Issues in Multi-Dimensional Legislative Bargaining: Collective vs. Particularistic Goods
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Date
2007
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Abstract
In this project, Kagel and Morelli examine legislative bargaining on two
dimensions -– particularistic goods and collective goods, or public interest
goods that benefit society as a whole. The results of their two game theory experiments run counter to what standard economic theory predicts for legislative bargaining, prompting Kagel and Morelli to provide alternative explanations for these phenomena.
Description
Research project funded in academic years 2006-07, 2007-08, and 2008-09
The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.
The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.
Keywords
public goods, government resource distribution, bargaining