Transparency, Protest, and Democratic Stability
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Date
2017-04-06
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security Studies
Abstract
Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: In transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.
Description
The media can be accessed here: http://streaming.osu.edu/knowledgebank/Mershon17/Peter_Rosendorff.mp4
Keywords
transparency, protest, democratic stability