Underwater: Entangled Governmentalities, and the Emergence of Counter-Resilient Practices in Post-Hurricane Sandy Canarsie, Brooklyn

“I’m very disappointed in this meeting. You talk about a lot of things: mental health, farming, sewers... But the main thing a lot of people come out here to hear about is reimbursement... You talk about mental health, which is a result of the trauma that a lot of us experienced during the hurricane, but you can’t disregard the stress this issue has caused us... that’s what people want to talk about!... It’s a big issue. You could address it for five minutes, ten minutes. Instead, you just ignore it.”

More than 200 residents packed themselves into the stuffy auditorium of Canarsie’s Hebrew Educational Society in mid-July for the first of four planned public engagement meetings for New York Rising, the state government-led project to form post-disaster reconstruction plans for 124 localities around the state, and as the meeting wore on tensions mounted between meeting organizers and angry residents. The above quote comes from a man who rose towards the tail end of the meeting. Overpowering numerous interruptions (“this is not the forum for that!” “this money was given for a specific reason!”) from those running the meeting and segments of the audience, he chided organizers for the meeting’s agenda, which explicitly excluded discussion of reimbursement for residents. It was a familiar scene to me as I spent the summer of 2014 touring public meetings in Canarsie and surrounding neighborhoods of Brooklyn which were ‘recovering’ from Hurricane Sandy since the storm hit in late October 2012. While residents were eager to discuss compensation and reimbursement at public meetings, meeting organizers routinely attempted to redirect issues to their own selected topic of choice: resilience.

In the past several decades resilience has become a prolific discourse used by actors in government and NGOs in the context of disastrous climate events. However, different actors formulate different conceptions of the meaning of resilience, and the term remains open and contested. Accompanying the varied understandings of resilience, recovery groups and programs
make use of certain techniques (discursive strategies, methods of classification, participatory modes of governance, and regimes of accounting and calculation) to strategically govern residents’ practices.

To better understand how resilience was constructed and propagated by actors in Canarsie, I utilize Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality to provide an analytical framework that “is especially useful toward connecting abstract societal discourses with everyday material practices” (Ettlinger 2011). Governmentality refers to an ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, strategies and tactics that allow for the calculated exercise of specific forms of power on target populations through the “political economy of a will to knowledge” (Foucault 1998). Techniques of governance work by engaging the relation between the various societal mentalities that may simultaneously exist in the social nexus and the material practices of people’s everyday lives (Foucault 2000b). In Canarsie, programs and organizations deploy techniques to strategically govern residents’ recovery practices. These techniques typically embody neoliberal tropes, individualizing costs and casting resilience as a technical problem to be solved through calculable solutions. As an epistemological approach, governmentality helps interpret and explain how forms of governance are normalized and legitimized for those enrolled in them. The governance of disaster recovery in Canarsie has been rationalized through the increasingly prevalent societal mentality that the solution to problems of human/environment relations lies in resilience that must be developed, known, calculated, and constructed. I sketch the techniques Canarsie recovery actors (programs, organizations, and policies) use to ground their conceptions of resilience in newfound resilient practices of residents, who are the subjects of resilience.
Governmentality is useful for research on disaster and climate governance because it is conducive to recognizing the multiplicity of actors that participate in governance. There has been a tendency in disaster recovery literature to over-emphasize the role of specific actors such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an underfunded government agency unable to meet its goals without substantial partnerships with, or assistance from, the private and non-governmental sectors. Following Braun’s (2014) conceptualization of resilient governance occurring through an assemblage (dispositif) containing a dizzying variety of practices, institutions, discourses, mentalities, and funding mechanisms, I analyze Canarsie’s recovery as being governed by a multiplicity of actors.

Different recovery actors articulate resilience in varied ways, prompting differing strategies for governing resident recoveries. NY Rising approaches resilience as an infrastructure problem, while the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) associates it with individual homeowners’ adaptations to risks. Different recovery actors develop different techniques of resilience for governing resident practices in accordance with their understandings of resilience. Canarsie disaster recovery occurs through an assemblage of actors, each of whom produces their own resilient governmentalities. Analyzing disaster recovery as simultaneously governed by multiple governmentalities provides space for thinking about disaster recovery as being constituted by entangled and at times incoherent perspectives and strategies. As recovery actors distribute recovery funds, they simultaneously produce and spread knowledge about what constitutes resilient and fundable spaces. Recovery groups within and outside of the government become crucial nodes of power in the context of individualized disaster costs that few people have the spare savings to meet. Need exceeds supply of recovery funding, necessitating groups’ use of techniques to strategically govern the distribution of funds. These techniques often involve
classificatory schemes bound up in neoliberal discourses of deservingsness, sustainability, and resilience. NY Rising’s classificatory schemes revolve around cost/benefit analyses, which direct funds towards critical urban infrastructure. Meanwhile, city housing recovery program Build It Back’s funding mechanisms quickly fulfilled multimillion dollar deals with inexperienced outside contractors, simultaneously failing to begin servicing its 20,000 resident housing recovery funding waitlist for nearly 18 months. Viewing recovery actors as each participating in their own resilient governmentalities helps interpret how individualized costs have been distributed to residents, and through what techniques.

Although Canarsie was not my initial planned neighborhood of study, I became drawn to it by the sense that it was a space of disconnect between the recovery assemblage and the needs of residents, a sense underscored by it being a constant source of debate and controversy amongst recovery organizers throughout the city. I knew before arriving that Canarsie had been targeted by subprime lenders more than any other neighborhood in New York City during the 2000s, that “the pre-event trajectory of a community’s economic vitality and quality of life almost always continues in the aftermath of a disaster,” and that by six months after the storm, 10% of 1-4 family units in Canarsie were in foreclosure (Mooney 2008, Cutter and Emrich 2006). What I did not know was that some Canarsie residents caused major controversy in the recovery assemblage by improperly using charitable funds designated for portions of their houses (basements) that recovery groups had deemed unsustainable, unresilient, and unfundable. I cast these emergent, unexpected resident recovery strategies as counter-resilient practices, and portray these practices as understandable and rational while arguing that their unexpectedness emerged from gaps in knowledge and understanding between the groups and programs
encompassing the recovery assemblage and local residents. Further, I ask: did differing understandings and associated techniques of resilience cohere, or produce perverse effects?

Below I summarize my research methods, and subsequently I draw from critical scholarship to situate Canarsie’s disaster recovery assemblage within broader neoliberal mentalities of governance. Next, I position my research within the dense existing scholarship on governance through resilience, differentiating my project both from mainstream and critical accounts. I find that the former depoliticizes and normalizes resilience as a technique of governance, while the latter lacks examination of the practices of newly-formed resilient subjects and implicitly presents resilience as “working.” I discuss the results of my field research by interweaving a governmentality analysis of the exclusionary mechanisms utilized to govern recovery with a narrative account of the first NY Rising public meeting in Canarsie. My aim is to explain the perpetually porous and imperfect nature of projects of climate-related governance with reference to the contingent constructions and practices of resilience in ways that allow us to see residents not as victims, but as agents navigating a risk-filled urban environment in entrepreneurial and emergent ways.

**Research Methods**

This study is based upon two months of field research in Canarsie, Brooklyn in summer 2014. I utilized two methods: semi-structured one-on-one interviews with residents in churches, town halls, parks, office spaces and private residences, as well as participant observation at town halls, public meetings, as well as closed meetings of recovery organizers. I used the snowballing interview technique for sampling, by which I identified gatekeepers both in the neighborhood

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1 Approved by the Institutional Review Board, Protocol #2014E0158. All interview subjects have been given pseudonyms.
and in the recovery assemblage who introduced me to a range of other voices within their respective communities. This paper draws upon over 20 interviews with actors in the recovery process, including Canarsie residents; volunteers and leaders from local congregations and Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs); public officials; and volunteers and leaders of local Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), including board members of the Brooklyn Long-Term Recovery Group. I remain in contact with many of my interviewees, and consider this work a result of my ongoing discussions with those in the community.

I arrived in Brooklyn with several neighborhoods in mind for potential study, anticipating that within a few days of fieldwork one site would emerge as being both intriguing to me and ripe for research material. As briefly indicated above, Canarsie quickly won my heart and attention. Punctuated on its southeast border by the calm Canarsie Pier overlooking Jamaica Bay, the neighborhood of Canarsie appears as its own pier jutting out of the southeast border of Brooklyn. Up against the coast of Jamaica Bay and flanked on its southwest and northeast sides by Paerdegat Basin and Fresh Creek respectively, the neighborhood fits mainstream understandings of vulnerability to flooding and climate-related sea-level rises (Center for NYC Neighborhoods 2013, Cutter and Emrich 2006). Several phenomena in Canarsie also fit common understandings of social vulnerability: Canarsie has a substantial minority population (85% black with many families having roots in the Caribbean, especially Haiti), and limited connection to the denser urban core (just one subway station and line connect Canarsie to the rest of the city, and buses to and from Canarsie are routinely overcrowded). Further, it lacks substantial tourist or retail attractions, and was in the midst of a housing crisis on the eve of the storm, having been targeted by subprime lenders more than any other neighborhood in the city during the 2000s (Center for NY Neighborhoods 2013, U.S. Census 2010, Mooney 2008). One representative with
a local recovery organization explained, “in a subprime hotspot like Canarsie, many people are paying half of their income to meet their mortgage payments” (interview with ‘Martin’). This leaves residents at extreme risk of foreclosure in the case of the loss of a job or the need to seek medical care, not to mention the repair costs from a disaster. Locals stressed that Canarsie was already ailing on the eve of the storm, and that Sandy effectively took a pre-existing foreclosure crisis in the neighborhood and “kicked it into overdrive” (interview with ‘Emily’). That Canarsie stands at the intersection of mainstream understandings of physical and social vulnerability and faces unique challenges, such as a pre-storm foreclosure crisis driven by the impacts of subprime lending, makes it an excellent space to examine both the effects of the pre-Sandy context and the governance of resilience with reference to the recovery assemblage and local residents.

Although my appearance as a young white male made me an outlier in Canarsie, my status as a clear outsider was helpful to my research more often than not. One successful research strategy I stumbled upon was to bring my laundry to Canarsie laundromats, where I was regularly approached by residents who recognized me as an outsider and were curious as to what brought me there. Quite often residents I spoke with were enthusiastic about my research and more than willing to share their stories or connect me with friends and relatives similarly affected by the storm, and I am deeply indebted to all the residents of Canarsie who enthusiastically welcomed me into their communities and homes and helped to make my experience meaningful.

**Positioning Disaster Recovery within Neoliberalism**

Projects of governance are intrinsically linked to societal mentalities and regimes of truth, which are grounded into material practices by techniques of power (Foucault 2000a). I begin my
analysis of Canarsie by situating disaster recovery within the broad regimes of truth known to scholars as neoliberalism, a constantly evolving bundle of governmentality that produce and engineer competition in the marketplace, working to see the market pervade all aspects of the social fabric (Foucault 2008). Crucially, neoliberal governmentality impacts the actions both of residents and the many actors involved in recovery work. Interviews revealed that disaster recovery organizers often are surprised by the extent to which they are “left to do the heavy-lifting” in residential recovery (Interview with ‘Emily’). The diverse apparatus of community-based and faith-based organizations that is responsibilized with the recovery inevitably lacks the resources to meet the needs of residents. The limited recovery funding prompts entrepreneurial behavior from the variety of groups who enter into quasi-competition with each other for funding and the financial viability of their organizations. To one experienced recovery organizer, this situation often leads to “the careless waste of recovery funding” through the “hubris and ignorance” of those who become distracted from recovery work while desperately trying to obtain the necessary funds to keep their organization running (Interview with ‘Don’). It is in this context that organizers’ most pressing concern was fraud: “all it takes is a couple of instances of fraud, even minor fraud, to make everybody skittish about spending their charitable dollars” (Interview with ‘Martin’).

The actions of recovery organizations and workers are conditioned by the sense that they are on their own; very much the result of the neoliberal “frugal government,” in which the central government, ‘the state,’ performs actions and disperses funds based on a calculation of how little the state can reasonably provide while maintaining its goals of active production and competition through the marketplace (Foucault 2008). Neoliberal disaster recovery thus focuses primarily on the maintenance of critical infrastructure while leaving residents to recover
themselves. This frugality engenders a devolution of responsibility, in which citizens are told they are responsible for their own material conditions and the possibility of changing them. This transference is legitimized through a ‘politics of individualization,’ in which individuals and organizations are pitted against each other, which according to market logic should lead to the most socially optimal outcome (Lazzarato 2009). It is within this context that it is possible to understand a system that devolves the costs of a disaster to individuals without the requisite resources to achieve ‘recovery.’

Although the individualization of costs after disasters might initially appear an intensely political issue, fundamental to the neoliberal project is the casting of governance as apolitical and increasingly tied up in more ‘technical’ methods of governing, typically involving calculative regimes of accounting and financial management (Rose 1993). Residents contested this depoliticization using town hall meetings and events by local politicians to confront the capricious and supposedly apolitical disaster recovery programs to which they were subjected. The politics of individualization and enterprise society that are key characteristics of neoliberalism connect with the mentality of homeownership in the United States whereby the house is understood as a site of investment and the most important asset most Americans will ever own (Hanan 2010). Many federal programs throughout the past century aimed at encouraging U.S. homeownership, perhaps most prolific among them being the mortgage-interest tax deduction. As one community organizer said, “The dream of homeowning, I don’t know if it’s hard-wired into the American psyche, but it’s certainly much-touted on both sides of the political aisle” (interview with ‘Martin’). Homeownership as a societal mandate contributed to the construction of Canarsie’s subprime crisis, and has continued to pervade resident decisions regarding the repair of their basements and attempts to salvage their mortgages.
The shift in neoliberal governance away from social insurance to a kind of privatization of risk management has been dubbed ‘prudentialism,’ in which citizens add to their obligations “the need to adopt calculative and prudent personal relations to risk and danger” (O’Malley 1992). The neoliberal principle of economic-centric solutions to societal ills is well illustrated by the example of the NFIP. Created in 1968 after decades of debate following private flood insurers retreating from the market after the 1927 Mississippi River Flood, the NFIP has become one of the main tools at the disposal of the federal government for attempting to regulate citizens’ exposure to flooding (Knowles and Kunreuther 2014). Those enrolled in the program pay monthly premiums based on highly technical calculations of flood risk conducted through Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). While the updating of these flood maps provides the program with its technical underpinning, in typical frugal government fashion, the costly floodplain mapping has been badly underfunded and deferred over the years (Knowles and Kunreuther 2014).

Understanding disaster recovery as embedded within neoliberal governmentality provides numerous insights into the formation of resilient subjects in Canarsie. First, we see that both residents and disaster organizers are integrated into an enterprise society, which mediates their actions with reference to economic rationales such as resilience, sustainability, or in the case of organizers the need to ‘compete’ with other groups for limited recovery funds. Fundamental characteristics of neoliberalism such as frugal government, the devolution of responsibility this entails, and the politics of individualization that legitimizes it, condition much of what occurs in disaster recovery. Prudentialism underscores the federal government’s most comprehensive efforts to confront these issues through the NFIP, which in typical neoliberal fashion is calculative and, following Rose (1993), therefore depoliticized. These underpinnings of
neoliberalism have pervasive effects that shape the trajectory of recovery and the need for it, from the culture of individualized homeownership to the neoliberal preoccupation with discourses of participation observed by Ellis (2012). Beyond the constitution of disaster recovery in Canarsie, I turn now to the scholarship that surrounds resilience to better position the discourses that communicate the values embedded in recovery efforts.

**Positioning in Resilience Scholarship**

Scholarship on resilience has exploded in the past decade, becoming one of the most prolific discourses on climate change and natural disasters. However, as Brown (2014) asserted, this emerging field encompasses a multiplicity of voices contesting and constructing resilience in different ways. Normative approaches have attempted to quantify economic resilience, understood as the speed at which an entity or system recovers from a severe shock to its desired state (Rose 2007). Within this framework, resilience appears as a neoliberal discourse from the outset, emphasizing the retention of productivity and functionality. Assessing social vulnerability and resilience in coastal areas of the U.S, Cutter and Emrich (2006) define resilience as the ability of a given social group to “adequately recover” from the impacts of hazards. They position resilience and vulnerability as largely the products of social inequalities, raising questions about the future of coastal counties that have grown more populous, racially and ethnically diverse in the past decades.

Scholars have stressed the importance of taking into account socioeconomic factors when identifying vulnerable areas, showing how recent disasters reproduce inequalities, and raising pertinent questions regarding who will pay for adaptation measures in a world of human-driven climate change (Lecihenko and Thomas 2012, Peck 2006, Reid 2013, Cutter and Emrich 2006).
A substantial scholarship across multiple disciplines uses a ‘managerial approach’ and an aspiration to scientific language in attempting to anticipate, plan for, and develop governing techniques for restructuring life around climate issues, a process that often involves the use of resilience as a discursive tool (Brassett and Vaughn-Williams 2013). These mainstream approaches to resilience provide insights into shortcomings in existing disaster recovery and climate governance, but they often problematically assert an unexamined and universal ontological basis for resilience. In contrast, Leichenko (2011) emphasizes that the term is contested, arguing that in order to ensure the concept retains its utility there must be “continued questioning of how the concept is used and applied to urban areas.” The purpose, then, is to ensure that as resilience becomes intertwined with climatized development, “it fosters positive social change while contributing to long-term sustainability” (Leichenko 2011).

Taking up the call for further critical evaluation of the concept of resilience, scholars have examined the power relations bound up in the production and dispersal of the discourse. MacKinnon and Derickson (2012) argue that the mobilizing discourse of resilience naturalizes the ecologically dominant system of global capitalism by placing the onus on local actors to adapt to “the logics and implications of global capitalism and climate change,” thoroughly implicating resilience in the hegemonic modes of thought that support global capitalism. Development and security studies have seen an explosion of literature about resilience in past decades that critiques positive ‘managerial’ studies through Foucauldian approaches to show how resilience produces a ‘politically-debased’ form of neoliberal subjectivity that secures neoliberal governmentality” (Brassett and Vaughn-Williams 2015). Pugh (2014) positions resilience as a form of power that works on populations to create resilient subjects who understand that risks and hazards and dangers are a permanent feature of life. Evans and Reid
(2014) concur, finding that the resilient subject “is required to accept the dangerousness of the world it lives in as a condition for partaking of that world and accept the necessity of the injunction to change itself in correspondence with threats now presupposed as endemic and unavoidable.” These authors see resilience as a biopolitical project masquerading as apolitical, deliberately disabling “the political habits, tendencies, and capacities of peoples and replacing them with adaptive ones.” They raise the important question of how to measure the success of resilience, asking whether we should celebrate the vulnerable subject who fulfills its neoliberal potential, or the subject who moves to combat the system that seeks to render them resilient as such. To these authors, resilience is ultimately a program of social compliance rather than “a political ambition to transform the very sources of inequality and injustices experienced by marginalized populations.”

Few have placed as much theoretical emphasis on resilience as an emerging mode of governing populations as Braun (2014), for whom governing through resilience has entailed the incorporation of ‘natural processes’ as part of the critical infrastructure of urban life; emphasizing the historicity and contingency of how life is administered today, he concludes that “resilience is the name for our contemporary form of biopolitics.” Usefully, in contrast to critical scholars who portray resilience as a program of governance being imposed upon populations who lack the agency to resist, Braun (2014) leaves open the possibility of alternate climate futures arising from the “micro-politics of struggle” within communities in which this new management of life is taking place, one which holds the possibility of reforming such assemblages away from sustaining the very social orders that causes the problems it purports to solve. Evidence of such a micro-politics of struggle can be found in Grove (2014), whose
research on disaster management in Jamaica showed that everyday life undermined neoliberal programming in ways that draw out the possibilities for political contestation and resistance.

My aim is to ground the aforementioned conceptual tools in a case study to show how the disaster recovery assemblage in Canarsie ‘manages life’ in the wake of disaster, and the ways in which the micro-politics of struggle shape, resist, and reshape the trajectory of recovery. Brassett and Vaughn-Williams (2015) have critiqued governmentality approaches to resilience for committing the same methodological error as managerial approaches to resilience by problematically accepting that resilience ‘works.’ Rather, they stress the role of ambiguity, indeterminacy, and contingency in attempts to govern via discourses and practices of resilience. Seeking to “recover the performative politics of resilience as a series of attempted closures, which are always already in excess of their own logic, and give rise to unexpected, unforeseen, and disruptive effects,” these authors aim “to repoliticize the otherwise technocratic nature of resilient knowledge and its effects” (Brassett and Vaughn-Williams 2015).

Although Brassett and Vaughn-Williams’ (2015) critique identifies crucial shortcomings in existing governmentality studies of resilience, I suggest that these problems emerge not from the conceptual lens itself but from misapplications of the tools of governmentality. Issues of scale are crucial when pursuing a governmentality study; Foucault (1980) calls for an “ascending analysis” that begins by identifying the regimes of practices occurring at the microscale of analysis, and works from there to connect these practices with organizations, institutions, and broader societal mentalities. Analyzing the macro-scale construction and dispersal of resilience without investigating how resilient governmentality has impacted practices at the micro-level entails conducting the type of descending analysis against which Foucault warned. Conducting a governmentality study through ascending analysis leaves room for consideration of how
“practices can diverge from prescribed norms,” with there being “no presumption of effectiveness of a technique of power” (Ettlinger 2011). Investigating the micro-scale of analysis for regimes of practices rather than assuming that techniques of governance produce their intended practices is crucial for understanding the multiplicity of contingencies that pervade the disaster recovery apparatus and the unanticipated resident practices in Canarsie.

In the following section I interweave a brief account of the public engagement meeting from which the opening quote in this paper was obtained with analysis of the meeting as a participatory technique of governance being used in Canarsie to produce resilient subjects. Brassett and Vaughn-Williams (2015) indicate that sites like NY Rising are worth investigation because they show “how the resilience agenda seeks to encompass (and apparently unite) the governance and protection of material infrastructure, human subjects, and their interrelation.” My intention is to not assume that resilience “works,” but rather to critically deconstruct the interrelations between resilience as a discourse and as practiced to grasp the contingencies embedded in resilient governmentalities.

Brassett and Vaughn-Williams’ (2015) call for scholars to investigate “whether resilience always does and means the same thing across different contexts” suggests that building resilience is an inherently spatial process that unfolds unevenly in its attempts to create and govern resilient spaces and resilient subjects. To extend these authors’ insights through an analysis of the uneven construction of resilient subjects and spaces, I take inspiration from Roy’s (2009) work on civic governmentality in Mumbai and Beirut. Studying NGO work with slum redevelopment, Roy (2009) found that NGOs serve as forms of government and produce governable spaces and subjects, and their associated regimes of participation and inclusion produce a distinctive political subjectivity. By examining the relationship between governmental
regimes of inclusion and the production of space, Roy (2009) concludes that “there is a great deal to be learned about power and authority by studying how subjects and power come to be ‘inside’ the project of citizenship.” In Canarsie we can learn a great deal by understanding the politics of inclusion associated with the recovery; however, rather than questioning who is included in the project of citizenship, in the case of Canarsie we must ask: *what spaces and subjects are included in the project of resilience?* Using the framework of civic governmentality, Ellis (2012) indicated that public consultations are techniques of governance with “wide appeal because they tap into a more pervasive discourse about participation… participation is a key trope of neoliberal rationale of governance.” Using the following vignette of the NY Rising public engagement meeting I identify the techniques NY Rising and other Canarsie recovery actors use to manage inclusion.

**Participatory Disaster Recovery in Canarsie, and Regimes of Exclusion**

In this section, I interweave analysis of the participatory techniques used in Canarsie with an abbreviated narrative account of the first of four planned Canarsie public engagement meetings for the NY Rising program, which I attended in July 2014. While participation is a pervasive feature of neoliberal governance, it represents such a broad array of governing practices that the term’s meaning is contested (Huxley 2013). Further, participatory schemes often promise inclusion and empowerment while achieving neither. I identify participation as a technique groups like NY Rising use to govern the politics of inclusion. NY Rising organizers used participatory exercises to engage the discourse of inclusiveness, yet in practice the form of the exercises produced inclusion and exclusion simultaneously. While NY Rising engages the mentality of inclusive governance through participatory schemes, other groups have constructed
their own regimes of in/exclusion. I analyze how regimes of inclusion have been constituted by different recovery actors in Canarsie, and how this has been connected to their particular constructions of ‘resilience.’

Residents filed into the auditorium of Canarsie’s Hebrew Educational Society for Canarsie’s first public engagement meeting and were greeted by well-dressed members of the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (GOSR) and Canarsie’s NY Rising planning committee. The enthusiastic organizers passed out information packets. The accompanying packets offered a brief overview of the program, which is a $650 million initiative started by the New York state government in April 2013. The packets brag that NY Rising “is a unique combination of bottom-up community preparation and State-provided technical expertise.” One states the goals as empowering the most impacted communities in the state “to develop thorough and implementable reconstruction plans to build physically, socially, and economically resilient and sustainable communities” and to rebuild “in a way that will mitigate against future risks and build increased resilience.” The packets assured residents that “all New Yorkers will benefit from added resilience. Added resilience means less storm damage in the future, saving lives and taxpayer dollars needed for emergency response.” Throughout the opening presentation, organizers emphasized that it was crucial they “use their time at this meeting to form a plan for improving community resiliency.” Everyone was encouraged to get involved in the process now, “or don’t complain when things are put in place.”

This account of the first NY Rising Public Engagement meeting provides insights into the techniques of governing recovery in post-Sandy Canarsie. The technique of governing by participation has become a taken-for-granted aspect of neoliberal governance (Ellis 2012, Huxley 2013). Participation is open to a number of meanings and implementations, making it a flexible technique of governance for engaging mentalities regarding the need for governance to appear inclusive and democratic (Huxley 2013). Despite optimism about the potential for resident participation in the governance disaster preparedness (van Aalst 2008), Cornwall (2008) notes that regimes of participation commonly exclude people: especially vulnerable are those who have to work, have small children, or otherwise are unable to justify large chunks of time spent outside the house. The discourse of inclusiveness obfuscates the ways that inclusion and the
empowerment of certain perspectives and voices are mutually constituted with the exclusion and marginalization of others. Although participatory regimes typically privilege urban planners and experts, the results of these schemes are often portrayed discursively by program organizers as the products of the wishes of the very residents of the targeted community. Throughout the NY Rising public meeting organizers encouraged the public to “take ownership of the process” and remain highly involved “or don’t complain when things are in place,” pre-empting the eventual dissatisfaction that might arise towards the chosen projects and legitimizing the democratic and inclusive nature of the program. Participatory governance in NY Rising became a means by which to govern inclusion and exclusion.

Build It Back’s organizers discursively framed the program’s regimes of inclusion as empowering low-income residents to recover and ‘rebuild better,’ leaving them more ‘resilient’ (in a home that was less physically vulnerable) when the next storm arrives. However, in practice Build It Back’s registration and communication mechanisms governed inclusion by providing few resources for non-English speakers, while the application process was sufficiently onerous to exclude many elderly residents and recent immigrants. Further, miscommunication of policies led many renters to only discover that they were eligible for Build It Back after the registration had closed (Make the Road New York 2014). In the context of scarce recovery funds, many groups based their in/exclusions of residents on assumptions about other recovery programs. For example, many FBO and CBO housing recovery groups excluded residents who were already on Build It Back’s waitlist to avoid a duplication of recovery funding. Frugal neoliberal mentalities strategically governed these groups’ respective regimes of inclusion.

*At the meeting’s outset, an organizer set out what was at stake: $11.9 million had been awarded to Canarsie through CDBG-DR. Public engagement meetings “held after each important milestone of the planning process” would help form a community-specific*
reconstruction plan to serve as a “roadmap for building the community’s resilience.” Canarsie’s planning committee sends its final proposals to the GOSR. The GOSR has the final say in selecting and implementing projects for improving communities’ resilience, with its project funding criteria including cost-benefit analyses, feasibility, and “the effectiveness of each project in reducing risk to populations and critical assets.”

Members of the public spent a half-hour taking part in ‘needs and opportunities,’ ‘community vision’ and ‘asset-mapping’ exercises. These exercises consisted of discussion about resilience with meeting organizers who patrolled poster boards on either side of the room. The poster boards highlighted potential infrastructure improvement projects, asked residents about their vision for the neighborhood, and provided maps of Canarsie with visualizations of flood risks, housing assets, infrastructure, and economic assets.

Following the feedback exercises, participants were encouraged to return to their seats so members of Canarsie’s planning committee and the GOSR took turns ‘summarizing and responding’ to feedback. Common themes included the revitalization of Canarsie pier, more police and security cameras in the neighborhood, attracting ‘trendier’ businesses, adding a farmer’s market and mental health facility, expanding access to solar panel technology, and improving the neighborhood’s sewage system. Residents raised concerns about the lack of a place to go in the case of disaster and pushed for expanded transportation options such as a tram or ferry system, but these options were dismissed as too costly. Organizers instead emphasized building a disaster relief center in the community to provide a centralized place for those in the neighborhood to go and access resources. A woman from the audience interrupted this proposal to emphasize alternative transportation options, saying “I think it’s something that really needs to be considered and addressed, because it’s just something- you have to think about the weeks we were home not able to get to our jobs, if somebody fell ill how could we get to hospitals? It’s a very dire situation.” The woman’s comments drew support from the audience, prompting the GOSR’s regional lead to take the microphone and assure her that “it’s a great idea we’ll consider through the process,” hurriedly moving on to the next speaker. The organizers’ attempts to cut off ‘participant interruptions’ and keep the meeting’s agenda moving grew more assertive as the meeting drew on. One committee member began his talk by asking people “not to stand up and scream like that,” concluding by saying “we’re not here to be stuck in the past, we’re here to move forward. And as we move forward, the past will slowly fix itself.”

While the NY Rising program’s participatory exercises reflected discourses of inclusiveness and empowerment, this examination of participation in practice shows how the form of participation, which is determined not by the participants but rather by the facilitators of the participatory exercise, precipitates the results of participation. NY Rising’s particular resilient governmentality employs participatory exercises as distinct techniques of managing inclusion. While NY Rising discursively portrays its funding decisions as constituted by the results of participatory exercises, in practice this process is reversed. The program connects its
neoliberal mentalities of frugal governance to its practices of building infrastructure through regimes of accounting and calculation that abide by market logics, such as cost-benefit analyses of proposed projects. Projects that Canarsie residents ‘decide upon’ are sent to the GOSR for evaluation, but there is no guarantee of implementation. The GOSR’s evaluative schemes of cost-benefit and feasibility analyses are far more empowered decision-makers in the NY Rising planning structure than the participatory residents. Throughout the process, plans would only slightly deviate from the initial proposals made by the committee, and the final public meeting was scheduled after the steering committee completed the final draft of proposed projects.

NY Rising uses participatory exercises to discursively position its techniques of funding as being constituted through the participatory input of residents, hence positioning the funding mechanisms as legitimized and inclusive. Other recovery actors make no such distinctions, with their funding mechanisms governing the politics of inclusion in discourse and practice. Rather than legitimizing their politics of inclusion through participatory exercises, other groups managed inclusion by producing and dispersing knowledge of resilience, sustainability, and their own funding regimes that served to normalize and legitimize their contentious funding decisions. Build It Back’s lengthy applications process and schemes for classifying deserving residents produced knowledge of what constitutes un/fundable spaces and residents. Non-governmental housing recovery groups adopted the NFIP’s framework for conceptualizing and spreading knowledge of risk and resilience, arguing it would be irresponsible to use charitable funds on spaces that would be hit with massive NFIP premium rises in the coming years. Through these and other techniques, Canarsie recovery actors have normalized and legitimized the choices they make in managing their regimes of inclusion.
Before breaking for public feedback, the opening speaker made a brief aside that signaled the unfolding of tensions. Encouraging anyone interested in “fighting Build It Back” to attend different meetings, he warned that this meeting was not for Build It Back-related concerns. In response, portions of the crowd began raising their hands and complaining out loud. With great effort the crowd was subdued and he assured the crowd that they would be directed to more appropriate venues for their Build It Back concerns, emphasizing that it was crucial they use their time at this meeting to form a plan for improving community resiliency. At the conclusion of the opening presentation, several residents took the pre-emptive gag order on reimbursement as their cue to leave.

The tense dismissal of Build It Back feedback demonstrated how this participatory event was pre-fashioned to facilitate certain participants and types of participation while excluding others. Build It Back is the New York City government’s housing recovery and reimbursement program, which has been mired in controversy since its inception. In 18 months, the program sent just three reimbursement checks and began only six reconstruction programs for its 20,000 enrolled homeowners (Durkin 2014). As discussed earlier, communication breakdowns between the program and intended beneficiaries, the refusal to reimburse low-income residents for their rentals during extensive home repairs, and many NGOs’ decisions to exclude residents on the lengthy Build It Back waiting list from consideration for funding enhanced the backlash. Further, the program requires that all cases in which a house is in foreclosure proceedings should be put on hold, a policy some CBO organizers described as “tone-deaf” and “unrealistic” (Interviews with ‘Martin’, ‘Tom’). Residents broached their dissatisfaction with reimbursement programs several times during the meeting, despite the organizers’ best efforts. Although the material results of the meeting would seem to render residents’ objections futile, some local residents viewed speaking out against the scripted and exclusive nature of participation as empowering, and at the meeting’s close many locals thanked the ‘unruly ones’ for interjecting with the topics on everyone’s mind.
Towards the end of the meeting the neighborhood’s State Senator Nick Perry rose to thank the Governor for including Canarsie in the program, and the residents for their active participation. He told residents he was working hard on their Build It Back and insurance-related concerns, telling the crowd that he will keep pushing for a Sandy loan relief program in the New York legislature, “And I’m not talking about welfare, I’m talking about people really in need.” After discussing the need for capital projects to address Canarsie’s waterways and sewage, he asked how many residents in the room were homeowners. Looking at the scores of outstretched hands in front of him, he brought his speech to a close: “You are all investors in Canarsie. You have most of your money in a small spot in Canarsie. You can’t up and leave, because you have to rebuild to recovery equity in your homes. You’ll really have to stay for the reconstruction. And Canarsie’s going to be the place to live, you’re going to have flood-resilient homes, and you’re not going to have to worry. Thanks for showing that you’re here, you’re a real community, and that Canarsie is going to rise again.”

After the applause subsided, the GOSR’s regional lead told residents, “What you have here is a platform. Tonight, we’re coming together and creating consensus.” Alluding to the repeated interruptions from residents, she said that she and committee members would stay after the meeting “to make sure everyone fully understands the program.” Residents were reminded of the next meeting time, cajoled to attend and bring their neighbors and friends, and the meeting adjourned.

State Senator Perry’s speech offers another example of how certain voices and perspectives are privileged through participation. Residents were shouted down for distracting from the program when attempting to discuss Build It Back and insurance claims, while the State Senator’s speech, which focused on those two key issues, earned enthusiasm from the crowd by virtue of his pledge to fight for them. The Senator’s discursive construction of a loan relief program as being clearly distinct from welfare insofar as it was for “people really in need,” tied neoliberal policing of deservingness to the meritocratic march of productive society (Wacquant 2010). Finally, Senator Perry’s recognition of residents’ need to stay in the neighborhood and salvage their equity acknowledged the power of the mortgage to discipline residents’ actions.

The final list of projects the Canarsie planning committee sent to the GOSR offers insights into the way participatory mechanisms seek to ‘create consensus,’ as well as the ways in which NY Rising’s techniques governed the in/exclusion spaces and subjects. The final list of projects does not address concerns residents raised about mental health or transportation. Rather,
it proposes using $7.7 of Canarsie’s $11.9 million to build a flood wall to protect against storm surges in Fresh Creek, which forms Canarsie’s northeast border (Bailey 2015). A full project of “ecosystem restoration, shoreline stabilization, enhancing community access and protecting against the 10-year flood” along Fresh Creek was estimated to cost $60 million, and so the final project approved by the committee funds only the construction of cheek walls and bioswales along certain low-lying, high-risk areas along Fresh Creek. The Canarsie planning committee also proposed million-dollar projects to improve resident and visitor access to Canarsie Pier, as well as to build a recovery community center “to coordinate local relief services and supplies following a disaster, and provide year-round programming” (Bailey K 2015, NY Rising Community Reconstruction Program 2014). One housing recovery organizer suggested to me that these recovery center proposals, common amongst recovering Brooklyn neighborhoods, were “like the Superdome in Katrina: it’s isolated, it has no infrastructure, it has no electricity, and you can’t get anything to it. That’s not where you want people to be.” She suggested the focus should be making sure residents can get out of at-risk neighborhoods rather than building a place in the neighborhoods for them to converge upon (interview with ‘Shauna’).

The scarce remaining funds were split between three proposals aiming to produce resilience knowledge within the community. The committee proposed spending $150,000 to launch Canarsie Corps, “a six-week summer youth job program that identifies and creates paid jobs for youth for resiliency and community projects for two years.” $1 million was allocated to Resiliency Workforce Development, a project to extend existing workforce training programs “and connect Canarsie residents to employment opportunities in a range of resiliency-related industries.” Perhaps most compelling was the committee’s $1.5 million proposal to establish a program for auditing 100 homes in the community and providing 50 grants to projects “that
would enhance resiliency of homes in the 100 year flood-plain.” The GOSR has final say-so on these projects, and it will be revealing to see which proposals correspond with the GOSR’s own techniques of governing the dispersal of funds.

The list of proposed projects and the discourses on display throughout the NY Rising public meeting provide valuable insights into how resilience is being conceptualized by the program. The vast majority of proposed spending target infrastructure improvements such as the Fresh Creek floodwall; NY Rising casts resilience as first and foremost an infrastructural project of gradually negotiating the relationship between natural processes and the built environment. Also notable is the piecemeal nature of this project: regimes of budgeting and cost-benefit analyses render the “most resilient” solutions that may be identified (such as the $60 million Fresh Creek project) impossible, necessitating compromises. Resilience as imagined and propagated by those steering the NY Rising public meeting in Canarsie is primarily concerned with using infrastructure to mediate interactions between the environment and human society. Public concerns related to Fresh Creek and the sewage systems in the area led to multi-million dollar project proposals, yet committee intermediaries repackaged the extensive discussion about transportation into a $100,000 proposal for a transportation and parking study, and subsequently dropped from consideration.

While residents may have had alternative interpretations of resilience, the structure of the NY Rising participatory mechanisms emphasized geoengineering infrastructure projects while downplaying the possibility of using the program’s funds for other causes that may have more immediate impact on residents’ everyday lives, such as improving transportation or mental health facilities in the neighborhood. NY Rising’s organizers aimed to legitimize the program’s politics of inclusion by discursively positioning its funding decisions as the results of inclusive
participation. However, this discourse lacked alignment with on-the-ground practices, and the structure of NY Rising subordinated participation to calculated neoliberal funding mechanisms. Although all recovery actors in Canarsie used funding mechanisms to sort through beneficiaries, few took up NY Rising’s elaborate exercise of supposed inclusiveness, and instead legitimized their regimes of inclusion by disseminating knowledges of their specific conceptions resilience that served to normalize and justify their own funding mechanisms. Understanding how people and spaces are in/excluded from projects of resilience shows how inequalities can be replicated in the recovery from disasters or the preparations for climate change.

The Resilient Subject, and Entangled Governmentalities

My interest in Canarsie is not only the resilient governmentalities NY Rising and other actors produce, but also the resilient subjects they form. Neoliberal techniques of governance work through the establishment of “an enterprise society” in which the individualized and responsibilized units of the social fabric are transformed into rational, profit-seeking actors. This “enterprise society” mediates subjects’ actions and decisions according to economic rationales (Foucault 2008). In disaster recovery, this economic rationale is bound up in discourses of resilience and sustainability; the residents who must now make decisions about their homes and lives with reference to such concepts are hence transformed into resilient subjects. Neoliberal subjects are governed simultaneously by a multiplicity of governmentalities being produced by a variety of actors, organizations and institutions. These governmentalities may co-exist, cohere, or conflict with each other, opening spaces of rupture for counter-conduct and resistance to governance (Ettlinger 2011). In this section I trace prominent governmentalities operating within the Canarsie recovery apparatus, as well as the ruptures and unexpected resident practices
produced by their articulations. Canarsie residents are the subjects of multiple resilient
governmentalities whose entangled techniques produce perverse and unexpected effects.

Through the participatory events it holds, discursive practices it engages in, and physical
projects it undertakes, NY Rising produces its own governmentality, governable spaces, and
resilient subjects. As outlined in the previous section, NY Rising’s governmentality stems from a
conception of resilience as something to be achieved through changes to the critical
infrastructure of the built environment. The practice of building and funding large capital
projects is enabled through its funding mechanisms, which engage neoliberal mentalities of
frugal and calculative governance through the use of cost-benefit analyses. In accordance with
neoliberal mentalities regarding the need for ‘inclusive’ governance, NY Rising used
participatory mechanisms to pose the program’s results as emanating from the grassroots
community. NY Rising’s ideal resilient subjects internalize the scope of possibilities set out by
the program’s resilient governmentality, according to which risks are best mediated by
infrastructure projects that have passed through neoliberal tests of feasibility and cost-benefit-
analyses. However, NY Rising’s influence is by no means totalizing or hegemonic. Multiple
governmentalities co-exist and can govern the same subjects and spaces in ways that can
supplement or contradict each other (Ettlinger 2011). Recovery funds are partitioned to the point
where few groups, organizations or programs can responsibly claim to be forming a
comprehensive recovery plan; the Canarsie planning committee’s half-measure to improve
resilience along Fresh Creek provides an informative example. The many actors that comprise
Canarsie’s recovery assemblage each develop their own techniques of governance for connecting
their specific mentalities of resilience to their targeted governable spaces and subjects.
In light of the controversy showcased within the previous vignette, Build It Back’s
governmentality is worth further attention. Individualized disaster costs typically exceed
individuals’ savings, leaving residents subservient to recovery organizations that distribute
funding. Canarsie’s residents in need of housing repairs turned to Build It Back, the city’s
housing recovery program, for funding, and hence were made subjects of Build It Back’s
conceptions of risk and resilience, as well as its techniques for classifying residents by
deservingness and eligibility. Upon going through the substantial application process, residents
were placed on lengthy waitlists and prioritized according to numerous criteria, including income
and risk of future storm damage. 20,000 program applicants waited more than 18 months for the
first dozen reimbursement checks to be sent out. As its participants suffered through waitlist
purgatory for months on end, Build It Back gave over $5 million to inexperienced subcontractors
for “flawed or incomplete” work, and spent nearly $10 million hiring one of the most expensive
business consulting firms in the nation (Buettner and Chen 2014). Contrasting the speed with
which Build It Back’s funding mechanisms dispersed funds to contracting firms as opposed to
low-income residents indicates that Build It Back’s governmentality is constituted by the
neoliberal “centaur state” that is liberal and trusting to those at the top while being frugal and
paternalistic towards those at the bottom (Wacquant 2010). Build It Back produced
individualized and responsibilized subjects while also marginalizing them through their need for
outside recovery funds.

The governmentality produced by the NFIP has also been prominent in Canarsie’s
recovery, and it demonstrates the instabilities and contingencies through which projects of
governmentality operate. The NFIP is the federal government’s primary policy tool for
regulating how Americans will live by the coasts, but its governing mentalities have evolved
significantly since its founding in 1968. America’s coastal communities have seen their populations explode by 40% since the NFIP’s introduction, forcing the program to evolve beyond its original mandate of dealing with routine flooding along the Mississippi River (Knowles and Kunreuther 2014). Today, the NFIP aims to govern U.S. residents’ ability to live by the coasts by calculating their household’s risk of flooding and charging homeowners premiums that are based on those risk calculations. The NFIP’s governmentality thus exemplifies numerous features of neoliberal governance through its reliance on specialized forms of knowledge and expertise, and its use of calculating and commodifying governing mechanisms.

All residents with federally-backed mortgages (90% of Canarsie residents) and houses within the 100-year flood plain are required by law to apply for the NFIP and pay premiums based on flood risk. FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers make Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) calculating flood risk solely on the basis of structure base-level elevation, with no consideration for surrounding infrastructure; “the actuarial tables don’t exist” (interview with ‘Emily’). The NFIP’s governmentality entails grounding its formulations and calculations of risk through charging premiums to individualized homeowners; it is a financial mode of selecting who can live by the coasts. The risks to human populations that live on or near the coasts are governed through the mechanism of affordability.

The NFIP provides an important case of how practices can diverge from policies. The NFIP’s policy goals are actualized through such techniques as calculating flood maps and requiring homeowners to enroll, yet neither of these techniques is without serious flaws. The continuous updating of flood insurance maps “provides the technical underpinning of everything the program strives to do,” yet the costly floodplain mapping has been badly underfunded and deferred over the years, resulting in a “mismatch between the ambitions of the policy and the
knowledge needed to carry it to success” (Knowles and Kunreuther 2014). Meanwhile, low take-up rates have been a constant of the NFIP despite the legal requirement that all homeowners within the 100-year flood plain with federally-backed mortgages own flood insurance. Banks and financial institutions are entrusted with enforcing this law, but often chose not to do so because they were unlikely to be fined, or failed to do so because the mortgage was transferred to financial institutions in parts of the country where flood-hazard risks are not a focus (Knowles and Kunreuther 2014).

Just as the NFIP’s techniques are inundated with gaps, the program’s governing mentalities are a site of intense political contestation. The future of the NFIP is mired in ongoing uncertainty over the political will to move to fully risk-based premiums, as opposed to the subsidized and grandfathered model of the past in which properties built before FIRMs were introduced are shielded from risk-based premiums. The debate over moving to fully risk-based NFIP premiums is intertwined with regimes of accounting a budgeting that cast the program as being in desperate need of changes to nullify its $27 billion debt to the U.S. Treasury.

Attempting to ‘balance’ the NFIP’s budget, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters flood insurance reform law (BW12), immediately eliminating grandfathering and subjecting pre-FIRM properties to 25% premium rises per annum until actuarially sound, prompting immediate backlash from Congressmen and women from the southeastern United States. Two months after BW12’s passage, Hurricane Sandy brought $68 billion of damage to the northeast, prompting the region’s representatives to join the fight against BW12. In 2014 Congress passed the Menendez-Grimm Flood Insurance Affordability Act (MG14), restoring pre-FIRM properties to grandfathered rates for a year before subjecting them to 15-18% per annum increases until premiums reach actuarial
levels. But with the deeply-indebted program up for renewal in 2016, its political future remains cloudy, and more reforms and delays could be forthcoming.

The many ruptures within the NFIP’s system of governmentality are particularly deleterious because other recovery actors’ techniques are constructed based upon the expectation that the NFIP’s techniques *work as prescribed*. This prompts two crucial points: first, governmentalities are relational insofar as they have ‘spillover effects’ on other governmentalities; second, projects of governmentality are perpetually imperfect, and the effectiveness of a technique of governance can never be assumed. The techniques of governance developed by recovery actors within Canarsie’s recovery assemblage are relationally constituted, meaning no single governmentality can be analyzed in isolation. For example, the NFIP’s calculations of risk (as being solely based on base-level elevation) are influential amongst housing recovery organizations who base their formulations of un/sustainable spaces and un/fundable residents on the expectation that NFIP premium increases will be a potent force within the neighborhood. CBOs and FBOs focused on housing recovery also adopt many Build It Back classification schemes to integrate their efforts and avoid overlaps in recovery funding dispersal, and often avoided funding residents who were on Build It Back’s waiting list. These decisions caused massive controversy, as Build It Back’s funding mechanisms took 18 months to begin sending significant numbers of reimbursement checks (Durkin 2014). In Canarsie, recovery actors relationally developed techniques based upon assumptions of the effectiveness of other actors’ techniques. Hence, when one actor’s techniques were ineffective (NFIP enrollment regulations were not communicated to residents by banks), it had knock-on effects upon numerous other governmentalities in the area (residents who had never been informed of their need to enroll in the NFIP were excluded from the funding regimes of most housing recovery organizations on the basis of their non-compliance.) In this context,
Canarsie residents are best understood as the subjects of entangled governmentalities complementing, interfacing with, and contradicting each other.

The incoherencies and inconsistencies between resilient governmentalities can be traced all the way up to the level of mentalities, demonstrated by recovery actors’ differing conceptualizations of resilience. NY Rising invites residents to ‘participate’ in planning resilience at the broad scale of their neighborhood through infrastructure improvement projects chosen outside the bounds of participation, while Build It Back uses multi-year waitlists to ‘empower’ residents to rebuild their homes with resilience. Meanwhile, NY Rising’s focus on infrastructure improvements to mediate risks fails to alleviate the financial burden Canarsie residents face, because the NFIP’s calculations of risk do not account for infrastructure. At the level of mentalities, the multiple governmentalities within Canarsie’s recovery assemblage found coherence in shared neoliberal principles of individualization, responsibilization, depoliticization, and the management of inclusion. However, subtle differences in conceptualizations of risk and resilience led to incoherencies between different groups’ techniques of resilience. Further, the numerous techniques that hinged upon the effectiveness of other groups’ techniques often compounded ruptures within both groups’ governmentalities.

**Counter-Resilience**

Having discussed at length the incoherencies produced by the confluence of multiple resilient governmentalities in Canarsie, it is worth reflecting upon what the recovery apparatus does as a whole: marginalize residents by ensnaring them in paradoxical webs of bureaucracy from which there appear to be no easy escape routes. Canarsie’s significant Caribbean immigrant population, many of whom speak Haitian creole, were largely excluded from Build It Back
registration through the program’s problematic management of inclusion (Make the Road New York 2014). Two years after Sandy, most residents who did manage to enroll still remain on Build It Back’s waitlist, and their enrollment precludes them from securing funds elsewhere. If the storm and Canarsie’s pre-storm foreclosure crisis were not enough to financial destabilize residents, the need to elevate one’s house or possibly face up to $10,000 per annum in NFIP premiums is poised to displace another batch of residents. In face of this threat of eviction, I underscore once again the imperfect nature of governmentality, and the spaces it leaves for a micro-politics of resistance. Grove (2014) found that everyday life undermined neoliberal disaster management programming in ways that draw out the possibilities for political contestation and resistance, while Brassett and Vaughn-Williams (2015) claimed that resilience is a political project representing “a series of attempted closures, which are nevertheless always already in excess of their own logic and give rise to unexpected, unforeseen, and disruptive effects.” Drawing inspiration from Ettlinger’s (2011) insights into how multiple governmentalities’ interactions can have perverse effects, and Foucault’s (1996) understanding of power as a productive system in which there is always room for resistance and counter-conduct, I turn now to counter-resilient practices in Canarsie that diverged from the prescribed norms of resilience.

As touched upon in the introduction, the ongoing controversy and debate in Brooklyn’s recovery community surrounding basements in the area prompted me to center my research upon Canarsie. In the last section, I explained how the Canarsie assemblage’s entangled governmentalities have been unresponsive to resident needs, frequently leaving residents in paradoxical ‘no-win’ situations. The Canarsie basements controversy is one situation in which the entangled governmentalities of disaster recovery have nothing but insecurity to offer
residents. Hurricane Sandy flooded basements across Canarsie, leaving some residents without the rental income they relied upon to pay their mortgages. Geographers have shown that mortgages contain a bundle of techniques of discipline that encourage subjects to self-rule, producing a subject who is governable by finance (Kear 2013). Homeowners’ actions are persistently disciplined by the need to pay their mortgages (and associated homeownership costs) or face displacement. Residents attempted to recover from Sandy with reference to what needed to be done to maintain their mortgages; State Senator Perry acknowledged this stark fact in his speech at the public meeting, as he mentioned that Canarsie’s homeowners, “investors,” as he called them, “can’t up and leave… have to recover the equity in [their] homes.” With the threat of displacement looming, residents typically turned to housing recovery groups to secure rebuild funding for their basements, only to discover that these organizations had developed funding mechanisms that strategically excluded them from recovery funds.

Build It Back, FEMA, and most major housing recovery NGOs constructed techniques of classification that excluded rental-basements from funding by classifying the spaces in three ways: First, as revenue-earning spaces, essentially places of business outside the purview of funding allocated for ‘housing,’ a description that excludes the perspective of the recently or soon to be evicted renters of Canarsie basements, many of whom are immigrants from the Caribbean. Second, as informal spaces, often rental spaces that were cellars according to their building codes, and therefore not legal rental units. Third, as counter-resilient spaces, which groups identified with reference to anticipated new NFIP flood insurance zones that will subject many Canarsians who have never had to buy flood insurance before to NFIP premiums that may render their houses unaffordable (see figure 1). Faced with the disciplinary power of their mortgages, as well as multiple exclusionary classifications by recovery actors, many residents
reconstituted the contested meaning of resilience to fit their pressing material needs, developing counter-resilient practices.

**Figure 1:** Updated FEMA flood maps of Canarsie place ten times more residents in flood zones (retrieved from stormrecovery.ny.gov)

Reasoning they “can’t be resilient if my house is getting foreclosed upon,” residents reformulated resilience as a call to self-preservation in their own homes and communities (interview with ‘Cheryl’). In the process they eschewed mechanisms of classification in favor of counter-resilient practices that would allow them to re-establish their normal lives as quickly as possible. Counter-resilient residents used funds from government programs or charitable groups towards basement repairs, an illegal use that risks the government clawing back funds. Other counter-resilient residents conducted do-it-yourself work against code, thereby rendering their basements informal, accepted help from family members, dipped into credit card debt or retirement accounts, or defaulted, knowing the foreclosure process can take years to complete. Many recovery organizers expect that neighborhood basements will eventually be eliminated once NFIP premium rises go into effect and displace the current residents. While I aim to shed
light on the perilous position the Canarsie assemblage’s techniques of resilience have produced for Canarsie’s counter-resilient residents, I do not cast these residents as victims. Rather, the previous discussion of the problems with assuming the effectiveness of any technique suggests that the situation in which counter-resilient residents find themselves contains spaces of potential rupture and resistance. Further, I claim that their emergent practices engage in the ongoing contestation and re-politicization of the entangled resilient governmentalities that stand posed to evict them.

Canarsie’s counter-resilient residents face a paradox, and appear to submerge themselves in risks no matter what they do. Eliminating their basements and raising their houses’ elevations, something few residents have the spare funds to do, place their houses in line with recovery groups’ understandings of resilience and avoids skyrocketing NFIP premiums, but the lost basement rental income will eventually result in foreclosure. Regardless of how risk, resilience, and sustainability are conceptualized, repairing recently flooded basements in the neighborhood surely is a perilous move: another disaster could strike and flood the basements again; the government could claw back money if the resident cannot provide receipts indicating they spent funds as promised; NFIP changes could eventually jack up premiums to the point where the homeowners are driven out. But many counter-resilient homeowners understand the ruptures in the NFIP system, have heard a variety of understandings of resilience pushed upon them by a number of organizations who are unresponsive to their specified needs, rely upon basement rental income to pay their mortgages and retain their largest investments (many of which are figuratively underwater), and understand how lengthy the foreclosure process can be. Embedded in these contexts, residents’ decisions to take whatever measures necessary to keep their houses are emergent adaptations to the resilient governmentalities that exacerbate their financial
insecurity. Any number of contingencies, be it a new, better paying job for someone in the household, a beneficial NGO program, or a change in unstable NFIP policies, could put these families back in the position to salvage equity in their houses in the indeterminate time period before one of the aforementioned risks befalls the homeowner. I use the term ‘counter resilience’ to refer to those who have recognized the contingent and constructed nature of the conceptions of risk, resilience, and sustainability that increasingly are used as mentalities of governance. In Canarsie, counter resilient residents took up emergent practices that see them retaining their houses and basements in defiance of regimes of environmental governance that are poised to evict them in the name of resilience.

Disaster recovery worker and organizers also take up counter-resilient practices, working from their limited positions to expose gaps in the system. Organizers recounted frank confrontations with Build It Back officials over the ‘tone-deaf’ nature of its foreclosure policy, or worried that the inflexibility of organizations’ rules left the recovery apparatus as a whole with an approach that was too top-down to incorporate knowledge of local issues (interviews with ‘Tom’ and ‘Emily’). Workers with FBOs and CBOs pointed out that recovery groups too often focused on physical resilience while de-emphasizing the social and financial aspects of resilience. NY Rising participants similarly practiced counter-resilience by disrupting the meeting’s agenda to broach issues that had been excluded from discussion, illuminating the narrowly-constructed pathways of the participation that was being solicited and permitted. Explaining that climate change made the broad-scale rebuilding of New York City inevitable, one counselor at a Canarsie housing organization set the stakes clearly: “Will the rebuild be market-driven or policy-driven? Because if it’s market-driven, Canarsie’s looking at casinos and condos. So it will be a question of social justice. How do we decide to live by the coasts?
Because we *can* do it” (interview with ‘Shauna’). Inspired by social justice, counter-resilient agents like Shauna engage in the ongoing contestation and re-politicization of projects of disaster recovery, resilience and managing life by the coasts in a time of impending climate change.

**Conclusion**

The perpetual financial insecurity that is characteristic of neoliberal life renders storm-impacted populations dependent upon financial assistance from outside actors. These outside actors develop methods of strategically distributing funds in the face of an imbalance between disaster costs and recovery funds. As I have attempted to highlight, the management of a ‘politics of inclusion’ is a crucial technique within each group’s own resilient governmentality; NY Rising’s discursive performance of participatory governance provided one example of how groups legitimate their exclusionary methods. Groups’ techniques of inclusion were closely linked to their respective mentalities regarding what constitutes governing by resilience. While NY Rising sought to build resilience through community-scale infrastructure projects, the NFIP, clouded in political uncertainty, works at the scale of individualized property owners to enforce its own calculations of risk, which do not account for infrastructure. Meanwhile, Build It Back put residents on multi-year waitlists while it lost their paperwork and audited and re-audited their claims, simultaneously paying millions of dollars to subcontractors with no experience, typifying a program of the neoliberal “centaur state”(Wacquant 2010). Despite these varied approaches to governing by resilience, the assorted projects of resilient governmentality are entangled in ways that can increase the potency of, or gaps within, techniques of governance. I emphasized this entangled aspect of resilient governmentalities through the example of residents who are excluded from housing recovery organizations’ funds based upon their statuses on Build It
Back’s multi-year waiting list, using this case to argue that groups’ assumptions of the effectiveness of other groups’ techniques often compounded the ruptures within resilient governmentalites.

Although I have highlighted the role of entanglements, ruptures, and contingencies in projects of resilient governmentality, I emphasize that as a whole the Canarsie recovery assemblage’s entangled policies marginalize and evict thousands of residents throughout Canarsie and wider Brooklyn. This coherent set of practices is produced as a result of groups’ neoliberal mentalities regarding the need to formalize disaster recovery, submit it to regimes of budgeting and calculation, and subsequently develop methods for strategically excluding residents from recovery funds. Through these neoliberal mentalities, the unquantifiable human suffering and peril that is wrought by disasters is to be managed by regimes of financial governance that transform the post-disaster space into a plane of knowable, calculable risks. Recovery groups attempt to standardize calculable ways of knowing the risks that perpetually surround neoliberal subjects; in doing so they overlook to needs and contingencies that inevitably arise from the mess that is everyday human practices. These gaps in the management of post-disaster life in Canarsie have given rise to a variety of counter-resilient practices. Counter-resilient residents interrupted NY Rising participatory exercises in ways that exposed the program’s narrow politics of inclusion, while counter-resilient organizers contested the neoliberal mentalities driving their and other organizations’ recovery strategies. Finally, Canarsie’s counter-resilient residents occupy their homes and retain their basements in defiance of a set of entangled resilient governmentalities poised to evict them. Counter-resilience breeds performative political acts that illuminate and contest resilient governmentalities’ regimes of exclusion, as well as the inequalities and spaces of rupture they produce. Grappling with the
spatially and historically contingent nature of the construction and practice of resilient
governmentalities allows us to understand counter-resilient residents not as victims of a
totalizing neoliberal regime of resilience but as agents navigating a risk-filled urban environment
in emergent ways, exposing spaces of rupture and glimpses into the profoundly political and
perpetually incomplete project of resilient governmentality.
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