Children’s Interests in a Familial Context: 
Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption

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In regards to abused and neglected children, federal policy has shifted its emphasis away from efforts to preserve the family unit, and towards efforts to create new families for these children. This policy shift is reflected in the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, which allows for simultaneous efforts to reunite the child with his or her family along with efforts to place the child up for adoption. Professor Cahn argues that placing such an emphasis on adoption will create situations in which otherwise strong familial bonds are disrupted, resulting in severe damage to the child. The author argues that it is unwise to pursue adoption while at the same time pursuing reunification. Rather, each child should be cared for with family reunification as the primary goal.

Professor Cahn begins by providing an overview of federal involvement in foster care. She then discusses some of the problems with the emphasis upon removing a child from his or her family—since each child’s situation is not given an individual evaluation, one instance of abuse or neglect may result in permanent damage to an otherwise strong familial relationship. The author continues by noting that the interests of the child often overlap with the interests of the parent, even when these interests diverge, policies can be implemented which benefit both the parents and the child. Finally, Professor Cahn concludes by suggesting a more humane system of foster care and adoption that would emphasize family preservation as the preferred solution.

In 1996, Representative Clay Shaw convened hearings on “Barriers to Adoption.” Notwithstanding the title, the hearings focused on barriers to moving children more quickly out of foster care and into an adoptive family. Witnesses narrated horror story after horror story about children who had languished in the foster care system, or who had continued to experience abuse in their families of origin, rather than being placed out for adoption. These and similar hearings culminated in the enactment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), which was designed to promote the adoption of children in foster care, *

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1 Barriers to Adoption: Hearings on S. 104-76 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 2–5 (1996) [hereinafter Barriers to Adoption].


3 See 42 U.S.C. § 671(c) (Supp. III 1997) (requiring that “reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete

The primary goals of the 1980 Act were to improve the child welfare system, to provide federal support and oversight for foster care, and to encourage adoption of children with special needs. By the time of the 1997 legislation, however, these goals were restated. Although the ASFA reiterates prior law in requiring states to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify existing families,\(^4\) it places new emphasis on permanency planning and adoption. Rather than the previous focus on pursuing reunification before adoption, the new legislation allows for simultaneous pursuit of “reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a legal guardian [and] reasonable efforts [to reunify].”\(^5\) Moreover, if reunification efforts would conflict with a “permanency plan,” then the plan takes priority.\(^6\) The legislation also provides incentive payments to states to increase the number of children adopted out of foster care.\(^7\)

The 1997 legislation reflects a major shift in federal policy towards abused and neglected children, and is a dramatic change away from efforts to preserve families towards efforts to create new families for the children. While it is hard to argue against increased permanency planning for children,\(^8\) at least I am not alone in this venture in calling for family reunification as the primary goal. Professor Marsha Garrison has eloquently articulated the tension between meeting “both the child’s need for a stable loving home and the maintenance of his earlier family ties.”\(^9\) This Article will discuss the flaws in contemporary federal policy towards abused and neglected children. Particularly for poor children, who are whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child”).

\(^{4}\) See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (Supp. III 1997). In addition to the exceptions discussed infra in the text, reasonable efforts are required except when the parent has “subjected the child to aggravated circumstances,” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (Supp. III 1997), or committed murder or manslaughter, severely abused the child, or has had parental rights terminated for a sibling. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii) (Supp. III 1997). If the parental rights were involuntarily terminated for a sibling, the circumstances and timing are irrelevant. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). The recently released guidelines developed by the Department of Health and Human Services Working Group on Implementation reiterate that “the most preferred placement for a child is safe and permanent reunification with the birth parent,” and add that this includes placement with a member of the extended family. Donald N. Duquette et al., U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., Adoption 2002: The President’s Initiative in Adoption and Foster Care: Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation Governing Permanence for Children, at ch.2, pt.1 (last modified June 1999) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/special/02adpt2.htm#genguide> [hereinafter ADOPTION 2002].


\(^{7}\) See 42 U.S.C. § 673(b) (Supp. III 1997).


disproportionately subjected to the foster care system, the efforts towards permanency planning may lead to unfair and untimely disruptions of their relationships with their parents.

The most recent debate over the federal approach to abuse and neglect has been framed around children’s rights to safety, with the implicit assumption that past policies have returned them to their unsafe families of origin. Children’s rights to grow up in a safe environment should continue, of course, to be central to any reforms in the abuse and neglect system. But those rights must be placed in the context of, first, children’s familial interests of maintaining contact with their parents, siblings, and other relatives, and second, the policies and practices of the existing child welfare system. Removing children from their families of origin may disrupt the otherwise strong emotional bonds between family members and have a particularly severe impact on the child.

The policy of child protective services exists on a continuum between child removal and family preservation. The ASFA represents a shift towards child rescue, and is an overreaction to a perceived bias towards family preservation. Displacing the continuum by focusing on children in context may result in more humane child protection practices. Indeed, the historical development of federal support for foster care over the past century shows shifting priorities between in-home and out-of-home care, even though prevention is more economically efficient than removal. The tensions between the two different meanings of the child welfare system—the welfare system that provides aid to children and the welfare system that protects children from abuse and neglect—are longstanding. And the tensions between supporting a child inside her family as opposed to outside of her family are similarly enduring. This Article advocates a return to a focus on children as members of an existing family within a larger community as the means for grounding the child welfare system. It is thus paradoxical to pursue reunification with that family and also to pursue adoption. Each disposition may be appropriate for any particular child at a specific time, but pursuing both charts an inconsistent course. Emphasizing the child in context

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10 In her book on abuse and neglect, Professor Elizabeth Bartholet argues that “underintervention” has been a significant problem, and that “parents who want their children back have generally been given the benefit of the doubt.” ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 99, 105 (1999).


13 This approach was supported by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. The presumption should be reunification subject to limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i), (ii) (Supp. III 1997).
should result in more resources for the child’s successful return (or even better yet, to prevent removal altogether).

This Article begins with an overview of federal involvement in foster care, starting with the 1909 White House Conference on Dependent Care, to show the historical relationship between aid to children and in-home care. Part II then continues with a discussion of the relationship between poverty and the abuse and neglect system. Part III provides a fuller examination of the implications of the 1997 changes in abuse and neglect policy for poor children. Part IV concludes by suggesting alternative approaches to the current abuse and neglect system that will place children in a safe family.

I. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN FOSTER CARE

On January 25, 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt convened the White House Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, which had a goal of formulating policies to care for poor neglected children who were not juvenile delinquents. At the end of the conference, the participants, who included Jane Addams, Booker T. Washington, and Theodore Dreiser, proposed making payments to poor parents so that their children could stay at home, rather than be removed to an orphanage. Conference members did not specify the source of payments, although they advocated private relief. Two years after the conference, Illinois and Missouri adopted mothers’ pensions laws, followed soon thereafter by most other states. The mother’s pensions laws certainly received an impetus from the White House Conference, but they built on Progressive Era beliefs that idealized motherhood and the family. As one of the Progressive Era...


17 See SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 424.

18 See CRENSON, supra note 14, at 262.

19 See SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 433–34 (noting that women’s magazines provided the ideological groundwork for mothers pension enactments).
women's magazines explained, mothers' pension provided compensation to women just as wages provided compensation to men: "[A man] is paid for his work; she for hers. And she should be paid by those for whom she does it—all the citizens of the state."20

The mothers' pension movement thus represented an effort not just to alleviate poverty, but to keep children out of orphanages and foster care.21 Matthew Crenson notes that, as early as the 1860s, orphanages had given money to families to enable them to care for their children, so that the orphanage would not become overcrowded.22 The development of foster families seems to have occurred during the latter part of the nineteenth century as well.23 Other early twentieth century governmental efforts were similarly designed to promote maternal care of their children.24 The Sheppard-Towner Act,25 which provided information to mothers—regardless of class—to enable them to raise healthy children, can also be viewed as an attempt to prevent additional child abuse and neglect. Beginning with these early mothers' pensions' laws, there has been a strong link between aid to dependent children and the assumption that this aid would allow children to be cared for at home, which was the most suitable environment for them. Similarly, as traced in a fifty year history of the efforts of the Federal Children's Bureau, child welfare agencies have shifted their focus from outside placement to maintaining children at home.26


22 See Crenson, supra note 14, at 260.

23 See id. at 28, 313-14 (discussing the practice of boarding out, which enabled the orphanage to unburden itself of children with disabilities whose care was expensive, as well as young children who were thought to need family life the most).

24 See Skocpol, supra note 16, at 494-97 (discussing the Sheppard-Towner Act).


26 Dorothy Bradbury mentions field work during the early 1920s on foster home care agencies, in which the agencies "were moving from a strong emphasis 'on adoptions and free-home permanent placements' to 'stressing the preservation of family ties.'" Bradbury, supra
In providing federal aid to dependent children, the government was clearly attempting to provide support so that children could stay within their families, when those families were appropriate recipients of aid. States developed their own standards as to which families qualified for aid. Based on the abuse of the qualification process, in January of 1961, however, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare prohibited states from terminating aid to children if their homes had been found unsuitable.

So strong was the policy of providing support only for children who lived at home that, until 1961, a child was ineligible for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) unless she was living with her parent or a close relative. A child who had been removed for abuse and neglect, then, was no longer eligible for aid under the federal program. In 1961, Congress enacted legislation expanding ADC and changing its name to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The legislation was designed to allow children who were needy as a result of the unemployment of a parent to receive aid. As part of this massive revision to aid for needy children, Senator Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma proposed to the Senate Finance Committee that children removed from their homes for abuse and neglect pursuant to a court order be eligible for continued federal aid. Senator Kerr observed that he had offered this amendment because some state courts might feel a "psychological barrier" to removing a child from an abusive or neglectful home because that child would lose federal aid, and become dependent on the state or locality instead. The Finance Committee echoed his concern, explaining that it was worried that the unavailability of continued federal aid had interfered with courts acting in the child's best interests; prior to the 1961 amendment, the only federal money available for foster care came from Title V of the Social Security Act.

note 25, at 34, 37, 113. She also mentions the shift in emphasis at other times, such as at a 1929 meeting on rural children, and during the years from 1957–62 when states made "real progress toward a well-rounded child-welfare program." Id. at 34, 113.

27 See Ross & Cahn, supra note 20 (forthcoming 1999); see also S. REP. NO. 87-165, at 6 (1961) (discussing federal payments to children in unsuitable homes, and noting that "some States have placed in operation statutes terminating payment when a child’s home is found unsuitable because of the immoral or negligent behavior of the parent").

28 For discussion of the "Flemming Rule," see Pappas, supra note 21, at 1308–09; see also Levesque, supra note 15, at 13.


30 See id. at S6387.


32 See S. REP. NO. 87-165, at 6–7 (1961). The report explained:

[T]here are some home environments that are clearly contrary to the best interests of [dependent] children... Often, however, remedial action on behalf of the child was not
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There was relatively little debate over the foster care amendment. The primary controversies on the Senate floor concerned the availability of continued federal aid to a child placed in a foster home where she was receiving religious instruction, as well as the potential federal interference with state foster care programs. Senator Kerr explained that the federal government was not attempting to interfere, in any way, with state laws and policies concerning foster care, nor with intrafamilial relations. Instead, he wanted to ensure that courts felt free to act in the child's best interests without feeling financial constraints. Moreover, the amendment contemplated only private, state-licensed foster care homes, not institutional care, and thus religious instruction would not be an issue.

Since 1961, the federal government has become increasingly involved with foster care, and has consistently attempted to influence state foster care programs. As the population of children in foster care increased dramatically during the 1970s, Congress held hearings on how to manage the crisis. In 1980, Congress removed the federal foster care system from Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, and established a separate program under Title IV-E through the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA). The AACWA attempted to federalize state foster care programs by establishing comprehensive standards, and it emphasized the importance of providing reasonable efforts both to prevent a child from being removed from her family, and to return her to her family. It also regularized federal reimbursements for state-approved foster care. Under the AACWA, states were required to submit a plan to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which provided that in each case, "reasonable efforts will be made . . . (i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and

possible. We believe that this undesirable situation could be avoided, in many instances, if assistance under this program were available for the care of the child in a foster family home when such care is necessary.

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While Federal funds available through the child welfare services to States under title V are used for foster care of children to a limited extent, the bulk of the cost of foster care is paid from public funds, State or local, or from funds of voluntary agencies. The lack of financial resources for such care has hindered the development of the most suitable care for children who have to be cared for outside their own home.

See id. at 6-7.

37 See S. Rep. No. 96-336, at 12 (1979) (eliminating the old federal reimbursements that ranged from one-third to two-thirds of the cost of foster care, substituting a flat reimbursement rate of 75%).
(ii) to make it possible for the child to return to his home. Moreover, in order to remove a child from her home, states were required to show that the removal occurred because of a finding that staying in the home would be "contrary to the welfare of such child" and that reasonable efforts to keep the child at home had been made.

Although individuals do not have a right of action against the state agency responsible for establishing reasonable efforts, the Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for overseeing and approving state foster care programs.

In the hearings that culminated in the 1997 ASFA legislation, witnesses repeatedly emphasized the problems resulting from the provisions in the 1980 law that required reasonable efforts be made to reunify troubled families. Witnesses to the hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee recounted the physical, emotional, and sexual abuse visited upon children as a result of their return to the custody of biological parents who suffered from substance abuse, mental illness, or other conflicts that prevented them from assuming full responsibility for the care of their children. Foster parents and adoptive parents described their efforts to extricate children from troubled homes, only to face recalcitrant judges, social workers, and other actors in the foster care system who enforced compliance with family preservation and reunification policies devised pursuant to the statutory mandate to make reasonable efforts to reunify families. Moreover, the problems resulting from family preservation and reunification policies were not limited to the abuse inflicted upon children when their biological families resumed custody. Heads of government agencies, attorneys who represented children or parents in the foster care system, and prospective adoptive parents outlined the destabilizing effect of placing children from troubled families in multiple foster homes, while government or nonprofit agencies administered services to the parents in order to enable them to

38 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. III 1997). To ensure the implementation of the reasonable efforts requirement, the state agency was required to develop a case plan for each child which included a description of the placement and an explanation of its appropriateness, and a plan to facilitate the return of the child or another permanent placement. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(1) (Supp. III 1997).


42 See Barriers to Adoption, supra note 1, at 74, 128 (statements of Robert Dean and Patricia Flory); see also id. at 168 (reading of a letter from Hear My Voice).
successfully reunify with their children.\textsuperscript{43} To those individuals who testified at the hearings, the reasonable efforts requirement in the 1980 legislation had been interpreted by many jurisdictions as a requirement that agencies undertake all possible efforts to reunify or preserve the family unit, without regard to the welfare of the children.\textsuperscript{44}

The witnesses at the hearings proposed a number of solutions that could be incorporated into the 1997 legislation.\textsuperscript{45} First, many witnesses advocated that limits be placed upon the amount of time needed to assess the problems within troubled families and to administer services to these families for the purpose of family preservation and reunification.\textsuperscript{46} Other witnesses proposed applying a presumption or an outright ban on reunification in circumstances in which the biological parents inflicted severe physical or sexual abuse upon the children, or if the biological parents suffered from chronic substance abuse problems.\textsuperscript{47} Finally, some witnesses supported expediting judicial proceedings for the termination of parental rights and for determining permanent placements for children in dysfunctional families that did not respond to the rehabilitative services provided by state and local agencies.\textsuperscript{48}

The ASFA seeks to prevent children from spending too much time in foster care, and to promote adoption. To accomplish the first goal of preventing foster care drift, as well as the second goal of freeing up children for adoption, the ASFA requires, among other things, that a state seek to terminate parental rights for children who have been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months.\textsuperscript{49} It also requires a permanency hearing to be held within twelve months of a child’s entry into foster care,\textsuperscript{50} in contrast to the AACWA, which required simply that a “dispositional” hearing be held within eighteen months.\textsuperscript{51} The permanency plan required by the AFSA must include a schedule for: (1) returning the child to her parent, if that is an option; (2) placing the child for adoption and terminating her parents’ rights; or (3) referring the child for permanent placement.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{43}See id. at 46, 65, 99 (statements of Judith Goodhand, Laureen D’Ambra, and Patricia Warenda).

\textsuperscript{44}Not everyone agrees on the federal government’s bias, however. The director of Michigan’s Social Services Department claims that the federal government did not provide sufficient support for family preservation efforts. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, Kids on the Block, 28 NATL. J. 247, 249 (1996).

\textsuperscript{45}See generally Barriers to Adoption, supra note 1.

\textsuperscript{46}See id.

\textsuperscript{47}See id.

\textsuperscript{48}See id.


\textsuperscript{50}See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1997 III Supp.).


\textsuperscript{52}See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (Supp. III 1997). The House Report explained that the
legislation authorizes financial incentives of up to $6,000 per child adopted.\textsuperscript{53} Finally, the Act clarifies that children’s safety concerns are the paramount consideration in any family preservation, foster care, or adoption efforts.

II. PROBLEMS WITH THE RETURN TO REMOVAL

A. Poverty and the Abuse and Neglect System

1. The Relationship Between Poverty and Abuse and Neglect

Historically, there has been a strong link between child abuse and neglect and poverty.\textsuperscript{54} Poor and African-American families are disproportionately more likely to be charged with child neglect.\textsuperscript{55} Thirty-two percent of the children served by the child welfare system from March 1, 1993 to February 28, 1994 were African-American; fifty-seven percent were white, and eleven percent were Hispanic.\textsuperscript{56} As discussed infra, African-American children also spend a longer time involved with the system than do white children. Today, it is 22 times as likely that abuse or neglect will occur in families with incomes less than $15,000 per year than in families with incomes greater than $30,000 per year.\textsuperscript{57} The reasons for this variation are unclear, although it is clearly not poverty alone that causes abuse; instead, it appears that poverty interacts with a series of other factors.\textsuperscript{58}

The association is particularly strong for poverty and neglect. Children may be removed for poverty alone.\textsuperscript{59} One Illinois study found that almost ten percent of the change in name from “dispositional” to “permanency” was to “emphasize the goal of early permanent placements.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 13 (1997).

\textsuperscript{53} See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1997).


\textsuperscript{55} Bernardine Dohm, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 2 (1995).

\textsuperscript{56} See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL STUDY OF PROTECTIVE, PREVENTIVE AND REUNIFICATION SERVICES DELIVERED TO CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: FINAL REPORT IX, at 7-2 (1997) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY].


\textsuperscript{58} See Diana J. English, The Extent and Consequences of Child Maltreatment, FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 1998, at 39, 47 (asserting that these factors include “unrealistic expectations, depression, isolation, substance abuse, and domestic violence”).

of children were removed because of "environmental neglect," which is broadly defined as a lack of adequate food, shelter or clothing\footnote{Kristin Shook, Assessing the Consequences of Welfare Reform for Child Welfare, 2 POVERTY RESEARCH NEWS (Joint Ctr. for Poverty Research, Chicago, Ill.), Winter 1998, at 2, ¶26 (visited Nov. 21, 1999) <http://www.jcpr.org/winter98/article2.html>}. rather than any deliberate actions on the part of the parent; and another twelve percent were removed for lack of supervision. These are resource problems, not the problems of abusive or neglectful parents. If there is adequate funding for the necessities of life, then poverty alone will not cause neglect. Similarly, if parents received adequate support for caring for their child, in the forms, for example, of day care or after-school programs, then this will ameliorate the lack of supervision problem.

A recent study of child abuse in Denver found that children in single-headed, African-American households were more likely to be reported for abuse than were white children living in two-parent households who had also been abused.\footnote{See Carole Jenny, et al., Analysis of Missed Cases of Abusive Head Trauma, 281 JAMA 621, 623 (1999).} Physicians missed child abuse in white children at a rate of about forty percent; for black children, it was twenty percent.\footnote{See id. at 623.} There were comparable rates for single-headed versus two-parent families. I think these studies show that the abuse and neglect system is not administered even-handedly—and they also show there is a high correlation with poor families and that system. More than one-third of the children in New York City's foster care system also receive public welfare.

2. Welfare Law and the Abuse System

The disappearance of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and its replacement by the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, creates more possibilities for poor people to come into contact with child protective services.\footnote{See Mark Hardin, Sizing Up the Welfare Act's Impact on Child Protection, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1061, 1068 (1997); see also Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 59, at 448–49; Shook, supra note 60.} It is estimated that 3.8 million children will be affected by the 60-month limit on welfare receipt;\footnote{See GREG J. DUNCAN, ET AL., TIME LIMITS AND WELFARE REFORM: NEW ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF AFFECTED FAMILIES 7 (1997).} their parents will become ineligible for aid sometime early in the new millennium. Their new opportunities for contact with child protective services result from several sources, such as the following. First, the welfare to work program requirements might lead to parents leaving their children unattended because of a lack of good child care.\footnote{See generally Martha Matthews, Assessing the Effect of Welfare Reform on Child Welfare, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 395 (1999) (noting that there may be benefits if parents get good jobs).} Even if they do
not work, once parents are ineligible for public welfare, they will be unable to provide food and shelter for their children, leading to the potential for contact with child protective services. Once a child is removed, the requirements of a reunification plan combined with a work plan may make it difficult for a parent to comply with both. Second, the requirements for drug testing for TANF applicants may lead families with these problems not to apply for benefits, thus triggering more poverty, and more contact with the child protection system. Studies of child abuse and neglect indicate that between one-third and two-thirds of all substantiated reports involve some form of parental substance abuse. Third, with a decrease in the number of families on public assistance, there may be more voluntary placements in foster care, as parents try to help their children by placing them elsewhere. The requirement that unmarried teen parents live with an adult may also cause more interest in inspections of their parents' houses.

As this brief survey shows, the abuse and neglect system is integrally tied in with child poverty, and changes in each system affects the other.

B. Problems with the Adoption Emphasis

The ASFA isolates one important moment in a child's life—the incidence of abuse or neglect that led to removal—from the child's lifetime relationship with her parents, her extended family, and her community. As a recent student note pointed out, the ASFA simply does not allow for individual evaluation of each

See Peter Edelman, The Role of Government in the Prevention of Violence, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 7, 14–15 (1998) (advocating government actively participating in locating jobs for welfare recipients to help prevent increases in the number of children who will come into contact with protective services); see also Nancy A. Wright, Welfare Reform Under the Personal Responsibility Act: Ending Welfare as We Know It or Governmental Child Abuse?, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 357, 365–66 (1998) (asserting that welfare policy must include publicly-funded jobs to enable welfare recipients to achieve economic independence, thereby preventing the need to remove children from their home into foster care).

See generally Matthews, supra note 65.


See Hardin, supra note 63, at 1068. Ironically, foster care parents receive more money than do recipients of public welfare. See Mark E. Courtney, Report V: Welfare Reform and Child Welfare Services, in CHILD WELFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF WELFARE "REFORM" 1, 3–4 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, eds., 1997) (noting that in 1993, the federal government spent almost $11,000 per child in the foster care system, contrasted with $975 for every child receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children).

See Courtney, supra note 69, at 21.
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child's situation. It overlooks the psychological effects on the child of parental rights terminations, it does not necessarily ensure that each child will be adopted, and it assumes that child protective services will always do the right thing.\(^{71}\) Children may be in foster care because they will never be returned to their biological parents, but an adoptive placement is unavailable, either because the agency is attempting to create a basis for family reunification, or because of a lack of adequate planning and resources. The ASFA, however, does not distinguish between these situations, and forces children in all settings into adoption and termination of parental rights.

In order to facilitate adoptions, the ASFA provides for speedier termination of parental rights through a variety of mechanisms. While these provisions are eloquent on paper—who doesn't want to prevent foster care drift and ensure permanency for children?—they are ill-advised in practice. First, the ASFA assumes that a certain amount of time in foster care means that the parents are, and will continue to be, unable to care for their children. Once a child has spent fifteen months out of the prior twenty-two months in foster care, then the state is required to initiate proceedings for termination of parental rights.\(^ {72}\) Such an assumption is unwarranted under many circumstances. The length of time for permanency planning, especially because it is not based on any substantive ground, ignores the relationship between the child and her parents, overlooks the actual reasons that a child may be in foster care, and is unmoored from any "reasonable efforts" to return the child to her family.\(^ {73}\) States could use the length-of-time ground even when parents are responding to services, and the child would like to return home.\(^ {74}\) Instead of helping children, terminating parental

\(^{71}\) See O'Laughlin, supra note 12, at 1437–48.

\(^{72}\) There are certain exceptions to this strict time limit, such as when the child is in kinship care, or where the state has failed to make reasonable efforts. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii) (Supp. III 1997). For criticism of these exceptions as failing to place the child's interests first, see Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 658–61 (1999) (arguing that the mandatory termination requirements favor the interests of adults in ways that are harmful to the children).


\(^{74}\) As Marylee Allen, from the Children's Defense Fund, explained: "Consider a situation, for example, where a parent has successfully completed substance abuse treatment, has begun weekend visits with the children, had one child returned and will have the other two children returned within the next two months." Promotion Adoption: Hearings on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources Comm. on Ways & Means, 105th Cong. 33–34 (1997), available in 1997 WL 165564 (statement of Marylee Allen, Children's Defense Fund) [hereinafter Promotion Adoption].

Second, in implementing ASFA, states have considered, and begun to adopt, legislation that is particularly punitive to the families of origin. For example, in Arkansas, the welfare agency can only continue to pursue reunification when the parent is making "significant, measurable progress" under the goals of the case plan.\footnote{S.B. 211, 82nd General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999). By contrast, the Washington state bill simply requires the court to establish where there has been compliance with the case plan. See S.H.B. 173, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 1999) (reenacting and amending R.C.W. 26.33.170(7)(b)(iv)).} The burden of proving a "genuine, sustainable investment" in completing the provisions of the case plan and complying with court orders has been placed on the parent; if she fails to meet her burden, then the agency need not pursue reunification.\footnote{Ark. S.B. 211.} Louisiana legislation requires that the case plan contain documentation of the "compelling reasons for determining that filing a petition for termination of parent rights would not be in the best interest of the child."\footnote{H.B. 827 Art. 675(B)(4), 1999 Reg. Sess. (La. 1999) (enacted).} In Nevada, a parent’s failure to comply substantially with the terms of the reunification plan within six months of the child’s placement is evidence that could lead to termination of parental rights.\footnote{See A.B. 158, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1999) (amending 128.109(1)(B)).} In North Dakota, a parent who "fails to make substantial, meaningful efforts to secure treatment for the parent’s addiction . . . [or] behavior disorder" is deemed to have abandoned her child.\footnote{S.B. 2171, 56th Leg. Assembly (N.D. 1999) (amending 27-20-02(A)).} In Illinois, although ASFA provides parents with some protection against termination when the state has failed to provide reasonable efforts, it is the parents’ responsibility to file a motion that requests the court to find that no reasonable efforts have been made within sixty days of the end of the time period during which the state is required to make reasonable efforts.\footnote{See Cheryl A. DeMichele, Comment, The Illinois Adoption Act: Should a Child’s Length of Time in Foster Care Measure Parental Unfitness?, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 727, 754, 758 (1999).}

Some states are grappling with issues involving drug and alcohol use and treatment concerns.\footnote{Recently enacted legislation in Montana provides that, in determining whether the parents are likely to remain unfit and thus unable to care for their child, the court shall consider use of alcohol or a drug that "affects" the parent’s capacity for caring for the child. See H.B. 366, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999) (enacted).} The treatment process is often complicated, however, relapse may even be an integral part of the healing process. As a recent report from the Department of Health and Human Services explained:
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Addiction treatment cannot guarantee lifelong health, although nearly one-third of clients achieve abstinence from their first treatment attempt. Relapse, often a part of the recovery process, is always possible and treatable. Addiction treatment can reduce the number and duration of relapses, minimize related problems such as crime and poor overall health, reduce impact of parental addiction on children, improve the individual's and his or her family's ability to function in daily life, and strengthen the individual's ability to cope with the next temptation or craving.83

Third, ASFA seems to blame the length of time that children stay in foster care on the inability of their biological parents to pull their lives together, notwithstanding the massive intervention by social workers seeking to offer the requisite "reasonable efforts."84 This is highly improbable, in light of the severe funding shortages and high caseloads of most urban child welfare systems; families are simply not receiving the services that they need, rather than refusing to comply with the services that are offered. From 1977–94, the number of children who received child welfare services decreased by almost fifty percent, from 1.8 million to 1 million.85 Even where child maltreatment has been substantiated, approximately forty to sixty percent of these cases receive no additional services.86 Fewer than ten percent of child welfare agencies are able to find substance abuse treatment programs for most of their clients within thirty days.87 Given that the children's case plans inevitably require their parents to get treatment, the unavailability of programs means that children will remain in foster care, and reunification will be postponed or become impossible.88 There is no requirement for providing additional services to parents and children in order to facilitate reunification.89 At the time that Congress was considering the ASFA, there were lawsuits in almost half of the states because of the inadequacies of

83 BLENDING PERSPECTIVES, supra note 68, at 13–14.
84 One recent student note argued, for example, that it was “the abysmal failure of the policy favoring reunification” rather than the actual number of children in foster care which led to ASFA. Cristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 294.
85 See Kim, supra note 84, at 300. The lack of resources for child welfare services is certainly not a new problem. See Garrison, supra note 14, at 1767.
86 See English, supra note 58, at 49.
87 See BLENDING PERSPECTIVES, supra note 68, at 80.
88 See E-mail from Martha Matthews to Naomi Cahn, (Jan 28, 1999) (noting that “there aren't enough of the services parents need to comply with their reunification plans”) (on file with author).
89 The Children's Defense Fund explained that it was concerned because, “without an assurance that services will be available to meet the needs of the children and their parents who come to the attention of the child welfare system that the interests of children will be jeopardized.” Promotion Adoption, supra note 74, at 19.
their child welfare systems.  

Judges have enormous discretion in deciding whether the state has met the reasonable efforts requirement, and rely on the testimony of the underfunded child welfare workers. In many cases, it is the failure of the child welfare agency to offer adequate services, rather than the failure of the parents to comply with reunification efforts, that explains the lack of reasonable efforts.

Finally, a primary concern of ASFA is increasing the number of children adopted, with the underlying assumption that children were not being adopted because their parents' parental rights had not been terminated. As the House Committee on Ways and Means Report explained:

There seems to be almost universal agreement that adoption is preferable to foster care and that the nation's children would be well served by a policy that increases adoption rates. . . .

[T]here seems to be a growing belief that federal statutes, the social work profession, and the courts sometimes err on the side of protecting the rights of parents.

Prior to ASFA, however, only a small percentage of the children eligible for adoption were actually adopted. While the ASFA has served to increase the number of children adopted, the problem has not been the number of adoptable children whose parents' rights had not been terminated; the problem was finding adoptive parents for these children. To promote adoption, it is unnecessary to terminate the parental rights of more parents; what is needed is placing the children already available for adoption more quickly. In his study of the number of children whose parental rights had been terminated in Michigan and New York prior to ASFA, Professor Martin Guggenheim found that the number of children adopted out of foster care failed to keep up with the number of children eligible to be adopted, and that the total number of children whose parents' right had been terminated continued to increase. He expressed concern about the impact on the general child welfare system as well as on the child herself of terminating a child's parental rights without ensuring the availability of a permanent

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90 See Barriers to Adoption, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of Rep. George Miller).
91 See Kim, supra note 84, at 303; Raymond, supra note 34, at 1263.
92 See Kim, supra note 84, at 306.
94 For example in 1995, only 20,000 of the 100,000 children eligible were actually adopted. See H.R. No. 105-867 § 4 (1997) (statement of Sen. Mike DeWine).
95 See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights in Foster Care: An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 Fam. L.Q. 121, 132 (1995). Professor Guggenheim also noted that two earlier studies of the adoption rate of foster care children produced consistent results. See id. at 132–33 (discussing analysis of Marsha Garrison in 1980 and those of Margaret Beyer and Wallace Myleniec in 1986).
Moving too quickly to terminate parental rights may often not be in the child’s best interests. A related danger of this provision is that financially-needy states will move too quickly to make children available for adoption in order to receive the incentive bonus. There is no corresponding incentive for successful family reunification. In addition, adoption is not always preferable to foster care. As the legislation recognizes, when children are placed in kinship care, there need be no rush to adoption. For older children, foster care may provide an appropriate balance between safety and connection to their families of origin. Where foster care provides support for reunification, then adoption is certainly not the best solution. Nonetheless, some have argued that the AFSA is inadequate because it continues to provide inefficient protection to children, and places too much emphasis on family preservation. Indeed, Professor Elizabeth Bartholet charges that various “loopholes” in the AFSA may prevent child protective services from taking permanent adoptive placements seriously. Instead, she believes that children should be removed regardless of whether they are physically safe in their homes, and that the priority placed on keeping children in their community of origin is misplaced. This vision, however, minimizes the relationships of children to their parents and community.

III. Families’ Identity, Children’s Interests

In arguing that the law should respect the integrity of the family unit, I want to place this concept in the context of children’s interests. Of course, in addressing how best to respect children, there are many different frameworks and many

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96 See id. at 133–34; DeMichele, supra note 81, at 727.
97 See generally Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1983) (commenting that terminating parental visitation rights is unnecessary and may prove damaging to the adopted child).
98 The Children Defense Fund’s Marylee Allen pointed to this as a potential problem. See Promotion Adoption, supra note 74, at 36 (stating that “it is important that the adoption . . . be crafted so that it does not encourage states to move children toward adoption without sufficient attention being given to whether adoption was the appropriate plan in a particular case”).
99 See Encouraging Adoption: Hearing 105-3 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Ways & Means Comm., 105th Cong. 6–7 (1997) (statement of Fred H. Wulczyn) [hereinafter Encouraging Adoption]. One program, which provided a set amount of foster care payments rather than a per diem reimbursement, resulted in a decrease in the number of children remaining in foster care. See id. at 8–18 (discussing the Home Rebuilder Demonstration Project in New York City).
100 See BARTHOLET, supra note 10, at 193, 204.
101 See id. at 204.
102 But see id. at 177 (“It is true that some older children in foster care have developed meaningful ties with biological parents.”) (emphasis added).
disagreements over where the focus should be. Parents can only be defined in relationship to children. Respecting families does not mean jeopardizing children. It is not a choice in which we respect either parents or children; their rights generally do not conflict. Instead of reifying a dichotomy between the interests of parents and the interests of children, we should recognize that, in most cases, they overlap significantly. Martha Minow reminds us of the importance of not basing politics solely on one's identity. In this context, it is important to remember that parents are all children too. General cultural assumptions that children are best taken care of by their parents serve to respect children's interests. Respecting "rights for children" requires "concern[ ] about the importance of connection, care-taking, and social relationships" as well as an acknowledgement of the "critical role of relationships with adults."

Even when the interests diverge, however, respecting children's interests and safety does not mean overlooking adults' interests. Nor should recognizing adults' interests mean trivializing children's interests. While it is critical to respect children's rights and relationships, to make decisions that are in their best interest, and to listen to them, I believe that parents' rights can also be respected without classifying children as "property" or without ignoring children's actual interests. Whether one recognizes the interests of parents, or the interests of

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103 For example, Professor Martha Fineman, of Cornell and Columbia Law Schools, has been holding a series of "difficult conversations" between advocates of children's rights and women's rights, both of whom hold strong beliefs.

104 As discussed in Part III obviously the most difficult cases do involve conflicts between parent's le and children's rights (and relationships). After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 514 U.S. 1094 (1995), I recall a discussion on the FEMJUR Internet list in which parents were acting selfishly, without regard to the child's best interests. Some maintained that the adoptive parents should have arranged visitation between the biological parents and Richard in order to ease the eventual transition, while others maintained that the biological parents should have recognized that it was in Richard's best interests to remain with the adoptive parents.

This discussion shows how language affects our perspective on what constitutes children's best interests and parental rights. Each set of parents could have phrased its arguments in terms of the best interests of the child.


106 See Kittay, supra note 20, at 23 (noting a claim for validity based on having had a mother).


108 Professor Scott Altman argues that parents, unlike property owners, have duties towards children; property owners do not have similar obligations with respect to the property itself. See Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair?, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. Fam. L. 325, 350 (1996/1997). He notes: "Children become property not when laws consider other interests, but when they fail to treat children's needs with the same seriousness as those of other persons." Id. at 350–51.
children, either view recognizes the needs of both individual and community, of both autonomy and family.

Parents develop complex emotional and psychological bonds with their children that should be respected by the law. Even when children do not live with them, parents can develop significant relationships with their children that benefit both the parent and the child.\(^\text{109}\) There is a bond that develops out of parents’ connection to their children which, in turn, becomes part of how the parents define themselves. They see themselves as parents. This bond can develop in many different ways, and it does not automatically develop because of biological connection.\(^\text{110}\)

Respecting this bond is respecting the emotional connection. It is very different from giving parents rights because they own their child.\(^\text{111}\) While I agree that “inchoate possessory right[s]”\(^\text{112}\) do not entitle a parent to continue to abuse

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\(^\text{110}\) Thus, for example, lesbian co-parents and step-parents who are biologically related to the child may be seen by the child as parents. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 474–83 (1990). This term, the United States Supreme Court will be considering a case in which the parents seek to prevent third parties (in this case, grandparents) from visiting pursuant to a court order. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 11, 11 (1999) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).

\(^\text{111}\) Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, of course, fathers were awarded custody because they owned the labor of their children. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEART: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 235 (1985); MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 1–47 (1994).


her child, I do not think that notions of children as property are what is underlying removal of abused and neglected children. Instead, I believe that children are too often removed without an adequate examination of their biological parent's means for support. Such examination is necessary so that children's lives are minimally disrupted. We may use the legal terminology of "rights" to justify recognizing these relationships, but legal terminology is merely the method for phrasing a nonlegal emotion.\textsuperscript{113}

There can be no safe presumption that parents will always want only what is best for their children, although this remains a good working hypothesis.\textsuperscript{114} An abusive mother who wants custody of her daughter creates a very dangerous situation.\textsuperscript{115} In the short term, contact would be harmful. In the long term, however, (and depending on the nature of the abuse, of course) the mother's wishes could be partially accommodated through carefully structured visitation that protects the daughter. The mother has some affective interest that differs from a property right in maintaining contact with her child, and the child often has some affective interest in maintaining contact with his or her mother.\textsuperscript{116} If the

Moreover, in this context at least, the concept of rights allows us to recognize the relationship at issue. See Minow, supra note 107, at 6; see generally Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in a Civil Context, 64 FORDHAM L.R. 1571 (1996) (using a discussion of rights to argue that children should be appointed counsel in civil litigation).

Katherine Federle argues that to truly respect children's rights, we must treat the children as parties to any dispute that affects them, and, to ensure adequate representation, appoint them counsel. She believes, for example, that children must approve any custodial outcome that affects them. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1523, 1564 (1994).

\textsuperscript{113} As Professor Bartlett points out: "If we have to choose between children and adults, we may prefer to be a society which puts the child's interests first, but our larger concern is how the interests of both parent and child link together in relationships." Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 304 (1988); see also Katherine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Convention, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1578 (1998) (noting that the conception of property is based on relations between people); Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren, 26 CONN. L REV. 1315, 1361-63 (1994) (discussing how not to privilege the interests of grandparents, parents, and grandchildren over each other and, instead, to respect their interdependent relationships).


\textsuperscript{116} I saw this frequently while representing parents of abused and neglected children, see Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, supra note 109, and in my work representing victims of domestic violence. For further discussion of the importance of contact between parents and children, even in child abuse and neglect situations, see Altman, supra note 108.
mother nonetheless attempts to continue the abuse, then she clearly should not be allowed continued access to her child.

Even in such a situation, I believe it is important to recognize the mother's interests. These interests arise from her prior relationship to the child (not her biological connection), as well as from her own sense of identity, which includes a notion of herself as the mother.

When parents divorce, we accord the noncustodial parent visitation rights, even at the potential expense of the child's best interests.117 I believe that we do this in recognition of the noncustodial parent's relationship to his child. Even though some of our most influential child psychologists argue to the contrary, courts believe that two parents are best for every child.118 I think that we have such a deeply held belief, in part, because we want to find some way of granting the noncustodial parent some "rights" in her child.

The child's best interests are not unmoored from the identity of her "parents." State statutes require that the parents' wishes be considered in child custody litigation. The parents' wishes are not determinative, nor should they be. But a custody standard that did not consider how the parents feel about their child would be a travesty.

Assuming that the parents want to retain custody of the child because she is their "property" demeans the conception of parenthood. So does removing a child from a familial situation because of the neglect that results from poverty. The dichotomy between "child-centered" law, which focuses solely on children's best interests, without deference to the parents, and "children as property" law, which focuses only on to whom the children belong, is false.119 Advocates of a "child-centered" focus bring critical attention to issues concerning children by forcing us to listen to children and attend to their needs. While it is somewhat harder to defend the "children as property" perspective, I think it suggests that parents have rights that must be respected. These positions exist on a continuum, and child welfare policy should respect the interdependent nature of the rights of children and parents.120 Children generally need their parents, and their parents depend on

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117 See Garrison, supra note 9, at 379–80; cf. Joseph Goldstein, et al., In the Best Interests of the Child (1986) (arguing that a child needs continuity of caretaking and bonds with one psychological parent). But see infra note 118.


120 See Annette Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C.L. REV. 577, 610 (1997). Professor Appell advocates that the abuse and neglect system focus on the parent-child relationship, rather than using either a parent-focused or child-focused inquiry. This standard for intervention would not examine the behavior or morals of the caretaker, but rather her functioning as a parent. See id. at 611.
support from others. Moreover, a sole focus on parent or child, or even a focus solely on the parent/child relationship, overlooks the child as a member of a family and a community. A family includes not just parent(s) and a child, but also siblings, grandparents, and other relatives. In determining removal, foster care placement, reunification, and adoption, the child’s interests must include a consideration of her relationships with these other people. Looking at children in context considers their relationships to parents, siblings, and other relatives. While this has led to increased use of kinship care, it should also result in fewer removals and more emphasis on reunification.

The goal of permanence, of getting children out of the limbo of foster care, has enormous symbolic value. Adoption symbolizes a complete change in a child’s family structure. The rights of her biological parents are terminated, and she receives a new birth certificate that reflects her adoptive family as her birth family. All ties with her family of origin are severed and she is able to begin a new life. Yet, “[o]utside the child welfare system, our legal tradition has generally accepted the premise that parents have a paramount claim to the care and custody of their minor children.”

For a graceful articulation of interdependency theory, see generally Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999). Professor Czapanskiy explains:

[A] proposed legal intervention is acceptable only when it supports caregivers in maximizing their ability to care for a child. . . . Interdependency theory assumes . . . that the caregiver stands at the threshold between a child and society. Society is dependent on the caregiver to care for the young child; thus what society can do best for the child is to support the caregiver.

Id. at 958, 967.

See Adoption of Hugo, 694 N.E.2d 377, 379–80 (Mass. 1998), cert. denied, Hugo P. v. George P., 119 S. Ct. 1286 (1999) (upholding sibling separation notwithstanding importance of that relationship). As professors Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley point out, family members are individuals, but they are individuals who are in part defined by their relationships with others.” Minow & Shanley, supra note 119, at 5.

See 1 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, at 1-1 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger et al. eds., 1999); Naomi R. Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Records, 2 U. PA. CONST. L.J. (forthcoming 1999). Professor Bartholet has argued that the adoption solution continues to be overlooked; see generally BARTHOLET, supra note 10.

Garrison, supra note 14, at 1769.

See Michael Grossberg, Some Queries About Privacy and Constitutional Rights, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 857, 860 (1991) (discussing the class-based nature of Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)). Professor Grossberg argues, more generally, that “[p]rivacy rights have
their familial based decisionmaking, as the very history of public welfare to children shows. As discussed earlier, the history of aid to poor women is replete with attempts to control their lives by conditioning public welfare on their compliance with morality requirements that involve state supervision of their lives. As Jacobus tenBroek originally pointed out thirty years ago,

[W]e have two systems of family law... One is public, the other private. One deals with expenditure and conservation of public funds and is heavily political and measurably penal. The other deals with the distribution of family funds, focuses on the rights and responsibilities of family members, and is civil, nonpolitical, and less penal. One is for underprivileged and deprived families; the other for the more comfortable and fortunate.

This two-tiered model pervades every aspect of family law as a result of, first, the different laws that apply to rich and poor; second, the differential administration of any applicable law; and third, the different patterns of usage of existing laws which seem affected by class. In the foster care system, this dual system is transparently clear; federal funds are not even available for foster care for children who are not eligible for public aid. Abuse within wealthier families is simply not subject to the same level of scrutiny.

never been uniformly granted but have varied according to age, sex, race, marital status, political beliefs, religious practices, and residence.” Id. at 862. And Professor Martha Fineman has queried why single mothers, particularly poor and divorced mothers, were excluded from the protections of privacy. See FINEMAN, supra note 20, at 180.


127 This was true, regardless of the type of “aid” these mothers received. See GORDON, supra note 54, at 82 (1988) (noting attempts to impose middle-class norms on poor women who were victims of domestic abuse).


129 See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 540 (1992) (explaining that judges grant judgment to the landlords when neither side produces evidence, and that this phenomenon goes beyond the applicable statute).

130 See generally Beverly Horsburgh, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Domestic Violence in the Jewish Community, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 171 (1995) (discussing the little attention given to Jewish battered women); Ross & Cahn, supra note 20 (forthcoming 1999).
Given the number of children who are removed for poverty alone, a sole emphasis on best interest of the child leads to class and race bias. Instead, children must be viewed in their familial contexts—their relationships to their siblings, parents, relatives and community—and must be supported in this context. Removing a child from her family disrupts all of these relationships. While removal can certainly be justified where there is severe abuse or where the child will not be safe, for most families, there are means short of long-term removal that will provide benefits to the child.

This is particularly true for African-American children, whose foster care placement rate is twice as high as that of white children. An overwhelming majority of white children—seventy-two percent—in the abuse and neglect system received in-home services, while only forty-four percent of African-American children received in-home services.\textsuperscript{131} The dimensions of this disparity do not reflect differences in the population of children referred to the child welfare system. As the Department of Health and Human Services concluded, "even when families have the same characteristics and lack of problems, African-American children, and Hispanic children to a lesser extent, are more likely than white children to be placed in foster care."\textsuperscript{132} In addition, African-American children spend more time in foster care than do white children.\textsuperscript{133} The disproportionate representation of poor and African-American children in the abuse and neglect system show that something other than the need for more permanency is wrong with the system.

\section*{IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR MORE HUMANE IMPLEMENTATION}\textsuperscript{134}

Placing children in a relational context requires careful thinking about alternatives to traditional foster care and adoption, acknowledging both the importance of preserving the family and removing the child when the family is unsafe. One comparatively recent innovation has been an increasing use of kinship care, allowing relatives rather than strangers to care for children after removal.\textsuperscript{135} While this allows a child to maintain connections with her family, it

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{131} See \textit{NATIONAL STUDY}, \textit{supra} note 56, at 6-3. The placement rate for Hispanic children was 40\%, while the in-home service rate was 60\%.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{132} \textit{NATIONAL STUDY}, \textit{supra} note 56, at 7-22.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{133} See \textit{id.} at 7-16 (observing that the length of time was "32.9 months for African-American versus 18 months for white in kinship placement, and 27.2 months for African-American and 19.1 months for whites in non-kinship placement").

\footnote{\textsuperscript{134} Family preservation costs $4,500 per year, while foster care is $17,500. See Stanfield \textit{supra} note 44, at 250 (citing the Center for Study of Social Policy and Change).

\footnote{\textsuperscript{135} Under 42 U.S.C. \textsection 671(a)(19) (Supp. III 1997), which was enacted as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, states must now consider giving preference to adult relatives over unrelated care providers.}}
attempts to ensure the safety of her familial placement. Others have suggested changing the standard for intervention such that child protection authorities could not remove children unless placement in foster care would be more effective than remaining in the home situation. Such a proposal grapples with the inadequacies of foster care as well as the benefits of maintaining a child's family of origin. An additional protection, which would be particularly helpful for poor families, would mandate court-appointed counsel for all parents involved with the abuse and neglect system from the initial suspicion of neglect through all subsequent proceedings. In addition, there are many mechanisms that keep children safe without terminating their familial ties.

There are a series of different strategies that states, localities, and nonprofits can undertake both before a child is removed and then afterwards to encourage reunification. These strategies do not necessarily involve the expenditure of more state and federal money on abused or neglected children. Instead, they involve a reallocation of existing resources. Given the disparities between the amount of money expended when a child remains in her home as opposed to being placed in foster care, maintaining in-home placements could be supported without additional money. Spending the money well before a child is removed, at the time of initial identification of risk, could prevent escalation of the abuse or neglect as well as a foster care placement.

In considering changes to abuse and neglect services, it is critical to eliminate race-based disparities throughout the system. That is, of course, an extremely difficult premise to implement given contemporary culture. Using more community-based interventions may be one effective method of distilling the racism that seems to pervade the abuse and neglect system; in addition, child welfare agencies need training and monitoring on these issues.

A. Pre-Removal

The federal government allocates less than five percent of its child protective services budget to family preservation, while the remainder is spent on foster care placements.

Of course kinship care is not perfect. It is unclear whether kinship care is formalized familial care, or is, instead, a conventional foster care placement. This confusion is mirrored in policies surrounding such care. See Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family Care and Kinship Care, FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 1998 at 72, 84. Foster care pays more than public welfare. See Laurie Hanson & Irene Opsahl, Kinship Caregiving: Law and Policy, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 481, 483 (1996). Reunification occurs more slowly in kinship care than in other types of foster care. One reason may be the financial incentives to keep children in familial care rather than returning them. See Berrick, supra, at 82–83.


See Kathleen A. Bailie, supra note 75, at 2285 (1998).

See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1997).
Although both the AACWA and ASFA mandate intensive pre-placement services, federal funding for child welfare remains grossly skewed in favor of subsidizing foster care rather than preventive programs. While the number of children in foster care has remained constant, the number of children receiving in-home services declined from 1,244,400 in 1977 to 497,000 in 1994.1

Given the relationship between poverty and neglect, more public welfare funds and better support for poor working parents142 might obviate the need for any involvement with the abuse and neglect system. There are many kinds of other interventions before a child is removed that may be effective in preventing her removal, ranging from parenting classes to home visiting, to helping parents find housing and jobs, to coordinating public welfare services and domestic violence interventions with the child welfare system, to providing more intensive substance abuse programs.

1. The Child Protection Agency

Child welfare agencies are charged with a variety of tasks. They are frequently underfunded and understaffed. In 1996, child welfare agencies in twenty-one states were subject to court supervision based on their failures with respect to the child abuse and neglect systems.143 For example, the foster care system in the District of Columbia has been in court-ordered receivership since 1995.144 The New York City foster care system has been under legal attack for its failure to protect children.145 A recent report on the New York system found various continuing problems.146 The lack of funding affects not only the operations of a child protection agency, but also their ability to offer the needed services.147

140 See Courtney, supra note 69, at 13. Roger Levesque shows how the AACWA has created incentives for foster care, rather than preventive services. See Levesque, supra note 15, at 19; see also Gordon, supra note 72, at 664–65. Levesque also discusses how even the limited focus on prevention served to prevent attention being given to postreunification efforts to maintain the family. See Levesque, supra note 15, at 19.
141 See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 8-2. The number of children in foster care in 1977 was 543,000, and it declined slightly to 502,000 in 1994. See id.
147 See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text (discussing these funding problems).
Professor Leroy Pelton has suggested restructuring the child protective services agency to focus on children’s issues, rather than on investigative and law-enforcement processes. Such a restructuring might make clients more comfortable seeking and accepting preservation services if they know they are getting help, rather than making themselves subject to a high risk of child removal. Several states have implemented screening programs in which the child welfare agency investigates only the most severe cases of alleged abuse and neglect, while other cases are referred for family assessment and support.

2. Emphasizing Community Involvement

States are also experimenting with more community involvement, such as working with local community centers, to provide better, and more targeted, services. For example, the District of Columbia recently received money from the federal Department of Health and Human Services to hire four people to work with community collaboratives, which include community residents and local service providers, in an effort to prevent removal as well as to improve permanency. Community centers that provide support for parenting could also offer health care, child care and more general monitoring. The whole concept of kinship care builds upon the strength of the child’s extended community.

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149 See Pelton, Enabling, supra note 148, at 492.

150 See Waldfogel, supra note 12, at 112–114 (discussing efforts of Missouri and Florida). In Florida, a preliminary evaluation of the project found better safety outcomes for children involved in the new system. See id. at 114.

151 See id. at 115–16 (discussing Iowa’s Patch Program).


3. Early Prevention Efforts

Trying to prevent abuse and neglect from occurring in the first place is a critical priority. Other possibilities involve "home visiting," which provides prevention at an early stage, if families can be identified early enough. Home visits can even begin during a woman's pregnancy. For example, if a sibling has already been placed in foster care, home visiting for a new mother might provide security and stability for a new baby so the baby can remain with the author and so the sibling can be returned. Home visiting includes a range of programs "that equip individual 'visitors' with information about pregnancy, infant needs, child development, nutrition, and parenting tasks" so that they can develop an ongoing relationship with pregnant women or new parents. The visits may continue for several years. Other programs offered as part of home visiting could provide ongoing education and support to parents of young children. Evaluations of home visiting programs show that they are effective at reducing child abuse compared to control groups who did not receive this type of intervention. Home visiting programs can also promote contact with other supportive resources that will strengthen parenting.

Although there are legitimate fears based on the historical misuse of home visiting as to the potential for overly zealous intervention with respect to recipients, it is possible to develop programs that are sensitive to culture and

155 See Martha Minow, Learning from Experience: The Impact of Research About Family Support Programs on Public Policy, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 221, 222 (1994); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Home Visiting and Family Values: The Powers of Conversation, Touching, and Soap, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 253, 262 (1994) (discussing the benefits that the author, currently a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, received from a "visiting nurse" as a new mother in 1969); see generally Home Visiting, 3 Future Children, Spring 1993, at 1, 4–214 (devoting the entire issue to home visiting); Home Visiting: Recent Program Evaluations, 9 Future Children, Spring/Summer 1999, at 1, 1–223 (same).

156 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Poor Mothers, Poor Babies: Law, Medicine, and Crack, in Child, Parent, and State: Law and Policy Reader 111 (Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994). Poor black women, who are among those most likely to need prenatal care, are among those least likely to receive it. See Woodhouse, supra note 155, at 255–56. Home visits can begin shortly after the baby is born.

157 See Minow, supra note 155, at 222.

158 See Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 399, 432.

159 See generally Home Visiting, 3 Future Children, Spring 1993, at 1, 4–214 (devoting the entire issue to home visiting); Home Visiting: Recent Program Evaluations, 9 Future Children, Spring/Summer 1999, at 1, 1–223 (same).


161 See generally Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding state AFDC requirement of home visit over objections of welfare recipient). Home visits may serve many purposes other than providing support. See BARTHOLET supra note 10, at 65–68.
that provide support to families, rather than further legal involvement. Professor Martha Minow suggests that local communities work with social scientists to plan culture-specific strategies that would meet the needs of families.162

Turning to substance abuse issues, a major problem for pregnant, drug-addicted women is the lack of treatment facilities.163 Providing treatment before the child is born would help women with their substance-abuse problems. Children need not be removed in order for parents to receive treatment. Child welfare agencies and their community-based agencies can provide services such as family and individual therapy, parenting education, and school-based services. For example, New Hampshire is currently attempting to assess the impact of parental substance abuse treatment on child safety and family stability by examining where substance abuse treatment and subsequent intensive services can support families.164

4. Poverty and Neglect

Additional preventive services focus on providing sufficient resources so that the family is able to support its children. Given the correlation between poverty and involvement in the abuse and neglect system, addressing a family's financial needs is an extremely effective method for deterring child abuse. The provision of adequate housing165 and other resources might help to reduce the number of neglect and abuse problems. Homelessness may serve as a basis for denying public welfare benefits to mothers,166 thereby exacerbating the family's poverty. The head of the foster care system in the district of Columbia estimated that up to fifty percent of the children in foster care could be returned to their parents, if housing was available for them.167

States should be precluded from bringing a neglect petition based on a family's homelessness,168 thereby attempting to sever actual neglect from poverty. A comparable problem occurs when mothers are forced to work outside

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162 See Minow, supra note 155, at 224–52.
163 See ROBERTS, supra note 139, at 178.
of the home; the lack of adequate child care may also lead to neglect. One Colorado jurisdiction has sought to coordinate the two aspects of child welfare, the public aid and the abuse and neglect system. Thus, for example child welfare caseworkers have access to public welfare resources in order to support the child’s family.

5. Child Abuse and Woman Battering

Although there is a strong nexus between adult and child domestic violence, there is often, nonetheless, a lack of coordination between the domestic violence and child welfare systems. Indeed, my domestic violence clients often felt that if they reported the violence against them to public authorities, then their children might be removed. Where there has been a report of child abuse, in determining whether to provide services or remove children, the child welfare worker should evaluate who is doing the battering. If it is the mother’s boyfriend or another male in the household, then it may be more appropriate to remove him than the children. Child welfare prevention efforts often require support of a battered mother so that she can separate from the batterer, providing safety for both herself and her children. They also require domestic violence and child abuse training and protocols that are sensitively integrated. For example, a local domestic violence center can provide help to parents of children in the abuse and neglect system.

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169 See White, supra note 153, at 117.
171 See id. at 29–30.
173 See Edelman, supra note 66, at 16–17 (arguing that “we need to introduce into the child welfare context a battered woman’s perspective” and providing examples of jurisdictions that have done so).
174 See Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1995) (“The paradox of society’s treatment of battered women is that the word is ‘out’: if you report domestic violence in your home, your children might be removed.”).
175 See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 231 (1996) (arguing “that when determining whether a woman is responsible for harm done to her child by a third person, courts should employ an objective standard”); Murphy, supra note 114, at 712, 762.
176 See Murphy, supra note 114, at 763–64; see generally Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991);
B. Post-Removal

One comparatively recent innovation has been an increasing use of kinship care, allowing relatives rather than strangers to care for children after removal. While this allows a child to maintain connections with her family, it also attempts to ensure the safety of her familial placement. In fact, ASFA recommends the use of kinship care. Children in kinship care are less likely to lie in multiple foster home placements. While fifty-nine percent of children in nonkinship care had only one placement, eighty-three percent of children in kinship care had only one placement. Others have suggested changing the standard for intervention such that child protection authorities could not remove children unless placement in foster care would be more effective than remaining in the home situation.

In addition, there are many other mechanisms that keep children safe without terminating their familial ties. Where agencies can actually work with biological families in providing needed resources, reunification becomes more feasible. In Cleveland, through the Family-to-Family program, birth parents and foster parents work with the child welfare agency to prepare the best long-term plan for the child, using both community and familial support. One of the foster mothers involved in this program said that she had initially believed that she could provide better care for her foster child than could his biological mother, in part due to her greater resources. But after watching him interact with his mother, she knew that she could never give her foster child what his biological mother could. He was in foster care for four years while the two mothers worked together. Longer term foster care is not inherently a bad idea if it is

177 Under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (Supp. III 1997), which was enacted as a part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, states must now consider giving preference to adult relatives over unrelated care providers.

178 Of course, kinship care is not perfect. In fact, the term itself is far from precise. It is unclear whether kinship care is formalized familial care or conventional foster care placement; this confusion is mirrored in policies surrounding such care. Indeed the term is susceptible to many interpretations. See Berrick supra note 136, at 84; Hanson & Opsahl, supra note 136, at 483 (1996); Ross & Cahn, supra note 20 (manuscript at nn.12, 74, on file with authors). Reunification occurs more slowly in kinship care than in other types of foster care. One reason may be the financial incentives to keep children in familial care rather than returning them. See Berrick, supra note 136, at 81–82.

179 See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 6-16.

180 See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 59, at 463; Kindred, supra note 137, at 39.

181 See Barriers to Adoption, supra note 1, at 46–47 (statement of Judith Goodhand).

182 See id. at 52–53 (statement of Patricia Newell).

183 See id. at 54–55 (statement of Patricia Newell).

184 Professor Derdeyn suggests the importance of considering "a legal framework for permanent custody with foster parents without terminating parental rights." Derdeyn, supra note 11, at 347; cf. Gordon, supra note 72, at 689 (suggesting federal disincentives to long-term foster care in an effort to promote funding for preventive services).
combined with a coherent and reasonable reunification plan, or if it becomes a permanency plan itself. Particularly for older children, foster care may preserve their sense of family and community. Early termination of parental rights can be detrimental, especially for older children, who will not necessarily be adopted. The termination of parents' rights also means the termination of the rights of other relatives.

Where adoption is clearly warranted, there can still be a possibility of "adoption-with-contact," or "open adoption," through which the biological parent and child retain some connection and contact that could be legally enforceable. That is, the adoption occurs but the biological parent can still remain in contact with her child. A number of states have recently enacted legislation designed to validate and enforce such open adoption agreements when both the adoptive and biological parents have consented to the contact. Other states have passed slightly different statutes that authorize a court to award post-adoption visitation to a child's biological relatives, whenever such visitation is in the child's best interests. The Uniform Adoption Act allows for the creation and enforcement of adoption-with-contact orders in step-parent adoptions, even where the parties have not agreed to permit the contact. The federal government's Adoption 2002 Guidelines recommend that state law allow for legally binding agreements concerning post-adoption contact.

See Gordon, supra note 72, at 667 (criticizing ASFA for its lack of sensitivity to the age of the child in foster care).


See Hand, supra note 73, at 1268 n. 97; DeMichele, supra note 81, at 757–58.


See UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 4-112-113 (1994); see generally Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and Enforceability of Visitation Orders for Former Parents Under the Uniform Adoption Act, 59 FLA. L. REV. 89 (1999).

See Donald N. Duquette et al., U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., Adoption 2002: The President's Initiative in Adoption and Foster Care: Guidelines for Public Policy and State
Open adoption is being touted as an option in the foster care context, in part to encourage biological parents who are unable to care for a child to voluntarily relinquish their parental rights without completely severing their connection to the child. While there are various ethical issues involved in negotiating an open adoption agreement in this context, it nonetheless remains useful to consider this alternative to complete termination of parental rights.

In other situations, perhaps the parental rights should not be terminated unless there is a strong belief that the child will be adopted; otherwise, the courts may be cutting off children from relatives with whom they have close ties.

The Alabama abuse and neglect system provides some ideas for improving the system. As a result of a lawsuit forcing the social services agency to change its practices, the consent decree specifies that the abuse and neglect system has as a primary goal, allowing children to remain with their families of origin, so long as they are safe. The child abuse and neglect agency is required to provide intensive in-home services where this will help keep the children at home. Such services range from accompanying a parent to an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting to teaching parents how to help their children do homework to various forms of counseling. By changing their orientation, the child abuse and neglect workers "learned how to look beyond the often abundant negatives and engage families in a genuine partnership by identifying their strengths." If children are removed from the home, then the new system supports contact between foster children and their families of origin. In Alabama, the number of children in foster care declined from 4,625 in 1992 to 3,650 in 1996, and the average time in

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192 See, e.g., Appell, supra note 109, at 1013–25.

193 See Madelyn Freundlich, Adoption and Ethics: The Hard Questions, ADOPIVE FAMS., July/August 1999, at 8, 11 (raising questions about the fairness of using adoption-with-contact as an inducement to biological parents’ agreement to a voluntary termination of their rights).

194 Martin Guggenheim suggests that parental rights not be terminated unless: (1) there are grounds to terminate; (2) the child’s “best interests” require termination; and (3) it is not improbable that the child will be adopted. See Guggenheim, supra note 95, at 136.

195 See R.C. v. Nachman, 969 F. Supp. 682, 682 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (rejecting motion to vacate the consent decree); see generally BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING CHILD WELFARE WORK: HOW THE R.C. LAWSUIT FORGED NEW PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT CHILDREN AND SUSTAIN FAMILIES 22 (1998) [hereinafter MAKING WELFARE WORK].

196 See MAKING WELFARE WORK, supra note 195, at 62. Other services include helping the parents find housing, helping the parents with vocational training, providing transportation for children and parents, and parent training. See id.

197 See id. at 51–52.

198 The consent decree requires that children be allowed to contact family members, and both the social worker and foster care provided are supposed to encourage “frequent contact” between the child and her family. See id. at 101 app.4.
foster care also decreased. 199

Such innovative thinking presents possibilities for changing how we think about child abuse and neglect, and provides hope for the poor children most likely to be subject to that system. There are creative solutions that allow children to remain safely in their families of origin.

Other states have developed initiatives that help reunify families when appropriate. In Arizona, a Housing Assistance Program provided support for families where housing was the primary barrier to reunification. 200 As a result, almost twelve percent of the children in foster care between 1991–95 were reunited, and the state saved more than $1 million in foster care and related expenses. 201

V. CONCLUSION

Federal policy towards foster care and adoption seems predicated on stereotypes: stereotypes about foster care, adoption, abused and neglected children, and mothers. It establishes dichotomies: the good mother is capable of reforming herself within one year, or else she is a bad parent. Parents and children are adversaries in the abuse and neglect system. Foster care is bad for children, so they need to be freed for adoption. These stereotypes have a particularly strong impact on poor children, who are those most likely to appear in the child protection system. Recent federal policy sacrifices children’s interests in its rush towards adoption as the solution for all abused and neglected children, rather than focusing on the relationships of children to their families and communities. Outside of cases involving severe abuse or neglect, family preservation—both pre-removal and post-removal—remains the preferred solution. The origins of the foster care system, as an effort to preserve families and allow children to stay in their families of origin, reflects the impulse reflected throughout American law that children belong with their parents. The disproportionate use of the abuse and neglect system against racial minorities, and the removal of children for poverty alone, show the dangers of not presuming family integrity.

The goals of the 1980 legislation—safety and family connection—remain in the child’s best interest. Families have strengths that can be supported so that children are not unjustly removed. Rather than providing for only two options—termination of parental rights and adoption or reunification—on the misguided assumption that they can be pursued simultaneously, federal law should encourage alternatives, such as open adoption or longer term foster care placement. Moreover, the strict time frame during which the states must act on

199 See Courts Say Many States Fail to Protect Foster Kids, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 17, 1996, at 8A.


201 See id. at 9.
termination of parental rights will have a particularly harsh effect on poor children, who are often removed from their homes for neglect stemming from poverty, rather than from severe abuse or neglect. Federal law should return to the presumption that children are best cared for in their families and communities of origin, and should include the presumption that these families deserve the support to enable them to perform and act in the child’s best interests.