Abstract

In the early 1930s, a famine often called the Holodomor took place in Ukraine, and millions of people died. In recent decades, many, particularly the Ukrainian diaspora around the world, have suggested the Holodomor was genocide against the Ukrainian people by the Soviet government, and several countries have recognized the famine as such. No scholarly consensus exists, however, as to whether the Holodomor was genocide. This project therefore focuses on the connection between the Ukrainian diaspora in the West and its advocacy for recognition of the Holodomor as genocide despite a lack of consensus on the subject. To investigate, many books, newspapers, and websites on the famine were read, as well as on the history and behaviors of the Ukrainian diaspora. The project has relied heavily on primary sources such as public statements from various politicians and governments, current websites directly expressing the views of Ukrainian diaspora groups, and newspapers expressing certain points of view regarding the famine. Because the Ukrainian diaspora positioned itself into places of prominence in new communities, current research shows it has done significant work to advocate for the awareness of the famine as genocide. Many declarations, monuments, laws, museums, and the like have been created to recognize and commemorate the famine as genocide, including a monument in Washington, D.C. This progress towards recognition of the Holodomor despite the lack of scholarly consensus suggests that societal power of diaspora populations and their advocacy on behalf of certain issues can be stronger than established scholarship in changing societal and historical narratives. Moreover, the Holodomor is significant in current Russian and Ukrainian relations: the current conflict in Ukraine has led to repeated allusions to the Holodomor and its role in the current political narrative.
Introduction

The politics of memory are often contentious, especially with historical events still debated in the modern day. Many Soviet leaders’ atrocities fall into this category, such as Josef Stalin’s purges. While many have heard of the terrors of Soviet collectivization, which led to the deaths of millions of people, few are aware that some events have been considered genocidal. One particular instance contested as genocide was a famine in Ukraine (then the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), where approximately two to seven million people starved to death between the years 1932 and 1933; this was during the peak years of Stalin’s policies directed towards the collectivization of farming in the Soviet countryside. Many use the term “Holodomor” (translated roughly as “Extermination by Hunger,” in English) to describe the famine, which several countries, including Ukraine and Canada, consider to be genocide (“Ukraine’s Tragic History.”).

These figures vary widely due to poor record keeping, with reports of less than one million deaths to reports of ten million deaths. Most scholars claim that somewhere between two and seven million people died during the famine.

Although referenced and used in this thesis, the term “Holodomor” itself is controversial. Although the phrase is a combination of голод (Hunger) and мір (Plague), many scholars refrain from using the term Holodomor. The term is interconnected with the general campaign by the diaspora to advocate for the famine’s recognition as the term Holodomor originated with the Ukrainian diaspora. The term is also problematic because the famine did not only affect Ukrainians; although Ukraine was hardest hit by the famine, the famine affected Russians, Kazakhs, and many others in the Soviet Union. Yet, the Holodomor is a strictly Ukrainian term meant to refer to the conditions in Ukraine. Therefore, a common criticism of the idea that the famine was genocide against the Ukrainian people is that because many others were affected, the argument that Ukrainians were specifically targeted is weakened.
Although the famine took place several decades before the fall of the Soviet Union, there was little discussion on the subject until the disintegration of the USSR. In the 1980s, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, such as glasnost and perestroika, made open discussion more of a reality, academic pieces and serious debate over the famine became widespread. The discussion on the controversial subject subsequently intensified with the publishing of the book *Harvest of Sorrow* (one of the most famous books on the famine printed in English) as well as the United States investigation of the Ukrainian famine, which was done in 1986.

Ultimately, while there is little debate that the famine was a tragedy, the nature of the intent behind the event has been questioned for some time, and there has not been a consensus as to whether the event was genocidal. Politically speaking, the current Russian government, the successor state of the Soviet Union, denies that the famine was genocidal. According to the 2008 vote, where Russian lawmakers voted 37-56 against calling the famine genocide, the famine occurred due to mistakes in collectivizing that led to mass starvation, rather than an attempt to target the Ukrainian people in particular, which many Ukrainians alive today emphasize (Gutterman).

Further complicating the issue is that various scholars disagree on the nature of the famine. The issue becomes complicated with the consideration of the formal definition of genocide and determining whether it is applicable to the famine of 1932-33.
The formal term, coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1948 in Article 2 in the United Nations Convention to Prevent Genocide, is defined as the following:

“[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 280).

In terms of definition, much of the debate on the famine’s nature currently hinges on the existence of the “intent to destroy” a group of people. Was the Soviet government trying to target the Ukrainian people in particular with a famine, or were there other factors at stake that make the usage of the term genocide inappropriate?

Several scholars, including the famous James Mace and Robert Conquest, who worked on and published *Harvest of Sorrow*, one of the first major books written on the subject in English, answer this question in the affirmative. They claim that the Soviet government specifically targeted the Ukrainian people with a man-made, artificial famine. Interestingly, however, Conquest’s sources were somewhat limited at the time of writing, as the scholar did not have access to the Soviet archives that documented the famine, since the archives were closed until 1991 (Fitzpatrick). Conquest himself even admitted he had little information regarding the famine’s death tolls (Marples 507). Notably, Raphael Lemkin, who initially coined the term genocide after the Second World War, also spoke extensively on the Ukrainian famine and
argued that, like Mace and Conquest argue, the situation was genocidal, claiming that the famine was an attack on the “soul” of Ukraine (Lemkin).

There are other scholars, however, who disagree with the genocide narrative. Mark Tauger, a history professor at West Virginia University, has argued that the famine was not genocide, and instead claims that much of the disaster was due to a combination of natural causes and government mismanagement (Tauger).

John Paul Himka, a prominent scholar from the University of Alberta, argues against the general campaign advocating for recognition of the Holodomor, though he does not deny that a significant famine happened to Ukraine in particular. Instead, Himka believes much of the famine was due to the disastrous jump to collectivization, but also claims that much of the discussion revolving around the famine is problematic. Instead, he cautions that the genocide argument often buttresses other goals instead of acting as a stand-alone political agenda of obtaining justice for those who suffered during the famine (Himka 212).

Ultimately, while many scholars have strong opinions on the famine one way or another, the lack of scholarly consensus concerning the nature of the event is important to consider; this is because many actions are being taken to recognize the famine as genocide despite the lack of scholarly consensus. Therefore, while the Holodomor as a singular event was tragic, it cannot be studied in isolation if its impact on current international relations is to be understood.

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According to Himka, one such goal of the genocide argument is the campaign to glorify anticommmunist resistance from Ukrainian nationalists during the Second World War, which was often violent (Himka 212).
The famine has become politically charged due to the ongoing histories of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, as well as the current relationship between the two current nation states. Even in terminology of name, the name “Ukraine” has come with significant ramifications for the relationship between Russians and Ukrainians. In the early 1990s, when Ukraine became independent from Soviet rule after seventy years, the new state of Ukraine argued for the historic name change from “The Ukraine” to “Ukraine.” Because Ukraine means “borderland” or “land,” using the phrase “the Ukraine” was viewed by some as a way of reducing the Ukrainian identity to a territory, rather than as a nation state with its own unique identity (Steinmetz). Therefore, Ukraine’s choice to change its name shows the tension that has epitomized the Ukrainian-Russian relationship for years. While many people view Ukraine as its own separate identity, there is a fear that many are wont to describe Ukraine as an extension of Russia, and therefore not its own entity or nation state with political power. To many Ukrainians, the Holodomor reflects this fear, as many of them see the Holodomor as an attempt by Russian-led authorities to destroy the Ukrainian identity as they knew it.

Because many modern Ukrainians see the Holodomor in this light, the Holodomor continues to shape national feelings for Ukrainians in and out of power, especially concerning national identity. Over the last twenty-five years, the positions of the Ukrainian leadership regarding the Holodomor reflect the uncertainty of Ukraine’s overall direction as a country, and whether it will try to align itself further with the West, or if it will maintain close ties with the Kremlin. Since its formation as an independent state after the fall of the Soviet Union, the modern country of Ukraine has struggled to build its future. The period after the fall of the Soviet Union was a time in which Ukraine found itself in significant economic hardship, but with the
2000s came an attempt to forge a collective identity, as seen in the Orange revolution of 2004; still, consistent problems with corruption and poverty are ongoing.

At every point in recent history, however, the significance of the political ramifications of the Holodomor has consistently been considered by the Ukrainian leadership. With the resurgence of the Ukrainian identity and its association with the west with the Orange Revolution in 2004, interestingly, president Viktor Yushchenko made the 1932-3 famine a national issue that promoted “the struggle of memory over forgetting” as part of his attempt to move the country towards democracy (Motyl).” Only a few years later, however, the next Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, decided to take the opposite direction with his foreign policy and deleted the link about the Holodomor on the president’s official Web site as soon as he came into office (Motyl). In more recent years, current President Petro Poroshenko (who came into power after Yanukovich was ousted in 2014) has returned to the tactics of actively denouncing the actions of Putin as tensions have worsened, often comparing them to the times of Russian aggression in years past, such as the Holodomor.

The various, somewhat contradictory actions by Ukrainian leaders regarding the Holodomor suggest that Ukraine is in a difficult spot; if it is to have a Ukrainian identity that acknowledges its past as it chooses, it stands to lose Russian support and security. This is fine to some, but certainly not for others, especially in Eastern Ukraine, where many citizens align themselves more closely with Russian interests. While much of the population considers itself

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4 Yushenko even introduced legislation that would make denying the Holodomor illegal in 2007, but the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful (Holodomor and Holocaust denial to be a criminal offense).
ethnically Ukrainian, much of the Eastern population considers itself to be chiefly Russian, and some are sympathetic to Russian goals in the region.

With the arrival of 2014, already existing tensions in Russian-Ukrainian relations and the future of the Ukrainian identity came to a head when Russia annexed Crimea, which had been Ukrainian territory for years. Ever since, Russian leadership has been accused of destabilizing much of the Eastern Ukrainian countryside for its own benefit, which has led to the formation of several small republics, such as the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic (both remain unrecognized by Ukraine). As a result, Ukraine’s future is currently not clear. What is clear, however, is that its future will likely be determined in part by its relationships with other countries.

Unfortunately for Ukraine, the relationship between many of the entities traditionally known as the “Western Powers” and Russia has been on the decline, to the point where some have suggested that the world is entering a “Second Cold War” (Woll). With this in mind, the historical memory of the Holodomor has and will likely continue to be used as a tool in order to paint the future of the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, and therefore a tool used to determine much of the future of the relationship between the East and West. This can be seen with the actions made by many countries outside the current conflict, as many have made strides in support of Ukraine; many of these were made in a public manner. Internationally, sixteen countries have come forward with their beliefs that the Holodomor was an act of genocide, such as Argentina, Australia, Estonia, Georgia, Mexico, Peru, and Canada (“International recognition of Holodomor”).
It is interesting to note that some international support for Ukraine has centered on the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide, which is a goal many Ukrainians have had for some time. When looking at the North American continent, for example, it is crucial to note that both the United States and Canada, both with major diaspora populations (which are often known for being tight-knit, and for their desire to spread the message about the Holodomor), have made monuments commemorating the victims of the Holodomor, all the while clearly communicating the event to be genocide.

Due to the efforts of the Ukrainian diaspora and their respective governments, there has been some success in obtaining widespread recognition for the Holodomor. For example, one way countries have shown solidarity with the Ukrainians has been through building monuments commemorating the Holodomor as genocide. One such monument was built in Washington D.C., and opened in November 2015. Although new, the monument has already received significant amounts of criticism and praise since its opening in the United States capital last year.

While monuments commemorating the Holodomor, such as the monument in Washington D.C., may not seem significant to the public at first consideration, their place in prominent locations such as the capital of the United States can wield significant power. Millions of people visit Washington D.C. every year, and therefore many who may not have heard of the Holodomor previously can become exposed to knowledge of the event. Because of this, their opinions of the monument and of the famine have a serious impact on attitudes regarding the current Russian and Ukrainian states. Furthermore, a changed public opinion may further influence future actions made by governments regarding their relationship between themselves, Russia, and Ukraine, especially at a time when Ukraine’s future is
uncertain. In this case, the opening of the memorial has already led to charged political statements that have echoed internationally. One such statement was from none other than Petro Poroshenko, the current President of Ukraine, who commented that the memorial was “being opened when Ukraine [was] defending its independence, overcoming obstacles and rebuffing the aggression of Russia. Again, as in times of Holodomor, Kremlin is trying to wipe Ukraine off the map. Death is coming from the East once again” (President About the Opening of the Memorial).

In terms of public opinion, it appears that the work done thus far to raise awareness about the famine has been successful for Ukrainians worldwide. In terms of Ukrainian politics, the Holodomor’s significance has gone up, as many people now know of and are willing to discuss their beliefs on the event, whereas many were not previously.

For example, according to a 2007-2008 article by Mykola Riabchuk, a Senior Research Fellow at the Ukrainian Center for Cultural Studies in Kiev, the issue of the famine of 1932–33, occupied in the mid-2000s held “a much more prominent position in Ukrainian politics and society than it was ever accorded during the 1990s, let alone in the previous decades when the issue was effectively silenced by the Soviet authorities, and any references to Holodomor were criminalized” (Riabchuk 5).

To back this claim, Riabchuk gives information on a 2003 survey conducted by the Kiev Institute of Sociology and the Sociology Department of the University of Kiev-Mohyla Academy, which showed that “only 75 percent of respondents in a 2003 national survey confirmed their awareness of the event, while 13 percent confessed that they knew nothing about the Famine, and 12 percent declined to express their opinion,” but that only “[t]hree years later, in September 2006, as many as 94 percent of respondents confirmed their awareness of the
event, even though a substantial number of them (12 percent) considered that the Famine was mainly caused by natural phenomena” (Riabchuk 5).

A more recent statistic also suggests serious change in public opinion in Ukraine as to whether the famine was genocide: Serhiy Kostyuk, President of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress of Edmonton claimed that “more than 70% of Ukrainians consider the Holodomor as act of Genocide – a more than 30% increase in the last two years” (Levytsky).5

Just as public opinions are changing in Ukraine, they are also changing around the world, as international awareness of the tragedy has “increased dramatically” in the twenty-five years since the fiftieth anniversary commemoration of the famine, which helped publicize the history of the event in the early and mid-1980s (Sysyn). This shift in opinion demonstrates the success of the Ukrainian people around the world in publicizing the event, despite their doing so without scholarly consensus of the event.

Although there is no scholarly consensus on whether the Holodomor was genocide, the thesis will not be centered around determining the nature of the event. Instead, in studying the political memory of the Holodomor and its current place in international politics, I will focus on the connections made between the diaspora’s role in instigating recognition for the Holodomor, particularly within relatively new monuments built in the United States as well as in Canada, especially because both countries are home to a significant portion to the Ukrainian diaspora. I will use the study of the diaspora’s influence regarding major strides towards recognition of the Holodomor internationally, which I will then connect to its relationship to the future of Russian and Ukrainian relations in consideration of the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

5 This was a piece written in 2014 by a member of the Ukrainian diaspora and is not necessarily a reliable source.
Ultimately, this thesis sets out to demonstrate that because the Ukrainian diaspora was able to position itself into relative places of prominence in their new surroundings after leaving Ukraine, it has been able to do significant work in advocating for the awareness of the Holodomor, an event it considers genocide. Many declarations, monuments, laws, museums and the like have been created in recent to recognize and commemorate the Holodomor as genocide, even though there has not yet been a scholarly consensus on the subject. The amount of progress towards recognition of the Holodomor despite the lack of scholarly consensus suggests that diaspora populations and their advocacy on behalf of certain issues, when done effectively, can be stronger than established scholarship in changing societal and historical narratives about a certain population or event.

**The Ukrainian diaspora**

Due to its efforts in previous decades, the diaspora of Ukraine has had a significant influence on the Holodomor’s place in modern world politics. They have put forth significant efforts to organize themselves to raise awareness of the Holodomor as genocide, even though the famine has not been universally recognized by scholars as genocidal in nature. To understand the magnitude of the diaspora’s role in Ukrainian politics regarding the Holodomor and public awareness of the Holodomor worldwide, it is vital to understand the nature of the Ukrainian diaspora, which maintains significant connections to Ukraine.

The term *diaspora*, coined from the Greek term meaning “a scattering,” describes populations living outside their original homelands (Diaspora). The term, first used to describe the Jewish diaspora, is especially applicable to ethnic groups who maintain a connection to their homeland in some way after leaving, either by physically returning to visit their homelands, upholding their identities by maintaining their homeland’s language, or other cultural behaviors
and activities. A common theme among diaspora populations, therefore, is nationalism, which is defined as loyalty to a particular nation state, in addition to a “sense of …consciousness” to one’s national identity (Nationalism).

There is now is a significant Ukrainian diaspora population outside Ukraine today, which numbers around twenty million people worldwide (Hoppe). This is significant compared to the current population of Ukraine, which totals about forty-five million people (The World Factbook: Ukraine). The Ukrainian diaspora often carries a nationalistic sense of pride, just as many diaspora populations do. Ukrainians around the world also have a collective sense of justice, and many have taken an active interest in current Ukrainian issues, such as the Holodomor.

Because there are sizeable diaspora populations around the world from Ukraine, the history of the diaspora is complicated, as the story of the Ukrainian diaspora varies widely depending on where Ukrainians moved. Generally, members of the diaspora stick together upon their move to other countries, and this is especially applicable to the Ukrainian diaspora, which often moved in waves. When considering immigrations from Ukraine to the Americas, for example, four separate waves of migration are relatively easy to define. The first wave started around 1895 and continued until the First World War, followed by a second wave between the World Wars. A third wave occurred after the Second World War, and was mostly comprised of refugees and migrants, who had been displaced by the war (Isajiw 293). The current wave of migration, which started when the Soviet Union fell in the early 1990s, is ongoing and generally comprised of educated Ukrainians unable to find work suitable for their education level (Isajiw 294).
While the Ukrainian diaspora is present in many countries, it has sizeable populations in North America; namely, the United States and Canada. In the United States, there are about one million Ukrainians, and there are particularly large communities in New York City as well as Chicago, with about 200,000 and 150,000 people respectively (Chicago’s Ukrainian Village; Kozloff). Despite a significant presence in the United States, however, the Ukrainian diaspora has been the most politically influential in Canada. While there are only a few more Canadian Ukrainians than there are American Ukrainians, simply put, a much higher percentage of Canadians are Ukrainian. Additionally in the United States, there are many other diasporas Ukrainians have to compete with for political attention that are not as present in Canada.

In fact, 1,250,000 Ukrainians live in Canada (a population of about thirty million), making it the largest singular population of Ukrainians outside the former Soviet Union. Despite a brief internment of Ukrainians in Canada during the First World War,\(^6\) the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada has risen to a place of prominence, and has used its local and international connections to advocate for issues pertinent to Ukrainians, especially those still in Ukraine. Additional large diaspora populations include Brazil and Argentina, where many Ukrainians migrated in the late 1800s (Isajiw 292).

There are also many Ukrainians that live in various regions of the former Soviet Union, and this population is often described as the Eastern Diaspora. While almost three million Ukrainians were counted in the Russian Federation’s 2002 census, some estimates place the

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\(^6\) During World War One, Ukrainian Canadians were placed into internment camps. At the time, Ukraine was split between the Russian empire (an ally of Canada’s) and Austria-Hungary, which was an enemy. In 1914, Canada enacted a War Measures Act, which allowed it to intern peoples belonging to enemy groups. Because many Ukrainians were affiliated with the Austro-Hungarian empire, they were a primary target of the Canadian government for the internment camps. (The Internment of Ukrainian Canadians)
number of Ukrainians in Russia at over ten million. Additionally, there are likely around 500,000 Ukrainians in both Belarus and Kazakhstan, and smaller populations in other former Soviet Republics, such as Azerbaijan (Isajiw 290). Many Ukrainians that moved eastward were often deported or otherwise forced to move for political or economic reasons. The Ukrainian diaspora has not organized itself in these areas as much as they have in western countries, though some self-advocacy has been done, demonstrated by smaller organizations such as the Ukrainians of Moscow Union. Due to the not uncommon sentiment against the concept of Ukraine and current hostilities between Ukraine, some [pro-Ukrainian] nationalist leaning sources argue that the numbers of Ukrainians in Russia have decreased because it often is not advantageous to identify as Ukrainian in Russia. The Euromaidan press, one of these pro-Ukrainian news sources, in fact argues that the number of Ukrainians in Russia has dropped by about one million people because Ukrainians have stopped identifying themselves as such (Fewer Ukrainians in Russia). Despite the biased source, the statement is indicative of an environment in Russia potentially hostile to Ukrainians working together to advocate for Ukraine’s national issues. For these reasons, this thesis will focus on the Western diaspora, and more specifically on the diaspora in the United States and Canada.

Like many groups of people who left their countries for new futures, Ukrainians were often searching for political and economic stability when they left Ukraine for a new place to call home. In their new communities, Ukrainians often united around cultural traditions, but often did so in a way that meant that they could assimilate as time passed. Many became doctors, lawyers, and other prominent members in their communities, especially in Canada and the

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7 This was particularly true during the 1930s, when Josef Stalin’s regime sent much of what it considered the kulak class to Siberia, where many perished (Isajiw 292).
United States. The diaspora, however, also organized to maintain connections around the world, and established many Ukrainian based organizations outside of Ukraine, many of which still exist today. According to a study by scholars in Toronto, Canada, about ninety percent of the Ukrainian diaspora present felt passing on their heritage was important to them, and of two-thirds of the responders said they were heavily invested in Ukrainian politics (Isajiw 301).

Currently, the Ukrainian diaspora is particularly known for political advocacy for themselves as an ethnic group, both in their new lives and for their homeland. The diaspora established various organizations over the span of the twentieth century, including women’s groups, children’s groups, religious groups, and many others (often with regional chapters in many countries). The diaspora has also been known for its political advocacy. For example, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, established during the Second World War, was established to coordinate and represent the interests of Ukrainian Canadians to the Canadian government (Who We Are). Another organization, the Canadian Friends of Ukraine, was more recently established in 1990, and its mission is centered around using Canadian “know-how” to promote democracy in Ukraine (About CFU). These organizations, like many diaspora organizations, reveal not only a desire to maintain Ukrainian culture, but also a desire to influence world events in a way they see favorable to the country of Ukraine.

Many other organizations like these Canadian-Ukrainian organizations have been established and connected around the world, and they have often worked for what they consider to be in the best interests of Ukrainians around the world. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians, for example, was established in 1967 and was later renamed the Ukrainian World Congress (Isajiw 295). The organization acts as an umbrella to coordinate for various Ukrainian communities around the world and today and represents the diaspora populations of over thirty
countries with and over ninety organizations (Isajiw 295-296). Other organizations around include the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, and the Association of Ukrainians in Ireland (Association of Ukrainians; Ukrainians in Ireland).

In recent years, these international Ukrainian organizations have not hesitated to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian diaspora. For example, the western Diaspora has worked to create an environment where more eastern Ukrainians could identify as Ukrainian, as the eastern Ukrainian diaspora has had comparably less success organizing itself as a group. Before the 2002 census in Russia, for example, the Ukrainian World Congress released a statement imploring those in the Russian Federation to recognize and support Ukrainians in Russia as a distinct group, as there was (correct) concern that the new census in post-Soviet Russia would show a decline in Ukrainians in the Russian population that could not be explained by deaths and migrations alone (Звернення СКУ про перепис в Росії).

In the United States, the UNWLA, or the Ukrainian National Women’s League of America, was founded in 1925, also actively works to promote diaspora activities. Its goals are to “initiate and uphold ties with other Ukrainian as well as American and international organizations” and even to financially assist Ukrainians around the world to research and promote Ukraine’s history and culture (Our Purpose).

This kind of organization and advocacy present in Ukrainian organizations is also common in the Ukrainian Orthodox community around the world, as many Ukrainians are also Orthodox Christians. In present times, for example, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America even has its own “Aid to Ukraine” relief fund because of the conflict currently in Eastern Ukraine (Aid to Ukraine Relief Fund).
In creating more avenues for self-advancement and advocacy, many Ukrainians entered public office in their respective new countries, especially in Canada, which helped them amplify their voices when speaking upon the issues of the Ukrainian peoples, both locally and internationally. Prominent Canadian politicians include Ramon John Hnatyshyn, Governor General of Canada from 1990 to 1995, Gary Filmon, who served from 1988–1999 as the premier of Saskatchewan, and Ed Stelmach, the premier of Alberta from 2006–2011 (Hoppe; Kościński).

Although the story of the Ukrainian diaspora is complicated because many groups of people have had to leave Ukraine over the centuries, many of its members actively maintain a relationship to their homeland, which has in turn been strengthened by community connections and organizations (particularly in the Americas) and assimilation that has made advancing Ukrainian issues to the forefront of world politics a priority. Because the diaspora actively maintained ties to Ukraine as it worked to make connections with local leaders and governments, in addition to international associations aiming to bring Ukrainian interests to the forefront, many efforts towards recognizing the Holodomor as genocide have been made a reality by the diaspora. After all, many Ukrainians outside Ukraine are not only interested in maintaining their heritage; many have a vested interest in Ukrainian politics. Because the Holodomor remains a sore spot in the hearts of Ukrainians around the world, it is therefore no surprise that the Ukrainian diaspora would make a serious attempt to obtain international recognition of the famine as genocide, considering their nature as a group.
Methods of advocating for Holodomor as Genocide

Because of the cohesive nature of the Ukrainian diaspora, it is unsurprising that the diaspora played a major role in influencing public opinion on the Holodomor through monuments, museums, and political maneuvering. As shown by the strides made towards recognition of the famine that will be discussed in the following chapter, public opinion regarding the Holodomor has clearly been influenced by the Ukrainian diaspora around the world.

Before analyzing the events that have spread awareness of the famine, however, it is important to note that most of the work done to raise awareness of the Holodomor has been done only since the 1980s, about five decades after the Holodomor took place. The famine was kept a state secret of the Soviet Union until the end of 1987, when the Kremlin was forced to admit its wrongdoings with the outpouring of information that occurred with new Soviet policies introduced in the 1980s, including glasnost and perestroika. Before the reforms, discussions on the famine’s existence were rare in the first place, let alone discussions regarding its potentially genocidal nature (Marples 3). The many kinds of recognition which have subsequently happened therefore are commendable because a scholarly consensus as to whether the Holodomor was genocide has not been reached.

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8 Glasnost and Perestroika (meaning “openness” and “restructuring” respectively) were a pair of Soviet reforms in the mid-1980s meant to transform the political and economic structures of the Soviet Union. They loosened previous restrictions on free speech, and journalists were able to uncover and freely discuss government corruption over the years: this meant that the famine of 1932-33 was now up for discussion in the public sphere, though previously the government denied its existence (Glasnost and Perestroika).
As a result, few knew about the Holodomor until more recently, although worldwide knowledge of the famine still pales in comparison to other mass killings and genocides of the twentieth century, such as the Holocaust.

Because the narratives regarding the Holodomor have changed significantly in recent decades, it is important to analyze the various mediums the Ukrainian diaspora has used over the years to advocate for awareness of the famine. As the following sections will show, Ukrainians around the world have used various mediums including books, documentaries, and clout in the political realm to control and transform traditional narratives and views on the famine over time.

Publications

Because many were silent about the famine long after its occurrence, publications meant to inform the general population on the Holodomor were often successful. Several publications in the 1980s played a major role in igniting North American interest on the subject, as international discussion of the famine, especially in academia, was relatively limited previously. In many of these cases, members of the Ukrainian diaspora created, published, or otherwise contributed to Holodomor publications; therefore, they have had control over how the famine is portrayed to the public.

One of the first significant publications was the 1986 book *Harvest of Sorrow* by Dr. Robert Conquest. The book proposed that the Holodomor was not just an artificial famine, but that it was genocide that targeted the Ukrainians as an ethnic group. Although Conquest himself was American, the book was written with the assistance of historian James Mace, who became dedicated to researching the famine upon the request of Ukrainian Americans, and said that “it happens to be my destiny to have been chosen by the Ukrainian dead to do this” (James Mace).
Often considered one of the first full histories written on the Holodomor in English, the book was well received and helped reignite discussion on the nature of the famine.

Another prominent publication was the official investigation by the United States into the Holodomor in the late 1980s, the *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-33*. The 1986 investigation was conducted to determine the effects of the famine on the Ukrainian people. It concluded that Stalin’s regime carried out genocide, and included many testimonies from members of the diaspora who were either famine survivors or their surviving relatives (Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine iv). Like *Harvest of Sorrow*, the *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine* was influential in energizing interest in the famine and in new research. The investigation also produced significant eyewitness accounts, especially from survivors who moved to America and were still alive (Marples 507).

Although mostly conducted by United States government officials, the commission itself was composed of various persons advocating the idea that the Holodomor was genocide, including *Harvest of Sorrow* historian James Mace. Moreover, nine of the fifteen members of the commission were chosen because they were prominent members of the Ukrainian American community (Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine vi). The Commission was carried out with the help of several members of Congress, and the results were delivered to the United States Congress in 1988 (Table of contents for Investigation of the Ukrainian famine).

Another prominent example of an influential publication on the famine is the documentary *Harvest of Despair* (1984), which was almost entirely funded for and created by researchers at the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre (Harvest of Despair). Although the film itself did not label the famine genocide, it argued that the famine was inherently tied to Soviet intolerance of the concept of Ukraine, and claimed that the famine
was completely deliberate on the part of the Soviet government (Harvest of Despair Final Script).

Like academic publications, the film had significant impact and won several awards at festivals such as the 1985 Strasburg International film festival (Harvest of Despair). Perhaps due to its successes, Harvest of Despair has even been scoffed at by some Russian sources that claim Ukrainian nationalists made the film to jumpstart a “Holodomor Movement” (Blinova). Just like the previous publications discussed in this chapter, the diaspora played a role in the production and distribution over the contents of Harvest of Despair, and had control over how the famine would be depicted to those unfamiliar with the subject.

In many of these publications, the term “genocide” and the idea that there was intent to destroy the Ukrainian people are frequent topics of discussion. Despite the reality that many scholars disagree with the genocide narrative, it seems that many members of the diaspora feel strongly about their ideas on the famine, which is why so many of the publications they have created and influenced suggest the famine was genocidal. Furthermore, in some cases, members of the Diaspora did not stop with the label genocide in their efforts to raise awareness of the event. Some have even used the term “Ukrainian Holocaust” to describe the event, taking the genocide narrative a step further. Examples of this can be found in many early diaspora publications on the famine. Wasyl Hryshko’s book on the famine, The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933, for example, was published by diaspora organizations in the United States before the Soviet Union acknowledged a famine had even happened in Ukraine (Hryshko)! Like The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933, The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust was published by a diaspora association, the Ukrainian National Association, in 1983 (The Great Famine in Ukraine). Similarly, the comparatively new website for the Harvest of Despair film
calls the famine a “forgotten Holocaust” (Harvest of Despair). While many now find comparing the famine to a Holocaust to be inappropriate, thinking about the famine in genocidal terms has been a common idea amongst the Ukrainian diaspora, even before many of the academic discussions on the subject took place.

Ultimately, publications on the famine have become major venues through which discussion on the Holodomor has begun. The prominent diaspora influence demonstrated in many publications show that the ties Ukrainians around the world often have regarding their homeland are political in nature. They also show that the diaspora has control over how historical events important to them are portrayed, which has the potential to change narratives and, consequently, public views on the subject. In the case of the Holodomor, the large presence the diaspora has played in the academic realm on the topic has prematurely shifted the center of discourse from debate on the Holodomor’s nature to advocating for the famine’s recognition as genocide.

As will be discussed in the following sections, the Ukrainian diaspora has taken its belief that the Soviet government targeted the Ukrainians as an ethnic group (which it has further inflated through its various publications on the topic), and has spread the idea into various public venues, despite the reality that various scholars still disagree with the genocide narrative much of the Ukrainian diaspora clings to in the first place.
Monuments and Museums

Around the time significant publications on the Holodomor came out, many monuments memorializing the Holodomor were also being built. While the most famous monuments and memorials commemorating the famine are in Ukraine, there are memorials in several other countries. Unsurprisingly, many of these monuments around the world have been built in communities with significant diaspora populations, particularly in Canada. In fact, the first Holodomor memorial outside Ukraine was built just outside the city hall of Edmonton. The memorial was built in 1983, a time when many Soviet Officials still denied the very existence of the famine in Ukraine during the 1930s (Theobald). The monument was built by Ludmilla Termertey, a child of famine survivors who moved to Canada after the Second World War (Wallo).

Rather than giving a history on the debates existing surrounding the famine’s nature, the 1983 Edmonton memorial bears an inscription that describes the famine as a “genocidal Famine” (Holodomor: A Day of Remembrance). Considering that little academic discussion existed on the famine at this early point, it seems that the monument was built with the intention of repeating and reinforcing the genocide narrative that many Ukrainians stood by, instead of simply raising famine awareness.

Just like memorials, museums and exhibits about the Holodomor can also have significant effects on public perception of historical events. In the case of the Holodomor, a few museums regarding the event exist, along with many smaller scale exhibitions. Although there is a significant famine museum in Kiev, Ukraine, there are several other museums with Holodomor exhibits around the world, many started in part by the Ukrainian diaspora (Holodomor Victims’ Memorial).
Interestingly, many Holodomor exhibits previously featured in museums in North America have come from the same source. The Ukrainian Museum of New York City, for example, hosted an exhibit about the Holodomor called *Holodomor: Genocide by Famine* in 2008 and early 2009. The League of Ukrainian Canadians produced the exhibit, together with a museum in Ukraine and a Canadian Ukrainian women’s organization (*Holodomor: Genocide by Famine*). Partially created by diaspora members, *Holodomor: Genocide by Famine* was not a standalone exhibit, but instead was part of a larger attempt to raise awareness by the Ucrainica Research Institute of Toronto, Canada, an institute founded several decades ago by Ukrainian Canadians for research on various Ukrainian topics (About Ucrainica Research Institute).

The website providing the information on the exhibit, the website for the Ucrainica Research Institute, does not provide citations for many of its figures, including its claim that about ten million people died during the Holodomor (a number significantly higher than typical estimates); instead, the institute uses much of its website to discuss its efforts to spread its own exhibit to over fifty locations, including other museums, churches, city halls, and universities in North America in 2008 and 2009 (Exhibit Dates and Locations). Like many monuments previously discussed, the exhibit used charged language to describe the famine, as it also claims the famine was a genocide.

Although the Ucrainica Research Institute used politically charged terms inconsistent with the lack of scholarly consensus regarding the famine, it created an exhibit that appeared in many respected institutions. While the contents of these exhibits may not be completely factual (just as monuments are not always factual), many who see the exhibit interpret it as such. As a result, the diaspora’s role in creating a new narrative of the Holodomor becomes particularly
pronounced in examples such as these museums and memorials because the diaspora can often successfully advocate for the creation of such displays, and can often do so on their own terms.

Another major memorial showcasing the diaspora’s activism for of the famine is the new monument in Washington D.C., which opened in November of 2015. The Ukrainian Government was given permission through the United States Congress to place a Holodomor monument on American soil with United States public law 109-340 in 2006 (Public Law 109–340, 109th Congress). Ukrainian Americans strongly supported the memorial, which was put forth by the Congressional Ukrainian Caucus, a caucus consisting of over thirty members of the United States House of Representatives, which was in fact created by an American Ukrainian organization, the Ukrainian Congressional Congress of America, or UCCA (Congressional Ukrainian Congress).

The ability of the Ukrainian Congressional Congress of America to form its own committee of United States representatives demonstrates the Ukrainian diaspora’s networking abilities are such that they can advocate for issues in ways that impact laws created, which, in the case of the Holodomor, could significantly change the American understanding of the famine. According to the National Park service, who assessed and approved the proposed monument, the government of Ukraine worked with the UCCA to create the monument: this meant both parties exercised substantial control over how the famine would be portrayed in the memorial (Memorial to Victims of the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide 1932-1933).

The Holodomor memorial in Washington, D.C. was designed by architect and Ukrainian diaspora member Larysa Kurylas. The monument, a tall, black wall with stalks of wheat, is simply designed in such a way that a general audience can appreciate, as many Americans are likely to associate Ukraine with wheat. With a closer look, however, the amount of wheat present “declines” as it recedes into the memorial. When interviewed, Kurylas commented that
this was done specifically to convey the deliberateness and artificiality of the famine, which led to the disappearance of wheat available for consumption. Another feature of the monument is the word “Holodomor,” which is placed in large font at the bottom of the monument, along with a description of the famine as a “famine-genocide.” This memorial, therefore, advances the diaspora narrative of the famine as genocide without presenting the realities of the lack of academic consensus on the issue.

Furthermore, according to Kurylas, the memorial was designed specifically to promote the usage of the term Holodomor in English, saying that the term should become prominent and “should enter into the English lexicon. If people see it enough, perhaps they will be curious to read about it, and the word will begin to be commonly used” (Wallo).

Ultimately, as the monument’s architect personally explains, the monument is designed to cater to a large audience who may know little about the famine, or even Ukraine in the first place. The monument, therefore, becomes not only a place of learning for the general public, but also a place where the genocide narrative of the famine can be presented without significant dissent. The memorial also has strong anti-Soviet rhetoric, as it has a box with text saying that the memorial was made “[i]n
memory of the innocent victims of a man-made famine in Ukraine engineered and implemented by Stalin’s totalitarian regime (Holodomor Memorial Unveiled).”

Considering that the D.C. monument has unmistakably anti-Soviet rhetoric in addition to rhetoric supporting the idea the famine was genocide, it is not surprising that the Washington D.C. monument has been met with criticism, even in the years preceding its opening in the American capital. Many are skeptical regarding the Ukrainian government’s role in building the memorial, while others are frustrated because there is no direct connection between the famine and Washington, D.C. Why was a city so far removed from a decades old famine selected for the monument? Based on the monument’s prominent location in the city at the corner of Massachusetts Avenue and F Street NW (not far away from many of the city’s most renowned monuments) the location seems to many to be a move by the Ukrainian diaspora to obtain famine awareness (Kennicott).

Instead of just awareness, however, many also argue the diaspora is once again pushing its genocide narrative with the famine, even though the issue has long been controversial. After all, the D.C. memorial, similar to the Edmonton memorial discussed previously, labels the famine a “famine-genocide.” This is where the D.C. memorial becomes significant in advocacy of the famine being recognized as genocide, but also significant in the field of current Ukrainian and Russian relations. The Ukrainian and Russian governments have differing views on the famine’s nature: therefore, by electing to build a monument claiming the Holodomor was genocide (the Ukrainian view), has America picked a side? While the United States has not recognized the famine as genocide, its considerations towards the famine become significant in the context of the current conflict of Ukraine, where much of its Eastern (and more ethnically Russian) side has destabilized. Although the United States has not officially helped Ukrainians
in the conflict, siding with their controversial historical views by giving Ukrainians artistic and political control of the monument give Ukrainians in and outside Ukraine additional political backing at a time when circumstances appear uncertain. More impressive was that the current political situation in Ukraine was not enough for the American government to back out or change the narrative the monument displays: the diaspora was able to prioritize its issues enough that the American government was willing to follow through, even if that meant contributing to rising political tensions in the east.

Considering the Ukrainian diaspora’s ability to go through the American government to erect a monument in Washington D.C. on its own terms, the Ukrainian diaspora has therefore been able to influence government actions to advance the idea the famine was genocide, even though doing so had potentially significant ramifications for Ukrainians as well as the American government (which has remained neutral in the current conflict). As seen by their work with both Ukrainian and North American governments to create prominent monuments, the diaspora’s tendencies towards using its cohesive community structure to advocate for its views has been effective, even in a situation where its views are not based on scholarly consensus.

**Political Statements and Influence**

Just as memorials and museums take up space in the public eye, so have statements by prominent politicians regarding the Holodomor. As the Ukrainian diaspora assimilated into its respective communities, its political presence has led to many politicians, Ukrainian and otherwise, to take action regarding recognition of the Holodomor, many of whom reaffirm the idea that the Holodomor was genocide.

Many political statements on the famine, of course, have been made by Ukrainian politicians, as both current Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko and former president Viktor
Yushchenko have both been avid supporters of recognizing the famine as genocide. Many other powerful statements regarding the Holodomor, however, have been made by various prominent politicians around the world. And, as is the case for many, these foreign politicians either have an established relationship with the diaspora, or alternatively live in countries where the Ukrainian diaspora is prominent in the public eye.

In 2013, during the 80th anniversary of the Holodomor for example, Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister of Canada at time, issued the following statement regarding the Holodomor, using the term “genocide” to describe the event: “Tomorrow Canadians and people around the world will pause to remember the millions of men, women and children, who perished during the Ukrainian Famine- Genocide of 1932-1933 an atrocity perpetrated by Josef Stalin’s communist regime (Monuments: Monuments in Canada).”

Similarly, in 2008, American President George W. Bush visited Ukraine to see a memorial honoring famine victims with Viktor Yushchenko, the president of Ukraine at the time. During the visit, which was meant to highlight the desire for Ukraine to join NATO, Bush signed a document that claimed "Ukraine and the United States will closely cooperate to promote remembrance and increase public awareness of the 1932-33 man-made Great Famine (Holodomor) in Ukraine, including within the framework of the international organizations" (Guterman).

Although it is unlikely Harper or Bush (neither of which have Ukrainian heritage) are experts on the Holodomor, their strong words and actions on the subject suggests influence from the Ukrainian diaspora, who are prominent among their constituents. After all, their statements are likely to be the first time many of their citizens even hear about the event, as the famine is not particularly well known to the public. If they make strong points one way or another (as
many have), they could very well help to sway foreign views on the Holodomor, which is why it becomes fair to argue the diaspora has a major handle in controlling public perceptions of issues for which it may have an overarching agenda or plan.

Although the exact impact of these efforts by politicians is difficult to calculate, it is undeniable that there has been an impact on the public’s views of the Holodomor due to the Ukrainian diaspora’s activism over the years. First, seventeen countries have passed legislation recognizing the Holodomor as genocide over the last fifteen years. The most recent is Portugal, which passed the legislation in early March of 2017 (Portugal Recognized Holodomor). Although this is not a majority of countries by any means, it is noteworthy that many countries have done this despite the lack of scholarly consensus on the nature of the Holodomor.

Powerful political statements have often accompanied the passage of legislation recognizing the Holodomor as genocide, particularly in Canada, where many of the politicians have Ukrainian ties themselves. When Canada legally recognized the Holodomor as genocide, the Canadian Friends of Ukraine released a press statement making their involvement in the legislation clear (CFU Media Release). Furthermore, James Bezan, the conservative MP submitting the legislation, was Ukrainian Canadian himself. Upon introducing the bill, Bezan commented:

“I am a Ukrainian-Canadian and want to put forward this bill so that our government will acknowledge the deaths of 10 million victims as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people...I am also calling upon historians, journalists, and educators to record and include the facts from this horrible genocide so that all Canadians can learn from this tragic piece of Ukrainian history” (CFU Media Release).

Although denying that a genocide occurred, the Russian government too has made political statements about the famine. Rather than continuing to deny any famine happened in Ukraine during the early 1930s, the Russian government has ultimately had to change its position
since the 1980s on the Holodomor. Instead of denying a famine happened, the Kremlin now states that while severe famines happened in the early 1930s, the intent was not to wipe out the Ukrainian people, but that these instead occurred because of government mismanagement that led to famine all over the Soviet Union.

Ultimately, the diaspora’s work in advocating for the Holodomor has gotten many international, high profile politicians invested in its issues. These politicians, in turn, work through their governments to back the Ukrainian diaspora whenever possible, even when scholarship does not consistently back their claims. Because many of these politicians are prominent on the world stage, their interactions with the Ukrainian diaspora and its genocide narrative can directly influence public views on the topic, which has translated into more recognition of the Holodomor as genocide internationally.

Diaspora Self-Advocacy

Finally, the Diaspora has worked hard on its own terms to maintain and pass down knowledge to their future generations and local communities. In addition to the physical manifestations of attempts to portray the Holodomor as genocide such as monuments and memorials, the diaspora has often hosted many different types of events to raise awareness in their respective communities. This has happened more frequently in recent decades, and particularly so in places where the diaspora has become prominent, such as in larger cities of Canada.

For the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor for example, members of the Ukrainian diaspora of Canada arranged an extensive series of events to commemorate the victims, including candlelight vigils and even “33 hour famines” hosted by Ukrainian student organizations on college campuses around the country (Events in Canada). More recently, the
Ukrainian Canadian Congress launched a similar week designed to commemorate the victims in November 2016 (Holodomor Awareness Week). As time has passed, events such as these have become common in areas with significant diaspora populations.

The diaspora has also taken steps to educate their communities on the famine. During April 2015 for genocide awareness month, researchers from the Holodomor Research and Education Consortium (HREC) conducted Holodomor workshops for educators in Ontario. According to Valentina Kuryliw, who headed the workshops, commented that the diaspora’s work was raising awareness as the community had hoped: “A number of [the educators present] already teach the Holodomor and were eager to acquire additional resources. This was a definite improvement over a workshop I conducted in 2011, in which almost none of the teachers knew about the Holodomor” (Baziuk).

Ultimately, while the diaspora has made significant connections with various political figures around the world to advance the narrative that the Holodomor was genocide, its day to day work in its own communities has also advanced its agenda regarding the famine.

Interestingly enough, however, is a point that makes this thesis come full circle: the Ukrainian diaspora was the entity that coined the term Holodomor in the first place (Hadzewycz, Kolomayets, and Zarycky). By creating a term on their own in the late seventies to early eighties, the diaspora has created a label for the famine that is unique, memorable, and effective, as many academics have decided to use it in their scholarship. The term, coming from the Ukrainian words, is also chiefly Ukrainian, coming from a combination of the words голод (hunger) and мордувати (to murder) (Furr).

Just as arguments for the genocide narrative of the famine have been criticized, some commentators have even accused the Ukrainian community of deliberately coining the term
Holodomor to sound similar to the term Holocaust, to make the two events appear more comparable to the general public (Furr). While this accusation is difficult to confirm, it speaks volumes on how others view the Ukrainian Diaspora’s actions, as its campaign to attain recognition for the Holodomor as genocide has often been outspoken. While it is understandable that the Ukrainian diaspora wants some semblance of justice over an event where it suffered great losses, is it acceptable that so much of the community has advanced a genocide narrative much of the academic community disagrees with? Due to its advocacy in previous decades, the diaspora, right or wrong, has shifted the way much of the public thinks of a particularly charged historical event, and has successfully become more relevant than scholarship on the topic on its own. To accomplish this feat, the diaspora’s groundwork in its own communities have been just as important as its work in the international community.
Conclusion

Because the Ukrainian diaspora positioned itself into places of prominence in its new communities, it has advocated for the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide through mediums such as monuments, museums, political statements, and local activism. The diaspora did this work despite the lack of scholarly consensus on the famine’s status, which demonstrates that social and ethnic groups can often shape public perception of historical and societal narratives more effectively than established scholarship if they so choose. In other words, this thesis suggests that it is possible to change the public’s view of a historical narrative or event. Are our understandings of historical events based on facts, or on how groups of people have influenced our understandings of events over time? The case surrounding the Holodomor seems to suggest the latter, especially as time passes and the public is forced to rely increasingly on historical memory.

It is understandable that the Ukrainian diaspora has actively advocated for awareness of the famine, a personal event that cuts deep for many people. It is also necessary, however, to be critical of diaspora practices because much of their work has been done without substantial true scholarly consensus regarding the nature of the famine. Unfortunately, the subject is a complicated one because the Soviet government denied the famine’s existence for decades. The previous positions of the Soviet government are unacceptable, and perhaps justify Ukrainian frustrations on the issue to an extent.

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9 The Soviet government denied the famine before more information on the topic became public in the mid-1980s with Soviet reforms. The Soviets then were forced to change their stance: they acknowledged that a famine occurred, but maintained it was due to a combination of natural causes and government mismanagement.
However, prematurely advocating for the famine to be labeled as genocidal without scholarly consensus is also unacceptable. The term “genocide” carries a lot of historical and political weight; therefore, the term must only be used when appropriate.

After all, worldwide opinions of the famine do not exist in a vacuum: they carry over to worldwide views on the concept of the Ukrainian nation. If the international community believes the Soviets committed genocide against the Ukrainian people, they may view Russian and Ukrainian relations differently than they would have previously. Therefore, the diaspora’s work in advocating for the Holodomor as genocide is not only about the famine itself, it is also about how the world sees the Ukrainian nation and people in the past, present, and perhaps most importantly, the future. In other words, if the Ukrainian diaspora has had a significant impact on the historical narrative of the famine of 1932-1933, what else could the diaspora have significant influence on?

One event separates itself as relatively obvious, and this is the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The conflict has been ongoing since the ousting of Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and has led to the destabilization of much of Eastern Ukraine.

Interestingly (though perhaps, unsurprisingly) enough, the diaspora has actively worked to support Ukraine throughout the conflict, just as they have worked to promote the 1932-33 famine as genocide. One diaspora organization, the Ukrainian Federation of America, has taken on the task of raising money to pay for the medical treatment of Ukrainian soldiers injured in the current conflict, and even flying them to the United States to receive medical care when possible (“Our Wounded Heroes”). Others from the diaspora are instead choosing to fund the war effort directly, in the form of helmets, gunproof vests, and other war supplies (Harress).
“Is the diaspora at war with Russia? Absolutely,” said Lenna Koszarny, who is currently the head of Kiev’s arm of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. “The diaspora is helping Ukraine defend itself...We pressed the Canadian government to give as much aid as they can to Ukraine...“There are 20 million Ukrainians outside Ukraine doing all they can to support you” (Mackinnon).

There is truth in Koszarny’s words, as the Canadian government has been one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine in recent years. This has been demonstrated by prominent politicians, such as junior defense minister and Ukrainian Canadian James Bezan, who personally delivered relief supplies to Ukrainians in the midst of the new conflict (Brewster). Kyiv Post, an English-language newspaper for the international Ukrainian community, also ranked former Prime Minister Stephen Harper among the most outspoken “promoters” for Ukraine within the international community (Mackinnon). Furthermore, the article actively made a connection between the diaspora’s activism and its effects on higher leadership, commenting that “perhaps Stephen Harper would not support Ukraine that actively if Canada did not have the world’s largest diaspora community” (Mackinnon). According to the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), the diaspora has been influential on Canada’s stances towards Ukraine in the midst of the new conflict, which began with the ousting of Ukrainian PM Viktor Yanukovich and the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Kościński).

Indeed, since 2014, Canada has passed several sanctions against Russia for its responsibilities in destabilizing Ukraine. Much of these sanctions are economic in nature, as the regulations impose a freeze for Canadians on assets and dealings with designated Russian businesses and persons (Canadian Sanctions Related to Russia).
At a time where Russia’s current aggressions appear directed towards Ukraine, the famine seems to find itself once again the minds of Ukrainians around the world. And because the Ukrainian diaspora has made strong ties in its local communities around the world, it is undeniable that the memory of the famine and the ownership of the narratives of the famine are inseparable to international ideas of Ukraine’s future.

If we are to understand the entire debate surrounding the famine, however, we must take a step back from the actions the diaspora is currently making towards recognition of the famine as genocide, and instead acknowledge that the issue is not black and white. In reality, while much of the Ukrainian diaspora likely has honest intentions of obtaining some semblance of justice for their collective loss, many scholars do not agree with their ideas on the issue. This means that their tendency to label the event as genocide in museums, memorials, and in the law are misinformed at best and incendiary of conflict at worst, especially because it is clear their actions influence public opinion of the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Instead, the international community as a collective must prioritize academic voices on the issue, so that some semblance of consensus one way or the other may emerge before proper action can be taken. Unfortunately, as the tension in Ukraine continues and worsens, the discussion on the famine has heightened, and not necessarily in a way that attempts to maintain a sense of objectivity. An article published this year even makes direct connections between the famine and the current conflict. The article comments that both the current conflict and the famine were wars on Ukraine that were done by choice, and that “the perpetrator [of the famine] was Stalin; today, the perpetrator is Vladimir Putin, who, it will be remembered, has not been loath to see a rehabilitation of Stalin’s memory and image in his new Russia. And it is not difficult to find a further parallel” (Weigel).
The Holodomor’s place in history has come to the center of debate as to Russia’s intentions for Ukraine, and this is demonstrated further through what has been taught in Ukrainian schools before and since the conflict. Since Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union, the Holodomor has been taught in schools as genocide. At least, this was true until recently. Since the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has started, many schools in the East have started teaching school children a version of the famine more like the Russian narrative, where it is argued that while the famine was terrible, it was not committed against Ukrainians in particular, and instead was a disaster due to weather and mistakes made by the Soviet government in the process of collectivization. This practically instantaneous shift demonstrates how interconnected the debate on the Holodomor is to the current understanding of what it is to be Ukrainian in a changing world; it is important enough to the destabilized region of Ukraine (which has had a significantly larger Russian population than the west) to become more “Russian” that they feel strongly they must teach the Russian version of the story (Kramer). It also reveals that the famine is still at the front of the debate, especially at a time where Ukraine’s future is uncertain. The conflict is now in such a place that it is unclear that Ukraine will ever regain its lost territory in the east; therefore, some believe that the Ukrainian identity and future at whole is at risk. This idea rings true if one talks to the schoolchildren of that area: when asked about learning about Ukraine, one ninth grader in south eastern Ukraine (part of the area Ukraine has lost control of) said that “There’s no sense in studying the history of Ukraine any longer,” she said. “We’re not in Ukraine” (Kramer).

As the political situation in Ukraine worsens, time will tell as to how the narrative of the Holodomor will play a role in the country’s future. Unfortunately, it does not appear that a return
to obtaining a sorely needed consensus on the issue will happen at a time when many are actively connecting the famine to the current conflict.
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