Love in Montemayor’s Diana is presented as a force contrary to reason. Though love is, according to Leone Ebreo’s Dialoghi d’Amore, born of reason, it is not governed by its progenitor:

But though I said that such love is born of reason, I did not say that it was restricted or directed by reason. Rather I say that, after it has been produced by reason and knowledge, love, once born, no longer submits to the orders and rule of reason which bore it; but recalcitrates at its parent, becoming, as you say, so ungovernable as to harm and injure its votaries. For he who truly loves another, unloves himself; which is against all reason and duty. For love is charity, and should begin at home; but we disregard this, loving others more than ourselves: a noteworthy thing!

This passage, found practically verbatim in the Diana, is central to the pastoral novel’s global argument, according to which love represents a force that does not allow itself to be governed by anyone, including the most prudent. Love, in the novel, is “la sinrazón”—which can be multiply rendered in English as “wrong,” “injury,” “injustice,” “unreasonableness,” “absurdity,” “foolish thing,” “nonsense”—for which the only remedy resides not in the world of the mundane but rather in the realm of the supernatural, in the miraculous water of the sage Felicia.

Among the various complaints raised against love, which are the veritable “building blocks” of the Diana, is the story of Felismena, which represents the most poignant and exemplary demonstration of the sinrazón of love. The account of Felismena’s love for Felix constitutes none other than a thorough and well-orchestrated argument, in which the former defends herself against “cruel love” in the presence of what latently constitutes a jury: the concerned nymphs who attentively hear her plea.

The “case” of Felismena reveals major parallels between the Diana and various precepts of classical and Renaissance rhetoric. The following study intends to expose and trace the employment of certain aspects of rhetorical theory in this particular episode of the novel. It will be shown that, with the theories of love prescribed by its day (a thematic concern having already received sufficient attention by López Estrada and Avalle-Arce), the Diana strategically
utilizes as well concepts—specific rhetorical prescriptions—which govern the exposition of such theories in narrative. While it is known that classical and contemporary rhetoric influenced the literary works of sixteenth-century Spain, there has nevertheless been little demonstration of this generality as it applies to specific texts. As for the Diana, deserving closer study are certain rhetorical precepts that not only latently inform but also appear to privilege both the character and episode of Felismena, the analysis of which may shed more light on our understanding of the novel and the genre. Rhetorical analysis of the Diana, as well as of the pastoral novel in general, becomes all the more crucial considering that both largely consist of prosopopeia, as the various wronged characters rally to their self-defense by employing all their oratorical might in railing against the inevitable, erring force of love. In line with this larger concern is the following study of the rhetorical orchestration of Felismena’s plea.

According to the Ad Herennium (2.18.28),

The most complete and perfect argument . . . is that which is comprised of five parts: the Proposition, the Reason, the Proof of the Reason, the Embellishment, and the Résumé.

These five parts then receive the following definitions:

Through the Proposition we set forth summarily what we intend to prove. The Reason, by means of a brief explanation subjoined, sets forth the causal basis for the Proposition, establishing the truth of what we are urging. The Proof of the Reason corroborates, by means of additional arguments, the briefly presented Reason. Embellishment we use in order to adorn and enrich the argument, after the Proof has been established. The Résumé is a brief conclusion, drawing together the parts of the argument.

These five parts of the argument are echoed in the Ars dicendi (1556) and the Organum Dialecticum et Rhetoricum (1579) of Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas, also known as “El Brocense,” a major sixteenth-century Spanish humanist who lectured at the University of Salamanca and who was and is known primarily for his commentary on Garcilaso’s poetry (80, 82, 292).

125
The speech Felismena delivers to the nymphs follows suspiciously closely these guidelines, thereby constituting a fine argument—"absolutissima et perfectissima," in the words of the Ad Herennium—against love's many wrongs. Her story, however sentimental, does not, therefore, turn a blind eye to the abstract calculus of effective verbal persuasion. In the discussion that follows, the five parts of argument will be considered in turn as they are exemplified in Felismena's speech.

I. The "Proposition" & II. The "Reason":

The "Proposition" and the "Reason" proffered by Felismena to the nymphs, whom she has just rescued from the sexual aggression of the fierce savages, are exposited in the following passage (taken, along with subsequent passages, from Bartholomew Yong's 1598 translation):

Love is not such a qualitie (faire Nymphs of the chaste Goddesse) that the person, whom it holdeth in captivitie, can have any regarde of reason, neither is reason a meanes to make an enamoured hart forsake that way, wherein the cruell destinies will conduct it.

The "Proposition"—"neither is reason a meanes to make an enamoured hart forsake that way, wherein the cruell destinies will conduct it"—is that the love-struck victim has no power over the self, which is totally subjugated to the external forces of love and Fortune. The "Reason" or cause of subjugation—that love does not follow reason, nor does reason accompany love—occurs twice in the passage.

III. The "Proof of the Reason":

In order to corroborate the first two steps of the prescribed method of argumentation by means of the "Proof of the Reason," Felismena claims that experience itself has provided them with sufficient evidence: "For prove whereof," she declares, "experience is at hand..." (80: 15). She then refers to the most recent example presented by experience:

[T]hough you were loved of these cruell Savages, and that
the laws of honest and pure love doth prohibite all injuries, and whatsoever might offend you, yet on the other side, that headlong disorder comes, wherewith it workes with such strange and sundrie effectes, that the same men, that should serve and honour you, seeke to spoile and hurt you. (80: 15-21)"  
Thus, as exemplified by the savages' attempt to subdue the nymphs, love induces disorder, from which comes the opposite of the due or proper effect—that of offending rather than serving, of injuring rather than honoring.

However, the savages' attack on the nymphs does not represent the only proof of the wrongs of love, nor do such wrongs pertain only to the "mal amor" of the savages, as Felismena's "case" itself readily testifies.

IV. The "Embellishment":

Felismena then directs the attention of the nymphs to her own case, an example which most incisively reveals love's injustices:

And because you may knowe, that I am not urged to say this, as only induced by that, which now at my coming I have seen in this vallie, I will tell you that, which I thought to conceal from all the world, but only from him, to whom I yeelded up long since the freedom of my hart . . . whereby you shall see how in the schoole of mishaps I have learned to talke of loves consequences, and of the effectes, which the traitor works in their sorrowful harts, that are subject unto him. (80: 21-29)"  

Although Felismena "yielded the freedom of her heart," the passage suggests that the responsibility for this act lies not so much with her as with the causes of Fortune and time—motifs which, along with love, are pivotal to the novel.

Proceeding, Felismena then embarks upon the "Embellishment" of her case by means of identifying herself to her audience and jury. She declares,

You shall therefore knowe (faire Nymphes) that great Vandalia is my native countrie, a province not far hence, where I was borne, in a citie called Soldina, my mother called
Gauntt

Delia, my father Adronius, for lineage and possessions the chiefest of all the province. (80: 30-33)\textsuperscript{11}

These “circumstances of person” follow, albeit partially, those proposed by Cicero in the De Inventione, which states that

All propositions are supported in argument by attributes of persons or of actions. We hold the following to be the attributes of persons: name, nature, manner of life, fortune, habit, feeling, interests, purposes, achievements, accidents, speeches made. (1.24.34)\textsuperscript{12}

The “circumstances of person” are further delineated by Felismena, with the very purpose of the self-description—that of “supporting propositions”—being disclosed by the speaker herself:

And because you may knowe (faire Nymphes) in what great extremities love hath put me, you must understand, that (being a woman of that qualitie and disposition as you have heard) I have been forced by my cruel destinie to leave my natural habit, and libertie, and the due respect of mine honour, to follow him, who thinkes (perhaps) that I doe but leese it by loving him so extremely. (82: 26-32; italics mine)\textsuperscript{13}

By establishing the favorable circumstances of her person, responsibility for the event that she will narrate to the nymphs appears to lie not so much with her as with forces beyond her control. As will be shown, Felismena’s tale emphatically qualifies the causes of the events befalling her as external rather than internal—those of Fortune and necessity, causes which exempt her from blame.\textsuperscript{14}

In the continuation of the “Embellishment,” Felismena sets out to trace the external causes of her fall from reason and self-governance. She outrightly blames Fortune for “those infinite wrongs, that she hath continually done me” (82: 38-39), reporting how, “reserved by [her] sinister destinies to greater mishaps” (83: 12-13), she had to spend time at her grandmother’s home, where and when Fortune provided the occasion for what Felismena refers to as “the force and violence” of love (83: 36). Love, Felismena insists, was not a question of her will, which, thus perturbed, readily worked against her, even forcing her into transvestism so that she might be
near her beloved Felix, who—naturally, as these things go—moved away:

[B]eing in the mids of my mishaps, and in the depths of those woes which the absence of Don Felix caused me to feel, and it seeming that my greefe was without remedie . . . I determined to adventure that, which I thinke never any woman imagined: which was, to apparell my self in the habit of a man, and to hye me to the Court to see him, . . . which determination, I no sooner thought of, then put into practise, love blinding my eies and minde with an inconsiderate regard of mine own estate and condition. (87: 18-30; italics mine)\(^1\)

As addressed in the preceding passage, the *sinrazón* of love usurps the power to act freely or in accord with one’s nature and well-being. The passage thus intimates the “Proposition” and the “Reason” as well as provides the “Proof”—experience itself, in this case, the particular and telling experience of Felismena.

Felismena’s narration of the events during her sojourn at the court serves further to “embellish” or amplify the “Proof of Reason.” There, in order to be near and to assist the person she loves, Felismena, disguised in opposite sex and rank, becomes Felix’s page, adopting the name Valerius. Part of her office requires that she serve as intermediary between the person she loves and his latest interest, Celia. Such is the perturbance of love that it causes one to “wage war against oneself.” She astonishes her audience by reporting this effect as

the wofull estate, whereunto *my hapless love had brought me,* since *I was forced* to make warre against mine own selfe, and to be the intercessour of a thing so contrarie to mine owne content. (97: 32-35; italics mine)\(^2\)

Further, upon mediating a successful correspondence between Felix and Celia, Felismena mourns, “Oh thrise unfortunate Felismena, *that with thine own weapons art constrained to wounde thy ever-dying hart,* and to heap favour for him, who made so small account of thine” (100: 18-20).\(^3\)

With events getting even more twisted when Celia falls in love with her ostensibly male intermediary, the *sinrazón* of love is

129
further demonstrated. Now pursued by Celia, Felismena nevertheless still finds herself in the position of being compelled to “wage war against herself” by having, in the interest of her beloved’s well-being, vigorously to promote matters between him and Celia. Otherwise, her failure to do so could very well precipitate, as Felismena sees it, an end to Felix. Instead, her plan leads to Celia’s unrequited-love-induced suicide and to the disappearance of the resultingly distraught Felix, an event which, in turn, has led to Felismena’s protracted search for him, which, in turn, has brought her before her present audience.

Highlighted in Felismena’s “case” is a notion underlying the entire novel: that the causes and effects and even the remedies of love exist beyond the human domain. The character’s decision and actions have already been determined by the external factors of time, Fortune, and love. With this in mind, Felismena brings an end to her tale:

Whereupon you may perceive (faire Nymphes) what cruel torments I did then feel, then did I wish a thousand times for death to prevent all those woes and mysteries, which afterwards befell me: For Fortune . . . was but weary of those which she had but till then given me. But as all the care and diligence which I employed in seeking out my Don Felix, was but in vaine, so I resolved with myselfe to take this habite upon me as you see, wherein it is more then two yeeres, since I have wandred up and downe, seeking him in many counttries: but my fortune hath denied me to finde him out, although I am not a little now bounde unto her by conducting me hither at this time, wherein I did you this small peace of service. (103: 14-25; italics mine)

Her freedom from blame is subsequently and immediately certified by the narrator’s confirmation of both the character of the speaker and the causes of her actions:

When the Nymphes had heard faire Felismenas tale, and understood what a great Lady she was, and how love had made her forsake her naturall habite . . . they were no less amazed at her constancie and zeal, then at the great power of the cruel tyrant, who absolutely commands so many liberties to his service. (103: 29-34)
Gauntt

V. The "Résumé":

In the preceding passage, in which love is accused of tyranny, the narrator initiates the "Résumé" of the case of Felismena and then proceeds to consign further pronouncements to Doria, the nymph most affected by the speech's "Appeal to Pity," a strategem highly prescribed by the Ad Herennium (2.31.50) and Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria.20

Doria's lengthy declamation denouncing love and its companions, time and Fortune, functions as the "Résumé" of the argument. As such, it is directly based on the "Proposition" and the "Reason" posited by Felismena at the outset of her speech. Regarding the sinrazón of love, the nymph declares:

And cruel love is of so strange a condition, that he bestoweth his contents without any good order and rule, and giveth there greatest favours, where they are lest esteemed .... (104: 11-13)21

The conclusion ("Résumé") thus returns to the beginning ("Proposition" and "Reason") of the story-argument in order to state succinctly the truth demonstrated, amplified, and "embellished" in the narration of events ("Proof of the Reason" and "Embellishment"), this truth being that in love, the victim loses his or her freedom because reason fails, thereby allowing "cruell destinies" to prevail. Of Doria's speech, the most significant words are the first four: "What can we do ... ?" What can humankind do in the face of what she refers to as the "blowes of Fortune," the "mutabilities of time," and the "violence of love?"22 Not much, the nymph concludes:

[T]he medicine of so many ills, (whereof this tyrant is the cause) is her discretion and courage that suffereth them. But whom doth he leave so free, that these may serve her for a remedie? Or who can command her selfe so much in this passion, that in other womens affairs she is able to give counsell, how much lesse to take it in her owne? (104: 13-18)23

That is, not even discretion and courage can prevent or overcome the love-induced state of lost freedom and self-control.

Doria's verdict is based on the argument that if the tyrant
 strips one of reason and freedom, how can one be held accountable for one's actions? Felismena, who, even in virtue, is susceptible, is therefore acquitted and invited to the temple of the sage Felicia, where the only remedy, the miraculous water, awaits her. The nymph, exonerating and consoling Felismena, says:

Yet, for all this, I beseech thee (faire Ladie) to put before thine eies, and consider what thou art, because if women of such high renowne and vertue as thou art, are not able to tolerate his adverse effects, how can they suffer them, that are not such. And in the behalfe of these Nymphes and mine owne, I request thee, to go with us to the sage Felicias pallace, which is not farre from this place... where... thou shalt finde great remedies for thy greefes. . . . (104: 18-27)

In this way, the amatory problem and episode of Felismena comes to a supernatural ending. 

In summary, the episode of Felismena is consistent with the five parts of the argument prescribed by classical and Renaissance rhetoric: "Proposition," "Reason," "Proof of the Reason," "Embellishment," and "Résumé":

I. Proposition:
He who is in love is without freedom.

II. Reason:
He who is in love is not free because he lacks reason, which is incompatible with and subdued by love. As such, he who loves, and is therefore without reason, is completely subjugated to the external forces of necessity and accident.

III. Proof of the Reason:
This is confirmed by experience: that of the assault on the nymphs by the savages; that of Felismena's subjugation to love's sinrazón.

IV. Embellishment:
Felismena's amplification of her case—the narration of events—effectively demonstrates the lack of freedom vis-à-vis the sinrazón of love.
Gauntt

V. Résumé:
The nymph Doria’s speech recapitulates the “Proposition” and the “Reason” and declares Felismena’s innocence.

As Montemayor visibly and meticulously employed concepts originating from the period’s theorization on love, it should not surprise us, then, that he did likewise with its many precepts concerning effective persuasion or rhetoric. To bolster further the novel’s underlying premise, the sinrazón of love, Montemayor does not exempt from its power even the most prudent and skillful of his characters, Felismena, whose nature is confirmed as much by her “most complete and perfect” tale/argument as by her actions. The organization and adornment of the episode—respectively, the dispositio and the elocutio—thus testify both to the general significance of such formal concerns as well as to the truistic but often overlooked matter that Montemayor directly partook of the literary theory of his day, not ours.

University of Montevallo
Notes

1. The Philosophy of Love 58. Dialoghi d'Amore, ed. Caramella, 52-53: “Hai inteso la verità, ma s'io dissi che tale amore nasce de la ragione, non t'ho detto che si limiti e sia drizzato da questa. Anzi ti dico che, dipoi che la ragione conoscitiva il produce, l'amore, nato che è, non si lascia più ordinare né governare da la ragione, da la quale fu generato; ma calciata contro la madre e fassi, come dici, sfrenato tanto che viene in preiudizio e danno de l'aman, perché quel che bene ama, se medesimo disama. Il che è contro ogni ragione e dovere; che l'amore è carità e da se medesimo debbe principiare: il che non facciamo, ch'ammiamo più altri che noi medesimi; né questo è poco.”

2. The Diana’s direct appropriation of text from Ebreo’s treatise on love has been indicated by F. López Estrada in his 1946 edition of the pastoral novel (194-201 n.15).

3. Diccionario de Autoridades defines sinrazón as “La acción hecha contra justicia, y fuera de lo razonable, ó debido” (120).

4. See mainly studies by J.B. Avalle-Arce and F. López Estrada (Los siete libros de la Diana; La “Galatea” de Cervantes, “La influencia italiana en la Galatea de Cervantes,” and Los libros de pastores en la literatura española).

5. The importance of character had been established and “rediscovered” in Aristotle’s Poetics, which posit it along with plot, diction, thought, spectacle, and melody as the six parts of tragedy, formal elements not entirely irrelevant to the pastoral novel. The importance of character had been established and “rediscovered” in Aristotle’s Poetics, which posit it along with plot, diction, thought, spectacle, and melody as the six parts of tragedy, formal elements not entirely irrelevant to the pastoral novel.

6. While López Estrada (Los libros de pastores en la literatura española, 424-72) and Fernández-Canadas de Greenwood have shown the genre’s general indebtedness to contemporary rhetoric, they have by no means exhausted the matter nor have they addressed the more limited concerns treated by this paper.

7. This passage, as well as the others that follow, comes from
Kennedy’s edition of Yong. The original passages in Spanish are taken from López Estrada’s edition of Montemayor: “No es el amor de manera, hermosas Nimphas de la casta diosa, que pueda el que lo tiene, tener respecto a la razón, ni la razón es parte para que un enamorado corazón dexe el camino por do sus fiers destinos le guieren” (94).

8. “Y que esto sea verdad, en la mano tenemos la experiencia . . .” (94).

9. “[P]uesto caso que fuéssedes amadas destos salvages fieros y del derecho del buen amor no dava lugar a que fuéssedes dellos ofendidas, por otra parte, vino aquella desorden con que sus varios efectos haze, a dar tal industria que los mismos que os avian de servir, os ofendiessen” (94).

10. “Y porque sepáis que no me muevo solamente por lo que en este valle a sucedido, os diré lo que no pensé dezir sino a quien entregué mi libertad, si el tiempo o la fortuna dieren lugar a que mis ojos le vean y entonces veréis cómo en la escuela de mis desventuras, deprendí a hablar en los malos sucesos de amor y en lo que este traidor haze en los tristes corazones que subjetos están” (94).

11. “Sabréis, pues, hermosas Nimphas que mi naturaleza es la gran Vandalia, provincia no muy remota, de éstas a donde estamos, nacida en una ciudad llamada Soldina; mi madre se llamó Delia y mi padre, Andronio, en linaje y bienes de fortuna, los más principales de toda aquella provincia” (94-97).

12. These circumstances are also found in the rhetorical treatises of Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas (42, 226, 228): “natio, patria, genus, sexus, nomen, aetas, dignitas siue conditio, educatio, habitus, affectio, studia, victus, bona animi, bona corporis, bona externa siue fortunae, facta siue casus siue orationes, mors.”

13. “Y porque sepáis, hermosas Nimphas, el estremo en que amor me ha puesto, sabed que siendo yo muger de la calidad que avéis oyo, mi desventura me a forçado que dexe mi hábito natural y mi libertad y el débito que a mi honra devo, por quien por ventura pensará que la pierde, en ser de mi bien amado” (99; italics mine).
14. The distinction between external and internal causes is central to Felismena’s and the Diana’s argument and receives the following extensive development in the aforementioned treatises of Sánchez de las Brozas:

Causa est ea quae induxit ad factum commodorum spe aut incommodorum evitatione. Cumque nihil sine causa fiat, magnus est usus huius argumenti. . . . Quaecumque homines efficunt—ut in Rhetoricis ad Theodectem inquit Aristoteles—aut efficient per se ipsos aut non. Si per se, aut ex consuetudine aut propter appetitum; qui aut est rationis compos aut expers rationis, huiusque duae sunt partes: ira et cupiditas. Rursus cum per se homines non faciunt, duobus id contingit modis: aut enim -fortuna interueniente aut necessitate, quae aut externa ui aut insita naturaque ipsa impellente homines ad efficiendum cogit. Septem igitur sunt causae humanarum actionem: mos siue consuetendo, ratione siue consilium, ira, cupiditas, fortuna, uis seu necessitas seu uiolentia, natura. (Ars dicendi 52; Organum 208)

15. “... estando yo en medio de mi desventura y de las ansias que la ausencia de don Felis me hazia sentir, pareciéndome que mi mal era sin remedio y que después que en la corte se viese, a causa de otras damas de hermosura y calidad, también de ausencia que es capital enemiga del amor, yo avía de ser olvidada, yo determiné aventurarme a hazer lo que nunca muger pensó. Y fué vestirme en hábito de hombre, y yrme a la corte por ver aquel en cuya vista estava toda mi esperanza y como lo pensé, assí lo puse por obra, no dándome el amor lugar a que mirasse lo que a mi propia devía” (105; italics mine).

16. “. . . el estado triste a que mis amores me avían traydo, pues yo misma me hazia la guerra, siéndome forçado ser intercessora de cosa tan contraria a mi contentamiento” (118; italics mine).

17. “. . . ¡O desdichada de ti, Felismena, que con tus propias armas te vengas a sacar el alma! ¡Y que vengas a grangear favores para quien tampoco caso hizo de los tuyos!” (121; italics mine).

18. “Ya véis, hermosas Nimphas, lo que yo sentiría; plugiera a Dios que yo fuera la muerta y no me sucediera tan gran desdicha que
Gaunt
cansada devía estar la fortuna de las de hasta allí. Pues como no bastasse la diligencia que en saber del mi don Felis se puso, que no fué pequeña, yo determiné ponerme en este hábito en que me veis, en el qual a más de dos años que e andado buscándole por muchas partes y mi fortuna me a estorvado hallalle, aunque no le devo poco pues me a traído a tiempo que este pequeño servicio pudiesse hazeros” (124-25; italics mine).

19. “Quando las Nimphas acabaron de oyr a la hermosa Felismena y entendieron que era muger principal y que el amor le avia hecho dexar su hábito natural . . . quedaron tan espantadas de su firmeza como del gran poder de aquel tyrano que tan absolutamente se haze servir tantas libertades” (125).

20. According to Quintilian, the “Appeal to Pity” should occur at the end of the speech. However, given that “sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet” (4.5.6), this precept is not confined only to the beginning and the end of the discourse; it applies as well to the exornationem” (4.2.111-116).

21. “Y es el crudo amor de condición tan estrefia que reparte sus contentamientos sin orden ni concierto alguno y allí da mayores cosas donde en menos son estimadas . . .” (125).

22. In Yong (103: 40-104: 5): “What can we do (faire Lady) against the blowes of Fortune, what place is there so strong, where one may be safe from the mutabilitie of time? What harneys so impenetrable, and steele so well tempered, that may serve for a defence against the violence of this tyrant, whom so unjustly they call Love?” In Montemayor (125): “¿Qué haremos, hermosa señora, a los golpes de la fortuna? ¿Qué casa fuerte avrá adonde la persona pueda estar segura de las mudanzas del tiempo? ¿Qué armes ay tan fuerte, de tan fino azero que pueda a nadie defender de las fuerças deste tyrano que tan injustamente llaman Amor?”

23. “. . . medicina podría ser para tantos males como son los que este tyrano es causa, la discreción y valor de la persona que los padece. Pero ¿a quién la dexa ella tan libre que le pueda aprovechar para remedio o quién podrá tanto consigo en semejante pasiôn que en causas agenas sepa dar consejo quanto más tomalle en las suyas propias?” (126).
24. “Mas con todo eso, hermosa señora, te suplico pongas delante los ojos quién eres, que si las personas de tanta suerte y valor como tú no bastaren a sufrir tus adversidades ¿cómo las podrían sufrir las que no lo son? Y demás desto, de parte destas Nymphas y de la mía, te suplico en nuestra compañía que vayas en casa de la gran sabia Felicia... donde tengo por averiguado que hallarás grandíssimo remedio...” (126).

25. Montemayor’s use of *deus ex machina* to resolve the amorous conflict of the characters and the exigencies of the plot receives negative criticism from Cervantes in the *Quijote*, as indicated by Avalle-Arce: “La solución dada a este episodio axial recibió dura crítica por parte de Cervantes. Durante el escrutinio de la librería de don Quijote, la *Diana* se salva condicionalmente de las llamas. El cura no la condenará al brazo secular del ama siempre y cuando ‘se le quite todo aquello que trata de la sabia Felicia y de la agua encantada’ (I, vi). Se hace obvio que la solución ofrecida por Montemayor no es tal en opinión de Cervantes. Como explicó hace años Américo Castro [1925, 150-151], el amor, fuerza vital, no puede ser desviado por medios sobrenaturales. No se debe hacer tabla rasa con las angustiadas vidas pastoriles y someterlas sin discriminación a un artificial elixir anti-vital. Para Cervantes este problema, como todos los otros, debe resolverse dentro del ámbito de las existencias en juego, no en el arbitrario alejamiento de las mismas.” (89-90)


