Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as Contract

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Title: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as Contract
Creators: Verdier, Daniel
Keywords: game theory
international institutions
nuclear proliferation
contract theory
Issue Date: 2006
Abstract: In this project, Verdier set out to explain why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been so successful. Using game theory, Verdier argues that the object is to maximize non-proliferation by promising to reward signatories and threatening to punish non-signatories and cheaters. He then makes predictions about which countries were likely to sign and when. Finally, he is testing those predictions on a panel of all countries from 1968-2002.
Description: Research project funded in academic years 2005-06 and 2006-07
The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.
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