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dc.creatorGehlbach, Scott
dc.descriptionStreaming audio requires RealPlayer.en_US
dc.descriptionThe University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe state,writes Douglass North, trades a group of services, which we shall call protection and justice, for revenue. This paper explores the possibility that an efficient trade may not be possible, while providing an explanation for variation in the degree to which such protection is provided. At issue is the fact that the revenues which in principle could justify the ex ante provision of protection are typically collected ex post. Protection having been provided, firms may therefore have an incentive to hide revenues from the state, while differing in their ability to do so. Thus, the state will typically favor economic activity which is more taxable,a proposition supported by data from a survey of firms in 25 postcommunist countries. Perhaps surprisingly, such discrimination may exist even when a state with commitment power can deter revenue hiding by promising to leave firms with a share of their unhidden production.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipOhio State University. Mershon Center for International Security Studiesen_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsEvent webpage, streaming audioen_US
dc.format.extentAudio Duration: 01:24:01en_US
dc.publisherOhio State University. Mershon Center for International Security Studiesen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMershon Center for International Security Studies. Political Economy Speaker Seriesen_US
dc.titleTaxability, Protection, and the Stateen_US
dc.typeRecording, oralen_US

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