Creating the Disabled Citizen: How Massachusetts Disenfranchised People under Guardianship

KAY SCHRINER*
LISA A. OCHS**

Studies of the disability category in American public policy have focused on its use in economic, social, and civil rights policy. This study continues that tradition by reporting on the development of disability-based disenfranchisement in Massachusetts. The authors examine the establishment of the guardianship exclusion in Massachusetts suffrage law, originally adopted in 1821. The authors argue that it was first conceived largely as an economic exclusion intended to disenfranchise those who were not competent to manage their financial affairs, an exclusion that was conceptually consistent with the property-owning and taxpaying qualifications of earlier periods. In 1853, when the guardianship exclusion was again discussed in a constitutional convention, the same provision came to be understood as an exclusion based on the moral and intellectual incompetence of individuals who were called “idiots” and “insane” persons. An analysis of the events surrounding this transformation in justification of the disenfranchising provisions suggests a complex interrelationship between disability, dependency, and deviancy in the development of American political thought about the qualifications for participation in electoral politics. The implications of this history for contemporary disability policy, particularly the protection of voting rights for people with cognitive and emotional impairments, are also discussed.

* Research Fellow, Fulbright Institute of International Relations, University of Arkansas; Ph.D., University of Kansas, 1981. The preparation of this article was supported, in part, by a grant to both authors from the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research.

** Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology and Counseling, Arkansas State University; Ph.D., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas (1999); J.D., Washburn University School of Law, Topeka, Kansas (1995).
# Table of Contents

## I. Who Are "the People"?

## II. Suffrage Law in Colonial and Early Post-Revolutionary America

## III. The Colonists Sow the Seeds of the Guardianship Exclusion

   A. The Puritan Theocracy
   B. Suffrage in Colonial Massachusetts
   C. Disability, Dependency, and Deviancy in Colonial Social and Political Organization
      1. Settlement Laws and Access to Public Aid
      2. The Principle of Local Responsibility
      3. The Disability Construct in Colonial Poor Law
   D. The Seeds Are Sown

## IV. The New State Creates the Guardianship Exclusion

   A. Disability, Dependency, and Deviance Coalesce as State Concerns
   B. Voter Qualifications before the 1821 Constitutional Convention
   C. The Justification for the Guardianship Exclusion Is Transformed: Comparing the 1820–1821 and 1853 Constitutional Conventions
   D. Explaining the New Justification
I. WHO ARE “THE PEOPLE”?

One of the central issues in democratic theory and practice is who exactly are “the People.” The historical contest over suffrage rights gives testimony to the people’s understanding of the importance of voting rights. In the United States, the question of “who votes” historically has been a contentious one because its answer is so basic to the functioning of a representative democracy. The selection of political decision makers—perhaps the most significant element of this form of self-governance—is understood as the vital connection between individual, group, and national interests and the expression of these interests in the political system. Only through helping select the political decision makers can the interests of individuals and groups be given voice.

The nation’s history is storied with the demands of disenfranchised groups to be included in the American electorate. In most cases, the groups have succeeded. The property-less, immigrants, African-Americans, religious minorities, and women are among the groups that have fought for, and won, the right to suffrage. These conflicts occurred in the context of larger economic and social forces and replicate in political terms the historic struggles to achieve equality in all its forms.

In the case of disabled people, the issue of electoral participation has been framed primarily in terms of architectural access for persons with mobility impairments and confidential voting for blind individuals. Largely overlooked are the state laws that exclude from the electorate some individuals with cognitive or emotional impairments, usually when these individuals have been adjudicated incompetent or placed under guardianship. Today, a large majority of states provide for the disenfranchisement of some individuals with cognitive and emotional impairments—making individuals with disabilities and criminals the two major exceptions to universal adult suffrage.

State constitutions, statutes, and/or case law governing voter qualifications in forty-four states disenfranchise some individuals with cognitive and emotional impairments. The affected individuals are categorized using a variety of terms

---

1 We will use the terms “disabled people” and “people with disabilities” (and their variants) interchangeably, though it is important to note that there is no consensus on what terms are most appropriate. Also, we will use terms such as “idiots” and “insane persons” when discussing historical events. These terms are no longer accepted in professional and academic circles.


including the following: idiot, insane, lunatic, mentally incompetent, mentally incapacitated, unsound mind, not quiet and peaceable, and under guardianship and/or conservatorship. Fourteen states use the terms "idiots," "insane," and/or "lunatics" for identification purposes. Thirty-two states identify individuals on the basis of mental incompetency and mental incapacity, and one state, "unsound mind." Eleven states specifically disenfranchise individuals who have been placed under a guardianship and/or conservatorship. In the last five years, Alaska, Idaho, and North Dakota have repealed either their statutory or constitutional disenfranchising provisions but not the parallel provisions in their respective statutes or constitutions.

Among the six states (Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania) that do not specifically disenfranchise some individuals with cognitive or emotional impairments, Kansas's and

---


4 Id. at 439.

5 Some states have conflicting disenfranchising categories in their respective constitutional and statutory provisions; therefore, number counts across categories do not equal fifty. Id.

6 Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas, supra note 3, at 439.

7 Alaska's constitution states, "No person may vote who has been judicially determined to be of unsound mind unless the disability has been removed." ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2 (Lexis Law Publishing 1998). However, its disenfranchising statute was repealed. ALASKA STAT. § 18.05 (Michie Supp. 1999). Idaho permits mental health facilities to deny the right to vote if the right has been limited by prior court order (IDAHO CODE, § 66-346(a)(6) (Michie 1996)) and has a similar provision regarding individuals with developmental (IDAHO CODE, § 66-412(3)(j) (Michie 1996) while its constitutional language providing that people under guardianship, idiotic or insane cannot vote was removed in 1998. North Dakota's constitution states "no person who has been declared mentally incompetent by order of a court or other authority having jurisdiction, which order has not been rescinded, shall be qualified to vote." N.D. CENT. CODE, § 16.1-01-04 (Michie 1998). While its election statute disqualification was repealed (N.D. CENT. CODE, § 16.1-01-04 (Michie Supp. 1999), its guardianship scheme provided that wards may vote unless there has been a specific finding otherwise. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04(3) (Michie 1996).

8 COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 5 (containing relevant suffrage provisions).

9 IND. CONST. art. II, § 1 (stating pertinent election requirements).

10 N.H. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (describing election circumstances).

11 PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See also PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stating elections will be free and equal).

12 KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (allowing the legislature to disqualify from voting persons having mental illness). See also KAN. CONST. art. V, § 1 (describing basic qualifications for electors).
Michigan's constitutions contain permissive language enabling their legislatures to enact disenfranchising provisions. The permissive language is not found in Alaska's, Idaho's, or North Dakota's constitutions. Specifically, Kansas's legislature could disenfranchise based on mental illness and Michigan's based on mental incompetence. Meanwhile, Colorado's constitution directs the legislature to secure the purity of elections but does not speak to disenfranchising individuals with cognitive and emotional impairments as a means to secure election purity.

Among the states that disenfranchise some individuals with cognitive or emotional impairments, only California, Florida, Hawaii, Oregon, and Wisconsin have constitutional and/or statutory provisions that specifically address or refer to voting capabilities. However, eleven states have provisions regarding voting rights in their guardianship and/or conservatorship statutes. These provisions address issues such as the following: ability of a guardian or conservator to restrict a ward from voting, notice requirements about the potential loss of voting rights upon the filing of a guardianship and/or conservatorship action, and voting-specific evaluations and/or court findings.

13 Mich. Const. art. II, § 2 (permitting the legislature to exclude individuals from voting due to mental incompetence). See also Mich. Const. art. II, § 1 (containing basic qualifications for electors).

14 Alaska Const. art. V, § 1 (stating requirements for electors). But see Alaska Const. art. V, § 3, which permits the judicial branch to prevent an individual from voting who has been found to be of "unsound mind" by the courts. Such an individual, however, may vote if the court determines the "disability has been removed."

15 Idaho Const. art. VI, § 2 (describing qualifications for electors).

16 N.D. Const. art. II, § 1 (describing suffrage requirements).

17 See supra notes 12–13 for a discussion of the relevant constitutional provisions for both states.

18 See People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. News-Times Publ’g Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912 (1906) (holding that Colorado’s constitution “confers upon the legislative branch” the duty to secure the “purity of . . . elections”). See also Colo. Const. art. VII, § 1.


20 Fla. Const. art. VI, § 4 (preventing mentally incompetent individuals from voting until the disability has been removed).

21 Haw. Const. art. II, § 2 (disqualifying any person who is “non compos mentis” from voting).

22 Or. Const. art. II, § 2 (describing individuals who qualify to vote).

23 Wis. Const. art. III, § 2 (empowering the legislature to enact laws excluding incompetent or partially incompetent individuals from voting unless “the person is capable of understanding the objective of the elective process”).

24 Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas, supra note 3, at 439.

The laws that disenfranchise people with cognitive and mental impairments are a remarkable example of the use of a disability category in the American political system. They are seldom discussed, but apparently enjoy broad support. Many policy makers and members of the public would probably argue that the laws are necessary to protect the political process against the unreasoned choices that such individuals presumably would make and the undue influence others might exert over these individuals. The ease with which such justifications might be made is evidence of the intransigence of the category in contemporary society. But what is the history of these disenfranchising provisions? When were they adopted, and why? Have they been justified on the same grounds over time?

Historically, the disability category in electoral law has not been subjected to the critical analysis that earlier disenfranchisements of minorities and women or the contemporary exclusion of felons have been subjected. States' efforts to prevent Blacks from voting have been well-documented and thoroughly discussed. Similarly, the long struggle to secure the right to vote for women has been the subject of interest for many scholars. Scholars have examined the contextual factors associated with the efforts to overcome racial and gender prejudice in electoral qualifications, documented the activities of advocates for expanding suffrage rights, described the registration and voting patterns of the affected groups, and so on. The collection of important works on these subjects has resulted in a rich knowledge base that is useful in illuminating our past and guiding the way into the future.

In contrast to more visible and concerted scholarly efforts on the preceding groups, there has been little attention paid to the disability category in the context of voter qualification laws. In this article, we will attempt to shed some light on the history of the disability distinction. This article will focus on one state—Massachusetts—to permit a more thorough evaluation of the circumstances prevailing when the disenfranchising category was originally adopted and during later changes.

1987 & Supp. 1999) (stating guardian must obtain express court approval to prohibit incapacitated person from voting); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357(c) (West 1998) (indicating the incapacitated person may be disqualified from voting); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1826(h) (West 1991 & Supp. 2001) (stating court investigator may evaluate incapacitated person to determine if that person is capable of completing an affidavit of voter registration); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331(3)(d)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001) (stating incapacitated person may be evaluated for voting disqualification); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-5-7(f) (1997) (stating there shall be independent court evaluation of an incapacitated person's right to vote); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04(3) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (stating wards may vote except upon specific finding of the court); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 3-113(B)(1) (West 1991) (stating court shall make specific determination of ward's voting capacity); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.10(D) (Michie Supp. 2000) (stating proceeding may affect whether incapacitated person is allowed to vote); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.030(4)(b) (West 1998) (stating incapacitated person could lose the right to vote); W. VA. CODE § 44A-2-6(d) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2000) (stating proceeding may affect incapacitated person's right to vote).
Massachusetts is the proper state to begin this endeavor for several reasons. First, Massachusetts was one of the original thirteen colonies and the home of political actors whose influence extended beyond its borders. Second, Massachusetts was an innovator in developing the precursors of modern social policy affecting people whose impairments we now call mental illness and intellectual disability. Finally, Massachusetts’s history exemplifies many of the social, economic, and political trends that shaped the entire nation. The combination of these factors renders Massachusetts a natural selection for the beginning of a systemic program of inquiry about the disability category in voter qualification law.

The problem of deciding who should vote is, as we shall see, inextricably tied to conceptions of disability, dependency, and deviancy. These connections are rooted in ideas about who has a stake in society, what interests a state is to protect, the nature of dependent relationships in colonial and early American times, the changing constructions of “disability” and their frequent pairing with notions of moral deficiency and deviancy, and the emergence of a specific “disability policy” and the disability professions.

II. SUFFRAGE LAW IN COLONIAL AND EARLY POST-REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA

During the colonial period, the common practice in the New World was to require property ownership as a basis for voting. The right to vote was essentially “a right to vote as a stockholder in a corporation,” though in Massachusetts and other parts of New England, suffrage was limited to church members and others of good moral character. The colonies resembled businesses more than political subdivisions whose concerns were, at first, primarily commercial. However, as the colonies became more complex and the colonists began to identify themselves as having more than strictly business interests in common, the property requirement became less tenable. As the colonies evolved into political entities, suffrage qualifications defined characteristics that were thought to “determine capacity to take intelligent interest in community affairs.” These characteristics included race, gender, age, religious affiliation, and residence.

Nevertheless, there is no clear distinction to be made in suffrage qualifications between the periods immediately before and after the Revolution. As Kirk Porter notes, “1776 is an appropriate date from which to trace the development of suffrage, not because that date is a landmark of especial

---

27 Id. at 3.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3–4.
importance, but rather simply because 1776 marks the beginning of the United States as an independent country with a history of its own.\textsuperscript{30}

For many reasons, property ownership was adopted and remained the preeminent criterion for suffrage during the colonial period and into the post-Revolutionary period. First, the colonists predictably carried forward English practices based on the notion that property ownership was a prerequisite for selfhood.\textsuperscript{31} Those holding property were believed to be the "repository of virtues not found in other classes"—men who would have "a common interest in and a permanent attachment to society and the state."\textsuperscript{32}

There was also a fear that votes would be controlled through direct and indirect influence of the wealthy. Renters would be susceptible to the power of their landlords, and employees subject to the influence of their employers. This thought replicated ideas already common in England. In his \textit{Commentaries on the Laws of England}, Blackstone borrowed Montesquieu's dictum that the "true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in voters is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation as to be esteemed to have no will of their own."\textsuperscript{33}

Finally, the property qualification was consistent with the emphasis on the protection of property \textit{by} government, and the protection of property interests \textit{from} government.\textsuperscript{34} Consistent with the perspective that property interests were the basis for representation, the idea that government was supposed to be the shield between a property holder and the threat of confiscation or undue interference with property use underscored the importance of private property interests.

As the colonial period ended and the new nation took shape, suffrage qualifications began to change, though the process was slow. After the Revolution, all thirteen states still had a property qualification, though only five still required real property.\textsuperscript{35} The breakdown of the real estate requirement, according to Porter, typically occurred in two steps: "first, the substitution of personalty for real estate, and second, the substitution of taxpaying for property of any kind."\textsuperscript{36} The Revolution occurred in the midst of this transition.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Id.} at 2.
\textsuperscript{32} Chilton Williamson, \textit{American Suffrage from Poverty to Democracy 1760–1860}, at 3 (1960).
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.} at 5.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Id.} at 11 (citing I William Blackstone, \textit{Commentaries} 171).
\textsuperscript{35} Cunliffe, \textit{ supra} note 31, at 1018.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Porter, supra} note 26, at 11.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Id.} at 11–12.
The major mark of the Revolutionary period was "the breaking down of religious and moral qualifications."³⁹ States abandoned these qualifications but at the same time began to exclude "foreigners, the free negro, and [women]."⁴⁰ The states also established suffrage laws that "began to assume the function of penalizing men for crime and keeping the polls free of corruption."⁴¹

During this same period, states began to develop disability-based exclusions. Before 1820, only two states (Maine and Vermont)⁴² had such exclusions, but more states adopted such measures in subsequent decades. Massachusetts did so in 1821 with its prohibition on voting by persons under guardianship, Virginia disqualified persons of unsound mind in 1830, and Delaware began to exclude idiots and insane persons in 1831.⁴³ Between 1840 and 1860, California, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin had joined in excluding citizens from voting because of disability.⁴⁴ In 1860, fifteen of the thirty-three states then in the Union, or forty-five percent, had disenfranchising provisions.⁴⁵ By 1880, eleven more states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia) had adopted constitutional provisions prohibiting voting by

³⁹ Id.
⁴⁰ Id. at 14.
⁴¹ Id.

⁴³ MASS. CONST. of 1780, amend. art. III (1821); VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (excluding "any person of unsound mind"); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1 (excluding any "idiot, or insane person").

⁴⁴ CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5 (excluding any "idiot or insane person"); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5 (excluding any "idiot or insane person"); LA. CONST. of 1845, tit. II, art. 12 (excluding "any person under interdiction"); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5 (excluding any "person under guardianship as a lunatic, or as a person non compos mentis"); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 2 (excluding any "person under guardianship, or who may be non compos mentis or insane"); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, ¶ 1 (excluding any "idiot, [or] insane person"); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 6 (excluding any "idiot, or insane person"); OR. CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 3 (excluding any "idiot or insane person"); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 4 (excluding any "lunatic, person non compos mentis, person under guardianship"); WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 2 (excluding any "person under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane").

⁴⁵ See supra notes 42–44 for the list of the states with a disenfranchising provision by 1860.
some individuals with disabilities. These comprised sixty-eight percent of the states then in the Union. Most of the states adding exclusions between 1860 and 1880 were Southern states that wrote disenfranchising language into their new constitutions following the Civil War.

In this paper, we focus on the Massachusetts experience. In 1821, the suffrage provision of the original 1780 constitution was amended in two significant ways. First, the 1780 property qualification was dropped in favor of a taxpaying qualification; second, "paupers and persons under guardianship" were excluded from the electorate. This exclusion was justified on a property basis. Paupers (persons who had no means of self-support and thus were dependent on public relief) and persons under guardianship (insane persons, drunkards, and others whose financial affairs were managed by a guardian for the primary purpose of avoiding dependency on public relief) were viewed as unworthy because of their economic dependency.

In 1853, when suffrage qualifications were again taken up in a constitutional convention, the discussion regarding this exclusion had been transformed dramatically. Now, delegates referred to the exclusion in terms of "idiocy" and "insanity," emerging terms being used to label people with emotional and cognitive impairments. The justification had been transformed into one of intellectual and moral incompetency due to disability, not dependency. True, people with those impairments were often dependent, but by 1853 the disability category had taken on a much more contemporary connotation. By 1853, though the wording of the constitution did not change, "persons under guardianship" were clearly identified as "idiots" and "insane" persons in delegates' minds. Disability had taken on a political meaning of its own, distinct from dependency, but still very much rooted in it.

The Massachusetts experience illustrates the common nineteenth-century experience of moving away from basing suffrage exclusions on economic grounds to basing such exclusions on characteristics such as disability, gender, and race. Colonialists and early American policymakers were experimenting with various ways of determining who would select their representatives in democratic

---

46 ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. VII, § 3, ¶ 4th (excluding "[t]hose who are idiots or insane"); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 6th (excluding "[t]hose who are idiots or insane"); FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2 (excluding any "person under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane"); GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, ¶ 2d (excluding "[t]hose who are idiots or insane persons"); KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. 5, § 2 (excluding any "person under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane"); MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 2 (excluding "idiots and insane persons"); NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. VII, § 2 (excluding those who are "non compos mentis"); NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 1 (excluding any "idiot or insane person"); S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 2 (excluding those "of unsound mind"); TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. VI (excluding those "of unsound mind"); W. VA. CONST. of 1861-63, art. III, § 1 (excluding those "of unsound mind").

47 See ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. VII, § 3, ¶ 4th; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 6th; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, ¶ 2d; MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 2; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 2.
institutions. The debates exposed how the standards and biases of the time interacted to exclude first, those without real property, and later, via categories serving in some respects as proxies for the property-holding requirement, many of the same groups excluded under the property-holding requirement.

However, these new exclusions also disclose emerging ideas about the nature of voting (was it an obligation based on protecting the interests represented by the voter, or the right of an individual to participate in representative government?) and the character of immigrants, women, blacks, and, also, dependent people of whom some were disabled. As the democratic institutions of the new nation took shape, so did the standards for being a new democratic citizen. Only those who possessed the requisite moral and intellectual competence (first indicated by property ownership, later by taxpaying, and still later by categories based on individual characteristics) would be allowed to vote. Voting was being transformed from a means of protecting the rights of property-holders to a mechanism for representing the interests of individuals. As this notion took hold, the complementary effort to define and categorize individuals whose interests could be looked out for by others, or who were simply unable to protect their own self-interest because of incompetency, was well under way.

III. THE COLONISTS SOW THE SEEDS OF THE GUARDIANSHIP EXCLUSION

Massachusetts began its history as a collection of small settlements of English Puritans. Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, the first two of these settlements, were established in 1620 and 1630, respectively, as the Puritans fled English law and sought the freedom to put into practice their understanding of God's will. The two collections of Puritans differed somewhat in their ideas about English religious traditions. The Plymouth Puritans had broken from the Anglican Church and thus had no government charter, while the Massachusetts Bay settlement had been granted a company charter by King Charles I in 1629. The conditions they encountered upon landing on the shores of New England had the effect of minimizing such differences. The commonality of economic hardship, the similarity of Biblical interpretation, and the belief that the community should be constructed to implement God's law, became more important than any strategic differences in relation to the English crown. By the time they had established their respective settlements, it was evident that "this body of people were to an exceptional degree bound together by the consciousness of their common faith."49

One difference between the two settlements is, however, notable. The Massachusetts Bay colony, established by the Massachusetts Bay Company

49 RALPH BARTON PERRY, PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY 73 (1944).
trading company, was governed by stockholders (freemen) who met four times a year to establish laws governing company and colonial affairs and to elect company "officials" (governor and assistants).\textsuperscript{50} The 1629 Charter had not specified the freemen's meeting location and, shortly after the establishment of the colony, the colonists argued for the meetings to be held in New England, thus creating a "political commonwealth"—a development that turned out to be momentous in the history of the republic.\textsuperscript{51} The failure to state a meeting place in the original company charter is thought by some to have been not merely an oversight, but a purposeful attempt to use the royal charter as a pretext for establishing the theocracy of the Puritan mind. John Winthrop, the first Governor to hold office under the newly transferred charter,\textsuperscript{52} compared the Massachusetts Bay Colony to other colonies declaring that "[t]hose planters go and come chiefly for matter of profit; but we came to abide here, and to plant the gospel, and people the country, and herein God hath marvellously blessed us."\textsuperscript{53} In commenting on this and other evidence of the Puritans' intentions, Albert McKinley concludes that "[t]he absence of any stated meeting place for the company is now believed to have been the result of conscious endeavor" to eventually transfer power to the New World.\textsuperscript{54}

The Plymouth Puritans, in contrast, established their version of the theocracy with "no organic or legal connection with the English government."\textsuperscript{55} The Plymouth Puritans' journey to the New World was funded by a London-based company formed for this purpose; but in 1626, the Londoners' shares were bought out by the colonists, producing much the same result as had the Massachusetts Bay colonists' charter transfer.\textsuperscript{56} In both cases, the events transferred power to the colonies, and also equated the company with the geographic entity of the colony itself and its new political rights of self-determination.\textsuperscript{57}

A. The Puritan Theocracy

The most important characteristic of the colonies was their religious grounding. In this respect, the significance of the Puritans' history as English
people can hardly be underestimated. Their experiences under English rule had convinced them that the “centralized, hierarchical, and universal” nature of the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches was inconsistent with the New Testament model of the church, in which the body of Christ is the church itself.\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, the Puritans believed that church membership should be restricted and admittance should be granted only to those who lived their lives in accord with Christ’s teachings.\textsuperscript{59}

The outgrowth of this experience under English rule was a “theology [that] was profoundly political,” and a body of religious thought that “was infused with such concepts as power, participation, and autonomy.”\textsuperscript{60} Thus, the Puritans were as much concerned with political affairs as with religious ones. Their concerns about how the church was to be governed were essentially political, for the church was a predominant force in English life during that period. The issues of privilege, hierarchy, and decision making, as they were related to church doctrine, were also related to the community as a whole because of the virtual unity of the religious and the political bodies. Puritan objections to the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches centered on the way that power “issued from the central authority down to local congregations; that authority was made up of ranked church officers (bishops, cardinals, etc.), and that everyone in a certain area was either admitted to the church or required to be a member of it.”\textsuperscript{61}

In the New World, the Puritans reformulated their theoretical criticism of the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches into an “alternative structure of small, autonomous churches in which the membership, not the church officers, had sovereign authority.”\textsuperscript{62} Membership gave one the right to voice opinion in the conduct of the church’s affairs. Further, town and church were virtually the same entity. “From 1631 to 1634 all members of the Massachusetts company were members of the General Court,” or governing body.\textsuperscript{63} And, beginning in 1631, all freemen were required to be church members.\textsuperscript{64} Their political ideals revolved around their religious ideals, and having political freedom meant essentially the right to put into practice these religious principles. Their new world would be a “city upon a hill” with “the eyes of all people” upon them.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{59} Id. at 25.
\textsuperscript{60} Id. at 23.
\textsuperscript{61} Id. at 24.
\textsuperscript{62} Id. at 25.
\textsuperscript{63} Id. at 27.
\textsuperscript{64} MCKINLEY, supra note 48, at 304.
A central feature of Puritan life was “the covenant,” described by Stephen Patterson as “a contractual arrangement among the members of the church or the members of the society whereby they defined their relationship with one another and with the community as a whole.” The men of the community “agreed to subordinate themselves to a civil government which would govern according to God’s law.” This covenant was not so much a societal creation as it was the only logical way to impose God’s natural law, an order instituted “after the Fall of Adam by divine degree in order to restrain what otherwise would be the anarchic ravages of depravity.” The covenant was the inevitable outgrowth of combining the religious and the political order. In the words of John Winthrop, the Puritans were required to “seek out a place of habitation and consortship, under a due form of government both civil and ecclesiastical.”

Not only did the covenant make the rule of God supreme over the religious and political community, it also subordinated individual interests to the common good. Public needs were more important than the needs and concerns of any single community member. As Governor Winthrop stated, “the care of the public must oversway all private respects... for it is a true rule that particular [individual] estates cannot subsist in the ruin of the public.” This subservience of private concerns was not so much a purposeful choice as it was an accepted component of the theological perspective. God’s will, and its implementation in public affairs, was the predominant consideration. The private interests of individuals were insignificant by comparison and hardly merited attention.

Consistent with the limited heed paid to private interest were the limitations placed on individual freedom. People could do as they pleased only so long as their actions were congruent with the greater good. Personal opinions and concerns were tolerated if they were expressed in a way that furthered the religious goals of the community. Otherwise, members of the church were expected to suppress their opinions and concerns.

Further, the covenant allowed for inequality based on social and economic status. Governor Winthrop, who was antidemocratic in many of his views, stated, “God Almighty in His most holy and wise providence hath so disposed of the condition of mankind as in all times some must be rich, some poor; some high and eminent in power and dignity, others mean and in subjection.” An early pamphlet by Jonathan Edwards spoke of the “beauty of order in society” when “the different members of society have all their appointed office, place, and

---

66 Stephen E. Patterson, Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts 11 (1973).
67 Id.
69 Winthrop, supra note 65, at 82.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 79.
station, according to their several capacities and talents, and every one keeps his place, and continues in his proper business." William Cooper compared the heavenly order to the political order, saying:

If we look around the Earth, we see it is not cast into a Level; it has Mountains and Plains, Hills and Vallies. Even so in the political World, there are the Distinctions of Superiours and Inferious, Rules and Ruled, publick and private Orders of Men: Some sit on the Throne of Majesty, some at the Council Table, and some on the Bench of Justice; and some hold subordinate Places of Power; while others serve their Generation only in a private Capacity.

Positive law was the mechanism to realize God’s purpose, and the purpose of the Puritan leadership was to discern His will in the particular laws by which the community was governed. The function of a legislator, then, was not to discern what was important among his constituents or to exercise independent judgement about how best to represent their interests; these practices would have been foreign. The purpose of governing was to make positive law consistent with God’s greater purpose. Thus, the lawmaker affirmed the natural law’s presence and reflection in the positive law. This reflected the medieval tradition in which a legislature “interchangeably exercised legislative, judicial, and executive powers.” A legislator often acted as a judge, taking on such issues as the proper placement of boundaries between towns and the proprietary rights to rivers and streams. Thus, a legislator in the General Court of Massachusetts had to be above the self-interested pursuits of individuals and, instead, represent the common good of all the people.

Puritan thought, then, afforded legitimacy to class distinctions, the use of government as a means to achieve God’s ends, and the subservience of individual interests to the common good. These ideas are apparent in the ebb and flow of political thought as Massachusetts participated in the American Revolution and in the decades after, though in somewhat different forms and with fluctuating influence.

B. Suffrage in Colonial Massachusetts

The Puritans’ ideas about the formation and governance of a church influenced their practices in forming and governing their towns. Indeed, the town and church were almost “indistinguishable” in the Puritan mind. But, while

---

72 PATTERSON, supra note 66, at 12.
74 PATTERSON, supra note 66, at 15.
75 Id. at 16.
76 MILLER, supra note 58, at 27.
these innovations were radical for their time in expressing the democratic aspirations of these religious communities, we must also recognize that Puritan laws governing participation in both town and church consciously excluded many male adults.

Immediately after the establishment of the Plymouth colony, freemen (men with ownership in the company) were permitted to participate in elections, but other men (those not stockholders, called “particulars”) were not. 77 After 1626, when the colonists bought out the interests of London shareholders, the stockholder distinction was dropped in favor of inhabitancy. 78 Suffrage rights were then controlled by the granting of inhabitancy. 79 But the conduct of some inhabitants raised concerns about their moral fitness, and officials began to evaluate more carefully men’s characters when deciding whether to admit them to the colony. 80 Additionally, qualifications for freemanship (including application to the general court, a term of probation, and the taking of a freeman’s oath) were imposed to ensure that undesirables were not admitted. 81 Finally, religious qualifications were imposed in mid-century to exclude Quakers and their sympathizers. 82

In the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the charter granted by Charles I provided for the selection of a governor, a deputy-governor, and eighteen assistants by the corporation’s freemen. 83 The freemen, who were to meet in general court, were empowered to admit new freemen; it was by virtue of this prerogative that the Puritans hoped to enforce political fidelity to their religious views. 84 After company operations were moved to New England in 1629 and the colonists began to realize that the transfer of power from England to the New World presented new, unexplored options for self-governance, the question of the settlers’ role in colonial governance began to fester and shape subsequent events. 85 Even in the first few years, the Massachusetts Bay colony was facing pressure from settlers who were not members of the church. After all, the number of freemen in 1630 did not exceed fifteen, but more than one hundred men requested to be admitted as freemen. 86 Given the virtually unlimited power of the General Court and its officers, which had “full and absolute power and authority

77 McKinley, supra note 48, at 339 (explaining that “particulars”—males who did not own stock—“came out at their own risk and expense, and hence did not form a part of the communistic enterprise”).
78 Id. at 340.
79 Id. at 340–42.
80 Id. at 343–44.
81 Id. at 345.
82 Id. at 346.
83 Id. at 302.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 303.
to correct, punish, pardon, govern, and rule,” it was perhaps natural that those with no voice in the Court’s decisions would develop a growing desire to achieve some influence there.

The impetus for democratic reforms was, in part, the oligarchic decisions of the freemen in 1630. At the General Court’s first meeting, the freemen relinquished their right to choose the governor and deputy-governor, giving this right to the eighteen assistants they would still select. Six months later, the freemen voted to allow decisions to be made by only five of the assistants, and sometimes fewer. The influence of the new governor, John Winthrop, perhaps explains these actions. Winthrop was, despite his representations of the Puritan church as a democratic institution, profoundly antidemocratic.

Under the Charter of 1691, a new, non-commercial corporation was founded, and the religious qualification abolished. At the same time, though, a universal property requirement was adopted which permitted only those owning freehold land or other property of a certain value to vote. The centrality of this qualification in Puritan thought is indicated by the fact that it persisted until the Revolution. In colonial Massachusetts immediately before the Revolutionary War, the property requirement stood at “real estate yielding an annual income of forty shillings” or “other property worth forty pounds.” The property requirement serves as evidence that the state of financial self-sufficiency was associated with the ability to manage one’s affairs and to participate in the community’s governance.

Adherence to strict moral codes was also important. The selectmen freely disciplined those whose behavior was disruptive and threatened to impose an obligation on the town. This discipline sometimes included being evicted from the corporation, as happened to four male freemen named Barnes, Newland, Howland, and Beare, who were:

convicted by law, and sentenced by the court to be disfranchised of their freedom of this corporation; the said John Barnes, for his frequent and abominable drunkenness, and William Newland and Henry Howland for their being abettors and entertainers of Quakers [who were considered to be morally inferior because of their religious views], contrary to the aforesaid order; likewise Richard Beare, of Marshfield, for being a grossly scandalous person, debauched, having been formerly convicted of

87 Haynes, supra note 53, at 8.
88 Id. at 13.
89 Id. at 13–14
90 Id.
91 McKinley, supra note 48, at 353. The new corporation was christened “Province of the Massachusetts Bay in New England.” Id.
92 Id. at 354.
93 Porter, supra note 26, at 9.
94 Id. at 10.
Being expelled from the corporation meant that one was expelled from the governing body. The moral and political statuses of church members who had violated the behavioral codes of the community were diminished. Furthermore, town selectmen possessed much discretion in enforcing moral and political standards.

Because of the importance of self-sufficiency (as will become more apparent in the next section), the colonists valued highly the ability to provide for oneself. While the political consequences of being thought of as incapable of managing one's affairs are not well-documented, Robert Brown relates a story about two candidates in a close race for public office in 1757. Each candidate's supporters challenged the other candidate's claim to victory, and allegations of corruption and bribery "flew thick and fast." Among the challenges was a challenge to one voter on the basis of competence. A town selectman defended the voter by saying that the voter "was not 'non compus mentis,' as accused, but merely had a guardian because he drank too much." In the House of Representatives' subsequent deliberations to decide the race, Brown reports that all voters were presumed competent. This incident suggests that one competence standard did revolve around the ability to manage one's business affairs, and also underscores the fact that guardians were appointed for a variety of reasons, including drunkenness, insanity, and being a spendthrift.

The political culture of colonial Massachusetts supported these various practices. Colonial ideas about individualism were quite different than contemporary notions. The church and its clergy were significant influences on society, the close-knit nature of families and communities constrained individuality, and convention dictated personal conduct. As Mary Ann Jimenez explains, "individual decision making was not strongly valued in many areas of life. Insofar as deference and consensus characterized the political culture, the role of individual political choice was deemphasized." It was important that towns and other geographic areas be represented, but more contemporary notions about representation based on individual and group interests were only beginning to gain credence. Further, the early practice of disenfranchising a man because of

97 Id. at 45.
98 Id. at 44.
99 Id. at 45.
drunkenness, associating with Quakers, and immoral behavior\textsuperscript{101} emphasizes the importance of moral and intellectual competence that is at the core of early suffrage law.

At the same time, it may be said that the Puritans' experience foreshadows the subsequent demands for the expansion of suffrage rights. As Joshua Miller claims, "The Puritan experiment itself taught the people that they legitimately possessed a share of power."\textsuperscript{102} New, more participatory standards for governing were emerging.

C. Disability, Dependency, and Deviancy in Colonial Social and Political Organization

Consistent with their theocratic beliefs and their insular focus on the family was the Puritans' extreme fear of public dependence. Those who became dependent generally did so because of emotional or intellectual disability, criminal conduct, or family circumstances such as the death of the head of the family. Puritan society had not yet developed distinct categories for labeling dependent people. The labels we now use to differentiate among and between disability, deviancy, and dependence were largely unformed. At the same time, the need for such distinctions was beginning to be felt. The colonists realized that not all dependency was created equal; different forms of dependency appeared to call for different solutions.

The threat posed by dependency was felt strongly; as Robert Kelso (sympathetic to the Puritans' motives) argues, "[t]he margin of subsistence was so narrow that starvation stalked through the dreary months of more than one chill winter. There was urgent need, therefore, that the settlers guard their hearth-fires against the indigent and the incompetent."\textsuperscript{103} Pauperism, defined by Kelso as "willful poverty," had "hung like a millstone" around the necks of English taxpayers, and the Puritans vowed to enforce discipline by refusing poor relief to anyone other than those who "could no longer help themselves and had no kin who owed them support."\textsuperscript{104} Further, English Poor Law officials began to transport criminals and paupers to the colonies as early as 1617, leading the colonists to enact laws designed to reduce the influx of vagrants into their towns.\textsuperscript{105} The settlers viewed these circumstances as quite threatening and took steps to decrease the likelihood that dependency would place so great a burden on

\begin{thebibliography}{100}
\bibitem{note101} KELSO, \textit{supra} note 95, at 32.
\bibitem{note102} MILLER, \textit{supra} note 58, at 28.
\bibitem{note103} KELSO, \textit{supra} note 95, at 37.
\bibitem{note104} Id. at 33.
\bibitem{note105} Id. at 42.
\end{thebibliography}
a town that the town's very existence would be threatened, though at least one scholar has suggested that this threat may have been exaggerated.\textsuperscript{106}

1. \textit{Settlement Laws and Access to Public Aid}

The colonists accomplished their purpose of controlling the provision of public aid in three main ways. First, colonial towns instituted laws of settlement that specified the conditions under which strangers could be admitted to town inhabitancy. Inhabitancy was legal residency, and legal residency was required before public aid was granted. The laws of settlement determined "jurisdictional responsibility for public expenditures made on account of persons in distress."\textsuperscript{107} Second, the towns routinely "warned out" strangers, actively seeking to avoid accepting new arrivals into their midst, with the hope that strangers would choose to move on to the next town (where they might again be warned out).\textsuperscript{108} Third, the colonies also routinely required that newcomers request permission, which was often refused, to reside in a particular town; and towns also required that property owners seek approval from the authorities before selling property to a stranger.\textsuperscript{109} The historical record is clear that settlement laws were used to rid the colonies of many kinds of undesirable persons, including those considered mad. For example, John Winthrop's diary includes a note concerning "One Abigail Gifford, widow,... [who was] found to be somewhat distracted and a very burdensome woman" who was returned to the ship on which she traveled to the colony.\textsuperscript{110}

The development of settlement laws was the primary mechanism for controlling both the religious makeup of the town's residents and the town's responsibility for the dependent, though the concern about dependency seems to have been the more important.\textsuperscript{111} Inhabitancy was granted only to those with suitable religious beliefs and who could be shown to belong to a family unit. Every member of the town, with the sole exception of free adult males, was required to belong to a family. Children, servants, and women had to be bound to a master, who in turn was responsible for their support.\textsuperscript{112} The belief that the family bore the responsibility for the care of its members was a central tenet of Puritan social and political organization. Thus, only church members who were

\textsuperscript{107} KELSO, \textit{supra} note 95, at 35.
\textsuperscript{108} Id. at 50.
\textsuperscript{109} Id. at 41.
\textsuperscript{110} Id.
\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 35.
\textsuperscript{112} Id. at 30.
members of families were eligible for public aid should they fall on hard times and require such assistance.

The reliance on the family to maintain discipline and independence was of paramount importance in the Puritan communities. Given the small size of the towns, the common ownership of public land, and the self-reliant philosophy, the centrality of family can be seen as entirely consistent with other practices of the earliest Massachusetts settlers.

2. The Principle of Local Responsibility

The colonists employed the settlement law to govern the provision of public aid, thus associating legal inhabitancy with a right of access to public assistance. Chief among the principles of poor relief was that the responsibility for such aid was local. Locating the liability for aid in the town was natural for the colonists. The town was:

where he has dwelt and had his home; where he has earned and spent his wages; where his children have gone to school; where the ties of his everyday life bind him: that is his home, and, should he come to distress, that is the group of neighbors who should, as against others more remote, rally about him to set him on his feet.113

The significance of the settlement law was its use to attempt to construct strict boundaries between individuals whose inhabitancy made them eligible for aid during times of need and individuals who were ineligible for aid.

Aid might take many forms and be partial or complete. Some dependent persons were placed with families who agreed to care for them for a time with the cost to be paid out of town funds.114 When persons were not totally dependent they might receive a gift of land for the building of a home, permission to conduct trade on the sidewalk,115 or the abatement of taxpaying obligations.116 Often, dependents were provided health services without charge.117 In more severe cases, when one was completely without resources, the shape of aid was much less desirable. Dependents, no matter whether men, women, or children, might be auctioned off to the bidder willing to provide them room and board at the lowest cost to the town.118 When dependents could work in exchange for the aid, they were expected to work. Another formal version of this arrangement was the indenturing of needy persons.119

113 Id. at 92.
114 TRATTNER, supra note 110, at 18.
115 KELSO, supra note 95, at 39.
116 TRATTNER, supra note 110, at 18.
117 Id. at 18–19.
118 Id. at 18.
119 Id. at 22.
Decisions about who would be provided help and the kind of assistance to be given were made first by town selectmen on an individual-by-individual basis, and later by overseers. Town selectmen eventually found that dealing with the poor was too demanding. By 1691 in Boston, for example, selectmen decided to appoint four officers whose sole responsibility was to oversee the care of dependent persons, partly because the public burden was increasing dramatically. Boston residents spent about 500 pounds on poor relief in 1700, but by 1715 the annual cost had risen to 2,000 pounds, and in another twenty years the cost doubled. By the mid-1700s, Bostonians were facing poor relief costs of 10,000 pounds yearly and the cost continued to grow, even when the population did not.

Around 1800, public almshouses began to appear. This indoor relief (as opposed to the outdoor relief of placement in private homes, apprenticing dependent children, etc.) became favored as the problem of dependency deepened in the colonies. Almshouses were thought to be more effective in imposing discipline on the poor—a step believed necessary for restoring the productive capacity of dependents. Decisions about poor relief were complicated, though, by the realization that there were many causes of dependency and many different kinds of people who became dependent. Almshouses and jails, the other major institution for dealing with deviancy, were crowded with widows, children, people whom we would now label as intellectually impaired or mentally ill, criminals, and others who drank too much. They "housed little children with the prostitute, the vagrant, the drunkard, the idiot, and the maniac." Partly because of this unfortunate mixing of the deserving and non-deserving poor, crime and deviancy were spread. Though the almshouse ultimately failed to achieve its lofty objectives, it was a significant departure from earlier practices and signaled the beginning of a new era in policies directed at the dependent poor.

3. The Disability Construct in Colonial Poor Law

The colonists began the slow process of constructing an administrative framework used to make determinations about who was or was not worthy of poor relief. The Puritans' concern was hardly new. Beginning around 1500, economic changes rocked English society. Vagrancy increased as feudal

---

120 KELSO, supra note 95, at 93.
121 TRATTNER, supra note 110, at 30.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas, supra note 3 at 443.
125 TRATTNER, supra note 110, chapter 4.
126 Id. at 53.
127 KELSO, supra note 95, at 112.
relationships dissolved and a nascent market economy developed. The dislocation of economic relations caused social and political instability, and English officials experimented with ways of controlling the labor force. They searched for ways to balance the humanitarian needs of those who were unable to work against the need to force those who could work into the new market economy.

English officials had established the rough outlines for determining worthiness as early as 1388 when they specified the ability to work as the criterion for receipt of aid and invested local officials with the power to determine the work ability of dependent people. In 1531, the English parliament had instructed local officials to find the “aged and impotent poor” and register them for begging within certain geographic boundaries; in 1536, “lepers and bedridden creatures” were excluded from automatic expulsion from the territories established for begging. Finally, in the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, the English demonstrated that “a formerly undifferentiated mass of paupers [could] be understood as comprising several distinct elements” which included “children, the sick, the insane, ‘defectives,’ and the ‘aged and infirm.’” In making these distinctions, the Poor Law established the “concept of need” as the “mirror image of the concept of work.” It unified formerly undifferentiated conditions that were “more unified in the notion of vagrancy than in any concept of common cause.” To put it another way, the English had found a way to identify those who were unable to work through no fault of their own. This distinction, though, was not nearly so benign as might be thought because of the social construction of these disability categories as deviant, dependent, and at least vaguely threatening. The deserving poor—those who were provided with public aid without being required to work for it—were privileged by virtue of not having to work, but at a considerable cost to their social and political status.

In the Puritans’ minds, madness was explained by a combination of supernatural actors such as the Devil, personal sin, and human biology; madness being more likely to visit itself upon those weakened by sinfulness. Apparently, insanity, however, was not elevated to the place of a major social problem in the public’s mind. Distraction and other forms of madness, such as

---

129 Id. at 37.
130 Id. at 39.
131 Id. at 40.
132 Id. at 55.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 16.
135 Id. (stating, “the sinner could be blamed for bringing on his own sensibility by invoking God’s punishment. The Devil could be summoned... as a way of blaming those who did not resist his blandishments, or as the overpowering force that swept aside the rationality of an unwilling victim.”).
melancholy and mania, were more likely to be considered oddities of the human condition that generally could be accommodated in the everyday life of the town.

Most of the mad were not confined during the colonial period, and were generally cared for by their families. Families provided for them as best they could, and they were generally accepted by friends and neighbors. Insane people were probably a common sight in the colonies and were usually tolerated. When their mental conditions improved, they often returned to their former occupations and status.

The few individuals whose situations commanded the attention of public officials were those who were violent or those for whom families, friends, or neighbors could not provide. When the insane threatened the social order, officials were forced to take action, typically by paying for their care in private homes or confining them to jails or almshouses. The treatment of the insane did not differ greatly from the treatment of other groups of disabled persons. There were few hospitals and the physically sick were cared for in their homes.

Elected officials had almost complete discretion when making decisions about insane individuals. Because responsibility for public aid was local, local towns were invested with the authority to determine who should be subjected to discipline and be admitted to public aid. A 1678 Massachusetts act ordered town selectmen with “unruly Distracted persons” to “take care of all such persons that they do not Damnifie others” and to:

take Care and Order the Management of their Estates in the Times of their Distemperature, so as may be for the good of themselves and Families depending on them; and the Charge be Paid out of the estates of all such persons where it may be had, otherwise at the public charge of the town such persons belong unto.

The act also gave judges the right to liquidate the estates of distracted persons to cover the cost of their support and to order an insane person to take work to help pay for the town’s assistance.

The 1678 Act was significant in establishing local responsibility for insane paupers. It indicated the colonial concern with order and dependence, while also providing some protection for the property of the insane by requiring that their estates be managed by a guardian. This legal framework was furthered by a 1694 Act, “An Act for the Relief of Idiots and Distracted persons,” that provided:

136 Jimenez, supra note 100, at 49.
137 Id. at 37.
138 Id. at 50.
139 Id. at 50–51.
140 Id. at 51.
141 See id. at 50–51.
142 Id.
When any person . . . by the Providence of God shall fall into distraction and become non compos mentis, and no relations appear that will undertake the care of providing for them, or that stand in so near a degree as that by law they may be compelled thereto, in every such case the Selectmen or Overseers of the Poor of the town where such person was born, or is by law an inhabitant, be and hereby are empowered and enjoined to take care, and make necessary effectual provisions for the relief, support and safety of such impotent or distracted persons, at the charge of the town or place whereof he or she of right belongs if the party has no estate of his or her own, the incomes whereof may be sufficient to defray the same.143

In discussing the legal principles established by these colonial laws, Jimenez observes that authorities were rarely asked to control someone who had “dannified” another and that they had “little to do” with the determination of insanity in guardianship cases.144 Often, guardianship simply involved the legal sanctioning of an arrangement already made between private individuals.145 Justices of the peace, however, possessed the authority to use an insane person’s resources to provide for his or her family and to order the insane person to perform “any proper work or service he or she may be capable to be employed in” to help pay for his or her care.146 These laws served as a sort of backstop to prevent an undue financial burden on localities whose insane residents were violent or indigent.147

By 1736, a law was enacted to specify the procedure for determining mental incompetence.148 Town selectmen were to decide if an individual was insane.149 The criteria for this determination were not dictated, though the ability to conduct one’s business affairs was apparently critical, particularly for men.150 Physicians, who at that time had only a limited interest in insanity, were not involved in the determination process.151 When the probate court appointed a guardian, protection of financial resources was the primary concern.152 Guardians were expected to manage the estate “frugally and without waste and destruction and to provide for the insane and his family out of the income of the estate.”153 For the insane poor, then:

143 Id. at 51.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See id.
148 Id. at 57.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 57–58.
151 Id. at 57.
152 See id. at 58.
153 Id.
heir status as paupers was far more important in determining their fate than was their madness. In general, the financial dependence of the insane was a greater concern than their insane behavior. The guardianship laws were designed primarily to ensure that the insane did not become financially dependent; the great care taken to warn out distracted strangers suggests a related fear of long-term financial incapacity.154

With respect to idiocy, the colonists' opinions reflected their understanding of insanity as a form of deviancy and dependency. Indeed, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that idiocy took on a meaning distinct from insanity. Because colonists' work was primarily agrarian in nature, intellectual impairments did not have the economic significance that they would later acquire when work became more individualized and routinized.

Before the American Revolution, then, insanity was considered another condition of dependence. It was not terribly different from any other circumstance that thrust someone into a state of economic need. Insanity was not thought of as a medical condition, but a moral condition. While insanity could cause disturbing or threatening behavior, it was not subject to professional intervention, but rather was treated as a religious issue. Insanity was largely a private matter and became a public concern only when the mad person was violent or indigent.

Public officials during this time embraced the public idea of insanity primarily as one of dependence. In this respect, there was a fear of insanity but, to a large degree, this fear had more to do with the fiscal nature of insanity's threat than with any other kind of threat. In a time of limited public resources, madness posed the unpleasant prospect of public obligations—obligations that were both unwanted and difficult to meet.

It seems apparent that the Puritans' primary motive was to ensure the survival of their colonies by controlling the amount of financial responsibility placed on the public treasury. The moral rightness of their motives and the quality of their charity have been variously described as understandable, perhaps justifiable, and admirably generous given their limited means. Regardless of their motives, their policies are important for illustrating both the process by which insanity came to be recognized as a public problem and the approaches taken to dealing with it. By framing the public nature of insanity primarily in terms of dependency, the Massachusetts colonists created the pairing of madness with a lack of both personal and familial economic wherewithal. The relevance of this construction will become more apparent as we examine subsequent developments in suffrage law and disability policy.

154 Id. at 59.
D. The Seeds Are Sown

In Puritan Massachusetts, the seeds of the disability exclusion had been sown. The Puritans' experiences set the stage for the eventual adoption of a guardian exclusion in two important ways. First, the use of guardianship status to control and execute the public responsibility for idiocy and insanity established these individual differences as both politically and economically problematic. The potential of incurring public cost to care for the insane and idiots was a constant source of concern to the colonial town selectmen and helped form their understanding of disability's political aspects.

Second, the Puritans (and many other early colonists) established the importance of financial wherewithal in determining who could take part in governance and who could not. Though qualifications first centered on membership in the company, by 1691 the colonists had stepped in the direction of property-based qualifications by instituting a province-wide property requirement for men who were not church members. In so doing, they set forth the other important criterion for the eventual adoption of the guardianship exclusion in 1821. By equating insanity and idiocy with dependency and deviancy (through the use of public guardianship for the violent and dependent insane and the development of disability categories for specifying the deserving poor), the Puritans built the foundation on which future lawmakers could exclude individuals under guardianship.

IV. The New State Creates the Guardianship Exclusion

With the colonial period drawing to a close, Massachusetts was still searching for solutions to the problems caused by dependency, and had decided on a property suffrage qualification as one element of its governmental system. The Revolution was fast approaching, and at its end, the new state experienced a period of rapid change in economic, social, and political conditions. Though the Puritan domination in state affairs was diminishing, conservative philosophy and traditions continued to influence public affairs.

In the years immediately preceding the American Revolution, Massachusetts was awash in uncertainty. When the Provincial Congress convened in October of 1774, circumstances in Massachusetts were "profoundly unsettled." It had neither written a constitution nor established a government, Boston was occupied by the British, and there was little hope that the political dispute would be resolved quickly. But by 1780, the situation had changed rather dramatically.

155 BROWN, supra note 96, at 237.
156 Id.
John Hancock had been elected governor by the “nearly unanimous vote of his fellow citizens” and a new constitution promised stability and progress.157

As the new century arrived and wore on, change proceeded apace. First, economic conditions took on a different character. Boston traditionally had been the center of commercial activity, but other towns gradually gained economic importance by virtue of their whaling, farming, or manufacturing interests.158 Second, political strife tore at traditional party structures and allowed for new parties that represented the emerging demands for democratic reforms. Agitation for more egalitarianism in economic and political affairs confronted the conservative tradition of Massachusetts politics. Disputes over national banking policy, representation in the state legislative bodies, suffrage expansion, and slavery were prominent topics of political discussions.159 In each case, the central concern of dissenters was the expansion of opportunity, equality, and representation for the lower strata of society. Third, immigration produced profound reconfigurations in the state’s social and political make-up. A large number of immigrants arriving in the nineteenth century were not easily accepted or accommodated. Housing was inadequate, many employers exploited immigrant labor, and immigrants’ social and religious habits were criticized by Protestants.160 Immigration set the stage for serious debates over the moral and intellectual competence of certain groups. Fourth, the state’s role in addressing the issues of disability, dependency, and deviancy was transformed during this period. Historically, as we have seen, the state had taken a limited role at most, but now it began to view the issues as social concerns requiring a concerted public response. Policy initiatives included experiments with asylums and schools for persons we would now label as disabled, prison and jails for criminals, and various programs to control and provide for the poor.

In the remainder of this section, we will describe these events and analyze their relationships to the adoption of the guardianship exclusion in Massachusetts voter qualification law. First, we will focus on the coalescence of disability, dependency, and deviancy as public concerns. Second, we will address the political dynamics underpinning the 1780, 1820–1821, and 1853 constitutional conventions in which delegates made decisions about suffrage rights. Such a discussion is necessary to explain the evolution of justifications for the guardianship exclusion, from the one in 1820–1821 based on the economic dependency of persons under guardianship to another in 1853 based on the moral and intellectual incompetence of “idiots” and “insane” persons.

157 Id.
159 Id. at 130.
160 Id. at 162–64.
A. Disability, Dependency, and Deviance Coalesce as State Concerns

Between the colonial period and 1853, when the disenfranchisement of persons under guardianship began to take on its contemporary disability connotation, Massachusetts changed in many ways. In this relatively short period, not only did conceptions about the nature and etiology of various forms of dependency undergo profound change, but so did the nature of public policy directed at dependent persons.

During this time, a variety of social ills were occupying the public’s attention. Dependency was still viewed as a scourge on society; the cost of providing for dependents was high, had risen for decades, and was feared to have no ceiling. A number of circumstances had caused these miseries. The most important circumstances included: massive immigration, unavailability of work, wars and other military engagements, illegitimacy, and epidemics. But while many citizens supported the provision of relief out of a sense of duty to ameliorate the conditions of the poor, there was also widespread resentment of the associated tax burden imposed. The fact that taxpayers received a separate bill for poor taxes only exacerbated the situation.

The rising costs of providing for the dependent population created pressure on public officials, though private charities played perhaps a more prominent role in poor relief during the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century. Both the public and private sectors recognized that the problem of dependency was best addressed in two ways. First, the needs of the poor should be met, albeit with a mixture of charity and control. Second, poverty should be prevented to the extent possible. Providing relief for dependent populations was a duty, but many also believed that the root causes of poverty could be ferreted out and destroyed by applying the promise of nascent scientific methods and professional expertise to the human condition.

Initiatives taken by both the public and private sectors to remedy the causes of poverty and the living conditions of the poor took on new characteristics. A core premise of these initiatives was that categorization of the poor was necessary to devise effective policies for ridding society of the problems associated with poverty. People who could work should be treated differently from those who could not work. As we have seen, this central distinction—between the

---

162 See id.
164 Id. at 16.
165 TRATTNER, supra note 110, at 32.
166 See KATZ, supra note 163, at 18.
167 Id.
deserving poor who could not work through no fault of their own and the undeserving poor who did not work because they were immoral—was not a distinct American invention but rather reflected the earlier English practice.\(^{166}\)

The nineteenth century saw this distinction emerge in public policy in the United States as it had in English law. The former practice of using the almshouse as a one-size-fits-all approach for addressing dependency evolved in the direction of dividing the dependent population into discrete subgroups for different treatment.\(^{169}\) Criminals were sentenced to confinement in jails, and the unworthy poor were sent to poorhouses where they were forced to labor, both to reduce the financial burden on the public and to improve their character.\(^{170}\) Treatment of the deserving poor depended on the perceived cause of poverty. People believed to be insane or idiots were treated differently than widows, orphans, and the physically ill.

This trend was particularly evident in the case of insanity. The end of the eighteenth century brought significant change in the way insanity was viewed. The Puritan preachers who had been so influential in interpreting madness began referring to it in ways that, while still containing moral judgement, did not implicate the Devil. Rather, the evolving perception suggested that personal volition was involved. Surely, God’s law was being transgressed, but it was increasingly portrayed as a function of the individual’s religious grounding (or lack thereof) and moral choices. The “structure of causality,” as Jimenez refers to it, was pulled from its previous roots in the supernatural and re-established in the ability to reason.\(^{171}\) The effect of the Enlightenment had been to bring the power of individual judgement to the fore in explaining madness. Predictably, a byproduct of this new perspective was the decline of the ministry’s influence in construing the causation of madness and in dictating its cure.

One factor in this new conception of insanity was the slow emergence of the health profession as an influence on social and political views about madness. Prominent theorists such as Pinel (a Frenchman), Tuke (an Englishman), and Benjamin Rush (an American) were exploring ways of explaining insanity, and their work was widely read among American intellectuals.\(^{172}\) Though they took quite different approaches, the collective efforts of these men prompted physicians in Massachusetts and elsewhere to reconsider the causes and treatment of insanity.\(^{173}\) The illness metaphor of madness complemented the ethical understanding. But the illness etiology also had a distinctly individualized aura about it. In the American version of the medical explanation (especially as

\(^{166}\) See Stone, supra note 128, at 36.

\(^{169}\) Trattner, supra note 110, at 61–62.

\(^{170}\) Katz, supra note 163, at 22–23.

\(^{171}\) Jimenez, supra note 100, at 29.

\(^{172}\) See Grob, supra note 106, at 7–12.

\(^{173}\) See id.
espoused by Benjamin Rush), passion played a central role. Passions must be controlled, since an absence of moderation could lead to problems of all kinds, not the least of which was madness. To be mad was to have failed, to have been unable to exercise control over the more destructive passions, and to have given into “avarice and ambition,” as Benjamin Rush phrased it.

By the 1830s, Samuel Woodward, the superintendent of Massachusetts’s first public insane asylum, had gained considerable credibility and prominence with the state legislature and others concerned about the growing social problems believed to cause, and be caused by, madness. In Woodward’s view, there were two primary reasons people went insane—intemperance and masturbation. Woodward’s opinion contrasted with the opinions of other superintendents of the time who held that the poverty-stricken conditions of the poor and other social ills were the leading causes of insanity.

The collection of explanations began to coalesce around the notion of madness as a disease having both voluntary and involuntary dimensions. In this changing causal formulation, the insane both gained and lost. Now, madness could be controlled; it was no longer a supernatural curse. Insanity could be conquered, especially if the insane person was actively engaged in the curative process. But this new emphasis on rationality and the self led to a reassessment of blame. The mad were, at least in part, responsible for their own illness.

This confluence of forces resulted in a profound change in both the conception of insanity and its place in the public sphere. In the latter decades of the eighteenth century, towns throughout Massachusetts were beginning to confine persons believed to be insane—in stark contrast to the earlier colonial practice of intervening only when an insane person was violent or indigent. Whereas insane people previously had been sent to almshouses (also called poorhouses) where they mixed uncomfortably with other dependent or deviant people, some towns began to separate insane paupers from the remainder of

---

174 Jimenez, supra note 100, at 67–68.
175 See id. at 68.
176 Id. at 73.
177 See id. at 83–85.
178 Id. at 83.
179 See id. at 85.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 86–87.
182 See id. at 87–88.
183 See id. at 87.
184 See id. at 89.
185 See id. at 90.
186 See id. at 49–51.
187 See id. at 59–60.
the pauper population.\textsuperscript{188} Significantly, in Salem insane persons confined to the almshouse were not all paupers, thus breaking the historical connection between confinement of the insane and their pauper status.\textsuperscript{189} In 1796, Massachusetts lawmakers enacted a law permitting town officials to confine in houses of correction and jails the “furioulsly mad or those who were dangerous to the peace and safety of the good people.”\textsuperscript{190} There is evidence of adherence to this practice in many towns.\textsuperscript{191} By the late 1820’s, it appears that the majority of various town officials in the state had accepted the apparent necessity of confinement.\textsuperscript{192} An 1829 report to the state legislature documents this trend, with a total of 289 “lunatic persons” confined by 112 towns in almshouses, private homes, or jails, with 38 of them in chains.\textsuperscript{193} Conditions for most insane individuals were barely tolerable, and many lived in deplorable conditions.\textsuperscript{194}

The change in treatment of the insane suggests that officials had also adopted a different attitude toward them. Now, insanity was not just a departure from God’s teachings, but a state brought on by multiple and malleable factors. Social conditions could be improved and individual characters could be improved, but insanity was a threat to the social order that justified involuntary confinement. Still, the evolving stance toward insanity was also characterized by altruistic motives. Because insanity was taking on the character of illness, many also believed (at least initially) that it could be cured. The establishment of the asylum was accompanied by optimism, and it would be decades before that optimism faded in the harsh light of falling “cure” rates.

The belief in curability was evident in the establishment of publicly funded insane asylums. After considerable agitation on the part of a reform-minded elite that included members of the clergy, prominent lay people such as Dorothea Dix, and increasingly influential physicians, the Massachusetts legislature appropriated funds to establish the first such asylum at Worcester.\textsuperscript{195} The asylum opened in 1833.\textsuperscript{196} A central figure in the funding deliberations was Horace Mann, a member of the Massachusetts legislature, who argued for the hospital’s establishment on both humanitarian and fiscal grounds.\textsuperscript{197} To Mann’s mind, the state should be providing treatment to those insane individuals who could not

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[188] Id. at 90.
\item[189] Id. at 96.
\item[190] Id. at 92.
\item[191] Id. at 99–100.
\item[192] See id.
\item[193] Id. at 102.
\item[194] See id. at 103–05.
\item[195] GROB, supra note 106, at 28.
\item[196] Id. at 43.
\item[197] See id. at 27–28.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
afford the private McLean Asylum, opened in 1818. By 1854 another public hospital, located in Taunton, had also been opened, partly to relieve the overcrowding that already had begun to plague the Worcester public facility.

We should not assume, however, that the lawmakers' increasingly consistent stance toward asylums was indicative of any consensus within the medical community. Experts' opinions about the cause and treatment of insanity varied a great deal, and this diversity sometimes frustrated officials. This was especially true in the courts. Guardianship was still relied on to protect the property of insane persons and to save the public treasury from the cost of their support. But courts were reluctant to hear the testimony of physicians, and even guardians were not trusted to speak on the insanity question. Judges remained adamant that they could make such a determination only after they personally had interviewed the individual.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, a social construction of idiocy distinct from insanity was evolving. The distinction of idiocy from insanity, or alternatively as a type of insanity, prompted Massachusetts legislators to commission a report on idiocy. Samuel Gridley Howe's commissioned report was published in 1848. Howe discussed at some length the difficulty of diagnosing idiocy, but adopted a definition of idiocy as:

that condition of a human being in which, from some morbid cause in the bodily organization, the faculties and sentiments remain dormant or undeveloped, so that the person is incapable of self-guidance, and of approaching that degree of knowledge usual with others of his age.

Howe reported on a survey of 63 towns that had identified 574 idiots. By Howe's estimation, this finding could be extrapolated to conclude that there were between 1200 and 1500 idiots in the state. Howe portrayed these persons in sympathetic terms, but with a warning about the potential social consequences of failing to address the problem of idiocy. Further, he identified idiots as:

one rank of that fearful host which is ever pressing upon society with its suffering, its miseries, and its crimes, and which society is ever trying to hold off at arm's

---

198 See id. at 24–27.
199 See id. at 151–53.
200 For a discussion of these opinions, see Jimenez, supra note 100, at 65–79.
201 See id. at 79–80.
202 See id.
203 Id. at 79–80.
204 Samuel Gridley Howe, Report Made to the Legislature of Massachusetts, upon Idiocy (Boston, Coolidge & Wiley 1848).
205 Id. at 20.
length,—to keep in quarantine, to shut up in jails and almshouses, or, at least, to treat as a pariah caste; but all in vain.\textsuperscript{206}

Moreover, Howe’s definition of idiocy inherently contained a public policy prescription.\textsuperscript{207} Idiots should be provided education, just as were the other children of Massachusetts:

Massachusetts admits the right of all her citizens to a share in the blessings of education, and she provides it liberally for all her more favored children. If some be blind or deaf, she still continues to furnish them with special instruction at great cost; and will she longer neglect the poor idiot,—the most wretched of all who are born to her,—those who are usually abandoned by their fellows,—who can never, of themselves, step up upon the platform of humanity,—will she leave them to their dreadful fate, to a life of brutishness, without an effort in their behalf?\textsuperscript{208}

Soon after the release of Howe’s influential report, the Massachusetts legislature appropriated funds for the construction of the state’s first idiot school.\textsuperscript{209}

Massachusetts’s policy toward the insane, idiots, and other persons with disabilities was complemented by major initiatives directed toward the undeserving poor—adults who were not disabled and so were not excused from the societal expectation that they work.\textsuperscript{210} Traditional patterns of outdoor relief (the provision of aid to the poor in their homes or the purchase of custodial care in the homes of other community members) were replaced with a strong emphasis on indoor relief—confinement in almshouses—where a work ethic could be instilled through forced labor and harsh rules governing personal conduct.\textsuperscript{211} This strategy was adopted due to a growing concern that the nondisabled poor’s moral deficiencies were not being addressed through outdoor relief, and that in fact, the lack of tight controls over their behavior was contributing to their idleness and profligacy.\textsuperscript{212}

Such beliefs were particularly prominent in regard to Irish and German immigrants, most of whom arrived in the eastern ports from Baltimore to Boston.\textsuperscript{213} Some six million immigrants had landed on the shores of the United States between 1800 and 1860, and many Protestants were alarmed by their

\textsuperscript{206} Id. at 56.
\textsuperscript{207} Id. at 53.
\textsuperscript{208} Id.
\textsuperscript{209} JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1994).
\textsuperscript{210} See TRATTNER, supra note 110, at 54.
\textsuperscript{211} See id. at 56–58.
\textsuperscript{212} See id. at 54–55.
\textsuperscript{213} See id. at 55–56.
dissipation and licentiousness.\textsuperscript{214} The clash of cultures created considerable backlash to existing poor law, and officials responded by strengthening the emphasis on institutional care and indoor relief.\textsuperscript{215} In Massachusetts, the trend toward indoor relief is readily apparent in the growth of almshouses from 83 in 1824 to 219 in 1860.\textsuperscript{216}

When viewed in their entirety, these late eighteenth and nineteenth-century developments in thought, attitude, and behavior show an increasingly consistent stance toward disability, dependency, and deviancy. Society was changing, and many Massachusetts citizens did not think the changes were always for the better. The mutations in economic relations, rising concerns about the health and morality of the immigrant population, and novel concepts about insanity and idiocy formed the backdrop for alterations in policies toward those who were disabled, dependent, or deviant. Around the time Massachusetts adopted its first constitution in 1780, the state began settling into permanent perspectives regarding these fundamental problems. Among other things, the citizenry adopted perspectives on dependency that were consistent with the political decisions it made. It viewed dependency as a deeply troubling phenomenon and struggled both to establish and maintain standards for respectable behavior and to be consistently charitable toward the less fortunate. These events and circumstances allowed the people's representatives to establish the essential qualification for voting at the 1780 constitutional convention—property ownership. Further, ideas that later would lead to a disability-based disenfranchisement were beginning to be articulated, partly through the public policies directed at the dependent population. These policies had a distinctive form that foreshadowed the eventual adoption of such a provision.

B. \textit{Voter Qualifications before the 1820–1821 Constitutional Convention}

As they considered their constitution at the 1780 convention, the people of Massachusetts confronted many of the essential issues of democratic governance. These issues included the critical question, "Who decides?"\textsuperscript{217} This question was addressed in three parts: the apportionment of representatives to the chambers of government, the determination of qualifications for holding office, and the specification of qualifications for suffrage.\textsuperscript{218}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[214] Id. at 55.
\item[215] Id. at 55–58.
\item[216] Id. at 59.
\item[218] Id. at 35.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Convention delegates proposed two chambers for the state's government, a house of representatives and a senate.\(^{219}\) Representatives in the house were to be apportioned to towns in relation to the respective town's population.\(^{220}\) Towns with 150 rateable polls would have one elected representative, those with 375 rateable polls would have two, and another representative would be allocated for each additional 225 rateable polls.\(^{221}\) Senators would be chosen from senate districts apportioned on the basis of "the relative tax burden of each district."\(^{222}\) Officeholders had to meet various propertyholding and residency requirements.\(^{223}\) For example, senators had to have resided in Massachusetts for five years and have a 300-pound freehold, or a rateable estate of 600 pounds.\(^{224}\) Representatives were required to own a freehold of 100 pounds or rateable estates worth 200 pounds.\(^{225}\) Candidates for governor and lieutenant governor had to have a freehold of 1000 pounds in the state and to have been state residents for seven years.\(^{226}\)

In its first constitution, the state continued to rely on property ownership as the sign of a man's "deservedness" to vote.\(^{227}\) To vote, a male must be twenty-one years of age, reside in the town, and own a freehold of three pounds or a rateable estate of sixty pounds,\(^{228}\) which one scholar estimates amounted to roughly a twelve percent increase over the pre-Revolutionary requirement.\(^{229}\)

At least for the time being, these first decisions settled the most important questions of representation in Massachusetts. Property interests were protected both by basing the apportionment of senate seats on taxes and by the property-ownership requirement for suffrage and office holding.\(^{230}\) The interests of towns were represented by apportioning house seats to them.\(^{231}\) Individuals were assured of representation by the population-based apportionment of house seats.\(^{232}\) By dispersing representation across the governmental bodies, the constitution also attempted to decide the question of political equality for

\(^{219}\) PETERS, supra note 217, at 35.
\(^{220}\) Id.
\(^{221}\) Id. A person eligible to vote was "a rateable poll." Id. at 35 n.33.
\(^{222}\) Id. at 35.
\(^{223}\) See BROWN, supra note 96, at 393.
\(^{224}\) PETERS, supra note 217, at 35. All of a man's property constituted his "total rateable estate." Id. at 34.
\(^{225}\) BROWN, supra note 96, at 393.
\(^{226}\) PETERS, supra note 217, at 35.
\(^{227}\) See BROWN, supra note 96, at 394.
\(^{228}\) Id.
\(^{229}\) Id.
\(^{230}\) PETERS, supra note 217, at 36.
\(^{231}\) Id.
\(^{232}\) Id.
CREATING THE DISABLED CITIZEN

individuals (as will become apparent as we examine subsequent developments). Voting was still seen primarily as an instrument of the common good that ensured the rights of property holders. In continuing to exercise some constraint on suffrage, early Massachusetts citizens indicated their belief that voting was not a right but a privilege (and to some degree, a responsibility), though there is also evidence that public opinion was in transition on this point.

The 1780 constitutional convention might be better understood by considering its political context. During that time, it was generally known who voted and for whom, since open voting was the norm in Massachusetts during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Prominent men actively monitored the polling place, watched the votes cast and, by their presence, provoked fears of economic reprisals for making the wrong choice. Such use of "force" by Federalist party men is captured in one observer's definition:

> By force, I mean an intolerant and oppressive violence towards laborers, tenants, mechanics, debtors, and other dependents: every species of influence, on every description of persons, has been practiced, and with a shameless effrontery. Individuals have been threatened, with a deprivation of employment, and an instant exaction of debt to the last farthing as a Consequence of withholding a federal vote, or rather of not giving one.

Political parties also intervened to ensure that their supporters would be allowed to vote. This sometimes meant that otherwise ineligible men cast votes when wealthier sponsors vouched for their property holdings.

These events fueled criticism of election laws and practices. Observers repeated the traditional concerns about the influence of wealthy men in political affairs and often used these occurrences to support their advocacy for property suffrage requirements. In fact, it must be said that the property qualification for voting was not a controversial topic at the 1780 constitutional convention. It was so agreeable to most that "[l]ess than half a dozen towns" objected to the requirement that adult men be property owners before they be allowed to vote.

Between 1780 and the next constitutional convention in 1820–1821 though, political winds had shifted and the core issue of representation had to be reexamined. As a look at the second constitutional convention shows, the

---

234 Id.
235 Id. (emphasis in original).
236 See id. at 137.
237 Id.
238 See id.
239 See BROWN, supra note 96, at 396–97.
240 Id. at 396.
discussion of suffrage requirements was framed primarily in terms of the property-holding requirements believed necessary for ensuring that voters possessed the necessary moral and intellectual competence to participate in guarding the common good.

C. The Justification for the Guardianship Exclusion is Transformed: Comparing the 1820–1821 and 1853 Constitutional Conventions

During discussion of the number of senators to be elected, Mr. Keyes of Concord proposed to add a pauper exclusion to the qualifications for electors of the Senate. Almost immediately, Mr. Beach of Gloucester moved to add the phrase “and those under guardianship” to Keyes's language. Thus, the two categories were linked and stayed so for the remainder of the deliberations.

In later consideration of electoral qualifications, delegates debated a resolution that would “amend the Constitution as to provide that paupers and persons under guardianship, shall not be entitled to vote for any officer under the government.” It was this phrase that prompted a far-ranging discussion of the qualifications for electors and resulted in the adoption of both the pauper and the guardianship exclusions.

It is evident from the official report that it was property—not insanity or idiocy—that animated the discussion. Mr. Quincy, a delegate, correctly noted that the proposal could not be characterized as advocating universal suffrage since women and minors were prohibited from voting, aphorizing that “[t]he real nature of the proposition is the exclusion of pecuniary qualification.” Arguing for the imposition of qualifications, Quincy claimed that disenfranchisement was a just principle, saying, “Society may make a part of its members obnoxious to laws, and yet deny them the right of suffrage, without any injustice.” He went on to argue that “[i]n its true character, this provision is in favor of the poor;—that is to say, in favour of those, who have something, but very little; against those, who have nothing at all.”

241 JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 115 (Boston, Office of the Daily Advertiser 1821) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS]. The journal of the 1820–1821 constitutional convention is not a verbatim recording of delegates’ remarks, but rather an observer’s summary of them. The journal quotations included here are these official summaries.

242 Id. at 116.
243 Id. at 122.
244 See id. at 122–26.
245 See id.
246 Id. at 123.
247 Id.
248 Id.
vote was consistent with democratic philosophy, but a pauper was a different matter. He stated:

The theory of our constitution is, that extreme poverty—that is, pauperism—is inconsistent with independence. It therefore assumes a qualification of a very low amount, which, according to its theory, is the lowest consistent with independence. Undoubtedly it excludes some, of a different character of mind. But this number is very few; and from the small amount of property required, is, in individual cases, soon compensated. 249

Mr. Quincy was not alone in believing that some line had to drawn based on economic qualifications. The boundary may have been in dispute, but other delegates also believed it to be necessary. 250 It was not accepted by all the delegates, however, and some objected. 251 Mr. Austin of Boston supported the right of the state to establish electoral qualifications but spoke against this pecuniary qualification for both practical and political reasons. 252 Practically speaking, he said:

The provision could not be carried into effect; it was the cause of perjury and immorality—it did not prevent a fraudulent man from voting, who owed more than he was worth, but debarred an honest poor man who paid his debts—and it tended to throw suspicion of unfairness on the municipal authority. 253

His other concern was more philosophical. He asked:

[What w]ill you do with your labouring men? [T]hey have no freehold—no property to the amount of two hundred dollars, but they support their families reputably with their daily earnings. What will you do with your sailors? Men who labor hard, and scatter with inconsiderateness the product of their toil, and who depend on the earnings of the next voyage. What will you do with your young men? who have spent all their money in acquiring an education? Must they buy their right to vote? Must they depend on their friends or parents to purchase it for them? Must they wait till they have turned their intelligence into stock? Shall all these classes of citizens be deprived of the rights of freemen for want of property? Regard for country . . . did not depend upon property, but upon institutions, laws, habits and associations. 254

249 Id.
250 See id. at 122–26.
251 See id.
252 See id. at 123–24.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 124.
Some supported the property requirement on the grounds that it motivated men to improve their situation in life.\textsuperscript{255} Mr. Thomdike of Boston, for example, emphasized the effect of the pecuniary requirement on character development.\textsuperscript{256} He "had long been acquainted with the sea-faring men in a neighboring town," he said, and "had witnessed there the effect of the provision in the constitution upon young men under age. . . . They were generally anxious to amass the little property necessary to give them the right of voting, and this anxiety had a favorable effect on their habits and character."\textsuperscript{257} But not every seaman should be permitted to cast his vote; a property requirement should be high enough to ensure their independence.\textsuperscript{258} If seamen were of the type who "scatter[ed] a great deal of money and d[id] not save enough," they should not vote.\textsuperscript{259} Their votes would be "the votes of their owners, or of intriguing men who wish either to get into office themselves or to get their friends in."\textsuperscript{260}

The connection made between property holding, independence, and morality did not sit well with every delegate.\textsuperscript{261} Mr. Richardson protested that the "want of property in a free government, should be the last thing to prevent men from voting, unless the possession of property were shown to be necessarily connected with virtue."\textsuperscript{262} Nonetheless, the delegates persisted in asking whether some property-related qualification was required to ensure the electorate could be entrusted with the common good.\textsuperscript{263} Mr. Ward of Boston reasoned that:

If to require no pecuniary qualification to make a voter was the most likely mode of securing the best good of the whole, it ought certainly to be adopted. [But o]n the contrary, if to confine the right of voting to persons who are directly interested in the protection of the rights of property, as well as of life and liberty, was the most probable mode of securing the enhancement of just, equal, and useful laws, there could be no doubt that the people have a right, and that it is their duty so to limit the privilege of suffrage.\textsuperscript{264}

Mr. Baldwin argued that the pertinent test ought to be whether a man had paid taxes, not whether he owned property, as paying taxes was more consistent with the Bill of Rights' assertion that "all men are born free and equal."\textsuperscript{265} This

\textsuperscript{255} See id. at 122–26.
\textsuperscript{256} Id. at 124.
\textsuperscript{257} Id.
\textsuperscript{258} Id.
\textsuperscript{259} Id.
\textsuperscript{260} Id.
\textsuperscript{261} See id. at 122–26.
\textsuperscript{262} Id. at 124.
\textsuperscript{263} Id.
\textsuperscript{264} Id.
\textsuperscript{265} Id. at 124–25.
argument held sway, and delegates adopted a taxpaying requirement as the centerpiece of the suffrage provision. The result of the discussion was the following proposed amendment:

Every male citizen, of twenty one years of age and upwards, (excepting paupers and persons under guardianship) who shall have resided within the Commonwealth one year, and within the town or district in which he may claim a right to vote, six calendar months, next preceding any election of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senators or Representatives, and who shall have paid by himself or his parent, master or guardian, any state or county tax, which shall within two years next preceding such election, have been assessed upon him in any town or district of this Commonwealth; and, also, every citizen who shall be by law exempted from taxation, and who shall be in all other respects qualified as above mentioned, shall have a right to vote in such election of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senators and Representatives, and no other person shall be entitled to vote in such elections.

Thus, the delegates of the 1820–1821 constitutional convention adopted as the central voter qualification provision the idea that those casting ballots in elections be taxpayers. In so doing, they rejected the earlier idea that the ownership of a certain amount of real and personal property was required to indicate that one possessed the requisite character to vote. But they were clearly struggling with emerging ideas about political representation, the potential for conflict between individual and common interests, and the very nature of early American institutions of governance.

These ideas surfaced in their consideration of appropriate qualifications for the electorate. As the above excerpts from the convention record indicate, delegates considered the suffrage requirement in terms common to the day. The primary question underlying the discussion was that of independence: Did a man have the economic wherewithal necessary to exercise independence in political matters, or was he so dependent on other men for his livelihood or welfare that he might bend to their wishes? It was important to these delegates that the state’s electorate be free from economic coercion, since only those who were independent could be endowed with the public trust inherent in electoral participation.

There were other concerns as well. Economic status was still associated with moral virtue, at least in some delegates’ minds. Some delegates feared that pecuniary motives might hold undue sway in the political process—voters might cast ballots on the basis of their own selfish interests and not the greater good.

266 Id.
267 Amendments of the Constitution of Massachusetts, Proposed by the Convention of Delegates, Assembled at Boston, on the Third Wednesday of November, A.D. Eighteen Hundred and Twenty 12–13 (Boston, Russell and Gardner 1821).
268 See id.
Also behind the deliberations were the motivational effects of conditioning voting rights on economic status: By not requiring some amount of property, would young men be spurred to acquire the necessary assets to gain the right to vote? The implications of the suffrage requirement on the political stability of the state were also weighed, with some delegates expressing fear of the repercussions of preventing sailors and soldiers from being electors.

This mix of arguments pro and con is notable for one omission. Nowhere in the record does a delegate refer to those under guardianship with the terms of "insanity" or "idiocy." Delegates simply did not consider the guardianship provision from the standpoint of these categorical labels. The entire discussion was based on the theory that economic ties to the community have a protective value, both for the virtue of the individual and the polity as a whole. The philosophy underlying the debate was grounded in the common language of that era. The evolution of democratic thought had begun to move away from the strict application of a property-based qualification and toward a more universal (though still exclusionary) suffrage. The guardianship exclusion was an outgrowth of this trend. As suffrage expanded, the convention delegates found themselves resisting truly universal adult suffrage. They could not quite bring themselves to abandon completely the idea that some controls should be placed on voting privileges.

At the 1853 constitutional convention, delegates again considered the qualifications of the Massachusetts electorate. The debates here began to take on a very different hue than the debates at the 1820–1821 convention both with respect to the guardianship exclusion and another important controversy regarding the basis for Senate seats. In the 1853 convention, delegates used the terms "idiots" and "insane" freely. Apparently, there was a shared understanding of the identity of these individuals. These impairment-based categories were often referred to in the same breath as women, children, and foreigners, suggesting that delegates now had a common vocabulary for carrying on the emerging contests over precisely who would be included in the electorate.

As in debates over slavery, immigration, women's rights, and so on, these categories were of increasing importance in national quarrels of all sorts.

The lengthy wrangling of the convention includes frequent mention of these various groups. That women, "foreigners," children, and the "insane" and "idiots" were often referred to at the same time reveals the conceptions about intellectual and moral competence contained within the terms. In the debate on apportioning Senate seats, delegates argued over the nature of political representation and who had a right to such representation. Mr. Hallett observed that other states excluded from representation "children under twenty-one years,

---

269 See 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED MAY 4, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 221 (Boston, White and Porter 1853).

270 See id.

271 See id. at 218–33.
CREATING THE DISABLED CITIZEN

idiots and insane, strangers and women, and in another class of States, slaves also. One justification for these exclusions, he said, was that these groups were naturally incapable of participation and were legally restricted in other civil rights areas:

Children are excluded, from the nature of things... [This] rule is too universal to be questioned... [but it] is a temporary exclusion only, removed by the necessary age, and imposing no burden or acquisition upon the party before he can become a citizen.

*Idiots and insane, and those excluded from society by infamous crimes, are manifestly not a part of the acting society, and can make no contract.*

Women, by the practice of the world and their own modest, dignified, self-resigning consent, are excluded, though represented by their husbands, parents and male relations. It is unnecessary to discuss this, because all our governments were formed without any innovation on this common consent of mankind in all governments.

Slaves are excluded, for the same reason that minors and incompetent persons are, because, by the laws of the community in which they are found, they are incapable of making contracts. They are not citizens, and by no qualifications placed within their reach, by law, can become such.

It follows, that in any organization of government, in a community where slavery exists, the slaves must of necessity be excluded from political power. They cannot enter into any political relation. They cannot contract. To say they are slaves, is to say that they are not thought of as beings having a political existence.

The senate allocation dispute also contains numerous references to the representation of these groups' interests in the political process. Delegates argued over whether and how to provide for their presumably legitimate claims on public attention. Some thought it was possible for members of one group (free white men) to represent other groups. Typical of the delegates' statements were those made by Mr. Morton:

Can a man come here and not represent woman? What is representation but a reflection of the opinions of the district which sends its representative here?... I do not mean to be extravagant, but it would not be far from the truth to say that we represent the women and nobody else....

And not only so, but the children also are represented here....

---

272 Id. at 221.
273 Id. (emphasis added).
274 See id. at 218–33.
275 See id. at 223–25.
276 See id.
Are the women and children neglected in legislation? Are the insane and foreigners neglected in legislation? I apprehend not.\textsuperscript{277}

Delegates also mused about the ancient political idea of guardianship, which envisions that a political elite would protect the interests of another nonparticipating group.\textsuperscript{278} Mr. Wallace distinguished between the practice of representing another’s interests as an elected official and serving as guardianship over those interests, considering representation as a higher-order relationship between an elected official and voter.\textsuperscript{279} He argued that for those who could not vote:

\[\text{[t]he most that can be said of it is, that those persons who are elected, exercise a sort of guardianship over the women and children and foreigners in their districts. They are not their representatives. They assume a guardianship, and perhaps it is their duty to exercise a guardianship over the interests of those who have no voice in the election; but this is not representation.}\textsuperscript{280}

Mr. Simonds seemed to have had in mind that persons under a political “guardianship” were dependent, and further, that dependence was a condition disqualifying one from the possibility of representation.\textsuperscript{281} He stated:

\[\text{I find that mankind, in common with all created intelligences, are divided into two principal classes, the independent and the dependent. My idea of sovereignty, then, is, that those rightfully possess it, who stand in the relation of independent in the community, and not that of dependent. I necessarily come to the conclusion, then, that the female portion of the community are in this condition of dependence, that they never can, and never ought, rightfully, to be considered as possessing sovereign power.}\textsuperscript{282}

Delegates also debated the basis for the right to participate in selecting representatives.\textsuperscript{283} Mr. Bradford questioned who were “the people,” and concluded that the phrase referred to:

\[\text{that portion of the inhabitants of the country who are capable of instituting, maintaining, and altering government. It did not mean the child who was incapable for any act towards instituting, supporting, and maintaining government, but referred to the person, whose mental and physical faculties were more matured, and who was,}\textsuperscript{284}

\textsuperscript{277} Id. at 225–26.
\textsuperscript{278} See id. at 204–13.
\textsuperscript{279} See id. at 205–08.
\textsuperscript{280} Id. at 208.
\textsuperscript{281} See id. at 205–08.
\textsuperscript{282} Id. at 210.
\textsuperscript{283} See id. at 212–13.
by that very quality of mind, more competent to take a part in the discharge of
government matters. It did not mean the female part of the community, who, by their
physical organism, habits, and more gentle traits of character, are totally unsuited to
take a part in all the departments of government, in war and in peace, and in carrying
out the relations of commerce, and engaging in all the complicated and extensive
business of life.... It was intended to signify the adult male portion of the people,
those who were competent to take part in the management of the affairs of the
government.284

With respect to specific voter qualifications, the primary issue was whether or
not to recommend repeal of the taxing qualification (adopted in 1821 as a
replacement for the property requirement).285 The delegates adopted the
committee recommendation that this be done.286 Another less contentious
committee recommendation was that the “ability to read and write shall be an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the elective franchise.”287

They also considered the specific cases of “idiots,” “insane persons,” and
persons convicted of crime.288 Indeed, the Committee on the Qualifications of
Voters had proposed that the relevant constitutional article read, “That no idiot or
insane person, or person convicted of a felony, unless pardoned and restored to
the right of suffrage, shall be entitled to vote in any election.”289

Mr. Hathaway reacted to the committee’s recommendation by proposing that
the words “idiot or insane person” be replaced with the words “pauper, or person
under guardianship”—in other words, that the existing 1780 language be retained—because the “only criterion that I know of, or that any one can know of,
by which to settle this question of insanity or idiocy, is the judgment of a tribunal
that is fit to pass upon that matter.”290 Hathaway was reluctant to rely on
selectmen for determining whether an individual was an idiot or insane on
election day, preferring instead that this judgment be made by a court in
connection to guardianship status:

[T]he Committee had reported that ‘insane persons’ should not vote, and the reason
why I wished to substitute for that ‘persons under guardianship’ was, because I would
not deprive any person of the right to vote upon the judgment of the selectmen, and
because they might believe a person to be idiotic or insane who was not so, and the

284 Id. at 212.
285 See id. at 546–47.
286 Id. at 680–82. None of the constitutional changes proposed by the 1853 convention
were adopted by the people.
287 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION
ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 251 (Boston, White and Porter 1853).
288 See id. at 272–73.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 274.
only evidence that they should consider as sufficient to deprive any voter of his rights was a solemn adjudication, by a competent tribunal of law or probate, that the person was so, and that he was incompetent to vote.291

Others echoed Mr. Hathaway's concern about the difficulty of deciding who was incompetent to vote.292 Mr. Aldrich viewed the difficulty in determining competency as an insufficient reason for not excluding such individuals.293 Determining precisely which criminals had been restored to the right of suffrage was not an easy task, and "it will often be found equally difficult to ascertain who are insane persons, paupers, or idiots; and yet these several classes of persons are usually excluded, the difficulty of determination, not being regarded as a sufficient reason for making no disqualifying provision respecting them."294

Though the dividing line between competence and incompetence was narrow and difficult to discern, Mr. Aldrich still viewed the distinction as worth making, saying:

But all this furnishes no reason why an idiot should be allowed the important and responsible right of suffrage. Nor should insane persons be permitted to exercise this right, [simply] because it is not always easy to ascertain whether a person be of a sane or insane mind. Well, Sir, there are those who deem it equally clear, that that man who has shown himself, in a sense, morally insane by the commission of flagrant crimes, ought also to be disfranchised.295

The wedge being gradually drawn between pauper status and guardianship status in suffrage law is evident from the comments of Mr. Keyes who, in commenting on the proposal to substitute "idiot or insane person" for "paupers and persons under guardianship," claimed there was no justification for disenfranchising paupers.296 He stated:

I do not know why we should not extend the right of voting to all paupers, because they have... more interest in the laws, and in the conduct of the administration of affairs, than any other class of persons, inasmuch as they are the children of the government, and affected in their food and their raiment by the laws which are passed, and therefore, of all people, they have the highest interest in voting.297

291 Id. at 275.
292 See id. at 276–78.
293 See id. at 277–78.
294 Id. at 277.
295 Id. at 278.
296 See id. at 275.
297 Id. Mr. Keyes's remark is prescient. In 1974, the voters of Massachusetts agreed to repeal the constitutional provision that disenfranchised paupers, but retained the guardianship exclusion. See, publisher's "Editorial Note" to MASS. CONST. amend. art. II (Law Co-op 1990).
The change in the way lawmakers justified the guardianship exclusion is notable for many reasons. The first and most important reason is the new association of guardianship with insanity and idiocy in 1853. While these words appear nowhere in the record of the 1820–1821 convention, they are used frequently and with facility only three decades later. By mid-century, despite some uncertainty about exactly how to do so, legislators seemed to believe that people could be accurately identified as insane or idiotic. Further, they used the labels adeptly and characterized the two groups as at least intellectually incompetent, and perhaps morally incompetent as well. The reinterpretation of the guardianship exclusion—from one based on economic status to one based on cognitive and emotional impairment—was accomplished quickly and completely.

The terms used to identify who would be affected by the guardianship exclusion had been transformed. The transformation occurred within the context of greater political controversies about representation and participation. By 1853, the quarrel about essential voter qualifications was framed in terms of individual characteristics such as gender, race, disability, and immigrant status—not the previous battleground of property. However, it can hardly be said that economic status no longer mattered. Indeed, it may be that these categorical distinctions simply replaced the earlier economic ones and served as proxies for them.

In weighing groups’ political representation as well as their individual characteristics, legislators seem to have been reflecting the era’s growing concern about the relative weight of property interests versus other interests. Discussing the topic in these terms also suggests that attitudes toward the nature of voting itself were in flux. Voting was not only the means for ensuring the stability and quality of the republic, it was also a method for individuals to secure the consideration of issues important to them. This perspective on the purpose of electoral participation consciously allowed for the notion that the public good consisted of more than property interests. Proponents of expanded suffrage knew that some voters would challenge the fundamental value placed on property rights, and they argued that these interests were just as legitimate.

D. Explaining the New Justification

In 1820–1821, conventional delegates employed the phrase “paupers and persons under guardianship,” thereby indicating the associations they drew between the economic dependency of those receiving public aid (paupers) and of those with private resources who might become dependent on public aid (persons under guardianship). In disenfranchising these groups, legislators seemed to have believed that they were doing what was necessary to protect and further the democratic nature of their young state. The changing nature of the rationale for this exclusion, however, suggests that the legislators of 1853 had quite different notions of why such “persons under guardianship” should not be permitted to
vote. How are we to explain the dramatic change in legislators' rationales for the guardianship exclusion from 1820–1821 to 1853?

The shifting tapestry of social, economic, and political circumstances during that three-decade period contains several clues for the changing justification. One powerful causal thread is the broad collection of ideas about the nature of government and its relationship both to individual citizens and to the citizenry as a whole. The nineteenth century was marked by significant changes in this regard. In the fifty years after the Revolution, politics gradually became more democratic, a process marked by “the breakdown of the deferential style of politics, the emergence of egalitarian politics, the gradual opening of the political process to the average citizen, and most importantly, the gradual expansion of suffrage rights.”

During the Jacksonian era beginning in 1828, political parties mobilized voters of all classes, and campaigns became significant social events.

Political philosophy reflected these developments. The civic humanism tradition had elevated the common good over individual interests, but liberalism gave center stage to the individual rights to property, free political expression, and liberty from government interference. Voting was still a civic duty, but Americans also came to view voting “more as a political right that enabled individuals to ‘protect their interests.’”

But while the electorate was expanding dramatically, states were also excluding groups for various reasons. Not everyone benefited as voting evolved from a privilege to a right. Suffrage laws were employed to penalize criminals and to keep the polls free of corruption—nineteen of 34 states disenfranchised criminals in 1860. African Americans and aliens could vote in only 6 states. Soldiers and sailors were disenfranchised in the majority of states; students in seven. Paupers were excluded from the electorate in 15 states. As late as 1908, women had equal suffrage with men in only 4 states. Despite the

---

299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 PORTER, *supra* note 26, at 147–49.
303 Id. at 148.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Victoria Bissell Brown, *Jane Addams, Progressivism, and Woman Suffrage: An Introduction to "Why Women Should Vote,"* in *One Woman, One Vote*, 179, 184 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995). A petition submitted to the 1853 convention had called for the removal of the word “male” from all parts of the Massachusetts constitution, which, it was argued, would have had the effect of enfranchising women. Id. at 189. The Committee on
abandonment of an overt property requirement in most states, the
disenfranchisement of these groups enforced standards of intellectual and moral
competence.

Consistent with these fundamental political developments were the notions
about insanity and idiocy that were crystallizing during the nineteenth century,
particularly in its middle decades. Insanity itself was in conceptual transition,
changing from a spiritual malady to a medical one. New scientific approaches and
professional methods promised to cure insanity (a promise that went unrealized).
This optimistic outlook was tempered, however, by the concomitant belief that
the insane were somehow at least partly to blame for their condition.

Similarly, popular and elite conceptions of idiocy were imbued with negative
connotations. Idiocy was a threat to the social order, though the public bore some
responsibility to correct the situation through education of idiots. Idiots were
hardly expected to occupy places of status in the community, but reformers
believed that the social harm caused by idiocy could be reduced dramatically
through science and professional help. Nonetheless, idiocy was conceived as, at
best, an unfortunate condition, and, at worse, a sign of moral and intellectual
decay.

With respect to both idiocy and insanity, then, connotations were so negative
that even the most progressive thinkers of the time recognized that the survival
and betterment of humanity required that they be managed. At the forefront of
such reform movements was Horace Mann, an influential individual at the center
of Massachusetts political decision making. As a state legislator, Mann chaired a
committee appointed to look into the treatment of the insane\textsuperscript{307} and was "mainly
responsible" for the founding of Worcester State Lunatic Hospital.\textsuperscript{308} He was
later appointed to the state board of education and, as secretary, issued a number
of widely read reports.\textsuperscript{309}

Mann's ideas about idiocy and insanity are well worth noting, not only
because of his prominence in Massachusetts political affairs, but also because of
his influence on the political and social elite in Massachusetts and other states.
His ideas—and their implications for political participation—may be understood
from his writings. In his report entitled \textit{Political Education}, Mann emphasized the
civic purposes that public schooling could and should serve.\textsuperscript{310} A proponent of
making schools a tool of democracy, he viewed education as a requirement for a

---

Qualification of Voters responded to the petition by ignoring it and refusing to recommend any
change that would have permitted women to vote. \textit{Id.} at 189.

\textsuperscript{307} \textit{See} Grob, \textit{supra} note 106, at 26.

\textsuperscript{308} \textit{Gerald N. Grob, Edward Jarvis and the Medical World of Nineteenth-Century America} 119 (1978).

\textsuperscript{309} \textit{See} Grob, \textit{supra} note 106, at 35.

\textsuperscript{310} \textit{Horace Mann, Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Board of Education of Massachusetts for the Years 1845–1848, in Life and Works of Horace Mann} 268 (Boston, Lee and Shepard 1891).
self-governing republic. He feared a government that did not attend to the need to educate its citizenry, writing:

Nothing would be easier than to follow in the train of so many writers, and to demonstrate by logic, by history, and by the nature of the case, that a republican form of government, without intelligence in the people, must be, on a vast scale, what a mad-house, without superintendent or keepers, would be on a small one,—the despotism of a few succeeded by universal anarchy, and anarchy by despotism, with no change but from bad to worse.

Mann had decided, though, that men with the requisite orientation and education might successfully engage in governing themselves. "If asked the broad question, whether man is capable of self-government," Mann said he would "answer it conditionally":

If by man, in the inquiry, is meant the Feejee Islanders; or the convicts at Botany Bay; or the people of Mexico and of some of the South American Republics (so called); or those as a class, in our own country, who can neither read nor write; or those who can read and write, and who possess talents and an education by force of which they get treasury, or post-office, or bank appointments, and then abscond with all the money they can steal; I answer unhesitatingly that man, or rather such men, are not fit for self-government.... But if, on the other hand, the inquiry be, whether mankind are not endowed with those germs of intelligence and those susceptibilities of goodness, by which, under a perfectly practicable system of cultivation and training they are able to avoid the evils of despotism and anarchy; and also, of those frequent changes in national policy which are but one remove from anarchy; and to hold steadfastly on their way in an endless career of improvement,—then, in the full rapture of that joy and triumph which springs from a belief in the goodness of God and the progressive happiness of man, I answer, they are able.

Like many of his day, Mann seemed quite comfortable with the general notion that the right to participate in self-governance should be regulated. Truly universal suffrage was perhaps a possibility, but only if certain conditions were met. The ballot, he said, had "destructive potency [in the] hands of an ignorant and a corrupt people." Universal suffrage was dangerous "without mental illumination and moral principle." Economic independence was also a

\[\text{311 Id. at 268–69.}\]
\[\text{312 Id. at 269.}\]
\[\text{313 See id. at 355–56.}\]
\[\text{314 Id. (emphases in original).}\]
\[\text{315 See id. at 356–57.}\]
\[\text{316 See id. at 358–59.}\]
\[\text{317 Id. at 359.}\]
\[\text{318 Id.}\]
virtue because it allowed for political independence. In its absence, Mann feared the dependent might "vote from malice, or envy, or wantonness," which would involve "substantially the moral guilt of treason." Those who exercised such undue influence over dependent men also bore burdens, theirs being "baseness" and "subordination of treason."

Mann's common claim throughout his writing on this subject was that a republican government absolutely must commit itself to the moral and intellectual improvement of its citizenry. Otherwise it was doomed. "[W]ithout additional knowledge and morality," he wrote, "things must accelerate from worse to worse." If there was "universal suffrage, there must be universal elevation of character, intellectual and moral, or there will be universal mismanagement and calamity."

Mann's views provide us with some indication of how a prominent figure viewed the concepts and political implications of insanity and idiocy. Mann was well known at the time for his progressive stance on a wide range of issues, but differed from others in his more vociferous support for public education. His advocacy was founded not only on the idea that education was the basis for intellectual and economic advancement, but also on the notion that it was so important to the functioning of a republic. It inoculated democratic governance from much of what was feared about it. An educated citizenry staved off the more demagogic and destructive elements in society. It would provide a bulwark of stability and legitimacy in the face of challenges to its best impulses. In short, an effective system of public schooling would tip the balance between the beauty of republican government and the uglier forms of political organization.

Mann's ideas probably did not significantly differ from those of the rest of Massachusetts's elite in one important respect. Even when rhapsodizing over the possibility of the common man's ability to participate ably and effectively in self-government, one senses an ambivalence about that very ability. There is confusion and caution at the same time there is optimism and hope. Yes, there should be faith in the future of democratic governance... but surely there are limits?

Horace Mann, as well as many others, such as delegates to state constitutional conventions, spoke with what was most likely a common thought: there may very well be limits on the ability to participate. And as the early citizens of Massachusetts weighed the relative merits of restricting participation on the basis

319 See id. at 364.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 See id. at 365–66.
323 See id. at 366.
324 Id. at 365.
325 Id. at 366.
of property holding and, later, tax paying and the restrictions of the 1820–1821 constitution, they were making the difficult choices involved in specifying precisely where they believed those limits to be. They decided first that there must be some limits on participation—a decision originating in their doubts, not their faith; and second, that one of those limits would be based on idiocy and insanity—another decision originating in doubt.

Coincidentally, the new concepts of idiocy and insanity came to the fore at about the same time as did particularities of gender and race. This is perhaps the most significant aspect of the Massachusetts story told in this article. As the nation’s states were exercising their constitutional prerogative to establish voter qualifications, they were casting about for ways to realize the promise of the new political order expressed in the soaring language of the country’s founders and leaders. They were successful in some respects, primarily in moving away from the deliberate preference for economic privilege, but much less so in others.

Until now, we have believed that the major failings in suffrage laws were the formal gender and racial distinctions adopted after the American Revolution. There can be no doubt that these prejudices were deep-seated and long-lived, and their difficult legacy is still with us. It has taken the force of constitutional amendments and far-reaching legislation to address the enormity of these distinctions, and the battle is far from won.

Our purpose here is to suggest that the Massachusetts story exposes another prevalent form of discrimination in state electoral qualification laws, one based on intellectual and emotional impairment. Its presence today in the statutes and constitutions of forty-four states suggests that disability is a powerful idea in the imagination of the public and the public’s representatives. We argue, however, that it is an artificial dividing line between those believed to be “competent” and those believed to be “incompetent.”

Perhaps the outcome of the Massachusetts story would have been different had the delegates to the 1853 convention not had the original “paupers and persons under guardianship” language from 1820–1821 with which to contend. It is an intriguing question. The 1853 delegates deliberated during a time of

---

326 Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas, supra note 3, at 439.

327 We will not address the constitutionality of this distinction here; however, see Kay Schriner, Lisa A. Ochs & Todd G. Shields, The Last Suffrage Movement: Voting Rights for People with Cognitive and Emotional Disabilities, 27 PUBLIUS 3 (1997). We also raise the issue of the necessity of making this distinction in state law. Six states (Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania) do not disenfranchise specific individuals with cognitive or emotional impairments and apparently suffer no ill effects. Further, if states require some measure of protection for the intelligence of the electorate, they might follow the suggestion of the American Bar Association to establish objective tests at the point of registration. Any potential voter who can provide the information required to register (with appropriate accommodations for those who need assistance) should be permitted to vote. BRUCE D. SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES III (1982).
transition from an almost unquestioning acceptance of the necessity of a propertyholding requirement to more contemporary ideas about the right to vote and its role in ensuring political representation. Given that the original guardianship exclusion had been based on economic grounds, might the Massachusetts delegates of 1853 have avoided the discussion of "idiots" and "insane" people if the guardianship exclusion had not been there for them to transform?

If the experience of the other states is any guide, we would have to conclude that the Massachusetts constitution probably would have come to include a disability-based exclusion of some variety. Given the proclivity of the states to adopt such exclusions during the mid-eighteenth century, there is good reason to think that Massachusetts would have made this distinction in any case. The record makes it obvious that there was concern about the competency of people labeled as idiots and insane. Intellectual and moral competency were fundamental criteria for participation, and idiots and insane people had neither. Like other distinctions of the time, the Massachusetts guardianship exclusion perpetuated a mythology that the health of the republic depended on keeping some people from taking part in governing.