Any discussion of a medieval "psychology" is sure to come under fire for anachronism. However, if we set aside images of Freud or Pavlov and reduce the word psychology to its components — words or thoughts about the soul — it becomes harder to deny that Old English writers had a *logos* for the psyche. Nine different Anglo-Saxon words for mind, heart, and soul have been analyzed by Michael Phillips, setting aside compounds such as *modsefa* and words on the borders of the "soul-field" such as *gemynd*, *gewit*, and *gehygd*. Such a range of vocabulary seems to imply some subtlety in the concepts of the mind expressed through the language. The study of this vocabulary opens the possibility of illuminating not only Old English poetry but also forgotten ways of thinking about thinking. M.R. Godden, in "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," points out that "there are often important implications in the way that [Anglo-Saxon writers] talk about the mind, thought and emotion," and quotes anthropologist Rodney Needham's assertion that "we have to contemplate the possibility that some other linguistic tradition will have established (not simply named) an inner state for which English makes no provision." I would propose that the Anglo-Saxon mind-terms *mod* and *hyge*, as used in *Genesis B*, do not strictly correspond to Modern English terms but represent a division of mental functions at variance with our conceptions of the mind.

"Mod" and "hyge" are often considered equivalent in meaning. However, a description of the fall of the angels in *Genesis B* could give the impression that these terms, suggest opposing rather than synonymous qualities. After Lucifer, the *engel ofermodes* (272a) [literally, angel of over-spirit or -mind], has urged his fellow angels to revolt against God, the poem says that the angels fell "through hygeleaste" (331 b) [hyg-lessness], and a few lines later, "through their great mod" (336a). Synonymous definitions of *mod* and *hyge* make no sense of this passage. It seems more plausible to view them as two components of a divided model of the mind,
Alana

the imbalance of which is significant to the poem's view of sin and moral responsibility.

In "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," Godden recognizes "[t]wo distinct traditions of thought about the mind" in Anglo-Saxon writings: a "classical tradition" that "show[ed] the gradual development of a unitary concept of the inner self, identifying the intellectual mind with the immortal soul and life-spirit" and "a vernacular tradition more deeply rooted in the language, represented particularly by the poets . . . which preserved the ancient distinction of soul and mind." In a poem which pits mod against hyge, the image of a divided mind seems the more useful model, although the simultaneous existence of a concept of mental unity may help explain passages which seem to blur distinctions between mind-terms. It may be helpful to remember that both divided and unitary models of the mind exist in our own society, making terminology ambiguous: for example, the modern psychological term "ego" can mean one component of a divided mind, the unified self, or simply pride, depending on the speaker and context.

In "Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English," Phillips presents the various Anglo-Saxon mind words as basically distinct despite their occasional ambiguities. He cites as evidence the consistency of Anglo-Saxon glosses for various Latin mind terms, and concludes that the various Anglo-Saxon mind words "were apparently not considered synonyms" by the glossators. Among the words Phillips calls "non-transcendent soul-terms," mod is used most often and most flexibly. As the preferred generic mind word, mod may be seen as the part that stands for the whole. Only once in poetic language is mod the object of habban, to have, suggesting a stronger identification with the whole self than exists in other soul-terms; one does not have an angry or happy mod, as though it were something other than its possessor. Rather, one becomes angry or joyous in mod. Mod can also be seen to represent the whole self when it is used in place of the individual speaker in Alfred's translation of Boethius and in his introduction to the Soliloquies, which Alfred says is about Augustine's "mod inquiring and doubting; how his reason answered his mod"["be hys módes sméaunge and twéaunga; hú hys gescéadwísnes answarode hys móde"].

Where mod appears as a specific rather than a generic term, Phillips defines it through the relationships of control. The mod controls the body and its meægen, or strength, mod directs thoughts and restrains the will. Such passages lead Phillips to
call *mod* the “ruling principle.” But *mod* also needs to be controlled, sometimes by the faculty of reason [*gesceadwisnes*], sometimes more generally by the self, when the *mod* is conceived as something other than the self. Ælfric defines wrath as a condition in which “a man cannot control his *mod*”：“*Ira*, ῥἑ ᶶ ε *se mann ne mæge his mod gewildan, ac butan ælcam wisdome waclice irsa þa fea repniss.*” According to Ælfric, only wisdom enables one to wield one’s *mod* deliberately, rather than letting it loose in uncontrolled wrath.

The frequent association of *mod* with anger and its similarity to Old Norse *móðr* have led some to suggest “anger” as a second definition. Phillips argues against this interpretation, because “*mod* does not gloss or translate *ira* or any other Latin anger-term.” However, he does concede that a secondary definition of “pride” may apply to “a very small percentage of all the instances of *mod.*”

But even given a possible definition of “pride,” I think it unnecessary to determine positively whether each use of *mod* means “mind” or “pride”—as though it were always possible to rule out variant definitions of a word read or heard in any language. The two meanings color each other, so that “*mod*” must be read both as a component or aspect of the inner self and as the organ or faculty of pride and anger.

It is in connection with pride and anger that *mod* appears most strikingly in *Genesis B*. Anger is commonly found “on *mode*”: “*grám wæhr him se goda on his mode*” (302a) ["the good one became angry at him in his *mod*’]; “*mihtig on móde ‘yrre*” (342a) ["the mighty one angry in *mod*’]; and “*wrað on mode*” (405b, 744) [angry in *mod*]. Other emotions mark the use of *mod* and its compounds: pain [on *minum mode swa sar*, 425b], hatred [laj­wendemóð, 448b], mourning [murnan on mode, 734a], regret [hreowig*mod*, 770a]. Intellectual functions of the *mod*, while not excluded, are less prominent than emotional ones. Eve’s *mod* follows the serpent’s teaching (590b-91a), and she takes it into her *mod* (709b). I will return to these passages to discuss them in light of the interplay of *mod* and *hyge*; for now I will simply pose the question of whether Eve’s taking the evil teachings into her *mod* is an example of thinking or failing to think. Adam’s *mod* doubts (832b), which may be seen as an intellectual function. But for the most part, *mod* in *Genesis B* is described either emotionally, as above, or tangibly, in terms of its size and power [*mician mod*, 336a; *mihtig on mode*, 558a; *micle mod*, 737a]. While Godden and
Phillips both agree that distinctions between intellect and emotion are not the key to differences between Anglo-Saxon mind-terms. I would argue that the uses of *mod* in *Genesis B*, at least, lean toward emotion. To gloss *mod* conventionally as “mind” in every usage would miss its emotional connotations. But at the same time, “mind” must remain part of the term’s range of meaning; to treat *mod* simply as a synonym for pride requires the blasphemy of ascribing pride, one of the Seven Deadly Sins, to God.

*Mod’s* derivative *ofermod* is not so ambiguous. As a noun it is defined as “pride;” as an adjective, “proud, haughty.” Other compounds with *ofere-* suggest that the prefix may refer to the relative position of two entities, rather than the magnitude of a single entity: *oferhîfan*, “to tower over;” *oferrēcsian*, “to rule over;” *oferslētan*, “to subdue;” *oferscéawigend*, “overseer;” *oferslōp*, “upper garment.” In the case of *oferhîfan* and *oferslōp*, “*ofere-*” denotes a spatial relationship. This may be true for *ofermod* as well: to be *ofermod* or to display *ofermod* may be to raise up one’s *mod* over another person, or to let one’s *mod* rise over its proper place. *Ofermod* is often associated with the verb “to lift,” *ahebban*. *Pastoral Care* seems to treat the terms *ofermodan* and *upahæfenan* on *hira mode*, “lifted up in their *mod,*” as synonyms. In *Genesis B*, Lucifer’s *ofermod* is associated with raising himself up: “[God’s] angel began to be *ofermod*, raised himself against his master” (“his engyl ongan ofennod wesan, ahôf hine wið his herran”; 262-63). He sins by trying to raise his *mod* over God.

The idea of *ofermod* as the rising of the *mod* accords well with Phillips’ image of the *mod* as “that which controls and that which needs to be controlled.” The association of *ofermod* and *hygeleost*, upraised *mod* and *hyge*-lessness, implies that what is needed to control the *mod* may be the *hyge*. However, the controlling function of the *hyge* does not enter into Phillips’ definition of that soul-term; on the contrary, he says that *hyge* is characteristically “the object of verbs of restraining.” But at least one of the examples he uses to prove this point is ambiguous. In the maxim “*Hyge scæl gehealden, hond gewealden,*” Phillips sees *hyge* as “an affected rather than an agentive subject of *gehealdan,*” presumably reading the sentence as “one must control one’s *hyge* and wield one’s hand.” However, two other meanings are possible: either “the *hyge* must rule, and the hand wield,” appointing appropriate functions to each part, or “the *hyge* must rule, and wield the hand,” stressing the need for the *hyge* to control the body.
This last interpretation of \( \text{hyge} \), as the ruler of the hand, and hence of action, does accord with Phillips’ analysis in allying \( \text{hyge} \) with will,\(^{30}\) the meaning of \( \text{hyge} \), he says, “is quite close to ‘desire to act.’”\(^{31}\) The kinship of \( \text{hyge} \) and “will” may account for a verb form, \( \text{higian} \), meaning “to strive.”\(^{32}\) Another related term, \( \text{gehygd} \), suggests a connection between \( \text{hyge} \) and thought. Phillips points out that words for “thought” or “intent”— \( \text{gejoht} \), \( \text{gejanc} \), and \( \text{gehygd} \)—are sometimes used interchangeably with \( \text{hyge}. \)^{33}\) If thoughts or intentions can stand in the place of the \( \text{hyge} \), it may be reasonable to call \( \text{hyge} \) an organ of thought and intention.

\( \text{Hyge} \) is also associated with intellect through the standard definitions of \( \text{hygeleas} \) as thoughtless and \( \text{hygeleast} \) as thoughtlessness.\(^{34}\) What it means to lack \( \text{hyge} \) is illustrated in an admonition to bishops to behave with dignity: “Ne gerfse) biscopum ne at hám ne on sfœ to higeleás wise ac wísdóm and werƿspice gedafena) heora háde” [“Too \( \text{hygeleas} \) a manner does not befit a bishop either at home or abroad, but wisdom and dignity befit their order.”].\(^{35}\) \( \text{Hygeleast} \) is contrasted with wisdom; to lack \( \text{hyge} \) is to lack wisdom, the quality needed to control the \( \text{mod} \) according to \( \text{Ælfric’s} \) explanation of anger. Another usage, “\( \text{higeleas plega} \),” or “play,” referring to wantonness, associates lack of \( \text{hyge} \) with surrender to physical impulses.\(^{36}\) The opposite of \( \text{higeleas plega} \) might be actions carefully chosen by a will strong enough to control unruly impulses. These examples give \( \text{hyge} \) connotations of both intellectual activity and will power. I would argue that they also support the idea of \( \text{hyge} \) as a force of conscious intention which can control the passions of the \( \text{mod}. \)

The model of \( \text{hyge} \) as the higher part of the mind may be alluded to in \( \text{The Seafarer}: \) “forƿon nū min \( \text{hyge} \) hweorfed ofer hreƿelocan / min modsefa mid mereflode / ofer hweles eƿel hweorfed wide” [“Indeed now my \( \text{hyge} \) roams over the breast-enclosure, my \( \text{mod-sefa} \) with the sea-flood over the whale’s home roams far”].\(^{37}\) \( \text{Hyge} \) seems not to be an appositive of \( \text{mod-sefa} \) in this context, because it is in a different place: the \( \text{hyge} \) is flying “over the breast-enclosure,” above the body; the \( \text{mod-sefa} \) is “with the waves,” sailing on the water. It is only a spatial metaphor—but spatial metaphors influence our thinking powerfully. And the concept of \( \text{ofermod} \)—a \( \text{mod} \) that has gotten above itself—makes spatial metaphors particularly appropriate.

If the predominant metaphors for \( \text{mod} \) involve size, strength, and ascendance, the favorite for \( \text{hyge} \) metaphors are direction and, as Sarah Higley observes, hardness.\(^{38}\) The \( \text{hyge} \) can be directed to
a goal: in *The Seafarer*, for example, “His *hyge* is not to the harp nor to ring-receiving” [“*ne biþ him to hearpan hyge ne to bring þeges,” 44]. In *Genesis B*, Lucifer’s *hyge* impels him in a definite direction: “cwæð þæt hine his *hige* speone / þæt he *west* ond *norð* wyrecean ongunne” (274b-75b) [“he said that his *hyge* impelled him to build west and north”]. The *hyge* can also be turned from its course. Eve preaches to Adam the necessity of obeying the messenger and eating the apple: “until the *hyge* in the thane began to turn, so that he trusted the promise” [“*oo þam þeges ongan / his *hige* hweorfan þæt he þam gehate getruwode,” 704b-05]. The turning aside of Adam’s *hyge* is reiterated a few lines afterward: “*oo þæt Adame innan breostum / his *hige* hwyrfde & his heorte ongann / wendan to hire willan” (714a-16a) [“for Adam, within the breast, his *hyge* turned and his heart began to turn to her will”]. At the same time, a good *hyge* is one that is not turned, but is *hold*, loyal, holding fast to one destination. Adam, while still unfallen, says he has served God “*þurh holdne hyge*” (585a); Satan’s messenger falsely promises Eve “*his holdne hyge*” (653a); Eve tempts Adam to eat the apple with loyal intentions, “*þurh holdne hyge*” (707a), believing the tempter’s counterfeit message from God and wanting to protect Adam from divine punishment. When Lucifer first plots his rebellion, he rejoices in the support of his followers, “*holde on hyra hygesceaftum*” (288a)—an ironic praise, because thanes who have betrayed their first lord, God, to serve a new one, Lucifer, cannot be “*hold*” or loyal: if they are loyal to their current master, they betray their original one.

As the bearer of direction, *hyge* must direct the strength and passionate energy represented by *mod*. *Hyge* is deliberate and purposeful; *mod* capricious, associated with the “*gæl*” (327) or wanton desire which caused the fall of the angels. However, it must be acknowledged that *hyge* and related terms also appear in compounds with *ofer-*, indicating that an excess of *hyge* is conceivable. One of these compounds, *oferhygd*, seems to undermine the distinction between mind-terms that this article seeks to establish; like *ofermod*, it is usually acknowledged to mean “pride,” both in general usage and specifically in *Genesis B*. However, *hyge* and *hygd*, while related, are not interchangeable. A compound more closely related to *hyge*, *ofeरhfgian*, may support *hyge*’s distinctive association with direction and intention. This compound appears only in *Beowulf* 2766, “*Sinca eæs æg, / gold on grund(e) gumanne gehwone / oferhfgian*” [“Treasure, gold in ground, can easily *oferhfgian* any of mankind”]. Klaeber interprets it as “‘overtake’
Alama

(corresponding exactly to overhye of Northern dialects ...), 'get the better of,' 'overpower,'" following Ludwig Ettmüller, "who listed it as a compound of ... hýgian ('strive,' 'hie')."42 Clark Hall defines oferhýgian as "to delude, turn the head of," while Bosworth and Toller gloss it as "to overreach?" [sic]. All these suggested definitions involve a sense of overpowering one's reason or purpose, in accord with the controlling and directing functions of the hyge that I have proposed above.

Although hyge may control mod, these two components or functions of the mind are not in inverse proportion, as though the greater one's mod, the weaker one's hyge. In The Battle of Maldon, the combination of a great mod and a hard hyge is presented as ideal.43 In Genesis B, uprising of mod and loss of hyge seem to be related but separable symptoms. The poem presents three kinds of sin: Satan's sin, marked by ofermod but not necessarily hygeleaste; the sin of the other rebel angels, combining ofermod and hygeleaste; and the sin of Adam and Eve, marked by hygeleaste but not ofermod.

The word hygeleaste is applied to the fallen angels as a group, but never individually to Satan. The passage containing this word is entirely composed of plural-subject sentences:

lagon þá ofre fynd on þam fyre, þe ær swa feala hæfdon gewinnes wið heora waldend, wite þoliað,
hatne heaðowelm, helle tomiddles,
brand & bráðe lígas, swilce éac þa biteran récas,
þrosm & pystro, forþon hie þégnscipe
godes forgymdon. hie hyra gál beswác,
ingles44 oferh'ýgd, noldon alwaldan
word weorþian, hæfdon wite micel.
wærón þa befallene f'yre to bótme
on þa hátan héli þurh hygeleaste
ond þurh ofermetto. (322-32a)

[The other friends lay in the fire, that had had so much (of)
battle against their Ruler. They suffered torment, hot battle-
surge in the midst of hell, fire and broad flames, likewise
bitter fumes, smoke and darkness, because they had ne-
glected thaneship to God. Their wantonness deceived them,
the pride of an angel, they would not honor the All-ruler's
word, had great torment, were then fallen in fire to the
bottom, into the hot hell, through hyge-lessness and through
pride.]
Cassidy and Ringler gloss “pá oðre fynd” as “not ‘the other fiends,’ of course, but ‘the others, (the) fiends.’” But I find the syntactically straightforward interpretation, “the other fiends,” more plausible. There seems to be a difference between vocabulary used for the fallen angels as a group and that used for Satan individually. The word hygeleast is only applied to the group. Ofermod is Satan’s word; he is the one who “began to be ofermod” (262a), “the angel of ofermod” (272a), and “ofermóda cyning” (338). But unlike the other fiends, Satan seems to have hyge, if we take this term as “deliberate intention.” Aside from God, he is the only self-willed character in the story. He acts on his own intent, planning to achieve his will, exercising his hyge: “his hyge impelled him to begin to build west and north” (274b-76b); “his hyge enticed him” (350b); “his hyge welled up in him around his heart” (353b-54b); he develops his plans with a “deceitful hyge” (443b). Although he may not achieve all he attempts, Satan is well able to set a direction. He still possesses his hyge; it is his followers and dupes who are hygeleas.

Satan’s ofermod is revealed in his drive to assert his mod over others and at the expense of others. His ofermod enables him to override even the miclan mod (336a) of his “friends” (frynd, 287b), over whom he becomes “master” (hearra, 288b). Locked in hell, he appeals to his “thanes” to undertake a mission for him out of gratitude to requite the “princely gifts” he has given them (409-19) — namely hell, the only gift he can possibly have given. And yet he gets his way; an emissary is found to do his bidding. His ofermod gets the better of the hyge of his followers, inducing them to abdicate their power of deliberate choice as represented by the hyge.

The other angels have fallen because of “engles oferh’ygd” (328), “the pride of an angel”; the singular form suggests that this refers specifically to Lucifer. While the lesser fiends stand convicted of pride (ofermótt, 332a and 337a), having neglected thaneship to God (326b-7a), their pride is of a lesser order; there is no evidence that any of them sought to overmaster their peers. However, their miclan mod still implies a will to power, expressed in their compliance with Satan’s plan to subvert humanity. Satan rallies his followers to the task by promising them that when humankind is thrown into hell, “then we may have them as subordinates” (“jonne moton we hie us to giongrum habban,” 407). The prospect of ruling over human subordinates must appeal to the others, because they cooperate with Satan’s plan. Though hygeleas
and unable to control themselves, they prove *ofermod* in their drive to control others.

No variant or synonym of *ofermod* is applied to Adam or Eve in *Genesis B*. In contradiction to the Biblical account, they are not tempted with the promise that they can become like God by eating the apple. Rather, they are tricked into taking the serpent for God's messenger, and even threatened with divine punishment for not eating the apple. Satan's messenger warns,

> Ic wæt inc wælendum god
> abolgen wyrð, swa fc him þiþne bodscipe
> selfa sece, þonne fc of þys sfœ cume
> ofer langne weg, þæt git ne læstan wel
> hwilc ærendæ swa he easten hider
> on þysne sið sendede. (550b-55a)

[I know that the Lord God will become enraged at you two, as I tell him this message myself, when I come on this errand over a long road, that you two do not follow well whatever message he sends here from the east on this journey.]

Adam and Eve are so far from *ofermod* that they fall by underestimating their own rank in the universe: they come to believe the tempter's claim that "the Lord of men does not want the trouble of coming on this journey, but he sent his subordinate to speak to you" ["nele þa earfeðu / sylfa habban þæt he on þysne sið fare, / gumena drihten, ąc he his gingran sent / to þinre spræce," 512b-15a]. When the messenger first says this, Adam, still in possession of his *hyge*, responds that he needs no interpreter of God's will: "ic wæt hwæt he me self be bead, / nergend user, þa fc hine neþt geseah." (534b-35b) ["I know what he himself told me, our Savior, when I saw him last"]. Here, Adam shows a proper appreciation of his own capacity to think and decide—to use his *hyge*—which he later loses.

Human beings fall not by *ofermod* but by weak *hyge*. The serpent "led her so with lies and deceived the lady with cunning into that unright, until the counsel of the serpent began to well up inside her; the Creator had apportioned to her a weaker *hyge*, so that she began to let loose her *mod* after the teaching" ["lædde hie swa mid ligenum & mid listum spéon / idose on þæt unriht, od þæt
hire on innan ongan / weallan wyrmes gepeaht, hæfde hire wacran hige / metod gemearcod, þæt heo hire mód ongan / lætan æfter þam larum, "587-91a]. It seems clear in this passage that the purpose of hyge is to discipline mod. Because Eve's hyge is weak (589b), she lets go of her mod, which follows the serpent's teaching. Her fall is an error of reasoning, because she erroneously believes that the serpent represents God: she "took up the belief that he had brought the command from God" ["geleafan nom / þæt hea bysene from gode brungen hæfde," 649b-50b]. Again, when Eve urges Adam to eat the fruit, the poem stresses her innocent intentions and intellectual error: she "did not know that so many hanns, miseries of sin, should follow the race of men, because she took into her mod that teaching that she heard of the hateful messenger" ["nyste þæt þær hearma swa fela / fyrenearfedæ fylgean sceolde / monna cynne, þæs heo on mod genam / þæt heo þæs laðan bodan larum hyrde," 707b-10b]. Eve is called unrcede idese, "the ill-counseled lady" (699), stressing that she fell because of ignorance, not malice. But it seems that ignorance, here, is no excuse.

Eve's fall is also a failure of will: she abdicates control of her mind to a persuader. Through weak hyge, she allows the serpent to literally make up her mind for her; his thought "wells up within her" (588-89). When Eve "lets her mod go" after the serpent's teaching (590-91), and when she "takes the teaching into her mod" without knowing the consequences (709), there seems to be no question of the mod evaluating what it follows or takes in. The mod can hold a belief, it seems, but not reject one; in the presence of a "wacran hige" (589b), the mod may drift toward any passing dogma, without questioning.

Adam also fails in his hyge. Under the pressure of Eve's persuasion, "þam þegne ongan / his hige hweorfan" (704b-5a) ["the thane's hyge began to turn"). He, too, abdicates control of his mind to an outside influence. It is noteworthy that Eve is not blamed for trying to persuade Adam to eat the apple: we are told that "She did it nonetheless through loyal hyge" ["heo dyde hit þeah þurh holdne hyge"] (707a). Nor is she blamed for disobeying Adam and eating the fruit against his counsel. She is blamed, rather, for letting false teaching enter her mod; for failing to use her own hyge. Her fall warns readers of the need for mental vigilance against the subtle invasions of false prophets and evil spirits. If the hyge becomes weak, it will become open to domination by an unruly mod from within or a colonizing mod from without.
In sum, then, *Genesis B* presents an ideal of a strong *hyge*, a faculty associated with intellect and intention, to discipline the force of the *mod*, associated with emotion and the desire for power. Sin occurs through *ofermod* when the *mod* overreaches its position. Sin occurs through *hygeleast* when a weak *hyge* fails to discipline the *mod*, leaving it open to false teachings and evil influences. Both of these conditions can co-exist when one both abdicates the control of the *hyge*, and seeks to control others through the force of a great *mod*. Finally, *ofermod* is a graver sin than *hygeleast*. While the final judgment of *ofermod* angels and *hygeleast* humans is beyond the scope of *Genesis B*, its outcome is well known: the weak of *hyge* will be redeemed, despite their fall; it is the Satanic vice *ofermod* that kills the soul.

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Notes


2 See, for example, Godden: "The Wanderer uses various apparently synonymous terms for the mind, *mod, hyge, modsefa*, and *fert*." 291.

3 Quotations from *Genesis B* refer to B.J. Timmer ed., *The Later Genesis* rev. ed. (Oxford: Scrivener, 1954). Throughout the article, I will leave the terms *mod* and *hyge* untranslated in order to enable the reader to suspend judgment on their definitions until the full argument has been developed.

4 Godden 271.

5 To a Freudian analyst, the ego is part of the divided mind; to an Eriksonian analyst, it is the unified self. See entries in glossary under "ego" and "ego identity" in *Abnormal Psychology: Current Perspectives*, eds. Richard R. Bootzin and Joan Ross Acocella, 4th ed. (New York: Random, 1984) 573.


7 Phillips 212, 292. Phillips' other categories of soul-terms are "body parts with spiritual significance" and "transcendent" essences that leave the body upon death, 19, 292. *Hyge*, like *mod*, belongs to the category of non-transcendent soul-terms, 40.

8 Phillips 144, 176.

9 *Genesis B* 745b.
Alama


12 Phillips 181.

13 Phillips 196.

14 Phillips 182.

15 Phillips 181.

16 Second Old English Letter for Wulfstan, 162, qtd. in Phillips 187.

17 I am indebted to the anonymous reader for Proceedings of MAM who drew my attention to this cognate.


19 Phillips 203.

20 Phillips 212.

21 Godden 271; Phillips 19.

22 Genesis B 558.


24 Gneuss 128.


26 “Dæte on ðære wisan sint to monianne ða ofermodan & ða úpahæfenan on hira mode. ðan ðære wisan ða earmheortan & ða wåcmodan,” King Alfred’s West-Saxon Version of Gregory’s Pas-
Alama

toral Care, ed. Henry Sweet, EETS o.s. 45 (London: Trübner for the Early English Text Society, 1871), 209.


28 Phillips 35-36.

29 Phillips 36, citing Exeter Maxims I 121.

30 Phillips 30.

31 Phillips 31.

32 J.R. Clark Hall. I am indebted to Prof. Sarah Higley for calling my attention to this term.


39 For general usage, see Clark Hall; Bosworth and Toller also gloss oferhygd as “pride, arrogance” but offer a secondary definition of “honourable pride (?), high spirit.” For glosses of oferh’ygd,” see Timmer’s note for Genesis B line 328; glossary in Klaeber, The Later Genesis (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1931); and
Alama


40 Phillips observes that “there are strong indications that hyge does not fit into the class of thought/intention terms. Hyge is plural only . . . where the possessors of ‘higum’ are plural as well, while gepunc, gepoht, gehygd . . . are frequently plural. One can have many and various thoughts, but only one hyge” (28).

41 I would like to thank the anonymous reader for *Proceedings of MAM* for drawing my attention to this term.


44 I have restored the ms. reading, rejecting Timmer’s emendation to “englas” (see n. line 328).

45 Cassidy and Ringler, eds., “Satan in Hell” (From Genesis B), in *Bright’s Old English Grammar & Reader*, 303, n. line 322a.

46 See Genesis 3:5.