The Effects of Demographic Change and Education on Vote Share

Research Thesis

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In the 2016 election, immigration was one of the main issues discussed by then-candidate Donald Trump. Talk about immigrants that were coming into the country and building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border that would be financed by Mexico became a staple at Trump rallies. Unsurprisingly, given then-candidate Trump’s rhetoric, about two-thirds of Hispanic voters chose Hillary Clinton (Krogstad & Lopez 2016). This was slightly behind the seventy-one percent of the Hispanic vote that President Obama received in 2012. Clinton’s performance is consistent with the sixty-four percent of Hispanics that either identify or lean towards the Democratic Party (Gonzalez-Barrera et al 2016). The added emphasis on immigration in 2016 comes as the United States moves slowly closer to becoming a majority-minority country (Frey 2018). An increase in minority voters is in some ways good news for the Democratic Party, as minority groups tend to vote for them. However, there can also be a backlash from white voters to the increase in minority voters. There is some evidence that whites who live in states with more Latinos are more likely to vote Republican (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015). The idea is that simply being in proximity to Hispanic populations causes whites to become more conservative than they would be otherwise. This would suggest that as the population of the United States becomes comprised of more and more minorities, perhaps white voters will become more conservative as a result.

However, when dealing with election outcomes, the two trends described in the previous paragraph can’t both be true in the aggregate. It can’t be the case that counties that are becoming more Hispanic are becoming more Democratic and that those same counties are becoming more conservative due to a rightward shift from white voters in response to the influx of Hispanic voters. One of the trends has to be stronger than the other. However, it is not abundantly clear
which it is. The answer to which is the stronger trend is a fairly important one for both the Democratic and Republican Party. If it is the case that Hispanic voters are making counties more Democratic, then the status of Hispanics as a key voting demographic will only grow. Furthermore, the Republican Party may need to change its policy platform to appeal more to Hispanic voters. On the other hand, if white voters are having a strong backlash to increasing Hispanic populations, then the Democratic Party may need to alter its immigration policies or risk further alienating white voters across the country. It also could mean that Hispanic voters are not as important of a demographic to focus on for the Republican Party, and that Republicans should focus on appealing to these white voters who are turning towards their party in the face of demographic changes.

In this paper, I will observe the relationship between changes in Hispanic populations on the change in G.O.P. vote share at the county level. I find that as counties become more Hispanic, that the change in G.O.P. vote share decreases, suggesting that Hispanic voters making counties more Democratic is actually the more powerful trend. I then examine maps of the residuals for each model to examine if there are places in the country where Donald Trump or Mitt Romney consistently under or over-performs how my model would expect them to do. While there are no strong trends for Mitt Romney, Donald Trump outperforms the model in the Midwest, which is consistent with narratives about Trump’s 2016 electoral performance.

I also examine the possibility that my result actually could be the result of some other variable, specifically income, education, population density, or the percentage of white people in a county. I use added variable plots to examine the relationship between those four variables and change in G.O.P. vote share. Of the four, education and income appears to have a negative relationship with changes in G.O.P. vote share. This means that in counties with more people
who have earned at least a bachelor’s degree, or counties that have higher per capita, we would expect that changes in G.O.P. vote from 2012 to 2016 share to decrease. Overall, all of these findings suggest that increasing Hispanic populations making counties more Democratic is a stronger trend than a white backlash to changing demographics making counties more conservative. They also suggest that educated voters were much more likely to vote for Hillary Clinton in 2016 than Donald Trump. Finally, I examine if either racial animus or attitudes on trade mediate the effect of education on vote choice and use those findings to evaluate two academic accounts of the 2016 election. Overall, race does not appear to have a unique impact in 2016, while trade does. This finding counters some of the prevailing narratives about the 2016 election, which focus heavily on the effect that racial animus had on vote choice.

Theory

Hispanics have historically voted for the Democratic Party. In fact in every single presidential election since 1976, Hispanics have voted for the Democratic candidate (Roper 2018), often by large margins. Latino voters are fairly strong Democratic voters when it comes to presidential elections, but as a group, they are not as Democratic as African-Americans are. In the last few, two-thirds of Hispanics voted for Hillary Clinton, while nearly 90% of African-Americans voted for her (Roper 2018). One of the main reasons for this is that there are certain groups of Latino voters that tend to vote more conservative, mainly Cuban-Americans. In 2016, just over half of all Cuban voters in Florida, where the large majority of Cubans reside, voted for Donald Trump (Flores & Krogstad 2016). Overall, Hispanics are a group of voters that very much lean Democratic, but not as reliably as other minority voters, like African-Americans.

Furthermore, this disparity is one of the reasons why Hispanics have long been considered an important demographic for campaigns to target. This is because Latinos represent
a group of voters that is constantly growing in size. In 1992, Latinos made up nearly 6% of the electorate, and by 2016 that figure had nearly doubled to 11.9%, and in the same time, they had gone from making up 3.7% of voters to 9.2% of all voters (Bergad 2017, 11). Hispanic voters as a group will continue to be seen as influential as the population of Hispanic voters continues to increase. As mentioned earlier, the United States will in the coming decades become a majority-minority country. This means that eventually, white Americans will no longer comprise the majority of Americans. According to Frey (2018), when this occurs, it will do in part due to the growth of the Hispanic population in this country. If Hispanics are going to keep growing in population, then it makes sense that as this occurs more and more Hispanics will become voters. This is another reason why they are considered such an important group for campaigns to target. They are increasingly growing in numbers, and they don’t necessarily vote one way, so they may be persuadable. However, it must be noted that should Hispanic populations continue to increase as predicted, combined with what is currently known about how Hispanics tend to vote, a conclusion can be drawn. That is, as more Hispanics live and vote in the United States, those areas will most likely become more Democratic at the presidential level, given that Hispanics tend to vote for the Democratic presidential candidate.

The growing racial diversity in this country also has an effect on white voters. When white participants hear the fact that the United States will become a majority-minority country they express a greater preference to be in settings with other white people compared to those who were not exposed to that information (Craig & Richeson 2014). Furthermore, in that same study (Craig & Richeson 2014), participants exposed to facts about changing demographics in the United States reported feeling more coldly towards minority groups compared to those who were not exposed to the same information. So simply hearing that the United States will soon not be a
majority-minority country is enough to make some white Americans feel both an in-group preference for their own group, as well as animus towards other racial groups. When presented with information about the potential for whites being a minority in the United State, whites report more anger and anxiety compared to white participants who were shown stories about diversity and inclusivity (Levy & Myers 2018). Furthermore, this effect was more pronounced for Republicans than it was for Democrats, as seventy-five percent of Republicans expressed either anger or anxiety compared to forty-six percent of Democrats who expressed the same emotion (Levy & Myers 2018). Providing information about future demographic changes also has the effect of making white Americans policy views more conservative on both issues concerning race and those that do not (Craig & Richeson 2014). Overall these studies paint a picture of some white Americans that may feel threatened by a growing racial minority. The political effects of this are that those white Americans who feel threatened express more conservative policy preferences. This could obviously have trickle-down effects as the country continues to diversify, as this could make more white Americans view conservative policies and politicians as more on their side.

This concept of in-group preference and out-group hostility is nothing new. This is largely the definition that Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam give to ethnocentrism (2009). They call ethnocentrism prejudice, but with two components: solidarity within your own group, and hostility towards those in the out-group (Kam & Kinder 2009). This is nearly exactly the reaction we see from white Americans to information about the changing demographics of the United States. When informed about the changes, white Americans develop a preference to be around their own group, and growing hostility towards racial minorities, the out-group in this case. It should be mentioned that ethnocentrism is not a prejudice that all people contain. Some people
are more ethnocentric than others. Furthermore, Kinder and Kam also describe ethnocentrism as “a predisposition to divide the human world into in-groups and out-groups” (2009, 8). This is all to say that one should not expect all white Americans to develop these in-group and out-group preferences as outlined above. However, for those Americans who are predisposed to ethnocentrism as the country slowly becomes more diverse, it is not unrealistic to expect to see these tendencies arise and become more salient.

Should ethnocentrism become more relevant as the country becomes more diverse, one would expect the role of race in vote choice to also become a more important consideration for these voters. There is already some evidence that voters view the two parties very differently when it comes to race. First of all, over the last few decades, the share of the Democratic vote for president that has come from non-white voters has been increasing, while the Republican vote share from non-white voters has only slightly increased in that same time span (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015). This reflects both that the non-white share of the electorate has been increasing over time, and that groups like African-Americans and Hispanics tend to vote overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party is also much more diverse in its congressional delegation. There are fifty-two African-American members of the House of Representatives, and only one of them is a Republican (Atske & Brown 2019). In terms of Latino members of the House, there are thirty-seven total, and only five of them are Republicans (Gamboa 2018). While these numbers are not proportional to African-American and Hispanic populations in the United States as a whole, they are still fairly useful. Both the voting population and the elected officials for both the Democratic and Republican parties are very distinct.

Also, there is some evidence that racial attitudes can have an effect on vote choice (Pasek et al. 2009; Tesler 2016). Michael Tesler (2016) finds that racial attitudes can have effects on
how white Americans feel about policy issues such as healthcare during the Obama presidency. Those who were most racially resentful were nearly four times more likely to vote for the Republican candidate in 2008 and 2012 (Tesler 2016). Those same people were only two times more likely to vote for the Republican candidate before the 2008 election (Tesler 2016). This effect is also seen in feelings about Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and even Barack Obama’s dog, as those who were the most racially resentful were much more likely to have negative evaluations of these people and animals (Tesler 2016). However, it should be noted that two other variables, economics (Lacy & Christenson 2017; Nadeau & Lewis-Beck 2001) and partisanship (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015; Bonneau & Cann 2015) affect vote choice as well. But racial animus definitely has a statistically significant impact on voting that can’t be ignored as the country becomes more diverse. Overall, the two parties are made up different when it comes to voters and elected officials. Also in recent years, racial attitudes have become much more influential on vote choice. As the country becomes more diverse, this could have two possible, non-mutually exclusive, effects. First, the Democratic Party could continue to be the party that is seen as the party for minority voters. Second, white voters who are more ethnocentric could become more conservative, as they believe that their racial interests are better met in the Republican Party, given the greater diversity on the left.

So far the discussion has centered broadly on the role that group prejudice and race can and do play in American politics, specifically when it comes to white Americans. However, one of the main interests of this paper is what the effect of increasing Hispanic populations has on white voters. So do Hispanics and related issues, like immigration, have an effect on white political attitudes? The answer is unequivocally yes. Many negative stereotypes about Hispanics and immigrants are present in American’s minds. One of the more common narratives around
immigrants is that they increase crime in the United States (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015; Udani & Kimball 2017), but Americans have long associated immigrants and crime (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015; Green 2016). Also, majorities of Americans believe that immigrants strain welfare services (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015; Udani & Kimball 2017), and they harm wages for U.S. citizens (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015; Udani & Kimball 2017). Furthermore, whites do not necessarily differentiate between Hispanics, legal immigrants, and illegal immigrants (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015), so while Americans may admit to more negative views of undocumented immigrants, but these views seem to be connected to how whites view immigrants and Hispanics as a group. Finally, there is a link between anti-immigrant views and support for voting restrictions (Udani & Kimball 2017). Overall, white Americans tend to hold lots of negative attitudes towards Hispanics. Given the diverging paths the two parties are taking when it comes to immigration, it would seem that there is potential for an opening for those white Americans who have negative feelings towards immigrants and Latinos to move towards the Republican Party if they have not already.

One of the two main trends that this paper will be analyzing is whether there is a white backlash from white Americans to the increasing diversity of the United States. So far, a brief case for the backlash to exist has been laid out. But what evidence is there already that this white backlash is present? As it happens, there are already a couple of studies that have looked at this idea of a white backlash. Dixon (2006) that the presence of whites near African-Americans heightened prejudice in those whites. Also, Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal in their 2015 book, White Backlash, offer a few interesting tests of this theory. In the first test, they find that whites who live in states with more Hispanics were more concerned about immigration, more likely to identify as a conservative, and were more likely to vote for the Republican presidential
candidate in 2000, 2004, and 2012. (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015). This is fairly good evidence of a white backlash at the state level, but they also examine whether or not changes in the Hispanic population have an effect on whites’ political habits. They find that whites who lived in states with growth in Hispanic populations were more likely to vote for the Republican candidate in 2004 and express more conservative immigration views (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015), but the results were less conclusive than the one that just examined overall population totals at the states level. The final test they do is to control for neighborhood racial composition, and they find many of the same results from the first study, but many of the findings, including those on partisanship and vote choice, were not statistically significant (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015). Overall, this research would suggest that while a white backlash may indeed exist, it is unclear to what extent it exists below the state level, and if changes in population have a strong effect on it.

Data Sources

The county elections dataset that I used in my analysis was drawn from Github. This dataset is largely based around county election returns from The Guardian and Townhall. This file contained county election returns for each of the past three elections. I used change in G.O.P. county vote share when doing my analysis as opposed to just the G.O.P. county vote share from the previous election. I did this for a couple of reasons. The first is that many counties in this country vote largely the same way from presidential election to presidential election. The correlation between G.O.P. vote share in 2008 and 2012 was 0.976 and the correlation between 2012 and 2016 was 0.933. In other words, there are a lot of counties that do not see large swings in the partisanship at the presidential level. It also means that it would be hard to use the G.O.P. vote share to evaluate if there is something unique about Donald Trump as a candidate, especially compared to Mitt Romney. Looking at the change in vote share from the previous
election lets one compare the performances of both Trump and Romney and see where candidate Trump over-performs and under-performs Mitt Romney.

The demographic data that I also use in my analysis comes from three different places. The first, and main, place is Social Explorer, which is a website that contains a wide array of demographic data largely drawn from both the United States Census and the American Community Survey. I used Social Explorer to obtain data on Census population estimates for 2012 and 2016, the proportions of whites and Hispanic in each county, the proportion of each county that has completed at least a Bachelor’s Degree, the per-capita income of each county, and the population density for each county. The projections about population totals and demographic information for 2008 was obtained from the census website itself. Finally, unemployment data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For my initial analysis, I looked at the change in Hispanic populations in counties over the four years between presidential elections. This was done to see the effect that increasing Hispanic populations had on changes in county G.O.P. vote share. Furthermore, I used the change in unemployment from the year preceding the election, so from 2011 to 2012 and 2015 to 2016, as many models cite the economy as an important factor in determining vote share (Abramowitz 1988).

Methods

My initial analysis involved using linear regression models to look at the impact of changes in the Hispanic population on changes in G.O.P. county vote share in both the 2012 and 2016 election. Two separate models were run for both elections, one with the two variables previously described, and another set of models that included a control for unemployment change for the year prior to the election.
Then, I calculated the residuals for the models containing only the change in Hispanic population and mapped them to show in what areas of the country Mitt Romney and Donald Trump did better or worse than the model predicted. The maps were made using a blue and red color scale that diverges on zero as the midpoint. Any counties shaded blue means the change in county G.O.P. was negative, indicating that the county voted more democratic in 2016 than it did in the previous election. Any county shaded red indicates that the change in G.O.P. county vote share was positive, meaning the county moved more towards the Republican candidate in 2016. The darker the shade, the larger the value. This also enabled me to see if there were patterns in the places that Romney and Trump did better or worse than predicted, allowing me to potentially draw conclusions about their candidacies. If they had many similarities in where they did better or worse, perhaps it is not the case that Donald Trump was a unique political figure, and is instead the case that he won with a fairly standard Republican candidate. If there were no similarities, then perhaps Donald Trump was a unique candidate, or either Romney or Trump was particularly successful in a specific part of the country.

Results

The results from my regression analysis are presented in Table 1 below. For the 2012 election, a one unit increase in the Hispanic population in a county resulted in a 0.656 decrease in the change in G.O.P county vote share. For the 2016 election, a one unit increase in the Hispanic population of a county resulted in a 3.097 decrease in the change in G.O.P. county vote share. Both of these results are significant to p < 0.01. This result suggests that as counties became more Hispanic, the change in G.O.P. vote share decreased, indicating counties were voting more democratic than they did four years prior. This is the case for both 2012 and 2016.
The residual plots produced do a good job allowing one to view where both Mitt Romney and Donald Trump did better or worse than expected by the model. Map 1 displays the residuals for the model for the 2012 election and map 2 displays the residuals for the 2016 election. For Mitt Romney, the counties that he most over-performs the model are on the West Virginia and Kentucky border. Other counties that he over-performs in include Utah, the mountain west, as well as some Midwestern counties. There are not many examples of large under-performances according to the model. The ones that stand out the most are in the south, as well as in Arizona.

As for Donald Trump, his map has much clearer examples of over and under-performances based on the model. He does much better than the model predicts primarily in the Midwest, specifically in Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. This result is line with one of the dominant narratives that emerged from the 2016 election, that Trump outperformed expectations specifically in Midwestern states(Cohn and Confessore 2016). As for under-performances based on model expectations, the most glaring case is Utah. This makes sense given that there was a third party candidate, Evan McMullin, who garnered 21% of the vote in Utah. This cut into
Trump’s vote share in the state, as Hillary Clinton actually got a slightly larger share of the vote in Utah than Barack Obama did in 2012 (Utah Election Results 2018). Apart from that, there are counties across the country that showed a fair under-performance based on expectations for Trump in 2016. The starkest contrast between the two maps is the fact that Donald Trump’s map contains many more over and under-performances compared to Mitt Romney’s map. This would suggest that there are many counties where the change in G.O.P. county share from Romney to Trump either increased or decreased by a larger amount than my model would have expected. For Romney, this would imply, that the changes in G.O.P. vote share from John McCain to him were not as large.
Discussion

The results above suggest that the increases in Hispanic populations across the United States, even at the county level, are having a greater potential political impact than any backlash among white voters to this demographic change. It should be noted that the evidence presented does not suggest the absence of a white backlash, as that can’t be determined specifically by this analysis. It can be said that this suggests that the growth of Hispanics is having a larger effect than any potential white backlash. If it were the case that white backlash was the stronger trend,
we would expect to see the opposite effect, that growth in Hispanic populations was actually causing counties to shift more towards the Republican Party. Instead, the growth of Hispanic populations at the county level is related to swings towards the Democratic Party. Part of this can be attributed to the fact that, as mentioned earlier, Hispanic voters tend to vote for Democratic candidates. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that as counties become more Hispanic, they will experience a shift towards the Democratic Party.

One other major thing stands out when looking at the regression results. The first is the difference in the effect of changes in the Hispanic population in 2012 and 2016. The effect it has on changes in G.O.P. vote share in 2016 is about four to five times larger than the effect that it has in 2012. That is a fairly large difference. This is also the case when I control for economics, and the effects of unemployment are fairly similar for both Mitt Romney and Donald Trump. That means that even controlling for changes in unemployment, changes the effect of changes in the Hispanic population on differences in vote share was much larger for Donald Trump. One of the main reasons that this is interesting is due to the largely slow-changing nature of demographics, especially at the county level. For 2012 to 2016, the average change in the Hispanic population was a growth of about six-tenths of a percent. This demonstrates just how slow county-level racial demographics change in such a short period of time, and why it is impressive that the difference between the two coefficients is as large as it.

However, it may be the case that there is some other variable influencing my result. To investigate this, I looked at the possible effect that population density, percent of the county population that is white, percent of the population that has earned at least a bachelor’s degree, and the per capita income of each county to see if they had any effect on changes in G.O.P. county vote share. These are figures drawn from the 2016 five year estimate file of the American
Community Survey I took the residuals from original models and compared them to the residuals produced from models where each of the four new variables were regressed on changes in Hispanic population. The resulting scatterplots, two of which are displayed below, demonstrate the effects that income and education had on changes in county G.O.P. vote share for 2016.
The two plots above are for the percentage of the population in each county that has earned at least a bachelor’s degree and the per capita income for each county. The plots for population density and percent of the population that is white are not displayed as they did not show a significant relationship between those two variables and changes in G.O.P. county vote share. Both the education and income variable suggest a similar relationship for each of the variables. This makes sense as education and income tend to be correlated. As both percent of the population that have a bachelor’s degree increase and the per capita income of each county increases, the change in G.O.P. county vote share decreases. Focusing on education, these plots also provide further evidence to the narrative that one of the groups that abandoned candidate Trump was more educated voters (Silver 2016). This data suggests that Donald Trump as a candidate drove more educated people further towards the Democratic Party, a trend that would have negative effects for the Republican Party if it were to continue.

So far, my analysis has shown that Donald Trump performed worse among well-educated voters. But many of the accounts of the 2016 election mention feelings of racial animus as key in determining vote choice. In the aftermath of 2016, many gravitated towards the racial animus explanation for why Donald Trump won. One such case is laid out in the book, *Identity Crisis* by John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. In the book, they propose that the 2016 election was an especially racialized campaign, and this served to make racial attitudes much more salient than in previous elections (Sides et al 2018). If this is the case, we would expect to see two things. The first would be racial animus having a significant effect on vote choice. The second thing that we would expect is that the role that racial animus had in 2016 would be stronger than in the 2012 election. The claim is that race was a particularly salient issue in 2016, so it must have become a larger driver of vote choice in 2016 than it was in 2012. A second account by
Diana Mutz (2018), promotes a similar story. She proposes that anxiety among groups that have typically been dominant in American society, like whites, Christians, and males (Mutz 2018). The anxiety exists for two reasons. The first is that these white voters feel as if the growing racial minority in this country threatens their status, and the second is that growing globalization threatens America’s status as the world’s superpower (Mutz 2018). If this case is true, then we would expect to see two things. First, we would expect to see trade be a significant predictor of Trump support. Second, much like with the *Identity Crisis* case, we would expect to see race be a significant predictor of Trump support, and perhaps even be more significant in 2016 than it was in 2012.

That race and trade dominate these narratives is not surprising, as Donald Trump differed as a Republican candidate on those two issues. On race, he was much more willing to use overt racial language, instead of cloaking his language in euphemisms. This started at the beginning of his campaign when he called Mexican immigrants rapists and criminals continued through the end of the general election in November. Previous candidates were careful to not use such language, but Donald Trump, for whatever reason, was not averse to doing so. The second area in which Donald Trump differed from previous Republican candidates is on the issue of trade. Republicans had long held themselves as the party of free trade, but Trump again bucked the party (Jewell 2017). So examining how feelings of racial animus and trade mediate the effect vote choice could help determine which of those two issues played a role in 2016. Based on these differences, and the two academic cases presented above, we should expect to see both race and trade play a significant factor in determining vote choice in the 2016 election. Furthermore, we should expect these effects to be larger than they were in the previous election, given Donald Trump’s differences from previous Republicans.
To test this hypothesis, I used data available from the Voter Study Group which interviewed voters in 2011 and then again in 2012, and then the same group of voters were interviewed again in 2016. This longitudinal study will allow me to show if there truly are differences in how education, trade, and racial animus affected 2016 vote choice. Each of the three variables was coded from 0-1 so as to standardize the coefficients and make easier comparisons between them. I regressed education by itself, and the education with one of trade or racial animus for both 2012 and 2016 for a total of six models. The results are displayed in table 2 below.

The results above paint several pictures. The first is that education became much more influential for vote choice in 2016. The coefficient for 2016 is nearly twice the size of the 2012 coefficient. This further supports the narrative that more educated voters chose Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump. The effect of race in both elections is very large. In fact, when added to the model, racial resentment completely reverses the direction of the education coefficient. However, racial resentment is actually a more significant predictor of G.O.P. This suggests that actually,
racial animus became a less significant predictor of in 2016, despite Trump being more willing to make more overt racial statements. The effect that trade has on vote choice is also very important to observe. In 2012, trade does not have a significant effect on vote choice. This changes in 2016, as being more in favor of decreasing trade with other nations makes one more likely to vote for Donald Trump. This change would suggest that economic explanations, not necessarily racial ones, better explain the 2016 election. The effect of trade becomes significant in 2016 after not being a factor in 2012, while race becomes slightly less important in 2012. This suggests that there may be a Trump effect when it comes to trade, but perhaps not when it comes to race.

This analysis suggest mixed results when evaluating the two cases from above. First, for Identity Crisis, my analysis did not find evidence that race became more salient in 2016 than it was in 2012. In fact, the opposite happened. While it is true that racial animus is a significant determinant of Republican support in both 2012 and 2016, the effect of racial animus actually decreases between the two elections. For the Mutz paper, my analysis suggests mixed results. Much like Identity Crisis, these results again suggest that racial animus did not play a larger role in determining vote choice than it has in previous elections. Based on these results, it appears as if the 2016 electorate was not more motivated by racial animus than previous electorates. However, the trade explanation is supported by these results, as trade became a significant predictor of Trump support after being insignificant just four years. Overall, these results suggest that perhaps the narratives that focus on racial animus explanations may not be entirely correct and that explanations revolving around trade may warrant more investigation.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated a few key things. The first is that counties that have experienced growth in Hispanic populations between 2012 and 2016, on average, saw shifts
towards the Democratic Party. While this was also the case from 2008 to 2012 the size of the shift was much larger in 2016, suggesting that perhaps there was something about Donald Trump that caused it. This could suggest that a white backlash against changing demographics is not happening. Furthermore, the areas where Donald Trump outperformed my model were primarily in the Midwest, further providing evidence that he beat expectations in that part of the country. I also demonstrated that income and education had a fairly large effect on vote choice in 2016, suggesting that perhaps Donald Trump could be turning more educated voters away from the Republican Party. Finally, I ran regression analysis that showed that while racial animus had a large impact on vote choice in the previous two elections, the role it played did not really change between elections. However, trade became a statistically significant determinant of vote choice in 2016. I used this finding to push back on a couple of accounts of vote choice and the 2016 election.

There are a few aspects of this research that I believe could be explored further. It could be useful to try and get a clearer picture of if the effects of demographic change are the same in more urban areas compared to more rural areas. It may be the case that Hispanics are moving more into cities as there are more jobs available in cities, and as a result cities are becoming even more Democratic than they already were. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see if the observed effects are the same in more rural areas, or if there could be potential evidence of a white backlash specifically in very rural, very white areas. Finally, one final area of further research that I believe could be useful on this topic would be examining if there are other variables that mediate the effect of education and if those are unique to 2016 or not, such as some form of economic anxiety.
Donald Trump spent plenty of time on the campaign trail discussing immigration. This had the effect of causing areas that had become more Hispanic since the previous election to move more towards the Democratic Party as a result, as well as turning more educated voters away from his campaign. If this trend were to continue that could be an issue for the Republican Party. At the start of this paper, it was mentioned that it could be a concern for Republicans that Donald Trump’s rhetoric on immigration could turn off Hispanics, a key voter demographic, from supporting them in the future. However, this analysis suggests that Donald Trump’s rhetoric could also have the effect of putting off those voters who are more educated. If the Republican Party continues to nominate candidates like Donald Trump, they could continue to see more educated voters choose other options. Interestingly enough, Trump’s overt racial statements did not appear to make race a more salient issue than it had been in past elections. Perhaps it was because Trump was not running against the first African-American president. However, it is clear that while race is still a key issue in American politics, trade is potentially on its way to being a more partisan issue as well.
References


