Competencia por Clientes en la Industria Bancaria Costarricense
Creators:Herrera, Mariano Rojas
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Publisher:Ohio State University. Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics
Series/Report no.:Ohio State University. Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. ESO (Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper). No. 2139
This paper studies the evolution of the rivalry among Costa Rican private and state-owned banks. The conceptual framework comes from the New Empirical Industrial Organization, with contributions from the Austrian School and the Evolutionary Theory of the Firm. Special attention is given to the structural change experienced by the Costa Rican banking system in the early 1980s with the entry into the market of numerous private commercial banks. Prior to 1980, the system was characterized by the collusive behavior of the state-owned banks. To address these issues, the paper estimates a rivalry map (matrix of transition probabilities) on the basis of a Markov process.
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