies” (Cerulo, 1997: 390). The identity of an ethnic group is therefore enabled by the entire group as well as shaped by it. In this way, the identity of each individual in a national group is tied to the national characteristic, even as the national characteristics are dependent on the individual.

The issue of national identity becomes more complicated, though, because it is on one hand the organic dynamics of a group, and on the other hand, it is often conscientiously manipulated by those in power. Because of this, Anthony D. Smith (1991) suggests that national identity, which can share many characteristics with linguistic identity, should be analyzed somewhere between social constructionism and the more essentialist earlier views, citing a “need for community” as an important aspect of this type of identity. It is neither simply the characteristics of a group as dictated from above, nor the characteristics of a group as determined and continued by the members of that group, but a mixture.

The most recent type of identity theory to come out of the scholarship is Postmodernism. The basic tenet of postmodern identity theory is that earlier theories are too constricted in their views of identity. The theory holds that each individual is too multifaceted to be boxed into one

group or another, and that working on the idea that social identity can define an individual's identity is simplifying the issue (Cerulo, 1997). Postmodernism has been especially useful in discussing gender and sexuality identity, attempting to break down ideas about strict categories that people fall into.

For purposes of this study, it is important to keep all three approaches in mind (collective identity, social constructionism, and postmodernism); the group of Russian-speakers in Ukraine will certainly be multifaceted, and will both define itself and be defined from above. The main approach will be social constructionism, as the analysis of the study is based on data recorded during a specific period of time in Ukraine. Social constructionism relies on variables and correlates, which were chosen as the most adequate way to study the situation in Ukraine today. While I do not believe that postmodernism alone can be easily applied to the issue of national or linguistic identity, as both national identity and linguistic identity have relatively clear-cut boundaries and individuals often choose or are given definitive labels, there are certain aspects of postmodernism that apply to this situation. Mainly, identity in a context such as Ukraine can go through re-negotiation on a daily basis, and thus it is important to try to understand deeper, individual qualities; qualitative data from the surveys and interviews will help to shed light on some of these qualities. For these reasons, we will be looking at the situation in Ukraine through an adapted lens of social constructionism, remembering that many of the qualities that are ascribed to Russian and Ukrainian speakers may be given to them from above, and remembering to keep in mind individuals and the way that they may define themselves as well as their group.

Language and language attitudes in identity formation

Language has been found to be connected to identity, but it becomes even more complicated when language attitudes are considered; the way members from within as well as

outside of the linguistic group have toward the language play a large part in the formation of the collective and individual identity. In this section, social identity theory will be considered as it applies to language, and language ideology and its connection to identity will be studied.

Language and social identity theory

Social identity theory has been used to help explain many different aspects of identity, as stated earlier. Language is certainly an important part of one's identity, and especially in a bilingual society, being a member of a certain linguistic group often plays a defining role in an individual's sense of self.

It is difficult to definitively state how language and identity interact, because in different situations, language use will carry a different amount of significance. In monolingual societies, individuals may attach little significance to their linguistic group; alternatively, in multi-ethnic societies, many different ethnic groups may speak the same language, rendering its status as a group-marker as ineffective. Because of this, language may be a deciding factor in a group, but it does not have to be (Renan, 1990). In certain situations, especially multilingual societies, language choice may be critical to identity, while in others, it may be far less important.

Looking at language in this light, it is tempting to assume that language is not important to the formation of identity. This is a mistake, however. While language may not be a primary marker in all situations, it maintains strong associations with national and ethnic identity (May, 2008). Regardless of the situation of a given language group, language is often deeply tied together with the idea of national identity. When the political situation of a given language group is such that it is a marker of minority or majority status, the significance of the language in terms of identity is strengthened. "If a particular language comes to serve important cultural and/or political functions in the formation and maintenance of a particular ethnic or national

identity, it *is* important” (May, 130). Thus, while language may play a minor role in identity formation in certain situations (e. g. monolingual societies), it can be a critical factor in other situations (e.g. bilingual societies).

An example of the significance of language to national identity in a bilingual setting can be seen in the Catalonia region in Spain, where Catalan and Spanish compete for the same space. In this area, the language is perceived by both sides to hold significant value not only for its speakers, but for the group and the nation as a whole. On one side, Catalan nationalists view Catalan as a symbol of their culture with a long and celebrated history, while on the other, some Spanish speakers view Catalan as a threat to the nation (Rees, 1996). This situation is a clear illustration of how language choice, especially in a highly-charged bilingual situation, becomes connected not simply to the way that people speak, but who people are. “Multi-cultural nations throughout the world are undergoing varying degrees of language-related stress with separatist overtones. In Barcelona, the succinct slogan often seen on ‘tee’ shirts and in graffiti, *Som catalans, no som espanyoles*, (We are Catalans, not Spaniards) hints at independence for cultural survival” (Rees, 1996: 319). While language can play a secondary role in identity formation in many situations, there is no doubt that, given the right political environment, geographic space, and linguistic situation, language is a central factor to identity.

David Kaplan (1994) discusses the linguistic situation in Canada, where French and English groups contend for the same space. He writes that the language policy in Quebec separates French-speaking Quebec from English-speaking Canada, allowing each territory to use language to determine its social, economic, and cultural makeup. Kaplan shows that the language situation has, through the use of politics and group identity, grown to encompass more than just communication, but has effectively divided Canada.

As we think about the study of identity in terms of social constructionism, it is thus not difficult to see language as a critical part of a person's identity. In a mostly bilingual society, language can be a choice, and that choice can help to construct one's identity; when the use of that language has social, economical, and political implications, the choice of language can be the deciding factor for an individual in terms of which group they belong to; this can expand to include the role that the entire language group plays in society. Looking at identity through a postmodernist lens, language choice can be seen as a way that an individual negotiates their individual identity, while the language group as a whole interacts with society.

Language Attitudes and Identity

The idea of how language interacts with identity becomes even more complicated with the addition of language attitudes and ideology. In theory, linguistic choices simply reflect the group to which an individual belongs, constructing and maintaining an identity for that individual, and possibly constructing a group identity. In practice, though, there is more at stake than simply the categorization of an individual. Economics and power are certainly important to the choices that individuals make, but the attitudes of individuals and a society as a whole toward a language and its speakers become a critical part of the identity construction; negative attitudes between different groups of speakers can increase the strength of the ties between identity and language, and increased strength of ties between identity and language can increase negative attitudes toward speakers who belong to a different language group.

What is important to remember about language in a multilingual society is that it is often, at least on some level, consciously chosen. Edwards (1983) did a study in Guyana regarding the use of Standard English, Creole English, and an intermediate code. What is interesting about this study is that it looks specifically at the way that these languages are used by males in Guyana, all

of whom have significant exposure to each of the three varieties. In Guyana, Edwards found that rural speakers used Creole English, urban speakers used Standard English, and new immigrants from the rural areas to the city used a mix, using the least stigmatized forms of Creole English combined with Standard English forms. Urban speakers view rural speakers, and Creole English, as backwards and uneducated, which helps to explain why they overwhelmingly used Standard English in the interviews. Conversely, rural speakers in Guyana view urban speakers as untrustworthy, which helps to explain why they choose an identity that links them to other rural speakers. New immigrants to the city face pressures in both directions.

There is nothing that is surprising about this type of data. Linguists have long found speakers to adapt their speech to their situation, and Guyana happens to show a very clear-cut example. However, what is important here is the motivation behind these linguistic choices; attitudes toward one language or another allows for very specific pressure to center around how a person speaks. Rather than speakers finding a common language and accommodating each other, which often happens in register shifts, speakers are choosing to use a language to avoid possible negative attitudes, or to garner positive attitudes, that are held about the language choice.

Identity Negotiation in a Multilingual Context

It is clear that language and identity are intertwined, and many people feel that language connects them to their personal identity group. In a multilingual context, especially one with changing definitions of power and negotiation of public space, this relationship is strengthened. “In the continuum between those poles are territories still in the process of consolidating a cultural hold on their space. For them the path toward asserting identity is self-conscious and often facilitated by legal codification. Language is now often considered the most important

factor in defining who this group is” (Gade, 2003: 429). Although there are many factors that can determine identity, when language and power are in flux, language is often vital to an individual’s identity.

Gade discusses the “scriptoral landscape” of a given area, which is the way that written language presents itself in physical space, and notes that written language is visible proof of the cultural hold on the area. This scriptoral landscape includes official and professionally produced signs, but it also is made up of unofficial linguistic elements such as graffiti, banners, and inscriptions. In this way, while the official language is legally codified, there is a negotiation of space that keeps language in the public consciousness.

Gade studied two cities, a French-speaking city in Canada and a Catalan-speaking city in Spain, and their similarities with the cities that are to be studied in this paper are striking. In each of these cities the majority language of the city is different than that of the country, and that is the first distinction that comes up when discussing other parts of the country. The inhabitants of both of the cities use language to discuss character differences, as “[m]any Catalans describe their group as being better educated and more in tune with the whole of Europe than are other people in Spain. Reference is made to *seny* - a word with no equivalent in Castilian - as a special human quality that incorporates common wisdom and a sense of equilibrium that is claimed as a distinguishing feature of Catalans. Quebecois have frequently seen themselves as more fun loving - the *joie de vivre* metaphor - and less materialistic than English-Canadian” (434). Gade’s study illustrates how, in a multilingual context, characteristics are attributed to language groups and entire cities and regions.

These different characteristics push bilingual speakers to negotiate their identity and use their speech as a way to define who they are. Aneta Pavlenko discusses the way that language

and identity are intertwined, particularly in situations where there is an unequal distribution of power. Negotiated identities, she explains, are those which can be contested by individuals and groups (2003). In a multilingual setting, choice of language can, and often does, project certain attributes about an individual. For those who identify themselves primarily based on language, their use of language reinforces their status as members of the group. For others, language choice helps to project certain characteristics that they wish to attribute to themselves, and is a tool that is used to support their identity, rather than the primary means of identification.

Stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes

Stigma

Stigma can play a strong role in determining how identity is formed, especially when we assume that identity is a social construct. According to Goffman (1963), stigma is a characteristic that is present in an individual that is seen as departing, in a negative way, from the norms of society. One type of stigma, most relevant to our purposes, is tribal; race, nation, and religion, all of which are transmitted genetically and apply equally to all members of a family. Although Goffman does not list language as a specific example of this type of stigma, it fits within his definition, being transmitted through lineages and inflicting families.

Stigma has a negative effect on individuals, and the individual that carries a stigma is often shunned in various ways by other members of society, and that somebody with a stigma is viewed by other members of society as being not quite human. As we negotiate our identity, Goffman argues that people will often try to hide certain aspects of themselves, to minimize the stigma involved.

As Padilla and Perez (2003) point out, stigma varies from one situation to another, as a certain attribute may be normal in one society but a marker of stigma in another. What seems to

be universal about stigmatized attributes, however, is the association of a lack of power with the characteristic; high social standing and power are associated with a much lower risk of stigma.

Stigmatized attributes may be anything from mental handicap to gender, style of dress to religion, as long as the characteristic is associated with powerless in society and a minority standing.

Goffman highlights the importance of the visibility of a particular stigma. If a stigmatized characteristic is apparent to everybody who encounters the individual, this characteristic will hold great importance for the individual. Some examples of these types of stigma are physical handicap or race. A stigma that is immediately available to the rest of society becomes, of course, highly significant to that individual's identity.

There are other stigma, however, that are not readily visible to other members of society. An example of this type of stigma is sexual orientation. In the case of a stigma that is not visible, the individual has two choices, to attempt to "pass," that is, to monitor the way they dress, act, and look in order to hide the stigmatized characteristic from those in society, or, as Padilla points out, "other individuals may actually make a conscious decision to display their stigma by wearing signs or symbols that convey their stigmatized identity or engage in collective manifestations that demonstrate their identity with a stigmatized group (e.g., gay pride parade)" (45-46). While it is immediately clear that visible stigma plays a critical role in the formation of identity, non-visible stigma is critical in a different way; for some, it is the fear of being, as Goffman calls it, "discredited," while for others, it becomes a conscious marker of identity. Language choice can be seen as a type of stigma that is readily available, especially in a monolingual individual, but it can also be something that is hidden, and some speakers of a stigmatized language may simply choose to keep quiet rather than be discredited.

Stigmatized members of society, for the most part, are aware of the negative ideas that are placed upon their group by other members of society, and, for example, immigrant groups may actually rebel against acculturation if they believe that their group is being discriminated against by the majority group (Padilla & Perez, 2003). The existence of stigma, therefore, often increases the amount of resistance between groups, and may make coexistence more difficult.

An additional factor in stigma, discrimination, and identity is the idea of self-esteem. Self-esteem has been found to be tied up with a strong connection to a group. If a group views itself positively in comparison to an outgroup, individual members within the group have higher self-esteem (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). This fits in with the theories above that group membership fosters identity construction, but it also solidifies discrimination and stigmatization: “Collective self-esteem is not just a reaction to positive feelings toward the ingroup but involves a comparison with an outgroup, and the outgroup often loses in the comparison. People give higher ratings to ingroup members than to outgroup members on the same tasks (ingroup favoritism); and focusing on the negative aspects of the outgroup and the positive aspects of the ingroup (which is inherently part of group differentiation) makes ingroup members feel better about their group” (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 521). In other words, the association of an individual with a group can lead to an increase in negative attitudes and stigma of the other group.

Language Discrimination

Stigmatized language groups often face language discrimination; language groups that are the focus of linguistic discrimination may find themselves increasingly stigmatized. Especially in situations where one language is given obvious preferential treatment and preferred status, the stigma becomes more ingrained.

In the past few decades, linguistic rights and linguistic discrimination have been more thoroughly studied by scholars. According to Paulston (1997), the vast majority of works on the subject of linguistic rights have been done since 1979, much of which is either absolutely descriptive and with little attention paid to the consequences of linguistic rights or strongly ideologically biased. Paulston's article attempts to find middle ground, defining linguistic human rights as "derive[ing] from the attempt to link language with human rights, i.e. to re-frame the issues of language rights in terms of human rights, now a generally accepted notion" (76) and discussing the consequences of linguistic human rights.

An interesting point that Paulston makes from the beginning, which is relevant to our purposes, is the tendency of many scholars to discuss linguistic and ethnic groups in terms of minority and majority, although it is better to discuss them in terms of privileged and nonprivileged. The number of speakers of a language may not be indicative of the power that the language group holds.

Paulston describes two different ways that nations' policies tend to take linguistic differences into account: territoriality and personality. With a territoriality principle, the language of the territory is imposed on the entire area. With the personality principle, the individual chooses their own language, and the linguistic policy of each area within a territory more or less reflects the linguistic makeup of that area. There are two basic factors that come into play when determining language policy: environment and goals. If the goals of the nation are perceived as more important than the actual linguistic makeup, the nation is likely to adopt territoriality policies, and vice versa.

In 1996, UNESCO and other non-profits met in Barcelona and designed a "universal declaration of human rights. Article 3 section 2 states:

“This Declaration considers that the collective rights of language groups, may include the following, in addition to the rights attributed to the members of language groups in the foregoing paragraph, and in accordance with the conditions laid down in article 2.2:

- the right for their own language and culture to be taught;
- the right of access to cultural services;
- the right to an equitable presence of their language and culture in the communications media;
- the right to receive attention in their own language from government bodies and in socioeconomic relations” (<http://www.unesco.org/most/lnngo11.htm>, accessed on August 28, 2009).

Although the declaration uses the term “may” with regards to these rights, the basic desire of a linguistic group to have specific access to their language comes across very clearly. This is often reflected in the desire for language choice in schools, official documents, and media.

According to Dunbar (2001), the reasoning behind these types of rights is based on the idea that, as language is fundamental to identity, lack of services in a given language can be seen as an attack on an individual’s sense of self. Further, many who support these types of rights see language diversity as something that is positive in and of itself, and that linguistic diversity should be supported.

Linguistic Stereotypes

Closely tied to the problem of linguistic discrimination and stigma is the use of stereotypes that are created to reflect beliefs about a certain linguistic group. According to Meriam Webster Dictionary, a stereotype is “something conforming to a fixed or general pattern; especially : a standardized mental picture that is held in common by members of a group and that

represents an oversimplified opinion, prejudiced attitude, or uncritical judgment”

(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stereotype>, accessed on 8/29/09).

According to Kunda and Sinclair (1999), social psychologists generally look at two motivations for the creation and propagation of stereotypes: dissonance theory and attribution theory. In dissonance theory, the stereotypes are created to reduce the amount of perceived distance between two groups, and with attribution theory, the stereotypes help to reinforce self-worth of the in-group members. Although Kunda and Sinclair point out that the idea of motivation for stereotypes was not always without controversy, most social psychologists² now believe that stereotypes can be motivated by desires. Furthermore, “for the most part, research on the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning has focused on demonstrating motivated activation and use of cognitive elements, and research has shown that people are especially likely to activate and use those beliefs, concepts, and rules most likely to support their desired conclusion” (Kunda and Sinclair, 13).

Edwards’ 1983 Guyana study (cited above) exemplifies this point, as rural and urban speakers made specific language choices based on the least stigmatized form of Creole or Standard English, depending on their situation; one type of language protected the speakers from being perceived as backwards and uneducated, while another choice presumably increased their trustworthiness. In both cases, the stereotypes about speakers of the other variety of the language allowed for increased distance between the two groups as well as an increased level of self-worth based on the chosen language.

Another example of linguistic stereotypes is found in the Garinagu-speaking area of Belize, where Garinagu speakers carry a stereotype of being lower class and even “savage,”

² See Kunda and Sinclair, pp. 12-14

Spanish speakers are stereotyped as privileged outsiders that are “hotheaded,” and Creole speakers are seen as wealthy and adaptable, and authentically “Belizeans” (Bonner, 2001). Bonner discusses the various stereotypes that exist for the residents of the multilingual town of Dangriga, pointing out that the influx of Spanish-speaking immigrants has increased the motivation and strength of the stereotypes amongst all of the groups. The situation is complicated, as language choice in this area signifies affiliation with a specific group, but also is seen by many as an indicator of more than communication choice.

“Garinagu possess a more secure position within the imaginings of the Belizean nation than do ‘Spanish.’ The precarious nature of Creole status and hegemony, coupled with xenophobic fears of ‘Spanish’ takeover, lead some Creoles to reach out to Garinagu as individuals with whom they share an African heritage. The heightened popularity in Belize and elsewhere of philosophies of the African diaspora, such as Rastafarianism and Afrocentrism, also encourages connections between members of these two groups. However, Garinagu have paid dearly for the possibility of affiliation with Creole Belizean national culture. Optimistically speaking, they have made Creoles their allies, thus forging connections to this other, more powerful local community of the African diaspora. Nonetheless, the price they have paid is the shame that Garifuna youth feel about the use of their native language in multiethnic contexts” (Bonner, 92).

Not surprisingly, Kunda and Sinclair cite several studies that show that people are more likely to apply negative stereotypes to members of other groups when they have, for example, just felt an attack on their self-worth. The example in Belize illustrates this, as negative stereotypes are more strongly applied when outside groups enter the situation, and there is less power and prestige available for everybody.

History of Ukrainian in Ukraine

While the issue of a national language in Ukraine is currently an important subject for nearly all of the inhabitants of Ukraine, history shows that this has been a sensitive issue in Ukraine for centuries. One of the major reasons for this is that Ukraine has had such a troubled past, only emerging from under the rule of other nations in 1991.

Going back centuries, Ukraine has been alternately under the rule of Tatars, Poland, Lithuania, and Russia. Although the relationship between the Ukrainians and their rulers varied, the fact that the Ukrainian language and culture consistently survived various rules speaks to the strength of the Ukrainian people, and their unwillingness to see their way of life destroyed. Czubytyj writes, “By six hundred years of effort to reassert and to rehabilitate themselves in the face of enormous odds, the Ukrainians preserved their nation” (104). There has been a strong drive to keep Ukrainian alive, often associated with patriotism; now that Ukrainian is the state language, the connection of nationalism to Ukrainian heightens tension with Russian speakers. This complicates the issue – it does not boil down to merely a struggle for comprehension or rights, but has been, in some way or another, a part of every Ukrainian’s history.

With the advent of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians were able to speak Ukrainian; originally, Ukrainianization was used under Lenin’s rule as a means to justify Soviet power. In the 1920s, the Communist Party worked within the individual nations to include non-Russians so as to strengthen the party (Liber, 1982). Lenin’s policy on Ukrainian helped to support the language, which allowed for an early revival.

Although the USSR originally strengthened the Ukrainian language, the Russian language was used throughout the USSR as a lingua franca between republics. Because of this, the use of the Russian language was encouraged in Ukraine (Chamberlin, 1945).

“While basic instruction in the non-Russian republics is guaranteed in the local languages, Russian is the official language, and its study as a second language is compulsory in native schools. Moreover, upward mobility - especially in scientific and political arenas - depends on local elites' mastery of the Russian language and cultural norms, while Russians experience little pressure to master the languages of the republics in which they live and work. Shifts in language policy, which may have been intended to promote national integration, were interpreted as efforts at further Russification and have generated severe resistance and even massive demonstrations” (Lapidus, 104).

Even when Ukrainian was recognized under the Soviet Union, there was general governmental pressure for the Soviet people to learn and operate in Russian. This contributed to mixing of the two languages.

The support for Ukrainian under the Soviet Union was short-lived, however, and only the dedication of Ukrainian speakers kept the language alive. During Stalin's reign, the use of Ukrainian was “tatamount to treason” (Petherbridge-Hernandez and Raby, 38); still, the Ukrainian language survived. The political atmosphere only fueled greater emotional connection to the use of language.

After Stalin, the pressure against Ukrainian was more subversive and less overt. Under Khrushchev, Ukrainian schools were allowed, but they were staffed by lower quality teachers and the level of education was inferior to Russian schools. “It was widely accepted that having a Russian-language education increased the chances of entering higher education and getting a better job. Russian schools tended to have better-trained teachers, and entrance examinations were usually in Russian” (Bilaniuk 90). Thus, high levels of education were connected with the use of the Russian language.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the divide between east and west in Ukraine became pronounced. “By 1970 east Ukraine had become more Russified, especially in the cities, but west Ukraine remained loyal to Ukrainian,” (Szporluk, 93). Given the political

situation, the use of language came to symbolize more than communication, but was a political choice – with their utterances, speakers showed a loyalty to their history or a loyalty to the Soviet Union, and effectively took a political stand.

“Extensive data on Ukrainian bilingualism is offered by Yaroslav Bilinsky in his study, based to a large extent on interviews with former Soviet citizens. His evidence reveal a great deal of pressure, subtle and otherwise, in favor of Russian. According to defector testimony, on the eve of World War II, and undoubtedly at present, ‘if an educated Ukrainian in one of the large cities, who was fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian, chose to speak his native language, this was regarded not only as a sign of *mauvais ton*, but as Ukrainian nationalism, an act of political insubordination’” (Ornstein, 13-14).

In spite of the political pressure, Ukrainian managed to survive in villages and amongst nationalists. It is not surprising that certain stereotypes sprung up about Ukrainian speakers, connecting the use of the language with village life and lack of education or strong nationalistic tendencies.

The mixing of the two languages contributed to their similarities; there was a concerted effort by the Soviet Union to “Russify” Ukrainian, in order for the language to sound more like Russian (Bilaniuk, 2005). The efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to Russify Ukrainian contributed to the current similarities between the two languages, and the blurring of the boundaries between linguistic groups, as we saw earlier in the paper, increases a need for social differentiation.

Recently, the issue of language has come into focus as Ukraine gained its independence. In 1989, the Law on Languages made Ukrainian the official language of Ukrainian SSR; in 1990, the USSR declared Russian the official language of the entire Soviet Union. When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, Ukrainian again became the state language, which resulted in a surge of Ukrainian use. When the economy fell apart, however, Ukrainian fell out of favor, and

in 1993, Russian was more widely popular. During the Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukrainian was very strongly tied to national pride, and since then, there has been an upsurge of Ukrainian used, as well as an increase in the positive stereotypes connected to the users of the language (Bilaniuk 2005).

Taken on the surface, the linguistic situation in Ukraine today seems to be simple: approximately half of the country speaks Ukrainian, and half speaks Russian as its native tongue. But coupled with the sociolinguistic values of national identity as well as the history of Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine, it soon becomes clear that the issue is complicated and delicate. Every Ukrainian is touched by this issue; as language is so closely intertwined with identity, it is a very personal matter. Language is shaping the politics of the country, and affecting the way that Ukrainians from all over the country view themselves and each other.

Study methodology

For this study, I traveled to Ukraine during October and November of 2009. I spent approximately two weeks in each of the cities of Kherson, Kyiv, Simferopol', and Kharkov. While each of the cities is primarily Russian speaking, each city has specific demographic characteristics that make its population unique. Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, is a young, vibrant, and liberal city. As it is the political center of the country, it is also the concentration of positive ideology geared towards the Ukrainian language and there is a strong focus on increasing the use of Ukrainian. Simferopol' is the capital of the Crimean region; as Crimea was gifted to Ukraine under Khrushchev, and it houses a large Russian naval center, many Crimeans consider themselves to actually be a part of Russian. Further, Crimea is the only region in Ukraine that is considered an autonomous region rather than an *oblast'*, which means that it is not subject to the same laws as the rest of the country, including some laws on language requirements. Thus,

many in Simferopol' consider themselves to be genetically Russian and are less subject to the positive ideology about Ukrainian. Kharkov, in the far east of Ukraine, is geographically very close to Russia, and the entire region has a very high level of Russian speakers. Kherson, on the other hand, is in the south, and is a Russian-speaking city surrounded by Ukrainian-speaking villages.

Over the course of eight weeks, I collected 101 questionnaires from the respondents in the four cities. I solicited responses from acquaintances and their acquaintances, as well as approaching random people in parks. I chose to use both strategies because gathering questionnaires through acquaintances presented certain biases (such as belonging to the same general social circles or regions of the cities), but approaching random strangers made it impossible to control for variables such as education, and the majority of people who were willing to take questionnaires from a stranger were older women. By gathering questionnaires in two different ways, I was able to mitigate the disadvantages of each method.

The questions on the surveys concerned identity, language use, attitudes, linguistic ideology, language maintenance, and language stereotypes. There was a mixture of multiple choice questions and open-ended questions, and the respondents were encouraged to write additional comments to questions. All of the respondents identified themselves as native speakers of Russian.

Relevant Research Questions

When it comes to the current linguistic situation in Ukraine and the role that identity plays in the situation, there are several research questions that must be addressed. First and foremost, how are Ukrainians currently identifying themselves? In order to understand how identity and language interact, it is critical to understand the way that Russian-speaking

Ukrainians see themselves: primarily based on their language, their ethnicity, or their geographical location. The way that Ukrainians self-identify will be critical in understanding current language attitudes.

Along these same lines, it will be important to understand whether feelings of identity vary depending on demographics. The way that age, region, and gender affect how people identify may reflect not only the way that linguistic policy is affecting different groups of people differently, but also how the situation is changing.

Is there a correlation between identity and language attitudes? If so, what kinds of correlations, why do they exist, and how do they manifest themselves?

Understanding the way that these issues are currently being played out in Ukraine will help to explain the current linguistic situation. There is no doubt that identity is connected to language; exactly how that correlation works in Ukraine is critical to understanding the overall situation.

Hypotheses

Social identity, or the way that identity is constructed for an individual with respect to their status as a member of a group, is useful in understanding the language attitudes that are currently being found in Ukraine. Based on our knowledge of the linguistic situation in Ukraine, we can make several hypotheses about how linguistic attitudes are changing over time.

If the language and identity link is strong in Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine, we should see that language use is connected to other perceived characteristics. In this way, we can expect that the group of Russian speakers in Ukraine expect for Ukrainian speakers to share a perceived set of group characteristics, and people who share those characteristics may choose to speak Ukrainian. Similarly, native speakers of Ukrainian who feel that they have certain

characteristics may choose to speak Russian instead of Ukrainian, and those that speak Russian may be perceived to share certain characteristics.

Although many of the negative attitudes and stereotypes toward Ukrainian no longer have a basis in reality, social identity theory allows us to understand some of the motivation behind these feelings. Russian speakers in Ukraine have found themselves to be a marginalized group, as Ukrainian has gained and maintained status for all official uses. As a result, the identity of Russian speakers as it pertains to the group should be felt more strongly, and perhaps the desire to alienate those from outside groups (i.e., Ukrainian speakers) will become more important in order to maintain a positive group identity. The stereotypes about Ukrainian and Ukrainian speakers have been widely felt for centuries; we expect that the elevation of the status of Ukrainian to the official language, rather than eradicating these stereotypes, has just provided Russian speakers with a stronger need to propagate them.

The ties between the members of the language group, if they reflect those in other similar multilingual situations, will extend beyond the language or even stereotypical characteristics, but we expect a strong association between Russian language speakers and Russia, and an equally strong tie between the use of Ukrainian and Ukrainian nationalism.

It has been nearly 20 years since Ukrainian was made the only official language of Ukraine, and most of today's young adults, even in Russian-speaking regions, have been educated in Ukrainian and have spent much of their lives surrounded by official documents in Ukrainian, politicians speaking only Ukrainian, and much of the media being in Ukrainian. Other adults, on the other hand, experienced a sharp transition, and may not have been fully prepared; they have most likely faced more consequences and we therefore expect them to have stronger reactions toward Ukrainian. Similarly, as Ukrainian gains in strength from west to east,

we expect stronger negative attitudes toward Ukrainian in the eastern areas, and more liberal opinions in central regions.

Thus, there are four hypotheses about how linguistic attitudes are changing in Ukraine:

1) an expectation that individuals suggest that Ukrainian-speaking highlights certain characteristics of its speakers and that speakers of Ukrainian possess certain characteristics because they speak Ukrainian; 2) an expectation that some Russian speakers will perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers; 3) the connection of language to national identity should be strongly felt; and 4) an expectation for different opinions based on age and geographic location. While the majority of Ukrainians are proficient in both Russian and Ukrainian, the results of this study will help to highlight how linguistic policy change can affect the way groups of speakers see each other and themselves.

Research Findings

The surveys, questionnaires, and interviews that were conducted in Ukraine covered a wide range of topics; in this section, analysis is done based on survey questions related to language and identity. Specifically, we will be analyzing questions relating to basis of self-identification and linguistic attitudes, and the correlations between those factors.

Basis of self-identification

Sweeping changes have happened in Ukraine since its independence in 1991. While Soviet citizens were encouraged to think of themselves as part of a unified system, and thus Soviets above all, the question of nationality was relatively straight-forward: everybody over the age of 16 had a passport, and in that passport was the person's nationality, based on ethnicity. After 1991, however, the Ukrainian national passport had no such distinction, and the question of nationality was less official. Thus, there are three main ways in which Ukrainians may currently

identify their nationality: based on their citizenship, their ethnicity, and their language. As we examine the way that Ukrainians identify themselves, one of the most basic and important questions is where the sense of national identity comes from. We have seen that in a bilingual society, language often plays a large role in self-identification; the following data illustrate how recipients responded to questions about where their feelings of national identity come from.

Table 1.1 shows all 101 respondents' answers nationwide to the questions, "How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?" and "How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which nationality is listed in your passport?"

Table 1.1 Overall basis of self-identity (percent)

Region	How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?				How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which nationality is listed in your passport?			
	Strongly connected	Relatively connected	Not connected	Other	Strongly connected	Relatively connected	Not connected	Other
Ukraine	19.8	31.7	46.5	0.0	11.9	26.7	59.4	1.0

Table 1.2 illustrates the 101 respondents' answers to the question "How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?"

Table 1.2 Overall basis of self-identity (percent)

Region	How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?			
	Strongly connected	Relatively connected	Not connected	Other
Ukraine	22.8	37.6	35.6	3.0

From these tables, we can see that more people connect their internal feeling with their geographical location than which language they speak more fluently, and fewer people connect their self-identity with the passport. When we break up the data by region, age, and gender, trends can be established.

Table 1.3 looks at the basis of self-identity based on the questions "How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?" and "How

strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?” broken down by region. The question regarding passport information did not illustrate any clear differences when compared between the respondents from different regions.

Table 1.3: Basis of self-identity by region (percent)

Region	How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?			How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?			
	Strongly connected	Relatively connected	Not connected	Strongly connected	Relatively connected	Not connected	Other
Kherson	26.7	30.0	43.3	23.3	40.0	36.7	0.0
Kyiv	11.5	30.8	53.8	38.5	50.0	7.7	3.8
Kharkov	24.2	27.3	45.5	15.2	24.2	54.5	3.0
Simferopol	8.3	50.0	41.7	8.3	41.7	41.7	8.3

Looking at the information by region, we see that those in the highly concentrated Russian-speaking areas are much more likely to connect their self-identity to the Russian language, whereas in Kyiv, internal feelings of self-identity are much more likely to be connected to the fact that they live in Ukraine. Kherson citizens, while likely to connect their self-identity to their native Russian, also report connections to their geography in greater numbers than those from Kharkov or Simferopol.

The breakdown of these questions by age is critical to understanding the changes that are happening within Ukraine. As we saw in the research hypotheses, it is my contention that a shift is happening, wherein people within the Soviet Union primarily identified themselves based on language, but now, there is an upsurge in patriotism and a connection is being made between the Ukrainian language and national pride; thus, looking at the following questions by age perhaps allows us to understand the mechanism for changing attitudes of Russian speakers toward Ukrainian and its speakers. Table 1.4 looks at the answers to the questions “How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?” and “How

strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?”

broken down by age group.

Table 1.4 Basis of self-identity by age (percent)

Age group	How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to which language you speak better?			How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine?			
	Strongly connected	Relatively connected	Not connected	Strongly connected	Relatively connected	Not connected	Other
18-35	14.8	31.5	51.9	12.6	50.0	31.5	3.7
45-80	25.7	31.4	40.0	34.3	22.9	42.9	0.0

When comparing these charts, we see that the younger generation is more likely to connect self-identity with living in Ukraine, while the older generation is more likely to connect self-identity to language.

Although gender can be an important factor in self-identification, the breakdown of the data according to gender in these questions, as well as for the majority of the data, did not reveal any noticeable differences. For the rest of the study, gender will only be discussed when the responses illustrate a clear difference between the genders.

To sum up, there are a variety of ways that Ukrainians currently identify themselves, with the two most important characteristics being language and geography. The respondents of these questionnaires were all native Russian speakers, and all lived in Ukraine. However, some of the respondents felt a stronger connection to their native Russian than the fact that they live in Ukraine, while others strongly connected their identity to their geographic location. Generally speaking, those in areas with a high concentration of Russian speakers and older respondents were more likely to identify based on their native Russian, while those in Kyiv and younger respondents were more likely to identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine.

Self-identification

Because self-identification may be based on a number of factors in Ukraine, it was critical for the survey to be designed in a way that would make it possible to understand not simply the way that people identify based on their own internal feelings, but also the way they identify themselves to others, showing a complex picture of identity formation from above and within, at the collective and individual level. As we have seen in this paper, identity is incredibly complicated, and understanding the way that people identify themselves both internally and externally, officially and unofficially, will help us to understand how these factors interact and create a sense of identity.

The first question to ask, then, is how people identify themselves – as Russian, Ukrainian, or other. Table 1.5 illustrates the answers of all 101 respondents throughout Ukraine to the questions “When people ask, ‘who are you?’ whom do you identify yourself as?” and “How do you feel internally?”

Table 1.5 Overall national identity (percent)

Region	When people ask, “who are you?” whom do you identify yourself as?			How do you feel internally?			
	Russian	Ukrainian	Other	Russian	Ukrainian	Russian and Ukrainian	Other
Ukraine	17.8	70.3	9.9	18.8	43.6	32.7	5.0

Table 1.6 gives the answer from all 101 respondents in the study to the question, “In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?”

Table 1.6 Overall change in internal feelings (percent)

Region	In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?			
	I felt more strongly Russian	I felt more strongly Ukrainian	I began to wonder more about who I am in this country	No
Ukraine	4.0	24.8	23.8	37.6

Based on these findings, the majority of people identify as Ukrainian when asked, but nearly a third feel internally that they are both Russian and Ukrainian. Nearly half of the participants

stated that their identification did not change after the fall of the Soviet Union, but approximately 25% felt more strongly Ukrainian, and another 25% began to wonder more about their place in the newly independent country.

The overall information can give us an idea of the big picture in terms of self-identity on a national level, but one of the most important breakdowns in terms of the data is the way that perceptions of identity differ geographically. Table 1.7 illustrates the responses to the questions, “When people ask, ‘who are you?’ whom do you identify yourself as?” and “How do you feel internally?” separated by region.

Table 1.7 National identity by region (percent)

Region	When people ask, “who are you?” whom do you identify yourself as?			How do you feel internally?			
	Russian	Ukrainian	Other	Russian	Ukrainian	Russian and Ukrainian	Other
Kherson	10.0	86.7	3.3	13.3	53.3	30.0	3.3
Kyiv	7.7	73.1	19.2	7.7	57.7	26.9	7.7
Kharkov	30.3	63.7	6.1	30.3	27.3	39.4	3.0
Simferopol	33.3	41.7	25.0	25.0	33.3	33.3	8.3

Table 1.8 shows the answer to the question, “In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?”, broken down by region.

Table 1.8 Regional change in internal feeling (percent)

Region	In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?			
	I felt more strongly Russian	I felt more strongly Ukrainian	I began to wonder more about who I am in this country	No
Kherson	3.3	16.7	33.3	43.3
Kyiv	7.7	38.5	19.2	26.9
Kharkov	3.0	21.2	18.2	42.4
Simferopol	0.0	25.0	25.0	33.3

In this data, we can see some interesting trends shaping up. First, those who are in the highly-concentrated Russian speaking areas are more likely to identify as Russian than those in Kyiv and Kherson. These trends are true both for how people identify themselves when asked by outsiders, and in terms of internal identification. Approximately the same percentage of people identify themselves as both Russian and Ukrainian in all four regions.

Of all of the regions, those from Kyiv are most likely to feel more strongly Ukrainian after the fall of the Soviet Union, with few people from any region expressing a stronger feeling of Russian identity. Those in Kherson were most likely to wonder about their place in the country, with approximately 1/3 of the Kherson respondents choosing this answer. For all of the regions except Kyiv, the majority of the respondents answered that their self-identification had not changed since independence.

It is also important to look at the way that the data breaks down by age. Many of the respondents never held a Soviet passport; some of them have never known anything other than Ukrainian as the official language. Looking at the data by age will help us to understand if and how the situation is changing. Table 1.9 gives the responses to the questions, “When people ask, ‘who are you?’ whom do you identify yourself as?” and “How do you feel internally?”, broken down by age:

Table 1.9 National identity by age (percent)

Age group	When people ask, “who are you?” whom do you identify yourself as?			How do you feel internally?			
	Russian	Ukrainian	Other	Russian	Ukrainian	Russian and Ukrainian	Other
18-35	11.1	77.8	11.1	20.4	44.4	29.6	5.6
45-80	28.6	65.7	5.7	14.3	45.7	40.0	0.0

Table 1.10 illustrates the answer to the question “In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?”, broken down by age group:

Table 1.10 Change in internal feelings by age (percent)

Age group	In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?			
	I felt more strongly Russian	I felt more strongly Ukrainian	I began to wonder more about who I am in this country	No
18-35	1.9	20.4	20.4	38.9
45-80	5.7	28.6	22.9	42.9

In this data, younger people are much more likely to identify themselves as Ukrainian than older people, and older people are more likely to identify themselves as Russian than

younger people. However, when it comes to how the respondents feel internally, many young people still feel that they are Russian, and the older generation is more likely to feel both Russian and Ukrainian. Similarly, it was the older generation that felt more strongly Ukrainian after Ukrainian independence.

Linguistic attitudes

Everything that we have seen in this paper about the correlations between identity and social attitudes and stereotypes would suggest that, for those Russian speakers who connect their identity to language, negative attitudes toward Ukrainian would permeate the population, and for those who connect their identity to geography, more positive attitudes toward Ukrainian would appear.

Table 1.11 illustrates the respondents' opinion about the Ukrainian language. This was solicited by two different questions: "What is your opinion on Ukrainian?" and "When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:" with the options of "sounds pretty," "melodic," "sounds ugly," and "rude." Since multiple answers were possible, the numbers may add up to over 100%.

Table 1.11 Overall linguistic attitudes (percent)

Region	What is your opinion on Ukrainian?				When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:			
	It's a dialect of Russian	It is its own language	It's a language that lost a lot during the years under Soviet rule and came back as a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian	Other	Sounds pretty	Melodic	Sounds ugly	Rude
Ukraine	5.0	66.3	18.8	8.9	62.4	21.8	7.9	8.9

Table 1.12 gives the answers to the question "When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:" collapsed into positive and negative responses ("sounds pretty" and "melodic" are considered positive, "sounds ugly" and "rude" are considered negative).

Table 1.12 Overall impression of Ukrainian (percent)

When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:	

Region	Positive	Negative
Ukraine	84.2	16.8

As we can see, throughout Ukraine, people generally believe that Ukrainian is its own language, and are much more likely to have positive associations with the sounds of the Ukrainian language than negative associations. This is not necessarily true for all subsets of society, however; breaking down the data by geography, age, and basis of self-identity will show a more complex picture.

Table 1.13 shows the answers to the questions, “What is your opinion on Ukrainian?” and “When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:” broken down by region.

Table 1.13: Language attitudes by region (percent):

Region	What is your opinion on Ukrainian?				When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:			
	It's a dialect of Russian	It is its own language	It's a language that lost a lot during the years under Soviet rule and came back as a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian	Other	Sounds pretty	Melodic	Sounds ugly	Rude
Kherson	3.3	63.3	33.3	0.0	40.0	30.0	13.3	20.0
Kyiv	3.8	84.6	7.7	3.8	88.5	15.4	3.8	0.0
Kharkov	9.1	48.5	18.2	21.2	63.6	18.2	6.1	6.1
Simferopol	0.0	83.3	8.3	8.3	58.3	25.0	8.3	8.3

Table 1.14 gives the answers to the question “When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:” collapsed into positive and negative responses (“sounds pretty” and “melodic” are considered positive, “sounds ugly” and “rude” are considered negative).

Table 1.14 Regional impressions of Ukrainian (percent)

	When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:	
	Positive	Negative
Kherson	70.0	33.3
Kyiv	103.9	3.8
Kharkov	81.8	12.2
Simferopol	83.3	16.6

Not surprisingly, those in Kyiv were more likely to answer that Ukrainian is its own language, and that it is phonetically beautiful; Kyivans were more likely to have positive feelings about Ukrainian in general. Those from Kherson were also likely to see Ukrainian as its own

language, but had a more negative impression of Ukrainian than the respondents from any of the other cities. Simferopol respondents had generally positive attitudes toward Ukrainian; those from Kharkov were the least likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, but had generally positive feelings about the way Ukrainian sounds.

Looking at language attitudes by age will help us to fully understand the way that linguistic attitudes are changing over time, and with different levels of experience. Table 1.15 shows the answers to the above questions broken down by age group.

Table 1.15 Language attitudes by age (percent)

Age group	What is your opinion on Ukrainian?				When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:			
	It's a dialect of Russian	It is its own language	It's a language that lost a lot during the years under Soviet rule and came back as a mixture between Russian and Ukrainian	Other	Sounds pretty	Melodic	Sounds ugly	Rude
18-35	1.9	72.2	18.5	5.6	72.2	20.4	9.3	0.0
45-80	8.6	51.4	22.9	17.1	42.9	25.7	8.6	22.9

Table 1.15 shows that the younger age bracket is more likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, whereas those respondents aged 45-80 are more likely to see Ukrainian as something else, whether it is a dialect of Russian, a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, or “other.”

Table 1.16 collapses the answer to the above question into positive and negative responses (“sounds pretty” and “melodic” are considered positive, “sounds ugly” and “rude” are considered negative).

Table 1.16 Impressions of Ukrainian by age (percent)

Age group	When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:	
	Positive	Negative
18-35	92.6	9.3
45-80	68.6	31.5

In this table, it is clear that the younger age group has more positive impressions about Ukrainian, whereas the older age group is more likely to report negative impressions of Ukrainian.

In Table 1.17, the data is examined based on self-identification; the first group is those that strongly identify based on the language that they speak best, and the second group is made up of those that strongly self-identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine; the table shows the answers to the questions “What is your opinion on Ukrainian?” and “When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:”.

Figure 1.17: Language attitudes by self-identification (percent):

Basis of self-identity	What is your opinion on Ukrainian?				When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:			
	It's a dialect of Russian	It is its own language	It's a language that lost a lot during the years under Soviet rule and came back as a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian	Other	Sounds pretty	Melodic	Sounds ugly	Rude
Language	20.0	55.0	15.0	10.0	55.0	35.0	5.0	10.0
Geography	0.0	82.6	17.4	0.0	73.9	30.4	0.0	8.7

In Table 1.17, we see that those who define themselves by geography are much more likely to consider Ukrainian to be its own language, whereas those who identify themselves based on their native language are more likely to consider Ukrainian something other than its own language.

Table 1.18 combines the answers to the question on the perception of Ukrainian by the above two groups of respondents.

Table 1.18 Impressions of Ukrainian by self-identification (percent)

Basis of self-identity	When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:	
	Positive	Negative
Language	90	15
Geography	104.3	8.7

In Table 1.18, it is clear that those that identify primarily by geography are slightly more likely to have positive feelings about Ukrainian than those who identify primarily by language, who are more likely to have negative impressions of Ukrainian.

In sum, the data from this section illustrate that there is a correlation between linguistic attitudes, geographic region, age group, and basis of self-identity. Those that are from Kyiv and in the younger age group are much more likely to view Ukrainian positively; similarly, those that identify themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are much more likely to have positive perceptions about Ukrainian and those that speak it. Conversely, those that are in highly Russian speaking regions, older respondents, and those that identify themselves based on their native Russian language are much more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Ukrainian and its speakers.

Stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian speakers

The final category that will be examined in this paper is that of language attitudes and stereotypes. Table 1.19 looks at the respondents' answers to the questions "Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian?" and, of those who responded yes, "Do you believe these stereotypes?"

Table 1.19 Overall stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers (percent):

Region	Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian?		Do you believe these stereotypes?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Ukraine	27.7	62.4	42.9	46.4

As we can see in the above table, a large percentage of people throughout Ukraine have responded that they do not know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian; however, of those who know of stereotypes, roughly half of the respondents believe in them.

Table 1.20 shows the respondents' answers to the question, "Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Russian?" and, of those who answered yes, "Do you believe these stereotypes?"

Table 1.20 Overall stereotypes about Russian speakers (percent)

Region	Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Russian?		Do you believe these stereotypes?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Ukraine	16.8	73.3	41.2	52.9

The table above shows that many fewer people admit to knowing stereotypes about Russian speakers than not, and fewer than half of those who know these stereotypes believe in them.

As with the previous sections, the overall data is important to understand, but breaking it down amongst various demographics will help us to fully understand the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine. Table 1.21 shows the answers to the questions, "Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian?" and, of those who answered yes, "Do you believe these stereotypes?" broken down by region.

Table 1.21: Stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers by region (percent):

Region	Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian?		Do you believe these stereotypes?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Kherson	40.0	53.3	58.3	41.7
Kyiv	23.1	76.9	66.7	16.7
Kharkov	21.2	60.6	42.9	42.9
Simferopol	25.0	58.3	33.3	33.3

As seen in the table above, respondents from Kyiv are less likely to know stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, but of those who know of stereotypes, they are the most likely to believe in the stereotypes. Those from Kherson are most likely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, and fairly likely to believe in them. Kharkov and Simferopol respondents were approximately equally unlikely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, and were neither likely nor unlikely to believe in the stereotypes.

Table 1.22 shows the responses to the questions, “Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Russian?” and, of those who answered yes, “Do you believe these stereotypes?” broken down by region.

Table 1.22 Stereotypes about Russian speakers by region (percent)

Region	Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Russian?		Do you believe these stereotypes?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Kherson	16.7	76.7	80.0	20.0
Kyiv	19.2	80.8	0.0	80.0
Kharkov	15.2	63.6	20.0	60.0
Simferopol	16.7	66.7	100.0	0.0

As is seen in the table above, respondents from all four regions were approximately equally likely to admit to knowing stereotypes about Russian speakers (or, more accurately, admit to not knowing such stereotypes), but those from Kherson and Simferopol were much more likely to believe these stereotypes than those from Kyiv and Kharkov.

Table 1.23 shows the answers to the questions, “Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian?” and, of those who answered yes, “Do you believe these stereotypes?” broken down by age group.

Table 1.23 Stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers by age (percent)

Age group	Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian?		Do you believe these stereotypes?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
18-35	24.1	63.0	46.2	53.8
45-80	34.3	60.0	41.7	41.7

As seen in the table above, older respondents were more likely to admit to knowing stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, and were equally split as to whether they believe in the stereotypes or not; younger respondents were less likely to know stereotypes, and were less likely to believe in them.

Table 1.24 shows the responses to the questions, “Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Russian?” and, of those who answered yes, “Do you believe these stereotypes?” broken down by age.

Table 1.24 Stereotypes about Russian speakers by age (percent)

Age group	Do you know any stereotypes about people who speak only Russian?		Do you believe these stereotypes?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
18-35	20.4	70.4	45.5	45.5
45-80	11.4	77.1	25.0	50.0

In these charts, we can see that young people are both more likely to know stereotypes about Russian speakers than older people are, and they are considerably more likely to believe them.

While the majority of the respondents overall did not have knowledge of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers or Russian speakers, when respondents were asked to indicate attributes that they felt Ukrainian-only speakers had, the answers were quite different. For this question, respondents were given the option of marking multiple options; specific stereotypes were provided. A few individual respondents marked every answer, and a few left the answer blank, but the majority marked either positive or negative stereotypes. Table 1.25 gives all the respondents’ answer to the question, “What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible.”

Table 1.25 Overall attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

Region	What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible						
	Illiterate	Uncultured	Simple	Nationalistic	Literate	Cultured	Intellectual
Ukraine	5.0	5.0	22.8	53.5	33.7	22.8	12.9

Table 1.26 combines the negative answers to the above question (illiterate, uncultured, simple) and positive answers (literate, cultured, intellectual) combined. Nationalistic could be seen as either positive or negative, so it remains separate.

Table 1.26 Overall attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

	What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don't speak Russian? Multiple answers possible		
Region	Negative	Nationalistic	Positive
Ukraine	32.8	53.5	69.4

Overall, more respondents feel positively about people who only speak Ukrainian than negatively, and a significant percentage of respondents believe that those who speak Ukrainian and not Russian are nationalistic.

Table 1.27 illustrates the answers to the question, “What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don't speak Russian? Multiple answers possible,” broken down by region.

Table 1.27 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

	What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don't speak Russian? Multiple answers possible						
Region	Illiterate	Uncultured	Simple	Nationalistic	Literate	Cultured	Intellectual
Kherson	3.3	0.0	30.0	50.0	36.7	16.7	10.0
Kyiv	11.5	11.5	11.5	50.0	50.0	30.8	34.6
Kharkov	3.0	6.1	30.0	54.5	21.2	21.2	6.1
Simferopol	0.0	0.0	8.3	75.0	25.0	25.0	0.0

Table 1.28 combines the answers given in Table 1.27, with “illiterate,” “uncultured,” and “simple” considered negative responses, “literate,” “cultured,” and “intellectual,” considered positive responses, and “nationalistic” left as its own category, as it could be considered either negative or positive.

Table 1.28 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

	What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don't speak Russian? Multiple answers possible		
Region	Negative	Nationalistic	Positive
Kherson	33.3	50.0	63.4
Kyiv	34.5	50.0	115.4
Kharkov	39.1	54.5	48.5
Simferopol	8.3	75.0	50

Table 1.28 shows that respondents from Kyiv have much stronger positive feelings about those who speak Ukrainian than respondents from the other regions, which have are nearly equal in

their responses, although those from Kherson are slightly more likely to feel positively about those who speak only Ukrainian. Simferopol respondents are the least likely to report negative characteristics that they attribute to Ukrainian speakers, with the other three regions being relatively similar. Those in Simferopol are also more likely than respondents from other regions to report that they believe Ukrainian speakers are nationalistic respondents from the other three regions.

Table 1.29 gives the answers to the question “What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible,” broken down between age groups.

Table 1.29 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?							
Multiple answers possible							
Age group	Illiterate	Uncultured	Simple	Nationalistic	Literate	Cultured	Intellectual
18-35	1.9	3.7	29.6	55.6	37.0	40.7	18.5
45-80	11.4	8.6	17.1	48.6	28.6	8.6	5.7

Table 1.30 combines the answers given in Table 1.29, with “illiterate,” “uncultured,” and “simple” considered negative responses, “literate,” “cultured,” and “intellectual,” considered positive responses, and “nationalistic” left as its own category, as it could be considered either negative or positive.

Table 1.30 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?			
Multiple answers possible			
Age group	Negative		Positive
18-35	35.2		96.2
45-80	37.1		42.9

As we can see in Table 1.30, approximately the same amount of younger as older respondents attribute negative characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, and there is very little difference in the percentage of respondents who consider Ukrainian speakers to be nationalistic; however, those

who are between 18-35 are much more likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian speakers than those who are 45-80 years of age.

As with previous sections, language attitudes when broken down by gender show no noticeable difference in most of the questions. However, there was a difference in the answers to the question, “What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?” Table 1.31 shows the answers to this question, split between male and female respondents.

Table 1.31 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

	What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?						
	Multiple answers possible						
Gender	Illiterate	Uncultured	Simple	Nationalistic	Literate	Cultured	Intellectual
Male	5.7	0.0	25.7	48.6	31.4	25.7	11.4
Female	4.5	7.6	21.2	56.1	34.8	21.2	38.5

Table 1.32 collapses the data in Table 1.31 between positive responses, negative responses, and “nationalistic,” which can be considered either positive or negative.

Table 1.32 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

	What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian?		
	Multiple answers possible		
Gender	Negative	Nationalistic	Positive
Male	31.4	48.6	68.5
Female	33.3	56.1	94.5

Table 1.32 shows that, while men and women are equally likely to attribute negative characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, women are much more likely to attribute positive characteristics than men are, and slightly more likely to believe that Ukrainian-only speakers are nationalistic.

Table 1.33 shows the answer to the question, “What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don’t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible,” broken down by basis of self-identification.

Table 1.33 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

	What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don't speak Russian?						
	Multiple answers possible						
Basis of self-identity	Illiterate	Uncultured	Simple	Nationalistic	Literate	Cultured	Intellectual
Language	10.0	20.0	30.0	75.0	30.0	20.0	10.0
Geography	0.0	0.0	26.1	39.1	52.2	30.4	26.1

As is seen in Table 1.33, each of the first three categories (negative responses) is more widely believed by those who identify themselves based on their native Russian language, and each of the last three categories (positive responses) is more widely believed by those who identify themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine.

Table 1.34 collapses the data from Table 1.33 into negative and positive responses, along with “nationalistic,” which can be considered either positive or negative.

Table 1.34 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)

	What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don't speak Russian? Multiple answers possible		
Basis of self-identity	Negative	Nationalistic	Positive
Language	60.0	75.0	60.0
Geography	26.1	39.1	108.7

Table 1.34 shows that those who identify primarily based on geography are much more likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, while those who identify themselves primarily based on their native Russian language are much more likely to attribute negative characteristics to Ukrainian speakers. There is also a large difference in the number of respondents who view Ukrainian-only speakers as nationalistic; those who identify themselves primarily based on language are much more likely to see Ukrainian speakers as nationalistic.

To summarize, while most respondents did not claim to know stereotypes about those who spoke only Russian or Ukrainian, when given possible stereotypes to choose from, we were able to see specific trends with regards to attitudes about Ukrainian and its speakers.

Specifically, those from Kyiv, younger respondents, women, and those who connected their self-

identity to the fact that they live in Ukraine were far more likely to hold positive views of Ukrainian and its speakers than their counterparts; negative responses were much more equally distributed. Across the board, the idea of a pure language was held up as a higher standard than any mixtures between Russian and Ukrainian.

General Discussion

Identity is comprised of many factors, and is constantly being negotiated. According to the social identity theory, one of the most critical ways that individuals define themselves is by the group that they are a part of, as well as by the group of which they are not a part. In Ukraine, many of the people generally share the same religion, the same general ethnic background, and the same cultural customs. However, there is one marker that separates the country into two very distinct groups: language. Although most Ukrainians are bilingual, the mother tongue of a region has come to symbolize not simply the preferred method of communication, but it also brings to mind the politics of the region, as well as many of the perceived characteristics of the speakers. This paper, and the survey questions analyzed, help to show us how identity and language interact in Ukraine, how various linguistic attitudes are playing out throughout the country, and how it is reflected on different groups of people. In this section, we will discuss the implications of the research, as it pertains to the changing basis of identity in Ukraine, and the implications such identification has for the different groups within the country, including linguistic attitudes and stereotypes.

Basis of self-identity:

One of the most important factors in understanding the current linguistic situation in Ukraine is the basis of self-identification. Because of several reasons, the basis of self-identity in Ukraine is complicated. National identity under Soviet rule was dictated from above in the form

of a passport feature; on the other hand, language has been shown to be closely tied to national identity, and since independence, there has been an upswing in nationalism tied to the idea of living in Ukraine. Thus, understanding how and why people are identifying helps to explain all other connections between language attitudes and identity.

The findings reported in this paper show that overall, in Ukraine, there is a tendency for people to connect their own self-identification with the fact that they live in Ukraine, rather than their native tongue or their passport status. This gives us a good impression of the current situation, as Ukrainian national pride has been strongly supported, especially since the Orange Revolution of 2004, and where nationality has not been marked in passports since the fall of the Soviet Union. As the majority of respondents did not feel a connection between self-identification and the nationality listed in their passport, language and connection to Ukraine are the most critical factors in identity formation and negotiation in Ukraine today.

Taking this into account, different demographic groups base their self-identity on these two factors (language and geography) in different ways. As we have seen earlier in the paper, identity is complex, negotiable, and fluid; hence, these factors vary amongst individuals and throughout different groups. In Ukraine, the two clearest demographic indicators that affect how individuals form and negotiate their identity are age and region within Ukraine.

Generational differences are seen throughout the world, and it is no surprise that they come into play in Ukraine, where the social, economic, and political world has changed enormously over the past thirty years: the younger generation is in an entirely different country than the one in which the older generation came of age. As Padilla and Perez pointed out, social identity theory tells us that an individual's behavior reflects their society. The society of the youth today is vastly different than that in which the older generation formed their identities.

One of the key components of social identity theory is that individuals play up the characteristics of their social group while viewing out-group members in a more negative light in order to build their own self-esteem and gain a strong sense of identity. For the youth in Ukraine, the defining groups have shifted significantly. In the Soviet Union, at least in theory, all members of the Soviet Union were part of one large group, and the use of the Russian language helped to cement the ties of this group, as did the out-group comparisons to the west during the Cold War. Soviet citizens were able to form their identity against those who were different; at least one aspect that could be used to determine outsiders from insiders was language. In this way, the older generation in Ukraine had a vested interest in building their identity based on their language, and perpetrating negative stereotypes about those who spoke differently (in this case, those who spoke Ukrainian).

On the other hand, the younger generation is part of an entirely different social group. Ukraine as a country has long been associated with Russia, all the way back to Kyivan Rus', and the independence of the country requires a symbolic separation from Russia. The younger generation, thus, has a new social group which defines itself in opposition to Russia. The younger generation has a strong incentive to build their identity based on their geographic location rather than language: their geographic location allows them to be a part of a strong, nationalistic, independent Ukraine, whereas basing their identity on their native Russian language ties them more closely to the outgroup, Russia.

In both of these situations, the Ukrainians were able to maintain their uniqueness in the world in opposition to the outgroup, while supporting a sense of belonging to their ingroup. Thus, the changing basis of identity for these groups is not simply an individual phenomenon, but instead, a reflection of the vast changes that have occurred in the country.

In a similar way, geographic location within the country has a large impact on the way that individuals form and negotiate their identity. In some parts of Ukraine, such as Simferopol and Kharkov, the ties to Russia are still very strong, with many citizens having relatives in Russia and with frequent travel back and forth to Russia. Because of this, the ingroup for many in those regions is actually not Ukraine, but Russia. For the same reasons as seen above, these individuals have a strong incentive to identify therefore on the basis of their language, which they share with their neighbors to the east, as opposed to the fact that they live in Ukraine, which alienates them from the other members of their ingroup. In Kyiv, however, the political center is built on Ukrainian independence, and all official business is centered on Ukraine. Thus, the citizens in Kyiv have a stronger interest in forming identity based on the fact that they live in Ukraine, which ties them to Ukrainians, as opposed to their native Russian, which ties them to their particular outgroup (Russia).

Looking at the negotiation of identity for different demographic groups in Ukraine helps to paint a bigger picture about how the social, economic, and political situation is affecting individuals. Identity negotiation and formation for different age groups suggests that there is a large shift occurring in the country over the course of time, with the ingroup of the younger generation being tied to the newly independent country and opposed to Russia, whereas the older generation's social group was tied to the rest of the Soviet Union. Likewise, geographically, we can see a change sweeping across the nation from west to east, with the more western and central regions connecting themselves to the newly independent country, and the eastern regions being part of an ingroup that is connected to Russia.

Once it is clear what social group a certain demographic is likely to align themselves with, the identity formation and negotiation falls into place as expected by social identity theory,

and the positive and negative attitudes that arise about the Ukrainian language and its speakers are exactly what we might expect: those who see themselves first and foremost as part of the independent, strong, nationalistic Ukraine perpetrate positive stereotypes and attitudes, and those who connect themselves to Russia are much more likely to view those who speak Ukrainian as members of an outgroup, and to hold negative viewpoints accordingly.

Self-Identity

Now that we understand why people are identifying themselves in the way that they do, it is useful to take a closer look at how people identify, in terms of nationality. Throughout the nation, respondents were overwhelmingly more likely to identify themselves to others as Ukrainian, whereas internally, there is a lot more room to negotiate, with respondents splitting their answers between Ukrainian, Russian, and Ukrainian and Russian.

As we have seen earlier in the paper, a multilingual setting allows for and even encourages a somewhat fluid sense of identity. Gade's 2003 study showed that the "scriptural landscape" in a multilingual setting keeps language in the public consciousness, and this is absolutely true in Ukraine today, especially in regions with a Russian-speaking majority. While day-to-day business, family life, conversations between friends, and nearly all other personal interactions take place in Russian, the written environment, by law, is nearly completely Ukrainian, and the media is some of each, with many television channels showing Russian programs with Ukrainian subtitles. Because of this, it is always in the forefront of many native Russian speakers' minds that they are on one hand Ukrainian and therefore connected to the country, and on the other hand alienated somewhat from the official discourse.

This kind of fluid self-identity is seen especially amongst demographic groups that are caught between two worlds. Identity is being imposed on all Ukrainians from above, connecting

language and nationalism, and providing many with a strong incentive to identify as Ukrainian first and foremost. It is also felt by native Russian speakers from below, providing an incentive to identify as Russian. Regionally speaking, Kharkov is quite close to Russia, and Simferopol has a very strong Russian past; while speakers from these regions certainly feel the pressure from above to identify as Ukrainian, their Russian identity has a solid base. Kyiv, on the other hand, is the political center, and even if private discourse is in Russian, public conversations, business transactions, and workplaces are often Ukrainian-speaking. In Kyiv, we saw the fewest respondents identifying either internally or externally as solely Russian.

Pavlenko (2003) discusses this when she talks about negotiating identity in multilingual settings; in a situation where identity is truly fluid, and there are options, choice of language signifies an individual's desire to belong to a group, based on certain characteristics, or to play up characteristics in themselves that are associated with that group. Because of this, there is often a difference in the way that individuals identify themselves internally and externally. Externally, respondents from all regions use their Ukrainian national identification as a way to highlight their feelings of national pride, whereas internally, they may feel more strongly Russian.

Kherson is a Russian-speaking city surrounded by Ukrainian-speaking villages. It has neither a strong connection to Russia nor important political connections. The national identity of those in Kherson is the most vulnerable of all of the regions. Interestingly, Kherson's respondents defined themselves to others as solely Ukrainian more than any other region, including Kyiv. Internally, they also self-identified at a high level as either Ukrainian or Ukrainian and Russian. This is interesting, given the history of the region as a Russian-speaking stronghold. However, if we look back to the way that Smith (1991) views national identity

through the lens of social constructionism, it is not surprising to see respondents from Kherson identifying strongly as Ukrainian. As we have seen above, their identity is in a vulnerable position, politically and geographically, and Smith's "need for community" places a greater need on Kherson residents to find that community. As the bases of self-identification become shaken, the members of the community risk more by being ambivalent about the community to which they belong; thus there is more pressure to adhere to specific communities.

This vulnerability is shown in the way that respondents report changes after the fall of the Soviet Union. Although a few respondents in Kyiv felt more strongly Russian, Kyivans were much more likely to report that they felt more strongly Ukrainian, perhaps as a result of the very rapid change of official business to Ukrainian. Khersonians are the most likely of any respondents to feel confused about their place in the country; this is not a region with an inherent connection to either Russian or Ukrainian identity, so confusion is more likely here. As noted above, though, this confusion indicates a vulnerable situation, and leads to more people clinging to the identity that is imposed from above.

When it comes to the difference between self-identification and age groups, we see that younger people are more likely to identify themselves to others as Ukrainian, but when it comes to internal feelings, the 18-35 year olds were much more split than the older group. Much like the data from Kherson, this is most likely an indication of changing times and the vulnerability of the youth. They are pressured from above to feel a national pride and identify as Ukrainian, but geographically and linguistically, many of them feel strong connections to Russian, as well. Thus, social constructionist theory lets us see this in terms of what each group of respondents is receiving from and giving to the community; on the surface, and to outsiders, it is increasingly important for young people to identify as Ukrainian in order to conform to the pressure of

society. However, the fluidity of identity and the importance of language and immediate social circles can push them in the opposite direction.

When we look at the data about changes since the fall of the Soviet Union, there was not a large discrepancy between the younger and the older respondents. Those aged 45-80 were more likely to feel more strongly Russian, more strongly Ukrainian, and more confused; this makes a lot of sense once you take into account the fact that many of the younger respondents had not fully formed their identity when the Soviet Union fell (the oldest members of that group being only 17), and therefore, they were less likely to feel any sort of change, or report on it in the survey.

Summary of discussion on identity

As we saw earlier in the paper, identity is incredibly complicated, and involves a myriad of factors. Social constructionist theory allows us to look at the way that society shapes identity both from above and from within, and when we look at the data from the surveys, that is precisely what we see happening in Ukraine. On the surface, there are pockets of relatively stable identification, whether geographically, politically, or in terms of age. Scratching below the surface, however, we see that certain subsets of Ukraine are becoming more vulnerable to questions of identity, based on pressures both from above and from within. We have seen that identity in a multilingual context is constantly being negotiated, and Ukraine illustrates this point quite well.

The data shows us that, in general, those who are living in Kyiv are more pro-Ukrainian (both as a language and as a nation), as are those who are between the ages of 18 and 35. We have also seen that those who are living in Kharkov and Simferopol, long seen as Russian strongholds, are more likely to identify as Russian, to connect their identity to their native

Russian tongue, and be less affected by the pressure from the state to feel strongly nationalistic. We see the same with the older group, ages 45-80. We also see, however, that in the vulnerable geographic area of Kherson, identity is much more confusing and fluid; younger people, too, are likely to feel pulled in multiple directions. This is likely a direct result of their changing position (politically, geographically, linguistically), and the need to feel connection to a group while maintaining strong internal feelings of identity.

Ukraine is rapidly changing, and the identification of the people from Ukraine reflects these changes and the personal disturbance that comes with such strong political and linguistic upheavals. While each person in Ukraine determines their own identity and basis for that identity, there is pressure from the central powers to connect identification to living in Ukraine, and internal pressure that connects identity to language. The results from these surveys reflect such pressures. How people identify themselves is critical to the way that people interact with each other, and is central to the way that language attitudes play out in society.

Stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes

In order to understand the way that language attitudes work in Ukraine, it is critical to look at the data keeping in mind stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes. Goffman's (1963) work on stigma helps us to understand the potential for negative attitudes between language groups in a multilingual situation. As Padilla and Perez point out, the factor that is stigmatized is one that is, in some way, disadvantaged or having a lack of power. In Ukraine, there are two ways in which power is connected to language choice currently: economically and politically, and socially.

In Ukraine, Ukrainian is currently the language of political and economic power. Currently, an individual that is not fluent in Ukrainian faces a large disadvantage in the country,

even in regions where Russian is primarily used; court documents, post office signs, train schedules, and all official writing is in Ukrainian. Further, many workplaces require Ukrainian fluency, such as schools, universities, and government offices. In this sense, Russian language would be the language to carry stigma; the reverse of this is that Ukrainian language speakers are given positive attributes based solely on their language use.

In Ukraine, the choice of Ukrainian for the entire nation is clearly an example of Paulston's (1997) territoriality principle. As we discussed earlier, this indicates that the goals of the nation currently come first in Ukraine. Because of this, the situation for native Russian speakers in Ukraine is in opposition to the linguistic rights laid out by UNESCO: in many places, Russian is not taught (or is not taught at an equal level as Ukrainian), there is restricted access to cultural services, there is not equitable presence of their language and culture in communications media, and they cannot receive attention in their own language from government bodies. This directly affects the stigma that can be felt by those who speak Russian natively.

On the other hand, Russian is, in many regions, socially more powerful than Ukrainian. As a gentleman in Kharkov was opting not to fill out the survey (he did not want to have documented proof of him speaking out about Ukrainian), he told me that Ukrainian would never gain a foothold in Kharkov, even if it was required in schools. Teenagers like his daughter, he said, would simply refuse to talk or associate with somebody if they tried to use Ukrainian in conversation. In this sense, Ukrainian can be the stigmatized factor.

As Kunda and Sinclair (1999) pointed out, situations such as the one above can lead directly to linguistic stereotypes. Because of dissonance theory, stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian may be perpetrated in order to increase the distance between the two groups, and

because of attribution theory, positive attributes may be given to speakers of each language in order to increase their self-esteem.

Because the stigma and the power vary between the two languages, there is not an obvious language choice for all situations. At times, in certain regions, and in various situations, Ukrainian may be stigmatized; other circumstances can result in a stigmatization of Russian. This complicates the situation, but it helps us to understand how and why both positive and negative stereotypes and attributes about Ukrainian are currently found in Ukrainian society, and how the attitudes break down across demographics can show us more clearly the power differentials between the languages in different situations.

As in previous sections, how an individual determines their social group is critical to understanding the way that these stereotypes work throughout the country. For those who are identifying first and foremost as Ukrainian, because they live in Ukraine, Russian is stigmatized, and Ukrainian is characterized by positive attributes and stereotypes. For those who identify primarily as Russian, because that is their native tongue, Ukrainian is stigmatized, and negative stereotypes and attributes are assigned to it. In the next two sections, we will discuss the specific findings with regards to language attitudes and stereotypes.

Language attitudes

The overall survey results found that most people in Ukraine see Ukrainian as a separate language, and the vast majority of overall respondents had a positive response to the way that Ukrainian sounds. Given the generally negative feelings about Ukrainian under the Soviet Union, this is strong evidence to the success of policies to increase the use of and positive attitudes toward Ukrainian.

It is important to note some conventional wisdom about Ukrainian, which seems to be known by all but hard to verify. Something that often comes up in conversations about Ukrainian is the idea that Ukrainian is one of the most melodic languages in the world. Although it is very often cited, it is difficult to find the source. The following quote comes from an article about Ukrainian: *На конкурсі краси мов у 1934 р. у Парижі українська мова зайняла третє місце після французької і перської* (In a contest of beautiful languages in 1934 in Paris, Ukrainian took third place, after French and Persian).³ However, there seems to be no trace of the actual contest. Regardless, it is in the public consciousness that not only is Ukrainian a beautiful language, but it is internationally regarded as such. Hence, it is not surprising that many respondents answered that Ukrainian sounds beautiful or melodic.

Regionally, the responses exactly reflect what the scholarship expects. Those from Kyiv, which has the strongest political and economical advantages for Ukrainian, and the weakest social advantages for Russian, were most likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, and are much more likely to have positive than negative responses to what Ukrainian sounds like. Those in Kherson were also very likely to think of Ukrainian as its own language, but were the most likely of all the respondents to respond negatively to the sounds of Ukrainian. Once again, the data from Kherson indicate something of a dichotomy, as on one hand, those from Kherson seem to support Ukrainian, and on the other, they have negative attitudes about it. This is a result of the competing forces that are playing themselves out in Kherson.

Those from Kharkov, which has the least economic and political power for Ukrainian and the most social power for Russian, are least likely to see Ukrainian as its own language and most likely to see it as a dialect of Russian, although they have a generally positive attitude about the

³ (<http://www.ukrlit.vn.ua/article/1046.html>, accessed on January 11, 2010).

way that Ukrainian sounds - with a caveat. In Kharkov, many respondents made sure to point out that standard, literary Ukrainian (such as the Ukrainian from the international competition) is beautiful, but that the language which is spoken in the western part of Ukraine today is not. In this way, respondents were able to maintain negative beliefs about what is actually being spoken, while accepting the ideology of Ukrainian (in many people's minds, this can only mean the literary standard language) being beautiful.

The data from Simferopol is difficult to fully understand. We would expect the responses from Simferopol to mirror those of Kharkov, which they do, in terms of the sounds of Ukrainian, but respondents from Simferopol were nearly as likely as Kyivans, and much more likely than any other regional group, to feel that Ukrainian is its own language. This may be because of the small sample size from Simferopol.

When looking at language attitudes by age, the youth are much more likely to feel that Ukrainian is its own language, whereas the 45-80 age group respondents were more likely to think of Ukrainian as something else, whether it be a dialect of Russian, a mixture between an older version of Ukrainian and Russian, or other. This reflects the changing attitudes; many of the youngest respondents had not yet made it through the school system when most schools switched to Ukrainian, and therefore, are more likely to accept Ukrainian as a fully functioning, legitimate language; they likely connect Ukrainian to economic and political power, and, having been educated in Ukrainian, are less likely to feel the social pressure to always speak Russian. Similarly, the age group breakdown showed a significant difference in the way that respondents felt that Ukrainian sounds, many more of those 18-35 felt positively towards the sounds of Ukrainian than those between the ages of 45 and 80; conversely, very few of the younger group felt negatively, as opposed to nearly 1/3 of the older group.

One of the most telling ways of looking at the data on language attitudes is by breaking it down by basis of self-identification. As we saw earlier, respondents were asked to distinguish what they most strongly connected their identity with: passport status, language, or the fact that they lived in Ukraine. Those who identify themselves based on their native Russian tongue are likely to attach a stigma to the Ukrainian language, in order to distance themselves from the outgroup. On the other hand, those who identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian, in order to boost the collective self-esteem of the ingroup. The data from the survey reflects just this phenomenon.

From the data, we can see that those who strongly connect their self-identification with the fact that they are native Russian speakers are more likely to think of Ukrainian as a dialect of Russian, and have a negative view of the way it sounds, and those that connect their identity with the fact that they live in Ukraine are more likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, and are more likely to think of Ukrainian as beautiful or melodic.

Stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian speakers

Overall, there were more respondents that did not know any stereotypes about Ukrainian-only speakers than those who did, and of those who did, approximately an equal number were likely to believe in the stereotypes as not. Fewer people knew stereotypes about Russian-only speakers, and the respondents were less likely to believe the stereotypes. Given what we know about the formation of stereotypes, and the fact that the respondents were all native Russian speakers, it is somewhat surprising to find such similar numbers when it comes to belief in stereotypes, although not surprising to see that many more people knew stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers. Looking at the data from the point of view of specific subgroups, however, makes the picture much clearer.

Regionally, those from Kherson were the most likely to know stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, while those in Kharkov were the least likely. However, while those in Kyiv were unlikely to know stereotypes, they were the most likely to believe in them. Those from Kharkov and Simferopol were approximately equally unlikely to know or believe in the stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers. All groups were equally unlikely to know stereotypes about Russian-only speakers, but those in Simferopol and Kherson were very likely to believe in such stereotypes.

Looking at this question from the point of view of age groups, the younger group was slightly less likely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers than the older age group, but both groups were split fairly evenly on whether they believed the stereotypes or not. However, the youth were more likely to know of stereotypes about Russian-only speakers and were far more likely to believe in the stereotypes.

The data on stereotypes is surprising; except for the fact that young people are more likely to believe in stereotypes about Russian-only speakers than the older population, there is no clear explainable trend. This may be because of the wording of the question in Russian, which used the borrowing *стереотипы* (stereotypes), which does not have the strong connotations in Russian as it does in English. However, this is something that will need to be examined more thoroughly in the future.

When asked about stereotypes in a different way, however, very clear trends became apparent. Rather than asking recipients to describe stereotypes that they knew, this question asked for respondents to check off characteristics that they attributed to Ukrainian speakers. The choices were illiterate, uncultured, simple, nationalistic, literate, cultured, and intellectual, with

multiple answers possible. Some respondents chose not to answer at all, some marked every response, and many chose a few responses.

Overall, the percent of positive responses about Ukrainian outnumbered the negative stereotypes. Throughout the data, there is a strong correlation of speakers of the Ukrainian language and nationalism. Many of the respondents wrote in answers about their feelings of patriotism toward Ukraine, even though there is no reason that a Russian native speaker might not love the country. However, in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalism has been strongly connected to the use of the Ukrainian language. Thus, overall, it seems that the connection of Ukrainian to national pride and positive ideology are effectively managing the stereotypes that are being associated with Ukrainian speakers.

Regionally, those in Kyiv were overwhelmingly more likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian-only speakers, followed by Kherson, with Kharkov and Simferopol evenly matched. Given that Kyiv attaches the most economic and political power to Ukrainian, this is to be expected; the stigma is likely to be on Russian speakers, and positive attributes assigned to Ukrainian speakers. Kherson is, once again, pulled in many directions and likely to have positive feelings about Ukrainian, as dictated from above. All of the regions except Simferopol reported approximately 1/3 negative stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, with Simferopol reporting far fewer. Kherson, Kharkov, and Kyiv were also very similarly matched in terms of believing that Ukrainian-only speakers are nationalistic, at approximately 1/2 of respondents; 3/4 of respondents from Simferopol reported the same. The data from Simferopol may be skewed because of the small sample size.

The responses, when broken down by age group, are quite similar to what we would expect. The majority of the respondents aged 18-35, who likely attach economic and political

power to Ukrainian, felt positively about Ukrainian speakers, as opposed to less than half of those between the ages of 45 and 80. The negative responses were fairly evenly matched, and approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ of each group felt that Ukrainian speakers were nationalistic.

What is striking about these data is not the negative stereotypes, or lack thereof – both regionally and by age group, approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of respondents reported negative stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, with little discrepancy amongst groups. This suggests that little is changing in the way of negative stereotypes over time or geography. In other words, the stigma that is attached to Ukrainian does not seem to vary depending on demographics, whereas the positive attributes and stereotypes differ greatly. Looking at this from the point of view of stigma, stereotypes, and discrimination, it seems that while the social power that is connected to Russian is steady (and thus, the stigma and negative stereotypes are steady) regardless of demographics. However, the economic and political power that is attached to Ukrainian, and thus, the positive attributes given to Ukrainian speakers, is being felt much more strongly amongst those who are in Kyiv and the youth. In this case, it is clear that the policies and ideology that are being promoted from the central government are having a direct impact on the way that people feel about Ukrainian speakers. Nationalism and language use are consistently approximately 50% throughout regions and age groups. This suggests that the idea of nationalism being connected to language is not changing with time or geography, but is already a relatively stable concept.

Although the breakdown between genders did not show a noticeable trend up until this point, it is interesting to note that they follow the same general pattern as the subgroups above, with women being more susceptible to positive ideology about Ukrainian. Both groups report approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ negative stereotypes, and approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ equate Ukrainian with nationalistic

tendencies. However, women report positive attributes the vast majority of the time, and men attribute positive attributes only about 2/3 of the time. This seems to indicate that Ukrainian women are more sensitive to the political and economic power that is being given to Ukrainian.

The final breakdown in this category is by self-identification, and it is very telling in terms of how linguistic stereotypes currently exist in society. Whereas all of the other subgroups had similar numbers for negative stereotypes and nationalism, the group of people who identify by language were much more likely to believe negatively about Ukrainian speakers than those who identify based on geography. Those who identify based on language were also much more likely to attribute nationalism to Ukrainian than those who identify based on geography, and much less likely to attach positive attributes to Ukrainian. This suggests that there is a greater-than-average social power attached to Russian for those who identify based on their native language, and a lower-than-average social power attached to Russian for those that identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine.

The other variation in this set of data is that of nationalism and the Ukrainian language. Those who identify based on language report a connection of Ukrainian to nationalism 3/4 of the time, whereas those who identify based on geography report the same connection only about 1/3 of the time, both of which are different from the data we received from any other breakdown of the data. Those who identify based on their native Russian tongue may be feeling defensive and more in-tune to the nationalistic ideology that has been connected to Ukrainian; those who identify based on their geography, by nature of their self-identification, feel a certain amount of national pride, and, as they are native Russian speakers, may not believe in a strong connection between native language and national pride.

Summary of discussion on linguistic attitudes and stereotypes

Looking at the data, it becomes clear that there are forces at work both in favor of and against the Ukrainian language. Linguistic attitudes, overall, are relatively positive about the Ukrainian language and its speakers, which is remarkable in and of itself, given the recent history of the language under the Soviet Union.

When we compare what is happening across different age groups, geographical regions, and identity groups, current trends of linguistic attitudes and stereotypes come into focus. In terms of linguistic attitudes, the younger respondents and those in Kyiv (and, to some extent, Kherson) are more likely to feel positively about Ukrainian as a language, and to see it as its own language; this helps us to understand the way that positive attitudes about Ukrainian are moving geographically across the country from west to east, as well as through time, with the younger generation feeling more positively about Ukrainian. Based on what we know about stigma, stereotypes, and discrimination, it seems that the youth and those in Kyiv are connecting more political and economic power to Ukrainian than those of other demographic groups. This suggests that positive linguistic ideology is affecting the groups of people who are less strongly connected to the Russian language in their communities.

In terms of stereotypes, we see similar results, with more positive stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers being held by the young and those who live in Kyiv, followed by those who live in Kherson. What is interesting about the negative stereotypes is that they are consistent across age groups, geography, and gender, showing that there does not seem to be a change taking place in Ukraine with regards to negative stereotypes. Similarly, nationalism is connected to Ukrainian speakers at the same rate regardless of demographics. However, there are large differences based on demographics in the number of respondents who believe in positive stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers; thus, these positive attitudes are likely in the middle of

change, as certain categories of people in Ukraine have accepted the ideologies while others have not yet. This suggests that the positive ideology about Ukrainian, and the connection of Ukrainian to political and economic power, is increasing over geography and time.

Always important in the discussion of attitudes and stereotypes is the issue of self-identification. Although some trends are visible based solely on geographical region, age, and gender, positive and negative attitudes and stereotypes about Ukrainian and its speakers come sharply into focus when broken down by basis of self-identification: those who identify based on their native Russian tongue are much more likely to feel negatively about Ukrainian and its speakers, and those who identify based on their geographic location are much more likely to feel positively about Ukrainian and its speakers. Once again, this likely reflects the way that the respondents understand the linguistic power in Ukraine today.

The political and ideological changes that are happening in Ukraine affect not simply the way that people view the language of the country, but also the way that people view each other. We have seen in this section that the positive ideology towards Ukrainian is changing the way that people view Ukrainian and each other, while for many, negative attitudes and stereotypes still hold true.

Relevant research questions and hypotheses

Earlier in the paper, we laid out several relevant research questions; after looking at the data, we can now shed light on the answers to these questions.

First, we wondered how Ukrainians are currently identifying themselves. It is obvious that Ukrainians are identifying themselves in multiple ways, and that there is no clear-cut answer. Even in individuals, there is some fluidity between the way that they identify themselves to outsiders and the way that they feel inside. However, the former role of the

identification in the passport is diminishing with time, and more Ukrainians are identifying themselves based on their language or the fact that they live in Ukraine. Of those, more young people and people in Kyiv are likely to identify themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine, with respondents from Kherson not far behind. Those in Simferopol and Kharkov, as well as older respondents, are more likely to identify themselves based on their native tongue. This split in how people identify themselves is more important in the explanation of different linguistic attitudes in Ukraine than the simple split of Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers.

In the course of determining how people identify themselves, it has become clear that, for many purposes, gender is not a significant factor in self-identification, although age and geography are.

We also posed a question about the connection of language attitudes and identity in Ukraine, and, in the course of the research, it has become very clear that language attitudes and self-identification are strongly correlated. Those who identify themselves based on their native Russian tongue are much more likely to hold negative views and stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers than those who identify on the basis of geography, who are much more likely to connect positive attributes to Ukrainian and its speakers.

We also listed several hypotheses earlier in the paper that should be revisited. The first was an expectation that individuals suggest that both Ukrainian-speaking highlights certain characteristics of its speakers and that speakers of Ukrainian possess certain characteristics because they speak Ukrainian. We found this to be true, with varying results. Once again, the issue of self-identity is at the forefront with this question, as those who identify based on language are more likely to believe in negative stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers; they are also more likely to believe in a connection between nationalism and Ukrainian speakers,

meaning that those who feel strongly nationalistic are likely to choose Ukrainian. Other respondents, who do not have as strong of a connection between identity and language, are also likely to believe certain stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, but they are much more likely to believe in positive stereotypes and characteristics.

Second, we expected that some Russian speakers will perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers; this is absolutely true, and the correlation, as discussed above, is on what basis the speaker self-identifies. If the speaker self-identifies based on language, they are much more likely to perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers.

Our third hypothesis was that the connection of language to national identity should be strongly felt; this was felt, across the board, by approximately half of the respondents. This does not seem to be dependent on geography, age, or gender.

Finally we expected different opinions based on age and geographic location, which was absolutely true. Age and geographic location helped us to understand how the situation is changing over time and as Ukrainian spreads from west to east. Additionally, basis of self-identification played a large role in the way that people view Ukrainian, and gender, while generally not a distinguishing feature for language and identity, made a difference when it came to stereotypes about Ukrainian.

Conclusion

Russian speakers in Ukraine are in an interesting position. Twenty years ago, Russian was the language of power, and, especially in cities and in the east, was the language of majority. During this time, the use of Ukrainian was often stigmatized, as many people believed that it was only fit for a peasant lifestyle and could not be used for serious work. Now, however, the tables

have turned, and in many places, especially Western Ukraine, Russian is perceived as the language of the oppressors, or, at the very least, a symbol of life before independence.

Ukrainian, on the other hand, has been connected by policy and ideology to national pride and independence.

Because of the multilingual status of Ukraine, identity is constantly being negotiated; this is especially seen amongst Russian speakers living in regions with high levels of positive Ukrainian-based ideology, and amongst the younger subset of Russian speakers. On the surface, it seems that there is a split in Ukraine based on native language, and there is; more importantly, however, is the way that people connect their identity to their language and their nation. Those who connect their identity to Ukraine are increasingly showing positive attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers, while those who connect their identity to their native Russian tongue are more likely to perpetuate the old, negative stereotypes about Ukrainian.

The linguistic situation in Ukraine is complicated and nuanced, but in understanding the way that identity affects people's attitudes toward each other, we can more fully understand how stereotypes and attitudes, both positive and negative, arise in society, and how linguistic policy and ideology affects such phenomena. Further, looking at changing identity and how this connects to attitudes and stereotypes allows us to better predict the direction in which Ukraine is heading, both in terms of time and geography; such understanding can also help to illuminate various multilingual situations the world over.

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