Completing the Coincidence Argument Against Metaethical Nonnaturalism
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Date
2025-05
Authors
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Publisher
The Ohio State University
Abstract
People commonly express a worry that we only hold our particular moral beliefs because it is fitness-enhancing to do so. In this paper, I investigate a particular argument that has emerged from this worry, the Coincidence Argument. First, I present a neutral formulation, arguing that disagreement over this issue should be understood as disagreement over an important condition in the formulation, the Reliability Condition. Then, I evaluate existing candidates and present one of my own, ultimately concluding that none are perfect. I conclude that based on considerations in this paper, the modal condition sensitivity is the theoretically preferable candidate for the Reliability Condition.
Description
Bingham Award
Keywords
metaethics, evolution, nonnaturalism, moral belief, justification