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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as Contract

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1811/29424

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Title: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as Contract
Creators: Verdier, Daniel
Keywords: game theory
international institutions
nuclear proliferation
contract theory
Issue Date: 2006
Abstract: In this project, Verdier set out to explain why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been so successful. Using game theory, Verdier argues that the object is to maximize non-proliferation by promising to reward signatories and threatening to punish non-signatories and cheaters. He then makes predictions about which countries were likely to sign and when. Finally, he is testing those predictions on a panel of all countries from 1968-2002.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1811/29424
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