

The Scottish Revolution in its International Context,
1639-1640

A Senior Honors Thesis

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by

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	1
Conventions and Abbreviations	2
Preface	3
I. International Dynamics & the Road to Revolution	5
2. A Treasonous Superscription	30
3. The Rebellion Progresses	43
Conclusion	62
Appendix A	64
Appendix B	66
Bibliography	67

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Conventions and Abbreviations

Conventions

Dates throughout utilize the Julian Calendar used in Scotland, Ireland, and England during the seventeenth century. However each year throughout begins on 1 January, as in Scotland, but not in England and Ireland, where the year began on 25 March. The majority of continental Europe utilized the Gregorian Calendar, which was ten days different from the Julian Calendar: thus 5 September 1639 in Great Britain was 15 September in France and the Low Countries.

Abbreviations

NA – National Archives, London

NAS – National Archives Scotland, Edinburgh

Preface

The Scottish Revolution of 1637-40 has been extensively researched and documented, either by itself or in conjunction with the Irish Rebellion and English Civil War that soon followed. Then in a series of path-breaking studies Steve Murdoch revealed the Revolution's international context, particularly Scotland's relationship with Scandinavia and the Dutch. The Scots received support from the United Provinces, because they too had rebelled against their sovereign when he attempted to force an alien confession of faith upon them.¹ Sweden also gave support to the Scots as "...Sweden too owed her independence to an uprising against the tyrannical rule of a foreign power, Denmark..."² The Scottish connection with France during the Revolution has, by contrast, been neglected.

This is surprising, because Scotland and France had been traditional allies since the thirteenth century, something the Scots called the Auld Alliance, yet historians have overlooked their connection during the Revolution. Charles I, ruler of England, Scotland, and Ireland since 1625, did not make this mistake. Although he made only muted protests when the Covenanters received aid from Scandinavia and the Dutch, when the Scots reached out to Louis XIII and France for assistance Charles created an international incident. The possibility of French involvement in Scotland terrified the king. Thus he chose to take a stand when his agents intercepted a letter, written by the Covenanters to

¹ Steve Murdoch, "Scotland, Scandinavia and the bishops' wars, 1638-40," in *The Stuart Kingdoms in the Seventeenth Century*, eds. Allan I. Macinnes and Jane Ohlmeyer, (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002), 115.

² *Ibid*, 115.

Louis XIII, and he used it to mobilize English support in what would become known as the Short Parliament in hopes of attaining funding for his second war against the Scots.

For the Scots, the letter to France was the last best hope of securing serious foreign aid against a king who seemed bent on destroying their religious and political liberty. Although the interception of the letter made French intervention impossible, the appeal of the Scottish leaders does provide important information on the international dynamic between Scotland, England, and their continental neighbors during the Scottish Revolution from 1639 to 1640.

Chapter 1 International Dynamics & the Road to Revolution

Charles I succeeded his father James I and VI in 1625, making him the first adult heir to ascend the Scottish throne since 1390.³ He also took over the throne at a time of relative peace in Scotland, especially after considering the country's tumultuous experiences in the 16th century. Yet the 17th century presented Scotland with another reality; that of an absent king residing in England. This reality increased Scotland's likelihood of having a king largely out of touch with their needs and their culture. The absence of the king also fostered the rise of Scotland's "new" men. Traditionally, Scottish society revolved around the king, yet without his physical presence in the country, he was forced to rely increasingly upon the nobility to carry out his will. In fact, from 1603 to 1641 the size of the Scottish nobility practically doubled.⁴ Thus Scotland's new men were becoming increasingly more important in the governing of the country.

In Scotland, religion held a particular prominence. Religion was the cornerstone of society and people depended on it in the everyday workings of their lives. The importance placed on religion did not lay in its structure but rather in its practice. Thus any changes to religious practice in Scotland provoked widespread unrest and agitation. James I did reinsert bishops into the Scottish Presbyterian system, much to the dismay of his Scottish subjects, yet it was Charles who elevated the bishops' positions within the Scottish system at the expense of traditional Presbyterian practices and regulations. This

³ David Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution 1637-1644*, (Great Britain: David & Charles; Newton Abbot, 1973), 15.

⁴ *Ibid*, 18.

gave Charles a trustworthy power base in Scotland, however ultimately it was his attempt at anglicizing the Kirk of Scotland that provoked widespread outrage and open hostility toward the crown. In fact, the new king hoped to form his countries into "...an Anglo-centric 'empire': a unity in which the two kingdoms of the Celtic fringe, Scotland and Ireland, were to be subordinated – and in part assimilated – to the religion and government of England..."⁵ His first act toward this Anglicization came in 1625 with the Act of Revocation, which rescinded grants and gifts of royal property given particularly to nobles since 1542. This was an extreme revocation as it included both royal and Kirk property. Although Charles' intentions concerning this revocation were moderate, it was a direct attempt to establish his power in Scotland at the expense of his subjects.⁶

The relationship between England and Scotland can be characterized by extreme antagonism. This antagonism was particularly vicious in the 16th century. For example, Scotland lost two kings within the span of twenty-nine years. In 1513 James IV was killed at the battle of Flodden fighting the English, leaving his toddler son as king. In turn, James V died at Falkland Palace after his crushing defeat at the hands of the English at the battle of Solway Moss in 1542. Instead of leaving a male successor however, James V left an infant daughter, Mary, as the heir to the Scottish throne. This event prompted the English to pounce on their demoralized neighbor by beginning the Rough Wooings led by Henry VIII. This period was characterized by Henry VIII's repeated attempts to marry his son Edward to Mary, in an effort to join the two countries together. When negotiation failed, Henry forced his idea upon the Scots through violence, which

⁵ John Adamson, *The Noble Revolt, the Overthrow of Charles I*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 4.

⁶ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 35.

also led to failure. These instances are only a sampling of all of the actual violence existing between Scotland and England contributing to their mutual antagonism.

Religion was also another key area of friction between Scotland and England. Both countries underwent reformations, however the Scots viewed their reformation as the purest in existence. Thus they saw Presbyterianism as superior to their English counterpart; Anglicism and the Church of England.

Scotland, like England, exhibited desires and motivations in their neighboring country. In fact, long had the Scots desired the control of the English throne. This want only heightened after the death of Henry VIII and his third act of succession, which reinstated the previously illegitimate daughters of Henry VIII, Mary and Elizabeth, after their brother Edward in the English succession. This was highly contentious, as both children were previously deemed illegitimate through the proceedings Henry himself initiated against their mothers, Catherine of Aragon and Anne Boleyn. Thus an argument formed that promoted Mary Queen of Scots as the true heir to the English throne after Henry's son Edward, as her grandmother was Henry VIII's sister. France, who wished to dominate both Scotland and England, greatly supported this argument. This contention concerning Mary Queen of Scots was also perpetuated through her son James in his quest for the English throne, which he eventually acquired in 1603 when he became James I of England.

Like the relationship between Scotland and England, the relationship between Scotland and France was equally deep-seated. However, the relationship between France and Scotland was not marked by antagonism but by friendship. The two countries were united through the long standing Auld Alliance. This alliance began on 23 October 1295

with the Treaty of Paris, which was an offensive and defensive alliance negotiated between John Balliol, King of Scots, and Philip IV of France.⁷ From that time forth, even through periodic ruptures, the alliance remained intact. One of the major obstacles to the Auld Alliance was the reformation in Scotland, which removed one of the key aspects of the alliance; Catholicism. However, the significant unifying force associated with the Auld Alliance stood intact; the need to act together against their common enemy, the English.

In the 16th century the Alliance found itself weakened through divisions of religion. Yet it was soon revived through Mary of Guise who married James V of Scotland. Mary came from a prominent French family with strong ties to Henri II, King of France. Mary of Guise's strong tie to France reinstalled strong Franco-Scottish connections in both countries. The Alliance was further solidified with Henry VIII's Rough Wooings, as the French actively supported the Scots against the English. Henri II insisted France should protect “ce pauvre royaume d’Escosse [poor Scotland]’ from falling under the sway of England...” while he also wanted “...to make Scotland ‘his’ and thirdly to unite the three Kingdoms of France, Scotland, and England into one self-same monarchy...”⁸ Instead of marrying Mary Queen of Scots into the English monarchy, Mary of Guise signed the Treaty of Haddington, which set up Mary Queen of Scots’ marriage to the French Dauphin. The French and Mary of Guise also had the backing of the Scottish nation as “Most of the political nation did not want union with England and to avoid it, they were prepared to become a French client, to allow their

⁷ Norman Macdougall, *An Antidote to the English: The Auld Alliance, 1295-1560*, (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 2001), 1.

⁸ Marcus Meriman, *The Rough Wooings: Mary Queen of Scots 1542-1551*, (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), 296.

queen to be raised in France and to postpone consideration of the implications of her marriage to the Dauphin.”⁹ The treaty essentially made Scotland a French satellite state, and in 1558 with the marriage of Mary Queen of Scots to the French Dauphin, Scotland became the keystone for French imperial design. The reality of Scotland becoming incorporated in a French empire occurred when Mary Queen of Scots signed secret documents preceding her marriage stating that should she die without children her rights to Scotland and the English succession would be transferred to France.¹⁰ Henri II would thus have access to not only Scotland but England for his imperial designs. After the failure of Henri’s dream of empire, the Franco-Scottish link again grew slight. Thus, it is apparent that France often used the Auld Alliance to further their own ends and needs without regard to the consequences in Scotland.

In addition to renewed ties in the 16th century, Scotland continued to send troops to France. This too aided the French with their involvement in wars on the continent. For example, in 1638 Cardinal Richelieu wrote to the French ambassador in London at the time, Monsieur de Bellièvre, concerning the acquisition of Scottish troops, stating that Louis XIII, the King of France,

...a pris un singulier plaisir à sçavoir les particularitez de ce qui s’est passé [sur ce sujet] en Angleterre, et n’en a pas un petit ressentiment. Il a esté aussy très ayse de voir l’espérance que la reyne d’Angleterre vous donne d’obtenir la permission de la levee des 2 régimens escossois...plus volontiers qu’il est advantageous au roy de la Gr. Br. de tirer des Escossois d’Escosse, en ce temps où il y a du trouble en ce royaume...¹¹

⁹ Jane Dawson, *Scotland Re-formed 1488-1587*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 173.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 193.

¹¹ M. Avenel, ed., *Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers d’état du Cardinal de Richelieu, vol. 6, 1638-1642* (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale), 212, Cardinal Richelieu to M. de Bellièvre, 26 September/6 October 1638.

The utilization of Scottish troops once again typifies the Franco-Scottish relationship as one of convenience and advantage for the French. Yet the presence of Scottish troops also signified that a link still existed between the two countries. The French were also aware and kept abreast of the rumblings that began in Scotland in 1637.

Like Scotland and England's relationship, the relationship between England and France was also marked with antagonism and hostility. English kings had long laid claim to the French throne. This claim was renewed notably in the 16th century with Henry VIII who actively claimed he was the true King of France in 1513 and again in 1544. This added to the rivalry and hostility between England and France. Yet these two countries were allies when it suited their needs and interests. In 1625 Louis XIII's sister, Henrietta Maria, married Charles I in order to prevent Charles from aligning with French Protestants or with Spain.¹² However the marriage designed to improve the relationship between the two countries, or at least aid France from a strictly French perspective, was quickly ruptured when Charles expelled the Catholics from Henrietta Maria's chamber.¹³

However it was the matter of the Palatine in the 1630s that dominated the relationship between Scotland, France, and England. This matter sparked the Thirty Years War with a Protestant union against the Habsburg Empire with Frederick the Elector of Palatine at its head. The need for Charles to settle the matter gained greater prominence when Frederick died leaving his son and Charles I's nephew, Charles Louis, Elector of Palatine.¹⁴ The French wanted the English to align themselves with France

¹² A. Lloyd Moote, *Louis XIII, the Just*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1989), 181.

¹³ Hubert Méthivier, *Le Siècle de Louis XIII*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 63.

¹⁴ Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 72.

against the Habsburg Empire. This position set up the need for France to be on amicable terms with the English. By August 1635 the English and French seemed to actually be getting along as the French inquired into a possible alliance between the two.¹⁵ Thus the French found themselves in the precarious position of maintaining an amicable relationship with England and Charles I while also maintaining open dealings with the Scots.

Scotland, France, and England all possessed highly complex relationships with one another in part due to the experiences of their rulers. Charles I's behavior and ruling style were greatly influenced by his childhood and his strained relationship with his father, James I and VI. Charles grew up in the shadow of his older brother Henry, whose death in 1612 shattered James. Instead of placing his love and favor upon his second son, Charles, James instead focused this attention on one of his court favorites, George Villiers, the duke of Buckingham. This alienation from his father turned Charles against many of James' innovations at the English court as well as his many Scottish behaviors including familiarity at court, which "...separated the prince from the centre of Scottish influence at the English court – the entourage in the royal bedchamber..."¹⁶ When Charles took the throne in 1625 his rebellion against his father's Scottish ways was vastly apparent as he created a court of strict formality and ceremony which only proved to further remove him from his Scottish and English subjects. Yet his Scottish subjects bore the brunt of his ways, as they were forced to adopt English manners when seeing him to receive even the slightest hope of favor.¹⁷

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 526.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 774.

¹⁷ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 17.

Although it is believed that Charles spoke with a Scottish accent, he retained little else from the country of his birth. Charles was much more anglicized than his father, leading to further alienation from his Scottish subjects. In time his Scottish subjects also began to resent Charles as he deprived many nobles from what they believed to be their fair share in the government of Scotland.¹⁸ In addition to this increased alienation of his Scottish subjects, Charles embarked on a very Anglo-centric foreign and religious policy. In 1633 Charles finally visited Scotland for his coronation, and while there he appeared to be very uncomfortable with Scottish ways. In addition, he ordered the reconstruction of St. Giles Church in Edinburgh into one large cathedral.¹⁹ This action helped signal that religion was to be a key and ultimately damaging issue in Scotland.²⁰ Charles and his key religious advisor the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, "...made no secret their intention to Anglicize the Kirk; for the first time, it was what London wanted which almost exclusively directed ecclesiastical policy. The Five Articles [of Perth] were pushed with renewed vigor."²¹ Ultimately it would be Charles' disregard, or rather his unwillingness to comprehend his Scottish subjects and their devotion to Presbyterianism, which brought about rebellion.

Charles also instituted controversial measures in England so he could rule without parliament. He invoked the ship money levy to bring funds into the government. Ship money was traditionally levied in coastal towns to provide funds to safeguard England's seas. However when Charles began the levy

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 30.

¹⁹ Jenny Wormald, *Scotland A History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 156.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 156.

²¹ *Ibid*, 156.

Opposition to it mounted, but only when it became apparent that the rate was to become an annual one, and the King's discretionary power to proclaim a permanent state of emergency was questioned...But it was not until the summer of 1639 that the opposition became effective.²²

Ship money was a hated and costly levy that would become a key concern once Charles finally did call a parliament.

Early in his reign, Charles embarked on a series of military ventures including disastrous wars with France and Spain. These undertakings were extremely unpopular and Charles eventually withdrew. He then ruled without parliament causing some to call this time period the "Eleven Years of Tyranny."²³ Although removed from continental war, Charles still pursued the restitution of the Palatine. Clearly Charles exhibited weaknesses in his rule, however the most crucial can be broken down as such;

...he was incapable of acknowledging the political manoeuvring within constitutional assemblies was not necessarily intended to obstruct or reverse royal initiatives. Secondly...Charles consistently pushed his prerogative to the limit without convincingly demonstrating the present necessity for authoritarian rule. Thirdly, Charles tended to view criticism, however informed, as subversive and even seditious.²⁴

These weaknesses would ultimately lead to Charles I's downfall.

Charles I's counterpart in France was Louis XIII, son of Henri IV. Louis was born in 1601 and had a different yet equally troubling childhood as Charles I. In 1610 Louis' father was murdered. Louis immediately became king and his mother, Marie de Medici, acted as regent. Her regency was exceptionally rocky as she became too attached

²² John Morrill, *Revolt in the Provinces: the People of England and the Tragedies of War 1630-1648*, 2nd ed., (London: Longman, 1999), 39.

²³ John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds, *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638-1660*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11

²⁴ Allan I. Macinnes, *The British Revolution, 1629-1660*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 75.

to her Italian friends intent on maintaining their political influence.²⁵ Marie also dismissed the great French finance minister, Sully, which made others extremely cautious. Thus, Louis grew up with the realization that his mother's regency was steadily eroding France.²⁶ In November 1630 Marie de Medici went into exile following the Day of Dupes, in which the enemies of Cardinal Richelieu believed they succeeded in ousting him from power, only to find that he remained Louis' closest advisor.

Louis was a precocious child. He was also vehemently anti-Spanish, often calling them "papa's enemies."²⁷ Throughout his life Louis remained staunchly against the Spanish, often courting Charles I into an alliance against them. In 1635 Louis declared war on Spain, later followed by conflict with the Habsburg Emperor, Ferdinand.²⁸ Louis also faced opposition from the Huguenot's during his reign, which he brutally put down. Yet one of the overwhelming conclusions about Louis XIII's reign was that Cardinal Richelieu, not Louis, controlled France. However Louis was always involved in the decisions made during his reign. He exhibited his own point of view concerning the world; he detested the Spanish and Habsburg Empire for the duration of his life, and he insisted upon a policy of toleration with the Huguenots, though he put down their rebellion as he saw it as unprovoked.²⁹

Louis' most trusted advisor was Cardinal Richelieu who rose to power quickly during Louis' reign. Richelieu was exceptionally good at reading the king and the two men complimented each other. Louis understood his duties, yet was often restless and

²⁵ Moote, *Louis XIII*, 41.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 41.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 49.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 239.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 296.

failed go beyond routine and rarely thought outside the box.³⁰ Richelieu on the other hand, was a "...workaholic who liked to concentrate on the whole problem, but he needed privacy to be at his best."³¹ The two quickly developed a rapport of mutual confidence and collaboration.³² This allowed Richelieu to consolidate his power swiftly. He also attempted to control Louis' council and important offices within the French state by utilizing those loyal to him.³³ Thus, Richelieu played a highly significant role during Louis' reign, shaping domestic as well as foreign policy.

As a people, the Scots were bound to the practice of their religion. Discontent with Charles' religious policies had been brewing since the early 1630s, and the prayer book was the tipping point. In actuality Charles made all Scottish grievances - high taxation, dissatisfied nobles, the Five Articles of Perth, the position and elevation of bishops - worse through his

...secretiveness, tactlessness and arrogance. He consistently refused to take account of the opinions and feelings of his subjects. Convinced of the rightness of his religions and other policies, and of his duty to impose them, he would have regarded it as a betrayal of his trust to change them in the face of opposition by subjects who had, as he believed, no right to impose him.³⁴

On 23 July 1637 the new Scottish Prayer Book, orchestrated by Charles and Laud, was read in Edinburgh. The book did not fall in line with Presbyterianism, but instead was much more concurrent with Church of England doctrine. The book also undermined how the Scots viewed their relationship with God and the Presbyterian doctrine of

³⁰ *Ibid*, 161.

³¹ *Ibid*, 161.

³² Méthivier, *Le Siècle*, 44.

³³ Moote, *Louis XIII*, 166.

³⁴ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 51-52.

predestination. When the book was read in St Giles Church in Edinburgh, Jenny Geddes threw a stool at the minister reading the book, igniting the Scottish rebellion.

Charles faced increasingly open opposition to the prayer book, yet he remained resolute in his insistence on the implementation of the book. He was furious that his subjects had disobeyed him and instructed that those responsible for the riots and disturbances in Scotland be punished. Charles also ordered the Scottish bishops to continue reading the prayer book as previously planned.³⁵ However disturbances in Scotland mainly led by nobles, continued to spread. On 28 February 1638 the National Covenant was signed in Edinburgh. The document was then passed around the country for others to sign. It was “violently” anti-Catholic, calling for the defense of true religion.³⁶ The Covenant also called for the renewal of the old covenant signed by James VI.³⁷ It seemed as though the struggle against Charles I was inevitable as “...there war abuses in both kingdomes that merit reformatioun...in kirk and pollicie, whiche the countrie culd not get repairit so long as bischopis stood, who wes ane of the thrie estaites of parliament, follouit still the King, and in materis questionable thair votes kest the ballance.”³⁸ It was also abundantly clear that the bishops had to be removed in Scotland, and in December the Glasgow Assembly was held. The Assembly did away with the Five Articles of Perth, made episcopacy illegal, and removed all bishops and archbishops.³⁹ However Charles could not tolerate this kind of insubordination as his Scottish subjects were directly threatening his authority. In fact Archibald Johnston of

³⁵ *Ibid*, 64.

³⁶ Wormald, *Scotland*, 158.

³⁷ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 82.

³⁸ John Spalding, *Memorialls of the Trubles in Scotland and in England. A.D. 1624-A.D. 1645*, vol. 1, (Aberdeen: Printed for the Spalding Club, 1850), 129.

³⁹ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 124.

Wariston, a very religious lawyer, went so far as to express a desire for the French to invade England, and more importantly a desire for Charles' deposition "...by the Lord's removal of Charles."⁴⁰ Thus, preparations for war began on both sides, as the collision course toward war proved inevitable.

In preparation for war the Scots sent propaganda into England in an attempt to explain what brought about the impending war. Needless to say, the king was furious with the propaganda and the proceedings in Scotland for war. Robert Baillie the Scottish minister wrote that Charles'

...rage was increased by his disappointment in all his designes among us; he was on his way; there was nothing now able to divert him from pursuing of us with fyre and sword bot the God of heaven...we did never dispaire, hoping still that the goodnes of God would never permitt so gracious a Prince to defile his hands in the blood of so loving subjects, for no cause at all bot their opposition to that corruption and tyrannie they were bringing, under the colour of his name, both into Church and State.⁴¹

Baillie acknowledged that the Scottish people were upset not with Charles but with his bishops in Scotland and with Laud. Thus they were still loyal to the king but not to his corrupt religious officials.

Yet the course was already set for war and troops on both sides began to mass. With the swift approach of war, Alexander Leslie returned to Scotland to help fight. Leslie, born in Scotland, was a military man through and through. He served in the Swedish army, had been knighted by Gustavus Adolphus on 23 September 1627, and had

⁴⁰ G.M. Paul, ed, *The Diary of Archibald Johnston Lord Wariston 1639*, (Edinburgh, 1896: Scottish Historical Society, XXVI), 390, discussion about armed resistance, 20/30 September 1638.

⁴¹ Robert Baillie, *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie*, vol. I, (Edinburgh, 1841), 198.

been appointed the governor of Stralsund.⁴² Indeed, Leslie was so well thought of “...his valour and good lvk attained to this title his Excellence, inferiour to none bot to the King of Swaden...”⁴³ Leslie also led a force of Scots in the Thirty Years War, as he believed he was really serving Charles I in restoring his nephew as Elector of Palatine.⁴⁴ He intended on serving the king directly should he decide to raise an army in the war. However after a brief visit to Scotland, Leslie changed his point of view dramatically, as he began to see the Scots’ struggle against Charles as a great European religious struggle.⁴⁵ He was extremely affected by what he saw in Scotland, as he previously believed Charles to be one of the protestant kings standing up to Catholicism.⁴⁶ Yet now “Serving the covenant, he revealed, he regarded as a matter of defending religion and national liberty.”⁴⁷ Leslie’s return to Scotland greatly aided the Scottish cause, as he had a wealth of practical military knowledge and service.

The Scots also greatly desired the support of the English people. Many Englishmen understood the war to be a priests’ war or a war for their priests, as the Scots rejected the Book of Common Prayer and Episcopal government.⁴⁸ In addition, many Englishmen did not want to go to war with the Scots. They believed if the war were

⁴² David Stevenson, “Leslie, Alexander, first earl of Leven (c. 1580-1661),” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford University Press, 2004), <http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/view/article/16482?docPos=2>, (accessed 15 November 2008), 1.

⁴³ Spalding, *Memorialls*, 130.

⁴⁴ Stevenson, “Leslie, Alexander,” 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 2.

⁴⁸ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I. 1639-1640.* edited by William Douglas Hamilton, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1877), 5, Answer of John Oneby, Counsellor at Law to the complaint of John Moore, 2 October 1639.

successful they would be placed in an even more subservient position below the king.⁴⁹ Nor did they want to support a war that could make the calling of parliament even more obsolete if successful. The Scottish war was also highly unpopular among the English people, as they had no desire to fight their neighbors to the north.

Yet Charles pushed forward. In 1639 the war began in Aberdeen, a notorious bastion of Catholicism in Scotland. To the dismay of Charles, the Scots ended up taking the city. Even early on the English did not do well. With news of these troubles, Charles' belief that the French were behind the Scottish rebellion grew.⁵⁰ However in reality, the French were not supporting the Scots. Regardless of the disappointing progress of the war for the English, Charles still believed that underneath it all the Scots were loyal to him.⁵¹ This depicts how unrealistic Charles' mindset really was toward his Scottish subjects.

Charles continued to be proven wrong, and by June he was convinced that the Scots possessed a large military force, largely due to a Scottish bluff. This prompted Charles into negotiation and in June the Treaty of Berwick was concluded. The treaty stipulated that all property that belonged to the king or royalists was to be returned, it freed imprisoned royalists, and it stated that the Covenanters could not hold any meetings that were against the law. In return Charles would withdraw his forces from Scotland, give all Scottish property and men that had been seized back to Scotland, and he would

⁴⁹ Samuel Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War 1603-1642 Vol. IX. 1639-1641*, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1891), 11.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 7.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 9.

call a general assembly and parliament in August.⁵² However, the treaty was merely an attempt by Charles to buy more time to conduct his next military campaign against the Scots. He had absolutely no intention of keeping to anything stipulated in the Treaty of Berwick. The same month the treaty was concluded, Charles set about outfitting and fortifying Edinburgh Castle.⁵³ This greatly alarmed many Scots and signified that in no way could Charles be trusted.

Charles did allow a Scottish parliament and assembly to meet, a measure meant merely to pacify the Scots. In parliament, the Scots came up with demands they should have raised when negotiating the Treaty of Berwick. They wanted firm constitutional changes. The Scots called for the official abolition of episcopacy, the deprivation of votes of bishops in parliament, and the Scottish command of the major castles – Edinburgh, Stirling, and Dumbarton.⁵⁴ In short, what parliament was really after was the control of the country. Charles saw this as direct disobedience, and he ordered the parliament be prorogued until March, again buying him time to properly attack the Scots.⁵⁵ The Scots were not ignorant of Charles' actions and they began to worry. On 12 August 1639 a leader of the covenanting movement, the earl of Rothes, expressed that it was not his intention to overthrow episcopacy in Ireland or England. He stated that this idea “was farr from my thoughts.”⁵⁶ Rothes also professed his loyalty to Charles I. Thus, in an attempt to rid themselves of the rumor concerning the overthrow of episcopacy outside Scotland, the Scots attempted to quash some of the tension between themselves

⁵² Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 155.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 157.

⁵⁴ Gardiner, *History of England*, 54.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 54.

⁵⁶ NAS GD 406/1/1093, The earl of Rothes to William Murray, Edinburgh, 12 August 1639.

and the king. Similarly, on 23 November 1639 another leading covenanter, Lord Loudoun, wrote to Charles' most trusted Scottish advisor, the marquis of Hamilton. Loudoun wrote of the need to remedy the problems between Charles and the Covenanters, and hoped Charles would meet with Scottish commissioners to view their petition.⁵⁷

The world was not ignorant of the ongoing events in England and Scotland. In fact the French were closely watching the proceedings between Scotland and England. The French had several main concerns. First of all, they were worried that the Scottish rebellion would push England closer to Spain, France's mortal enemy. The French were also concerned that they were losing the allegiance of the Scots. On 25 February 1639 the French ambassador in England, Bellièvre, wrote "J'ay descouvert que nos Ennemis se servent en Escosse du nom de ce Gentilhomme en la façon que je vous mande, pour nous y faire perdre nos amis..."⁵⁸ It is clear from Bellièvre's statement that he was concerned that France's enemies installed agents in Scotland and that Scotland may be turning against France. At the same time, the French were still very cautious to remain on good terms with the English as they hoped the English would aid them against Spain and the Habsburg Empire.

Charles also became increasingly alienated from France due to the arrest and detention of the Elector of Palatine in France. This alienation was bolstered by Charles' belief that the French, specifically Cardinal Richelieu, were behind the tumult in

⁵⁷ NAS GD 406/1/1125 – The earl of Loudoun to the marquis of Hammilton [Hamilton], Edinburgh, 23 November 1639.

⁵⁸ NA PRO 31/3/71, M. de Bellièvre to M. de Noyers, London, 25 February/7 March 1639.

Scotland.⁵⁹ In addition to his fears concerning French support for the Scots, Charles was also beginning to believe that the Scots were turning France against England. In a letter to the English Ambassador in Paris, the earl of Leicester, Charles wrote that the Scots were “...endeavoring to raise jealousies and misunderstandings between us and such of our neighbours as we are most nearly allied to, and with whom we desire to hold the most firm and inviolable friendship.”⁶⁰ This was a real threat to Charles, as he even asked Leicester to meet with the French King to profess England’s sincere friendship to France. Charles’ overture to the French was clearly an indication of the need to keep France as an ally and friend, and avoid complete alienation.

France was also gravely troubled by the developments in England. In January the French noticed the accumulation of levies raised to fight the Scots, and they feared the amount was far too great for that fight alone. Instead they believed that England made a treaty with the Spanish and Dutch against them.⁶¹ Later that month the Venetian Ambassador at The Hague noted English levies to raise 15,000 infantry and 2,000 horses;

This is ascribed to some hidden intention against France in case the disturbances in Scotland are settled. But the Dutch ambassador in France writes that the French are keeping an eye on this and at the opening of parliament they will direct their attention to conciliating the goodwill of that body and preventing any accident.⁶²

⁵⁹ Gardiner, *History of England*, 89.

⁶⁰ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I. 1640*, edited by William Douglas Hamilton, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1880), 19, Charles I to Robert earl of Leicester, 11 April 1640.

⁶¹ *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, Vol. XXV 1640-1642*, edited by Allen B. Hinds, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1924), 2, Anzolo Correr, Venetian Ambassador in France, to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 10 January 1639.

⁶² *Ibid*, 13, Gieronimo Giustinian, Venetian Ambassador at the Hague, to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 28 January 1639.

The former French Ambassador to England, Bellièvre, promptly dispelled this notion.⁶³ Yet the idea of possible war with the English lingered. The possibility that the English were considering an alliance with the Spanish and Dutch also concerned the French.⁶⁴ This posed an enormous threat to France - militarily and economically.

Even though they desired the friendship of England against the Spanish and the Dutch, the French continued to pursue levies of Scottish troops. This was a frequent topic of discussion within French correspondence particularly in 1639. The levies were also a mask for something deeper. Cardinal Richelieu's almoner, a Scottish Jesuit by the name of Thomas Chambers, made several visits to Scotland in the late 1630s. The missions, justified by the recruitment of Scots into the French army, established a link between France and the Covenanters. The English were not blind to this development. On the contrary the earl of Leicester wrote to English Secretary of State Coke in March about the identity of the Scotsman and his relationship to the French Court and Cardinal Richelieu. As a test Leicester recommended that Chambers be asked to take the Oath of Allegiance at Dover, which he believed Chambers would fail.⁶⁵ This test was indicative of English distrust toward Catholics and the French. It is suspected that Chambers really acted as Richelieu's ambassador to the Covenanters, expressing "goodwill" and negotiating contracts.⁶⁶ His role is believed to have expanded with the Bishops' Wars as he became "...the unofficial Scottish ambassador to the French Court."⁶⁷ However his real tie remains somewhat unclear. On 14 March 1639 the French Ambassador in

⁶³ *Ibid*, 16, Anzolo Correr to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 14 February 1639.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 2, Anzolo Correr to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 10 January 1639.

⁶⁵ NA SP 78/107 Folio 108, earl of Leicester to Secretary Coke, Paris, 15 February 1639.

⁶⁶ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 187.

⁶⁷ Macinnes, *The British Revolution*, 120.

London, Bellièvre, discussed Chambers in his letter back to France. In the letter Bellièvre expressed his fear that the role of Chambers in England would be misinterpreted, leading to allegations by the English about French support of the Scottish rebellion;

L'arrivée de M. de Chambres fera soupçonner icy toutes choses contraires à vos intentions: l'on s'imaginera en consequence de tous les bruits que l'on fait courir, et des opinions que l'on a eue qu'il vient pour fomenter la guerre d'Escosse: non seulement, le peuple, mais aussi beaucoup de personnes de qualité ont pris telle jalousie de nous que tout leur donne de soupçon.⁶⁸

Chamber's role in Scotland is thus somewhat ambiguous. The French choice in sending a Scot back to Scotland to levy troops is clearly suspect. However the concern shown by Bellièvre must be taken into account as it exhibits the French fear of angering the English. Thus, the real extent of Chamber's role in Scotland as a French agent remains undefined. However his presence does signify a move to return to the Auld Alliance of days gone past.

Charles was still extremely wary of the French, as he still believed they were behind the Scottish rebellion. Due to this belief, Charles realized France's worst fear by drifting more and more toward Spain. For example, in August 1639 Charles allowed a large Spanish fleet to enter English waters near Dover. This greatly dismayed the English people who could think of nothing other than the Spanish armada that Queen Elizabeth had so valiantly defeated in the 16th century. A battle between the Spanish and the Dutch ensued shortly thereafter. The Dutch won leaving Charles to mediate between the two. Perhaps the most important aspect to come out of the negotiation were the secret provisions made with Spain. Charles told the Spanish that if they continued to do "so

⁶⁸ NA PRO 31/3/71, M. de Bellièvre to M. de Noyers, London, 14/24 March 1639.

little” for the Elector of Palatine, they would not be greeted with “many courtesies” in England.⁶⁹ Charles was indeed growing closer to Spain while still protecting his interests in the Palatine. Yet the French also gained from the battle between the Dutch and Spanish. Waiting until a Dutch victory was at hand, Bellièvre somehow won Henrietta Maria back over to the French side. It has never been discovered how Bellièvre accomplished this, yet it was a significant accomplishment as Henrietta Maria, up until that point, had been an ardent supporter of Spain. This odd occurrence took place when her mother went into exile, angering Henrietta Maria and turning her against France. In any case, her conversion back to the French side also brought about her husband’s switch. Shortly after Henrietta Maria gave her support to France, Charles did as well. Charles told the Dutch that he would abandon the Spanish if the French made the Prince of Palatine head of the army commanded by the staunch Protestant Bernard of Weimar.⁷⁰ However amicable the Anglo-Franco relationship became after this point, it was quickly soured by the Prince of Palatine’s arrest later in the year by the French.

Even while the French were negotiating with the English, they were still levying troops in Scotland. In fact, the leading covenanters the earl of Argyll, the earl of Rothes, and Alexander Leslie promised Bellièvre they would send Scottish troops to France as soon as their conflict with Charles I was resolved; “...ils me promettent qu’ausstost que leurs affaires seront terminées, non seulement ils souffriront que M. Erskine face sa levée, mais aussy contribueront ce qu’ils pourront du leur à faire que se soient de gens aguerris.”⁷¹ By November some Scottish troops arrived in France and Bellièvre

⁶⁹ Gardiner, *History of England*, 62.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 63.

⁷¹ NA PRO 31/3/71, M. de Bellièvre to M. de Noyers, London, 5/15 September 1639.

instructed that they be well received and well treated.⁷² From these interactions, it can be assumed that the Scots and the French were concocting some sort of mutual agreement. Clearly the French were receiving Scottish troops in return for the aid they sent or planned to send to Scotland. Thus the Auld Alliance was once again acting as a mutually beneficial alliance.

In July 1639 the Scots received more encouraging news from France, or at least from M. de Bellièvre. On 27 June 1639, Bellièvre expressed his desire to send commissioners to Scotland to reassert the Auld Alliance.⁷³ This was a distinct switch from Bellièvre's previous position regarding the Scots. Initially, Bellièvre expressed little sympathy toward the rebellious Scots. However his attitude changed as he saw firsthand what Charles I was doing to the Scots, and he began to actively encourage French support for the Scots. This switch was also due to the appearance of the Prince of Palatine in England who was visiting his uncle. On 30 July, Bellièvre again expressed the need to send commissioners to Scotland to ensure that the Scots did not make any agreement with England that was unfavorable to the French;

...j'estime extrêmement nécessaire d'envoyer en Escosse quelque personne fidèle qui ait soing de nos interests et qui travaille à empescher que les Escossois ne s'accomodent avec les Anglois, au moins à nostre prejudice, et que dans cet accord, il y ait des clauses qui obligent les Anglois à ne se brouiller jamais avec nous sans estre assurez d'avoir en mesme temps les Escossois pour ennemis.⁷⁴

Essentially, Bellièvre reasserted the Auld Alliance by stating that if the English reverted to a hostile policy that hurt the French, they could count on having Scotland as an enemy as well as France. This definitive statement fully supported the Scots' plight against the

⁷² *Ibid*, M. de Bellièvre, 7/17 November 1639.

⁷³ *Ibid*, M. de Bellièvre to M. de la Barde, London, 27 June/7 July 1639.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, M. de Bellièvre to M. de Noyers, London, 30 July/8 August 1639.

English, if only for the true benefit of France. Thus, the French teetered on a very narrow edge between maintaining an amicable relationship with England and angering them by their illusive dealings with the Scots. The traditional antagonistic relationship between the French and the English was clearly still intact as was the Auld Alliance.

Meanwhile, the Scottish parliament was still seeking confirmation for the acts they passed. However it was reported by the earl of Northumberland in October that;

The affaires in Scotland are att this tyme in more desperate condition then ever, the actes they have lately passed in their parlement are so exorbitant and their demands so insolent that it can never be expected the King should give way unto their desirs, for now they goe about to change the whole frame of their goverment, and to deuest the King of all regall power...⁷⁵

It became readily apparent that neither side was going to capitulate, especially when the Scots kept adding to their demands, which further devalued Charles' power. In November in an attempt to work with Charles two commissioners, Loudoun and the earl of Dunfermline, were sent to London to seek the king's confirmation of the acts passed in the Scottish parliament.⁷⁶ While in London, Loudoun paid a visit to Bellièvre. In the meeting Loudoun expressed Scotland's goodwill and respect toward France, especially concerning the protection France provided Scotland in times of necessity. Loudoun also promised not to enter into any treaty with Charles I that did not concur with the following;

...que l'ancienne Alliance entre les Rois et Royaumes de France et d'Escosse sera en tièrement restablie: _ le Roy d'Angleterre ne pourra entre prendre aucune guerre sans l'avis et le consentement du Parlement d'Escosse, et s'il le fait autrement, les Escossois ne seront tenus de prendre part dans le conseil des affaires Estrangères près de la personne de Roy d'Angleterre il y aura doresnarent des Escossois qui pendront garde que rien ne se resolve qui préjudicie à leurs alliances: _ Que les Rois d'Angleterre et leurs fils auront des Escossois en chaque

⁷⁵ NA SP 81/48 folio 135, the earl of Northumberland to Secretary Roe, 29 October 1639.

⁷⁶ Gardiner, *History of England*, 73.

office de leur maison: _ Que le Roy d'Angleterre trouvera bon que les Escossois tiennent un agent à la cour de France, ainsy qu'ils font à la Haye.⁷⁷

The Auld Alliance had thus been virtually reestablished. This renegotiated proposal put together by Bellièvre and Loudoun was favorable to both France and Scotland against England. Scotland and France clearly became increasingly intertwined.

However productive Loudoun's meeting with Bellièvre was, the meeting with Charles was not, for Charles refused to even see the Scottish deputies. Now more than ever preparations for war were pushed. In February 1640 soldiers arrived at Leith outside of Edinburgh to reinforce Edinburgh Castle. This greatly shocked the Scots who feared an imminent shelling of the city.⁷⁸ They were caught seemingly unaware with the coming of this war or at least the speed at which it was approaching. It also seemed as though the king was much better prepared this time around. For Charles, the impending war against the Scots "...was a war of self-affirmation against those who doubted his judgement within the court, and of eventual revenge against his enemies outside it."⁷⁹ Yet he still lacked one thing; money. Charles was in desperate need to finance the war and in December 1639 to a council of lords he stated "...because it concerns us highly, and the safety of our kingdoms, that timely preparations be made for this great action, which cannot suffer the least delay, but requires a quick and vigorous supply of moneys for the present raising of forces..."⁸⁰ The need for money was truly pressing and if Charles wanted to wage another war against Scotland in 1640 he would be forced to call

⁷⁷ NA PRO 31/3/71, M. de Bellièvre to M. de Chavigny, London, 22 November/ 2 December 1639.

⁷⁸ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 179.

⁷⁹ Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 24.

⁸⁰ *CSPD 1639-1640*, 149, Charles I to certain Lords of the Council, London, 6 December 1639.

a parliament. Yet now he felt secure in his decision to call a parliament, as he possessed what he believed to be the ultimate damning piece of evidence against the Scots; an intercepted letter written by the Covenanters to Louis XIII. Thus, Charles called for a parliament to be held in April 1640.

Chapter 2 A Treasonous Superscription

“The Superscription of the Letter is this. AU ROY.”⁸¹ The Short Parliament opened in April 1640 with the reading of a letter sent by the Scottish Covenanters to the King of France, Louis XIII. The main point of contention for Charles I, King of England, Scotland, and Ireland, lay in the letter’s superscription,

For the nature of which Superscription, it is well known to all that know the style of *France*, that is it never written by any *French* man to any, but to their own king; and therefore being directed (AU ROY) it is to their own King...they do by that Superscription acknowledge.⁸²⁸³

Leading Covenanters wrote the letter to the King of France in an attempt to call for aid against the English in what would become the Second Bishops’ War. The letter was in fact a direct call for help,

Votre Majesté (estant l’asyle & sanctuaire des Princes & Estats affligéz) nous avons trouvé nécessaire d’envoyer ce Gentillomme le Sieur de Colvil, pour représenter a V.M. la candeur & naineté tant de nos actions & procédures, que de nos intentions, lesquelles nous desirons estre graveés & escrites à tout l’univers avec un ray du Soleil, aussy bien qu’a V.M.^{84*}

Charles immediately perceived the letter as an act of treason. The letter would in fact play a minute role in the events of 1640 in Scotland, France, and England. However, it did create international repercussions that would influence all three countries.

⁸¹ John Rushworth, *Historical collections of private passages of state, weighty matters in law, remarkable proceedings in five parliaments beginning in the sixteenth year of King James, anno 1618... / and ending [with the death of Charles the First 1648]*, vol. III, (London: Printed by J.A. for Robert Boulter, 1680), 1119.

⁸² *Ibid*, 1119.

⁸³ See Appendix A for Charles’ speech and the Lord Keepers’ comments in parliament, from Rushworth’s *Historical Collections vol. III*.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 1037.

* See Appendix A for Charles’ speech and the Lord Keepers’ comments in parliament, from Rushworth’s *Historical Collections vol. III*.

The Scots clearly maintained ties to France significant enough to send them a letter calling for aid. Nevertheless, presenting their traditional ally with an overture for aid was an entirely different and drastic step. To do so was a risky yet bold move, which required the support of strong and distinguished individuals. The eventual signatories of the 1639 letter were all such men, some of whom became prominent in the covenanting movement. Seven men in total signed the letter to France, they were John Campbell the first earl of Loudoun, John Leslie the sixth earl of Rothes, James Graham the first marquis of Montrose, Alexander Leslie the eventual first earl of Leven, Hugh Montgomery the eventual seventh earl of Eglinton, John Erskine the nineteenth earl of Mar and a man named Forrester of whom little is known.

Three of the seven signatories stood among the upper echelon of the resistance against Charles I. They were Loudoun, Alexander Leslie, and the earl of Rothes. Loudoun rose to become a central and driving force in Covenanter controlled Scotland. He began as a commissioner from the Scots to Charles I. However, Loudoun vehemently opposed Charles' religious policies from his accession to the throne. He wrote against the king's coronation oath in Scotland in which Charles swore to protect the bishops. Loudoun stated that the oath was unprecedented, as his father James I had not sworn to it. Nor did any other group receive this special treatment, such as the nobility or the barons. Loudoun's articulation of this issue reflected the concern of many, "...the taking of this Oath shall overthrow the King's course about tithes, hinder that he cannot make himself immediat superior to the Bishops vassals...give ground to the Church for exemption from secular obedience..."⁸⁵ Loudoun continued to be influential, as he played a prominent

⁸⁵ Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, vol. I, 478.

role at the Glasgow Assembly in 1638, in which the Covenanters took control of Scotland, and reformed Scottish government and worship.

Alexander Leslie became a subscriber of the Covenant because he "...regarded [it] as a matter of defending religion and national liberty."⁸⁶ This was the deciding factor in Leslie's return to Scotland. He now regarded Charles I as a monarch moving backward toward Catholicism, thus posing a threat to Protestantism in both England and Scotland. Leslie also possessed strong ties to the covenanting movement. He identified with the Leslie clan in Scotland, which the earl of Rothes' led, and he was married to one of Rothes' daughters.⁸⁷ Considering his outstanding military career, Leslie was a natural choice to lead the Covenanting armies. With his understanding of Scotland and the military, he created "A modern army...without compromising social structure..."⁸⁸ Leslie also inspired the Scots "...that in the awesome step of defying their king they not only had God on their side but a real chance of military success."⁸⁹ The success of the First Bishops' War for the Scots was largely accredited to Leslie. As Robert Baillie fondly recalled

...such was the wisdome and authoritie of that old, little, crooked souldier, that all, with ane incredible submission, from the beginning to the end, gave over themselves to be guided by him, as if he had been Great Solyman....yet was the man's understanding of our Scotts humours, that gave out, not onlie to the nobles, bot to verie mean gentlemen, his directions in a verie homelie and simple forme, as if they had been bot the advyces of their neighbour and companion...⁹⁰

Leslie again triumphed in the Second Bishops' War.

⁸⁶ Stevenson, "Leslie, Alexander," 2.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 2.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 5.

⁹⁰ Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, vol. I, 213-214.

John Leslie the sixth earl of Rothes equally propelled the Covenanter position in Scotland as a leader of the movement. He opposed episcopacy in Scotland from the very moment it was forced upon them by King James, and he voted against the Five Articles of Perth, articles attempting to instill religious practices on Scotland like those already found within the Church of England, along with Loudoun in 1621.⁹¹ In 1637 with Loudoun and several others, Rothes "...took offense at his Majesties zealous and godly government of this land, both in church and pollicie."⁹² This group also made a resolution against Charles I to clip his "...wyngis in royall government both in stait and kirk, and craftellie and quyettie tryis the hairtis of the nobles barronis, church, and gentry of England how they were set, and fane them of the same humour and discontentment that them selves were of..."⁹³ In addition, he was at the forefront of the opposition surrounding the introduction of the prayer book to Scotland, and he too played a prominent role at the Glasgow Assembly.⁹⁴ Rothes' was instrumental in bringing people into the covenanting movement. His uncompromising attitude toward episcopacy and religious affairs in Scotland also angered Charles I to the utmost.

The other signatories also had their own unique ties to the Covenant. John Erskine the nineteenth earl of Mar possessed impressive credentials, as he was a knight of the Bath, a member of the Scottish Privy Council, and governor of Edinburgh Castle.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Vaughan T. Wells, "Leslie, John, sixth earl of Rothes (c.1600-1641)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004). <http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/view/article/16493>, (accessed 20 October, 2007), 1.

⁹² Spalding, *Memorials*, 76.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 77.

⁹⁴ Wells, "Leslie, John," 3.

⁹⁵ Vaughan T. Wells, "Erskine, John, nineteenth or third earl of Mar (c. 1585 – 1653)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford University Press, 2004).

His support for the Covenant began in 1638 yet by the mid-1640s he was accused of returning to the king's party, and it has since been deduced that Mar's varying political affiliations were mainly influenced by his fluctuating financial situation.⁹⁶ Mar also possessed a regiment of Scottish troops in France, thus making him an ideal candidate and convincing signatory of the letter.⁹⁷

Hugh Montgomery, the eventual seventh earl of Eglinton, enjoyed strong ties to the Covenanting movement as he was married to the earl of Rothes' daughter. He also had a strong military background as he spent time in France during the 1630s studying fortification and serving with the French army.⁹⁸ Montgomery was a strong opponent of Charles I's ecclesiastical policy and thus took up an important role in the Glasgow Assembly in 1638.⁹⁹ Thus, when the Bishops' Wars began Montgomery was given the post of colonel because of his ardent opposition to Charles I as well as his previous military experience.¹⁰⁰

James Graham the first marquis of Montrose took a much different path to the covenanting movement. He was a supporter of Charles I but a meeting with the king in 1636 left him "slighted," therefore provoking him to switch his allegiance.¹⁰¹ However

<http://oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/view/article/67512>, (accessed 14 November 2008).

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 1.

⁹⁷ Steve Murdoch, *Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe 1603-1746*, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 26.

⁹⁸ T.F. Henderson, "Montgomery, Hugh, seventh earl of Eglinton (1613-1669)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford University Press: 2004).

<http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/view/article/19060>, (accessed 14 November 2008).

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 1.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 1.

¹⁰¹ David Stevenson, "Graham, James, first marquess of Montrose (1612-1650)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Montrose's allegiance to the Covenanters did not immediately develop. According to Robert Baillie, it was the earl of Rothes who convinced Montrose to join with the Covenanters, "...When the canniness of Rothes had brought in Montrose to our party, his more than ordinaire and civill pride made him very hard to be guided."¹⁰² From Baillie's comment it is clear that Montrose wanted to obtain importance within the upper echelon of the Covenant from the onset of his involvement. However Montrose did do some good for the movement, as he was instrumental in gaining signatures for the National Covenant.¹⁰³ Yet it was his desire to attain prominence that made him hotly resented by many within the covenanting movement.¹⁰⁴ For example it was soon apparent that Montrose's drive for power occupied his thinking as it was reported that being passed over for the position of commander-in-chief of the covenanting armies left Montrose feeling jilted.¹⁰⁵

Rothes was not the only signatory to anger Charles. Loudoun's dominant position made him a target as well. In fact, because of his opposition of the Articles of Perth, Loudoun had his promotion to earldom halted by Charles due to his uncompromising and outspoken position.¹⁰⁶ He continued however to notify Charles of the Covenanters' grievances and presented him with a new set in 1639.¹⁰⁷ The earl of Mar also made

<http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/view/article/11194>, (accessed 14 November 2008).

¹⁰² Robert Baillie, *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie*, vol II, (Edinburgh, 1841), 261.

¹⁰³ Stevenson, "Graham, James," 2.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 1.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution 1625-1660*, (Oxford: University Press, 2002), 91.

¹⁰⁷ Spalding, *Memorialls*, 223.

Charles I angry with his support of the Covenant and was stripped of his command of Edinburgh Castle.¹⁰⁸

The Covenanters were clearly exploring the idea of foreign intervention in their conflict, yet they continued to send commissioners to Charles I to negotiate their differences. Charles however proved unwilling to speak with them. These commissioners were repeatedly rejected or kept waiting for long periods of time. Each time Charles seemed to come up with an excuse to refuse them. For example, in 1639 Lord Loudoun traveled to London with several other Covenanters to talk with Charles yet,

...heiring of there cuming, causit command them, the commissioneris, not to approche court be 8 myllis, becaus he had writtin for his commissioner, and was detained by his subiectis maist vniustlie, aganes thair othe of allegians, and contrair to the law of nationis, whairby ane ambassador or commissioner may be recallit be his maister, fra any vther natioun, mekill mair be ane King fra his awin subiectis, at his plesour.¹⁰⁹

The commissioners were refused yet again by Charles, and sent home.

Indeed, Charles often had unreasonable expectations of the Covenanter commissioners. On February 17, 1640 he refused to see them "... unless they are couched in very humble form and accompanied by offers to agree to bishops residing in that kingdom, but that he will go forward with his plans, and obtain by arms what they refuse to concede to reason..."¹¹⁰ By March no real progress had been made. The king still refused to speak with the commissioners unless they came as suppliants and restored

¹⁰⁸ Wells, "Erskine, John," 1.

¹⁰⁹ Spalding, *Memorials*, 235.

¹¹⁰ CSPV, 17, Giovanni Giustinian, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 17 February 1640.

the bishops to Scotland immediately.¹¹¹ They commissioners remained steadfast against Charles I's demands and refused to disarm as they were faced with imminent danger.¹¹² The new French agent in England, Monsieur de Montereul reported similar findings concerning the difficulty the Scottish commissioners were encountering with their king. He also noted that the Scots were becoming more resolved than ever in their struggle against Charles I.¹¹³ As a result of fruitless attempts at negotiation, the First Bishops' War commenced. As Robert Baillie so eloquently but simply stated, the king entered in "...a course of warr against us."¹¹⁴ These accumulations - the prayer book forced upon the Scots, the refusal of Covenanter commissioners, open military action, and Charles' overall disregard for his Scottish subjects and their needs - led to ideas of foreign intervention.

Due to the long-standing Auld Alliance the French were a clear source of possible aid and intervention. However the French were still embroiled in the Thirty Years War. They had only just declared war on Philip IV of Spain in 1635 followed in 1636 by hostilities with the Holy Roman Emperor. Louis XIII was staunchly anti-Spanish and was thus trying to keep Charles I from forming any type of alliance with Spain. Due to the precarious relationship between France and England, the Scots had to be extremely careful when appealing to France for aid. No appeal could be too overt as to alienate the French from the English. In reality the Scots were walking a narrow tightrope, attempting to balance their needs with the needs of the French.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, 20, Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, London, 24 February 1640.

¹¹² *Ibid*, 20, Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, London, 24 February 1640.

¹¹³ NA PRO 31/3/72, M. de Montereul to M. de Chavigny, London, 19 February/1 March 1640.

¹¹⁴ Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, vol. I, 188.

The 1639 letter was actually the second attempt to secure French intervention. During the First Bishops' War in early 1639, the Covenanters drafted their first letter to Louis XIII. However this letter was markedly different from the letter they eventually sent. The initial letter did not ask for aid, but instead asked Louis XIII to mediate between the Covenanters and Charles. Robert Baillie commented on the letter in his journal stating, "We were hopefull of powerfull assistance from abroad if we should have required it. France would not have failed to have embraced our protection."¹¹⁵ In any case, the idea soon fell by the wayside for the Covenanters feared a backlash from the English, as they did not want to ignite anti-Scottish feelings in England.¹¹⁶ However, in early 1640, the Covenanters changed their mind and sent the second letter drafted in 1639 to Louis XIII. Something had definitively changed. In February 1640, Charles I sent troops and ammunition to Scotland to strengthen Edinburgh Castle. This alarming event made the Covenanters realize that the Treaty of Berwick, which had ended the First Bishops' War, had simply been a ploy by Charles to gain more time to prepare for another strike upon them. Also, the positive reaction toward the Covenanting movement from the former French ambassador, Bellièvre, encouraged the Scots to definitively reach out to France. Thus in 1640 the Covenanters sent a letter to France appealing for aid from Louis XIII.

The letter carrier was one William Colville, a Church of Scotland minister.¹¹⁷ Colville made it successfully to France but through convoluted channels one copy of the

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, 191.

¹¹⁶ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 157.

¹¹⁷ A.S. Wayne Pearce, "Colville, William (d. 1675)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford University Press, 2004). <http://oxforddnb.com/proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/view/artilce/6012>. (accessed 18 October, 2007), 1.

letter fell into Charles' hands by way of his lord high treasurer and main ally in Scotland, Lord Traquair.¹¹⁸ Contrary to the very first letter written in 1639, this letter was a direct call for aid. It appealed directly to the benevolence and kindness of Louis XIII as the "...refuge and sanctuary of afflicted Princes, and States..."¹¹⁹ The letter's superscription was also "Au Roy," a gesture of kindness and reverence to Louis XIII. For the Scots, the letter was one of the remaining options to win back the right to practice Presbyterianism against an absent king trying to impose English religion and culture upon them. The letter also represented the rekindling of the Auld Alliance between Scotland and France. In fact, it is the one scant piece of evidence that exists of friendship between Scotland and France in a time period when the alliance was wounded from the divide of Presbyterianism and Catholicism.

The interception of the letter led to the immediate end of possible French aid for the Covenanters. As soon as it was intercepted the English began their investigation into the letter. On 11 April 1640 Charles wrote to the English ambassador in Paris, the earl of Leicester, commanding him to hold an audience with Louis XIII. Just like the French, Charles worried about rupturing the current relationship between England and France. Accordingly, he commanded Leicester to tell Louis "...the reality and freeness of our heart, and how unwilling we are to suffer any sinister conceit to remain with us, to the prejudice of our friendship, or to the raising of the least misunderstanding between us..."¹²⁰ Charles also instructed Leicester to show Louis the intercepted letter. Clearly Charles viewed the letter as a direct threat to the vulnerable peace between England and

¹¹⁸ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 181.

¹¹⁹ Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, 1120.

¹²⁰ *CSPD 1640*, 19, Charles I to Robert earl of Leicester, English ambassador in Paris, 11 April 1640.

France. However he also saw the document as treason, as the letter treated Louis XIII as the Scots' sovereign. For Charles this proved the extent of the disloyalty that was rampant among the Scots but it also confirmed his long-lingering fear; that the French, who in his mind wanted to detach Scotland from his kingdom for their own purposes, encouraged the rebellion in Scotland.¹²¹ Although Charles wanted to preserve the friendship between the English and the French for the time being, the deep-seated precedent of Anglo-Franco hostility and antagonism was still rampant in his line of thinking.

The interception of the letter was also a contributing factor in Charles' decision to call a parliament. Charles was in desperate need of money to finance his upcoming war with the Scots. He ruled without a parliament for eleven years, but he felt that a new parliament would be willing to grant the money needed to fight what he believed to be a traitorous rebellion against him. Charles believed he possessed the trump card; the captured letter to Louis XIII from the Covenanters. The letter only proved to further his convictions that the French were behind the Scottish rebellion and he was convinced that parliament would interpret the letter in the same way. However Charles once again misinterpreted the feelings of his people. The English did not want to fight the Scots, nor did the parliament called in April 1640 want to grant money for another war against them.

Before parliament met Charles arrested Loudoun who was in London with other Scottish commissioners. Loudoun was questioned extensively on 14 April, and he denied knowing the letter had been sent. He also denied knowing the French language, as well

¹²¹ *CSPV*, 29, Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, London, 30 March 1640.

as Colville, the letter carrier. When presented with the letter, Loudoun acknowledged that he did indeed sign it, however he stated that it was dictated to him, again stressing his incompetence in French.¹²² That same day, Charles presented parliament with the letter. The Lord Keeper explained the significance of the subscription “Au Roy,” and then the letter was read in French, immediately followed by the English translation. After its completion, the king rose and announced, “Of these Gentlemen, that have set their hands to this Letter, here is one, and I believe you would think it very strange, if I should not lay him fast; and therefore I have Signed a Warrant, to lay him close Prisoner in the Tower.”^{123*} The Venetian Ambassador also reported that Charles “...did not wish them [parliament] to deal with any affairs at present, as the question of getting the army into the field was too urgent.”¹²⁴ Charles was extremely confident parliament would see that the signatories of the letter had committed treason, especially with what he considered to be the truly damning superscription “Au Roy.”

On 15 April, Montereul reported the events surrounding the letter to the French Secretary of State, the comte de Chavigny. He stated;

...qu'ils voient comme ses sujets d'Ecosse imploroient le secours d'un autre prince contre leur prince naturel, et encore du Roy son frere, qu'il croiort bien ne les devoir jamais assister et n'avoir eu aucune part en leurs mauvais desseins. Il fit veoir après la suscritpion de la lettre, qui fut trouvée fort unjurieuse au Roy de la Grande Bretagne...¹²⁵

Thus, at least within correspondence, the French were trying to sever any ties they may have had to the letter. As Montereul stated, Louis would not take part in assisting the

¹²² *CSPD 1640*, 30, John earl of Loudoun to Charles I, 14 April 1640.

¹²³ Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, 1120.

* See Appendix A for full speech.

¹²⁴ *CSPV*, 37, Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, London, 27 April 1640.

¹²⁵ NA PRO 31/3/72, 1, M. de Montereul to M. de Chavigny, London, 15/25 April 1640.

Scots, nor would the French play any role in the Scots' bad intentions. He also noted the letter's injurious superscription to Chavigny. Montereul reported that the reading of the letter in Parliament brought with it two advantages; the justification of the arrest of the Scottish deputies and a reason for the procurement of funds.¹²⁶

However, despite what Montereul reported and what Charles hoped for, the king found that he had once again miscalculated. Instead of a positive response from parliament, he received the opposite reaction. Parliament briefly stated that the letter had been written before the Treaty of Berwick, which ended the First Bishops' War. It was also their impression that the letter had not been sent to Louis XIII, which indeed it had been. The Commons thus skirted around the issue of the letter and instead responded to the king by asking him about ship money and tunnage and poundage, all unpopular issues facing England. These issues had yet to be addressed and the Commons were astonished that through all the drawn out talk of the letter "...not one word..." had been given to these pressing matters.¹²⁷ Even Montereul noted in his letter dated 23 April to Chavigny how important the matter of ship money was to parliament.¹²⁸ In addition to the aforementioned grievances, parliament enumerated their numerous other grievances to Charles including "1. Liberty of Parliament. 2. Generals concerning religion. 3. Generals concerning civil government."¹²⁹ Clearly parliament was concerned with more pressing matters than an old letter supposedly sent by the Scots to Louis XIII. Needless to say, Charles was not pleased, and dissolved parliament after three short weeks.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 2.

¹²⁷ *CSPD 1640*, 33, Edmund Rossingham to Edward Viscount Conway, London, 14 April 1640.

¹²⁸ NA PRO 31/3/72, 2, M. de Montereul to M. de Chavigny, London, 23 April/3 May 1640.

¹²⁹ *CSPD 1640*, 46, Minutes of John Pym's speech in Parliament, London, 17 April, 1640.

Chapter 3 The Rebellion Progresses

Around the same time the letter was intercepted William Colville's brother, James, was arrested. James Colville was in England distributing papers promoting the Scottish cause when he was apprehended and incarcerated in the Tower of London for dispensing seditious pamphlets.¹³⁰ It was originally believed that James was carrying the letter to France when in fact William was the brother who had delivered the letter to Louis XIII. In May through secret correspondence, the earl of Leicester noted that William Colville was in France and had been since early March. He also mentioned that William inquired after his brother James who he quickly learned was imprisoned in the Tower.¹³¹ The English still believed that James was the real letter carrier, as is indicated in more correspondence from the earl of Leicester on 8 May. Even so, suspicions were growing around one William Colville.

William Colville quickly became a wanted man, as the English slowly discovered his involvement with the letter sent to Louis XIII. On 9 May 1640 the earl of Leicester wrote to England stating that there was a Colville residing in France but his name was William, not James. The ambassador wrote that Colville left Scotland on 10 March and was in France carrying letters from Colonel Erskine, a colonel levying troops in Scotland for France and brother to the earl of Mar. He also reported that Colville commanded Scottish troops as a Captain Lieutenant.¹³² In reality, Colville acted as a mediator

¹³⁰ Spalding, *Memorialls*, 258.

¹³¹ *CSPD*, 104, secret intelligence from France.

¹³² NA SP 78/109 Folio 187, earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, Paris, 25 April 1640.

between the Covenanters and Thomas Chambers, Cardinal Richelieu's almoner.¹³³

However, Leicester stated that he would "...inquire after him; some but very few of his countrymen I know, the Scots have never come much to me, they take me, I think to be Ambr of the King of England only and Chambers the Cardinals' chaplain is Ambr for Scotland in their opinion, for to him they addresse themselves much..."¹³⁴ Although Leicester began the search for Colville within France, he lacked the support of Scots in France for they saw him as an ambassador for England, thus not representing their needs. Yet with the growing suspicions surrounding William Colville, Leicester spoke of kidnapping him and sending him back to England,

...I think I could finde him out...though I could get him into my handes I should not know how to convey him away, nor send him over, unlesse these ministers were acquainted with it...so as without all question somewhere or other, notice would be taken of him, and he would be stayed unlesse the action were avowed by this State, for it is not to be done here [in France]...And to desire the authority of this State to arrest the said Colvill and to conduct him into England, is a thing that I doubt would hardly be granted here, unlesse the person were a notorious traitor, of which I have not proofes to allege against him...¹³⁵

Leicester's worry about William Colville would not be left unattended, as he would soon have to deal with the French government.

With the revelation of the letter in parliament, Scotland and France were both forced to respond. The Scots quickly published a pamphlet that explained their reasons for the letter. They stated that they wrote to France in part due to past precedent of aid. The pamphlet also asserted that there were multiple letters written, however one "...was but an Embrio forsaken in the birth..." while the other letter "...was formed consonant to

¹³³ Murdoch, *Network North*, 26.

¹³⁴ NA SP 78/109 Folio 187, 2, earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, Paris, 25 April 1640.

¹³⁵ NA SP 78/109 Folio 206, earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, Paris, 8 May 1640.

the Instructions, and signed by many hands; But neither was this sent from us...because we conceived that mediation from France would be but late to avert the danger which was so neere.”¹³⁶ In addition, the writing contested Charles’ complaint about the letter’s superscription, “Aide and assistance hath been given in farmer times, If we had called at that time, or have called now in return of our troubles upon Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Poland, or other Nations for help, are we therefore inviting them all to sovereigntie over us?”¹³⁷ Charles’ assertion about the treasonous nature of the superscription was essentially made a mockery because the Scots’ pointed to the silliness of his claim, as it would make many nations sovereign over each other.

The pamphlet also stated that the two letters written in 1639 were done so before the Treaty of Berwick. With regard to the highly controversial superscription, “...the Letter was neither sealed, folded, nor written on the back by us, or by our knowledge...”¹³⁸ Thus in an attempt to clear themselves the Covenanters spread the notion that they had nothing to do with the controversial “Au Roy,” or that they had even sent the letters. All of this was clearly self-preserving propaganda that would coincide with similar French propaganda. However the denial distanced the Scots from France, making aid in the near future impossible.

France was equally quick to respond to the letter read in parliament. Louis XIII quickly rebuffed any attachment to the letter and to Scotland in an audience with the earl of Leicester. The ambassador reported that when he told Louis about the letter and its

¹³⁶ William Kerr, Earl of Lothian, *A true representation of the proceedings of the kingdome of Scotland; since the late pacification: by the estates of the kingdome: against mistakings in the late declaration, 1640*, (Edinburgh: printed by R. Bryson, 1640), 88.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 88.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 89.

superscription Louis declared, "...A moi?...as if he had started a little, ie n'ay point eu de lettre; no, sir, said I, the letter was intercepted..."¹³⁹ Leicester then showed Louis a copy of the letter, which in reality he had seen before. Louis' response was in direct agreement with the French position of denying any and all culpability

...Je vous assure que ie n'ay rien sçeu de cela, et s'ils sont si mal advises (those were his wordes) que de m'escire...vous pourrer assurer le Roy mon frere, que ie n'ay jamais eu et ne veux jamais ausir àffaire avec eux...Ouy (said he) le Roy mon frere peut estre assure de cela, que ie n'aime les rebelles et seditieux et que ie ne les assisteray jamais contre leur Prince.¹⁴⁰

The French King thus denied seeing the letter and helping the Scots. However his statement was in fact only partly truthful, as the letter he had seen was a different copy.¹⁴¹ Louis also claimed to hate the rebellion and the Scots' seditious behavior against their natural prince. Leicester's audience ended with assurances made by Louis to Charles I;

Your Majesty (said I) will then be pleased that I advertise the King my master of your promise and assurance that you will not countenance nor favuor the Scots: Ouy said he, ie vous prie escriver le au Roy mon frere, car comme ie vous ai dit, ie n'assisteray point les Escossois contre luy, ny aucuns autres rebelles contre leur Prince. Me thought this King spake this with much affection to the King and shewed great dislike of the Scots proceedings, and particularly of their letter, which makes me confident that in his owne disposition he doth abhorre their actions...¹⁴²

Thus Louis again asserted his dislike of the Scots and his assurance to Charles that he would never aid the Scottish rebellion. Clearly Louis attempted to distance himself from the Scots to avoid rupture with England. From Leicester's response it is also evident that he believed Louis' sentiments. However in hindsight it is apparent the Louis was simply

¹³⁹ NA SP 78/109 Folio 188, earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, Paris, 25 April 1640.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁴¹ Gardiner, *History of England*, 97.

¹⁴² NA SP 78/109 Folio 187, earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, Paris, 25 April 1640.

trying to maintain a friendly relationship with England when in fact France had been in negotiations with Scotland.

Cardinal Richelieu was also elated that the French averted entanglement with the Scots. Yet he recognized the precarious situation the French faced if it was discovered that they possessed a copy of the letter or that they were in contact with William Colville.

On 24 April he wrote to Chavigny;

Par l'événement Mr de Bellièvre cognoistra que nous avons esté plus sages que luy. On sçait en Angleterre que le gentilhomme qui l'est venu trouver est icy, c'est à luy à prendre garde qu'on ne le prenne au retour, et, à Mr de Chavigny, à luy faire une response sy précautionnée que, si elle vient à estre descouverte, elle ne puisse estre mal interprétée. Monsieur de Chavigny avisera, avec le d. sr de Bellièvre, s'il faudra retenir la d. lettre, ou la renvoyer, et donner bonnes paroles, telles toutesfois qu'elles ne puissent estre mal expliquées du roy d'Angleterre, si elles viennent à estre descouvertes.¹⁴³

Richelieu obviously believed it was not wise to take Bellièvre's advice in aiding the Scots. He also stated that Colville must take great care to avoid being captured. In conjunction with this sentiment, Richelieu advised Chavigny to take great precaution when writing Colville, only using language that could not be misinterpreted. The next day Richelieu wrote again to Chavigny. This letter also possessed a highly cautionary tone. Richelieu stated that "...le d. espion nous faisant cognoistre qu'ils n'ont pas envie de se brouiller avec aucune des couronnes."¹⁴⁴ This reassured the French, at least for the time being, that the English were not planning on initiating any kind of hostile action toward France.

Although the French denied knowing about the letter they did their best to protect William Colville without accumulating too much suspicion. Leicester was still actively

¹⁴³ Avenel, *Lettres*, 689-690, Cardinal Richelieu to M. de Chavigny, Reaumont, 24 April/4 May 1640.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 691, Cardinal Richelieu to M. de Chavigny, Reaumont, 25 April/5 May 1640.

looking for Colville, but every French official he spoke with denied knowing anyone by that name. For example, on 1 June French minister Monsieur de Bullion stated that he knew of no one in the king's service named Colville. However Leicester put his request in writing; "On demande pouvoir l'authoitié de prendre Guillaume Colvill Escossois et de l'envoyer en Angleterre..."¹⁴⁵ Bullion informed Leicester he would look into the matter. However the French had no intention of accommodating Leicester.

Richelieu wrote to Chavigny in response to Leicester's demand to take William Colville back to England. The Cardinal explicitly stated "Faut respondre qu'on n'a aucune cognoissance que Colvill soit criminel au respect du roy d'Angleterre, son souverain. Que s'il n'est accusé d'autre chose que d'avoir négocié avec les ministres de France S.M. le sçait innocent parce qu'il ne l'a pas faict."¹⁴⁶ Colville was accused of negotiating with French ministers, which according to the proceedings between the French and English, Charles knew Colville was innocent. Richelieu openly defended Colville and attempted to keep him out of Leicester's hands. The French claimed there was no evidence to indicate Colville committed a crime and thus he could not be forced back to England. The response that Richelieu gave to Chavigny was the exact response Leicester received. Thus Leicester's attempt to capture Colville and forcefully send him back to England was thwarted.

The French had in fact avoided disaster with the recalling of Bellièvre who wanted so deeply to assist the Covenanters. Louis also proved cunning when dealing with the English. The propaganda released with the denial of seeing a letter written by the Covenanters corroborated the Scottish contention that none of their letters had ever

¹⁴⁵ NA SP 78/109 Folio 208, earl of Leicester to, Paris, 22 May 1640.

¹⁴⁶ Avenel, *Lettres*, 688, Cardinal Richelieu to M. de Chavigny, 24 April/ 4 May 1640.

been sent to Louis XIII. Their immediate reaction contributed to the maintenance of relatively good terms with the English, something they desired. Thus Scotland and France were cleared of all wrongdoing concerning the letter, although Charles still maintained great misgivings about both countries.

The letter sent by the Covenanters to Louis XIII also created waves throughout Europe. Hugo Grotius, the Swedish ambassador to France, reported rather extensively on the letter. On 7 May 1640 he wrote about what had occurred in England and Scotland. He specifically extrapolated on the main point of contention of the letter, the superscription ‘Au Roy,’ stating that it caused great offense to Charles I.¹⁴⁷ Thus, continental Europe maintained a watchful eye on the ongoing events in Scotland.

Although the letter matter appeared to end amicably, there were still many fissures within Scotland, England, and France. The French were still gravely troubled by England’s burgeoning relationship with Spain. This is evident from Leicester’s repeated attempts to quash French fears “...as they [the French] shall not have cause to feare Spaine...”¹⁴⁸ The relationship between France and England was far from stable. Nor did things end well for Colville. By the end of May, William was found on a ship coming from Holland, and at first denied being of any relation to James Colville, still imprisoned in the Tower of London as the suspected letter carrier.¹⁴⁹ In June William Colville was finally pinpointed as the Colville mentioned in the letter to France, and was thus taken to

¹⁴⁷ Hugo Grotius, *Briefwisseling, vol XI 1640*, ed. B.L. Meulenbroek and Paula P. Witkam, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 253, Grotius to Mr. de Groot, Reigersberg, 7 May 1640.

¹⁴⁸ NA SP 78/110 Folio 88, earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, Paris, 14 August 1640.

¹⁴⁹ *CSPD 1640*, 245, Sir Michael Ernle to Secretary Windebank, Berwick, 30 May 1640.

London under guard.¹⁵⁰ Colville would later be released, and eventually became principal of Edinburgh University.

Meanwhile Charles continued to fortify Edinburgh Castle. His war preparations quickly progressed yet he still feared that leading Englishmen were in contact with the Scots.¹⁵¹ Charles however faced an even bigger problem; the English people had no desire to go to war against the Scots for a second time. In June the Venetian ambassador in England noted, “It seems that they discover more and more, by experience, the reluctance of the people here to take up arms against them [Scotland].¹⁵² The English now viewed the Scots as being on their side, as the Scots were enemies Archbishop Laud just like the them. Vehemence toward the Papacy proved to be even more unifying for the Scottish and English.¹⁵³ Charles did not or could not understand this bond between his subjects and this was to become a fatal flaw.

The Scots too prepared for the imminent war against Charles. Their preparations also proved to be more successful and organized than Charles’. Indeed, many foreign officers remained in Scotland training soldiers in the spring.¹⁵⁴ Yet something else was brewing in Scotland; talk of deposition. The idea of deposing Charles began in 1638 when Wariston broached the subject, and now the idea gained more momentum. Talk of deposition was never widespread but it was beginning to circulate as the Scots found themselves fighting Charles for the third straight year. The thought was “...that if he would never concede their demands and honour his concessions...then they would have

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 334, Edmund Rossinghan to Edward Viscount Conway, 23 June 1640.

¹⁵¹ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 188.

¹⁵² *CSPV*, 49, Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, London, 1 June 1640.

¹⁵³ Gardiner, *History of England*, 129.

¹⁵⁴ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 189.

to either have to give up their demands and submit, or deny his authority and depose him.”¹⁵⁵ This rapidly became an option as Charles repeatedly rebuffed the Scots’ commissioners and was clearly voiding the Treaty of Berwick with the fortification of Edinburgh Castle.

Charles faced a formidable foe as Scots’ were determined to receive recognition of their religion whatever the cost. To achieve this, the Scots wanted to hold another session of the Scottish parliament, and either Charles would consent or they would hold it against his wishes. Charles was aware of this condition and decided to let a session of parliament sit in July 1640. The Scottish parliament removed bishops and officers of state from parliamentary membership, which greatly deteriorated Charles’ power base in parliament.¹⁵⁶ With regard to religion, parliament ratified the acts passed at the Glasgow Assembly and the National Covenant. Previous acts of parliament in favor of bishops were nullified, including the Five Articles of Perth.¹⁵⁷ The Scottish parliament also extended its sitting until November. This would provide a precedent for the English Long Parliament, which would move England closer to civil war.

Meanwhile Charles ended the Short Parliament in May. The parliament failed to furnish him with funds to fight the Scots so he was forced to look elsewhere. It was this need for funds that drove Charles further into the arms of the Spanish. The king looked to be creating an alliance with “...the most iniquitous of all the papist ‘tyrants.’ To fund his war against Scotland...”¹⁵⁸ Yet once again he failed to see the international implications that this would create. He “...saw no hypocrisy in condemning the Scots for

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 191.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 194.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 195.

¹⁵⁸ Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 40.

asking Louis XIII to intervene in making peace while he looked to Spain, Holland, Denmark, and elsewhere to make war against his own subjects.”¹⁵⁹ Similarly, Charles reached out to France in hopes of attaining a loan. However he was completely rebuffed, as Richelieu wanted nothing to do with Charles’ difficulties.¹⁶⁰ This was a clear attempt to play on existing tensions between Spain and France.

In addition to Charles’ lack of funds, he also faced another problem concerning France; the French refused to send an ambassador to England. The Venetian ambassador in France tried to convince Louis to send an ambassador to England so the relationship between France and England could be maintained. However Louis countered this assertion stating he had not thought extensively on the matter and that the “...King of Great Britain, a prince of peculiar ideas, is unwilling to extend his vision outside his own kingdom, it pleasing him better to toil there with disadvantage and loss of reputation, than to take advantage of what could be done outside, for the benefit of the common cause.”¹⁶¹ Louis was referring to the matter in the Palatine, which still plagued both England and Scotland. It is evident from Louis’ comment that the Franco-Anglo relationship was rapidly deteriorating. It is also apparent that Charles’ reputation abroad was unfavorable, something that was highly undesirable especially when relationships between kings were so vital to the inner workings of a country.

Charles’ turn toward Spain also signaled the reemergence of vehement anti-Catholicism. A degree of anti-Catholicism existed in England since the country became a protestant nation, yet it had been growing in great lengths since Charles married Henrietta

¹⁵⁹ Mark Fissel, *The Bishops’ Wars: Charles I’s campaigns against Scotland, 1638-1640*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 297.

¹⁶⁰ Gardiner, *History of England*, 157.

¹⁶¹ *CSPV*, 77, Alonzo Correr to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 15 September 1640.

Maria. People disliked the dominance of the queen's faction, but more explicitly they feared the Catholics within her entourage.¹⁶² People had long feared the entanglement in one of the many wars between the Habsburgs and Bourbons. Charles' actions during his rule did nothing to dispel these worries, as he had ended the formal alliance with France, went against his peoples' wish to go to war with Catholic Spain, and allowed the reemergence of a Spanish faction at court.¹⁶³ Scottish propaganda that began in 1638 claimed papists, in order to remove Protestantism and reestablish Catholicism, advanced the war with England.¹⁶⁴ At the time this was a real worry and fear for people, and Charles' move toward Spain did nothing to quash these feelings. A speech in parliament by a Mr. Ruydiard echoed this sentiment, "This Roman Ambition will at length bring in the Roman Riligion..."¹⁶⁵

The questioning of Charles' authority went hand in hand with the reemergence of hostile anti-Catholicism. Charles effectively removed himself from the national conscience that was so vital in ruling Scotland, as well as England, and his assertion of the Divine Right of Kings was simply a joke.¹⁶⁶ In accordance with the degradation of Charles' power, the Scots wrote a note to him in March 1640 declaring their desires, including the justification of their covenant according to the laws of Scotland.¹⁶⁷ The paper also included many ecclesiastical and policy demands. These direct and straightforward demands challenged Charles' authority in his own kingdom. Soon thereafter Charles stripped the earl of Argyll of his titles of Argyll and Tarbet, thus

¹⁶² Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 842.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, 842.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 842.

¹⁶⁵ NA PRO 30/24/33/9, *Speeches in Parliament*, 1640.

¹⁶⁶ Gardiner, *History of England*, 145.

¹⁶⁷ Spalding, *Memorialls*, 258.

ordering that no one should obey Argyll. However the response from Edinburgh was not what Charles anticipated. Instead of complying with his order, the Scottish council replied with resounding non-compliance, "...in sic trubulous tymes...they durst scarslie hasard to mak any sic proclamationis against the persone of sic ane pryme noble man; besides, it wes not agrieable to Scottis lawis, to deprive him of his estait or digneteis..."¹⁶⁸ This was a direct rejection of royal order and thus a clear subversion of power. The Scottish council claimed they could not proclaim the order as Scotland was in an uproar; they faced sea and land armies, and Edinburgh Castle was threatened.¹⁶⁹

All this time Lord Loudoun continued to plead his innocence. By July Loudoun was released from the Tower with the stipulation that he would act as a pseudo-negotiator between the King and the Covenanters, presenting them with the Articles of Pacification and then returning to England in three weeks to report on his progress.¹⁷⁰ Loudoun did return to England at the end of July but with the Scottish army, and was present at the Scottish victory at the Battle of Newburn on 28 July.¹⁷¹

The Scots knew the support of the English people was vital to their chances of success. In accordance with this position, they sent manifestos and propaganda to England explaining their position. These manifestos included the changes Charles made against their religion, his attempt to suppress the ancient liberty of Scotland, which included the interruption of Scottish trade, the confiscation of their ships and goods.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 264.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 264.

¹⁷⁰ *CSPD 1640*, 460, Dr. Eleazar Duncon to Secretary Windebank, Durham, 9 July 1640.

¹⁷¹ David Stevenson, "Campbell, John, first earl of Loudoun (1598-1662)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford University Press, 2004). <http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/view/article/4511>, (accessed 16 October, 2007).

¹⁷² *CSPV*, 70, Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, London, 31 August 1640.

This declaration was an attempt to win English support for the Covenanter cause as well as to prepare the English for a Scottish invasion. Similarly, the propaganda sent into England intended to

...highlight the fundamental unity of the Scottish and English causes; to identify the mutual enemies of the two kingdoms, that is, the bishops and popish councilors who had led the king astray; and to emphasize the lawful and orderly nature of the Scots proceedings, so as to allay English fears that the Scots were seditious rebels or (after the August invasion) self-interested marauders.¹⁷³

The Scots believed the only way to truly defeat Charles I and make him respect their views was to invade England. The Scots also issued “The Intention of the army of the kingdom of Scotland, declaired to there bretheren of England, by the commissioners of the lait parliament, and by the Generall, nobilmen, barrons, and uther officiaris of the army.” This document professed Scotland to be a second Israel, a shelter for God’s people free from religious tyranny. They sought vindication of their religion from the evils of Charles I.¹⁷⁴

In accordance with their religious sentiment, the Scots wrote to ministers of reformed churches in Switzerland seeking aid for their religious precepts against Charles I. On 4 June 1640 Charles Marini, a resident in Zurich, informed Grotius of the contents of the Scottish letter to the Swiss;

...il semble, qu’ils ont assez de sujet de défendre leur privilèges et prévenir le mal qui les menace....En un mot ils concluent que les évesques introduits en Escosse auroyent tâche d’introduire peu à peu non seulement les cérémonies et l’hiérarchie papales, bastir des autels, insinuer l’union avec la papauté, mais s’attacher aussy au gouvernement d’estat, ius utriusque gladii sibi arrogando et, ut verba sonant litterarum, in sanctoris consilii senatu dominabantur, ius in foro dicebant, vectigalibus et fisco regio praesidebant, ut tandem et ad cancellariatus vestigia pervenirent. Telles choses certes on ne devoit point permettre aux gens

¹⁷³ David R. Como, “Secret Printing, the Crisis of 1640, and the Origins of Civil War Radicalism,” *Past and Present* 196 (January 9, 2008), 55.

¹⁷⁴ Spalding, *Memorials*, 321.

d'église protestante moins les défendre en la possession d'icelles come mal convenables à leur estat et personnes.¹⁷⁵

Thus, the Scots sought confirmation and aid from other like-minded Protestants against the injustices of Charles I. On 27 August it was reported that the Swiss wrote to Charles seeking an amicable compromise on behalf of the Scots.¹⁷⁶ Hence Grotius' correspondence illuminates the fact that the Scots actively sought support beyond the French for their struggle against Charles I. This support came mainly from Scandinavia, and surprisingly Christian IV gave more aid to the Covenanters than to Charles I.¹⁷⁷ In fact, by 1639 Scotland already had diplomatic ties to Scandinavia, which "...staved off condemnation of the National Covenant or military intervention by Denmark-Norway."¹⁷⁸ In addition, the letter to the Swiss depicts the Scots' continued effort to gain support from continental Europe even when aid from France was no longer a possibility. This appeal to the Swiss also represented the truly international dimension and European-wide consequences of the Scottish rebellion against Charles I.

Some of the English did fear an invasion while others simply believed it to be a bluff. However, it was not a bluff, and in August the Scots crossed the Tweed River into England. The Scots maintained a conscious effort to keep on good terms with the English, as they were potential allies. Thus the Scots developed a strict no plundering policy. Upon the crossing of the Tweed, "They issued a proclamation assuring the men

¹⁷⁵ Grotius, *Briefwisseling*, 328, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 4/14 June 1640.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 496, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 27 August/6 September 1640.

¹⁷⁷ Murdoch, "Scotland," 133.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 133.

of Northumberland that they would not take a chicken or a pot of ale without paying for it. They brought with them cattle and sheep for their immediate necessities.”¹⁷⁹

While the Scots hoped to end the war quickly by securing their demands, the French wanted to keep England embroiled in the Scottish war. This went hand in hand with the French refusal to send an ambassador to England. The English wanted a French ambassador in London to put pressure on the Spanish to negotiate, and the French refusal eradicated this pressure. The continuation of the war possessed a similar premise;

...the Puritans are less hostile to us [France] than to the Spaniards. These rebels in Scotland are making war openly on the king, and in England they are all ready to make some disturbance. So long as they see the negotiations continued with the Spanish ambassadors, and that there is no one representing France, they will keep up their agitation, from their fear that something may be arranged with the Spaniards to the prejudice of us or of the common business...¹⁸⁰

Thus it was to France’s benefit to keep England at war to further their seemingly perpetual conflict with Spain. In addition to the need to keep England at war, the French had to deal with their involvement in the Thirty Years War. This pressing matter, much closer to home, distracted French attention from the Scottish war.

The Scots however made great strides in England. Soon after they crossed the Tweed they occupied Newcastle followed by Durham. These occupations led to great English concern of what was to happen next, which led to the continued deterioration of the king’s authority and position. There seemed to be no likelihood that Charles could raise enough troops to defeat the Scots, as the English and Charles’ international overtures proved to be uncooperative in supplying men and money.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Gardiner, *History of England*, 189.

¹⁸⁰ CSPV, 81, Alonzo Correr to the Doge and Senate, Amiens, 23 September 1640.

¹⁸¹ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 210.

While Charles found no real support abroad to fight the Scots, there were countries that disagreed with their rebellion against their natural sovereign. For example, the English ambassador in the German states, Mr. Curtius, wrote that the German princes and people hated the crimes committed by the Scots.¹⁸² He also asserted that Charles was following the proper course, as he was merely attempting to uphold the law.

Yet with no viable support Charles was forced to negotiate with the Covenanters. Even his own army "...was without heart or discipline."¹⁸³ In October the council of peers met at York to provide Charles with advice on how to provide safety for England.¹⁸⁴ At this council Charles declared that he would summon another parliament, which would become the Long Parliament. In addition, Charles suggested that negotiations with the Scots be held at York, thus hoping to exert his influence on the Scots to fulfill his own ends.¹⁸⁵ However the Scots refused Charles' proposal. They repeatedly attempted negotiation in person with Charles in London only to be rebuffed.¹⁸⁶ Thus they were ill inclined to repeat previous mistakes. Even while negotiating at Ripon, the Scots displayed their suspicion of Charles as they refused to accept safe conduct for their commissioners signed by the king alone, instead insisting that the English peers also sign the conduct.¹⁸⁷ The Scots made a conscious effort not to repeat the mistakes they made in the past when dealing with Charles. Their efforts paid off as they concluded the Treaty of Ripon in late October. The terms of the Treaty were mortifying for Charles. The

¹⁸² NA SP 81/50 Folio 159, Ambassador Curtius to Secretary of State, Frankfurt, 6 September 1640.

¹⁸³ Gardiner, *History of England*, 197.

¹⁸⁴ CSPV, 86, Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, London 12 October 1640.

¹⁸⁵ Gardiner, *History of England*, 212.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 213.

¹⁸⁷ Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 212.

largest concession Charles made was agreeing to pay the Scots a huge daily subsidy. This made Charles dependent on parliament to provide funds to pay the Scots, thus disallowing him to dissolve parliament.¹⁸⁸ The truly bizarre development that occurred during the conclusion of the Treaty of Ripon was that Charles made no real attempt at negotiation, instead allowing the English and Scottish commissioners to negotiate directly.¹⁸⁹ This was a direct shift from the negotiation of the Treaty of Berwick. Perhaps this development signaled Charles' dwindling confidence in his own ability, or his hope that the English commissioners could attain more concessions from the Scots without him.¹⁹⁰ Whatever the reason for Charles' lack of participation, the Treaty of Ripon proved to be successful for the Scots. For the English it also proved successful as the Treaty ensured that a parliament would be called.

The Scots finally triumphed over the English with the conclusion of the Treaty of Ripon. A struggle ignited by a prayer book now seemed to be at its end. The letter sent to France by the Covenanters also seemed to fade out of thought. Yet those involved with the letter did not simply fade away. Loudoun's clear articulation and leadership of the covenanting movement later led to his appointment as Lord Chancellor of Scotland. After the conclusion of the Second Bishops' War, Alexander Leslie swore to never fight Charles I again for he felt the Protestant religion was secure, and in 1641 he was made the earl of Leven and he resigned his generalship.¹⁹¹ However with the coming of the Irish rebellion and later the English Civil War, Leslie was again called to serve. He was made lord general during the English Civil War, thus negating his previous promise to

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 213.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 213.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 213.

¹⁹¹ Stevenson, "Leslie, Alexander," 3.

never raise arms against the King. Hugh Montgomery was accused of being disloyal to the Covenanters, yet these accusations went largely unsubstantiated, and later in life he became a member of the Scottish Privy Council.¹⁹²

The earl of Rothes fell into a precarious financial situation, and died in August 1641 from a fever. The earl of Mar also experienced a financial downturn, and he died in 1653. Like his path to the covenanting movement, the marquis of Montrose took a much different route after the letter was sent than his fellow signatories. He hoped to walk among the upper echelon of the Covenanting movement, yet he instead felt neglected and slighted by them. It was this neglect that drove Montrose back into the arms of Charles I. The two kept up a secret correspondence, and when a Scottish parliament was called without the approval of the king, Montrose came to the conclusion the Covenant had become “radical.”¹⁹³ His move toward Charles I was also fostered by his hate of the earl of Argyll, the leader of the Covenant. In an effort to remove Argyll, Montrose informed the king that there was talk of deposition in Scotland, however his plan failed, as he was later imprisoned in Edinburgh Castle.¹⁹⁴ After being released from the castle, Montrose turned to rallying support for Charles I in Scotland, and when this effort failed, Montrose went to England.¹⁹⁵

Above all, the letter had impacted Charles I. He chose to take a stand against the possibility of French aid above all other possible sources of aid coming into Scotland, including Scandinavia. The letter, about which he had seemed so confident, failed to bring about funding from parliament to finance the Second Bishops’ War. Instead

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 2.

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, 3.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 3.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 4.

Charles fought another war vastly unprepared, and was consequently forced into the humiliating Treaty of Ripon. The treaty also ensured that a parliament would be held. The years that followed were especially trying for Charles, as his power and authority were tested on every level. He traveled to Scotland in an attempt to seek out support against the Long Parliament but was rebuffed. Riots broke out in London, and eventually the English Civil War broke out. The Scottish Revolution served as an excellent model for its English counterpart, setting a precedent of challenging Charles I. After years of fighting, Charles fled to the Scots hoping to avoid capture by his English enemies. The king was instead held for ransom and eventually sold back to his English enemies. On 30 January 1649 after more than ten years since the prayer book inflicted on Scotland began the road to revolution, Charles was beheaded and the office of king was abolished.

Conclusion

As a small country with vastly fewer resources and manpower than England, Scotland's defeat of Charles I in the First and Second Bishops' Wars was a triumph, securing their religious and political liberties. However limited resources forced the Scots, if they were to have any real hope of success, to appeal to other countries for aid. Appeals were thus made to Scandinavian countries, France, and Switzerland. While Scotland received substantial material assistance from the United Provinces and from Sweden, it was the appeal for assistance to France that brought about confrontation and conflict with Charles I.

The letter written by the Covenanters to Louis XIII of France confirmed to Charles, at least in his own mind, that France was ultimately behind the Scottish Revolution. Although Charles was mistaken, the letter signified that the "Auld Alliance" between France and the Scotland remained active, as can also be seen through Franco-Scottish correspondence. It is therefore strange that this connection between the two countries during the Scottish Revolution has been overlooked when considering the Revolution's international context. While Scotland did not in the end receive aid from France, the French dimension of the Scottish Revolution is still of great importance.

When considering which countries to ask for assistance, the Auld Alliance made France the obvious choice for Scotland. Although Cardinal Richelieu's correspondence reveals that he was wary of entangling the French in the Scottish Revolution, it seems probable that the French would have given covert aid to Scotland had the letter not been intercepted and published, as is evident from Thomas Chambers visits to France and the talks between Bellièvre and the Covenanters.

Moreover the interception of the letter prompted Charles to take a stand against the possibility of French aid rather than act to halt the actual aid flowing into Scotland from Scandinavia. Clearly this indicates the extent of Charles' fears concerning France compared with Scandinavian countries: the mere possibility of French assistance frightened Charles I to act. He could not tolerate even the possibility of French aid without taking vigorous counter-measures.

Charles' attempt to take a stand against the Scots after the interception of the letter ended disastrously for him in the Short Parliament. Although the interception of the letter ended all possibility of French aid to Scotland, the Scots still brought Charles to his knees. Despite their inferior resources, they defeated the king's army in battle, invaded and occupied northern England, and forced the king to pay them a huge daily subsidy until he reconvened the English Parliament and received its backing for a peace that granted all of Scotland's religious and political demands. Even more importantly, the Scottish Revolution set a precedent for rebellion against Charles, acting as a model for the Irish Rebellion and later the English Civil War.

In the end, the Scots' demands divided the English political elite and precipitated a Civil War, in which the king's opponents once more invaded and again defeated the king's army in battle; and when his English enemies seemed likely to capture him, the king fled to the Scots. After holding Charles ransom, the Scots sold him back to his English enemies, who eventually tried and executed him and abolished the office of king. In the downfall of the Stuart Monarchy, the short letter the Scottish leaders sent to Louis XIII of France played a brief, neglected but important role.

Appendix A

The KING.

My Lords,

Y^{O U} shall see he hath spoken nothing hyperbolically, or nothing but what I shall make good one way or other. The King's Speech.

And because he did mention a Letter by my Subjects in Scotland, who did seek to draw in Foreign power for aid, here is the Original Letter, which I shall command him to read unto you.

And because it may touch a Neighbour of mine, whom I will say nothing of, but that which is just (God forbid I should); for my part, I think it was never accepted of by him; indeed it was a Letter to the French King, but I know not that ever he had it; for by chance I intercepted it, as it was going unto him; and therefore I hope you will understand me right in that.

His Majesty delivering the Letter to the Lord Keeper, his Lordship began to read it, and observe as followeth:

Lord Keeper.

The Superscription of the Letter is this.

AU ROY.

FOR the nature of which Superscription, it is well known to all that know the style of France, that it is never written by any French man to any, but to their own King; and therefore being directed (AU ROY) it is to their own King, for so in effect they do by that Superscription acknowledge. A Letter from the Scots to the French King.

Then his Lordship read the Letter in French, being the original Language wherein it was Writ.

The Letter being read in French, his Lordship added.

His Majesty Comanded me to read it in English to you, as it is Translated, for that is the Original under their own hands.

Eeeeeee 2

SIR.

S I K,

Your Majesty being the refuge and sanctuary of afflicted Princes, and States, We have found it necessary to send this Gentleman Mr. Colvil; by him to represent unto your Majesty, the Candor and Ingenuity, as well of our Actions and Proceedings; as of our Intentions, which we desire should be Engraven and Written to the whole World, with the Beams of the Sun as well as to your Majesty: We most humbly beseech you therefore, to give Faith and Credit to him, and all he shall say on our part concerning us, and our affairs: being most assured of an assistance, equal to your accustomed Clemency heretofore, and so often shewed to this Nation, which will not yield to any other whatsoever, the Glory to be eternally

Your Majesties most humble, obedient
and affectionate servants,

Rohes.
Montross.
Lestey.
Marre.
Montgomery.
Lowdon.
Forester.

Then the KING added.

OF these Gentlemen, that have set their hands to this Letter, here is one, and I believe you would think it very strange, if I should not lay him fast; and therefore I have Signed a Warrant, to lay him close Prisoner in the Tower.

My Lords, I think, (but that I will not say positively, because I will not say any thing here, but what I am sure of,) I think I have the Gentleman that should have carryed the Letter, fast enough; but I know not, I may be mistaken.

And then my Lord Keeper concluded.

Gentlemen,

YOU of the House of Commons, his Majesties pleasure is, that you do now repair to your own House, there to make choice of your Speaker, whom his Majesty will expect to be presented to him on Wednesday next, at two of the Clock in the Afternoon.

Appendix B

SIRE,

Vostre Majesté (estant l'asyle & sanctuaire des Princes & Estats affligéz.) nous avons trouvé nécessaire d'envoyer ce Gentilhomme le Sieur de Colvil, pour représenter a V. M. la candeur & naïveté tant de nos actions & procédures, que de nos intentions, lesquelles nous desirons estre graveés & escrites à tout l'univers avec un ray du Soleil, aussy bien qu'à V. M. Nous vous Supplions doncques tresumblement (Sire) de luy adjouster foy & creance, & a tout ce qu'il dira de nostre part, touchant nous & nos affairs; estans tresasseurés (Sire) d'une assistance esgale a Vostre clemence accoustumée cydevant, & si souvent monstrée a ceste Nation, laquelle ne cederà la gloire à autre quelconque d'estre eternellement,

Sire;

de V. M.

Les tresumbles, & tresobeysants,
& tresaffectionés serciteurs,

Roths.

Montrose.
Montgomery.
Loudoun.

Leslie. Marre.
Forrester.

S rrrrr

Englised

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