Experimental Approach to Effective Implementation of Non-Compete Agreements

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Date

2015-08

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The Ohio State University

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Abstract

Although Non-Compete Agreements (NCAs) are widely used in employment contracts to prevent ex-employees from competing against their former employers, theoretical models and empirical studies have struggled to quantify their impact on the labor market. To study the effects of NCA enforcement policies on matching and separating decisions of firms and workers, a laboratory experiment was designed and conducted. The behaviors of economic agents and their impact on economic performance were compared under three policies: (1) firms were prohibited from using NCAs; (2) firms could impose NCAs after workers accepted a job offer and without prior disclosure; and (3) firms were required to disclose NCA requirements in the job offer. Under the prohibition of NCAs, the workers engaged in opportunistic behaviors and frequently changed employers in pursuit of better compensation. Consequently, the firms faced significant turnover costs. On the contrary, when NCAs were imposed on the workers without prior disclosure, firms tended to use unnecessary NCAs. In result, the workers suffered from decreased economic return. Mandatory ex-ante disclosure of NCA requirements overcame the shortcomings of the two extreme NCA policies: it provided the firms with the means to mitigate the investment risk while allowing the potential employees to impel firms to use NCAs only when necessary. If the NCA policy has comparable effects on the matching and separating decisions of workers and firms in the real world, the optimal NCA usage can be achieved through self-correcting markets. Mandatory ex-ante disclosure of NCA requirements is a potential solution to the struggles faced by states of maintaining and enforcing convoluted statutes regarding NCAs. It can also save significant amounts of time and money currently lost in litigation.

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Denman Undergraduate Research Forum Social and Behavioral Sciences: 3rd Place

Keywords

Non-Compete Agreements, Experimental Economics, Labor Economics, Public Policy

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