AFFINITY, EXPROPRIATION, AND DENIAL: CHANGING CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD REASON AND ISLAM: 11TH-14TH CENTURIES

Coeli Fitzpatrick

Over the course of several centuries during the medieval period of Latin Christendom, Christian attitudes toward reason changed significantly. Although scholars initially viewed the application of rational arguments in their considerations of the natural world with some trepidation, they grew increasingly comfortable with the concepts of reason and rationality and gradually came to embrace their use, primarily through the advancement of logic and dialectic, new philosophical language, and the art of disputation.[1] The history of medieval attitudes regarding reason and its applications has been traced.[2] In one of the most comprehensive accounts of the history, Edward Grant documents the changing attitudes about reason from the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, highlighting an emerging emphasis on reason that affected every aspect of intellectual life. Although Grant's work is broad and included the period of translations of works from Arabic and of the crusades, he did not cover the influence of Islam or Muslim writers on Christian thinkers.[3] Philosophically, this history of Christian reason is celebrated as a move away from textual authority as the primary arbiter of truth, toward a greater trust in human rational ability. This bold move will bring about the age of the Scholastic philosophers and the Enlightenment, and (as Grant

The development of this paper benefited greatly from the feedback received at the 54th International Congress on Medieval Studies in Kalamazoo, as well as from the criticism and suggestions from the anonymous reviewers for *Enarratio.*

[1] Alexander Murray distinguishes between reason as an intellectual activity by which the mind gathers information and makes deductions from it (*inter-lego* "I pick out") and rationalism, a systematic belief in reason alone as the only method of finding truth. In the period under consideration (11th-14th century), Murray shows that this second sense is both unorthodox and rare. In this paper, the terms reason and rationality refer to the first sense: the deliberate act of thinking about the world, relying more on one's mental capacities for guidance than on prior authorities. As Murray points out, there was really no sense that rational reflection would lead anywhere other than to affirming the Catholic faith. Alexander Murray, *Reason and Society in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 8.

[2] For example, Edward Grant, *God and Reason in the Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Alex J. Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance*, The Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). Novikoff's work is a recent study of the cultural history of disputation in the High Middle Ages and its reliance on reason (*ratio*) as a pedagogical tool. Toivo J. Holopainen's *Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 54 (New York: Brill, 1996) is a good study of the evolution of dialectic in theological discussions.

[3] Grant never claims that any of these are his concern. He aims to map out reason in the Middle Ages to argue that the Age of Reason began in the medieval period. This is a defense against the later critique of the medieval period as the "dark ages" or as an age enslaved by faith to the detriment of reason, as well as his efforts to show that Western civilization (unproblematically defined) and advances were a product of medieval Christian intellectual efforts.

Copyright Fitzpatrick © 2024. This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

promotes) is part of the history of human progress. For Grant, the move in the direction of greater reliance on the tools of reason was distinct to the medieval Latin West, something that he saw as setting the stage for later accomplishments in Western civilization.

John V. Tolan, Jonathan Lyons, and others reflect on the same historical period and how this understanding of Christian distinctiveness affected non-Christians in a period where it was not unusual for Arab and Muslim contributions to human knowledge to be sought after, welcomed, and praised.[4] Some writers such as Anna Abulafia, Gilbert Dahan, Jeremy Cohen, Amos Funkenstein, and Robert Chazan, have focused in various ways on the question of Christian deployment of reason against the Jews during the Middle Ages. This paper draws on the work of these scholars with the key difference that the focus here is specifically on how the changing Christian attitudes toward reason impacted Christian-Muslim interactions in the intellectual arena in the eleventh through fourteenth centuries. To trace these changing attitudes, I have borrowed a framework from Jonathan Lyons' work *Islam Through Western Eyes*, where he makes use of the categories of "affinity, expropriation, denial" to trace the West's reception of the Islamic scientific tradition.[5] This paper draws on primary material from Latin Christians writing between the eleventh through fourteenth centuries to illustrate that increasing Christian comfort with logic, dialectic, and disputation was accompanied by decreased appreciation for Arab and Muslim contributions to human knowledge. These materials illustrate Latin Christian thinkers' affinity and appreciation for Arab and Saracen reason, expropriation of the fruits of Arab and Muslim reason, and denial of Arab and Muslim contributions to intellectual thought and of their capability for reason, and how such moves are interlaced with an increasing rationalization of Christian thought and identity. This move is not neatly linear or progressive. The categories are fluid and untidy, better thought of as overlapping shingles than distinct stages of thought. However, despite their messiness, they can be used as lenses through which to examine some of the thinkers in the medieval Christian West and how their writings can help explain the rise and fall of the reputation of the Arabs and Muslims as important contributors to intellectual history.

My starting place is the eleventh century. At this time, there was not one specific understanding of the terms "Arab" or "Saracen."[6] As we will see, in the late eleventh and early twelfth century, some Christian thinkers seemed to equate the Saracen with the virtuous Pagan, someone driven by intellectual pursuits, rational, and disdainful of using authority as one's only guide to truth. Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, and Adelard of Bath use language that suggests their admiration of, or at least acknowledgement of, Arab and Muslim rationality. In

---

[4] For examples, see John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Jonathan Lyons, *Islam Through Western Eyes: From the Crusades to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). The title of this paper is inspired by a framework in Lyon's Chapter 4, "Islam and Science."

[5] Lyons, *Islam,* 79-80.

[6] "Saracen" would have been one of the most commonly used words, along with "Agarene" (stemming from Hagarene, derived from *muhajirūn,* the Arabic word designating those who emigrated with the Prophet from Mecca to Medina*)* to designate both Muslims and someone from what today we might call the "Middle East." See Brian A. Catlos, *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, c. 1050-1614* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1; and Norman Daniel, *The Arabs of Medieval Europe* (London: Longman, 1975), 53.

the period often called the "Twelfth Century Renaissance" there was great enthusiasm for gathering the works of the Saracens, or for traveling to places where one might encounter Saracen learning. But the respectful portrayal of the Saracen intellectual used by these early twelfth century authors will give way to a darker, less generous understanding of the Saracen. The crusades brought Islam to the fore of Christian consciousness, bringing it slowly into focus as a distinct monotheistic religion rather than being understood as a Christian heresy or a form of Paganism. The ideal of the virtuous Pagan is disrupted by Peter of Cluny, who serves as an early harbinger of what was to come: the move from acceptance of Saracens as great intellectuals, toward a conception of the Muslim as a true adversary who needs to be converted to the rational religion of Christianity. By the thirteenth century there is another image of the Muslim, represented here by the work of William of Auvergne and Humbert of Romans. In this intellectual climate thrives the idea that Muslim scholarship was rare and exceptional—almost as rare and exceptional as Muslim conversion to Christianity. As such, the proper stance toward Islam needed to include the threat of military action.

Denial is the long tail of the "affinity, expropriation, denial" trio. From the thirteenth century on, Arabs and Muslims increasingly came to be described as irrational by their Christian counterpoints, who argued that only Christian theological positions were logical and rational. [7] Yet the knowledge that Saracens were the source of much of the new intellectual material available in Latin translation could not be denied. John V. Tolan has shown that the wise men among the "Saracens," that is, the Muslim philosophers and scientists whose works were rapidly absorbed into Latin intellectual circles, were held to have secretly rejected Islam.[8] Tolan's work illustrates how Christian writers dealt with the dissonance between what they believed about Islam, on the one hand, and what they knew and appreciated about the texts by Muslim writers. Many thinkers developed a sense that anything great and accomplished by Muslim thinkers must have come *in spite of* their religion—not because of it. Muslim intellectuals were painted as exceptions to the rule of Muslim despotism, backwardness, and lasciviousness. We will leave off in the fourteenth century, when Italian humanist writer Petrarch (d. 1374) would vehemently reject the idea that Arabs and Muslims had contributed anything of value to intellectual history. It took just over one hundred years after their introduction for the names of Muslim writers (in particular Avicenna, Averroes, and Al-Ghazali) to become toxic and associated with heresy in Latin circles, and even less time for Christian dreams of peaceful conversion of Muslims to be lost. This paper attempts to give an overview of this drastic shift.

---

[7] This theme runs through Norman Daniel's book *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (1960; repr., Oxford: Oneworld, 1993), but particularly in Chapter IX "The Establishment of Communal Opinion."

[8] John Tolan. "Saracen Philosophers Secretly Deride Islam," *Medieval Encounters 8,* no. 2-3 (2002): 184-208.

THE CHRISTIAN SHIFT: EMBRACING THE NEW TOOLS OF REASON, LATE 11TH-MID-12TH CENTURIES

Among the many consequences of the social and political events of the early Middle Ages was that the Greek legacy of the ancient world would be partially lost to the Latin Christians. Although many Greek works were translated into Arabic, Latin Christianity carried on with a few precious works from Plato, Cicero, and the writings of the Church Fathers.[9] It was these works that formed the basis of philosophy that early medieval thinkers such as Boethius, Isadore of Seville, Alcuin, and Eriugena added to over the centuries. As more works became available in Latin translation from the Greek and Arabic, thinkers came to use more frequently arguments that did not rely on the premise of Christian authorities and to question how far one could apply the resurgent dialectical method to questions about faith without venturing into heretical territory. If we pick a starting place, or starting person, it might easily be Gerbert of Aurillac (Pope Sylvester II), who in the late tenth century brought value and attention to works by Cicero and Boethius, something which greatly elevated the study of rhetoric and dialectic (in addition to logic) by the early twelfth century. Gerbert's influence as a teacher at Rheims was profound and far-reaching.[10] In the eleventh century, Berengar of Tours (d. 1088) and Roscelin of Compiègne (d. 1125) are two examples of the growing number of scholars who more prominently engaged reason in their support of interpreting biblical ideas.[11] Berengar insisted that reason was a gift from God and was therefore acceptable to use with limits, and he praised the art of dialectic because of its use of reasoned argument. This position had its detractors, and eleventh-century thinkers had to struggle with the question of whether and how much dialectic had a place in Christian thought. The positions were often staked out in the form of theological debates in church councils, writings and letters, and glosses to the liberal arts.[12] Many feared that an incautious argument could lead to unorthodox theological positions, and Berengar was repeatedly condemned by the Church for his position on the Eucharist. Peter

---

[9] The classic text on the Arabic translation movement is Dimitri Gutas' *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbāsid Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th Centuries)* (New York: Routledge, 1998). Scholars of the translation movement note the contribution of the Syriac Christian community, from whom many of the translators were drawn. Often translations were done from Greek to Syriac, and then Syriac to Arabic.

[10] Gerbert is a thread that could be followed further. Interesting to note is recent work on Gerbert, which highlights his time spent in Iberia and what he learned from the Saracens, including William of Malmesbury's twelfth-century story about Gerbert's "snatching" the abacus from the Saracens. William credits Gerbert with bringing to Christendom "subjects that had long been obsolete." See E. R. Truitt, "Celestial Divination and Arabic Science in Twelfth-Century England: The History of Gerbert of Aurillac's Talking Head," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 73, no. 2 (2012): 201-22. See also Justin Lake, "Gerbert of Aurillac and the Study of Rhetoric in Tenth-Century Rheims," *The Journal of Medieval Latin* 23 (2013): 49-85.

[11] On Roscelin, see Constant J. Mews, "Nominalism and Theology before Abelard: New Light on Roscelin of Compiègne," *Vivarium* 30, no. 1 (1992): 4-33. David Knowles describes Berengar as "the first to stir up a major theological controversy in which all parties used the dialectical method, thus contributing greatly to its extension." David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1962), 95-96. Tina Stiefel credits Berengar as the first medieval thinker to express trust in the value of the intellect trained in the art of dialectic; see "The Heresy of Science: A Twelfth-Century Conceptual Revolution," *Isis* 68, no. 3 (1977): 346-62.

[12] Charles M. Radding and Francis Newton, *Theology, Rhetoric, and Politics in the Eucharistic Controversy, 1078-1079* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 6.

Damian (d. 1072) noted that a syllogistic argument could be used as an objection against the perpetual virginity of Mary.[13] Damian wanted to keep faith separate from the use of dialectic, which, he believed, could be manipulated into seeming to assert a fallibility on the part of God.[14] He warned that philosophers must be careful not to elevate the importance of logic so high that it would place limitations on God's abilities (which included even the ability to undo events by will).[15]

If the predominant intellectual Christian mood moving into the early twelfth century was a reliance on authority, the Christian perception of heretics and those Guibert labels as "Orientals," who were people from the Middle East, was their defiance of the steady guidance of authorities, in favor of errors that they defended through reason.[16] Yet gradually, over the course of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, more Christian thinkers made the argument that relying on the authority of scripture or the Church Fathers alone was not enough, and expressed frustration with some of their contemporaries who were wary of investigating beyond the well-trodden ground of what the Church Fathers had covered. Thinkers debated which authorities should be relied on, particularly in debates with gentiles, who would not accept Christian scripture as a foundation for the argument.[17] Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109) is an exemplar of this move away from authority to a greater reliance on reason. In his *Monologium*, Anselm informs his readers that he wrote the book at the urging of his fellow monks "in order that nothing in Scripture should be urged on the authority of Scripture itself, but that whatever the conclusion of independent investigation should declare to be true … be briefly enforced by the cogency of reason…"[18] Alex Novikoff has shown how Anselm's influence on younger scholars is particularly strong, notably in his use of the literary dialogue, which illustrated how theological positions could be set out and defended using rational methods.[19] The combination of an emphasis on reason and the pedagogical style of the dialogue were to become the preferred method of arguing about theology by the mid-twelfth century, and would eventually form

---

[13] Holopainen, *Dialectic*, 56.

[14] Holopainen, *Dialectic*, 43. Holopainen discusses Damian's arguments in Chapter Two, characterizing him as an antidialectician "to a mild degree" because of his hesitance to apply dialectic to theology.

[15] Holopainen, *Dialectic*, 7.

[16] Tolan, *Saracens*, 145. Tolan cites Guibert of Nogent's *Gesta Dei per Francos* where Guibert writes that the Easterners defend their positions with "apparently reasonable argument." For full text see Guibert de Nogent, *The Deeds of God Through the Franks: A Translation of Guibert de Nogent's Gesta Dei per Francos*, trans. Robert Levine (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1997), 31.

[17] Ryan Szpiech, *Conversion and Narrative: Reading and Religious Authority in Medieval Polemic*, The Middle Ages Series (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 9, points out that in the twelfth century we see a shift in who is accepted as an authority. There is an expansive move from the Augustinian/Church Fathers as the only non-scriptural authorities to the use of Aristotle and his commentators, and other contemporary authors. Although biblical authority remains paramount, this expansion allows the use of reason to become more commonplace and acceptable. See also M. D. Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), especially Chapter 9, "Tradition and Progress."

[18] Grant, *God and Reason*, 54. See also Heinrich Fichtenau, *Heretics and Scholars in the High Middle Ages, 1000-1200,* trans. Denise A. Kaiser (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). "His [Anselm's] use of the word *ratio* in contradistinction to making a case on the basis of past authorities was still quite striking in 1076, all the more so since this work was in all respects the product of a monastic and contemplative environment," 219.

[19] Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture*, 35.

the basis of the scholastic method.[20] Although it may be somewhat overblown, Grant characterizes this period in the twelfth century as that when "the genie of reason had been loosed from its bottle, never again to reenter."[21]

Other thinkers who pushed back against the idea that innovation in thinking was dangerous are Rupert of Deutz, Gilbert de La Porrée, and John of Salisbury.[22] But the most prominent was Peter Abelard. Although Abelard resisted the idea that reason could be used to undermine the authority of the Church, he firmly believed that philosophical reason could have utilitarian purposes in defense of scripture.[23] Heretics, particularly the Cathars, were adept at using logic to attack scripture, and they "assail us above all with philosophical reasonings."[24] No Christian would be capable of rebutting the arguments of the heretics if they did not have the skill to "unravel their disputations and to rebut their sophisms with true reasoning."[25] It made no sense to Abelard that Christians would leave the weapon of logic only to the heretics. Abelard was not challenging the authority of the Church, but he opened the door to the possibility of disagreeing with them.[26] The conflict between Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux can be taken as representative of the disagreement between those who were more cautious about using reason in interpreting scripture, and the newer theologians who embraced dialectic. Bernard of Clairvaux was convinced that using logic to reflect on matters of faith—even in its defense—was dangerous. He criticized Abelard because he "tries to explore with his reason what the devout mind grasps at once with a vigorous faith. Faith believes, it does not dispute."[27] Walter of St. Victor (d. 1180), who believed that all heresies were generated by philosophers, wrote a treatise against Abelard, Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Gilbert of la Porrée, accusing them of treating the faith with "scholastic levity," "vomiting heresies," and propagating errors in doctrine.[28] Yet even with powerful men objecting, the idea of applying logical analysis to areas involving the faith was gradually gaining acceptance. Grant notes that after the twelfth century, he can find no one who argued, as Peter Damian had, that God, if He wanted, could produce a contradiction.[29]

---

[20] Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture*, 39.

[21] Grant, *God and Reason*, 68.

[22] See Chenu, *Man, Nature, and Society*, Chapter 9, where he details some of the challengers to, in his terms, conservative theologians and administrators. Often at issue was the question of new philosophical terms (*novitates vocum*) and the extent to which they could be used without crossing into heretical territory.

[23] Grant, *God and Reason*, 57.

[24] Cited in Grant, *God and Reason*, 58.

[25] Abelard, *Letters IX-XIV,* 274. Quoted and translated in Novikoff, *The Medieval Cluture,* 87.

[26] Fichtenau, *Heretics*, 228.

[27] Grant, *God and Reason*, 64.

[28] Gerard Verbeke, "Philosophy and Heresy: Some Conflicts Between Reason and Faith," in *The Concept of Heresy in the Middle Ages (11th-13th C.)*, ed. D. Verhelst and W. Lourdaux (Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1983), 172-97, 173.

[29] Grant, *God and Reason,* 228. Recent scholarship has given more nuance to Damian's position regarding God and the law of non-contradiction. See Toivo J. Holopainen, "Peter Damian," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/peter-damian/.

AFFINITY

As noted earlier, up until the mid-twelfth century, widespread Christian interactions with Muslims, either personally or through contact with intellectual or religious materials from Muslims, were uncommon north of the Pyrenees and the North had little intellectual interest in Islam or Arabs prior to the First Crusade. The situation in the Iberian Peninsula and southern Italy was very different. Muslim settlement in Iberia in the eighth century had brought Christians and Muslims into close daily contact and engendered an Arabic-speaking Christian population that often had deep affinity with Muslim intellectual culture.[30] Although anti-Muslim polemical literature circulated within this Arabic Christian population, until the twelfth century, ideas about Islam would have come out of Iberia in only a trickle. Tolan notes that prior to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, northern European readers who wished to know something about the religious beliefs of the Saracens would have trouble finding information, never mind accurate information. Their knowledge of Islam would have been shaped by Biblical manuscripts which depicted the Saracens as Pagan idolaters, and they would have often been only a distant concern, if one at all.[31]

The return of the literary dialogue form in the eleventh and twelfth centuries brought with it a return of a Pagan interlocutor to express philosophical ideas that were at odds with Christian belief. The question of how to think about the virtuous Pagan is not new. Augustine and others had pondered the fate of those who, though living a virtuous life, had not accepted Christ. This updated Pagan expresses some of the virtues of Greek philosophy but is clearly of his own time, and this means that dialogues are informed by knowledge—albeit incomplete or incorrect—about the Saracen. In this section we look at three thinkers. The first two, Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard, are writers who use the figure of the rational Pagan in their works. Although there is some ambiguity as to the origin and religion of the Pagan/gentile interlocutor, we can venture that Anselm and Abelard express what might be called grudging admiration for the Pagan.[32] The third thinker discussed is Adelard of Bath, who most neatly fits into the category of "affinity" for his admiration of Saracen knowledge and desire to learn from the Arabs.

Anselm of Canterbury's *Cur Deus homo*, is a short dialogue written with a *Pagani* interlocutor in mind—a rationalist who rejects Christian thought on the grounds of its irrationality. In this dialogue Anselm wishes to explain why God became human, and he aims to convince non-Christians that this fundamental Christian tenet can be defended without appealing to Christian authorities.[33]

---

[30] See Catlos, *Muslims*; and Richard Hitchcock, *Muslim Spain Reconsidered: From 711-1502*, The New Edinburgh Islamic Surveys (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

[31] Tolan, *Saracens,* 104.

[32] J. Jolivet, "L'Islam et la raison d'après quelques auteurs latins des IXe et XIIe siècles," in *L'Art des confins. Mélanges offerts à Maurice de Gandillac*, ed. Annie Cazennave and Jean-François Lyotard (Paris: PUF 1985), 153-65.

[33] Anna S. Abulafia, "St. Anselm and Those Outside the Church," in *Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience: Papers Read at the Anglo-Polish Colloquium of the British Sub-Commission of the Commission Internationale d'Histoire Ecclésiastique Comparée, 9-13 September 1986*, Studies in Church History Subsidia 6, ed. David Loades and Katherine Walsh (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Published for the Ecclesiastical History Society by Basil Blackwell, 1990), 11-37,

These unbelievers find Christianity to be illogical. Anselm writes that "Unbelievers habitually raise this problem [of the incarnation and resurrection] against us and ridicule Christian simplicity as absurd."[34] The dialogue engages a student, Boso, who is in dialogue with Anselm himself. The *Paganai* comes in at the end of the dialogue, after Anselm has made his case to Boso using reason. Boso tells Anselm that with this rational argument Anselm would have satisfied "not only Jews, but even Pagans, by reason alone."[35]

We must admit that we do not know who exactly Anselm is referring to when he has Boso remark that the argument would satisfy "Jews and Pagans." But we can make some general comments about what this dialogue means in terms of Anselm's use of reason. The dialogue depicts the Pagan as something which a good Christian is not—overly reliant on reason to the detriment of faith. At the same time, Anselm's argument is itself very logical, and is a marker of what Cohen depicts as the reorientation of Christian religious polemic's reliance on rational argumentation.[36] Too much reason is harmful. The Pagan (and Jew) are not better off for their reason, they are worse, and the charge of rationality is a pejorative one. But Boso's words leave open the possibility that the Pagan is not left outside of the kingdom of Christianity forever. If he can overcome his excessive rationality through arguments based on reason, then he can enter the faith. This increased rationality in Christian reason will be built upon by subsequent thinkers.

Peter Abelard's work *Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian* depicts the philosopher as one of the interlocutors. The dialogue is a report of a dream, in which three men meet Abelard: A Christian, a Jew, and a Pagan philosopher. The three men report to Abelard that they have been arguing over which is the correct path for men to live their lives. Scholars have speculated that Abelard's philosopher, who is described as a circumcised descendant of Ishmael, is someone from the lands of Islam. J. Jolivet suggests that Abelard has in mind the philosopher Ibn Bâjjah (Avempace, d. 1138).[37] Marenbon and Orlandi observe that medieval readers would have only to have heard that the philosopher was a descendant of Ishmael to link this character to the Muslim world.[38] The Jewish interlocutor is portrayed as someone who only follows his own people, not reason, and after a short role at the first part of the dialogue the Jew drops out and the conversation continues with the Christian and philosopher.

Obviously, the philosopher cannot win the debate—Abelard's point is to show the weakness of the Pagan argument and the strength of Christian one.

---

discusses Anselm's terminology in *Cur Deus homo,* where he uses both *Pagani* and *infideles* but not interchangeably.

[34] Quoted in Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture*, 45.

[35] Anselm, "Cur Deus Homo," In *Basic Writings*, ed and trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007), 325.

[36] Jeremy Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 167.

[37] J. Jolivet "L'Islam et la raison." This position is disputed by Constant Mews, "Peter Abelard and the Enigma of Dialogue," in *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment*, ed. John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 25-52.

[38] John Marenbon and Giovanni Orlandi, "Introduction," in Peter Abelard, *Collationes*, ed. and trans. John Marenbon and Giovanni Orlandi, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), xvii-ciii, li.

However, the philosopher comes out in a more positive light than the Jew. The philosopher is the rationalist, the virtuous Pagan in the skin of a circumcised Muslim. Decades after Anselm's Pagan failed to embrace Christianity because of reason, Abelard's philosopher also fails. But it is evident that Abelard shows respect for the philosopher and his knowledge of ancient texts and virtue. This respect is not aimed at Muslims per se, but it is an acknowledgement of a learned tradition among the Saracens. Abelard likely believed that the Muslims would have at least tolerated someone with views like those of the philosopher. Finally, Abelard's argument is important for another reason, which is his use of the philosopher to articulate a critique of blind reliance on authority, a position that he had raised in his prologue to *Sic et Non*.[39] The *Dialogue* uses a Saracen mouthpiece to articulate a praise for reason and rational discussion of ideas which the Christian Abelard undoubtedly believed in. Although one should be careful not to overstate Abelard's position as one of religious tolerance or sympathy with the philosopher or his background, it is noteworthy that the circumcised descendant of Ishmael is the chosen mouthpiece for Abelard's points. Abelard did not need to describe the philosopher as a circumcised descendent of Ishmael in order to capture the philosopher's sense of virtue, and yet he did.

With Adelard of Bath (d. 1152), we find ourselves clearly in the territory of "affinity." Adelard is perhaps the most enthusiastic thinker when it comes to Arab reason. He holds up the Arabs for their scientific knowledge and what he sees as their ability to privilege reason over authority. Adelard has some background experience with Muslims. Further underscoring the move to rely on some non-traditional authorities, Adelard wrote that the Arabs were his masters in teaching, because he could follow them with reason as his guide, whereas others, his nephew included, "follow a halter, being enthralled by the picture of authority."[40] Twelfth-century thinkers are among the earliest who had some connection with the writings of Muslim scholars. Adelard epitomizes an acceptance of reason and criticizes those who turn to authority before exhausting the possibility that reason should be used. This is not an outright rejection of authority, but a call to trust human reason in the search for truth. Adelard told his nephew "... authority alone cannot win credibility for a philosopher, nor should it be adduced for this purpose."[41] Adelard was impressed with Muslim science, had travelled in Syria, was familiar with Arabic works of philosophy and mathematics, and claimed to have transmitted knowledge that he learned from the Saracens.[42]

There is no scholarly consensus on the identities of the Pagan/philosopher interlocutor in the dialogues of Anselm and Abelard.[43] However, it is possible to

---

[39] Mews, "Peter Abelard and the Enigma of Dialogue," 36.

[40] Adelard of Bath, *Adelard of Bath, Conversations with His Nephew: On the Same and the Different, Questions on Natural Science, and On Birds*, ed. and trans. Charles Burnett, Cambridge Medieval Classics 9 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 103.

[41] Adelard of Bath, *Adelard of Bath*, 105.

[42] There has been much work done on the possible identity of Adelard's Arab sources. See Charles Burnett, "Adelard of Bath and the Arabs," in *Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: The Translators and Their Intellectual and Social Context*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (New York: Routledge, 2009), 89-107.

[43] For examples, see Jolivet "L'Islam et la raison"; Anna Sapir Abulafia, *Christians and Jews in Dispute: Disputational Literature and the Rise of Anti-Judaism in the West (c. 1000-1150)*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Abulafia, "St. Anselm and Those Outside the Church." Iogna-Prat makes a passing remark that Anselm is addressing "two interlocutors, one Jewish, and the other Muslim"; see Dominique Iogna-Prat *Order and Exclusion:*

argue that their amorphous identities are an indication of Latin Christianity's lack of clarity on the nature of the religion. Lyons uses the term "undifferentiated experience" as a descriptor for how Christians just prior to the crusades would have understood Islam. If Islam is an undifferentiated experience for Christianity, then the Muslim has not yet been situated as a threat with particular ideological content that by itself presented an exceptional danger to the survival of the Church. Rather, the Muslim is a being "barely discernible among a sea of generalized threats to the world of Latin Christendom that included rebellious Normans, marauding Viking bands, and other Pagan barbarians of various stripes."[44] Brian Catlos notes that "…beyond the Iberian Peninsula, Muslims remained for the most part a vague and distant concern" prior to the mid-eleventh century.[45] With the onset of the crusades, this nebulous conception of the Saracen begins to change. The fact that we cannot rule out entirely the idea that these interlocutors, who are described as unbelievers, Pagans, and philosophers, are Muslims, is evidence that the sentiment that will later develop into a deep anti-Muslim one has not completely taken hold, even as late as the mid-twelfth century when Abelard and Adelard are writing.[46] Cohen suggests that Anselm uses a hermeneutically crafted Jew in his dialogue, who is imbibed with whatever characteristics were needed to advance his arguments about the superiority of Christianity. This heuristic role can be said of the Pagan/philosopher as well. To be an effective literary device the Pagan does not need to be to be specific to any one community of interlocutor; his role is to underscore the logic of Christianity.[47] As Christian reason develops thinkers develop better rational arguments against non-Christians, of which there is a growing category. Defining these non-Christians is not a straightforward process, but gradual and exploratory. Cohen shows how the crusades and other Latin Christian encounters with Islam caused Jews and Judaism to become less distinct categories in the Christian mind, becoming for a time part of the category of "infidel" that included Muslims.[48]

So we must conclude on the note that our Christian authors' affinity is not one towards Islam, as their understanding of Islam is nebulous. When Adelard praises Saracen reason he is not praising Islam; nor does he credit the Saracen religion for what he sees as their advanced state of learning. But his affinity for Saracen wisdom is clear, and it will be shared by others. Finally, we can point to some of the translators of Arabic scientific works as having an openness toward learning from the Saracen. Peter the Venerable's mission will be examined below, but the translators he engaged, Mark of Toledo and Robert of Ketton, were keen on finding Arabic works and translating them into Latin. Robert's personal projects were put on hold, famously, when he agreed to translate the Qur'an into

---

Cluny and Christendom Face Heresy, Judaism, and Islam, (1000-1150) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 136.

[44] Lyons, *Islam*, 48.

[45] Catlos, *Muslims*, 4.

[46] Even Daniel of Morely is still very much in admiration of Saracen reason, as late as the thirteenth century. Lyons explores Daniel of Morely more thoroughly in *Islam*, Chapter 4.

[47] Cohen, *Living Letters*, Chapter 5.

[48] Jeremy Cohen, "The Muslim Connection: On the Changing Role of the Jews in High Medieval Theology," in *From Witness to Witchcraft: Jews and Judaism in Medieval Christian Thought,* ed. Jeremy Cohen, Wolfenbütteler Mittelalter-Studien 11 (Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz Verlag, 1966), 141-62. During the period examined here, the categories of Jew, infidel, and Pagan shift and reorganize.

Latin for Peter. Thomas Burman notes that both Robert and Mark were convinced to put their own work aside for their patrons. After their task was complete, both went back to translating scientific works from Arabic, and with one exception for Mark of Toledo, never returned to translating or writing about the Qur'an or anti-Islamic polemic.[49]

Reason in Defense of the Church

In the twelfth century, Christian engagement with Arab and Muslim ideas takes manifold forms: written (in the form of polemic, the translation of the Qur'an and other works), verbal, and of course military (in the form of the crusades). By now the turn from the *internal* Christian use of rationality as thinkers consider Christian teachings through the lens of reason, to its *outward* projection as something useful to be deployed against others in defending Christianity has been made, starting with Anselm's use of reason to argue against the Jewish and Pagan interlocutor. Christian positions defended by reason begin to be defined as *rational* in and of themselves. That is, Christian positions are rational positions, and Christians set themselves apart from non-Christians by their rational acceptance of Christian truth. Note the shift from Anselm's *Pagani,* whose rationality was a barrier. Over time, reason begins to crystalize as a specifically Christian concept, something that is not shared with the Jews, heretics, or Saracens. Reason becomes equated with Christian truth, and as Christianity is the only true religion, it is therefore the only *rational* religion.

This extension of the charge of irrationality to Muslims is helped by the Latin translations of two important Christian polemics against Islam. The first is the *Risalat al-Kindi* (*The Apology of al-Kindi*), a ninth-century letter attacking Islam from the point of view of a Christian. The second is the Latin *Liber denudationis,* a translation of the *Kitāb al-Wādih bi-l-Haqq,* or *The Truthful Exposer*. David Bertaina shows how inter-Islamic disputes over inconsistencies in Qur'anic sura and hadith outlined by the Christian convert Ibn Rajā' became disseminated into Europe and reworked into Christian sources about Islam.[50] Both of these texts had been circulating in Christian Arab communities in the Middle East and Iberia for several centuries prior to their translation into Latin. Peter of Cluny read the *Risalat* and would have found in it arguments attesting to the irrationality of Islam, and an appeal to Muslims to use their God-given reason. Petrus Alfonsi, who was also familiar with the *Risalah,* argued that the Qur'an could not be divinely inspired because it contains logical contradictions.[51] The author chastises the Muslim in the discussion for accepting mere authority of Muslim scripture as enough "... with no evidence or proof [accepting it] from a

[49] Thomas Burman, *Reading the Qur'ān in Latin Christendom, 1140-1560*, Material Texts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), esp. Chapter 1.

[50] David Bertaina, *Būlus ibn Rajā: The Fatimid Egyptian Convert Who Shaped Christian Views of Islam*, Arabic Christianity: Texts and Studies 4 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2022), 85. Bertaina shows how ibn Rajā's book was referenced by Dominican preachers Ramon Marti and Ricoldo da Monte di Croce in their writings about Islam. Ibn Rajā, a convert to Coptic Christianity under the Fatimid dynasty in Cairo, wrote *The Truthful Exposure* to show the contradictory and often irrational passages of the Qur'an.

[51] Tolan, *Saracens*, 151-2.

person who transmits it in his and his people's own tongue, using it as proof of its veracity."[52] This old argument of Muslim irrationality finds ready reception outside Iberia.

Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny (c 1092-1156), brings the religion of Islam into focus in a way that marks a break in how Latin Christians outside of Iberia conceive of the Saracen. In holding up Islam as the object of serious study for the first time, Peter's views on Islam depart from the earlier, ambiguous views held by Anselm and Abelard where the Saracen could be just a rational non-Christian. His failure to be Christian is a problem, but this is not emphasized as a moral failing. Anselm, Abelard, and Adelard were not working with Muslim religious texts. Their understanding of Islam was gained either through personal experience or from their association of Muslim scientific texts with the Saracens who produced them—that is, separated from religion almost entirely. Peter's facilitation of the translation of the Qur'an into Latin allowed for a shift in the conversation regarding Muslims. More and more the question will be about the problem of the Muslim, and their ability to be converted or not. We will look at how rationality plays into this conversation.

Peter's *Contra sectam Saracenorum,* one of the earliest Latin texts to use reason in defense of Christianity against Islam, makes an appeal to Muslim rationality. The abbot writes that he hopes to appeal to Muslims "not by force, but by reason."[53] Scott Bruce calls Peter's 1156 work "…the first of its kind, a formal censure of Muslim beliefs that brought to bear the most important intellectual tool of the early twelfth century: reason."[54] The tract was written after Peter's visit to Spain, during which he had commissioned the Latin translation of the Qur'an and other texts that would make up the Toledan Collection. Unlike an earlier work, *Summa totius haeresis Saracenorum,* in which Peter critiques Islam from a Christian perspective, in the *Contra sectam* Peter purportedly writes for a Muslim audience, appealing to Muslim reason and their ability to discern true from false doctrines.[55] His hope is that dialogue with the Saracen might convince them of the truth of Christianity and avoid the necessity of Christian force. Peter's attitude toward Muslims in this work is in contrast with his characterization of the Jews, who he claims possess a "bovine" intellect, and who could hardly be expected to act better than "impudent dogs and vile pigs" incapable of reason. Note that Peter has no qualms about directing his criticism at *all* the adherents of Judaism. He is not targeting solely a singular author or prophet of Judaism. However, in the *Summa,* he narrowly directs criticism at Muhammad. Muslims are followers, duped by the promise of an easy life on earth and a carnal afterlife. Muhammad is portrayed as a vile cult leader who works the intentions of the devil.[56] Peter's

---

[52] Mourad Takawi, "'Abd al-Masih al-Kindi (D. CA. 830): An Arab Exposition of the Christian Faith," in *Medieval Encounters: Arabic-Speaking Christians and Islam*, ed. Ayman S. Ibrahim, Gorgias Handbooks 55 (New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2002), 133-64.

[53] John V. Tolan, *Sons of Ishmael: Muslims Through European Eyes in the Middle Ages* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008). See also James Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 176.

[54] Scott G. Bruce, *Cluny and the Muslims of la Garde-Freinet: Hagiography and the Problem of Islam in Medieval Europe* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2015), 99.

[55] Tolan, *Saracens*, 159.

[56] Tolan, *Saracens*, 158. Kritzeck, in *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, notes that in letters to his contemporaries, Peter asserts that Muslims, unlike the Jews, share some fundamental beliefs with Christians and therefore should not be exterminated. Peter wrote that [Muslims] "took away Christ

work was not translated into Arabic, and so remained out of reach of Muslim readers, but he also hoped that the work might prove useful for Christian audiences who might be tempted to convert to Islam.

If rationality is what separates humans from the lesser beasts, Peter must appeal to the rationality of the Muslim in Book One of his "Against the sect," enjoining his Muslim readers to recognize their commonality with Christians through the binding force of reason. After explaining how animals love their own kind, Peter writes that "… since man also exists among the infinite number of species which, as it is said, is contained under [the genus] animal, and since, furnished with reason, he has what no other species of animal has, he is induced, moreover, to love one like himself by the persuasion of reason far more than he is by the force of nature."[57] Peter hopes that—unlike the Jews—Muslims might be capable of recognizing rational arguments. If Muslims were deceived, it was that Satan led them away from the natural gift of human reason, using Muhammad as an instrument of evil. Peter calls Satan "the Corruptor of human nature with this poison tainted and infected those whom I mentioned, the Saracens of modern times."[58] Peter's dismay at Islam is magnified by the success that the Saracens have had in conquering geographical territory and by their success in "wisdom." As Muhammad had succeeded in duping people to follow him, Peter worries that Christians might also be so duped.[59] Throughout the text, Peter calls upon Muslims to debate their religion, explaining that if their religion is indeed the truth then they should not be afraid of debating Christians.

Certainly not all medieval writers who considered Islam would have accepted the idea of Muslim rationality. Early stereotypes about Muslims referenced their violent natures and the lascivious nature of their prophet. [60] The imbrication of Christian acceptance of reason with the stereotype of Muslim irrationality takes full form in the twelfth century. By this point a number of Arabic texts have been translated into Latin and there was wider circulation of earlier Christian polemics against Islam. In written form, much of the focus of Christian critiques of the irrationality of Islam focused on those parts of the Qur'an that did not agree with Christian theology. Thomas Burman has documented in detail the marginal notes in Robert of Ketton's translation of the Qur'an. Alongside a concerted effort to render a true translation of the Arabic, the marginal notes frequently use the adjective "stupid" to describe some of the ideas, particularly when the text differs doctrinally from Christianity.[61] One of the biggest chasms between Christian and Muslim thought was over the concept of

---

and substituted the devil; from here, not by gentle reason but by violent invasion, it subjected to the profane religion…Egypt, Libya, and all of Africa." Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam,* 157. We find a similar attitude toward Muslims as dupes in an early history of the First Crusade by Raymond of Aguilers, who he depicts as fighting against their wills to defend the laws of Muhammad. See Penny J. Cole, "'O God, the Heathen Have Come into Your Inheritance' (Ps. 78.1): The Theme of Religious Pollution in Crusade Documents, 1195-1188," in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, ed. Maya Shatzmiller, Medieval Mediterranean 1 (New York: Brill, 1993), 84-111, 94.

[57] Irven M. Resnick, trans., *Peter the Venerable: Writings Against the Saracens* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 77.

[58] Tolan, *Sons of Ishmael*, 52.

[59] Tolan, *Sons of Ishmael*, 60, suggests that the Christians Peter might have been thinking of when he says that he wrote the *Contra sectam* in part to cure the "hidden cogitations of some of our people" might be the translators and students of Arabic science and philosophy.

[60] See Clinton Bennet, "Christian Perceptions of Muhammad"*;* John V. Tolan, *Saracens.*

[61] Burman, *Reading the Qur'an in Latin Christendom*, esp. Chapter 3.

the Trinity. If Muslims could not see the truth of the Trinity, then this was enough proof of their irrationality. This is the opposite of Anselm's early twelfth century *Cur Deus homo,* wherein it was the *Pagani's* rationality which prevented their acceptance of Christian truth.

One way that the irrationality of theological opponents of Christianity could be highlighted was in public debates and in published polemical materials (which often claimed to be reflective of such debates). Staged performances or "debates" between Christians and (often coerced) Muslims or Jews were held for the benefit of the public. These performances emphasized rational discussion, and Christian positions were presented as the only rational ones. Not surprisingly, the Christian always "won" the debate, and hopefully convinced members of the audience of the truth of the Christian position. Tolan writes that "the Latin Christian world view, carefully constructed over the centuries and increasingly buttressed by philosophy, could not allow itself to be undermined by infidel objections."[62] The performances served to raise such questions about religion in the safety of a highly staged event where the non-Christian positions could always be shown to be problematic. Both in writing and in oral debates, philosophy was able to serve Christianity by providing logical and intellectual support for Christian positions that were first known through revelation. As Christian positions were held up and defended, they were contrasted with "irrational" positions of Jews, Muslims, and heretics.[63] However, despite many efforts to hold up Christianity as the only rational religion, there existed a major obstacle to the blanket characterization of Muslims as irrational: learned Latin Christians were well aware of their intellectual debt to the Arabs, which was ongoing in the twelfth century.[64] The incongruity between the known intellectual contributions of Muslims and the difficulties Christians had taking Islam seriously as a religion were explained away by appealing to the rationality of the intellectual Saracens, who must have rejected the irrational religion.[65] Some writers note only the works of the Arabs, seemingly avoiding the term "Saracen."[66]

EXPROPRIATION

Though the measure of what constitutes the rational changes over the course of the thirteenth century, there are certain hallmarks of rationality. One is that rational scholarship and arguments move beyond authority as a basis for truth. Accepting without question the authority of the Qur'an or Islamic law was thought by thirteenth-century Christians to be a central feature of Islam. Another measure is the frequent alliance of the "rational" with temperance, and irrationality with intemperance. Again, Christians found many examples of Muslim lack of restraint

---

[62] Tolan, "Saracen Philosophers," 197. See also Tolan, *Saracens.*

[63] Daniel J. Lasker writes that "the use of rational argumentation against Judaism is one of the hallmarks of the new Christian apologetics of the twelfth century." See Daniel J. Lasker, "Jewish-Christian Polemics at the Turning Point: Jewish Evidence from the Twelfth Century," *Harvard Theological Review* 89, no. 2 (1996): 161-73, 168.

[64] For a detailed account of this history, see Lyons, *Islam*, Chapter 4.

[65] See Tolan, "Saracen Philosophers," 186.

[66] See Benjamin Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches Toward the Muslims*, Princeton Legacy Library (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016), 90-92.

when it came to physical pleasures in this world and the next. The Christian critique of Muslim lasciviousness is one of the oldest and most long-standing negative characteristics highlighted in Christian materials.[67] Writers concerned themselves with the number of wives permitted to Muslims, with Muslim acceptance of divorce, and with the ease with which remarriage was permitted. The sexual habits of the prophet were frequently criticized. Specific stories and verses were repeatedly cited (Zayd, Maryam the Copt), and these topics themselves were cited as evidence of the irrationality of the Qur'an. Lack of temperance with respect to physical pleasures, combined with the sense that Islam was a violent religion spread by the sword because it was too ridiculous to have been spread otherwise, were common topics. Finally, because it was axiomatic for Christians that scripture was true, any beliefs that ran counter to scripture were de facto irrational.

William of Auvergne (d. 1249) attacks Muslims for all three of these features of irrationality. William, Bishop of Paris, is among the generation of Latin scholars who were the first to engage with the newly translated Greek and Arabic texts.[68] William was enthusiastic about the new translations of Arabic work and was heavily influenced by Avicenna in particular.[69] Borrowing what he found helpful from the Arabs, William also devoted time to critiquing Avicenna where he disagreed with him. The bulk of his critique is laid out in his set of treatises *Tractatus de fide et legibus contra gentiles*.[70] His critique in this work relies heavily on the connection between reason and the law, in this case Islamic law. After admitting that Islamic law prohibits some things that it should because they are morally evil (e.g. idolatry, sodomy) and permits/commands some things that are good, William notes that the Muslim paradise permits believers earthly pleasures—in unlimited quantities—thus sanctioning through the law irrational and destructive behaviors on a heavenly scale. William dwells at length on what be believes to be this torrid Muslim paradise and worries that a Muslim paradise, which allows for unrestrained sexual intercourse, would eventually run out of room for the children who would be born from these unions. Furthermore, bodies which lived forever and did not disintegrate would not depend on the nourishment of food, and thus the unneeded food and drink that Muslims consumed would only be expelled into paradise, eventually filling it up with excrement.[71]

---

[67] Clinton Bennett, "Christian Perceptions of Muhammad," in *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History. Volume 15, Thematic Essays (600-1600)*, ed. Douglas Pratt and Charles Tieszen with David Thomas and John Chesworth, The History of Christian-Muslim Relations 40 (New York: Brill, 2020), 153-79.

[68] Winston Black, "William of Auvergne on the Dangers of Paradise: Biblical Exegesis Between Natural Philosophy and Anti-Islamic Polemic," *Traditio* 68 (2013): 233-58, 236.

[69] See Roland J. Teske, "William of Auvergne's Debt to Avicenna," in *Avicenna and His Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium Leuven—Louvain-la-Neuve, September 8-September 11, 1999,* ed. Jules Janssens and Daniel De Smet, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 1st ser., vol. 1 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 153-70; Katrin Fischer, "Avicenna's Influence on William of Auvergne's Theory of Efficient Causes," in *The Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Physics and Cosmology*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci, Scientia Graeco-Arabica 23 (Boston: De Gruyter, 2018), 371-96.

[70] This treatise is one of seven that make up William's *Magisterium divinale ac sapientiale.* See Sean Murphy, "William of Auvergne," In *Christian-Muslim Relations. A Bibliographical History. Volume 4, (1200-1350)*, ed. David Thomas and Alexander Mallett (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 288-94.

[71] Black,"William of Auvergne," 253.

After exposing what he sees as the absurdities of such a place as this Muslim paradise, William turns to the Muslim wise men and the question of how they could buy into such a mad doctrine. As Black and Teske's scholarship has shown, William expresses dismay that such a great philosopher as Avicenna would consent to the kind of "madness" in believing the physical description of Paradise lay out in the Qur'an. In his discussion of paradise, William notes that "… for these reasons some of the wise among the Saracens hold that Mohamed did not understand these promises [of physical paradise] literally."[72] Avicenna's association with the Qur'anic description of physical pleasures in paradise prompts William to write that "On this point he [Avicenna] clearly showed himself not to be a philosopher, but a partaker in this madness."[73] Philosophical sensibility is contrasted with the irrationality of these particular objectionable beliefs. In this passage, William knows (on one level) that Avicenna *is* a philosopher, but in accepting this "madness" Avicenna is rejecting the only conclusion that William sees can be drawn by philosophy—that is, that the pleasures of paradise are spiritual.

Leaving aside any questions about the veracity of William's reading of Avicenna on this matter we can ask how William reconciles Avicenna the wise with Avicenna the fool. First, he goes to some pains to distinguish between the intellectuals of Islam—for whom he usually has respect—and the propagator of the religion, Muhammad, who has written this doctrine. We can note that William must have been among the very earliest of thinkers to make such a distinction between the Muslim believers and the "non-believing" sages. Having had the privilege to read—and admire—some of the Arabic translations, he cannot just blanketly critique Muslim beliefs. He must separate *true, believing* Muslims from intellectuals who are identified as Muslims but who *usually* are smarter than their own doctrines. Muhammad is in the former camp. William notes that one could call the prophet of the Muslims a "peasant, or even, as someone has said, a cowherd and swineherd."[74] Furthermore, according to William, Muhammad was not much of a philosopher (such as al-Battani) but a disciple of a Nestorian monk.[75] This kind of disparaging language does not need to be used on the pseudo-Muslim sages, who do not occupy this uneducated, irrational place. As for Avicenna, William notes that he usually saw beyond the "madness" of the Muslim position, but with respect to certain ideas, he seemed incapable of leaving aside the false law and its requisite beliefs. When Avicenna acts in his capacity as philosopher, he rejects Muslim belief. When he accepts Muslim belief, he is mad and irrational.

Another of William's critiques of Avicenna (and Muslims more broadly) is their unquestioning acceptance of the authority of Muslim law. Avicenna's conclusions regarding the nature of the human soul are attacked by William as irrational because they contradict Christian scripture. Referring to the 1210 and 1215 Paris condemnations of Avicenna's positions, William says they are merited, because Avicenna was "…so great a philosopher [capable of] being able

---

[72] Roland J. Teske, trans., *William of Auvergne: The Immortality of the Soul,* Medieval Philosophical Text in Translation 20 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press: 1991), 220.

[73] William of Auvergne, as quoted in Black, "William of Auvergne," 241.

[74] Willaim of Auvergne, as quoted in Black, "William of Auvergne," 250.

[75] William of Auvergne, *De legibus,* as quoted and translated in Black, "William of Auvergne," 250.

to see beyond such absurdities as the denial of individual immorality and yet neglecting to do so."[76] Rather than dismissing Avicenna's position as ridiculous, William attributes to him some kind of momentary weakness in this topic of the soul. Any position that contradicts Christian truth must be irrational. William might have just critiqued Avicenna's position as stupid, but he knows that Avicenna is not stupid, so he critiques him for his stubborn refusal to see that the positions on the soul contradict Christian scripture. Islam cannot be a starting place for a rational argument. Therefore, Avicenna's acknowledgment of Islamic law is an illegitimate starting place.[77]

Denial

The focus here has been on philosophical materials, but this same shift towards the rational over authority was seen in other areas. For example, Christian preaching materials, theological letters, and sermons changed to reflect more rational arguments. Roger Bacon (d. 1292) believed that the translations from the Arabic appeared perfectly timed to arrive in time for Christians to make good use of them. He saw this as proof that God sent Christians the support they would need for completing the necessary conversion of non-Christians.[78] Humbert of Romans (d. 1277) was initially so encouraged by messages sent back from Dominican missionaries about their success in converting Muslims to Christianity that he promoted the study of Arabic and Hebrew to help with conversion efforts.[79] But such enthusiasm was not to last. Humbert's later work *Opus tripartitum*, written about 1273, espoused that Muslims "reject all learning" and argued that it would be useless to waste rational arguments on Muslims in the futile hope of their conversion. Recall that for Peter the Venerable, reason was a human quality shared by all humans. Humbert's interpretation is that the Muslims have thrown themselves in with the brutish animals, and thus they do not share the quality of human reason. For Humbert, Muslims are violent and led like animals by a cruel Master. They have always lived by the sword. More importantly, Humbert erases Muslims from any contributions to the advancement of human knowledge. He sees the "new knowledge" (or "new philosophy") as the rightful inheritance of Christianity from the Greeks and makes no mention of the contributions of Arab philosophers or scientists.[80] While his contemporaries express guarded appreciation and thoughtful criticism for the Arab works, Humbert sees philosophy as handed directly from the Pagan Greeks to the Latin

---

[76] Quoted in Gordon Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Itellectual History* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1968), 194.

[77] Avicenna, for his part, had argued that Christian teachings contained logical inconsistencies. He wondered, for example, why the Christian resurrection would be *bodily* if the pleasures of paradise were only *spiritual.* See Tolan, "Saracen Philosophers Secretly Deride Islam," 188.

[78] Power, *Roger Bacon*, 264.

[79] Cited in Palmer Allen Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda* (Amsterdam: N. V. Swets and Zeitlinger, 1940), 168.

[80] Quoted in Edward Tracy Brett, *Humbert of Romans: His Life and Views of Thirteenth-Century Society*, Studies and Texts (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies) 67 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,1984), 48. See Throop, *Criticism*, 149.

Christians via Augustine: "Such Pagan studies as physics, ethics, logic and the like, are the spoils of the enemy of the Church. These studies which were useless to the Pagans can become for the Christian faithful a possession useful for the salvation of souls."[81] His efforts denigrate both the Pagan and the Muslim: the first had no good use for these studies, and the second group would not recognize intellectual genius when they saw it. He describes the Saracens of the Holy Land as a foul people who have "occupied, polluted, and profaned" the area, where they must certainly gather in holy chapels of the area to engage in illicit sex and other abominable acts before the crucifix.[82] This idea of Saracen inability to appreciate the classical heritage of Greece and Rome would strengthen over time.[83] The ultimate aim for the Dominicans must be to convert them—now by force if necessary—and repossess the holy lands. In this sense, Humbert's writings can be seen as a justification for future violence against the Saracens, who rejected Christian offers of conversion. It is a marker of the denial of Muslim value outside of their potential as converts.

Starting in the late thirteenth century and strengthening in the fourteenth, Christians gradually abandon the idea that Muslims will listen to rational arguments and be moved to convert to Christianity. The success of Thomas Aquinas in stripping away what from the Christian position are the errors of Arab philosophy—particularly those of the philosophy of Averroes—and claiming reason as a Catholic property contributes to a sense that the Arabs have corrupted the original philosophy of the Greeks. Brian Copenhaver has called this the move from "Commentator to Corruptor."[84] Christian authorities will oversee burnings of books attributed to the Averroist heresy, including Dante's *De Monarchia,* condemned by Pope John XXII (d. 1334). Dante had placed Averroes at the outermost circle of hell in his *Inferno.* But Averroes will inch closer toward hell in the works of later authors. His philosophical defeat is brought to artistic perfection in Francesco Traini's fourteenth- century painting *The Apotheosis of St. Thomas* in the Church of St. Catherine in Pisa. The painting depicts the glorified Aquinas, with the figures of the Greek philosophers at his side, and Averroes lying at the bottom of the painting under Aquinas's feet. Fourteenth-century humanists will accuse Averroes and the Arabic authors of "using a barbaric tongue" to express the ideas of Aristotle. Petrarch wished to devote much of his energy to refuting Averroes, who he described as a dog who "barks with his rabid and foaming mouth at the very sun of justice."[85] The fate of Islam as anti-rational is reaffirmed in the nineteenth century by Ernest Renan, who declared in his lecture "Islam and Science," delivered in 1883, that "What distinguishes the Muslim is the hatred of science…" and that Islam itself was harmful to human reason.[86]

---

[81] Brett, *Humbert of Romans*, 48.

[82] Brett, *Humbert of Romans*, 7.

[83] For examples, see Lyons, *Islam*, Chapter 4.

[84] Brian Copenhaver, "Ten Arguments in Search of a Philosopher: Averroes and Aquinas in Ficino's 'Platonic Theology,'" *Vivarium* 47, no. 4 (2009): 444-79, 469.

[85] Petrarch, *Invectives*, trans. David Marsh, I Tatti Renaissance Library 11 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 69.

[86] Ernest Renan, "Islam and Science: A Lecture," March 29, 1883, La Sorbonne, trans. Sally P. Ragep, 2011,
https://www.mcgill.ca/islamicstudies/files/islamicstudies/renan_islamism_cversion.pdf.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has aimed to link together the history of reason with a history of European Christian attitudes toward Muslim writers, and, by extension, Islam, suggesting that as intellectuals became more comfortable with Christianity using Aristotelian logic, dialectic, and disputation, they were increasingly uncomfortable with the idea that members of other religions could be considered rational, despite the many contributions toward intellectual material from members of non-Christian faiths. This rise of rationality accompanied decreasing hopes for conversion of Muslims, and a framing of the Saracen writers as wise men who secretly rejected their irrational faith. Taking its title and framework from Jonathan Lyons' assertion that Arabic science in the Latin Christian consciousness moves from "affinity to expropriation to denial," this essay has extended Lyons' own analysis and overlay it with a focus on Christian rationality from the eleventh through fourteenth centuries.[87] Adelard of Bath marks the period of affinity, with his praise of *studia Arabum* and the Arab scientists who have thrown off the halter of authority. Peter the Venerable's efforts to translate works of Arabic anti-Islamic polemic and the Qur'an serves as a turning point, after which Islam becomes for the larger Latin Christian world an object of study. William of Auvergne properly illustrates the "expropriation" of Arab work, insisting on Muslim irrationality while adopting and adapting scholarship from Avicenna and others. We can see in William's criticisms of Avicenna and of Islam the beginning of denial of Muslim contributions to intellectual advancements. For William, Avicenna was rational, but Islam was not. He puzzled greatly over how Avicenna could accept Islam. Other examples of Christian expropriation abound and have been covered by others. There are, furthermore, many thinkers who fit nicely into the mold of affinity, expropriation, denial who could not be covered in this paper. For example, Peter Alfonsi, who used the rationalist method in his religious polemics against Muslims and Jews, is only noted here. William of Tripoli is sympathetic to learned Muslims, as is Roger Bacon. Daniel of Morley, writing at the end of the twelfth century, explains that he left the ignorant brutes of Paris for Toledo where he could study the "teachings of the Arabs."[88] And of course, Tolan's work has covered Ramon Llull, Raymon Marti, and Ricoldo de Montecroce. Finally, the protracted period of denial describes not only the late thirteenth century with respect to Christian perceptions of Islam as anti-rational but can be generally applied to our own age.

There are at least two long-lasting effects that can be traced back to this history of "affinity, expropriation, and denial." The first is the framing of Muslims as irrational and enslaved to their religion—notions that persist to this day. Polemical works penned in the high medieval period promoted a picture of Muhammad as a magician who had tricked people into following his ridiculous

---

[87] Lyons, *Islam*, 80. One might argue that this move from affinity, expropriation, and denial can be seen on an individual level, too, in the work of men such as Peter Alvarus, or Ramon Llull. However, Alvarus' stance towards Arabs and Islam is less affinity or admiration than grudgingly acknowledging its attraction and hold on the Christian youth. He does not engage with such culture in order to be taught by it.

[88] Dorothee Metlitzki, *The Matter of Araby in Medieval England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 37. See also Lyons, *Islam*, Chapter 4.

ideas by tempting them with earthly pleasures, particularly sexual ones. The view of Islam was entirely a Christian one, void of any account by Muslims of their faith. The second effect is the erasure of the history of Arab—both Christian and Muslim—contributions to human intellectual history. The "caretaker" narrative—that the Arab intellectuals took care of the Classical Greek tradition until Europe was intellectually ready to take it over—was long the academic explanation for the undeniable existence of Arab and Muslim science. The careful work of George Saliba dislodged this narrative in scholarly circles, though Arab intellectual contributions to our collective human knowledge remain largely unknown outside of certain narrow circles.

Grand Valley State University

Bibliography

Abelard, Peter. *Collationes.* Edited and translated by John Marenbon and Giovanni Orlandi. Oxford Medieval Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Abulafia, Anna Sapir. *Christians and Jews in Dispute: Disputational Literature and the Rise of Anti-Judaism in the West (c. 1000-1150).* New York: Routledge, 1998.

Abulafia, Anna Sapir. "St. Anselm and Those Outside the Church." In *Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience: Papers Read at the Anglo-Polish Colloquium of the British Sub-Commission of the Commission Internationale d'Histoire Ecclésiastique comparée, 9-13 September 1986*. Studies in Church History Subsidia 6, edited by David Loades and Katherine Walsh, 11-37. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Published for the Ecclesiastical History Society Basil Blackwell, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143045900001149

Abelard of Bath. *Adelard of Bath, Conversations with His Nephew : On the Same and the Different, Questions on Natural Science, and On birds*. Edited and Translated by Charles Burnett. Cambridge Medieval Classics 9. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Anselm. "Cur Deus Homo." In *Basic Writings*, edited and translated by Thomas Williams, 237-326. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007.

Bennett, Clinton. "Christian Perceptions of Muhammad." In *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History. Volume 15, Thematic Essays (600-1600)*, edited by Douglas Pratt and Charles Tieszen with David Thomas and John Chesworth, 153-79. The History of Christian-Muslim Relations 40. Boston: Brill, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004423701_008

Bertaina, David. *Būlus ibn Rajā': The Fatimid Egyptian Convert Who Shaped Christian Views of Islam.* Arabic Christianity: Texts and Studies 4. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004517400

Black, Winston. "William of Auvergne on the Dangers of Paradise: Biblical Exegesis Between Natural Philosophy and Anti-Islamic Polemic." *Traditio* 68 (2013): 233-58. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0362152900001665

Brett, Edward Tracy. *Humbert of Romans: His Life and Views of Thirteenth-Century Society*. Studies and Texts (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies) 67. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984.Bruce, Scott G. *Cluny and the Muslims of la Garde-Freinet: Hagiography and the Problem of Islam in Medieval Europe*. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2015.

Burman, Thomas. *Reading the Qur'ān in Latin Christendom, 1140-1560.* Material Texts. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812200225

Burnett, Charles. "Adelard of Bath and the Arabs." In *Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: The Translators and their Intellectual and Social Context.* Variorum Collected Studies Series. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Catlos, Brian A. *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, c. 1050-1614.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511843518

Chazan, Robert. *Daggers of Faith: Thirteenth-Century Christian Missionizing and Jewish Response.* Berkely: University of California Press, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520407022

______. "The Deteriorating Image of the Jews—Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries." In *Christendom and its Discontents: Exclusion, Persecution, and Rebellion, 1000-1500,* edited by Scott L. Waugh and Peter D. Diehl, 220-33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Chenu, M. D. *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Cohen, Jeremy. *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520922914

______. "The Muslim Connection: On the Changing Role of the Jews in High Medieval Theology." In *From Witness to Witchcraft: Jews and Judaism in Medieval Christian Thought*. Edited by Jeremy Cohen, 141-62. Wolfenbütteler Mittelalter-Studien 11. Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz Verlag, 1966.

Cole, Penny J. "'O God, the Heathen Have Come into Your Inheritance' (Ps. 78.1): The Theme of Religious Pollution in Crusade Documents, 1195-1188." In *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria,* edited by Maya Shatzmiller, 84-111. Medieval Mediterranean 1. New York: Brill, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004477513_007

Copenhaver, Brian. "Ten Arguments in Search of a Philosopher: Averroes and Aquinas in Ficino's 'Platonic Theology.'" *Vivarium* 47, no. 4 (2009): 444-79. https://doi.org/10.1163/004275409X12512583682231

Daniel, Norman. *The Arabs and Mediaeval Europe*. London: Longman, 1975.

______. *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image.* 1960. Reprint, Oxford: Oneworld Press, 1993.

Fichtenau, Heinrich. *Heretics and Scholars in the High Middle Ages, 1000-1200.* Translated by Denise A. Kaiser. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992.

Fischer, Katrin. "Avicenna's Influence on William of Auvergne's Theory of Efficient Causes." In *The Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Physics and Cosmology*, edited by Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci, 371-96. Scientia Graeco-Arabica 23. Boston: De Gruyter, 2018.

Grant, Edward. *God & Reason in the Middle Ages.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511512155

Gutas, Dimitri. *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbāsid Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th Centuries)*. New York: Routledge, 1998.

Hitchcock, Richard. *Muslim Spain Reconsidered: From 711-1502.* The New Edinburgh Islamic Surveys. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780748678297

Holopainen, Toivo J. *Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century.* Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 54. New York: Brill, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004451063

______. "Peter Damian." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/peter-damian

Horowitz, Irving. "Averroism and the Politics of Philosophy." *The Journal of Politics* 22, no. 4 (1960): 698-727. https://doi.org/10.2307/2126929

Iogna-Prat, Dominique. *Order and Exclusion: Cluny and Christendom Face Heresy, Judaism, and Islam, (1000-1150).* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Jolivet, J. "L'Islam et la raison d'après quelques auteurs latins des IXe et XIIe siècles." In *L'Art des confins. Mélanges offerts à Maurice de Gandillac*, edited by Annie Cazennave and Jean-François Lyotard, 153-65. Paris: PUF 1985.

Kedar, Benjamin Z. *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches Toward the Muslims*. Princeton Legacy Library. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.

Knowles, David. *The Evolution of Medieval Thought.* Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1962.

Kritzeck, James. *Peter the Venerable and Islam*. Princeton Studies on the Near East. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400875771

Lake, Justin. "Gerbert of Aurillac and the Study of Rhetoric in Tenth-Century Rheims." *The Journal of Medieval Latin* 23 (2013): 49-85. https://doi.org/10.1484/J.JML.1.103772

Lasker, Daniel J. "Jewish-Christian Polemics at the Turning Point: Jewish Evidence from the Twelfth Century." *Harvard Theological Review* 89, no. 2 (1996): 161-73. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0017816000031965

Leff, Gordon. *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History*. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1968.

Levine, Robert, trans. *The Deeds of God Through the Franks: A Translation of Guibert de Nogent's Gesta Dei per Francos.* New York: Boydell Press, 1997.

Lyons, Jonathan. *Islam Through Western Eyes: From the Crusades to the War on Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Mews, Constant J. "Nominalism and Theology before Abelard: New Light on Roscelin of Campiègne. *Vivarium* 30, no. 1 (1992): 4-33. https://doi.org/10.1163/156853492X00025

______. "Peter Abelard and the Enigma of Dialogue." In *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment*, edited by John

Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman, 25-52. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812205862.25

Murphy, Sean. "William of Auvergne." In *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History. Volume 4, (1200-1350)*, edited by by David Thomas and Alex Mallett, 288-94. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012.

Murray, Alexander. *Reason and Society in the Middle Ages.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Nogent, Guibert de. *The Deeds of God Through the Franks: A Translation of Guibert de Nogent's Gesta Dei per Francos.* Translated by Robert Levine. Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1997.

Novikoff, Alex J. *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice and Performance*. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812208634

Petrarch. *Invectives*. Translated by David Marsh. I Tatti Renaissance Library 11. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Power, Amanda. *Roger Bacon and the Defense of Christendom.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511843402

Radding, Charles M., and Newton, Francis. *Theology, Rhetoric, and Politics in the Eucharistic Controversy, 1078-1079.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. https://doi.org/10.7312/radd12684

Renan, Ernest. "Islam and Science: A Lecture." March 29, 1883, La Sorbonne, translated by Sally P. Ragep, 2011, https://www.mcgill.ca/islamicstudies/files/islamicstudies/renan_islamism_cversion.pdf

Resnick, Irven M, trans. *Peter the Venerable: Writings Against the Saracens.* Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2016.

Rosenthal, Erwin. "The Place of Politics in the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 15, no. 2 (1953): 246-78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00111103

Szpiech, Ryan. *Conversion and Narrative: Reading and Religious Authority in Medieval Polemic*. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812207613

Stiefel, Tina. "The Heresy of Science: A Twelfth-Century Conceptual Revolution." *Isis* 68, no. 3 (1977): 346-62. https://doi.org/10.1086/351812

Takawi, Mourad. "'Abd al-Masih al-Kindi (D. CA. 830): An Arab Exposition of the Christian Faith." In *Medieval Encounters: Arabic-Speaking Christians and Islam,* edited by Ayman S. Ibrahim, 133-64. Gorgias Handbooks 55. New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2002. https://doi.org/10.31826/9781463244484-008

Teske, Roland J., trans. *William of Auvergne: The Immortality of the Soul.* Medieval Philosophical Text in Translation 20. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press: 1991.

______. "William of Auvergne's Debt to Avicenna." In *Avicenna and His Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium Leuven—Louvain-la-Neuve, September 8-September 11, 1999*, edited by Jules Janssens and Daniel De

Smet, 153-70. Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 1st ser., vol. 1. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002.

Throop, Palmer Allen. *Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda.* Amsterdam: N. V. Swets and Zeitlinger, 1940.

Tolan, John V. "Saracen Philosophers Secretly Deride Islam." *Medieval Encounters* 8, no. 2-3 (2002): 184-208. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700670260497042

______. *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

______. *Sons of Ishmael: Muslims Through European Eyes in the Middle Ages.* Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008.

Truitt, E. R. "Celestial Divination and Arabic Science in Twelfth-Century England: The History of Gerbert of Aurillac's Talking Head." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 73, no. 2 (2012): 201-22. https://doi.org/10.1353/jhi.2012.0016

Verbeke, Gerard. "Philosophy and Heresy: Some Conflicts Between Reason and Faith." *The Concept of Heresy in the Middle Ages (11th-13th C.),* edited by D. Verhelst and W. Lourdaux, 172-97. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983.