Confrontation Confidential: The Nixon Administration's Response to the Cienfuegos Crisis of 1970-71

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2023-05

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The Ohio State University

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Abstract

During a period of uninterrupted crises across the globe in the late summer and early autumn of 1970, the United States (US) compelled the Soviet Union (USSR) to abandon its efforts to establish a nuclear submarine base in the Cuban harbor of Cienfuegos. Follow-on negotiations that concluded in May 1971 restricted the operation of Soviet submarine tenders in the region that threatened to serve a similar role to the base, albeit to a lesser degree. This neglected episode of Cold War history highlights core attributes of the Nixon administration's approach to international politics in general and crisis resolution vis-á-vis the USSR in particular. Firstly, the budding détente between the two superpowers, which arose primarily because of the changing world balance of power, guided the US response. Meanwhile, efforts to link various developments and political imperatives at home and abroad shaped Nixon's framing of the issue. Finally, the organization of, and the culture in, the White House witnessed various actors—most notably the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger—use the situation to undermine others and increase their influence over policymaking.

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Detente, Cienfuegos Crisis, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Secrecy, Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines

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