Playing the Game: Trout Unlimited’s engagement with the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in advocating dam removal on the Clyde River, VT and the Kennebec River, ME
Interest Group Action
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
Bureaucratic Behavior Theory
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Publisher:The Ohio State University
Series/Report no.:The Ohio State University. School of Environment and Natural Resources Honors Theses; 2011
This paper examines interactions between the non-profit interest group Trout Unlimited (TU) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) during debates over dam removal. It uses one case study on the Clyde River in Vermont and one on the Kennebec River in Maine, delving into the tactics used by TU and to show how the group’s activities contributed to FERC recommendations for dam removal in both cases. Bureaucratic Behavior Theory is used as the framework to analyze agency rules, citizen participation, and agency official’s beliefs. Kingdon’s Policy Streams framework supports ancillary investigation into the transformation of private economic environmental groups to professionally-managed, science-based groups exemplified by TU. The dam removal scenario introduces a new formula for groups that act as policy entrepreneurs by assembling knowledge communities and actively seeking to apply their solutions. Other interest groups may be able to use this formula to position themselves for success when engaging federal agencies.
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