National Revolution and International Interference:
How American Intervention Influences Revolutionary States

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation
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by

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# National Revolution and International Interference:
## How American Intervention Influences Revolutionary States

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Chapter I

Statement of Problem
& Conceptual Development
1.1 Introduction

Around the world each year, hundreds, thousands, and in some cases, tens of thousands of lives are directly and indirectly affected by revolutions and the violence which they spawn. (Gurr 1970) As central social control breaks down and violence erupts, many can be killed, and multitudes more can be displaced. (Tanter & Midlarsky, 1967) In one of the most salient of modern cases of revolutionary social impact, the ongoing Syrian Civil War was estimated in April 2016 to have cost a staggering 470,000 civilian lives in a conflict which threatens to proceed into its sixth year in 2017. (SCPR, 2016) According to the Syrian Center for Policy Research, since the outset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, normal life has come to a screeching halt as child life expectancy among Syrians dropped by nearly 20 years in early 2016. While this conflict is certainly the most recognizable modern example of protracted revolutionary violence, it stands as only one of many examples of the deadly impact of revolution in the Middle East region. During the protests and resulting revolutions of the Arab Spring uprisings, displacement and death projections were maximized as civilian non-combatants and militaries clamored for national renewal, freedom, or for representation in the national politics of their states. (Amnesty International, 2015) Because of the great national impact of revolutionary violence, the identity of many states of the Middle East have been shaped as a result of revolutionary activity in the past 40 years.

1.2 Thesis

While the causative factors, internal happenings, and ultimate conclusion of revolutions can be directly influenced by many factors, this study aims to analyze the influence of American
intervention and American foreign aid on the outcome of revolutionary violence. To what degree does American foreign intervention and aid to Middle Eastern countries experiencing revolutionary activity influence the outcome of revolution? Moreover, does fluctuation in aid act as an indicator of future American intention? When American aid is distributed for the purpose of developing good governance in a state, or US leaders decide to intervene in physical, diplomatic, or multinational ways, does it have a sufficient impact to stop the revolution or to increase overall national or regional stability? Once American leaders apply interventional pressure to attain a particular aim, do national leaders respond with reforms which conform to the outcomes that American leaders endeavored to achieve? Finally, to what degree are the orthodox assumptions regarding drivers for revolutions supported in modern cases of revolution? The provision of aid and the application of interventional forces by US leaders can have a great influence on the outcome of the unrest. (Alesina & Weder, 2002) (Taveras, 2001) The goal of the paper is to make considerable steps towards understanding the possible influence US intervention can and does exert on modern Middle Eastern revolutions, and to give a clear view of what other factors alter the outcome of revolutions.¹

In this project, I hypothesize that American leaders likely use a variety of strategic tools in order to actively intervene in or influence the result of revolutionary activity. Furthermore, this intervention likely has played a significant role in supporting or causing the desired result of the intervention. Secondly, I hypothesize that foreign aid can and has been used as a strategic resource to constrain the interests of recipient states and their ruling regimes in cases of Middle

¹ When speaking of revolutionary success, I refer to the ultimate aims of the revolution. In many cases, this aim is governmental overthrow and replacement. I will refer to this as the ultimate aim of revolution.
## Year / Region

### Aid to Tunisia (In Millions)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
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<th>Tunisia Annual Revenues</th>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>$4,521,161,000</td>
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</table>

**Average:**

- **Aid to Tunisia (In Millions):** $37,734,098,158
- **Tunisia Annual Revenues:** $206,261,075,712,090

### NOTE:

Reliable figures for Annual Revenues in Tunisia are unavailable for years outside of 1992-2012.

## Year / Region

### Aid To Egypt (In Billions)

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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
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<th>Egypt Annual Revenues</th>
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<td>1988</td>
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**Average:**

- **Aid To Egypt (In Billions):** $3,893,017,902
- **Egypt Annual Revenues:** $210,948,580,622,716

### NOTE:

Reliable figures for Annual Revenues in Egypt are unavailable for years outside of 1988-2015.

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1. VIS. 1A
Eastern revolution, and to bend them to the interests of American leaders. As revolutionary activity occurs, the increased provision of American funds can give recipient states the opportunity to invest in measures that would appease their revolting publics. By providing funds which may spur economic and humanitarian development, provide for an increased measure of judicial purity, or provide regimes with the opportunity to sell their successes to their publics through massive statewide PR campaigns, American foreign aid may give foreign governments the added resources they need in order to tip the balance of revolutionary activity in their favor.

As American foreign aid increases, I hypothesize that state governments are able to establish good governance practices and stave off revolution in some cases by reform. In doing this, American foreign aid may reverse the national calamity which led to the initial revolt and aid in stabilizing national governments. By decreasing the initial drivers of revolution, later referred to as “Goldstone’s assumptions”, US foreign aid can head off revolutions before they develop fully. Furthermore, I hypothesize that when aid budgets are too politically sensitive, American leaders will intervene in more direct ways in order to shape the result of the revolution to their interests.

American foreign aid can be of great utility in aiding states in the completion of small development projects, inducing a greater level of military sophistication, and providing for an increased measure of judicial purity. However, the amount of aid that any state receives in comparison to national revenues from other sources or national GDP is marginal. For instance, in Tunisia, an important Middle East country which has received an amount exceeding $100 Million USD for 34 of the last 62 years, American foreign aid comprised roughly .018% of total government revenues in the period of 1992-2012 (Prichard et. al., 2014) In the same way, in the time between 1988 and 2015, American aid to Egypt, a state which has historically enjoyed a
closer relationship with the US than most other Middle East states, represented only 1.84% of Egyptian revenues.\(^2\) (Prichard et. al., 2014) More importantly than this, American foreign aid can be used as a signaling mechanism which is used to alter foreign regimes’ actions to adhere to the preferences of American administrations. To a degree, the amount of American foreign aid that is given to a state is important, as often hundreds of millions, or in some cases, billions of dollars are given to recipient states each year. (USAID, 2016) This, however, is not as important to recipient states as what the provision of aid signals. American economic investment in a state can signal a great degree of American support for that state and it’s current practices. As American leaders increase the amount of aid given, it can be perceived by recipients as a signal of commitment and continued mutual interest. Likewise, when the US decreases the level of aid provided to recipient states as a result of contrived changes in recipient states or after revolts begin, American leaders signal to recipient states that the relationship which both have enjoyed in the past is being stretched dangerously. American leaders indicate by this action that continuing similar activity could result in a recalculation of American interest in favor of alternative investment. More than the removal of hundreds of millions of dollars from a recipient’s developing economy, the retraction of American investment in any state can mean more complex national issues in the future, and a decreased capacity to respond effectively to future revolt. State leaders know that frozen relations with the US can mean economic instability, increased diplomatic burden\(^4\), and a lack of future support if popular revolt becomes more

\(^2\) These figures represent the only years with available reliable data pertaining to annual revenues, and provide a roughly 20 year span to represent a 30 year trend.

\(^3\) See VIS 1A

\(^4\) By diplomatic burden, I mean that states who perceive a state government as having been “kicked out of the fold” by the US will be less apt to make concessions to a government which has been diplomatically exiled by the existing superpower.
protracted or unmanageable. In this way, the amount of foreign aid dollars that a state receives as compared to other metrics of national economic activity is of little consequence in comparison to the strategic situation it signals toward future relations with the US. As the US alters its aid provision policy in the context of peace or revolution, it signals to recipient states its approval or disapproval and alerts recipients to its intended future actions given the situation that the recipient state finds itself in.

One of the central goals of this study is to discover to what degree American foreign aid and intervention is influential in cases of revolution in the Middle East, and if there is a purpose for the further study of American interventional influence in strategically complex international situations. As a first movement, this study will analyze revolution as a product of the five well recognized revolutionary drivers. These drivers are: I. National economic or fiscal strain, II. Growing internal rivalry, III. Popular anger at injustice, IV. Presence of an ideologically shared narrative of resistance, V. Favorable international relations. In this project, I will focus on indicators of the three most tractable of these as indicators of the rest including national economic stability, alienation or political involvement of populace and elites, and growing sense of injustice and governmental illegitimacy, which will be referred to as good governance. As the literature supports, I suggest that states which begin to experience revolutionary activity may possibly reverse the initial effects of revolt by adjusting the drivers of the above mentioned variables. If this can be done, it follows that revolutions can be stopped before they begin.

In order to identify the impact of American intervention and foreign aid on revolutions in the Middle East, this project will analyze two cases of successful Middle East revolution and two
cases of unsuccessful Middle East revolution. This analysis will seek to identify what circumstances in the above categories precipitated revolt, how American leaders responded, and what the result of that response was. In order to identify American intervention, this project will analyze American leader rhetoric, physical intervention, and institutional attempts at influencing or manipulating the outcome of the studied revolutions. Secondly, I will conduct a thorough quantitative analysis of American foreign aid flows to the state studied, and will endeavor to identify if there were significant changes after the outset of revolution, and if those changes may have had strategic implications. This project’s central hypothesis stands that American intervention and aid can buy or induce good governance and development (Tarp & Hansen, 2014), and in so doing can change the outcome of revolutions to suit American interests. (Skarbek & Leeson, 2009) In order to identify significant changes in governance, this analysis will identify structural components of each state studied, and will measure in a broad sense the impact of these circumstances on public perception. Second, this project will identify attempts at American intervention and will endeavor to identify the preferred impact of this intervention. Finally, state leaders’ reactions will be analyzed to determine if American intervention successfully bought or induced the desired changes and whether these changes were sufficient to stop or the revolution or spur it forward. If successful revolution ensued, I will endeavor to separate out cases of sufficient reform and cases of insufficient reform in the final chapter of this work.

1.3 Clarifications
Prior to delving into the substantive elements of the project, it is important to give a brief overview of the strictures which bound this project and the logic that underlies them. The first is the choice of timeline. From the perspective of American foreign policy, the 1979 revolution in Iran provides a clear changing point for American foreign policy, and for how the US deployed its resources in the Middle East. (Parvaz, 2014) Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, America’s strategic positioning with states in the Middle East has been relatively consistent, even despite the tumult produced by the Arab Spring. As US-Iranian relations collapsed, US leaders determined to widen the array of states with which it was allied, and sought to maximize their wide influence in a variety of new spheres. Furthermore, the larger context of the Cold War gave Middle Eastern states great motive to give into American attempts at establishing deep economic and diplomatic ties, the effects of which are still strong today. With the ending of the Cold War less than a decade away, American leaders were able to turn their attention to shoring up alliances with states around the region, and preparing for an era dominated by East-West trade and diplomatic relations.

Throughout this work, the term Middle East is used to describe the region for which the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near East Affairs has diplomatic and policy authority. This area generally includes the Arab states of North Africa, the Levant, the Gulf Region, and Iran. The significance of this region to US policy and diplomacy has been stated previously and the confinement of this area as a region of study represents an internally consistent policy preference and priority structure. The term “MENA region” or “MENA” are commonly used acronyms which refer to the states of the Middle East and North Africa. In this work, the term MENA should be considered an equivalent to the term Middle East.
When this work references American foreign aid or foreign aid, it is used to describe loan and grant funds that are allocated for economic or military purposes by the Government of the United States, and are represented in the official record of the United States Agency for International Development. This study makes no practical distinction between aid allocated for development, political affairs, security, or infrastructure. The provision of American foreign aid allows recipient states to use other public funds for crisis purposes, as funds allocated to revolt response can be replaced by US aid funds in national budgets. For this reason, this project analyses all forms of American foreign aid together, and makes no practical distinction between varied forms of aid. In this study, American aid to international organizations, including the United Nations, and its agencies is excluded. While American aid which is channeled through these institutions can be effective in altering the outcome of revolution, allocation of funds given to international organizations is restricted to the prerogatives and needs of the international organizations that receive them. Furthermore, it is incredibly difficult to follow the trail of American funds to embattled regimes when it is sent through international organizations. Finally, this work will not look at aid given through intelligence services or agencies with clandestine operations. While analyzing these flows would inevitably provide intriguing research, the information that is available for these flows is limited at best, and often not available to researchers or anyone without governmental security clearance. (Rubin, 2007) Accordingly, instead of providing a partial and likely incomplete assessment of these funds, it is better to exclude them entirely unless or until a greater multitude of information is available.

5 While this record is brought together and presented by USAID, this agency only provides roughly 6% of American foreign aid annually, and was only established in 1961. This source represents American foreign aid flows from all of the providing agencies of the US Federal Government for the years referenced. See reference list for link to dataset.

6 The US black budget in 2013 was $52.5 Billion. This includes agency budgets for CIA (14.7 Billion), NSA (10.4 Billion), and the clandestine arm the DoD. This also includes an estimated $29 Billion budget for secret weapons development. Specific information pertaining to flows to American black budget dollars to foreign governments are unavailable at present. More information available: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/781719/tables.pdf
1.4 Historical Context

In American diplomatic history, few events have undermined US Middle East strategic interests more than revolutions. (Johansen, 1980) (Snyder 1999) Moreover, no single variety of events has ended more governments, or caused massive national reshuffle as revolution has in the modern Middle East. (Gurr, 1970) In 1979, the Islamic Revolution of Iran saw the ousting of the Iranian President, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi despite his importance to US leaders and political elites, and despite US attempts to support his regime. (Bhagat, 1987) This revolution saw the expulsion of American aid and diplomatic apparatus from the state, and an Iranian movement towards theocratic authoritarian rule, despite the investment of billions of dollars of American development and American security support that preceded the revolution. (Viorst, 1995) In the same way, the 2011 Egyptian revolution that resulted in the ultimate installation of authoritarian Abdel Fattah el-Sisi plagued the US as diplomatic relations broke down, social violence occurred, and diplomats fled the state in the first major break in American brokered Israeli-Egyptian peaceful relations since the 1978 Camp David Accords were signed. (Reuters, 2011) Again, in 2015, after enjoying years of diplomatic and security relations, the US-backed Yemeni government of Abd Rabbu Hadi was deposed, Hadi was forced into exile, and American diplomatic engagement in Yemen came to a screeching halt as the US embassy was

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7 It should be recognized that the infrequency of revolutionary activity in the modern Middle East does nothing to make the study of them unnecessary or less significant. To the contrary, its relative infrequency and history as a mode of great national and international change only serves to strengthen the significance of revolutions as an area of necessary study.

8 The violence which resulted from the 2011 Tahir Square Revolution was followed by widespread economic and social unrest, and a recalibration of Egyptian ability to pursue their interests and those of their allies. While both al-Sisi and his predecessor were authoritarian rulers, the overthrowing of the Egyptian government run by Hosni Mubarak greatly diminished the ability of US leaders to assert themselves effectively in an Egyptian context.
evacuated. (Hjelmgaard & Onyanga, 2015) In this case, rebels citing a new revolution, took over much of the government infrastructure and severely limited the ability of American leaders to influence national policy in the country. While social violence and upheaval of any kind threaten to upend American interests in strategically important states, revolutions in the Middle East have more often been the cause of this tumult than other types of social violence in the last 30 years.\(^9\) For this reason, revolutions provide a lens through which to understand the development, implementation, and degradation of American interests abroad. Moreover, understanding possible causal factors which lead to revolutions allows for the development of policies which enable the attaining of national interests by both central and peripheral states in cases of possible revolution.

Since 1979, twelve popular revolutions in the Middle East have resulted in a complete overthrow of government rule and the purging of national institutions.\(^10\) In that time, a further nine attempted popular revolutions have resulted in marginal concessions being made to populations and political elites. While much is known about why revolutions happen, and how they transpire, woefully little is known about how other happenings impact the outcome of revolutions. (Walt, 1992) In every case of Middle East revolution since 1979, whether ultimately a case of successful revolution or not, significant changes have resulted economically, socially, and in terms of national governance. Most notably, during the violent revolutionary period known as the Arab Spring, twelve states across the Middle East experienced significant revolutionary activity which led to governmental change, leaving only five Arab states in the

\(^9\) See Visualization 1B

\(^10\) See Visualization 1A
Middle East untouched. Moreover, during this period, among the twelve states that experienced revolutions, half experienced a complete overthrow or replacement of their governments. In five additional states, revolutionary activity produced significant changes in national governing structure, and one became a case of protracted civil war. In the coming pages, I will endeavor to show that revolutions in the Middle East since 1979 have been developmentally significant for the states which have experienced them as well as the region as a whole. (Jones, 2012) I will further show that revolutions are uncommon, (Goldstone, 2011) and that the Middle East has been an area of relative stability during the last 30 year; a conclusion that threatens to overturn perceptions of the Middle East among academics, political pundits, and policymakers.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

As a first step towards deriving a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the Middle East and its revolutions, one must answer the question, “Does American foreign aid precipitate revolt?”. After a deep analytical look at the preceding literature on foreign aid, it is clear that unilaterally foreign aid is an insufficient force to produce revolutions. It is clear that it can however make its success more possible and in some cases might inadvertently purchases its success. Revolutions represent a complex socio-political clashing of conflicting interests and national dynamics. “Revolutions do not arise simply from mounting discontent over poverty, inequality, or other changes. Rather, revolution is a complex process that emerges from the social order becoming frayed in many areas at once (Goldstone,2014).” As revolutionary activity increases, national populations clamor for their interests to be heard and heeded by the loudest political voices of their nation. Their threat, if disregarded, is that their action will turn from
protest and unrest to full revolution wherein governments are overthrown and institutions are ransacked. While American foreign aid does certainly play a role in the complex dealings between foreign governments and their enraged, revolting populations, it is necessary to make clear under what circumstances foreign aid does have an impact and to what extent it does. To say that the application of American foreign aid always causes a particular outcome would be wrong, as revolutions and cases of other social unrest do not necessarily share a common causal stem. (Skarbek & Leeson, 2009) In reality, revolutions are highly complex socio-political events; their causes can be many and contingent on interactions among them. (Gottschalk, 1944)

When the US gives aid or intervenes in the circumstances of states which are experiencing revolt, it does this, in part, to assure the stability of governments who support American national interest. (Savun & Tirone, 2012) In other cases, American intervention and aid is withheld or restricted from states whose governments American leaders prefer to see reform or collapse, as was the case in Egypt after the military coup d'état of 2013. (US Budget, 2012) In cases of domestic upheaval, national governments may use US aid to buy off political elites’ allegiance, to suppress dissenters, or to develop national infrastructure in order to pacify their publics. In cases where the US withholds necessary aid, this could inhibit the recipient state from paying off elites, investing in development projects, and thus pacifying their local populations. (Knack, 2001) However, when the US increases aid, it can enrich political leaders, secure unpopular leaders in office (by co-opting elites), or allow for deeper misuse of funds. (Winters, 2010) The ability of elites and the public to see this transaction could further inflame an already negative public image of the government and may serve to increase the fervor and determination of revolutionary parties to achieve their aims. This could serve to motivate
disinterested members of the public towards revolutionary activity as the claims of revolutionaries are made more salient to the mass public. In this way, increases in American aid or intervention may serve to increase the likelihood of successful revolution. As rulers who are perceived as corrupt or self-interested receive more aid and are supported by US leader rhetorical or physical intervention, it may provide leaders with the opportunity to further misuse national resources and oppress their publics, thus deepening the distrust of elites and the public for the leader. In this case, the only opportunity that a state leader may have to stave off revolution will be to use interventional resources to quickly reform and develop the state institutions before the revolutionary group that plagues their state gets too large and powerful. Often, however, state leaders refuse to make deep, meaningful reforms until revolters have nearly won, underestimating their resolve, or thinking their government is too strong to fall.

American intervention is often highly influential, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively, in the success or failure of revolutions in the states of the Middle East. The ability of a national government to return from the brink of full revolution depends centrally on two factors. 1) Timing - as revolting groups increase in their size and complexity, their ability to effectively resist their national government increases. Eventually, if government changes are not made in favor of the demands of revolters, the revolting masses will gain enough internal structural stability and control to topple the national government and translate their popular unrest to complete government overthrow. Until a certain tipping point, the government may have the capacity to give selective concessions to revolters in favor of preserving the lives and freedom of rulers, and to avoid a complete revolution. If, however, the national government waits too long to give concessions towards stability, legitimacy, and representativeness, because
it feels that it either shouldn’t have to, or because it does not realize the revolters’ popular support and its eventual ability to seize control. The goal of any ruler must be to give early metered concessions before the revolters realize that they could take control of the state away from its leaders. Secondly, Caliber - if a government recognizes a need to give concessions towards stability, legitimacy, or representativeness and refuses to do so, or decides to do so too late, revolters will likely gain popular support, become more violent, and collect small victories which will slowly degrade the ability of rulers to govern and control their state legitimately. If a leader gives insufficient concessions, unrelated concessions, or no concessions at all, revolts can turn to revolutions and quickly overturn national governments, as was the case in a number of MENA states during the Arab Spring.\(^\text{11}\)

In endeavoring to discover the relationship between revolutionary activity and American intervention and aid, the question must be answered: if American intervention affects the success of revolutions, what is it producing or buying and what impact does it have on the recipient nation? In order to answer this question, one must understand what it is that national publics are most often interested in. As Jack Goldstone outlines, revolt is founded in public concern for their representation, their stability, and their role in the political apparatus of their nation. (Goldstone, 2014) As national leaders allow economic instability to grow, and political alienation to increase, the balance of contentment shifts and popular desire for forced change increases. In his work, Goldstone lays out a set of five key factors that have been shown to lead to revolt or revolutionary activity. Individually, these characteristics may not be powerful enough to spawn

\(^{11}\) See Visualization 1C
massive popular revolt, but brought in tandem with one another, these factors have led to revolution in a large number of cases.

The first characteristic that Goldstone references is economic and fiscal strain. This is typically conceived of as a calculation of foreign investments, corporate tax rate, consumer tax rate, domestic job growth, and inflation. As state leaders mismanage financial resources, states are required to increase taxes in order to drive further economic stimulus. This also results in the need to cut spending to important areas of the economy, which can inflame tensions as individuals and institutions are required to tighten already thin budgets. This can easily cause discontentment and further the frustrations of political elites, whom leaders are dependent on to pacify national publics. The second characteristic is a growing alienation of elites. Political leaders require the support of these individuals in order to convince the public to support the regime in power. (Gurr, 1970) If national elites feel as if their opinion is not heard or if they feel their political influence is waning, “they may decide to overturn and replace the existing social order, rather than merely to improve their place in it (Goldstone, 2014).” The third characteristic is a widespread popular anger about injustice. This is often seen when impoverished people experience rent or taxes increase, or when the working class are unable to find gainful employment. “When these groups feel their difficulties are the result of unjust actions by elites or rulers, the will take risks of joining in revolts to call attention to their plight and demand change.” (Goldstone, 2014) This often results in groups of people joining together in protests and marches in order to show their distain for the current system.

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12 While taxation bureaucracies in the state of the Middle East are often inefficient and uneven in their taxation, specific figures are available for taxation for each state studied in the case studies section of CH. 2.
As popular unrest grows and elites begin to mobilize popular frustration, the fourth dynamic comes into clear view. Elites begin to bridge the gaps between their frustrations, the frustration of common individuals, and the frustrations of common individuals as a group. (Goldstone et. al., 1991) This process creates a shared narrative of resistance and represents the final movement towards significant revolutionary activity. As individuals and small groups of people realize that their experiences and frustrations are shared among a larger minority of individuals or among a majority of individuals, these large groups join together to showcase their anger. As publics do this, they are are spurred on by elites who lead the frustrated masses to believe that their goals are attainable. The final movement towards total revolution requires favorable international relations. As small groups of individuals band together in protest of poor national situations, states with interest in preservation of the status quo for the revolutionary state commit to not intervene in the revolution against the revolutionary group and further commit that they will throw their support behind the post-revolutionary government in the interest of protecting and furthering their own interests.

The above factors, which I will hereafter refer to as Goldstone’s assumptions are the epicenter of revolutionary activity, and can alternatively be referred to in whole as bad governance. As the presence of these characteristics becomes more obvious, the condition within state descends towards revolt. As is clear in the mapping of Vis. 1C, state leaders have a number of opportunities to adjust and pacify their publics with reforms that fall short of regime overthrow. However, if leaders are sufficiently distanced from the frustrations of their publics, if their reforms are insufficient to pacify their publics, or if they refuse to reform, thinking that the revolt will pass on its own, the revolution will build steam and will certainly threaten the stability
of their regime. VIS. 1C lays out the specific junctures at which state governments are able to influence revolutionary activity and gives the logical conclusions to varied actional preferences on the part of the state government. As this is a conversation about external influence on internal revolution, what remains is to explain at which junctures foreign economic intervention can be influential.\textsuperscript{13}

The question which remains is how American intervention might be able to induce or purchase these stabilizers in cases where their absence has caused massive revolt. As revolters gain popular support against rulers who have allowed institutional control to be slowly centralized, slowly raided national treasuries to enrich themselves or to invest in fruitless endeavors, or subverted national laws and courts, rulers have the opportunity to introduce reforms that fall short of complete institutional overhaul. At critical junctures, American signals of support to rulers in peril may provide these leaders with the physical resources needed to pacify or resist their publics, or with the assurance that their rule is secure under the watch of a willing interventionist American foreign policy. It may also provide leaders with the opportunity or motive to invest in new reforms to the judiciary of their government and the appointment of special prosecutors in order to root out corruption. Furthermore, the provision of aid gives the government the opportunity to create jobs, stimulate stagnant economic sectors, and to promise otherwise allocated money to important groups and agencies that will help to suppress the popular outcry in their state. American support and aid can temporarily provide the perception of legitimacy of governments by providing reliable and trustworthy surrogates who can affirm the legitimacy of the national government, and provide it the tools to maintain its power. Finally, aid

\textsuperscript{13} See Visualization 1D
can buy perception of representativeness by allowing national rulers to advertise the ways in which they are representative. By giving the opportunity to purchase the support of public relations firms, and to do media campaigns aimed at convincing national publics that their government rulers represent them. In this way, American foreign aid can be used to inject a sense of stability, legitimacy, and representativeness into governments and stave off political collapse.

1.6 Theory of Revolt - External Motivation for Intervention

As states in which the US has interest begin to experience the results of bad governance, the US often analyzes its strategic capacities to influence the revolutionary activity to fit its interests. (Fitzsimmons, 2008)\textsuperscript{14} As anti-government protest increases, the American policy apparatus performs a strategic calculation of the cost/payoff of intervention and endeavors to assess the most reliable variety of intervention for the situation at hand. If it is determined that the upheaval is sufficiently potent to cause regime change, American policy leaders calculate whether it is in their interest to respond in order to affect the outcome of the upheaval. US strategic calculation allows for a varied response which includes military, economic, and political responses. As the US determines the appropriate step, whether to restrict funding to the national government or to increase it, to increase support to revolutionary groups, or to turn its back on both groups, the US makes a strategic decision to inject itself into the national politics of the state in order to restore order to a degree that satisfies US interests. The central goal of American administrations towards the Middle East in the last twenty years has been the development of effective governance in recipient states and the exportation of democracy to authoritarian states. (Fitzsimmons, 2008) As the effects of American involvement is realized, a final foreign policy

\textsuperscript{14} See Visualization 1D
internal response is actualized in order to readjust to new strategic realities, and to update expectations for future interactions with the revolutionary state. It is not clearly known, however, what the impact of American intervention is on revolutions. When the US gives $20 billion in aid to Egypt, is it actually able to buy better governance and representation for minorities? Does American aid provision lead to a greater investment in economic or human development which allows for a greater perception of legitimacy or good governance? Does intervention to support or oppose a totalitarian regime result in increased democratization or good governance? The answers to these questions are what wait to be uncovered in the subsequent chapters.

1.7 History of Intervention and Revolution

In the year 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran entirely reordered the geopolitical structure across the Middle East region, and showed that mass-revolution could be used as a tool by a populace to attain their national political goals by recusant means. (Singh, 2011) While the 1979 revolution in Iran was not the first major revolution in the modern era of the Middle East, it was significant in two ways. First, the 1979 revolution significantly brought into question the capacity of foreign powers to assert their wills on weaker powers of the Middle East. As Iranian protestors forced off the assertive influence of the United States in their national and international affairs, they made a proclamation to their allies, friends, and neighbors that American ability to supersede national interest, culture, and religion was not as universal as it was once thought to be. (Hunter, 1988) In as much a way as it caused the United States to reassess its ability to influence other states around the world, (Wise, 2011) it gave states around the world, and elements of their politically involved populations cause to question the future role
of the United States in their national political discourse. Secondly, the 1979 revolution in Iran showed that intransigent national policies could be forced to change at the hands of a sufficiently motivated and powerful populace, in even the most well organized states. In the course of just over a month, protestors and their leaders were able to topple a well-organized government which was backed by the modern world’s only existing super power. The introduction of these concepts into the minds of politically motivated and influential individuals in states around the Middle East had the capacity to catalyze revolutionary violence across the Middle East. (Saghieh, 2015) As populaces sought a new means of attaining their hopes, revolution presented a newly proved means of forcing political leaders to pay attention to the plight of marginalized populations. (Wise, 2011)

Considering the radical change that it precipitated, one would expect that the 1979 revolution would act as a catalyst for similar subsequent revolutions among the weaker states of the Middle East. Armed with the awareness of the possibility of revolutionary contagion in the Middle East (Goldstone, 2014), as happened after the uproar in Tunisia began in 2011, one could expect that the revolution in Iran would also start a wave of similar revolutionary activity. Moreover, one would expect that this activity would persist throughout the following decade, much as the revolutions of the Arab Spring did only 32 years later. Despite what appears to be an intuitively reasonable projection of events, the following years across the Middle East were years of relative stability.15 Despite the high probability of revolutionary contagion to neighboring countries, and the happening of revolution in seven Middle Eastern states in the last half-decade, revolution has been rare. By numerous metrics, the states of the Middle East have been relatively

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See Visualization 1E
free of revolutions even despite the massive upheaval which resulted from the Arab Spring revolutions. (Goldstone, 2014) As such, the Middle East is not entirely distinct from the rest of the world, in that revolutions are generally uncommon happenings around the world. (Walt, 1992) Since before the 1979 revolution and thereafter, the Middle East has been perceived by many in the West as the quintessential tinderbox (Bowles, 1957), where restless populations are waiting for their window of opportunity to fight against the governments that constrain them. (Great Decisions, 1970) The inability of the 1979 revolution to produce regional contagion or even less major revolutionary events in neighboring states which share similarities in population and popular ideology is striking to this conception. The lack of revolutionary activity in the Middle East paints a clear picture of the Middle East as a series of relatively stable countries which are growing through ethnic divisions and political development in quite a stable fashion. (Goldstone, 2014) This lack of revolutionary activity shows that a view of the Middle East as a region of significant upheaval must be more rigorously analyzed.

1.8 Foreign Aid and the Middle East

Few regions of the world since World War II’s reconstructive Marshal Plan have enjoyed continued American economic provisions as consistently as the Middle East has in the past 70 years. In the year 2012, the Middle East region received roughly $18 Billion of US foreign aid, totaling 27% of all US foreign aid disbursements for the year, whereas Europe, South and Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere received only 12% collectively. (USAID, 2016) When combined with the aid disbursed to neighboring Arab Islamic Afghanistan and Pakistan during the same year, the proportion of American economic aid to the region during 2012 was over
30%. Moreover, the Middle East has enjoyed this high proportion of American foreign aid for the majority of the last 30 years. “Foreign aid first became an important tool of American national security policy under the Truman administration. The first great foreign aid program, the Marshall Plan, was aimed at rebuilding Western Europe after World War II, in part as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. (Radelet, 2003)” In the time since the Marshal Plan, American economic aid has been used to motivate political allies towards cooperation with American interests, to support revolutions and counter-revolutions, and to support good governance policies in recipient states. As foreign aid was applied and reapplied to differing circumstances, the American foreign policy apparatus has learned the cases in which American foreign economic aid is effective at gaining quiescence with American interest and when it was not. As a massive trial-and-error strategy since 1979, policy leaders in the US have realized that the utility of American aid dollars is much broader than simple development. (Morgenthau, 1962)

In fact, aid is entirely useful for the purpose of motivating foreign governments to act or not act in a particular way. (Knack, 2001) Often in the last forty years, aid has been used by donors to incrementally strengthen governance in recipient states such as Bolivia and Egypt (Carothers & De Gramont, 2013), have been used to pacify publics, as was the case after the Zambian economic collapse in 2008, (Savun & Tirone, 2012), and in changing the method of governance to be more democratic in some states. (Carothers & De Gramont, 2011) It is my aim to identify whether it is useful for the purpose of encouraging revolutionary action or suppressing it, and for buying allies and marginalizing others. (Baldwin, 1969) As states have experienced difficulty, the strategic utility of economic foreign aid has increased drastically. (Bearce & Tirone, 2010) Whether seen as a motivator of development, an encouragement of resistance, or a
supporting of good governance, foreign aid can be used as a means of coordinating and supporting the result that most closely corresponds to American national interests. (Carothers & De Gramon, 2013)

1.9 Implications

Apart from being an interesting theoretical topic, understanding Middle East revolutions promises to bolster American foreign policy and America’s ability to attain goals which support American national interest. If revolutions and their causes are deeply understood, one can make assertions regarding how to encourage or discourage them, and how to better the chances that publics will be represented and not oppressed by their governments in the future. As the American foreign policy apparatus grows in its understanding of the impact of American moves in the context of revolutions, we can begin to uncover what may be trusted to stave off revolutions that would otherwise be inevitable. As American foreign policy comes into a new era when the Middle East is central to some of our most important strategic US interests, an ability to track with a high degree of certainty when revolutions might or might not happen, and what strategic moves will effectively bring them to be or keep them from happening allows American leaders to protect American national interest and further them in a more comprehensive way.

In the area of international relations, few areas of policy have been studied as heavily as revolutions. Through a study of the underlying causes, impacts, and motivations of involved actors, academic models have been developed that have helped policy-makers more accurately predict when a revolution might happen, and what might lead to an increased likelihood of revolutionary activity. However, since revolutionary activity in the Middle East over the last
decades has been relatively rare, it is apparent that there is a significant need for a deeper understanding of what motivates revolutions. While models exist that help to understand revolutions, few use American foreign aid to understand what may happen. Furthermore, little study has been done on the possible impact of American aid and intervention on the national policies of recipient states and their populaces. Since 1947, the US has given an annual average of just under 11 billion dollars of aid to the Middle East, and in some years has given as much as 33.7 billion. Over the last 70 years, this represents a greater consistent foreign aid investment than in any other region of the world.\footnote{16 \textit{SEE Visualization 1E}} \footnote{17 American foreign aid to Israel since it formally began in 1952 has been a great part of American foreign aid to the MENA region. When averaged together, American aid to Israel has comprised an average of 40.045\% of all aid to the region. While this sum is considerable, it does not weaken the claim of the importance of the Middle East to American policy makers. If anything, it serves to shrink the focus of American interest in the region to some degree. In the following portions of this work, I do not make any assertions of comparative value of states to US interest, I present the states as standalone recipients of aid. Israel is important to US interests, and as a Middle Eastern state, their unilateral interest to the US bolsters the importance of the region as a whole.} As American investment continues into the 21st Century, having a dynamic understanding of our national investment is key. (Schraeder et. al., 1998) As policy makers make the decision to strategically invest American financial and strategic resources into states experiencing revolution, there should certainly be an awareness of the possible impacts of that investment. Furthermore, more understanding is needed pertaining to what impacts American strategic actions have on the likelihood of revolutionary success, the outcome of revolutionary activity, and how the US foreign policy apparatus can better respond to revolutionary activity. (Bearce & Tirone, 2010) By analyzing cases that are similar in their historical locus, their cultural dynamic, and the variety of American aid that they mutually enjoy, this analysis promises to shed light on the impact of American aid allocation. Moreover, it will allow for future research into the broader impacts of economic aid on cases of revolution and
give the opportunity for models to be created wherein interventional impact can be charted and planned for in advance of revolutionary activity.

1.10 Ground Map

In the subsequent chapters of this work, I will lay out four cases of Middle East revolution and analyze the circumstances that precipitated revolt. I will endeavor to analyze the factors that lead to revolt, what spurred the revolt forward, and ultimately what the outcome was of the revolution. As a second movement, I will superimpose an analysis of American aid flows and intervention to the countries of interest on this analysis, will endeavor to uncover trends in aid and intervention, and will connect them to their effects on the ground in the countries experiencing revolution. In order to do this, I will analyze aid flows as they are reported in the US State Department Greenbook as well as the official record of US foreign aid flows released by the US Agency for International Development. Furthermore, I will identify forms of US intervention which were exerted once revolt had begun in each case, and will endeavor to uncover the impact of that intervention.
CHAPTER I REFERENCES


Information Pertaining to US Black Budget: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/781719/tables.pdf

ARABIC CHAPTER I REFERENCES

National Revolution and International Interference:
How American Intervention Influences Revolutionary States

Chapter II

Case Studies

Theoretical Relationship

& Testing
2.1 Case Study Structure

Since the Islamic Revolution swept through Iran in 1979 and started a redistribution of regional power and influence in the Middle East, a number of impactful Middle East revolutions have occurred. With a keen eye towards the availability of this information, I chose 4 cases of Middle Eastern revolutions both inside and out of the broadly impacting Arab Spring revolutions of 2000-2016. These cases include Syria’s failed Hama Islamist revolution of 1982 against longtime ruler Hafez al-Assad, Egypt’s successful Arab Spring revolution of 2011 which deposed decades-long strongman Mubarak, Iran’s successful 1979 Islamic Revolution, and Libya’s successful Arab Spring revolution which deposed Muammar Gaddafi. While each of these cases has a unique causal structure and had unpredictable consequences, they share a similar trajectory. In each of the chosen cases of revolution, national publics rose up to protest oppressive, undemocratic rulers to whom those publics assigned responsibility for their economic, social, or political dilemmas. Furthermore, their position in history stretches across a nearly 35 year swath of Middle East modern history. For this reason, there is a stronger likelihood that reliable case data will be available for each of the cases.

As mentioned in Chapter One, aid is useful because it can provide billions of American dollars to nations which depend on outside funds in order to develop their economies, secure their borders, respond to humanitarian crises, and in some cases to suppress their populations and buy off elites. Furthermore, in times of crisis, American intervention on behalf of embattled leaders can confer a temporary sense of legitimacy upon ruling leaders, which can help in turning the tide of domestic turmoil. In the forthcoming portion of this work, I will endeavor to survey four cases of modern Middle East revolution and identify pre-revolutionary contributing factors in areas of national economy, politics, judiciary, and military. Furthermore, I will make a
comparative analysis of the surveyed nations against other nations in the same region, and will endeavor to give context to the initial drivers of revolution. Thereafter, I will endeavor to make explicit the history of governance, economic growth, and judicial reform in each case, as this will provide an analytic clarity regarding latent expectations that national publics might have had prior to the outset of revolution. Finally, I will make quantitative assessment of American responses in aid, rhetoric, institutional influence, and physical interventional measures to the revolutions. In this, I will seek to understand in a complex way how American leaders sought to influence and manipulate the conclusion of revolutions, and what the impacts of those endeavors were.

In each of the forthcoming case studies, I will present the historical information that underlies each case. Second, I will analyze the national economic circumstances which preceded each revolution, and the changes which might have had a part in motivating the revolution. Third, I will analyze the social dynamics of the case studies, and will seek to identify if there were significant changes in the social order of each country prior to the revolution. I will then look at judicial governance and will try to identify whether there was widespread distrust or frustration relating to the judiciary and public opinion relating to corruption. I will then give a clear overview of America’s foreign aid prior to the onset of revolution, how it changed after the revolution, and what might have driven those changes. I will analyze other forms of US involvement, as mentioned before, and will endeavor to identify in what ways US leaders injected their preferences into the national revolutions of recipient states. Finally, I will assess how national leaders responded to revolutionary activity prior to their demise or success. This case structure will provide a clear and broad-reaching framework through which it will be possible to analyze the validity of Goldstone's assumptions and to identify the impacts of
American preference over revolutions. While these driving factors of revolution are well-established in revolution literature, it is not clear whether each are of equal importance to the onset of revolution, or whether a calculated response by national leaders has any consistent positive or negative impact on the outcome of the revolt. I suggest that the most salient features of pre-revolutionary instability, or ones which impact people most directly, will function most powerfully as drivers of revolution, and that national leaders’ efforts to provide late reforms will be of little impact to the onset of revolution.

Regarding foreign aid, I will show how aid functions as a signal of US intent which indicates the approval or disapproval of American national leaders over turmoil in recipient states. When states become recipients of American aid, American leaders signal to those foreign leaders that to some degree they support, or if nothing else, are complacent regarding their governing of the recipient state. As such, once a recipient state has received aid consistently for a considerable amount of time, leaders can expect that aid to continue, barring any great changes in the calculations of American leaders. In situations wherein recipient states experience revolutionary turmoil, once American leaders have exhausted other non-punitive strategies aimed at encouraging national reform in recipient states, American leaders may alter their response to include responses aimed at indicating the severity of the situation in recipient states. These costly signals may include official statements supporting protestors’ rights, the supporting of UN sanctions, or the decrease of foreign aid to the recipient state. These measures allow for a clear signal of intention to be relayed to the recipient state that reform is essential, without compromising the integrity of a longstanding relationship. As the US pulls its aid, it sends a signal to the recipient state that the rest of the relationship is in jeopardy if it continues along its current path. Ultimately, what I am studying is the impact of American relations with foreign
nations, and what the US does in cases of revolutions. Foreign aid is an interesting lens to do this through though. In any national calamity, it is essential to understand the driving components and indicators of changes in the world. A better understanding promises of this promises to allow a clearer understanding of the mechanical happenings prior to the success or failure of revolutions.

This work will analyze a varied selection of American foreign intervention on cases of revolution. In this work, I will analyze American interference in three broad categories: first, foreign aid, as this is an underlying focal point of this study. Second, I will analyze rhetorical interference. This will include presidential, diplomatic, and congressional statements of approval or disapproval of happenings and leaders before and during revolutions. Finally, I will analyze direct intervention, including the imposition of no-fly zones, troop deployment to regions, and the imposition of economic sanctions. This broad view will allow for a holistic approach towards the possible impacts of American intervention generally, and the impact of foreign aid specifically on revolutions. Based on the theoretical support of this work, it seems likely that American foreign intervention will share a strong relationship with the success or failure of the revolution. While it is not clear whether the impact of American intervention is sufficient to dictate a wholesale success or failure of the revolution, it seems clear initially that it is correlated to some degree with the outcome of the revolution.

2.2 Geostrategic Considerations

The cases chosen for this project are tied together by at least as much as that which separates them. In designing this study, it was essential to hold as many things constant as possible, so that variation on some other factor would not distort our conception of the cases, and we would not attribute correlation where this attribution was not due. For this reason, each of the
cases were hemmed in regionally, so as to limit variation in the geostrategic context of the cases. The Middle East region was chosen because US Department of State policy can be assumed to be relatively uniform across this region, in comparison to inter-regional policy. Secondly, this selection provided a region wherein the tenets of Islam were used as both guiding lights for national policy, and provide for a similar individual civilian mentality towards the West. In this way, apart from being a fascinating area, rich in opportunity for discovery, the Middle East stricture provides at least a baseline degree of geostrategic stability.

As importantly, this study controlled for temporal variation by limiting its scope to cases of revolution since 1979. While there are certainly important cases of Middle East revolution that fall outside this temporal boundary, this timeframe provides a relative consistency in regards to the major events which transpired in the Middle East. By the end of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Israel had been established and defended successfully as a legitimate Middle East state. Furthermore, the Arab states of the MENA region had by 1979 began to align around the ideals of Pan-Arabism and “anti-Israelism”. Furthermore, the geopolitical regional superpowers of the Middle East which would shortly dominate the political landscape were already emerging. With the influence of OPEC, founded nearly 20 years prior solidifying Saudi Arabia as a significant player in Gulf and Levantine wealth and control, Israel’s clear US-backed mandate as an independent power, Egypt’s Sadat beginning the process of coming to terms with US superiority and being bought off, and finally the wave of ultra-Islamism sweeping into Iran and other nations, the stage was set for a time of relative geostrategic stability in the Middle East. To a large extent, these factors did indeed give rise to an era between 1979-2011 that saw significant regional stability in the relative distribution of power between the states of the Middle East. Furthermore, the relative contemporary nature of the chosen timeframe provided a context which
would allow for deep analysis within the case studies, where any earlier case studies would have supplied significant restrictions regarding the availability of necessary economic, social, and judicial data.

While the above mentioned stricture do allow for a number of essential values to be held constant, no set of case studies can be entirely pure, particularly when dealing with a 30 year timeframe. In this way, the selection of any region around the world in recent history which would promise a reasonably high level of cases to study would likely also sacrifice the stability of the context due to long time horizons, or other important regional issues. In the case of the case studies chosen for this project, the greatest limiting factor from a geostrategic perspective is the wider world context. Regarding the Syria and Iran cases, US leaders were locked into a series of Cold War proxy engagements that significantly limited the capacity of American leaders to intervene in certain states of the Middle East. During their revolution, Iran was a close US ally, which put them firmly outside the influence of Soviet leaders. For this reason, American leaders were able to intervene significantly in 1979 without much fear of Soviet reaction. The case of Syria is entirely different than this, however. In 1982, Assad had firmly placed himself within the zone of Soviet protection. For this reason, an auspicious US intervention into a sovereign Syrian conflict would mean almost sure war between the US and USSR, thus shattering a tenuous, hard-built East-West peace. By the same token, Libya, another Cold War Soviet ally was unallied with a major global power which could stand as an effective deterrent to US intervention in 2011. For this reason, and because it suited the interests of American leaders, US leaders stopped at nothing to join with their European and other allies in obliterating Libyan air defenses and bombing the convoy that was to carry Gaddafi to safety outside of Sirte. This contrast between cases makes
clear the case that geostrategic constraints were highly important in determining whether US forces intervened and to what degree they intervened in the cases of revolution.

While these cases hold many factors constant, the geostrategic differences between the cases are pertinent and certainly gave rise to limitations which governed US response to some degree. To some degree, the selection of these cases represent a choice of necessity. Recognizing that there will be variation in any selection of cases requires any project to select cases which minimize this noise, while also providing an interesting context for research. In this way, necessity is a limiting factor, but it seems that this would be a factor in any set of cases selected. For this project, necessity is a virtue to the selection of cases, because it demonstrates the inevitability of variation in case DVs, and shows the limitation of case studies as a form of analysis. This should not be regarded as a fatal limitation to retrospective case studies, but rather a strategic limitation that requires thoughtful consideration, as any other does.

2.3 Geostrategic Constraint - What US Wanted vs. What US Could Get

Auspiciously missing from the body of this work is a conversation which incorporates a calculation of relative power and constraint. If misunderstood, this absence could give the impression that this work treats relative power and geostrategic constraint as immaterial. This is, however, not the case. This project recognizes the importance of power and constraint in full. It’s error, if any, may be that it under-represents its centrality in American decisions to intervene. This is done in part because in many cases since the end of the Cold War, the US had to consider very little in terms of a state’s ability to withstand against its decision to intervene, and because after the fall of the Soviet Union, there were no significant rivals that could and would be likely to challenge a US decision to intervene in cases of regional instability. It is for this reason that
the US interventions in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other states around the world were done with such blatant disregard to states in the periphery which might object to American intervention.

In two of the selected cases for this project, these assumptions must be relaxed, and constraint must be considered. Furthermore, this analysis would be remiss if it entirely disqualified a discussion of relative power relating to any of the chosen cases. The Syria 1982 case gives the greatest example of US constraint, as Syrian leader, Assad, enjoyed a longstanding relationship with Soviet leaders, and stood firmly under the Soviet umbrella of protection in 1982. This limitation severely hampered US capacity to respond to the actions of the Assad regime in 1982, and may well have led to the Assad government’s opportunity to crush the Hama Revolution. Furthermore, Syrian stability to US leaders was of little concern to American leaders during this time. While Assad was a strong regional leader and was projecting his strength into other regional states, he was not of sufficient strength or importance at the time to warrant serious efforts to overthrow by US leaders. These factors in combination with American strategic interests were likely to blame for the lack of American response to the violence in Hama. Therefore, despite the fact that American leaders may have felt general positive feelings about the notion of seeing Assad ripped from power, the constraining factor of large-scale Soviet backlash was sufficient to constrain US interest.

These constraints were not seen in the cases of Iran 1979, Libya 2011, or Egypt 2011. For Iran, while the US was engaged in the Cold War during this time, US leaders were free to

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18 I argue that the strategic limitations put on US leaders during the Cold War era are much like the limitations of the modern era. With the reemergence of regional centers of power which have the capacity to challenge US power, US geostrategic calculation must now be adjusted to accommodate both for the relative power of regional actors, and for the likelihood of intervention by these powers.
respond how they chose because Pahlavi had resisted Soviet overtures in favor of US alliance. Furthermore, the importance of Iranian stability was very high, due to both strategic calculations and longterm US-Persian relations. In the cases from 2011, as mentioned before, the Cold War constraints didn’t exist, and thus US leaders were more free to intervene, or not intervene, how they chose. Moreover, during this time, both of these states were of relatively high importance to US leaders: Egypt due to the longterm relationship enjoyed between leaders, and Libya, because of the destabilizing effect that Gaddafi had had on the region and his involvement with transnational terrorism.  

2.4 Syria 1982

The failed revolution which came into full swing in February of 1982 was preceded in Syria by the decades-long rule of strongman, Hafiz-al Asad. Taking power through a military coup in 1970, Asad began a 30 year rule which was punctuated by religious tension,  

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19 See Visualization 2

20 In this work, I refer to the events in Syria in 1982 as the Hama Revolution. While the events in Hama and elsewhere in Syria did not turn into a large scale national revolution, its components fit into the category of an attempted revolution. This term is not used to characterize these events as a full-scale revolution, but to properly classify them as pre-revolutionary events, despite their ultimate failure.
centralization of national control, and political repression of dissenters. (Perthes, 1995) (Seale & McConville, 1989) As president, Hafiz-al Asad’s rule emphasized his Alawi roots, (Al-Hawadith, 1980) and caused many Syrian Muslims to criticize the government for rampant corruption and sectarian inequality produced by his Alawi and political ally-preferring policies. (Ma’oz, 1993) In addition to domestic corruption, Asad’s regime through the 1970s and early 1980s engaged in regional interventions which aimed to preserve or create a Middle Eastern environment which suited Asad and his allies. By fumbling their intervention in Israel during the October War of 197321 (O’Ballance, 1978), auspiciously supporting Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (Goodarzi, 2010), and intervening in Lebanon’s various national upheavals (Ma’oz, 1993) (Petran, 1987), Asad caused tensions to rise among low-income Syrians; a trend that Islamist radicals in Syria were able to capitalize on in order to stage a massive national uprising against the government of Asad. (Lawson, 1982)

As Asad continued to centralize power and political influence among his allies, the policies of his government became more repressive, and less representative of large portions of the Syrian population. (Perthes, 1995) The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, a transnational Islamist group who’s ideology was set against nationalism and secularism set itself against the secular Arab-nationalist agendas of the Assad regime. Capitalizing on popular feelings of discontentment due to economic disadvantage, widespread nepotism, and corruption, the Muslim Brotherhood began staging large protests in urban centers around Syria. Frustrated by a perceived waste of state funds in a revisionist agenda aimed at supporting Lebanon’s campaign against Palestinians, Syrian tradesmen and workers united in opposition to the government of Asad. (Lefèvre, 2013)

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21 At the conclusion of Syria’s engagement in the October War, the Syrian army was decimated, and the Syrian government lost control of the strategically important Golan Heights in Southwestern Syria. This loss is most often blamed on internal divisions between political and military faction most loyal to Asad and those who were loyal to Syrian military leaders who were more informed about the strategic calculations regarding the war. (See Perthes 1995, pg.3)
After two years of protest and increased tension between revolters and the national government, including assassination attempts, the Syrian army withdrew temporarily from Lebanon and sent 12,000 troops to the city of Hama, the center of revolt activity to engage in a three week offensive which crushed the uprising, and resulted in the death of an estimated 10,000 people. (Fisk, 1991) (Conduit, 2016)

At its conclusion, the uprising which started at the beginning of February of 1982 was completely desolated by Hafiz-al Asad and his troops. The Muslim Brotherhood and its most known remaining members were exiled, killed, or fled Syria in the days after the Hama Revolution ended. Having destroyed the most potent challenge to his rule, Asad would now be able to continue to consolidate power into his own hands with a high level of surety that his opponents were either too disorganized, or too fearful to seriously challenge his rule again. Retrospectively, the revolution that never was failed first, because the Asad regime had done enough to buy off and accommodate nearly 77% of Syrian workers, so the frustrations of rural farmers and shop keepers were not relatable to them, and they were unwilling to sacrifice their newfound security for the concerns of farmers. For this reason, only small marches and protests were seen in centers like Aleppo and Damascus. (Lawson, 1996) Furthermore, the willingness of the Asad administration to relentlessly crush the rebellion in Hama showed their resolve to maintain power and further showed the futility of any group’s endeavor to pry power from Asad. The instillation of fear into Syrian opposition silenced other disadvantaged groups around Syria in fear of being dealt with in a similar fashion. (Perthes, 1995)

**Syria Case - Economic Factors**

The economy of Syria in 1979 and 1980 can be characterized as one of development and opportunity, but great inequality. When Hafiz-al Asad came to power in 1970, he began on a
strategy of nationalizing large parts of the national economy in an endeavor to dry up the wealth and economic power of the political elites who were deposed after the 1970 coup. (Perthes, 1995) As Asad continued to redevelop the Syrian economy, he endeavored to emphasize Socialist principles, and hoped to pull resources away from the strong agricultural sector, and provide them towards the development of a new business class. (Newnations, 2000) At the same time, due to new policies which resulted from the nationalization of Syrian industry, the salaries of industrial workers in nationalized industry, a group representing 56% of Syrian workers, became guaranteed. (Perthes, 1995) This new emphasis disadvantaged up to 25% of Syrian workers who felt as though they were to be thanked for the strength of the Syrian economy of the 1960s. As Syrian factory workers, oil workers, and businessmen enjoyed newfound wealth in metropolitan centers around Syria, agricultural workers and tradesmen in rural portions of Syria, which represented nearly a third of Syrian workers at the time, began feeling left behind and became angry as their personal wealth decreased relative to that of those living in cities. (Drysdale, 1982) As nationalization continued and the disparity between wealthy urbanites and increasingly poor agricultural workers increased, opportunistic social and political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood needed nothing more than to kindle the embers of anger and frustration in order to begin an uprising against the State.

In 1978, the Syrian economy had been growing consistently by various metrics. Rising from 2.2 billion when Asad gained control in 1970 to 13 billion in 1980, two years before the Hama Revolution, Syrian GDP was stronger than any time preceding. By 1982, Syrian GDP had continued to rise to just under 16 billion in a meteoric rise which placed the Syrian economy on a trajectory to shortly eclipse most others in the MENA region. The great expansion of Syrian

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22 See Visualization 2A
GDP during this time was largely due to the increase in global oil prices, which brought increased revenue to the national economy. Furthermore, as the forces of globalization expanded their influence, Syrians increasingly moved to other more oil-rich states of the Middle East for economic opportunities and sent remittances back to Syria. (Collelo, 1987)

Unemployment in Syria was not officially reported until 1991 by the World Bank. Thus, little is known regarding this metric from the time prior to the Hama Revolution. This is likely a product of two factors. First, the national government likely suppressed the publication of poor looking unemployment numbers in order to maintain a facade of economic development in the face of foreign investment and national appeal. Second, in the 1970s and 1980s, large portions of the Syrian economy did not officially exist. Due in part to the agrarian nature out of which the Syrian economy was still emerging by 1982, a large portion of the Syrian economy could not be reported on. (Lawson, 1996) In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large proportion of the national population was working in nationalized industry. During this time, the Syrian government
regulated that companies were required to employ much more people than their companies actually required, in order to suppress the high unemployment which resulted from the poor business environment that was produced by Asad’s Socialist economy. (Perthes, 1995) Because of this, companies which operated in Syria were required to employ, in some cases, thousands more workers than were necessary. In an economy like Syria’s, what is likely more accurate to say is that a high proportion of workers in the country were heavily underemployed. Because of the influence of the aforementioned nationalization, agriculturalists and shopkeepers around Syria saw family incomes decrease sharply in the mid-1970s. (Lawson, 1982) Because of this, many Syrian families were forced to subsist on significantly less income than prior. This resulted in a large proportion of the country being far underemployed.

Other economic indicators in Syria were not as strong prior to the Hama Revolution. Just prior to Hafiz-al Asad’s overthrow of the preceding al-Atassi government, the Syrian economy was booming due largely to the success of the agricultural industry and saw a negative inflation rate of -1.98%. (World Bank, 2001) After more than a decade of Asad’s socialist-leaning, regionally revisionist policies, Syrian inflation soared to 18.39%, a rate which was higher than all other MENA nation at the time, with the exception of Iran and Israel.23 Furthermore, while Syria did not default on its international debts, the Syrian government refused to pay any more towards their international debtors than the minimum which was required in order to keep from becoming insolvent. (Perthes, 1995) Furthermore, during Asad’s reforms from 1970 - 1981, Syrian external debt increased from $278 million (Current USD) to nearly 4.9 billion in little more than a decade.24 These increases in both inflation and external borrowing resulted in an excessive

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23 See Visualization 2B
24 See Visualization 2C
increase in the cost of living, particularly in metropolitan centers. By 1972, Asad had raised the consumer tax rate to 36\% from its rate of 25\% prior to the coup of 1970, in order to pay for his nationalization ventures. (Cummings et. al., 1982) By 1977, consumer tax rates decreased back to 15\%, but seemed to be on a path toward unabashed increase when the government increased taxes by 5\% in 1980. (Lawson, 1982)
Syria Case - Social & Judicial Factors

From the outset of the Asad government in Syria, there was widespread frustration over the centralization of power that happened after the 1970 coup. Since Asad came from the ranks of the military, he had a strong handle on their leadership, and often jailed or otherwise purged leaders from the military who were suspected of being unfaithful to his directives. (Macintyre, 2011) In this way, Asad ensured that the military did not gain significant political power, and no military leader got too powerful independent of his control. By this means, Asad’s government attempted to rule the military and civilians with absolute control and through political repression. (Perthes, 1995) (Lefèvre, 2013)

After his takeover and the deposing of the old ruling elite from before 1970, Asad filled government offices and high posts with other Baathist leaders with nationalistic and socialistic leanings, and sought to give new power to merchants and the landlord class, in order to purchase their allegiance. (Perthes, 1995) This fueled popular frustration at the sense of nepotism and internal corruption that citizens had regarding Asad’s leadership. When Asad took power, he reestablished the national parliament and allowed for the creation of new parties. The influence of these parties would largely be eclipsed by that of the ruling secularist Ba’ath Party, which was named “the leader party in the state and society” in Syria, rendering the Baath Party indistinguishable from the State. (Ziadeh, 2011) In addition to these reforms, Asad demanded the drafting of a new state constitution in 1974 which allowed the executive unabridged authority over the legislative and judicial branches of government. (Baladi, 2016) (Carlisle, 2005) The new constitution provided Asad with complete authority over Syria’s national intelligence bureaus and the military. By the times the Hama Revolution took place, it was clear that Asad wanted to
ensure that all government offices and positions were held by those he trusted, and that he was not afraid to subvert national law in order to stay in power. Furthermore, while his corruption and abuses were evident to many in Syria, he was strategically immune politically, as he had the capacity to buy off those who might influence his authority and institutional power over Syria.

**Syria Case - American Interventional Response**

Asad’s economic and political decisions cost him influence and respect internationally. As Asad socialized the Syrian economy and centralized state power around himself, this put Syria into the orbit of the Soviet Union. Because of this and Asad’s totalitarian tact, this put him at odds with his American-sided neighbors. When Asad made the decision to join in on the October War aggression against the newly founded State of Israel and their support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, this further entrenched Syria as a pariah state and left Syria with few friends. The strain of relationships with other nations in 1981 led to an inhospitable international environment for the 1982 Hama Revolution to take place in.

The confluence of economic, political, judicial, and social difficulties that Syria faced in the lead up to the 1982 Hama Revolution were significant to say the least. Syria had been violently taken over by a brutal military leader who forced the collapsed of the agricultural sector of the Syrian economy, and victimized many politically and economically. Furthermore, he wrenched political control from those who opposed him in every political and military directorate, and ensured that he had full control of the State apparatus so that he could wield its power against his state and domestic enemies. It is for these reasons that it is surprising that the revolution which started and ended in Hama in February of 1982 was entirely unsuccessful in its aims of forcing governmental change. It is clear that the variables that were influential in the onset of revolution were insufficient to produce large-scale national change in Syria.
American foreign aid to Syria has been of marginal impact since it was first provided in 1960. From 1970, when Hafiz-al Asad took control of Syria, until the 1982 Hama Revolution, the United States only provided foreign aid to Syria intermittently for 5 years. Almost all of the aid provided to Syria during this time was provided as development assistance or emergency relief for areas of Syria which were struck by famine. In 1975, the US government approved foreign aid in the amount of $669 million to Syria and continued to provide foreign aid until 1979 in roughly the same amount. In 1980, the US ceased foreign aid provision to Syria until 2008, when the US began providing humanitarian relief again to refugees.\(^{25}\) \(^{26}\)

The Asad government’s response to the Hama Revolution lasted three weeks, as government troops surrounded and besieged the city and its inhabitants. During this time, little was done by the United States to infringe on the Asad administration’s desire to crush the rebellion by force. Because the United States was already not giving any foreign aid, there was

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\(^{25}\) See Visualization 2D

\(^{26}\) It has been suggested that during the 1982 failed revolution, the American Central Intelligence Agency endeavored to supply arms and munitions to Syrian rebels through Jordan. While this may be the case, after an exhaustive search of both historical records and contemporary periodical review, there are no reliable citable sources that provide a confirmation of this suggestion. While it is imaginable that US covert operations did endeavor to influence the stability of the Assad regime in 1982, the pertinent details of this intervention are still not available to be analyzed. For this reason, this project only analyzes intervention narratives for which there is a clear, reliable, and citable source.
none to remove, and by the same token, because there were no joint military agreements, there were none removed either. Using its sway in the UN, the US did not suggest any retaliatory action against Asad, nor were there any suggestions of sanction, based on the conducted research. (DOT, 2013) The US government did not maneuver to pressure or to force Asad to back down, nor was there any military strike to force a different conclusion to the uprising. Finally, despite the fact that the Hama Revolution was covered by the media, there is no official record of statements from US leaders condemning, promoting, or otherwise referencing the events. In these ways, it seems as though there was no notable American response to the Asad administration’s activities against Syrian revolters during the Hama Revolution. While the Assad government clearly stood as a Middle East power which was both ideologically and militarily set at odds with American political and military priorities, the Cold War constraints which US leaders found themselves under were certainly impactful to the decision of US leaders not to intervene, if not entirely motivational unto themselves. There is no doubt that given to their own strategic calculations, US leaders would prefer to see the Assad government in Syria replaced, but given the likelihood of massive Soviet reprisal during the Cold War, American power was not able to be made evident, and Assad was left to crush the rebellion.

2.5 Egypt 2011

The failed 2011 popular revolution in Egypt is certainly one of the most salient examples of Middle Eastern uprisings during the events of the Arab Spring between 2008 and 2012. While the revolution was initially successful, causing the deposition of longtime dictator Hosni Mubarak and prompting the first free and open elections in Egyptian history, the successes of the revolution were shortly overturned as the military took over the political system and installed a military leader as political premier. Prior to the events which resulted in the revolution, Egypt
had been ruled since 1981 by Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s Vice President until the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, whom he replaced. (Lesch, 1989) Since the time of Nasser, Egyptian citizens had been living under unaccountable dictatorship with little opportunity for political involvement. (Azzam, 2010) Mubarak was a military leader who had risen through the ranks of the Egyptian Air Force and been appointed Vice President of Egypt by Anwar Sadat in 1975. (Deborchgrave, 2011) Upon Sadat’s assassination in October of 1981, Mubarak was named President. (Amin, 2012)

Motivated by the successful ouster of longtime dictator Ben Ali in Tunisia in early January 2011 and the mass protests beginning in Algeria, Egyptians took to the streets across Egypt to protest the nearly 30 year oppressive rule of Hosni Mubarak. As protesters filled the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and Giza, Mubarak hoped to instill fear in protestors and ordered the military to engage in a massive crackdown which led to over 6,000 Egyptians being injured and over 840 deaths. (Amnesty International, 2011) These events catalyzed the frustrations of Egyptians however and caused revolutionary support around the country to swell. Using social media platforms as a mechanism to unite them in their frustrations, Egyptian revolters successfully forced the ouster of Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011 and demanded free and open democratic elections for the first time in Egypt’s history.27 At the conclusion of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, Mubarak was tried for crimes against the people of Egypt, and Egyptians elected a far-right representative of the Muslim Brotherhood Islamist group, Mohammed Morsi. The effects of the 2011 election would be short lived as the Egyptian military would force the deposition of the democratically elected Morsi and install Army General and director of State intelligence, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

27 While Mubarak allowed for elections to occur in 2005, both Egyptian and international observers determined that this was not likely a free election due to election rigging and voter suppression. See (Wittes, 2016)
By most metrics, the national economy of Egypt prior to the revolution of 2011 was quite strong despite rampant corruption. As one of the largest and most consistent recipients of American foreign aid, and the home to the largest tourist economy in North Africa. In 2010, just prior to the revolution, tourism brought 14.7 million visitors to Egypt and generated $12.5 billion in national revenues, a figure representing more than 11% of Egyptian GDP (Smith, 2014) (Ragab, 2014) As a result of the violence of the resolution, revenues from tourism dipped by 30.5% in the following year to $8.7 billion. The strength of the tourism industry is representative of the general strength of the economy in Egypt prior to the revolution and shows that while concerns over the economy certainly played a part in the onset of the revolution, the economy was not the most significant driver.

Egyptian GDP prior to the revolution was generally strong and on an upward trend. Apart from the 2002-2006 slump which resulted from the September 11 attacks in the United States and the decrease in oil prices, Egyptian GDP had been on an upward trend since 1991. By 2010, Egyptian GDP stood at $218 billion, an astonishing $56 billion increase from two years prior. 28 Between the years of 2000 and 2011, Egyptian GDP grew at an average rate of $12.45 billion per year. By comparison, the average GDP growth rate from 1970-1981, under Sadat, was $1.42 billion per year. This means that GDP growth under Mubarak from 2000-2011 was 876% better than that of the Sadat years. Furthermore, this growth rate was better than that of any MENA nation during that time, with the exception of Qatar. (Worldbank, 2015) Because of the relative strength, and the overall strength of the economy during this time, consumer confidence in Egypt stayed quite high in the decade prior to the revolution. (Nielson, 2015)

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28 See Visualization 2E
Between the years of 1991-2010, Egyptian unemployment stayed stable and generally between 8-12% of total Egyptian population. In 2010, just one year prior to the outset of revolution, the Egyptian official unemployment rate, stood at 9%. This figure was roughly at average with other nations in the MENA region at the time. (World Bank, 2015) Furthermore, during this time, Egypt’s youth unemployment level dropped from its 2005 high of 22.7% to 14.8% in 2010, following a regional trend and maintaining its status as a rough regional median rate. Information regarding Egypt’s unemployment rate is only selectively available, as Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) did not consistently publish unemployment statistics prior to the year 1991. This is a hinderance as it makes a comparative analysis of unemployment under Sadat vs. unemployment under Mubarak impossible.

See Visualization 2F
Egyptian inflation in the years prior to the 2011 revolution was highly variable, as it has been since the early 1980s, and was the highest inflation rate in the Middle East, at 10.36%.\(^{30}\) (Worldbank, 2015) Egyptian inflation since 1970 has been generally high since 1970, and only occasionally has dropped from being among the highest inflation rates in the Middle East. In 1970, when Anwar Sadat became President of Egypt, inflation been steadily held at 3% for two years, and was in a general downward trend. By 1980, only a year prior to Sadat’s assassination, Egyptian inflation grew to 20.81%. Upon Mubarak’s taking over, Egyptian inflation initially dove to a low of 10.31% in 1981, but soon soared to a record setting 23.86% by 1986, due in part to an explosion of population growth, excessive quantitative easing, and a steep decline in national productivity. (Oweiss, 1989) From 1986 to 2001, Egyptian inflation consistently decreased to its lowest point since 1972 to 2.26% in 2001. From its low point in 2001 until 2010, inflation rose consistently again and finished at 11.26%. While this rate is relatively low in

\(^{30}\) See Visualization 2G
comparison to historic inflation rates in Egypt, the inflation rate in Egypt was a full 6 points higher than the average of other MENA states, and higher than all but 3 MENA states. (Worldbank, 2015) (Carvalho, 2010)

![Visualization 2G](source: The World Bank)

Egyptian external debt levels between 1989 and 2010 remained relatively stable at roughly $30 - $40 billion, after a meteoric rise from less than $10 billion to over $45 billion in 1989.\(^3\) Egyptian debt since the mid-70s has consistently been among the highest in the Middle East. (Randa, 2003) Through the late 1970s and into the 1980s, creditors including the IMF became frustrated with the continually rising proportion of debt that Egyptian leaders were incurring. In 1987 under Mubarak, Egyptian public debt rose to near parity with national GDP, after which Mubarak instituted new drastic reform measures called IMF Conditionality in order to provide a longterm solution to the growing economic issues. (Chapin-Metz, 1990) As a result of the restructuring implemented in the 1990s, Egypt enjoyed more than 20 years of stable external debt levels after the 1990s reforms which leaders implemented. As a result, Egyptian

\(^3\) See Visualization 2H
external debt was stable leading into the 2011 revolution, but still higher than any other nation in the region.

Prior to the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian system of taxation was well-developed, but not well-managed. Due to a high level of tax evasion by both citizens and businesses, Egyptian tax law was broadly seen as ineffectual and selectively applied. (Fawzy & Galalm, 1999) Egypt’s personal income, and corporate tax laws were well-defined as of 2010, and were considered to be roughly average for developing countries of the Middle East during that time. (Ernst & Young, 2010) (Deloitte, 2015) Because of the uneven nature of income tax collection, data relating to the level of taxation and the degree of revenue produced by private tax collection is generally unavailable. In 2010, just a year prior to the outset of revolution, tax revenues represented only 14% of Egyptian GDP, down from its early 1980s high of 24.82%. (IMF, 2013) (World Bank, 2015) While this level rose roughly 2% from 2002, it was near an all time low, and was in a general downward trend. Furthermore, corporate taxes, who’s rates are much more available than

Source: The World Bank
private tax rates, were one of the highest of the MENA states, but were in a generally downward trend from their business-stifling 2005 high of 54.4%.

**Egypt Case - Social & Judicial Factors**

From the time that Mohamed Naguib wrestled power from Egypt’s final monarchs in 1952, Egypt progressively slid into a more authoritarian political environment, punctuated by the extreme centralization of authority by the President. (Mansfield, 1973) After the October 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat by an ultra-nationalist faction of the Egyptian military, President Mubarak declared the enactment of Emergency Law 162. (Reza, 2007) This law was intended to suspend most constitutional rights, increased the authority of the military, and give virtually unlimited power to the President over State, military, judicial, and societal affairs. (Dunne, 2006) In order to maintain ultimate control over institutional power, Mubarak renewed the emergency law’s provisions every 3 years until 2012. (Stacher, 2012) This lead to State autonomy from democratic constraint, and made Mubarak the Commander in Chief of the Egyptian military, the Chief of the Cabinet, and Executive of all political happenings in the country. (Fahemy, 2002) This authority, and the President’s role in appointing judges to all of Egypt’s national courts led to a perception that the presidency was above prosecution and would only be toppled by popular unrest or external forces. (Fahemy, 2002)

Starting with the presidency of military leader Naguib, his succession by Nasser, Mubarak, and finally Sisi, all high-ranking military officers, the relationship between the State and the military was very close. Under Mubarak, the role of the military in the daily life of Egyptians increased with the imposition of emergency law. Mubarak was careful to limit the ability of the military to independently exert itself in the political arena, and would often sack military leaders that became too politically vocal, or threatened to change the State narrative.
apart from Mubarak’s control. (Kurtzer & Svenstrup, 2012) (Fahemy, 2002) While this was the case, because all of Egypt’s presidents had become president through military succession, the role of the Egyptian military was central to Egypt’s economy and political structure. (Kurtzer & Svenstrup, 2012) The strength and political separation of the military from the State ended up being a benefit to revolutionaries in Tahrir Square in 2011, as the president depended on their willingness to reign in political upheaval, and military leaders were ready to see an increase in their relative power in the Egyptian state system. (Martini & Taylor, 2011) (Bentlage, 2010)

Egypt’s judiciary prior to the 2011 was one characterized by ineffectuality and corruption during the Mubarak era. (Reza, 2007) In 1969, Nasser’s Massacre of the Judiciary eliminated much of the independence that judges enjoyed by installing new institutions through which the president could govern the judiciary, and instituting a Supreme Court with little authority over the presidency. (Bernard-Maugiron, 2008) This resulted in a deeper sense of autonomy for Mubarak, and an inability to ouster him or any subsequent executive by legal means. By 2010, the Egyptian State had one court which was considered to be nominally independent, the Supreme Constitutional Court (FS). (Fahemy, 2002) Even in cases however wherein the court ruled against the interests of the Mubarak presidency, Mubarak was able to disregard the court’s rulings with little in the way of repercussions. (Moustafa, 2003) (Fahemy, 2002)

The unicameral Egyptian Parliament (مجلس النواب المصري) prior to 2011 was overwhelmingly dominated by the National Party (الحزب الوطني الديمقراطي), which was led directly by Mubarak, and Sadat before him. Because of this, the parliament was widely seen as feckless and ceremonial, as their decisions almost always sided with Mubarak’s. (Fahemy, 2002)
Prior to the 2011 revolution, 10 major political parties sprung up and were established in Egypt’s parliament, representing a shift in Mubarak-centric legislation. (USDOJ, 2008) Mubarak would later outlaw many of these new parties, and still others would later be outlawed by Mohamed Morsi, Mubarak’s democratically elected successor.

**Egypt Case - American Interventional Response**

American foreign aid to Egypt has since 1975 been among the highest in the world, receiving an average of $4.504 billion per year since 1975, and encompassing 32% of all foreign aid given to the Middle East region year-to-year.\(^{32}\) American foreign aid began flowing to Egypt consistently in 1974, resulting in a Cold War alliance that allowed US leaders to project their own power into the Middle East and Africa in order to counter Soviet expansion from the Caucuses and Eastern Europe. With the collapse of the US relationship with Iran after the 1978-1979 Islamic Revolution, American foreign aid to Egypt increased to an all time maximum of $9 billion. This influx of US funds followed a regional trend, as US foreign aid into the MENA region generally increased to its highest level of all time - a level that wouldn’t be met again until 2004. In 2004, US foreign aid to Egypt rose to $5.75 billion, after which it began to slowly recede. In 2010, American foreign aid provision to Egypt totaled $3.3 billion, down from its 2009 high of $4.15 billion. In the years following the revolution, American foreign aid continued to decrease to Egypt, but did not accelerate from its pre-revolution rate until the subsequent 2013 military coup.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{32}\) See Visualization 2I

\(^{33}\) See Visualization 2J
The American response to the January 25 revolution was nuanced, and generally supported the rights of the Egyptian people to democratically choose their leaders, despite the close relationship that Mubarak had long-enjoyed with US presidents. On the evening of January 28th, American President Obama released a televised statement calling for a continuation of
democratic protests in a peaceful way, and calling for the Egyptian government to allow the future of Egypt’s government to be decided by the people, eluding to their interest in free democratic elections. (The White House, 2011)

In the early days of the Tahrir Square protests, Mubarak’s government seemed sure that protest activity would die out, and Mubarak’s long rule would continue as normal. However, as protests spread around the country, amid American calls for quiescence, Mubarak orchestrated a massive repression which resulted in the killing of over 800 civilians. (Heikh & Fahim, 2013) It is clear that Mubarak’s government underestimated the resolve and capacity of revolters, as these violent responses only increased the determination of revolters. Fearing that the revolution would end up successfully ousting Mubarak, in the first days of February 2011, American leaders became entirely unambiguous in their calls for Mubarak to resign. In addition to imposing travel restrictions to Egypt for American nationals, on February 1, 2011, the US embassy in Cairo evacuated all non-essential diplomatic and security personnel and threatened to reduce American aid to Egypt if Mubarak continues to refuse to step down in the face of months-long protests across Egypt. (Thomson Reuters, 2011) Finally, on the night of February 1, 2011, President Obama addressed Mubarak and said an “orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now. (The White House, 2011)” After losing any hope of US support for his continued rule over Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011, and allowed free and open elections to commence for the first time in Egypt’s history. Despite the initial great successes of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, its success was short—lived. After spurring the development of new democratic institutions, electing its first national leader, and causing great national change, the Egyptian military swept into control and unseated the newly
elected leader in 2013, effectively returning Egypt to its pre-revolutionary status with a new military head in power, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

2.6 Iran 1979

Prior to the successful 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iranian State politics had been governed by the Western-backed Pahlavi Dynasty since the February 1921 coup which caused Reza Khan, later known as Reza Shah Pahlavi to become Shah of Iran. Seeking a Cold War ally which would offer Iran protection from Soviet expansion through the Caucuses and into Central Asia, Reza Shah aimed to unite economically with Washington after decades of only mild US involvement in Iran during the Qajar Dynasty. (Zirinsky, 1986) While Reza Shah intended to create a state which centralized power around the presidency, Iran’s Ulama (عَلَمَاء) religious scholars and mullahs were a strong force in Iran and countered Reza Shah’s ambitions as being anti-Islamic. (Faghfoory, 1987) After attempting to pacify religious leaders, Reza Shah determined that the clerics were unreasonable and could not be convinced to support his autocracy. For this reason, Reza Shah in 1924 started to supplant traditional Islamic state laws with secular European law, and aggressively tried to limit and eliminate the ability of mullahs and clerics to influence state policy. (Akhtar, 1979) In marginalizing the Ulama, many clerics were exiled, imprisoned, or killed, as Reza Shah maximized his own power over the affairs of Iran. (Zirinsky, 1986)

Iranian State attempts to marginalize the influence of religious clerics and the role of Islam in State politics continued with Reza Shah’s eventual succession by his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in September 1941. After World War II, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi continued to marginalize the influence of Islamic clerics in Iran, which culminated in the White Revolution in
1963, which focussed on development of state institutions and further centralization of power. (Arjomand, 1988) (Watson, 1976) This further inflamed the frustrations of the Ulama, and then Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a vocal critic of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Western influence in Iran, and political modernization. Because of his views and his vocal criticism of the State, Khomeini was arrested and later exiled from Iran by Pahlavi in November of 1964. (Homan, 1980)

Through the late 1960s and 1970s, Westernization increased exponentially in Iran, as American influence became pervasive across major cities in Iran. (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1990) (Chapin Metz, 1987) Motivated by Pahlavi’s ineffective rule (Graham, 1978), suspicion of American manipulation of Iranian policy (Rubin, 1980), and frustration over the lack of influence that Islam had on state policy, and widespread perception of corruption (Mackey, 1996), protests began to spring up in 1977. (Foran, 1994) Despite attempts to quell the rebellion, protests spread outside of Tehran in early 1978, and in February of 1979, after decades of Pahlavi leadership, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi fled the country as Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned triumphantly to take took authority over all state institutions.

**Iran 1979 - Economic Factors**

Prior to 1978, the Iranian economy under the Pahlavi dynasty was strong and grew at a faster pace than most other countries in Asia. (Hakimian, 1999) With an aim of emerging from its pre-industrial past, under the leadership of Mosaddeq and President Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran embarked on a national development campaign which aimed at developing Iranian agriculture and industry in 1948. (Amirahmadi, 1999) (Bruton, 1961) In order to marginalize British control over Iranian production of oil, Iranian leaders voted to nationalize oil production
in 1951, and experienced abusive international sanctions by the British government for their
decision. Despite this, Iran emerged as one of the strongest global exporters of oil in the 1960s
and early 1970s. The production and export of oil surged in the early 1970s, making up 30-40%
of the Iranian economy through the 1970s. (Amuzegar, 1992) As this happened, the construction
and manufacturing industries in Iran surged as well. (CBIRI, 2007) In 1976, while Iranian
economic growth was at an all time high of 22%, the Iranian economy began to free fall into
negative growth - bottoming out at -7% growth in 1978.\textsuperscript{34} (Hakimian, 2007) This was partly due
to lack of substantive investment in important areas of the Iranian economy, the introduction of
new OPEC regulations which slashed Iranian oil exports by 20% (Foran, 1994), and capital flight
of up to $40 billion due annually by 1977. (Hakimzadeh, 2006) Because of this, and increased

\textit{VIS. 2K}

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\textsuperscript{34} See Visualization 2K
strikes by oil workers, in 1977, oil production slid from nearly 6 million barrels per day to less than 4 million per day. (Alizadeh et. al., 2000) These factors along with other longterm economic and social indicators were instrumental in providing those with ideological, religious, or political differences with the Iranian State the necessary impetus to challenge it.

After the wave of development and oil nationalization which characterized the 1950s and 1960s in Iran, Iranian GDP emerged among the strongest in the MENA region, and the strongest among developing nations. (World Bank, 2016) From 1965 until 1972, Iranian GDP growth stayed a strong 13.6%. (Katouzian & Shahidi, 2008) However, along with other economic indicators, Iranian GDP growth began to spiral downward in 1973, and by 1975, just three years prior to the revolution, GDP growth became negative, at -.32%. After a mild recovery in 1976, GDP growth plummeted to its lowest ever rate of -12.84% by 1978.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{35} See Visualization 2L
The meteoric descent of Iranian GDP was mirrored by other economic factors in Iran during the late 1970s. In 1977, consumer prices in Iran rose by a striking 16% in 2 years. As population growth continued to increase, housing prices in Tehran and other metropolitan centers around Iran rose by 200% in 1977 alone. (Foran, 1994) Despite its status as the second largest oil exporter at this time, Iranian GDP growth broke with global positive growth and began declining in relation to its regional neighbors, Western countries, and other developing countries. (Ghadar & Sobhani, 2011) (Esfahani & Pesaran, 2009) This rapid inversion in GDP growth, and the fact that it was not shared by other nations regionally or otherwise led influential Iranians to conclude that the contraction in GDP growth was a result of executive mismanagement and further enflamed their frustrations with the increasingly illegitimate Pahlavi government. (Esfahani & Pesaran, 2009)

In the decade preceding the revolution in 1979, Iran’s population grew steadily by 3.1%, roughly average with other MENA and developing states. (Elkan, 1977) (World Bank, 2016) In the 1970s, large numbers of Iranians were employed in the oil, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors, and urban unemployment was low. (Elkan, 1977) (Amuzegar, 1992) Specific information regarding national unemployment in Iran through the late 1970s was suppressed by the central government, and for that reason, reliable broad statistical data doesn’t exist for much of the 1970s. However, it is generally accepted that due to consistent growth in agriculture, manufacturing, and construction, Iranian unemployment just prior to the 1979 revolution was quite low. (Amuzegar, 1992)

As Iran’s economy grew through the 1960s, inflation stayed consistently around 2%. Starting in the mid-1970s, inflation began to rise precipitously, to 14.24% in 1974, and 27.28% in 1977, eclipsing rates in all MENA and developing states globally. (World Bank, 2016) The
exponential growth of Iranian inflation during this time was attributed to massive government spending on social subsidy programs, and the implementation of the 5th Five-Year economic reform and development plan (FYDP). (Looney, 1985) “In order to reduce the country’s dependence on oil and gas and diversify energy supply, the 5th FYDP calls for the optimization of production and an increase in power plant efficiency, reducing waste and development of Combined Heat and Power. (LSE, 2009)” (Hashim, 2012) Acting to curb the rampant growth of consumer prices, the Pahlavi government sought to inject oil revenues into the national economy, however, this strategy exacerbated the issue, and the economy only momentarily recovered in early 1978, but this recovery came too late. (Looney, 1985) (World Bank, 2016)

By 1976, Iran’s debt was pilling up, and it had already defaulted on nearly $4 billion in debt payments due in part to the devaluation of the Rial, and excessive international borrowing in the early 1970s. (Foran, 1994) (Pesaran & Esfahani, 2008) Wanting to be deeply integrated with the rest of the developed world, Iran invested billions of dollars into trade deals with the US and other nations, in the hope of developing deep ties. (Bigelow, 1979) After 1975, due to the impact of increasing political instability, economic data was suppressed or made unavailable in Iran, despite continuing to default on international debt responsibilities. (Amuzegar, 1992) (D.J. 1979) For this reason, it is unclear if the Pahlavi government was able to remedy the debt crisis that began in 1975 prior to the outset of the 1978 riots that resulted in the revolution. It is known, however, that in 1977, due to mounting pressure due to imbalanced nation budgets, Iran approached 11 American and European banks for a $500 million loan in order to balance the national budget. Furthermore, in order to support their nationalized mining industry, in 1978 Iran requested an additional $450 million in US loans. Iranian national borrowing became so imbalanced that an international audit of the Central Bank of Iran concluded that the bank “had
only $215 million in capital and reserves, less than half the value of loans received from Western banks”. (Gerth, 1981) Rather than pacifying the Iranian populace, the restriction of economic data likely lead to a furthering and deepening of the already entrenched belief that the Pahlavi government was illegitimate and that they were trying to shield a corrupt and broken government from scrutiny and tumult.

In the years between 1966-1976, Iran’s tax revenues increased by 77% - more than any other developing nation in the same period, due in part to the expansion of still-privatized portions of the oil industry. (Tait, Gratz, & Eichengreen, 1979) Despite this increase, Iran’s tax rate increased from 21.6% of GNP to 32.7% in 1976. Furthermore, between 1974 and 1978 tax revenue increased from 5.41% of GDP to nearly 9%, an increase of nearly 164% in only 4 years. (World Bank, 2016) In previous times of economic difficulty, the Iranian government had attempted to levy new taxes on its citizens, hoping that a presumably quiescent public would willingly take up economic responsibility for national irresponsibilities. (Chapin Metz, 1987) In 1963, in order to make up for a $300 million deficit, the Iranian government levied a new taxation regimen for heating kerosene and other domestic fuel sources. Almost immediately, protests began, as the Iranian public flexed its ability to compel its national leaders. (Haliday, 1979) Learning from previous experiences, as domestic frustrations rose in major cities across Iran, Iranian leaders began cutting income tax rates and investing heavily in social assistance programs, hoping to pacify the public. (Chapin Metz, 1987) These final steps in 1977 were seen by most as last desperate measures, and measures which only deepened the economic crisis faced by the country.
Iran Case - Social & Judicial Factors

In pre-revolutionary Iran, the Shah sat as the monarch of the Iranian State, and as such, had considerably more unchecked institutional power than he would if Iran had been democratic. (Zamahani, 2011) Prior to the revolution, the bureaucratic system in Iran was seen as serving the polity, and as such was seen as being highly influenced and motivated by the Pahlavi administration. (Bill, 1972) Corruption near the outset of the revolution increased as public servants and politicians perceived more latitude to exploit the contracting power of the government for their own benefit. (Gillespie & Okruhlik, 1988) Furthermore, prior to the outset of revolution, political persecution and imprisonment were often responses to criticism or when citizens, scholars, or politicians acted against unofficial government censorship. (Milani, 2012) By 1977, corruption in Iran was so pervasive that it was said to be “the glue that held the Pahlavi Dynasty together (Afary, Anderson, & Foucault, 2005).”

During the Pahlavi dynasty, judicial reform and development were central priorities. (Enayat, 2013) The basis for judicial law in Iran was established in the mid-700s, on Islamic thought and law. (Weiss, 2002) From the beginning of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1925, great efforts were made to marginalize the influence and authority of the Ulama, and to develop Western-inspired formal legal institutions. (Adel, Taromi-Rad, & Elmi, 2012) To this end, Reza Shah instituted non-Islamic judicial courts as replacements for Sharia courts, and put in place significant provisions to separate judges and courts from the influence of the clergy and the State. (Ameli, 2012) By the late 1980s, the majority of Iran’s traditionally Islamic courts had been replaced by Western courts, and the role of the Islamic Ulama had been significantly decreased. (Enayat, 2013) For this reason, while the judiciary in Iran was seen by most as being a stable arbiter of justice which was well-separated from the polity, its role as a replacement of traditional
Islamic courts was seen by many as a negative, and was a source of significant domestic friction. This is not to say that Iranian courts were seen as entirely pure and uninfluenced. Quite to the contrary, in the 1970s, the role of civilian courts was often infringed upon by military and other civil service tribunals. (Graham, 1978) (Mohammadi, 2008)

While the Iranian Imperial Guard was seen as advanced, strong, and well-developed during the later Pahlavi years, it was widely considered to be an apparatus wielded for the benefit of the State. Having been developed by the earlier Shah Pahlavi, the upper military ranks had been filled with officers which had been educated in Europe and widely had similar geopolitical persuasions as the Pahlavi Administration. (Ward, 2009) It is for this reason that it comes as such a surprise that the military responded in such a passive manner to the early 1977 protests and subsequent revolt which resulted in the ouster of the Shah. (Chehabi, 1998) In 1978, as riots escalated, the Shah determined again to wield military to suppress the uprisings across the country. To this end, Pahlavi instituted martial law, banned public demonstration, and aggressively suppressed the uprisings, resulting in more than 4,000 deaths. (Bill, 1978) By 1979, the intelligence and military apparatus in Iran was complex, and generally subservient to the will of the Shah. In the Iranian military, the Shah governed rank advancement, and ensured that fidelity to the Shah was centrally emphasized to rising officers. (Bill, 1979) With this and the lavish salaries and lifestyle that the Shah allowed for military leaders, he was able to buy the loyalty of the army, and supervise its strength, occasionally sacking officers who became too independent or developed political ambitions. (Zabih, 1988) Despite its strength and executive support of the Shah, in February of 1979, as senior military officers remained unified with the Shah, many members of the military which didn’t share the loyalty of their leaders deserted, and still others refused to fight. (Hashim, 2012) (Zabih, 1988) On February 11, after internal divides
made military unity impossible, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared neutrality and returned all troops to their garrisons, effectively sealing the fate of the Shah. (Arjomand, 1985) (Hashim, 2012) (Nikazmerad, 1980)

As one of the last remaining absolute monarchs, the Shah’s authority and control over the political systems of Iran was nearly absolute. (Bill, 1979) (Wise, 2011) Often throughout the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, if a political party became too strong or voiced heavily dissenting opinions regarding the Shah’s leadership, the party was made illegal, as happened with the Tudeh Party in the beginning of Shah Pahlavi’s rule, and the National Front Party during the revolution. (Foran, 1994) Through the later rule of the Shah, as the political scene in Iran became more polarized and militant to dissent, the national parliament, or Majlis became more internally contentious as law makers rose up against the repression of the Shah, and against the sham democratic institutions that the Shah governed. (Foran, 1994) (Mohammadi, 2008) As the Shah showed that he was willing to go to any extent to maintain control of the political narrative in Iran prior to the revolution, dissenting parties and politicians took to the streets to voice their outrage and distrust of the Shah. These were the matchsticks that would eventually enflame tensions across Iran and lead to the Shah’s ouster and exile from the country.

American foreign aid to Iran doesn’t seem to give itself to a causative or even instrumental argument regarding the 1979 revolution, nor does it seem that its fluctuation influenced the outcome of the revolution positively or negatively. In 1972, the US Department of State allocated its final provision of foreign aid to the Pahlavi administration. Totaling just under $56 million, the provision of this aid to a nation who’s national budget totaled $4.65 billion was dismally low, and comprised only 2% of the US aid budget for 1972.36 (USDOS, 2001) (USAID, 36 See Visualization 2M
Due in part to the fact that Iranian oil revenues were so high, American aid was deemed unnecessary, and was discontinue after 1972. It is likely that due to the special strategic relationships that was enjoyed between Iran and the US during that time that there were considerable covert aid provided through the US Black Budget, which is classified even today.

37 See Visualization 2N
Once protests erupted in major cities across Iran, American leaders began trying in earnest to stabilize the situation. As protests broke out around the country in January 1978, Iranian leader paid little attention to them. However, by the time revolution was in full swing, it was far too late for the Pahlavi government to introduce reforms. From August 1978 until the following January, great reforms were made, under the advisement of American leaders, and new elections were called in an attempt to stall the fervor of revolters. (Harney, 1999) (Little, 2011) However, beginning to change this late, and after such repressive responses to early revolt proved to be too little too late.

Into 1979, US intelligence and Iranian SAVAK worked very closely to monitor and respond to domestic and regional issues which threatened their mutual interests. (Gasiorowski, 2012) Even up until the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, the US was entering into weapons deals, including one for $9 billion in arms to be fulfilled from 1980-1982. (Wise, 2011) On January 4, just days before the official start of the revolution, and only a month prior to the demise of the Iranian monarchy, the US government sent General Robert E. Huysen, the head of US-European command as an advisor and as a sign that the US government was willing to support the Shah’s government even in the face of strong revolutionary forces in Iran. (Wise, 2011) (Hoyt, 1997) Through his mission and the entirety of the revolution, US officials continued to support the Pahlavi government and share intelligence with them regarding the status of revolutionary leaders. In late January of 1979, it became increasingly clear that despite great effort, the Pahlavi government would fall, and the US government endeavored to prepare itself strategically for a transition to an Islamist government led by Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of revolutionary forces. (Wise, 2011) These attempts to continue diplomatic and strategic relations
with Iran continued after the Shah’s January 16, 1979 flight to exile from Iran until the November 1979 Tehran Embassy crisis.

2.7 Libya 2011

The successful Libyan Revolution which forced the toppling and eventual extrajudicial killing of longtime strongman, Muammar Gaddafi, began as a result of both regional and national frustrations at autocratic dictatorship in the context of the Arab Spring revolutions. The 2011 revolution forced the expulsion from power of Libya’s 42 year autocrat, and threw Libya into a time of civil conflict which, as of 2016, still rages on. Prior to the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya was governed by monarchs which were established in the wake of the Italian defeat in World War II. (Alexander, 1981) Having emerged after World War II from decades of colonial rule, first under the Ottoman Empire, and then under Italian rule, the powerful emergence of young Gaddafi as a national leader marked a new era of Libyan national history. After World War II, leaders in the UN declared Libya free of colonial leadership, and appointed Senussi Order leader Idris bin Muhammad al-Mahdi King of the newly unified United Kingdom of Libya, officially establishing the independent state of Libya in 1951. (Metz & Library of Congress, 1989) Under Idris’ leadership, Senussi tribal and religious priorities were made state policy, and power was entirely centralized in Idris and his Senussi compatriots. (Bearman, 1989) (Pargeter, 2012)

Perhaps due to the existentially formed dues that King Idris owed to the West, Idris opened newly-formed Libya to strong military, economic, and diplomatic relations with the West shortly after he gained power. Moreover, inspired by Western allies, Idris made the Libyan State a federal system, and continued to give the US and UK significant influence over the newly
developed oil industry in Libya. (Vandewalle, 2012) As an opportunistic response to deep Western ties, and internal political rivalry, power was seized in 1969 by the RCC, a group from whom Gaddafi would emerge as leader. (Be’eri, 1970)

From the time Gaddafi came to power, his foreign and national policies reflected an intense distaste for the West, staunch support for the development of Pan-Arab identity across the Arab world, and strong autocratic rule. (Schnelzer, 2016) Moreover, during his rule, Gaddafi was known for his disregard for the rule of law, corruption, nepotism, and suppression of civil rights for Libyans. (Obala, 2011) (Busuttil, 2011) After more than forty years of corrupt, authoritarian leadership, spurred forward by the earliest successful revolutions of the Arab Spring, in January of 2011, mass protests arose in major cities around Libya. Despite attempts by Gaddafi to quell the unrest, the protests grew into the summer until they engulfed the country. (Middle East Reporter, 2012) After Gaddafi began a massive repression and torture campaign against revolters, a cohort of NATO and other nations intervened to incapacitate the military capacities under Gaddafi in late 2011. (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012) After nearly a year long insurrection, and more than 9,000 deaths, Libya’s longtime dictator was pulled from his hiding place in a drainage ditch near the city of Sirte, and subsequently killed by revolutionaries. The late October 2011 death of Gaddafi did not represent the end of Libyan civil violence, and the beginning of peace and stabilization. Quite to the contrary, this event marked the beginning of a nearly decade-long time of internal fighting and civil war between factions vying for power over the Libyan State. (Elkatawneh, 2013)

The Libyan economy prior to the 2011 revolution was significantly affected, much like its neighbors’ economies, by the finding of oil. Oil was found in Libya in 1959, just a decade prior
to the national takeover in Gaddafi’s bloodless coup. (St. John, 2008) In 1969, upon taking control of Libya, Gaddafi ordered the drafting of a new national constitution, and the nationalization of banks and hospitals, and the oil industry. (Vandewalle, 1998) Emerging from its agrarian past, the Libyan economy began developing at a rapid rate during the early 1960s, driven heavily by revenues from oil exports. (Heitmann, 1969) (Clarke, 1963) Much of the economic stability which was inherited by Gaddafi in 1969 was a product of this oil development, and enabled him to maximize the centralization of power and national resources in himself and his friends. (Twist, 2013) As Gaddafi marshaled national resources to build massive private estates for himself and to encourage Pan-Arab identity across the Arab world, the majority of Libyans lived in poverty. (Mitchell, 2011) (Neto, 2014) The economic legacy of Gaddafi’s 40 year rule is one of great rural economic inequality and is defined by squandered opportunity.

Libya’s GDP growth was exponential shortly after the finding of oil, with a 42% increase in GDP between 1966 and 1967. (El Mallakh, 1969) However, by the year 2001, battered by years of international sanctions and large scale corruption, annual Libyan GDP growth fell to -1.76%. Endeavoring to prop up the failing economy, in 2003 and 2005, Gaddafi instituted a series of wide-ranging economic reforms focussing on supplying greater resources to the development of agriculture, and decreased regulation on businesses. (IMF, 2005) (Masoud, 2013) This development was undergirded by the finding of significant oil reserves near the Mediterranean, which further supported the increase of Libyan GDP during this time, (St. John, 2008) Despite wide ranging reforms, and the influx of greater oil revenues, just after 2005, GDP growth began a steady decline from 11.8% to -.79% just a year prior to the outset of revolution.
From 2005 until its low point in 2009, Libyan GDP growth was among the lowest in the MENA region, and was lower than average for all other global middle income states.\textsuperscript{38}

Between 1980-2005, Libya’s population surged under 92.3% growth rates over the preceding 30 years. (Jelili, 2012) Between 1980 and 2010, Libya’s population nearly doubled from 3.078 million to 6.04 million in 2010. (World Bank, 2016) This factor in combination with rising corruption led to an incredibly high level of unemployment from the mid-1990s until just prior to the outbreak of revolution. In fact, as of 2006, nearly 20% of the adult population was unemployed, and over 50% of the youth population was unemployed. (World Bank, 2016) (Ronen, 2008) Libya’s issues with joblessness are difficult to assess on a long term temporal scale, as much of the necessary information is unavailable. However, scholars have suggested that Libya’s continuous issues with unemployment were a product of an extended attempt to suppress inflation rates. (Fargani, 2013) This is a trend that is seen among poorer Arab countries, but is accentuated in the case of Libya. (Al-Habees & Abu Rumman, 2012)

\textsuperscript{38} See Visualization 2O
Starting in 1991, the earliest year for which data is reliably available, the Libyan unemployment rate stood at 18.8%, nearly the highest in the MENA region. Through the late 1990s, unemployment continued to soar until it reached its record high of 19.7% in 2002 and as much as 30% in 2003.\textsuperscript{39} (Vandewalle, 2012) (Sullivan, 2009) Driven by a huge push for external investments in Libya, 360 foreign corporation were allowed by Gaddafi’s government to establish operations in Libya during the early 2000s. (Sullivan, 2009) Furthermore, Gaddafi’s government allowed for Libya’s oil exploration industry to be slowly opened up to foreign competition, increasing job opportunity for many Libyans. As a result of these liberalizing policies, in 2004 Libya’s unemployment rate began dropping back towards normal at a slow rate. By 2010, however, only marginal success had been made toward decreasing Libyan unemployment, and the official unemployment rate stayed stubbornly at 19.2%.\textsuperscript{40}

As a result of high unemployment and the influx of oil revenues, Libyan inflation from the mid-1960s until 2011 was relatively low, but fluctuated widely. When Gaddafi’s GPC took control of the Libyan government, inflation was low, at 0.39%, among the lowest in the MENA region and the world. (World Bank, 2016) From 1968 until the 2011 revolution, the inflation rate in Libya fluctuated widely, sometimes being as high as 29.3% in 1979 and as low as -9.8% in 2002. Most often, inflation in Libya during this time fluctuated due to the effect of oil market fluctuation and the effect of international sanctions. (Vandewalle, 1998) Despite great economic tumult, high levels of corruption, and inconsistency in oil markets, from the early 1980s until the

\textsuperscript{39} Some historian suggest that the unemployment rate as of 2003 was as high as 30%, while the World Bank’s figures record a 19.7% rate for 1999-2003. In qualifying the World Bank’s data, I determined that multiple scholars supported the 30% figure, and determined to include it in this work for that reason.

\textsuperscript{40} See Visualization 2P
late 1990s, Libyan inflation experienced relative stability, only fluctuating between 1% and 11% during the decade. This era of relative stability was attributed to the development of intensive economic reforms and development goals that were instituted by the central government, and increased governmental spending on infrastructure and industry. This spending in effect injected nearly $63 billion into the Libyan economy, and resulted in a short-term stabilizing of Libyan inflation through the 1980s.

In 1992, as a result of Libyan state support of terrorism, including the downing of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772, multiple countries and the UNSC condemned, sanctioned, and embargoed Libya, forcing Libyan officials to invest more heavily in military and security, in the absence of international assistance. (Franssen, 2002) (UNSC, 2016) This caused a great fluctuation in inflation, to which the Libyan government endeavored to respond, with little effect. Just prior to the revolution, Libyan inflation stood at 15.5%, up from 2.8% in 2010. This rate represented the highest rate in the MENA region as well as the highest rate among global middle
income states. (World Bank, 2016) So, while in the 2000s, Libyan inflation was at times as low as -9.8%, its unreliable and constant changing nature resulted in low consumer confidence, and national frustration over the constantly drifting value of national currency.\footnote{41 See Visualization 2Q}

![Libya Inflation - Consumer Prices (Annual %)](source: The World Bank)

Due in part to Libya’s history as a colonial enclave and its high revenues from oil, Libyan public debt was kept extremely low through the majority of the Gaddafi years. Because of its lack of public debt, Gaddafi was able to internally finance national development projects like the Great Manmade River project, which intended to bring fresh water from the interior of Libya to its coastal cities, for upwards of $25 billion. (Scholl, 2012) This lack of reliance on external debt accumulation allowed Gaddafi to provide consumer loans through the Libyan National Bank without interest to Libyan citizens, provide free utilities to many Libyans, and further helped to fuel the national economy through the 1950s to the late 1980s. (Fisher, 1953) (Chengu, 2014) Into the 1990s and early 2000s, the economic situation in Libya worsened slightly. Due to early
American and other embargoes on Libyan goods, and travel restrictions from many European and Western countries, tourism travel to Libya was drastically diminished in 1986. Furthermore, the Italian government called $5 million in outstanding debt held by Libya, and ordered the freezing of Libyan assets. (Hufbauer et. al., 1990) (LA Times, 1986) In general, the time preceding the 1990s in Libya were times of great expansion and development economically, but represented the beginning of economic instability and frustrations from Europe. (St. John, 1986) As Libya marched into the 2000s, economic tumult decreased in general, as the Gaddafi government did its utmost to reestablish its economic stability. (Huliaras, 2001) By the time revolutionary forces took hold of Libya, Libyan foreign debt stood at only 2.6% of Libyan-held foreign assets in 2010. (AFDB et. al., 2012)

Despite the consistent tumult of varying inflation and unemployment, partly because of oil revenues, Gaddafi was able to keep taxes both for consumers and companies relatively low through the later years of his reign. The Libyan State didn’t depend heavily on taxes due to oil revenues, and for this reason, tax collection was not well implemented. (Ozor, 2015) For this reason, even into the early 2000s, the majority of Libyan citizens were not required to pay taxes, and given the offering of zero interest government loans, were not obviously concerned with the status quo.

**Libya Case - Social & Judicial Factors**

The late Gaddafi government was one which was characterized by rampant corruption and nepotism. (Hitman, 2016) During his rule, Gaddafi was known to manipulate public perception by ordering crackdowns on lower-level corruption, while fostering it in the highest levels of government. (St. John, 2008) Furthermore, in an analysis of global and regional corruption, the Gaddafi government was ranked in 2010 among the most corrupt governments in
both the MENA region as well as the world. (Transparency International, 2010) Gaddafi’s personal involvement in funding rebellions, and funneling guns to insurgencies around the world furthered both domestic and international perceptions of Gaddafi as illegitimate and corrupt. (Bøas & Utas, 2013) In part as a result of decades of rampant corruption and funneling of billions of dollars from the State Treasury to personal accounts, perceptions of corruption played a great role in the developing of the 2011 Libyan revolution. (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013)

Having been established on the basis of separation between religious and secular law, the Libyan judiciary was heavily influenced by Islam when Gaddafi took control in 1969. (Metz, 1989) Through his rulership, Gaddafi had endeavored to merge the influence of the two court systems, but these attempts were met with stern resistance due to the resulting perception of decreased influence of Sharia courts under Gaddafi’s unified system. (ICJ, 2016) By the time the 2011 revolution erupted, Libya’s judiciary was well-developed and was widely seen as trustworthy. (Dunne, 2011) After structural judicial changes in 1971, the Libyan judiciary was structured to accommodate a multi-level system of courts, with the Supreme Courts as the highest court, appellate courts, and regional courts presiding over smaller affairs. (Metz, 1989) Due to purposeful insulating, Gaddafi and his inner circle sat firmly outside of the jurisdiction of the courts. By instituting councils which superseded the laws of the courts, and filling them with political allies, Gaddafi was able to further distance himself from the facade of corruption, while fertilizing it internally. (Government of the Netherlands et. al., 2014)

Libya’s legislature was organized under the principles described in Gaddafi’s Green Book, a book describing Gaddafi’s preferred direct democratic system, controlled by the nation’s General People’s Committee. (al-Gaddafi, 1976) Under Gaddafi’s government, legislative authority was divided between three levels of government: the 2,700 member regional General
People’s Congress, the Fundamental Popular Party, and the executive General People’s Committee. (Vandewalle, 1998) Appointed representatives from the legislature were not able to unionize or form parties from 1972 onward. (UNILO, 2010) (Chivvis et. al. 2012) During Gaddafi’s rule, free elections were not held - all ministers and representatives in both the FPP and General People’s Committee were instead appointed by loyal ministers in order to maintain a singularity of political authority. (Kjaerum et. al. 2015) Representatives could be named to the Congress through election, however they were required to be confirmed by the higher houses of the legislature, effectively eliminating the chance for opposition. The controls that Gaddafi implemented on the judiciary and legislature in Libya essentially eliminated institutional opposition and allowed for the great centralization of power in Gaddafi and his closest allies.

**Libya Case - American Interventional Response**

Prior to the 2011 revolution, Libyan military personnel numbered near 80,000. (Hackett, 2011) However, because the majority of Libyan military forces were conscripts, a great number of units deserted after the 2011 revolution began. Furthermore, because of the size and lack of professional leadership of the military, major portions of the military became virtually unusable in responding to uprisings and eventual bombardment by NATO forces. (Haddadt, 2011) As part of the overall national consolidation of power, Gaddafi had centralized power over Libyan armed forces on himself, due to repetitive attempts to mount coups against him. (Gaub, 2012) (Haddadt, 2011) Because of prior embargoes on the sale of military technology by the majority of Western nations, the regular Libyan military was generally under-supplied at the time of the 2011 revolution. (SIPRI, 2011) This in conjunction with an overwhelming response by NATO allies and the unwillingness of other Arab states to come to his aid was partly responsible for the overthrow of the Libyan government.
Libyan State relations under Gaddafi were described as heavily strained in the Arab world, and even more so with the West. After years of icy tension due in part to Gaddafi’s funding of terrorism and anti-Westernism, Gaddafi’s approach to the West softened and he agreed to make reparations to the families of Lockerbie victims, and made a decided turn away from the production of nuclear arms in 2003. (Hirsh, 2006) Before this time, and since 1964, the US sent no foreign aid to Libya. However, starting in 2006, the US began providing federal funds in order to aid in the decreasing of Libyan nuclear armaments and to convert them to civilian energy production apparatus. (USAID, 2016) During this time, and prior to the 2011 revolution, no development or military aid was provided to Libya apart from what was provided for energy use.\(^\text{42}\)

\(\text{VIS. 2R}\)

On March 17, 2011, after over a month of violent crackdowns on Libyan revolters by the Gaddafi government, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, paving the way for one of the largest transnational action of foreign intervention since World War II. (UNSC, 2011) As one of the supporting members of the actions, the US aided in approving the implementation of an enforced

\(^{42}\) See Visualization 2R
no-fly zone over Libyan airspace, freezing of international assets, further embargoes, strategic bombings of Libyan air defenses, and in some cases, the use of small special operations forces to protect civilians from government aggression. After nearly 8 months of intervention, and a significant suppression of Libyan military capacities, Gaddafi’s forces broke entirely, and Gaddafi fled, was caught, and immediately executed by rebels, thus ending the 2011 Libyan revolution. While not a unilateral response, the 2011 American involvement in Libya’s revolution represents the largest American military and economic intervention of the Arab Spring revolutions.
CHAPTER II REFERENCES

Syria Case


**Egypt 2011 Case**


Iran 1979 Case


Libya 2011 Case


National Revolution and International Interference:
How American Intervention Influences Revolutionary States

Chapter III

Findings

and

Future Research
3.1 Overview of Research Questions

At the outset of this project, I asked four questions regarding American intervention and aid to states experiencing revolution. The first, “To what degree does American foreign intervention and aid to Middle Eastern countries experiencing revolutionary activity influence the outcome of revolution or act as an indicator of American intention?” The goal of this question is to assess whether American foreign aid and intervention are important variables which have changed with the success or failure of revolutions. If American foreign aid and intervention effect the likely success of revolution, this has great implications for the meaning of American support to embattled leaders. If American support for embattled leaders is in fact correlated with revolutionary success, international leaders should be vigilant to do what they can to maintain a high level of American support in the future, particularly if they are experiencing significant levels of national popular protest. If American involvement is negatively correlated with the success of revolutions, American leaders should be highly vigilant to support leaders that they trust will act in the interests of the US in the long term. In terms of American intervention, involvement has often has had different aims. In some cases, US leaders have intervened to support a revolution, as was the case in Libya, and to a degree in Egypt, despite not preferring the toppling of Mubarak. What is at issue in these cases is not the intention of the intervention, but rather the result of the intervention. It is clear that American leaders choose to support certain leaders, not to support others, and to oppose others. The factor at issue on this study has been the outcome of that support, rather than its consistency across cases or its motivation.
The second research question from Chapter I was: “once American leaders apply interventional pressure to attain a particular aim, do national leaders respond with reforms which conform to the interests that American leaders endeavored to achieve?” This question is intended to assess the strategic value of foreign aid and intervention in achieving concessions from international leaders upon which American leaders assert pressure to reform their state policies. The answer to this question is essential, because it allows for the establishment of an orthodoxy pertaining to the ability of American leaders to influence foreign leaders and export progressive, democratic American values to other nations in an interest of promoting enhanced human rights, democratic representation, or other important freedoms to national publics abroad. While the international engagements of American administrations in the early 2000s have made very clear indications regarding the futility of efforts to export Western democracy, this question’s answers will help to inform whether the rejection and failure of this exchange is due to the nature of the recipient society, or if it is a rejection of a larger group of ideals identified as foreign, American, Western, or imperialistic.

“When American aid is distributed for the purpose of developing good governance in a pre-revolutionary state, or US leaders decide to intervene in physical, diplomatic, or multinational ways, does it have a sufficient impact to stop the revolution or to increase overall stability?” This question is much like the second question, but unlike the second, it does not analyze the individual results of American attempts to induce reform. Rather, it seeks to identify if these efforts have a discernible impact on the outcome of the revolution. In this way, the third

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43 It deserves to be stated that these values are not ends unto themselves, but rather strategic shortcuts to enhanced relationship and influence. Time has shown through US involvement in Europe after World War II, and in cases around the Middle East that if American leaders can engineer or hasten the development of mutual interest, shared values, and mutually constitutive identity, US leaders will be more capable of influencing and controlling the prerogatives of foreign states.
question continues where the second question stops, and seeks to identify what impact the potential reforms have on the outcome of national turmoil. As with the second question, this one assumes that aid is indeed given to governments experiencing turmoil, and seeks to identify whether the provision of foreign aid dollars for the sake of developing stronger judicial institutions, government auditing offices, and economic infrastructure, results in stability in the face of popular revolution? The answer to this question promises to offer direction to American policy leaders regarding how to strategically respond to future revolutionary violence in order to secure a conclusion which serves or promotes American interests.

The final research question that I posed in the first chapter relates to the foundational assumptions about the causes of revolutions which have been established in the comparative politics field for the majority of the modern era. This question seeks to know “to what degree are the orthodox assumptions regarding drivers for revolutions supported in cases of modern revolutions?” This question seeks to test and qualify the set of assumptions regarding the causes of revolutions, and endeavors to parse out which among them may be most motivating for early revolutionary activity. While these factors are well established in the literature, the analysis of these factors in comparison to each of the surveyed case studies subordinates this project under the wealth of research which has been conducted on the topic. Furthermore, the answer to this question will allow for a clear understanding of which areas of concerns among the five supported by Jack Goldstone were most influential in the aforementioned cases, and will aid in the establishment of a basis for further understanding of the causal drivers of revolutions in the Middle East.
3.2 Overview of Cases - American Intervention

Syria 1982

The case of Syria’s 1982 revolution is unique in that it shows the capability of a nation to exact its punishment on dissenters without the impact of American foreign policy intervention. The 1982 Syria case represents a polar non-interventional revolutionary narrative on the part of the American government. Despite the fact that the US had motive to support rebel groups in Syria due to their strong Soviet alliance (Breslauer et. al., 1990), and arguable had the strategic capacity to stop Assad’s assault, or punish him for his aggression, American response was imperceptible. While it has been suggested that American forces supported revolters in Syria through covert programs, reliable information isn’t available to support this notion.

Capitalizing on opportunity to speak out on totalitarian aggression against democratic protest could have achieved for US leaders an enhanced moral high ground against Soviet allied states. Furthermore, it would also allow for a significant reduction in the level of influence that Soviet leaders enjoyed in the Middle East. While American comparative power during the 1982 revolution was virtually unmatched during the revolution, the threat of war with the USSR was high. An American intervention in this comparatively insignificant revolt in Syria would serve some American interests, but the strategic payoff of toppling the Assad regime was certainly insufficient to warrant risking almost certain war with the Soviets. The 1982 Syrian revolution provides preliminary support for the central hypothesis of this work, but more than this, it provides evidence that American leaders balance calculations of their comparative power with calculations of the strategic context in determining whether or not to intervene in revolutions. Furthermore, it suggests that strategic constrain is either independently important as its own
indicator of intervention, or is a significant indicator of actual relative power. Moreover, in situations wherein American leaders have the capacity, motive, and opportunity to respond, but choose not to because of competing interest, or because of strategic or political limitations, it seems likely that national leaders will perceive this as a signal that they will not be strongly opposed by US or other Western forces.

An initial inspection of the Syria case suggests that without the threat of American diplomatic or military intervention, central governments will be empowered and more likely to suppress revolt in their country with great force, knowing that capable American leaders have determined to do nothing to stop them. While this point is interesting, it deserves qualification. As mentioned in previous sections of this work, during the 1982 Hama revolution, American preference toward direct intervention was curtailed by the geostrategic environmental context of the Cold War. In this case, American leaders were constrained by the fact that intervention would mean almost certain direct war between the Soviets and Americans, shattering the tenuous peace which had been maintained until that time during the Cold War. Despite its superficial support for the hypothesis of this work, a deeper analytical scrubbing of the case study which accounts for the impact of American constraints shows that American decision to not intervene was less a product of motive and more a product of geostrategic calculation. With this caveat, this case does lend meager support to the important role that the absence of American intervention can have in the calculus of dictators who are interested in wiping out a revolt.

Egypt 2011

Prior to the unsuccessful Egyptian revolution of 2011, American foreign aid to Egypt was among the highest in quantity in the world. Shortly before the revolution, American aid to

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44 As is mentioned in chapter one, media coverage, new administration, increased popular outrage, and other factors can change the willingness of American leaders to respond.
Egypt decreased by 20% nearly to its lowest point in 35 years, as mentioned in Chapter Two. Furthermore, after the 2011 revolution, American foreign aid to Egypt remained at its low point until American leaders finally removed all military and economic aid to Egypt after the 2013 coup which installed military leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi into power. As was found in the case study, American leaders supported the rights of Egyptians to protest against their national government, in spite of the fact that Mubarak had enjoyed many years as a strong ally of the US, and called for him to step down increasingly as the revolution continued. Starting only 3 days after protests began, American leaders sent clear signals to the Mubarak government that they were prepared to side with the democratic rights of protestors. (White House, 2011) As American leaders refused to back embattled Mubarak, and encouraged the representation of democratic rights, protestors successfully forced the ouster of Mubarak from power after a decades-long rule.

The choice on the part of American leaders to not support Mubarak in the face of national revolt was clearly a choice motivated largely by political limitation rather than American preference. While human rights, democracy, and other values were important to American leaders, administrations were perfectly content to enter into multi-billion dollar trade and weapons deals with Egyptian leaders for decades before Tarhir Square happened. While there were nearly silent directives through the years encouraging greater democratic representation of Egyptians, these calls were rarely followed by any reform on the part of the Mubarak government, and served more as a political proof of American values than a clear attempt to motivate reforms. When revolt began in Egypt in 2011, American leaders were constrained by their record of encouraging democracy around the world, and could not be seen by the American public as encouraging anti-democratic repression. For this reason, as a function of political
limitation, American leaders offered no support to Mubarak in his final days, reduced the amount of aid that the Mubarak government received, and when revolution began, stood behind their values to satisfy domestic constituencies rather than supporting an Autocratic old friend.

In this case, American decreasing of economic aid to Egypt during the time preceding the revolution does correlate with lack of support for the regime in power in Egypt. Furthermore, American calls for continued and increased democratic expression were connected to the initial success of the revolution, giving the revolution a greater sense of legitimacy and allowing it to maintain momentum through Mubarak’s short lived military crackdown. While the revolution had no staying power, due in part to the long history of military succession in Egypt, and highly politically connected military leaders, the initial success of the Tahrir Square revolution at least appears to support the notion that was established in the Syrian case: that the decision on the part of American leaders to not support embattled leaders is correlated with the success of revolution. Furthermore, the significant reduction of American foreign aid to the Egyptian government in the lead up to the revolution served as an indicator that US leaders intended not to support Mubarak in the revolution. These connections are loose at best though. While US leaders did refuse to outwardly support Mubarak against democratic revolt, this was more a product of political limitations on the part of the Obama Administration than a product of a US preference for democratic rights over a continued Mubarak leadership. Furthermore, it is hard to classify American leaders’ response as having supported revolters wholeheartedly. It is clear, due to the longterm support from American leaders that Mubarak enjoyed, that US leaders took no issue with his totalitarian way of governing. Furthermore, it was clear that American leaders prioritized economic and military partnership over democracy. However, once democratic action began taking place, American leaders were required to support the rights of revolters outwardly,
Despite inwardly preferring the maintenance of the status quo. For these reasons, the Egypt case gives support to the notion that American support does not indicate success of revolutions nor of leadership stability, but rather has little impact on the outcome of revolution, even among the greatest of strategic allies. However, in cases when American leaders refuse to outwardly support foreign leaders in the face of revolutionary activity, the success of revolution is more likely, regardless of the reason American leaders chose to not give support to the embattled leader. Furthermore, this and the Syria case suggest that an accurate assessment of American strength must be calculated with room provided for the impact of both domestic and international limitations and geostrategic constraints on the motives of American leaders.

**Iran 1979**

American foreign aid to Iran was nil prior to the revolution, due to overall Iranian economic stability. Therefore, in the case of Iran, American foreign aid was not a factor in the lead up to the revolution, or in its success. In the case of the 1979, American leaders supported the rule of the Shah, collaborating in defense, making trade deals, providing arms, and providing strategic support through US military advisors on the ground in Tehran. Having enjoyed decades of support from American leaders, Pahlavi was given more latitude to oppress the Iranian people with very little protest from American leaders. Even less than a year before his ouster, US President Carter declared regarding US-Iranian relations, “We have no other nation on Earth who is closer to us in planning for our mutual military security. We have no other nation with whom we have closer consultation on regional problems that concern us both. And there is no leader with whom I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal friendship (President Carter, 1977).” Even until nearly the end of revolutionary violence, American leaders were in support of
Shah Pahlavi, and collaborated with Iranian military leaders regarding how to maintain the stable rule of the monarchy.

Despite American support for the Pahlavi government, it violently fell in 1979. This threatens to deal a substantial blow to the theory that undergirds this project. Despite having received a nearly unprecedented level of American support, and having undergone an extensive program of repression, Shah Pahlavi’s rule was cut short, and subsequently the special Persian-American relationship was cut as well. While this has significant implications for the strength of this project’s theory, it exemplifies a central theme regarding international relations research. The political landscape of our modern world is complex and highly nuanced. As such, any case of revolution is complex and likely has a multi-causal root. While this theory certainly lends a great deal of understanding to the relationship between American foreign policy and revolutions, it is essential that these conclusions be hemmed in by the reality that the world is highly complex and that no one theory will fully satisfy the explanatory deficit that exists between events, their symptoms, and their results. Furthermore, this case study structure represents a high bar which seeks to identify at what point the theory begins to break down. In this way, this case fully satisfies this project’s main directive in that it provides a case wherein the assumptions of this project do not narrowly or perfectly fit the historical narrative.

An initial assessment of power in this context indicates that the Iranian Revolution from 1979 should have failed. Using the other case studies of this project as indicators, Iran represents the case which should support this project’s theory most strongly. Prior to the revolution, American leaders worked closely militarily, diplomatically, and covertly with Iranian leaders. Furthermore, the military of Iran was well-developed, well-funded, and strongly supportive of the Pahlavi Dynasty, having been the source of the Dynasty itself. Moreover, political power in
Iran was not heavily divided and the Shah held the lion’s share of institutional power over the country. Despite an overwhelming mass of power between the US and the Shah’s forces, and military superiority, the revolution rallied millions of Iranians in an overthrow which stunned world leaders. While a subsequent work could analyze the complex military, political, social, and global interactions which drove the success of the revolution, the most germane point to this work is that motive and comparative power balance will not always be sufficient determinants of success to justify intervention. American leaders chose in the context of the Iranian revolution an option that was based solely on a calculation of motive and comparative power, and neglected other variables that were centrally impactful to the outcome of the revolution. This was not necessarily the result of an inaccurate calculation of power or motive, but rather the result of incalculable variables which should stand as a clear barrier to future American intervention in foreign revolution. This Iran case shows that while success might be achieved through intervention, even in the most perfect of cases, the result of revolt can remain unimpacted by American intervention. Moreover, when revolutionary outcome does not adhere to American preferences, the impact can be greatly detrimental to American longterm interests, and can harm the capacity of American leaders to subsequently interact in a productive way in the region of the revolution, as it has impacted subsequent American influence in the Middle East.

Libya 2011

In much the same way as in the case of Iran 1979, prior to the 2011 revolution, Libya received no foreign aid, apart from a small portion to help them in their commitments to denuclearize. For this reason, economic aid can not be considered to have been influential on the outcome of the revolution. Prior to the revolution, American leaders were hostile to Gaddafi and his government, both for the discord and anti-Western sentiment that he sowed in the Middle
East and Africa, and for the wholesale corruption with which he engaged with the rest of the world. Once revolutionary activity began, the US government declared the Gaddafí government entirely illegitimate (Colvin & Bull, 2011), and launched an initiative with NATO allies to paralyze Libyan defenses, in order to allow revolutionary forces to push him out of power. Furthermore, even after his overthrow, US allies hunted Gaddafí near his hometown of Sirte, and French pilots bombed his convoy East of the city, rendering him entirely defenseless to the onslaught of rebels who would eventually murder him in a drainage tunnel. In the case of the Libyan revolution of 2011, while there were no signals through aid, US support for revolutionary actors was directly influential over the outcome of the revolution.

In the case of the 2011 Libyan revolution, American intervention was at a higher level than in any other case - to the point of funding and arming rebel groups, and providing air cover for their operations. (Hosenball, 2011) For this reason, the Libyan revolution case represents the opposing extreme of the Syrian 1982 case on the interventional continuum. During the Libyan revolution, the conclusion was bought and paid for by US leaders, and the major events of the revolution were orchestrated by US strategic leaders. Furthermore, it seems evident that without the influence of American and allied intervention, the revolution in Libya would have failed or been violently oppressed. This response marks the highest level of interventional involvement on the part of US leaders of any of the cases of Arab Spring revolutions, and may also represent the largest intervention in a sovereign revolution by American forces in history.

The Libyan revolutionary case represents the impact of unfettered American motive and comparative power advantage. In the case of Libya 2011, it is arguable that American leaders had a similar level of motive to intervene in the revolution as they had in Syria 1982. Having never engaged directly in ground war against Libyan forces, not having any direct foreign relations,
and not being existentially threatened by Libyan military action, it seems clear that the only motive American leaders had to intervene in the Libyan revolution was strategic. By allowing for the toppling of an anti-Western dictator, American leaders could reign in the anarchy spreading across North Africa, cement Egypt as the preeminent power in Africa, and show other Middle Eastern powers that they were willing to punish leaders who stepped out of line and impeded American interests. Furthermore, being a developing middle power in the Middle East, it was clear that American and allied firepower could easily overwhelm the capacities of the Libyan military to protect its valued institutions. Due to this calculation of comparative power and motive, and in the absence of international strategic constraint, American leaders intervened and crushed the Gaddafi government, allowing revolutionaries to overrun the country.

3.3 Findings

1. To what degree does American foreign intervention and aid to Middle Eastern countries experiencing revolutionary activity influences the outcome of revolution or act as an indicator of American intention?

In three of the four surveyed cases: Libya, Egypt, and Syria, government leaders were receiving no foreign economic or military aid from the United States, or the amount of aid being received was in significant decline at the time of revolution. In these cases, the downward change of foreign aid provision, or protracted withholding of foreign aid stood as an indicator of future waning support for the government, or for outright opposition to the central government in the face of revolutionary activity. In the case of Egypt, shortly after aid began to decrease to the Mubarak government, American leaders began supporting protestors and pressuring Mubarak to give up power. Furthermore, in the case of Libya, the application of economic pressure through the withholding of foreign aid, as well as the increase in sanctions prior to the revolution were
followed with a forceful anti-Gaddafi policy which led to his fall and ultimate death. Finally, in the case of Syria, after continued hostilities over the establishment of the State of Israel, American covert operations, and Syrian sponsorship of terror, American foreign aid was not given to Syria prior to the Hama revolution. In this case, American leaders resisted the urge to do anything to support the oppressive response of Assad against his people in Hama, but also did nothing to secure a peaceful outcome. The Hama revolution stood as a potential massive threat to the Assad government and resulted in a pulling of Syrian troops from other regional engagements to secure the stability of the government. Despite this, US leaders determined to remain silent and not assist Assad in maintaining control.

In each of the surveyed cases, the reduction or withholding of American foreign aid to the national government of a pre-revolutionary state was correlated with future opposition to the continued rule of the embattled leader. The case of Iran is important to this conclusion because, as mentioned previously, American aid was dropped years prior to the revolution. Moreover, despite receiving a huge amount of other support from American leaders during the successful revolution, Iranian leaders didn’t receive an increase in foreign aid. This can be explained by two means. First, Iran stands as an outlier among otherwise under-developed, poor countries of the MENA region. In 1979, Iran’s wealth had for many years been amassing, and had not required the provision of American economic aid for that reason. Because of this, Iran’s greatest failings were political rather than economic, so the impact of foreign aid would be marginal in comparison to other forms of aid. Second, while Iran did not receive increased economic aid during the time of the revolution, US leaders continued to trade heavily with Iran and continued to enter into massive trade deals, including a $9 billion deal just prior to the end of the revolution. This level of transnational trade may very well have been sufficiently powerful to
respond to economic difficulties in Iran and may have lessened the need for or impact of US foreign aid in the pre-revolutionary context. The cases surveyed provide robust support to the preceding hypothesis that American foreign intervention and aid are strong predictors of the level of support that leaders can expect to receive from US leaders in case of national turmoil.

In any case of revolution, it is likely that US-supported leaders will clamor for increased economic aid and political support, regardless of the level of support they initially receive. In the context of this project however, this fact is incidental. To this point, this project stands as proof that the level of support that leaders can expect to receive from American leaders in the case of national turmoil will likely be equal to the pre-revolutionary level of commitment they received, but will be highly impacted by the influence of the geostrategic and political context in which the revolution occurs. In cases wherein American leaders have motive to intervene and the geostrategic risk is low, American leaders will often support their preferred actor, whether revolters or standing governments to at least the same degree that they supported that actor prior to revolt. If, however, there are domestic or international constraints that affect American leaders’ calculus, embattled leaders or revolters are likely to only lukewarm rhetorical or covert support, regardless of the prior importance of the relationship between groups. This is likely due to the fact that American leaders recognize from experience that intervention in foreign revolutions has a high political cost, and isn’t always successful. Furthermore, American leaders have begun to recognize that their support for a revolutionary group or embattled leader doesn’t always dictate how the revolution will progress or how it will end. If American leaders can protect their interests by giving only tacit support to their preferred outcome, either outcome will be politically manageable to them.
Finally, in one case (Egypt) wherein US leaders cut off previously flowing aid, or decreased its provision, successful revolution ensued. In one case (Libya) in which aid was previously removed, but was followed with direct American intervention, revolution was successful. In the other case (Syria), American leaders refused to respond in any way or support either side, and revolution was crushed. Finally, in one case of successful revolution (Iran), American aid was removed, and American intervention grew to unmatched levels. Despite American support for the Shah, this revolution was successful, and the Shah was deposed.

Finding: The impact of American intervention and aid on revolutionary states is nuanced and often dependent on the level of intervention applied. For states which receiving foreign aid from the US, foreign aid variation can act as an indicator of future US support in cases of national turmoil or revolution. However, variation in the level of intervention in the revolution is not reliably correlated with success or failure of the revolution. If American leaders choose to intervene to the benefit of a government, it is not clear that the revolution will indeed fail or that the likelihood of revolutionary success will decrease in any perceptible way. Quite to the contrary, American intervention on behalf of a national government does not produce a reliable result - in some cases the revolution succeeds despite the preponderance of power that American forces may hold in the conflict. If, however, American leaders determine to intervene on the side of revolters, or to simply tacitly support their aims, it is reliable indicator that the revolution will be successful. Thus, the ebb and flow of American intervention and aid is an unreliable indicator

45 The decision on the part of American leaders to not intervene in Syria was largely a product of strategic constraints which resulted from Assad's Cold War partnership with the USSR. This is important because it shows that strategic constraint is as much a factor in American decisions to intervene as capacity is.

46 This work does not make any intentional effort to parse out what causes revolutions to succeed in a national political context, as a study of this would require a deep analytical assessment of each case. It is likely that this is a function of the stability of state institutions of power and the network centrality of revolt leaders among national publics. While this is certainly an important portion of revolutions, it is an area of study reserved for a deeper subsequent project.
of success of revolution. However, the removal of aid, or its decrease to nations experiencing revolutionary activity is a reliable indicator of future US support for embattled leaders. Furthermore, the US government has actively used intervention and the provision of aid as a strategic tool in order to influence the result of revolutions.

2. Once American leaders apply interventional pressure to attain a particular aim, do national leaders respond with reforms which conform to the interests that American leaders endeavored to achieve?

3. When American aid is distributed for the purpose of developing good governance in a state, or US leaders decide to intervene in physical, diplomatic, or multinational ways, does it have a sufficient impact to stop the revolution or to increase overall stability?

In cases of governmental instability during revolutionary activity, the US government often does not increase foreign economic aid to embattled leaders in order to reform or to support development projects by the embattled leader. While American leaders could approve the release of aid dollars in order for foreign leaders to use towards massive and decisive reforms, American leaders do not do this. In fact, in both of the examples of revolution among friendly Middle Eastern nations, aid is not used to this end. It is possible that if American leaders were willing to do this, that they would be able to buy the allegiance of revolting publics and save embattled leaders from toppling. As it stands however, in all of the cases, foreign aid was not used for this purpose. It is entirely possible that funds were provided to leaders through US black budgets, but it is likely that such funds would not be sufficient to invest in the necessary developmental programs in order to stabilize support for the leaders.

As was concluded previously, American leaders use aid as a signal of future interventional intent and often have used intervention in an effort to impact the outcome of revolutions. The pressure that American leaders assert on foreign leaders is often used in an
endeavor to induce governmental change, development, or reform in order to better the circumstances of national publics, or to give publics the opportunity to choose a new national leader. In two of the cases surveyed, (Egypt and Iran) upon pressure from American leaders and their national publics, leaders have chosen to announce reforms. This however has been insufficient due to the fact that they come too late, or were too narrow to be impactful. In both of the cases wherein the US applied external pressure in order to induce reform, reforms were announced by national leaders. In these cases, however, the reforms were insufficiently early or broad to slow or stop revolutionary activity, and the embattled leaders were swept from power.

Finding: In cases of revolution, US leaders have not used the provision of foreign aid as a strategic tool to induce reforms in the recipient state. In some cases, US leaders have made calls for reform in the face of revolutionary activity. These calls for reform are often not heeded in the short term, but are thereafter headed. The effect of these calls is insufficient, however, and leaders who choose to respond to US calls with efforts to reform do not survive revolution.

4. To what degree are the orthodox assumptions regarding drivers for revolutions supported in cases of modern revolutions? (Goldstone)

For each of the cases surveyed, four drivers of revolution were surveyed, and 11 subfield predictive indicators were surveyed as well. Once this was done, the values of each case were tallied for every factor and measured against the other cases. The conclusion of this project supports the well developed orthodoxy surrounding the cause of revolutions. In all of the four cases, each causative factor had at least one subfield indicator that was highly impactful to the overall condition of the country. This means that in each case, as Goldstone asserts, some of the motivating factors of revolution were present and part of the causal story for the revolution.47

47 See Visualization 3A
Furthermore, in each of the four cases, the impact of the economic strain and political alienation factors were more significant than that of the other two factors. In each case, there was a higher level of instability in the sections relating to these two categories than in the other two categories. While this may to some degree be a function of the availability and ease of measuring information in these categories, it seems intuitively clear that issues of economic instability and political alienation were the most impactful factors regarding the revolution. These case studies push forward Goldstone’s assumptions and indicate that economic strain and political alienation are the most acute drivers of revolution. In every case wherein revolutionary activity developed,

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48 In this study, the comparative value can be seen in the proportion of drivers for each case predictive indicator which are categorized as low in terms of observability in each case.
there was a high level of economic strain and political alienation. This may be due to the fact that the attributes and effects of these factors are highly visible and impactful to national publics, and may also be statistical noise. The case studies which were surveyed in this project strongly support the orthodox assumptions regarding the cause of revolt. In each of the surveyed cases, at least some of the drivers of revolution were present, consistent with Goldstone’s findings. This finding supports the previously held reality that revolutions are driven, at least in part, by a combination of economic strain, political alienation, and governmental illegitimacy.

**Finding:** Revolutions are caused by a combination of economic, political, and international factors. These factors are often present in cases of revolution to varying degrees, but are present in every case surveyed. In cases of pre-revolutionary states, the most likely drivers of revolution involves national economic difficulty and political alienation.

3.4 Summary of Findings

By applying theories of international relations to the case studies in this project, it can be seen that the modern Middle East revolutions affirm widely held beliefs regarding revolutions, furthers other theories, and provides a foundation for future research regarding the impact of American involvement in foreign revolutions. The initial question regarding the impact of American aid on the success of revolutions was answered with a clear and unambiguous no. It is clear from these case studies that the use of foreign aid as a tool to induce a particular outcome in foreign revolutions is not widely effective, and its effects are inconsistent. It is unclear whether a more robust, consistent policy on the use of foreign aid in cases of revolutions would provide more dependable or beneficial results. However, it is clear that in its current form, American
foreign aid is not used as such a tool. In some cases, the US chooses to lend its support to revolutions through a varied selection of interventional tactics. In cases where US leaders choose to support the standing government, the cases analyzed in this study indicate that revolution is most often less successful. Furthermore, in 3 of 4 cases wherein the US determined to support rebellion, the revolution was successful, and the standing national leader was forced from power.

A conclusion reached through this project is that as revolutions progress, the removal of aid, or its decrease to nations experiencing revolutionary activity is a reliable indicator of future US support for revolutionary factions. This is important to state leaders who are both recipients of American foreign aid and executives over a nation experiencing internal conflict. To these states, as American aid decreases, it is likely that American leaders will also support actors which may aim to overturn the government or impact its stability. Furthermore, despite its limited utility, American leaders have used the provision of aid as a tool to support or remove support for embattled national leaders, and this removal of support had correlated with the success of revolutions.

Regarding reform, US leaders often encourage foreign leaders experiencing internal opposition to reform and provide greater measures of security in the face of protest. In many cases, national leaders resist this urging until it becomes painfully apparent that not reforming will result in their necessary departure from power. While US leaders support the increase of reforms in nations experiencing violence, US leaders stop short of providing foreign leaders resources to provide for these reforms. Furthermore, once leaders decide to give in to US calls
for reform, it is often too late or insufficiently broad to impact the fervor of revolutionary factions in their nations.

Finally, this research supports the notions held in the orthodox view of the causes of revolution. Furthermore, it pushes forward those notions by prioritizing between them and showing that economic and political considerations are the most significant drivers of revolution among the five influential ones. Through this research, it is clear that national publics care more about the most obvious of national issues than those that are less salient or more nuanced. Furthermore, from this research, it is clear that economic issues are a great driver for revolutions, and that national publics will take these issues more seriously than others.

In the modern world, American support for revolution is significant to the outcome of the revolution. Furthermore, for those states that receive foreign aid, as US leaders decrease the provision of American aid, they signal a waning of support for state policies or leadership. It is important for states which receive aid to recognize that when aid is decreased during a time of economic or social instability, that national reform must ensue in order to have a dependable chance of surviving the potential of revolt.

**Findings**

1. *The ebb and flow of American intervention and aid is an unreliable indicator of success of revolutions.*

2. *The removal of aid, or its decrease to nations experiencing revolutionary activity is a reliable indicator of future US support for embattled leaders.*

3. *The US government has actively used intervention as a strategic tool in order to influence the result of revolutions. It has not, however, used foreign aid strategically in the context of revolutions.*
4. US leaders use rhetorical intervention as a mechanism to induce foreign leaders to reform. This reform is often insufficient and unreliable for the purpose of staving off revolution.

5. When US-supported leaders are facing revolution, American leaders do not support them with increased foreign aid provision.

6. Revolutions are caused by a combination of economic, political, and international factors. These factors are often present in cases of revolution to varying degrees, but are present in every case surveyed.

7. In cases of pre-revolutionary states, the most likely drivers of revolution involves national economic difficulty and political alienation.

3.5 Identity and Power as Drivers of Intervention

In the American field of international relations Social Constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink have argued that identity and ideas matter in shaping the interests and interactions of states in the international system. (Wendt, 1995) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) The preceding research indicates that this is to some degree true, that states will in some cases support outcomes which support their identities and values. More importantly, however, this study indicates that the power of ideas as a motivator towards intervention is strongly hemmed in by the influence of relative power and the geostrategic context in which those ideas exist. Through the cases surveyed in this study, it is clear that in cases wherein American leaders perceive a motive to intervene, and have the capacity to, they will intervene in revolutions in both friendly and hostile nations of the Middle East. Often, this intervention is at least marketed to Americans as being in support of democracy or other ideals that constitute a significant factor of collective American identity. However, this breaks down in the face of a complex geostrategic environment and in the face of an unaccommodating balance of power. While this conclusion doesn’t entirely discredit Constructivist claims regarding the centrality of identity in strategic calculation, it does qualify it. This study shows that while ideas
may matter, power and constraint seem to be the coin of the realm in foreign policy. In cases wherein US leaders have motive to intervene, superior comparative power, an ethical or moral argument to justify intervention, but a strategic environment which doesn’t support successful intervention, threatens important domestic political positions, or threatens an escalation of international tensions, American leaders will elect to not intervene, as was the case in Egypt and Syria. However, in cases wherein there is American motive to intervene, a justifiable argument, and no strategic or comparative power-based reason not to intervene, American leaders will intervene and endeavor to force the conclusion of the revolution to adhere to their preferences, as was the case in Iran and Libya. While this approach is well founded in American foreign policy, and among this project’s case studies, it is clear that the strategy employed by American leaders is not one who’s conclusion is predictable or even entirely beneficial to American interests.

3.6 Implications

The implications of this project for policymakers, state leaders, and for academia are broad and pertinent to the future of international relations. The truths that this project asserts should be rigorously tested against other cases to verify their validity. Moreover, there is great opportunity in the future research on foreign aid, hegemonic intervention, and revolutions for the concepts to be refined and clarified.

Implications for States Experiencing Violence

Regarding state leaders which are experiencing revolt or popular unrest, this project implies that those leaders are likely better off to determinately oppress revolters or to flee the country in favor of sparing their own lives than to implement eleventh hour reforms. This is a conclusion that Shah Pahlavi reached early on, realizing that reform would only embolden
revolters and would lead to his assassination, and a conclusion that Gaddafi realized after it was too late to flee. However, if revolutionary violence has gained any major popular support, and leaders are either unable or unwilling to respond with violence, it is unlikely that late reforms will turn the momentum of enraged citizens and cement their continued rule. This is not to say that embattled leaders should murder their own citizens in order to maintain their rule. Rather, this is to say that national leaders must be vigilant to respond to revolt, popular unrest, and any other form of organized protest in their states in a decisive way before these movements gain important momentum or popularity. A late decision on the part of embattled leaders to reform may be seen as a last desperate attempt to stave off revolution, as it was in the case of Iran and Egypt, and be met with a tidal wave of revolutionary fervor. In these cases, if the revolution has grown in sufficient size and momentum, any amount of reform will likely be insufficient to stop the revolution from happening. Referring back to Vis. 1C, it is essential that national leaders are aware of factions in their own states which are gaining momentum and questioning the legitimacy of their leadership. As shown in Vis. 1C, if leaders catch these movements in their infancy, they are given the opportunity to make meaningful reforms which will undercut the frustrations of revolutionary actors, and will allow for their continued rule. It is unclear at which point the success of the revolution under these circumstances becomes inevitable, but it is clear that the best way to stop revolutions from becoming powerful enough is to make reforms early that respond to revolters’ demands in a clear and meaningful way.

49 This is particularly true if the unrest has gained momentum in major population centers.

50 See Page 21
Regarding the same leaders, they should be wary of becoming dependent on American foreign aid as a resource, or as a stabilizer for their nation. In the past, American leaders have manipulated foreign aid and used indirect intervention to change the course of national revolutions in significant ways. Opening a door to that potential future influence is not certainly an advisable choice. This is not to say that American foreign aid and intervention absolutely will result in revolution or the deposing of national governments when there are revolts. It simply means that American leaders will not necessarily support the continued leadership of allies or longterm friends which experience revolutionary activity. This refusal, due to political calculations or geostrategic limitations, can often add to the difficulties of embattled leaders, and can give added leverage to American leaders who may not reliably act with recipient state leaders’ interests in mind, even when those leaders have enjoyed the closest of relationships with the US over the longterm. Quite to the contrary, it is likely that US leaders will call for widespread reform which may result in the ultimate removal from power of the embattled leader.

In cases of revolution in the Middle East, revolutionary violence has been triggered by a deep domestic need to reform economic and political institutions. Looking into the center of the issue, American leaders have seen that these reforms are essential to the goal of increased good governance, and have encouraged the swift development of these practices in the outset of revolutionary activity. In the future, states experiencing revolution would be well served to heed these American warnings and reform quickly and deeply in order to disqualify the frustrations that citizens are rallying behind. When national leaders stall, hoping that revolution will not come, their removal from power becomes more certain and more swift. This is not to say that economic or political reform will stop revolutions every time. The surveyed cases show,
however, that waiting to reform until it is absolutely necessary is unadvisable, and possibly deadly.

States experiencing national turmoil should be aware that even nuanced US intervention impacts the success of revolutions. Whether it is because of covert operations which come with American intervention, because of the influence of a contrarian hegemon, or because of a ideational power that American leaders hold in the minds of national publics, when American leaders choose to act, this often alters the course of revolutions. This impact is often entirely unpredictable, however, and should not be relied on as a weapon which can be wielded in the face of revolutionary violence. In some cases, this alteration is to the benefit of local leaders, but in most, it is not. Furthermore, when US leaders choose to intervene, the less direct the intervention, the less predictable the outcome. Finally, when US leaders choose to act in support of a national leader, it is likely that salient intervention will be seen negatively by national publics, and this action will induce a greater demand for revolutionary change. If American leaders determine to intervene in some way, it is important to use that intervention for productive reform-based development which targets the central drivers of national turmoil.

Implications for American Policy Leaders

In the past, American leaders have been a part of attempts to support dictators, have left other friendly dictators in the cold to be wrestled from power by revolters, and have mercilessly attacked other dictators in campaigns directed at removing them from power with alarming immediacy. In other cases, dictators have murdered massive numbers of their own civilians who were protesting widespread corruption and economic mismanagement, and American leaders have chosen to turn a blind eye to the democratic rights of those civilians which were being
snuffed out. In some cases, this response has been the result of domestic political constraint, and in some cases it has been the result of international geostrategic limitations which made successful intervention impossible.

American foreign aid is a resource with great potential, but it is entirely un-utilized for motivating leaders to reform in favor of stability today. As American leaders give aid to foreign leaders, they can buy trust, development, and a slow emerging of democratic rights. More than being used for these purposes, aid is used as a punitive stick to punish leaders with which US leaders disagree. Aid, however, can be used as a means of developing independent judicial bodies within states that broaden national power bases, and can further be used to respond to other significant issues that national publics cry out about. Furthermore, as publics revolt, aware foreign leaders can develop an acute sense of responsibility to respond to the drivers of revolution and may become more desperate for resources which will aid them in reforming as their publics would like. This provides an open door through which American leaders can introduce packages of reforms which are undergirded with the promise of additional support from US leaders contingent on those development goals being implemented.

American leadership in the Middle East has largely been led by national interest and an idealism that puts the promoting of democratic rights at the apex of foreign policy priorities. This priority has been secondary to other national interests, however, as dictators with whom American leaders share a strong relationship have often been supported despite their rigid opposition to democracy. However, American foreign policy has more often been a function of American strategic calculation than a desire to see the spread of democracy. Furthermore, American intervention has not produced results that support American interests, the interests of states experiencing revolt, or states in the regional periphery. In Egypt, Libya, and Iran,
American intervention was followed by a contraction of democratic rights, and increase in regional and national instability as well as a contraction of American regional influence and moral authority. This dismal record of failure in intervention gives itself to only one recommendation: that American leaders get out and stay out of the business of manipulating revolutions and spreading democracy. While American leaders may calculate comparative power, their motives, and geopolitical context well, national publics have on numerous occasions subverted American calculations and have left American foreign policy in a more vulnerable place after the revolution than before. Furthermore, after the revolution, in cases wherein the product of the revolution has not matched US intentions or preferences, American intervention leaves a dark and hard to remove stain on the memories of other state leaders who would otherwise gladly offer military or economic partnership.

Instead of using its influence to manipulate national publics and support dictators, American leaders should use its influence to encourage its friends, allies, and trade partners to constantly reform in a way that marginalizes the impact of Goldstone’s assumptions on the drivers of revolutions. If American leaders can develop a track record of success in staving off revolution by supporting reforms that target judiciaries, social institutions, economic institutions and legislatures, they can encourage wholistic representation of national publics, and can also encourage the development of regional stability in the Middle East.

Finally, American support for and intervention in revolutions has resulted in a terrible failure record. This is partly due to an attitude that responds to the most salient drivers of revolution and does not respond to other more fundamental issues to national publics. If American leaders will reform their foreign policy to encourage national response to the five essential drivers of revolution, Goldstone’s assumptions, American priorities may be served
better. In this way, producing a simplified policy that encourages reform and the production of
good governance will allow for a greater level of success when choosing to intervene to support
a revolution or an embattled foreign leader.

**Implications for Academia**

The study of revolutions in the International Relations discipline has been broad, and
there is more known today regarding the nature of revolutions than any other time in modern
academia. Moreover, the unfortunate abundance of modern cases of both successful and
unsuccessful revolution provide a treasure trove of testable cases to which new theories and
policies can be applied. The cases surveyed in this work provide a new frontier of academic
study of revolutions, and provide the opportunity to test new theories on a number of cases
across time, including the Color Revolutions of Europe, and a broader set of Arab Spring
revolutions, among others. This is centrally important because revolutions are impactful to
international order and the ability of peripheral states, including the US, to attain their goals in
the international arena. Accordingly, these hypotheses of this work should be reworked and
reapplied to other cases of revolution in an attempt to qualify and push forward its assertions. So
doing will allow for a clearer understanding of how revolutions happen and will allow for the
development of new theories which allow for better prediction of revolutionary violence and for
the development of response measures which promise to lessen the instability wrought by
revolutionary violence, and the lives that are taken by it.
3.7 Alternatives & Further Considerations

Some of the surveyed cases are plagued with the proverbial chicken or egg issue. Did American leaders decide not to support leaders in power because they saw that revolution was going to be successful, or was the revolution successful because American leaders chose not to intervene? Obviously, in the course of this study, I have supported the notion that it is the case that they fail, in part, because of the lack of American intervention. I support this notion because the posturing which resulted in the conclusive American policy to most of the states which later experienced revolution was present even prior to obvious signs of revolt. Despite this precaution, it could be the case that American leaders foresaw the events which led to revolution, and determined to respond to the threat of revolution with the observable policies that this study assesses.

Foreign aid is a complex, nuanced, and frequently changing measure. A number of different measures exist, some of which include only economic or military aid, and some of which predate the declassification of previously clandestine allocations. For this reason, and because covert budget allocations are unavailable to be analyzed, this project is only as good or as accurate as the data on which it is based. Future clarifications of this work should again go through the painstaking work of scrubbing the thousands of lines of US budget allocations for the last 50 years, and verify that the conclusions reached are indeed valid and in keeping with the data.

It is not clear at this point whether the observed impacts by American intervention on the sovereign affairs of Middle Eastern states are due to the impact of American strategic superiority
or if they are a product of America’s influence as a global hegemon. In the future, this project could be retested on other cases wherein hegemons intervened in revolutions, to assess whether this is a trend seen across time, or a development of the modern geopolitical world. A future study will apply the same analytical framework to other cases of revolution in order to further test this study’s findings more heavily. Optimal cases include the Color Revolutions in Europe throughout the early 2000s, and a larger proportion of revolutions in the Arab Spring. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to identify whether these same factors are as influential in cases of coups. While revolutions and the violence that they produce are greatly impactful to individuals and communities around the world, more must be known regarding how they happen, and what can alter their course once national publics have determined to revolt.
CHAPTER II REFERENCES


