Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Committees and Legislative Bodies: Theory and Experimental Evaluation
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Date
2004
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Mershon Center for International Security Studies
Abstract
Allocation of scarce resources is a central activity of governments
and a great number of international and national organizations,
often creating conflict between different stakeholders in these
organizations. Recent years have seen the development of game
theoretic models designed to understand the bargaining process
underlying these allocations, both in terms of their impact on
economic efficiency and on the share of resources allocated to
different stakeholders. Central to these models is the impact of
institutional rules and relative bargaining power on the allocation
of resources between competing factions. The present proposal is
designed to fund experiments to investigate the predictions of
these legislative bargaining models.
Description
The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.
Keywords
game theory, bargaining, competing factions