Motives for the International Licensing of Branded Food and Related Products
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Publisher:Ohio State University. Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics
Series/Report no.:Ohio State University. Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. ESO (Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper). No. 1688
Given initial empirical observations of international licensing of food and beer brands, this paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of the motives for licensing. The model suggests that imperfect competition in overseas markets and imperfect information about incumbent firms' payoffs are important determinants of a branded product licensing equilibrium.
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