Integration and Disintegration in NATO

Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community

By Francis A. Beer
Assessing the current prospects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the light of national goals and the crisis precipitated by the French withdrawal, Mr. Beer investigates the extent to which effective policy consensus and integrated programs can be achieved under the present organizational structure. In spite of the numerous refinements in administrative procedure that have accompanied the proliferation of NATO programs and activities since 1949, Mr. Beer concludes that more far-reaching integrative tasks have not been accomplished.

In each of five major areas of NATO activity—political consultation, military forces, armaments, infrastructure, and science—a pattern of national dominance and self-interest has emerged that leaves little scope for integrated programs. Although such results might have been expected in sensitive sectors such as political consultation and military forces, they prevailed as well in armaments, infrastructure, and science, where technical considerations might have been expected to provide a more unifying influence.

Integrative advance seems to occur mainly during situations of international crisis in spite of the ideology of the leadership, which has provided the most effective continuing impetus toward increased long-range planning, greater delegation of authority, and more centralized control. Because the leadership has had available only the powers of persuasion in appealing to the common perceptions and goals of members, however, Mr. Beer finds that the prospects for more substantial integration in NATO—for the appearance of binding institutional procedures, authority, and legitimacy—are slight.

Francis A. Beer is assistant professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin.
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FRANCIS A. BEER

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TO DIANA
This book was written with the help of grants received from the United States Government under the Fulbright-Hays Act, and from the Mershon Center for Education in National Security at the Ohio State University.

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F. A. B.
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List of Abbreviations

ACE: Allied Command Europe
AFCENT: Allied Forces Central Europe
AFMED: Allied Forces Mediterranean
AFNORTH: Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH: Allied Forces Southern Europe
AGARD: Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development
AMF: ACE Mobile Force
ANF: Atlantic Nuclear Force
APAG: Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
BAOR: British Army on the Rhine
CDU: Christlich-Demokratische Union
CINCCHAN: Commander-in-Chief Channel Command
CINCEUR: Commander-in-Chief United States forces in Europe
CNAD: Conference of National Armaments Directors
DFU: Deutsche Friedens-Union
DIAGE: Defense Industry Advisory Group in Europe
DPB: Defense Production Board
DPC: Defense Planning Committee
DPWG: Defense Planning Working Group
DRDC: Defense Research Directors Committee
DRG: Defense Research Group
EDC: European Defense Community
FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei
IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
MAS: Military Agency for Standardization
MC: Military Committee
List of Abbreviations

MLF: Multilateral Force
MPSB: Military Production and Supply Board
MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MRP: Mouvement Républicain Populaire
NADGE: NATO Air Defense Ground Environment
NADREPS: National Armaments Directors Representatives
NAMSO: NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization
NIAG: NATO Industrial Advisory Group
NBMR: NATO Basic Military Requirement
NDAC: Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee
NMR: National Military Representative
NPC: NATO Parliamentarians' Conference
NPD: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
NPG: Nuclear Planning Group
NPLO: NATO Production and Logistics Organization
NSC: National Security Council (United States)
NSC: NATO Supply Center
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPC: Payments and Progress Committee
SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT: Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SASWREC: SA CLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center
SBAC: Society of British Aircraft Constructors
SFIO: Parti Socialiste, section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière
SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
STC: SHAPE Technical Center
UDSR: Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance
UNR-UDT: Union pour la Nouvelle République-Union Démocratique du Travail
WEU: Western European Union
WUDO: Western Union Defense Organization
Introduction:
NATO and International Integration

During the last several years the bipolar configuration of international politics has appeared to be loosening. Growing difficulties within the major blocs—between the Soviet Union and China, between the Soviet Union and some of its East European neighbors, and between the United States and France—have all indicated that a less rigid international order may be possible in the foreseeable future. While this new order has looked as if it may bring with it increased tension in Asia, new opportunities for co-operation in Europe have also appeared possible.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been one of the cornerstones of the postwar international system. During the late 1960's, however, NATO's future has appeared uncertain. Not only has there been some doubt about the continuity of NATO institutions, but also over the extended participation of at least one major actor. Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that, "after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation." Thus, depending on legal interpretation, any nation may secede in either 1969 or 1970.

The intentions of French President de Gaulle are couched in ambiguous terms. In his note of March 7, 1966, to President
Johnson announcing his decision to withdraw militarily from NATO’s activities, de Gaulle stated France’s intention to remain a Party to the Treaty in 1969, provided that there had been no “basic” change in East-West relations, and that she was determined “to fight on the side of her Allies” should aggression against one of the them be “unprovoked.” The French Aide-Mémoire to the fourteen other NATO members on March 10, 1966, repeated the cloudy message, declaring that “the Alliance must continue as long as it appears to be necessary.”

These undecided circumstances have prompted NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio to state that one can not “guarantee automatically that the Alliance will continue without changes and without defections after its twentieth anniversary.” They also help to justify a study of NATO’s state and processes of cohesion through a focus on integration in NATO. Such an analysis may help to refine general ideas concerning alliance solidarity. More narrowly it may provide new information and insights—or recast old impressions—about the firmness of an organization which importantly affects the security of the United States, the Atlantic area, and the Western world.

According to NATO tradition, the Alliance’s military command structure and infrastructure have often been referred to as “integrated,” meaning that they are either jointly manned or jointly owned by the Allies. Such usage is obviously helpful in distinguishing what “belongs” to NATO from what does not. At the same time it would probably be unwise to lift the term from the Alliance quarry and place it as the cornerstone of the present analysis. Joint manning or joint ownership are criteria of integration which are too limited to serve as major analytical tools in a general study of NATO cohesion.

Other current uses of the term integration have appeared in the growing body of literature centering around the architectonics of international political communities. The complexity of social change has been obscured in some of these studies for a number of reasons: (1) integration has been defined in terms of a condition rather than a process; (2) the importance of institu-
lations has been de-emphasized; (3) there has been a concentra-
tion on environmental configurations as causal factors and a
neglect of the immediate motives and expectations of key politi-
cal actors.³

In the present study, a concern for the mechanisms of change
leads to a definition of integration as a process. The substantive
focus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, requires a discus-
sion of formal institutions. Limited resources make it not only
desirable but necessary to concentrate on the immediately re-
lated perceptions of specifically affected actors. We, therefore,
shall understand integration as “the process whereby political
actors in several discrete national settings are persuaded to shift
their loyalties and political activities toward a new center, whose
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing
national states.” ⁴

The new center under consideration is NATO viewed in terms
of formal political-administrative institutions and informal pat-
terns of actor participation. Political actors are those groups at
both the national and subnational levels which appear most
relevant in NATO-related decision-making, as represented by their
leaders. They include the dominant states in NATO—the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States—other states being considered when especially
relevant. Various domestic groups of importance include political
parties, governmental agencies, and interest groups.

Integration in NATO can be described by three sets of indica-
tors which subsume various aspects of the shift to the new center
of actor loyalties and activities. The first integrative indicator is
institutional autonomy: the growth of the new center may be
measured by the increase in differentiation and scope of the
common structures and the tasks they are called upon to per-
form. Important indices are proliferation of NATO agencies and
programs, increases in binding NATO procedures, such as the
evolution of voting procedures away from unanimity, and NATO
budgets. The second indicator is authority: shifts in actor activi-
ties and loyalties toward NATO may be viewed in terms of the
growth of compliance, willing or not, with Allied decisions. Indices of growing NATO authority may include increasing acceptance of direct rather than indirect NATO decision-making and implementation of decisions arrived at through NATO institutions. The third indicator is legitimacy: the shift of actor activities and loyalties may be seen in attitude changes showing increased belief in the values of NATO symbols, institutions, and programs. Indices of change comprise various aspects of program support—contributions of money, personnel, and facilities—as well as verbal support.

The degree of integration having been established, its dynamics may be examined in terms of three major assumptions. The first of these is the belief that integration is more likely (a) when the alliance leadership combines ideological clarity with ambiguity, (b) when decisions are made jointly by independent experts and instructed delegates, and (c) when coalitional support is varied according to the program in question.

No matter what kind of activity is involved, energetic executive leadership is likely to be helpful in moving the actors toward greater institutional autonomy, authority, and legitimacy; the most crucial phases of this interaction are those of ideology, decision-making, and coalition formation. In all of these phases, integrative leadership must avoid approaches that are overly responsive to either political or technical considerations, such as opportunism, which attempts to meet political conflicts by sacrificing longer-range integrative goals, or utopianism, which ignores such conflicts and assumes a non-existent technical consensus.

Leadership which is to have integrative effects must formulate ideology with a mixture of ambiguity and clarity so that long-range goals which imply the strengthening of the organization may be implemented through an action program. Ambiguity is required for leaders to be able to appeal to a diverse audience made up of groups both inside and outside the organization. At the same time clarity is necessary if leaders are to advance goals in terms of specific plans and programs.
For the chosen ideology to be effective, it is important to have a pattern of decision-making which combines analysis and bargaining between independent experts and instructed delegates. Such a decision-making structure represents a contact point at which the leadership, through its specialist cadres, can hope to persuade clients to follow its goals.

Finally, if the ideology and decisions are to be translated into action, it is well for leaders to build variable supporting coalitions, composed differently for each issue. In this way, the leadership's program is backed by relatively stable aggregates, which are still sufficiently dispersed to prevent their subverting it.

NATO leaders are identified by formal role rather than by informal influence; here the vital question is "Who speaks for NATO?" rather than "Who governs?" Of special importance are the incumbents of two positions: the Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who stand at the apex of the NATO civilian and military bureaucracies. The ideology of the leadership may be considered in terms of a continuum ranging from generality to specificity, from public support of NATO in whole areas of activity to public support of concrete programs. The influence of the leadership on decision-making may be weighed by the extent to which decisions advance the ideology, and by the influence of experts and delegates of varying degrees of independence and instruction. Experts are separated from delegates in rather gross terms as one moves across a spectrum which includes persons drawn from specialized fields of competence outside formal NATO or governmental structures, persons who are members of the NATO International Staff/Secretariat or military bureaucracy, high-level national officials who are not members of national delegations, and members of national delegations. The independence of the expert may be gauged by assessing his professional and political stature; the independence of the delegate will depend not only on such factors, but also on his influence in the drafting and revision of his instructions. Finally, the ability of the leadership to foster coalitional variety
in support of different programs may be judged by the positions of specific actors toward such programs and by the permanence of groupings.

The second assumption is that integration is unlikely in those sectors of alliance activity which are most political, but becomes increasingly possible when a technical leaven exists. The domain of politics includes activities of major importance to entire societies—or substantial portions of them—where intense conflicts of interest may be expected. Gigantic resources are involved, making high the stakes and risks of the game, and frequently leaving coercion as the only effective sanction. Technical affairs, on the other hand, have a more limited scope. Co-operative patterns of behavior are increasingly likely when resources are reduced, and utilitarian and normative incentives are likely to be decisive.

This "functionalist" assumption may be examined in NATO by investigating integration in five sectors which promise to cut across a spectrum from most to least controversial—political consultation, military forces, armaments, infrastructure, and science. NATO political consultation and military forces are the traditional arenas of foreign and strategic policy, in which the full resources of national entities are pitted against one another in a pattern which often includes violence, and the dominant personnel are the symbolic political representatives of nations. NATO armaments, infrastructure (military construction) and science are less political sectors, and a larger technical admixture may be expected. The interests of various actors should tend to greater convergence as resource shares become more moderate, utilitarian and normative sanctions more common, and technically trained personnel ubiquitous.

The third assumption both extends and limits the second. Although integrative tendencies should be most pronounced in those alliance sectors which are less political, nevertheless, activities in these sectors are not likely to "spill over." Integrative advance may take place under the stimulus of crisis; but it is unlikely that the actors' interests will be sufficiently convergent
through time to sustain a consensus promoting alliance growth.

The term ‘spill-over’ refers to the process whereby integration in a technically infused sector, where interests are identical or convergent, gradually extends into more political areas. While the actors may not originally have intended such expansion, the logic of the situation requires further integration if they are to achieve their particular aims. Such spill-over has occurred in the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community.

Spill-over is less likely in an alliance because the focus on defense implies that sectors of activity which might otherwise provide a technical impetus for growth will be dominated by political characteristics; in these areas the dynamic of convergence is likely to be undermined by conflict of interest. While high tides of crisis may temporarily submerge the reefs and shoals of inter-allied differences, receding seas and routine water levels will leave prospects for integrated programs aground.

The working of spill-over in NATO can be investigated by comparing the convergence of actor interests over an extended period that includes situations of perceived crisis as well as routine circumstances. If the presumption is correct, and spill-over does not routinely take place in alliances, NATO growth and interest convergence will occur mainly during crisis periods.

Further discussion should help to answer such questions as: To what extent does integration occur in alliances such as NATO? What is the relative importance of each of the following factors in advancing integration in NATO: the dynamics of leadership, the relative predominance of political or technical types of activity, the ‘spill-over’ of technical activity into more political sectors, and the impact of crisis situations? It is also the purpose of such discussion to clarify the essential factors to be considered in assessing the prospects of NATO in the 1970’s.

The chapters which follow attempt to paint in greater color, depth, and complexity the various sections of the canvas which have just been sketched out. The processes of NATO integration are now to be examined in the discrete sectors of political con-
sultation, military forces, armaments, infrastructure, and science. In thus presenting specific cross sections of NATO activity, the aim is to open a door to the benefits of comparison, and to provide a foundation upon which to build conclusions concerning integration in NATO.

ORIGINS OF THE ALLIANCE

The precedents and preparations for the Atlantic Alliance were laid during the years from the end of World War II through 1949; and much of the stimulus for joint action was contributed by an atmosphere of deepening international confrontation. During the war, Western statesmen had been aware that the postwar period would bring significant differences with the Soviet Union. Only as the immediate postwar era developed, however, did activities on both sides produce a situation in which Western decision-makers perceived the Soviet Union as an immediate military danger to Western security and in which they ultimately established NATO's fundamental institutions. ¹¹

With the coming of Allied victory, first in Europe and then in Asia, the Grand Alliance of World War II began to dissolve and the shape of a new international system to appear. A rough configuration of this world had been foreseen in preceding years. Thus the eminent British geopolitical analyst and strategist, Sir Halford Mackinder, had looked to the postwar emergence of the Soviet Union as the dominant global land power and to the formation of a strategic Atlantic Community consisting of Western Europe and North America. Although they had emphasized the Soviet threat less than European-American ties, wartime variations on this theme had been played in the Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and Churchill; in the writings and speeches of Americans of disparate influence such as Wendell Willkie, Clarence Streit and Walter Lippmann; by the Federal Union of Great Britain; and by continental Europeans, especially in Belgium and Norway. ¹²

As the war drew to a close and the Soviet Union moved
toward dominant positions in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Ru-
mania, and Albania, Western leaders began the formation of an
opposing coalition. In his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, on
March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill publicly referred to the “iron
curtain” which had bisected Europe. George Kennan, in a long
dispatch from Moscow on February 22, 1946, described an at-
mosphere of extreme Soviet hostility and prescribed a policy of
containment in his “X” article which subsequently appeared in
Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{13}

On March 4, 1947, France and the United Kingdom signed a
fifty-year Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance at Dunkirk.
Although specifically aimed at the possible resurgence of the
German threat, this treaty was to be the first in a series of
Western security agreements to be directed against the Soviet
Union. On March 12, alarmed by Communist pressures in
Greece and Turkey, President Truman enunciated the doctrine
which called for United States support for other nations against
various forms of armed pressure and requested Congress to
appropriate financial aid for Greece and Turkey. In June Secre-
tary of State Marshall, in a commencement speech at Harvard,
proposed his plan for United States support for a co-ordinated
European program of economic rehabilitation. Although Mar-
shall defined Europe broadly enough to include the Communist
sphere, the Soviet Union objected to such a co-operative effort,
and in July the British and French Foreign Ministers decided to
go ahead without Soviet participation, inviting all the other
European governments except Spain to participate in an organi-
zation for European recovery which would begin by studying
Europe’s needs and resources.

In response to the Western actions, particularly the Marshall
Plan, the Soviet Union organized the Cominform and supported
the insurrectionary strikes which swept France and Italy in 1947
and 1948, as well as the coup of February 22, 1948, which
gained control of the Czechoslovakian government.

The scope and pace of Western action expanded. Canadian
Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent, speak-
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ing to the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1947, proposed a defensive alliance. On January 22, 1948, Ernest Bevin, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggested the formation of a "Western Union," based on the previously concluded Dunkirk Treaty, including Britain and France, and adding Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and other European countries, including Italy. Representatives of the Dunkirk and Benelux governments assembled in Brussels on March 4 to draft and, two weeks later, sign, the Brussels Treaty, a fifty-year treaty of collective self-defense and economic, social, and cultural cooperation. On the day of signature, President Truman indicated to Congress his intended support. In June the United States Congress enacted a Selective Service bill.

The Soviet blockade of the land access routes to Berlin which began on June 24 gave further impetus to the formation of NATO itself. On April 11, United States Secretary of State Marshall and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett had initiated conversations with Senators Vandenberg and Connally on European and American security problems. Two months later the United States Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution which called for "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the [UN] Charter" and which aimed at "contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security." On July 6, negotiations began in Washington between Lovett and the ambassadors of the Brussels Treaty powers and Canada concerning North Atlantic defense. These talks continued through the summer and autumn, when the Foreign Ministers took over. On September 9, they concluded with a report on the general form which should be taken by the proposed treaty of common defense. At the end of October the Brussels Treaty Organization Consultative Council announced "complete agreement on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic
and the next steps to be taken in this direction.” On December 10, negotiations began in Washington focussed around the actual drafting of the treaty; and on March 15, 1949, the Brussels Treaty nations, the United States and Canada formally invited the governments of Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal to join.15

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On August 24, subsequent to ratification, the Treaty entered into effect. Against the perceived Soviet threat had rallied a bipartisan American majority, British Conservatives and Labourites, French parties of the right and center, and similar groups in the other member nations. Nevertheless, there remained significant opposition to NATO. In the United States the Republican right wing was still a force to be reckoned with; in Britain the Labour left was hostile; in France NATO was opposed not only by Thorez’ Communists, but also by budding neutralism which Le Monde would support and which would eventually include groups surrounding other organs of public opinion such as Esprit and France Observateur; in Italy there was opposition from Togliatti’s Communist party and Nenni’s left wing Socialists.16
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty laid down the foundation for political consultation in the NATO framework by stating that “the parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.”

INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

During the early years of the Alliance, political consultation occurred in NATO’s major decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, on an ad hoc basis. In 1950 and 1951 interest focused on the problems of German sovereignty, rearmament, and reunification. In 1952 the Council broadened its scope to include matters outside the North Atlantic Area, passing a resolution which supported the United Nations in Korea and the French in Indo-China.

Between 1952 and 1956 ad hoc political consultation continued in the Council. Prior to the Big Four Summit and Foreign Ministers Conferences, the United States, Britain, and France informed the Council of their proposals. Discussions took place on such subjects as East German recognition, the Austrian State Treaty and the roles of SEATO and CENTO in Far and
Middle Eastern Affairs. On the other hand differences over independence for Cyprus—involving the British, Greeks, and Turks—were negotiated largely outside the Council; and the British and French clandestinely prepared their October, 1956, intervention in Egypt over the Suez Canal.3

In January, 1957, a Committee of Political Advisors, meeting once a week, was established to act as a staff arm to the Council. Later, Groups of Experts focusing on broad regional areas—the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa—and on disarmament questions began to assemble approximately twice a year. An Atlantic Policy Advisory Group was created in 1960 to convene twice a year and examine long-term problems. Following the French military withdrawal, the Council decided in December, 1966, to move NATO's civilian headquarters, including its political institutions, from Paris to Brussels; and on October 16 of the following year the transfer was officially consummated. In its new location, the Council for the first time was to have "a central intelligence and communications center, equipped and staffed to provide rapid and continuous support for crisis management." 4

In spite of such advances, binding institutional procedures did not grow. The major NATO political structure, the Council, usually met twice a year at the Ministerial level, mainly to exchange information, make soundings, and gain sympathy for national positions. Often informal and exclusive gatherings proved more valuable for these purposes than the full-dress meetings of the whole Council. What decisions the Ministers made tended to focus on administrative matters and NATO activities in other issue areas.

The Council at the level of permanent representatives was the highest regular body, acting not only as the main device for political consultation within NATO, but also as a day-to-day Board of Directors. The unanimity rule was implicit, with each nation preserving a possible veto on decisions. Ordinarily the Permanent Council produced no common paper, but only a record of the presentations of the national Ambassadors and the Chair-
man's summary. Political communication was emphasized rather than political decision-making. While smaller countries seemed to benefit, national officials from some of the larger nations claimed that the political information was generally not far ahead of newspaper dispatches and that traditional bilateral diplomatic channels were more instructive.

The Committee of Political Advisors consisted of officials from national delegations and dealt with those matters referred to it by the permanent representatives. Although the political advisors had relatively exclusive authority in some areas, decision-making was not usual; rather meetings were focused upon papers delivered by members of national delegations. There was ordinarily no common paper but only a record of the meeting; and the Chairman summed up his interpretation of consensus which was inserted in the record.

The Groups of Experts ordinarily convened immediately to precede Ministerial Councils. They concentrated more on data than policy and produced common papers which were drafted by a member of the Secretariat and underwritten by the responsibility of the Committee. The papers provided no explicit recommendations to national governments but merely conclusions—in which recommendations might be implicit—from which governments drew their own inferences. Meetings of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group focused on papers given by national delegates on particular long-range problems. Subsequently the Chairman wrote a paper, for which he took responsibility, summarizing all delegate papers and comments.

In this process, the major tendency towards autonomy was presented by the International Staff/Secretariat. The Secretary General in his role as Chairman presided at and summarized the meetings of the Council, and was responsible for an annual appraisal of NATO's political activities. The Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and his staff supported the Secretary General, administered, summed up, and wrote occasional common papers for the meetings of the Committee of Political Advisors; drafted the papers of the Groups of Experts; and both
drafted and took responsibility for the papers of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group. Nevertheless, such activities were insufficient to produce binding decisions.

Several bodies were tangentially related to NATO's political sector. Most important of these was the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (renamed the North Atlantic Assembly in 1967), which first met in 1955. The NPC was an annual meeting of legislators from NATO nations, with a small Secretariat, and an annual budget of a little over $200,000, but with no official tie to NATO. In the years 1955-63, one analyst, J. Allan Hovey, estimated that the NPC made forty-four formal political recommendations; however, the force of these recommendations was reduced by several facts. First, the NPC—although it made recommendations concerning NATO activities and institutions, and although it was usually addressed by high NATO dignitaries—had no official tie with NATO. Second, NPC recommendations tended to generality, as indicated by Hovey's estimate that only four of the forty-four resolutions were "operative." Third, the participants did not seem to have a high and widespread feeling of efficacy. Although legislators did not often publicly air such linen, occasional comments indicated malaise. Thus Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota, in a series of hearings on the Atlantic Alliance, said:

I have been Chairman of a NATO Parliamentarians' Conference Committee for some time. For many years before that, I was a member. I must say that I have had the feeling that we pass more resolutions and get fewer results than any other body with which I have ever been connected. The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, it seems to me, is just a nice social gathering where we engage in a lot of oratory which results ultimately in futility.

AUTHORITY

The general weakness of NATO institutions went together with a lack of NATO authority in specific situations. Thus NATO politi-
cal consultation did not lead to authoritative decision-making on issues of primary importance to the participants—issues such as Algeria and Tunisia, Cyprus, Berlin, the Congo, Cuba, arms control, or Vietnam. Occasional exceptions—like Malta—together with the co-ordination of some minor issues were only dim candles.

Algeria and Tunisia

The Algerian rebellion, which began in 1954 and continued until 1962, was never a subject for NATO political decision-making. The French conceded that NATO should not increase its infrastructure investment in Algeria, but successive French governments refused to submit the conflict for political review, arguing that it was a domestic matter. France’s allies undertook actions, either in the United Nations or elsewhere, damaging to French pacification efforts. Thus on November 15, 1957, the Americans and British, without prior NATO consultation, delivered arms to neighboring Tunisia. Ostensibly the shipments were to preclude Communist sales, but they indirectly aided the Algerian nationalists. What consultation there was occurred after the incident. They brought the matter to the NATO Council “only after the damage had been done,” said Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak. “How much better it would have been if they had done it before.”

Even the removal of the newly independent Algeria from the area of NATO competence seemed to have been determined without prior consultation. A NATO press communiqué of January 24, 1963 implied that the French representative had recently informed the Council that the French grant of independence to Algeria in July 1962 automatically made “inapplicable” the relevant clauses of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Cyprus

Successive outbreaks of violence on Cyprus led to attempts by NATO Secretaries General to use their good offices to settle a
dispute involving three NATO members; however, their success was limited. In March, 1957, Lord Ismay offered his services as mediator to the British, Greek, and Turkish governments; though the British and Turks agreed, Greece refused. During 1958, Secretary-General Spaak, encouraged talks among the three powers and tendered his good offices for possible negotiations. When Greece again remained reluctant, he paid a surprise visit to Athens to press his proposal. On September 24, Spaak submitted a Cyprus plan to the NATO Council in Paris, for which he requested immediate acceptance in principle and subsequent consideration of detail. The British delayed their acceptance; and, though discussions continued for another month, by November they had broken down. At the December Council meeting Greece and Turkey scheduled talks outside NATO which ultimately led to the Zurich and London agreements.

Beginning in late 1963, violence between Greece and Turkey once again seemed imminent. General Lemnitzer undertook a fact-finding mission and Secretary-General Stikker sent "notes to the two countries apprising them of my official interest and my desire to help in resolving the dispute." In February, 1964, Britain and the United States advanced a plan under which the NATO countries would provide peace-keeping troops and a neutral mediator. This proposal, though accepted by Greece and Turkey, was rejected by Archbishop Makarios, who demanded that any troops be placed under the UN Security Council. In March a UN peace-keeping force and mediator arrived; and in May, the NATO Council gave Stikker a "watching brief;" he "was to follow the situation closely and consult the Council whenever he deemed it necessary." In December, this "watching brief" was renewed for Stikker's successor, Manlio Brosio.

When it looked as though the peace would once more be broken in November, 1967, the Turkish and Greek governments accepted the Council's offer of the Secretary General's good offices. Brosio shuttled back and forth between Ankara and Athens, and the waters were eventually calmed. It remained uncertain, however, whether the emergency had been resolved through Brosio's efforts; because of the good offices of Cyrus
Vance, President Johnson's special envoy; or because the Greek and Turkish governments by themselves had not wished to cross the brink of war.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Berlin}

During the Berlin crisis of 1958–62 NATO was involved only to a limited extent. On November 10, 1958, Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced that the USSR wished to terminate the Four Power agreement on the status of Berlin, thereby beginning a period of Soviet pressure on Allied rights which reached a peak on August 13, 1961, when the East German government erected a wall sealing the border between East and West Berlin. On December 16, 1958, the Council made a relatively strong statement, declaring that:

\begin{quote}
no State has the right to withdraw unilaterally from its international engagements. It considers that the denunciation by the Soviet Union of the inter-allied agreements on Berlin can in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations. Such methods destroy the mutual confidence between nations which is one of the foundations of peace.
\end{quote}

The member states of NATO could not approve a solution of the Berlin question which jeopardised the right of the three Western Powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it, and did not assure freedom of communication between that city and the free world.

The Council considers that the Berlin question can only be settled in the framework of an agreement with the USSR on Germany as a whole. It recalls that the Western Powers have repeatedly declared themselves ready to examine this problem as well as those of European security and disarmament. They are still ready to discuss all these problems.\textsuperscript{14}

In ensuing years, Council communiqués made frequent references to the problem of Berlin and to the Declaration of Decem-
November 16, 1958, but NATO's political machinery played a secondary role. The NATO Council was not extensively used as a forum of consultation nor for the evolution of plans, though it was kept informed about the Berlin situation and the reactions of the four major powers. The primary arena for political consultation and planning was the Ambassadorial Working Group in Washington which included the three former occupying powers—the United States, Britain, and France—and eventually Germany. Only when discussions among the Four Powers in Washington broke down were they transferred to Paris. There meetings that included representatives from the fifteen member nations were conducted in Secretary-General Stikker's office for several weeks to facilitate agreement. On some other occasions, NATO drills were held in order to ensure that each nation had a representative able to appear on immediate notice.\(^{15}\)

The Allies participated in the formation of an Emergency Defense Plan but this was mainly a back-up structure, removed from current policy decisions. Thus a former British Minister in Berlin revealed that "NATO as such was only brought into the Berlin problem in connection with economic or other measures which would be necessary if the situation were to deteriorate to the brink of war or simply to ensure that all the Western Allies knew what was afoot." \(^{16}\) At the level of more immediate contingency planning, the Allies were only generally informed of the work of the Ambassadorial Working Group. The NATO military command structure in Europe was bypassed. "Live Oak"—the Ambassadorial Working Group's military agency for the implementation of contingency plans—took orders from General Norstad and later General Lemnitzer, but the generals spoke as CINCEUR, not as SACEUR.\(^{17}\)

Even outside NATO's structures, there was limited accord between those Allies most concerned—the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The Ambassadorial Working Group and its subordinate working parties by the spring of 1961 had "succeeded in establishing agreement on the central facts about Berlin and its environment," and had "eliminated several
hypothetical Western initiatives or reactions that proved on closer examination to be unrealistic." At this time the United States proposed "that agreed contingency plans for a Western response to a Soviet threat to Berlin should now be finalised." 18

Two militarily oriented plans were immediate candidates for adoption. One of these was the program of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whom President Kennedy had directed, in March, to undertake special studies of the problems of NATO and Germany. When Prime Minister Macmillan visited Washington in April, Acheson presented his suggestions on Berlin, concluding that "the moment there was an interruption of access itself, we must act; first an airlift—and then, if that could not be sustained against Soviet counter-measures, a ground probe in force too large to be stopped by East German troops alone." 19

A second military plan had been developed during the Eisenhower administration and was reported to have the backing of the American and British military staffs. According to this projection, airlift was ruled out as the response to a new Berlin blockade. Instead, an American-British-French military task force would seize control of the Autobahn control post on the other side of the border and undertake small-scale penetration in East Germany. Initially the tripartite force would use only conventional armament, but it would respond in kind if East German or Soviet troops used nuclear weapons. 20

Eventually these two plans were superseded by a complicated series of scenarios which foresaw a possible Soviet blockade of Berlin along several dimensions, including means of access (road, rail, air) and target groups (Allied soldiers, all Allied nationals, German nationals, and others). The Allies might reply to such types of provocation with limited road and rail probes, an airlift combined with the utilization of existing Berlin stocks, a global diplomatic/economic offensive, a propaganda barrage, and other forms of harassment. Between six months and a year later, the stocks in Berlin would have run down and the global diplomatic economic offensive would have been played out. At this time there might be limited military actions on East
German territory, larger Allied operations up to the divisional level, and finally nuclear warfare.

In the end an overall Allied contingency plan was either never adopted or, if it was agreed upon, the four governments refused to commit themselves to automatic implementation without further intergovernmental consultation in the light of future specific challenges to West Berlin. The British and French refusals were reported to be particularly emphatic. Allied differences on military projections were crucial. France and Britain were reluctant to plan for a military land probe or a riposte on East German soil. The reasoning here was that the conventional forces in Europe would probably be insufficient to reopen the road to Berlin if it were closed, and that nuclear escalation would be inevitable to re-establish Allied access. In this case, they felt that the risk might outweigh the objective.

President Kennedy, in July, announced his intention to request an increase in the defense budget, to call up certain reserve and National Guard units, to procure new weapons, and to enlarge the program of civil defense. The Germans extended the period of conscription from twelve to eighteen months, and increased the Bundeswehr force target from 350,000 to 500,000 men, reversing the change of 1956. Neither the British nor the French, however, undertook dramatic steps toward mobilization.

Kennedy emphasized American willingness to negotiate, stating that ‘we are willing to consider any arrangement or treaty in Germany consistent with the maintenance of peace and freedom, and with the legitimate security interests of all nations.’ This position was strongly supported by the British; the Germans agreed with reservations; the French ‘remained flatly hostile to the whole idea.’

Allied contingency plans had concentrated on the possible repetition of, or variation on, the Berlin blockade of 1948–49. Instead, on August 13, the East German government erected barriers sealing off East from West Berlin and effectively ending Berlin’s quadripartite status. The Allies—either caught by surprise, or willing to accept the border closing in order to cut off a
large and potentially destabilizing flow of refugees—responded relatively mildly. Notes of protest were dispatched to the East German and Soviet governments; and the garrisons in Berlin were reinforced. The United States sent a 200 vehicle convoy and 1,500 men; the British and French sent 34 and 26 armored vehicles respectively. American Vice-President Lyndon Johnson and General Lucius Clay, who had dealt with the earlier blockade, were dispatched to Berlin.

By April, 1962, there were obvious disagreements about further Western response. The United States favored a plan which provided for an International Access Authority with equal participation by East and West German regimes, "a number of East-West German commissions to deal with technical problems, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries." The Germans, afraid of Soviet "salami tactics," leaked the plan to the press in order to destroy it, and Chancellor Adenauer publicly opposed further "exploratory" talks.

Congo

The initial Belgian decision concerning Congolese independence was made without prior consultation, though NATO played a slightly larger role afterwards. Prior to Belgium's grant of independence to the Congo of July, 1960, "Belgium never put its quandary to its Allies and asked for advice and help in advance, nor did the latter offer any." Following his retirement as Secretary-General, Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak began a series of frequent trips to NATO, one result of which was the declaration of the Permanent Council on November 24, 1964, which "unanimously expressed its understanding and appreciation" of the Belgian paratroop action to save foreign hostages at Stanleyville. Nevertheless, when United States airplanes took off from Evreux airbase in France, in order to airlift Belgian paratroopers to Stanleyville, and later used the base at Chateauroux as a rallying point for United
Nation troops on their way to the Congo, the French government claimed that it had not been consulted.  

Cuba

Political consultation prior to the Cuban crisis of October, 1962, had little authoritative impact. For some time prior to the crisis, the United States had attempted to persuade its NATO Allies to end their trade with Cuba. In February, 1962, a special mission headed by Walt Rostow had requested Allied cooperation in the restriction of Cuban trade; there had been repeated requests both in the Council and to Allied ambassadors in Washington; and finally, on October 16, Abram Chayes, State Department legal advisor, arrived in Paris to inform the Allies of the Kennedy administration's plans for economic sanctions against nations whose ships were trading with Cuba.

Relations became particularly strained between Britain and the United States. Although the British government had refused export licenses for arms to Cuba for approximately two years, and although overall British exports to Cuba had fallen drastically from a six-month average of £7 million in 1959, it was estimated that Britain was still exporting a six-month average of £1.3 million in 1962. On September 10, members of a Cuban exile group operating out of Puerto Rico, Alpha 66, attacked a British vessel in the Cuban port of Caibarien; and, on October 11, they announced that they would attempt to attack all merchant ships carrying supplies to Cuba. The reaction of the American government was mild. Following the September attack, President Kennedy stated in a press conference, "Our friends in NATO must realize the implications of their ships engaging in Cuban trade. We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's future return to freedom." Following the October announcement, a representative of the State Department stated that the United States was not prepared to act against the exiles, for shippers ran risks in trade with Cuba. The United States did
not sanction the assaults, but there were difficulties in guarantee­
ing peace in the Caribbean. On the other hand the British government took “a serious view” of the Alpha 66 attacks; and the Admiralty announced that the British Royal Navy would protect British ships if they were attacked by Alpha 66 on the high seas.\(^{34}\)

The American decision to institute a military blockade of Cuba was taken almost completely without Allied consultation. The public announcement was made on October 22; most Allies were informed only hours before the public announcement and none had been “consulted.” The British were the first to know, having learned of the imminent blockade by October 19; the other Allies were informed through the NATO Council and presidential emissaries on October 22. The nature of the transaction was highlighted by the exchange between de Gaulle and Acheson, eight hours before Kennedy’s public speech.

De Gaulle raised his hand in a delaying gesture that the long-departed Kings of France might have envied. “May we be clear before you start,” he said. “Are you consulting or informing me?” Acheson confessed that he was there to inform, not consult. “I am in favor of independent decisions,” de Gaulle acknowledged.\(^ {35}\)

Arms Control

With regard to arms control, NATO made frequent statements in its communiqués, and representatives to the Geneva disarmament conference often visited the Council to keep it informed. Nevertheless, most of the Allies received very limited prior information when advances took place. Thus, prior to the signature of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty in 1963, “no consultation took place in any of the numerous European bodies; neither did any take place in the Atlantic framework. Several of the European allies of the United States were informed of the details of the Treaty negotiations only at a very late date, or not at all.” \(^ {36}\)

On other occasions discussion meant open conflict. In April,
1967, the Permanent Council was unable to agree on a draft non-proliferation treaty. The United States, Britain, Denmark, and Norway wished to seek immediate agreement with the Soviet Union. The Germans and Italians objected to the possible impact of inspection and control provisions on the development of peaceful atomic technology; and they preferred inspection by EURATOM to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency—which the United States claimed the Soviet Union would not accept. Belgium and Canada stated that the treaty discriminated against the non-nuclear powers. The French had already announced that they would refuse to join. When a non-proliferation treaty was finally signed on July 1, 1968, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Turkey did not participate.

Viet-Nam

As United States military involvement in Viet-Nam deepened, Secretary of State Rusk, Under-Secretary of State Ball, Ambassador Lodge, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Harriman, and other American officials visited NATO to explain the American position and request Allied support. Nevertheless, Secretary General Dirk Stikker reported that “the response from other members in the Council was vague. Sometimes there was complete silence,” he said, “and ambassadorial silence is never a good omen for spontaneous loyal support.” The British, Greeks, and Turks continued to trade with North Viet-Nam; the French called for an end to foreign intervention; and Allied aid to American efforts remained uneven and relatively meager.

Middle East, 1967

The Middle East crisis of 1967 had implications for NATO. Part of the United States Sixth Fleet, which operated in the Mediterranean, was earmarked for NATO in case of emergency; a British base remained on Malta; and the security of Greece and
Turkey, should the conflict seriously escalate, might be threat­
ened.

Nevertheless, the Allies did not tightly concert their activities.
On May 23, the United Arab Republic closed the Gulf of
Aqaba to Israeli ships and to strategic materials destined for
Israel. The following day President Johnson declared the block­
ade illegal; and on May 24, the French government suggested
that the Big Four—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain,
and France—co-operate to maintain peace. Although the British
government quickly supported the idea of Four-Power talks, the
United States awaited the Soviet response before committing
itself.\textsuperscript{39}

During the next two weeks the United States and Britain
sponsored a declaration of maritime nations that the Gulf of
Aqaba had the status of an international waterway through
which all ships had the right of passage. The French did not
associate themselves with the diplomatic offensive.\textsuperscript{40}

On June 5, armed conflict began between Israel and the
Arabs. The United States, Britain, France, and Germany an­
nounced their neutrality the same day. On June 1, the Turkish
government had taken a public anti-Israeli position by announc­ing
that no military bases on Turkish soil could be used against
the Arabs; Greece was to join Turkey on June 7.\textsuperscript{41}

Britain, France, and Germany announced the suspension of
arms shipments to the belligerents on June 5 and 6. A spokes­
man for the Netherlands Ministry of Defense stated that the
Netherlands would continue to supply arms to Israel.\textsuperscript{42}

On June 17, the United Nations General Assembly convened
in emergency session; and on July 4, it voted on a series of
resolutions. Three of these votes, summarized in Table 1,
showed serious division in NATO ranks. A resolution sponsored by
eighteen non-aligned nations, with strong Soviet support, called
for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory. Ten
Allies voted against it; Portugal abstained; France, Greece, and
Turkey favored it. A resolution sponsored by the Latin Ameri­
can nations linked the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the cessa-
tion of Arab belligerency. Ten Allies favored it; France, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey abstained. A Pakistani resolution criticized Israeli steps to annex Jerusalem. Ten Allies voted for; Iceland, Italy, Portugal, and the United States abstained.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{TABLE 1}

\textbf{PARTICIPATION BY NATO MEMBERS IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY EMERGENCY SESSION ROLL CALL VOTES, JULY 4, 1967 *}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Non-Aligned Resolution</th>
<th>Latin American Resolution</th>
<th>Pakistani Resolution</th>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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* Associated Press Release, July 4, 1967. Abbreviations in the table are as follows: O = Opposed, F = Favored, A = Abstained.

\textbf{Secondary Issues}

Authoritative political consultation occasionally occurred in less important areas, but even here, the record was slight.

"The emergence of Malta as a sovereign state in 1964 was handled with close reference to the views of Britain's NATO Allies in the Mediterranean, in a working group of the Council headed by the Secretary General"; \textsuperscript{44} and Manlio Brosio served as negotiator between the Council and the Maltese government in talks about the maintenance of a NATO base there. Upon Malta's accession to independence, the Council adopted a resolution
which included Malta in the consultative framework: The reso-
lution stated that “consultation should take place between NATO and the Government of Malta, whenever, in the opinion of the Government of Malta, or of any of the members, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of Malta is threatened.”

The Committee of Political Advisors made decisions in a few sequestered areas. It issued general guidelines to the Allied Travel Office in Berlin for travel of East Germans to NATO countries, specific instructions for the issuance of East German Temporary Travel Documents, and rules for Allied participation in East Germany’s Leipzig Fair.

LEGITIMACY

The frailty of NATO authority in cases such as these was matched by a lack of legitimacy, for acceptance of NATO as a forum for political consultation was not implicit in the policies of the member nations. Suitor nations solicited NATO legitimation for their own policies without necessarily accepting NATO influence on policy formation; the nations courted were reluctant to provide the desired concurrence.

Three successive American Secretaries of State verbally fa-vored the expansion of political consultation. John Foster Dulles called for the advancement of NATO “from its initial phase to the totality of its meaning.” Christian Herter proposed greater politi-
cal consultation within NATO. Dean Rusk suggested common NATO policies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Nevertheless, Dulles made it clear that the United States would act in critical areas, such as Formosa, without necessary prior consultation within the Council; and Rusk assumed that a common NATO pol-
icy in Asia would be one which would support the American position there.

Shortly after his return to power, General de Gaulle had supported the deepening of political consultation between France, the United States, and Britain. On September 17, 1958,
he wrote to President Eisenhower and “called for a tripartite organization on the level of world policy and strategy to take joint decisions on political questions affecting world security.” Although there is insufficient public information available to be certain that such political consultation was intended to bear the NATO label, De Gaulle probably felt that it should be related to the Alliance. In his speech of September 5, 1960, he joined the directoire proposal and NATO by asking, “if there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe?” It was clear, however, that De Gaulle saw his proposal mainly as a means of obtaining American support for French policies. On December 15, 1958, he talked with Secretary of State Dulles. After discussing the possibility of beginning tripartite planning and “the absence of such tripartite co-operation in Africa in recent years, particularly in North Africa”, de Gaulle stated that he would nevertheless welcome genuine three-power planning in Africa, even if tardy. He then concluded, ‘Of course, a common policy in North Africa would necessarily be a French policy.’

If a nation brought its political problems to NATO for consultation, other nations attempted to remain uninvolved. Thus when the United States introduced the issues of Formosa and the Offshore Islands to the Council, and when the United States and Britain discussed the circumstances in Lebanon and Jordan prior to their intervention, Secretary General Spaak reported that “the reserve and caution of certain countries was very great. A number of countries remained silent.”

Non-national advocacy of NATO political consultation was sporadic, even though the political issues were often the focus of strong attitudes. The most consistent support, while it had little apparent effect, came from the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference. This group had backed the expansion of political consultation since its inception. In 1956, an NPC Resolution cited Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and then called upon the North Atlantic Council to “give full scope to such interpretation (of
Article 4) and consultation so as to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community. In 1965, the NPC urged "NATO Governments to maintain their efforts to solve the problems of the co-ordination of their policies and their forces," and recommended "that special attention be paid immediately to the problems of political and operational planning."  

LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

Although their success seemed slight, NATO's Secretaries General provided leadership for political consultation. They were all distinguished and they all expounded an ideology which included liberal doses of general exhortation. Nevertheless, only one of them, Paul-Henri Spaak, strove forcefully to drive home a substantial series of proposals for specific NATO structures and tasks.

On March 12, 1952, the Council of Deputies appointed Lord Ismay to be the first NATO Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the Council. Lord Ismay was a British soldier who had made his early career in the outposts of the British Empire and who had served closely with Winston Churchill; at the time of his new appointment he was British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. When he appointed Lord Ismay, Churchill told him that NATO was the best, if not the only, hope of peace and that it "must be more effectively organized and managed," a task to which Lord Ismay set himself.

In 1956, following four years of service, Lord Ismay resigned, and the Council selected Paul-Henri Spaak to succeed him. Spaak, a Socialist, had been Prime Minister and several times Foreign Minister of Belgium, President of the United Nations General Assembly, President of the Council of Europe, and President of the ECSC Assembly. He was, to say the least, a seasoned politician. He hoped to expand the scope of NATO through the broad co-ordination of policies outside the purely military and strategic areas and specifically emphasized "the
necessity for giving the organization of the Atlantic Alliance a political and also an economic basis.”

Spaak resigned in 1961 and was replaced by Dirk Stikker, who had a varied background in business, politics, and diplomacy. During the postwar years in the Netherlands, Stikker had been President of the Fondation du Travail; President of the Parti de la Liberté et la Démocratie (Liberal); Foreign Minister; President of the OEEC; President of the Netherlands delegation to the UN Economic and Social Council; and Ambassador to Iceland. Immediately preceding his appointment to the post of NATO Secretary General he had been Permanent Representative to NATO and the OEEC. The French initially opposed his appointment; and during his three-year term as Secretary General, President de Gaulle received him only once. The role which Stikker set for himself seemed more limited than that of the men who had preceded him. He defined his major aims in terms of ensuring the survival of NATO and of making conflicts between Allies manageable.

Manlio Brosio succeeded Stikker in August, 1964. Brosio was an Italian politician and diplomat, who had been associated with the Liberal Party and had been Ambassador to Moscow, London, Washington, and Paris. One advantage that he enjoyed over his predecessor was a more friendly personal relationship with De Gaulle. Indeed it was rumored that he had been the candidate for Secretary General supported by the French at the time of Spaak’s resignation. Brosio’s style was lower-key than that of his predecessors. While Spaak and Stikker had often taken their own initiatives to national governments, Brosio preferred to use existing national positions and Allied consensus as bases for action.

Lord Ismay had laid the general ideological groundwork for political consultation in his farewell address, which presented five “Rules for NATO Conduct.” Two of these rules warned of the dangers and lessons of the continuing Soviet threat. “Never relax your vigilance,” Ismay said, “unless it is absolutely certain
that the danger has passed. Remember the recent past. The Soviet has always hated NATO; they have always tried, and are still trying to disrupt it. "Do not forget," he continued, "that the North Atlantic Treaty is not only a solemn obligation but also an insurance—a collective insurance—against measureless catastrophe." A third rule exhorted the Allies to consult early and in depth. It was "imperative that the partners should keep in the closest touch with each other on all matters great and small which affect the Alliance." This meant that none of them "should take action or reach firm decisions on such matters without consulting (their) allies or, at the very least without keeping them fully informed." A fourth injunction called upon the member governments to formulate and abide by common policies for the extra-treaty area. They were not to forget that, "the world in which we live is now a small place and that there may be developments outside the NATO area which may exercise a permanent influence on the security of that area. NATO must therefore always have an agreed policy for dealing with such developments as they occur, and must pursue that policy resolutely." Finally the Allies should settle internecine conflicts "as quickly as possible" and without involving others. To bolster his admonition against washing "dirty NATO linen" in public, Lord Ismay recalled Kipling: "When ye fight with a Wolf of the Pack, ye must fight him alone and afar, / Lest others take part in the quarrel, and the Pack be diminished by war."

For Ismay's successor, Spaak, the Suez crisis showed both the deficiencies of past attempts at consultation and the necessity of undertaking a major new effort. He thus moved political consultation into a position of primary importance. In November, 1959, Spaak stated that "NATO is ten years old. For the first six years, the principal effort was military. During the following four years, it has been political."

The ideology with which Spaak attempted to advance political consultation was complex. At the highest level of generality, it invoked the sanctions of Atlantic interdependence and of the Atlantic Community. Spaak was present at the meeting between
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in October, 1957, and contributed to the formulation of their declaration of common purpose, which underlined the interdependence of the countries of the free world, and which led to the meeting of the Allied heads of government in Paris two months later. Elsewhere, he said that, "the Atlantic Alliance should become the Atlantic Community. One of our first objectives must be to co-ordinate Western policy." 58

Spaak also emphasized the fact that the Communist threat had not diminished but had, in fact, increased since 1949, that the threat had expanded from a European-military to a global-political one, and that the Allies should band together politically to meet the danger. Less generally, he asked member states to use NATO machinery for consultation on and co-ordination of the whole range of their foreign policies—including their relations with Africa and Asia—at the earliest stages of policy formation. 59

At the level of particular structures, Spaak made two principal recommendations. The first suggestion was that the unanimity rule be abandoned, but Spaak doubted that this was possible for the foreseeable future:

Political consultation in NATO is not what I would like, and I have so often expressed my personal opinion that it is well known. I myself believe that international organizations, whether they are universal, Atlantic, or European, will not really function well until the day when the strict rule of unanimity will have been abandoned. But one must certainly recognize that, in saying this, I or people who share this feeling are far ahead of their time.

The second recommendation was that permanent consultative committees be formed to deal with Allied policy in different regional areas; but this proved unrealistic as well. 60

Spaak also commented on particular political tasks. He defined a desirable position for NATO on the problems of Germany and Berlin: "We cannot accept the neutralization of Germany," he said. "We must continue to regard German reunification as
our objective; we can, under no circumstances, abandon the Berliners, which means that we must not allow civilian and military communication between West Berlin and the free world to be cut." On the issue of Algeria, he suggested that France should present her troubles to the Allies, who would listen with a sympathetic ear. "If I may permit myself to reproach the French government," he said, "it is for not having till now clearly posed the problem (of Algeria) to NATO as a whole. Why? Because I believe that the French position is so good that it must necessarily triumph. The immense majority of the NATO countries realize the importance for Europe and for the Atlantic Organization that French influence remain preponderant in Algeria."

In spite of the primacy which Spaak gave to political consultation, the going proved rough. By 1959 he was openly discouraged. "While the situation was very satisfactory throughout 1958 and during the first six months of 1959," he stated, "after the Geneva Conference matters became worse, and certain decisions were taken. The situation had thus become less satisfactory, causing considerable uneasiness." Following the December, 1960, meeting of the Council of Ministers, his successor reported that Spaak was ready to resign because he "was in disagreement with the policies followed by several Ministers, and there was, in his opinion, insufficient consultation and practically no unity of action." Following Spaak’s departure, Secretary General Stikker continued general support for political collaboration. He stressed that "the principal way continually to renew and strengthen the bonds that unite us is political consultation and harmonization of our foreign policies."

At the same time, his remarks implied a feeling that the realities of NATO in the 1960’s required a less ambitious approach to Allied politics. "The unity of the alliance was no longer what it had been at the beginning," he felt, and "new disagreements both in political and military affairs, some of them acute, were to arise. As I saw it, my first responsibility was to ensure that NATO
continued to function.  My second was obviously to narrow the areas of disagreement to workable dimensions."

Stikker supported specific institutional innovations, moving political consultation into a position of procedural primacy in the meetings of the Permanent Council. Under Spaak, the Permanent Council had first attempted to clear the terrain of administrative questions, and then had dealt with political matters. As a result, Stikker felt that meetings had been extended and political discussions truncated. At its Oslo meeting in May, 1961, the Council of Ministers reversed the order, and subsequent Permanent Council meetings began with political issues.

In the realm of particular tasks, Stikker defined a firm policy for Berlin. "Through the sequence of events since the end of the Second World War," Stikker said, "the limits within which we can manoeuvre and within which we can negotiate in the case of Berlin are very narrow indeed. In its efforts to be reasonable and co-operative, the West has already over the years conceded several points, and very little could be conceded now without our setting our foot on a steeply inclined and very slippery plane."

Nevertheless, Stikker appeared more cautious than Spaak. While Spaak had stressed long-term planning in political affairs, Stikker focussed more closely on the military future, opposing an American proposal that APAG undertake long-term political projections for NATO because he feared that it could not successfully accomplish the job. While Spaak had hoped to establish a NATO European policy, Stikker was more skeptical. He felt that Franco-German conflicts would continue to prevent agreement, even after De Gaulle had left French politics.

Brosio's approach was as ambivalent as Stikker's. He continued the general call for political co-operation. "We have concluded perhaps the first half of our soccer game one goal up," Brosio said, "but we are in the course of a difficult second half, where we are playing against the slope and the final result is uncertain. We should be careful, lest we find ourselves losing in the diplomatic field the possibility not only of a victory but even of a fair and honorable draw." Brosio also placed major
emphasis on the goal of narrowing foreign policy conflicts. "It must be the purpose of our consultation process," he said, "to prevent at least conflicting policies and contradictory action within the alliance." 68

He called for joint action and negotiation on a series of specific problems within the geographical area covered by the Alliance, under the "policy of the outstretched hand." Rapprochement and détente with Eastern Europe, the end of the political division of Germany, and balanced arms control measures were sectors in which he believed progress might be made. 69 NATO consultation on problems outside the Treaty area "was also highly necessary and desirable, and in the evident interest of all Alliance powers." Nevertheless, Brosio felt that "an extension of Alliance commitments outside the NATO area might well do more harm than good," and that extra-treaty area problems, "since they are not covered by the Atlantic Treaty, will as a rule not give rise to Atlantic policy." When he particularly appealed for Allied support of the United States in South Viet-Nam, he was careful to mollify the other Allies by noting that the problems there were theirs, but only "indirectly." 70

In its generality, the ideology of NATO's leaders aimed at all Alliance members. At one end of the spectrum were the larger powers—the United States, United Kingdom, and France. The Suez interventions which helped to upgrade political consultation had placed Britain and France on the opposite side from the United States, a critical situation which the leadership realized would destroy the alliance if repeated. Furthermore, concern with the extra-treaty area—while it could apply equally well to nations like Belgium and the Netherlands, if not to Portugal—obviously had special relevance for the Big Three. Finally, the emphasis on narrowing foreign policy conflict bore special implied reference to the growing differences between the governments of France and the United States, both in the military and political spheres. At the other end of the spectrum were the smaller powers, who might be expected to applaud such stands as Spaak's rejection of de Gaulle's proposal for a political direc-
toire, and who, it might be hoped, would share Brosio's belief that a "lack of timely and serious consultation" entailed "the risk of subjecting the minor powers of the Alliance to the consequences of individual initiatives and faits accomplis on the part of others." 71

The leadership's attempt to house all of the Allies under the roof of political consultation was most clearly articulated by Spaak when he defended his proposal for a set of permanent committees to consult on specific geographical areas of the world. Spaak stated:

The most powerful members of the Alliance, who would, of course, be members of all the restricted committees, would thus acquire a general view of world problems and would be in a position to co-ordinate the action of the Alliance. This, it seems to me, would be a step towards the elaboration of a global strategy.

The countries with limited interests would have the opportunity to concert their action with their more powerful allies and would no doubt obtain from them the help they need.

Finally, the other members of the Alliance would not be kept in the dark. On the contrary, they would be informed, to the extent that they were interested, in accordance with the principles laid down in the report of the Three Wise Men. 72

While NATO leaders tried to co-opt those elements within national governments traditionally responsible for foreign policy formulation and execution, they made little attempt to bring arrivistes such as national legislators inside out of the cold. Spaak, Sikker, and Brosio all told the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference that they saw no immediate prospect for transforming the NPC from a gathering without formal ties with NATO into an official parliamentary body for the Atlantic Alliance. 73

DECISION-MAKING

Notwithstanding their efforts to advance political consultation, the Secretaries General were blocked in NATO's decision-
making structures. Independent experts gave them some support but instructed delegates ultimately remained in control.

In NATO's earlier years, Lord Ismay had been able to use two ad hoc groups of national officials acting in the capacity of independent experts, each of which had recommended improvements in political consultation. The first of these was the NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community, which made its final report to the Council at Lisbon in February, 1952. The Committee consisted of Ministers from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. Mr. Lester Pearson was Chairman of the Committee, and Charles Spofford, the American Chairman of the Council of Deputies, was the only non-Ministerial and large-power representative. This body recommended that political consultation under Article 4 be expanded, especially during "emergency situations" and in the early stages of policy formation. "There is a continuing need," the Committee said, "for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO." 74

The second group, the Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, was established in May, 1956, by the Council to advise it "on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community." This committee, later known as the "Three Wise Men," consisted of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway: Lester Pearson, Gaetano Martino, and Halvard Lange. During 1956 it submitted a questionnaire to the member governments and conducted a series of interviews with government representatives, probing attitudes on the possible future role of NATO.75

The Committee's final report devoted an entire chapter to the support of political co-operation. Among the institutional innovations which it proposed was that there be "preparation for political consultation" through the constitution under the Council of a "Committee of Political Advisers from each delegation, aided
when necessary by specialists from the capitals." For "peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes," it recommended "empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration."

There was to be "an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance by the Foreign Ministers each Spring, in preparation for which "the Secretary General should submit an annual report." Finally, the Committee suggested "that the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences," such as the NPC, "and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings. Invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers [should] attend certain of these meetings." 

The Report was approved by a general resolution of the Ministerial Council of December, 1956. The Council added a specific endorsement of the recommendation that the Secretary General be allowed to offer his good offices to initiate and facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. Ultimately the Committee's work represented the foundation for the reforms which followed the Suez crisis.

At the Ministerial Council in December, 1959, American Secretary of State Herter suggested that NATO develop a ten-year plan for the coming decade. The Ministers, in their final communiqué, "instructed the Permanent Council to undertake long-term planning, to cover the next ten years, on the objectives of the Alliance in the political, military, scientific, and economic fields, and in regard to arms control." Secretary General Spaak was given the task of developing the details of the plan.

Spaak constructed the exercise around the theme of the Atlantic Community and used the Three Wise Men's report as a base. During the fall of 1960, he met with the permanent representatives every week in his office. Agreement was almost impossible due to conflicting and constantly shifting national positions.

In December, 1960, Spaak presented his report to the Minis-
ters. To improve political consultation, he recommended the establishment of a set of permanent committees which would focus on regional areas. Membership in each would include the United States, Britain, and France; perhaps Germany and Italy; and those Allies most concerned. Thus Belgium and Portugal would sit on the African committee, the Netherlands on the Asian group, Greece and Turkey on the Middle Eastern body.

The Council did not approve Spaak’s recommendations for expanding NATO’s consultative organs. The United States, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy were generally favorable, but President de Gaulle still supported the creation of a directoire and the Scandinavians were reluctant to assume new military responsibilities.

At this point Spaak made his initial decision to resign. Not only had the Council refused his political proposals; it had also turned aside his suggestions for economic co-operation and for substantial increases in the science and information budgets. Portugal had made a presentation of her political problems; but nobody had replied to or discussed it. Finally the conflict between France and the United States was growing without candid discussion; and De Gaulle had begun military withdrawals.

Stikker replaced Spaak in April, 1961, and at their May meeting in Oslo, the Foreign Ministers approved a final report on the Long-Term Planning Exercise. It is unlikely that this document conspicuously bore Spaak’s imprint. Indeed, the Council at this time finally “rejected the idea of adding any permanent consultative organs to the already complicated bureaucratic apparatus and decided, instead, to rely primarily on ad hoc committees.”

In the fall of 1964, the Canadian government suggested that NATO conduct a new exercise to study the future tasks of the Alliance. Pierre Harmel, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a similar proposal at the Ministerial Council two years later and the Council “resolved to undertake a broad analysis of international developments since the signing of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty in 1949.” Its purpose was: “to determine the influence of such developments on the Alliance and to identify the tasks which lie before it, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace.” The Council noted particularly its intention to “examine ways of improving consultation within the Alliance, including the European member countries.”

A preliminary report was scheduled for the spring, 1967, Ministerial meeting; and the exercise was due to conclude at the subsequent gathering in December. On February 15, 1967, high-level delegates from national capitals attended the meeting of the Permanent Council to discuss the implementation of the Harmel Plan. A week later the Permanent Council formalized this meeting by noting that it had set up, “under the Chairmanship of the Secretary General, a Special Group of Representatives designated by governments to prepare a report.” Under the Special Group were also established four subgroups, with different rapporteurs, to deal with the topics of East-West relations, inter-allied relations, general defense policy, and relations with other countries.

Once Foreign Minister Harmel had made the original proposal, Brosio assumed an important role in working out the specific structures and tasks of the exercise. The Harmel Plan represented a vehicle for putting early and with force the argument for the continued need for NATO after 1969, when Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty allowed any nation to withdraw with one year’s notice. Brosio did not hope that the study would “lead to NATO becoming an executive body for the implementation of a common policy; there is no question of committing now the Alliance as such to a definite course of bloc-to-bloc negotiations,” he said. “The Allies are not pursuing any ambitious goal such as ‘a Political High Command.’” Rather the object of the exercise was to investigate ways in which the Alliance could be “strengthened and adapted to meet the needs of the immediate and of the more distant future,” with specific emphasis on the problems of détente.
Brosio’s position gave him good leverage to pursue his aims at several levels of national instruction and independent expertise. As Chairman of the Council, he had access to national permanent representatives at regular Council gatherings and in informal meetings. He was also chairman of the Special Group on the Study of the Future Tasks of the Alliance (AC 261). This group was composed of—and two of its subgroups were headed by—senior officials from national foreign ministries, as indicated in Appendixes A and B. Two subgroup rapporteurs were more independent, former Secretary General Spaak, who had retired from active Belgian politics in 1966, and Dr. C. L. Patijn, Professor of International Political Relations at the University of Utrecht. Finally, Brosio headed the International Staff/Secretariat which was responsible for certain research and drafts.

It yet remained unlikely that the Harmel exercise would result in significantly improved political consultation. Harmel had suggested that a “European caucus” be created within the North Atlantic Council, which could speak with a single voice and which could concert policy with the United States on a more equal base than the European nations individually. By October, 1967, this suggestion had been shelved. The French, still participants in NATO’s political activities, had initially approved the exercise, but were unwilling to endorse a strong report. Among the remaining fourteen states were those, including the Germans and Canadians, who wished to preserve as much French co-operation as still remained. Moreover the exercise had been constructed only partially to improve political consultation. Perhaps equally important had been the desire to move public opinion, to persuade the electorate—especially young voters who had relatively dim memories of the dangers of the late 1940’s and early 1950’s—that NATO still remained necessary.

When the Harmel report on “the future tasks of the Alliance” finally appeared in December, 1967, it proposed no radical innovations. Major emphasis rested on the need to use “the Alliance
constructively in the interest of détente' in order to achieve 'peace and stability in Europe.' At the same time it made clear that "Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision" and that the most desirable situation would be one in which the Allies remained on 'parallel courses' rather than on a common tack. The Allies were to "examine," "study," and "consult on" the future of Germany, disarmament and arms control, NATO's south-eastern flank, and the extra-treaty area; but concrete action would have to await the Permanent Council's "detailed follow-up" to the Harmel study.

The permanent day-to-day structures and processes of political consultation seemed to allow little grounds for optimism about constructive change. Within these more permanent structures, the Secretary General and his experts—the Staff/Secretariat—could of course inject perspectives independent of national positions. Their roles as chairmen of the various consultative bodies involved the conduct of meetings and drafting of minutes and papers.

The decision-making structure for political consultation, nevertheless, remained heavily weighted on the side of instructed national delegates, though degree of instruction varied with the rank and relation of the individual with his home government, the gravity of the subject under discussion, and the degree of national commitment which might be involved. The Permanent Council consisted of national permanent representatives to NATO, the Committee of Political Advisors of representatives from national delegations, the Groups of Experts of national foreign office representatives, and the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group of national foreign policy planning officials.

The pattern of behavior within this framework tended to be one in which little change in national political positions appeared. Members of national delegations stated privately that "convergence" of originally disparate national positions was extremely difficult to achieve; rather, NATO structures produced less satisfactory outcomes of "specialization" and "redundancy." Is-
issues were assigned to groups with specialized areas of competence; but when they were elevated from lower to higher groups the issues tended to be no closer to a joint solution than before.

COALITIONS

In spite of the leadership's attempts, a stable base of coaltional support for NATO political consultation failed to develop. Perhaps the best facsimile of a supporting coalition was provided by the United States and Britain subsequent to Suez. The two nations co-operated privately and informed the NATO Council before intervening in Lebanon and Jordan. In Cyprus, they proposed that the NATO countries provide peace-keeping troops and a neutral mediator. During the Middle East crisis of 1967 they jointly sponsored a Declaration of Maritime Nations. Nevertheless in these cases—and in joint actions such as the shipment of arms to Tunisia in 1957 and the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963—the two were more concerned that their Allies fall in line with American and British policies than that their Allies participate in the process of policy determination.

Another possible coalition, represented by De Gaulle's proposal for closer political co-ordination between the United States, Britain, and France, was rejected by the NATO leadership and by the United States on the grounds that such a grouping would undermine rather than advance the NATO program. Spaak stated that "within the Alliance most of the members are opposed to the idea of a 'directory.'" In spite of the differences in national responsibilities he felt that the "directory" proposal was misguided in "granting to some the right to decide for the others. The biggest countries must now resign themselves to endeavor to convince the others," he continued, "because, though they are larger, they are no longer large enough to make the decisions alone. Only the Atlantic Alliance can face up to the threat." 86

In his reply of October 20, 1958, Eisenhower "declined to enter into any arrangements that would give our other Allies, or
other countries of the free world, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interests were being made without their participation." 87

Other protocoalitions were only tangentially related to NATO political consultation. Co-operation between the United States, Britain, France, and Germany over Berlin—symbolized by the Ambassadorial Working Group in Washington—took place primarily outside NATO. The caucus of the Fourteen, formed in the wake of De Gaulle's military withdrawal, concentrated mainly on problems in other areas of NATO activity. The decision of the Fourteen, announced in October, 1966, to move NATO's political headquarters from Paris to Brussels—though it had profound political implications—was less politically substantive than an administrative measure to reunite NATO civilian and military bureaucracies. Even here there was Canadian and Danish opposition. 88

FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER

The failure of integration was to be expected in political consultation, since issues here cut to the core of national foreign policy and were highly controversial. While some less important matters, such as travel documents for East Germans, resulted in Allied co-ordination, activities which might in other contexts have been technical—for example, the exchange of information—remained political by reason of long traditions of diplomatic secrecy and considerations of diplomatic strategy.

A major impetus toward NATO political concerting came from the perceived dangers of the Suez crisis. Spaak noted that the Report of the Committee of Three, which underlay most subsequent political development, "was discussed by the Ministers soon after the Suez crisis, and this circumstance no doubt explains why it was approved without lengthy discussion." He continued:

The Alliance, had, in fact, just been in serious danger. On a question of real importance, the respective positions of the
United States, on the one side, and France and Great Britain on the other, had been entirely different. One did not need to be a prophet to see that, if such a situation arose again in the future, it was very possible that the Alliance would not survive. Aware of the danger, the Ministers ratified the conclusions of the Three Wise Men.\textsuperscript{69}

The inability of the political program to expand substantially and gain popularity once the immediate crisis had passed can be attributed to the lack of convergent interests which might have made nations agree to bear extra political risks, military commitments, and economic burdens. Interests were compartmentalized by discrete spheres of influence. In Berlin, the three former occupying powers and the Germans were the major nations concerned; in post-colonial situations such as Algeria, Cyprus, and the Congo, the former colonial power and the new claimants held center stage; in Cuba the United States acted in support of the Monroe Doctrine, an exclusive policy almost one hundred forty years old, while in South Viet-Nam it fought a battle which the French had abandoned and others were unwilling to support. Even in such non-territorial areas as arms control, interests were separated by barriers between the nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots, with implications not only for test bans, but also for such areas as non-proliferation and non-dissemination, reduction of nuclear stocks, denuclearized areas, denuclearization of space, regulation of conventional weapons, establishment of observation posts, and peaceful exploitation of atomic energy.
Allied co-operation in military forces also relied on explicit North Atlantic Treaty provisions. Article 3 stated that, "the Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Under Article 5 each Party agreed that in the event of armed attack, it would "assist the Party or Parties attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Finally in Article 9 it was decided that the Council "shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5."

INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

At its first meeting in 1949, the Council established the Defense Committee, normally to be composed of defense ministers, and suggested to it the general outline of those subsidiary military bodies which it considered appropriate for the task of aiding the Defense Committee in recommending measures for the implementation of the Treaty.
Among these was the Military Committee composed of national chiefs-of-staff or their representatives, normally to meet in Washington. The terms of reference of the Military Committee directed it to "provide general policy guidance of a military nature to its Standing Group; advise the Defense Committee and other agencies on military matters as appropriate; recommend to the Defense Committee military measures for the unified defense of the North Atlantic area."

Beneath the Military Committee there was to be "a sub-committee of that body to be known as the Standing Group," consisting of representatives from France, the United Kingdom and the United States and functioning continuously at a permanent site in Washington. Under its directive the Standing Group, "in accordance with general policy guidance provided by the Military Committee" was to "provide specific policy guidance and information of a military nature to the Regional Planning Groups and any other bodies of the organization as is necessary for their work." Furthermore the Standing Group was to "co-ordinate and integrate the defense plans originating in the Regional Planning Groups."

Five regional planning groups were set up on a geographical basis "in order to ensure speedy and efficient planning of the unified defense of the whole North Atlantic area": the Northern European Regional Planning Group, the Western European Regional Planning Group, the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group, the Canadian-United States Regional Planning Group, and the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group.

In 1951 the Council paved the way for the development of a set of civilian defense substructures by institutionally incorporating the Defense Committee. Following the work of a Temporary Council Committee, the Annual Review Committee was created in 1952 to promote force planning by co-ordinating yearly estimates of Allied military and economic capabilities. This body was assisted by the Economics and Finance Division of the International Staff/Secretariat and supervised Annual Reviews
between 1953–61 and a Triennial Review in 1962. During 1952
the Council also created the Military Budget Committee to
oversee the operating expenses of NATO's military establishment.

In 1963 the Council established itself as the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) with a subordinate Defense Planning Working Group (DPWG) in order to examine further "the interrelated questions of strategy, force requirements, and the resources available to meet them;" and in December, 1966, the Council approved the formation in 1967 of a Five Year Rolling Defense Program which would project "Alliance force goals and country plans five years ahead each year." During the course of 1966–67, the DPC emerged as an alternate Council. Following French withdrawal from NATO's military organizations, it became "the coordinating body for the defense plans of the 'Fourteen' dealing with all matters connected with integrated common defense."²

To deal with the area of nuclear consultation and planning, the Council in 1965 set up a Special Committee of Defense Ministers, known as the McNamara Committee after the American Secretary of Defense who originally suggested it. Beneath it, this Committee created three temporary working bodies: the Nuclear Planning Working Group, the Working Group on Intelligence and Other Data Exchange, and the Working Group on Communications. These groups were to function under the guidance of a steering committee composed of the permanent representatives of the participating countries—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Council substituted two permanent bodies for this set of structures in 1966. The first of these was the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), whose task was "to propose general policy on the nuclear defense affairs of the Alliance," which was open to all NATO members, and which twelve nations—excepting France, Iceland, and Luxembourg—joined. The second body was the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which was created "to carry out the detailed work required for policy proposals." Four
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nations were to have permanent seats on the NPG: the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy; three seats were to rotate every eighteen months. During the first term, Canada and the Netherlands participated, with Turkey and Greece each serving half the time of the third position. Belgium and Denmark sat on the NPG during the second eighteen months, with Greece and Turkey again dividing the remaining seat.³

In 1967, the International Staff/Secretariat was reorganized and a Division of Defense Planning and Policy was created, with subordinate directorates of force planning, nuclear planning, and civil emergency planning.

On the more strictly military side, the Military Committee which the Council had established in 1949 set up its headquarters in Washington and evolved a schedule in which it met approximately twice a year at the level of national chiefs of staff and twice a month at the level of permanent representatives.⁴ The Military Committee’s subordinate agency, the Standing Group, was changed in 1964 by the internationalization of its planning staff. Under the new arrangement the director was to be chosen from a nation not a member of the Standing Group; and there were to be four deputy directors, two from the members of Standing Group nations and two non-members in rotation. In June, 1966, following the French military withdrawal, the Standing Group was abolished and replaced by an international military staff directly serving the Military Committee. The staff consisted of about forty-five planners from twelve nations—not including France, Iceland, and Portugal—organized into divisions for plans and policy, operations, logistics, communications, and intentions. In October, 1967, the Military Committee, with staff, moved to Brussels.

Of the original regional planning groups, only the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group remained by 1966; the other groups had been replaced by Allied Commands. In 1950 the Council had decided upon the establishment of “an integrated force under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defense of Western
Europe.' Under the strategic direction of the Standing Group, there was to be the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) with "the authority to train the national units assigned to his command and to organize them in an effective integrated defense force." He was to be "supported by an international staff drawn from the nations contributing to the force." In April of the following year, the first SACEUR, General Eisenhower, activated the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Allied Command Europe (ACE), both in France. Two months later, the deputies signed a status of forces agreement covering the position of military personnel of one NATO nation serving on the territory of another. During 1952, the first Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief Channel Command (CINCCHAN) were appointed.

In subsequent years, SACEUR emerged as the most important military commander. Beneath him at SHAPE were deputies for air, naval, and nuclear affairs, a science advisor, and special assistants for international and French affairs. There were also deputy chiefs of staff for logistics and administration and for plans and operations. Major divisions included Personnel and Administration, Budget and Finance, Programs, Intelligence, Logistics, Communications and Electronics, Operations, Plans and Policy, and Public Information. In addition there were representatives from SACLANT, national governments, and national strategic forces (United States Strategic Air Command and Atlantic Strike Fleet and the United Kingdom Bomber Command); and SACEUR's Liaison Group with the Joint Strategic Planning Staff at Omaha. Beneath SACEUR in the Allied Command Europe were major geographical commanders in chief for Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED), as well as the United Kingdom Air Defense Region, and an ACE Mobile Force, including components from seven nations.

The French military withdrawal brought some changes. Geo-
graphically, the Council decided in 1966 to move SHAPE from Rocquencourt, in France, to Casteau, Belgium, and AFCENT from Fontainebleau to the Brunssum-Maastricht area in the Netherlands. Structurally, AFCENT headquarters were reorganized and consolidated by eliminating separate establishments which had existed for land and air forces (LANDCENT and AIRCENT), and AFMED was transformed into a subordinate command under AFSOUTH.

A further addition was prompted by the Arab-Israeli conflict during the spring of 1967, together with significant Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean. In December, 1967, the Council created a Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) consisting of "destroyer-type ships" that would be continuously operational and ready to move quickly to any potential trouble spot. The new force replaced a previous training exercise group that had operated intermittently during the previous three years; and the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Norway provided an initial contribution of one vessel each.

In spite of structural differentiation and change, binding institutional procedures did not appear to grow substantially stronger. Basic decisions and plans of the NATO military force program were made by the Council, the DPC, and the Military Committee, where the unanimity rule prevented decisions which individual nations chose strongly to oppose. While some procedural developments mitigated the force of this rule—national concurrence in the Council with formal reservations; French non-participation in the DPC; referral of papers upward by lower bodies, such as the DPWG, if no agreement was reached; SACEUR's formulation of plans as a basis for decision—nations in the last instance retained the right of veto if they chose to use it. In the more specialized nuclear institutions—the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group—papers were presented by individual representatives for comment by others, but initially there was no joint product. Indications of some development were contained in a report of October, 1967, which stated that the NPG meeting of September had directed
Nor was it clear that there were net increases in NATO military tasks. On the one hand, there had been certain forms of apparent task expansion. The Annual Review, a yearly NATO study that had examined Allied military and economic capabilities since 1953, was replaced during 1962 by the Triennial Review, and then in 1966–67 by the Five Year Rolling Defense Program. A co-ordinated air defense and early warning system for the European nations, comprising four air defense regions—Northern, Central, Southern Europe, and the United Kingdom—was approved in principle in 1955 and finally implemented in 1960. The ACE Mobile Force—composed of special units drawn from already assigned forces, and designed to serve as a military fire brigade in NATO's border regions—was established in 1961; and in 1967 it received funds from the NATO military budget for the first time. In December, 1967, the Council extended the precedent by creating the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. The Military Budget—which financed the activities of SHAPE, SACLANT, approximately two dozen subordinate headquarters of SHAPE and SACLANT, assorted communications agencies (e.g., The Allied Military Communications Equipment Committee), the NATO Defense College, the ACE High Communications System, the Latina Electronics School, NATO Early Warning Stations, and a few other bodies in the fields of armaments and defense science—increased from a total of less than $10 million in 1951 to approximately $60 million in 1965, and an estimated $81 million for fiscal year 1967.8

The line of attempted defense was gradually moved forward until it reached to or near the Iron Curtain. Allied strategists had
begun with plans which aimed at withdrawing behind or de­
fending at the Rhine, but by 1958 they hoped to hold a line
along the Rivers Weser and Lech; by 1963 they proposed to
defend all West German territory.\(^9\) Greek and Turkish military
resources had joined the Alliance in 1952, and German strength
in 1955. Finally an expanded array of nuclear weapons had
strengthened the NATO arsenal, ranging from systems with coun­
terforce interdiction targets in Eastern Europe—such as major
troop concentration areas, airfields for strike aircraft, warning
radars, road and rail communications, command centers—down
through unsown nuclear landmines. The total number of Ameri­
can nuclear warheads on European soil in 1966, according to
Secretary McNamara, was approximately seven thousand.\(^10\)

Nevertheless, for several years, serious disputes had existed
over the strategic doctrine governing the use of NATO forces. In
1956 the Council issued a political directive which stated that
nuclear weapons might be “used from the onset” of hostilities;
subsequently the Military Committee presented a plan, MC
14/2, which endorsed both strategic and tactical use of nuclear
weapons in case of enemy attack and which authorized SACEUR
to use the force necessary to carry out his mission. Sponsored by
the American government at the time when Admiral Radford
was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MC 14/2 was inter­
preted as the transfer to the NATO arena of the strategy of massive
retaliation and gave rise to some European opposition, prompted
by a consideration of the possible costs of nuclear war. The
conditions of nuclear warfare had been simulated in SHAPE
Exercise “Carte Blanche” which had been held in West Ger­
many, the Lowlands, and northeastern France in June, 1955.
The estimates of 1,700,000 dead and 3,500,000 wounded had
produced substantial public concern, especially in West Ger­
many. Although the Council agreed to MC 14/2 on May 9,
1957, several nations, including Germany, the Netherlands,
France, and Norway expressed reservations for the record.\(^11\) In
1959, a new plan, MC 48/2, re-enforced the existing doctrine;
but, at the Ministerial meeting in Oslo in May, 1961, the
Foreign Ministers directed the Military Committee and the Standing Group to draft a strategic paper replacing the earlier ones and emphasizing limited types of response.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1963, the Military Committee had ready MC 100, a document which included provisions for the use of the whole spectrum of military systems, including not only nuclear but also conventional armament. The American government had proposed the revision; but the French now opposed MC 100 on the grounds that it moved too far backward in the direction of flexibility. Other Europeans were also skeptical, though they did not publicize their doubts. Over the years, European leaders had, to a certain extent, made their peace with nuclear weaponry. Moreover, the gradual shift of American military doctrine during the Eisenhower years from “massive retaliation” to “graduated deterrence” and, during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, to “flexible response” made some Europeans suspect a weakening of American resolve to use the United States’ most powerful weapons in defense of its Allies.

European doubts had been aggravated by American reversal of the traditional NATO roles of shield and sword. General Norstad had once explained the symbolic significance of the shield and the sword. “The emblem of SHAPE,” he had said, “is a shield and a sword. I think of that emblem as representing the dual aspect of our forces—the Europe-based forces shielding the air and ground, while the retaliatory forces strike back as the avenging sword.” At Nassau, in December, 1962, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan had transposed the terminology, agreeing that “in addition to having a nuclear shield, it is important to have a non-nuclear sword.” The implication of the inversion was that, while nuclear forces might act as a peacetime shield to discourage attack, they would not necessarily strike back in revenge should deterrence fail.\textsuperscript{13}

A new document, MC 100/1, was drawn up as an attempted compromise. Again the French objected, MC 100/1 failed, and NATO remained through mid-1967 without a strategy commanding the effective agreement of the Allies. The French
military departure opened the way for adoption of a new document, MC 14/1, by the Defense Planning Committee. MC 14/1 represented an updated version of MC 100/1 and set forth a common Allied strategy “based upon a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression.”

It was not clear whether the new strategy implied the attainment of substantial Allied consensus, or whether, instead, it had merely papered over existing differences. The flexibility of the new formulation was limited by the fact that it undertook to “maintain the security and integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty area within the concept of forward defense.” German Defense Minister von Hassel delineated the boundaries of flexibility in an interview during May, 1966. “Flexibility is limited by the geographical conditions prevailing in Central Europe,” he said. “We too are of the opinion that this flexibility must be adequate to prevent a border incident from escalating into a nuclear war. On the other hand, we are aware that, considering the alarming narrowness of our space, the flexibility could be very limited.”

There had also been a series of reductions in the total ground forces called for by supporting Allied military force plans. NATO’s original military force plans had been based on those developed under the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO), which had functioned under the auspices of the Brussels Treaty. In these early days, three plans had been formulated. The Short-Term Defense Plan was essentially a program for emergency evacuation, providing assignments of emergency withdrawal routes and authority to commandeer ships in Allied ports. The Medium-Term Defense Plan was a battle plan which looked toward withdrawal, behind a screen of mechanized cavalry units, to positions behind the Rhine. The Long-Term Defense Plan was the requirements plan for major war. Aiming at a total of approximately one hundred divisions, it required eighty to eighty-five divisions for the old Western Front, plus an addi-
tional fifteen divisions for defense of the Scandinavian and Brenner-Trieste areas.¹⁷

At its Lisbon meeting in February, 1952, the Council approved force goals which aimed at a total of ninety-six divisions by 1954. These included twenty-five to thirty active divisions on the central front, seven to nine divisions in the Brenner-Trieste area, and two to three divisions in Scandinavia. The remainder was to be made up of reservists, capable of mobilization within thirty days, thirty to thirty-five divisions of which were earmarked for Central Europe.¹⁸

The Ministerial meeting in December, 1953, retreated from the force goals which it had set at Lisbon. The target year for fulfillment was no longer 1954; the Lisbon goals were stretched out to be implemented over the "long haul." By way of compensation, the Council publicly implied for the first time the tactical use of nuclear weapons in Atlantic defense, by saying that "special attention should be given to the continuing provision of modern weapons of the latest types to support the NATO defense system."¹⁹

Beginning in 1954 a series of plans appeared which substantially cut Allied force requirements and provided for tactical nuclear weapons. Under the initial plan, MC 48, the requirement for standing forces remained approximately the same, but reserves and back-ups were greatly reduced. They were to be replaced by low-yield battlefield atomic armaments under American peacetime custody and control. During 1956 the Council directed SACEUR to reappraise the forces needed for the defense of the NATO area; and SHAPE undertook the Minimum Forces Study 1958–63. Two years later, the Council approved MC 70, a plan for 1958–63, which set Central European goals of thirty combat-ready divisions while again reducing reserves and further modernizing armaments. The Council approved MC 26/4, which replaced MC 70, in January, 1961, projecting force goals through 1966, and cutting the number of active divisions for the Central front to twenty-eight and one-third divisions.²⁰
In July, 1966, a special meeting of Defense Ministers adopted a NATO force plan for the period through 1970; in December, 1967, and January, 1969, NATO ministers adopted five-year NATO force plans, covering first the period 1968–72, and then 1969–73, in accordance with the procedures of the Five Year Rolling Defense Program. It is likely that the later plans continued earlier trends. Thus one account indicated that the plan for 1970 was “based on the forces available rather than on the requirements previously set by the NATO military authorities but never met.”

During 1967 there were reports which implied that future plans might bring even more drastic reductions. A circulating SHAPE document supposedly depicted alternate strategies which might become appropriate with diminishing levels of ground forces along the borders of the Warsaw Pact nations.

A forward strategy, similar to the currently approved approach, putting the bulk of available ground forces forward along the eastern frontier of West Germany.

A theater reserve strategy, involving a thinning out of the forward wall of troops with strong, highly mobile, armored and helicopter units sitting well back of the border ready to move to the point of principal enemy thrust.

A strategic reserve strategy, envisioning the withdrawal of significant United States and other forces to their own territory, with modern aircraft and fast ships designed to rush them back to the front if intelligence discovers a major enemy build-up.

An air strike concept depending heavily on large numbers of fighter-bombers to speed to the point of a border incursion and blast the enemy overwhelmingly with non-nuclear weapons in hopes of dissuading a big attack by quick action.

Although MC 48 and its replacements were based on a possible tactical use of nuclear weapons, it was difficult to see that this completely neutralized manpower reductions. American Generals Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin had viewed the substitutions as declines in both the credibility of the American deterrent and in
American commitments to the Allies. The later emphasis, especially by the United States, on flexibility and conventional options indicated that the use of nuclear weapons on which the plans were based might be substantially delayed. Finally, in a battlefield situation where both sides were equipped with nuclear armament, it was possible that more, rather than fewer, men might be required, since heavier casualties could be anticipated and there was the chance that the use of nuclear weapons might, in many circumstances, work against the defender.  

**AUTHORITY**

Within the context of this ambivalent institutional pattern, NATO authority was less direct than indirect and effective only insofar as national governments agreed to make it so. As Secretary General Spaak stated, “In spite of the Alliance, our countries have retained almost complete sovereignty as far as their military organization is concerned.”  

Alliance authority—as indicated by SACEUR’s powers over his “assigned” forces—remained largely indirect. Of three categories of Allied forces, by far the largest were those forces “remaining under national command,” including national long-range strategic forces. Second were those “earmarked” for commitment to NATO at a future date, comprising both active and reserve components of land, air, and naval forces. Finally came forces which were committed to NATO under specified conditions. These included those standing forces provided for in NATO force plans covering the Central European area. NATO’s military authorities were informed of the movements of earmarked forces; and assigned forces could not, in principal, be withdrawn without notifying NATO.  

The Supreme Commander’s authority varied between war and peacetime. During wartime, SACEUR would theoretically command Allied forces in Europe, though his command would probably be limited by competition with national political and military leaders. Under normal peacetime conditions, however,
SACEUR's authority was more circumscribed. Through his position as Commander-in-Chief of United States forces in Europe (CINCEUR), he controlled a portion of the Allied forces. He was also authorized to declare certain emergency conditions under which Allied assigned forces—with national variations—would come under his partial command or operational control. Thus he could act alone in declaring certain alert stages involving the cancellation of Allied leaves, the recall of troops, increases in readiness and fueling of aircraft, and aircraft dispersal. Finally, he could order some Allied air defense units to open fire in the event of specific and clear-cut types of Western airspace violations.

For the most part, however, SACEUR's influence over the assigned forces was indirect. All assigned forces remained under national control for administration, discipline, and logistic support. SACEUR exercised influence through the planning activities of SHAPE. He participated in the formulation of joint military plans which laid the groundwork for exercise of direct authority in the event of war. He was responsible for the construction of NATO exercises. Particularly important were two series: Fallex exercises, occurring every other year and involving both command post and field participation, and Express exercises in various border regions for the training of the ACE Mobile Force. He was also responsible for the inspection of units placed under Allied command in peacetime and for recommendations to national authorities concerning the training, organization, and equipment of their units. In communications and air defense, he operated the ACE high and early warning networks, linking major military headquarters and collating information acquired by separate national radar stations.28

In a special category were nuclear forces committed to SACEUR, including several United States Polaris submarines, the United Kingdom V-Bomber force, fighter bomber squadrons from approximately half the Allies, and various air defense and battlefield systems. Here control remained clearly in national hands. Although planning for these forces was undertaken both
through SACEUR's Liaison Group to the Joint Strategic Planning Staff at Omaha, and at SHAPE through SACEUR's Deputy for Nuclear Affairs, national decision-making—especially American—remained decisive. SACEUR's Liaison Group at Omaha served less to influence American planning than to ensure that SACEUR's plans did not run counter to American ones. With the exception of Great Britain, the nuclear capabilities of the Allied nations depended on American warheads, which were safeguarded by physical storage in special ammunition sites controlled by American forces or, when placed in alert positions, by electronic Permissive Action Links which could only be released by decision of the American President.  

In practice, the effectiveness of NATO decision-making is uncertain, due to the strictures of military secrecy. Nevertheless, if the implementation of a "forward strategy" for NATO and the realization of the force levels called for in NATO plans can be taken as two indicators, NATO effectiveness depended on relatively independent policies of national governments.  

Almost since the inception of NATO, its guiding strategic concept had been a "forward" one, that ultimately little or no European space would be traded for defensive time, should war come. However, it was only in the mid-1950's that the implementation of the forward strategy was decided "in principle" and 1962-63 before SACEUR attempted to "operationalize" the concept. At this time the plans of Generals Norstad and Lemnitzer called for Allied redeployment. The French, who occupied rearward positions in the South of Germany, were to move East. The British, in the North, would also move forward. The United States and Germany would be responsible for the forward defense of the middle sector.  

The proposed troop movements were never completely carried out. The French—although they eventually stationed one Hawk regiment forward at Dachau, about eighty miles from the Czechoslovakian border—maintained the remainder of their German-based troops in a line which included Koblenz, the Rhine, Speyer, Karlsruhe, Pforzheim, Tübingen, Reutlingen, Munsin-
Intervention and Disintegration in NATO

French officials gave two major reasons for their non-compliance. First, they felt that France should have a reserve role. Germany, not France, had a “natural vocation” to act as the edge of the military sword because of her geographical position. If the Germans would not do so then the United States, important as a symbol of deterrence, or Britain, to establish her engagement, should fill the gap. Secondly, the French pointed out that they could not move forward because German and American troops were still occupying barracks intended for the French, and the German government had not been able to provide France with alternate troop quarters and installations. The British Army on the Rhine complied with SACEUR’s plan by establishing supply bases closer to the Iron Curtain, but, nevertheless, maintained its actual garrisons towards the rear.

NATO’s basic force goals for the years 1958–66 had been established by MC 70 and MC 26/4. These plans stipulated that Germany would supply twelve divisions, the United States five or six, France four, the United Kingdom three or four, Belgium two, the Netherlands two, and Canada one-third.

In practice, the implementation of these force levels varied widely in terms of number of divisions, divisional strength, conscription terms, supply levels, and modernization of equipment. The best performance was by the United States which fielded its agreed total in a configuration which included high manning levels, twenty-four-month conscription terms, a ninety-day general supply level, and modern equipment—nuclear, conventional, and personal. In intermediate positions came the Germans and British. By April, 1965, the Federal Republic had turned over all twelve of the divisions called for by the plans; but these divisions tended to have incomplete active and support complements, including shortages of officers and technical specialists, eighteen-month inductees, supply levels of thirty days or less, and equipment standards lower than the Americans. The British formally provided three divisions; but the manning level of 51,000 lowered their fighting strength to an estimated two
and one-third divisions; there was no conscription; and stocks of supplies and equipment were reduced. Finally the French in later years provided only two of their four planned divisions, with conscription terms which eventually declined to 16 months.33

More current NATO force plans were projected from available forces. By mid-1967 it appeared that the level of availability was falling. The United States proposed to redeploy two-thirds of a ground division and four aircraft squadrons; the United Kingdom planned to cut the BAOR by 5,000 men and one squadron. Germany was preparing for reductions in its active ground forces; and France had withdrawn all of its troops from NATO as of July 1, 1966.

**LEGITIMACY**

The lack of NATO authority was paralleled by constricted NATO legitimacy. In the United States, Britain, Germany, and France there were variable losses and few significant gains for the NATO program.34

*United States*

Developments were mixed in the United States. During the course of four Presidential administrations, an initial policy of NATO force contributions increasingly appeared as an economic burden. Support of the NATO nuclear program and American nuclear contributions to NATO increased, but with the understanding of strict American control. Domestically, while the isolationists had been defeated in 1951, there still remained politically significant opposition to American participation in NATO programs.

The initial American policy had provided significant force contributions to NATO. American remobilization for the Cold War, following the force reductions of the immediate postwar years, was foreshadowed by a National Security Council docu-
ment, NSC 20, which elaborated the policy of containment, and put into high gear by NSC 68. NSC 68 called for an immediate and large-scale build-up of American and Allied strength, to be completed by 1954, identified as the year of maximum danger. Tangible support for NATO was provided by the dispatch of General Eisenhower to Europe, with four additional United States divisions, bringing the American divisional total in Europe almost to six.  

By 1953 the sense of urgency had diminished, and there was increased concern for the long-run soundness of the economy, leading to a downgrading of NATO force priorities. A change in the American administration had brought the New Look of 1953, which was formally embodied in NSC 162 and NSC 162/2. The policy of containment was to continue, but with reduced urgency. The year of maximum danger was de-emphasized and replaced by the concept of the 'long haul.' There was to be a phased reduction of American ground strength; in its place the military were to base defensive planning on the use of tactical nuclear weapons and strategic airpower. These decisions were taken with little previous discussion with the NATO Allies, yet were the major factor in downgrading NATO's force goals.

By way of compensation the United States, with successive amendments to the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 and 1958, moved to place American nuclear weapons in Europe, without, however, giving up their control. In October, 1953, the first American 280 mm. atomic cannon arrived in Europe; and in December, 1954, the Council authorized SHAPE to base military planning on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used in a future conflict. Following the endorsement of the NATO Council in 1957, the United States installed Thor and Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) sites in Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Although the missiles in Britain were not attached to NATO, those in Italy and Turkey were under SAC's jurisdiction. None of these systems could be fired without American agreement; and American reluctance toward further
nuclear sharing, perhaps of a more reciprocal nature, was made clear by John Foster Dulles, who stated that no "member of the NATO community could have a veto, implied or actual, over the use of America's retaliatory power." 37

During the later years of the Eisenhower administration, the perceived burden of the American contribution seemed to grow with increasing balance of payments problems. It was reported that the Department of the Treasury and Bureau of the Budget were suggesting the recall of two American divisions and seven fighter-bomber squadrons from Europe, and in late 1960, C. Douglas Dillon and Robert Anderson undertook a special mission to Europe—concentrating on Germany and the issue of support costs of American troops—to attempt to persuade the Allies to contribute a larger share of NATO expenses.38

Considerations of secrecy combined with the balance of payments to complicate the area of nuclear sharing. At the meeting of NATO defense ministers in April, 1960, American Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., had "proposed the European deployment of hundreds of Polaris missiles on barges and flatcars, when they were expected to become available in a year or two. At the same time, he suggested a modification of the system of dual control which would give NATO's supreme commander the decision to join the missile and activated warhead and send them off." 39 By the Ministerial Council of that December the American emphasis had been modified. Secretary of State Herter endorsed the concept of a NATO Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) force and offered to assign five Polaris submarines, armed with 80 missiles, to NATO, if the Allies could agree on a multilateral system of control. In return the Allies were requested to buy from the United States another 100 Polaris missiles—without warheads—at an estimated cost of $100 million.40

With the advent of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the United States continued generally to support NATO military force programs, but in the context of calls for additional
Allied contributions and some actual reduction in American ones, and a basic policy of non-proliferation which retained control of nuclear weapons in American hands.

Secretary of Defense McNamara supported such NATO activities as the Force Planning Exercise and the Five Year Rolling Defense Program:

For many years I have urged my NATO colleagues to establish the procedures needed to deal with this problem [the balance between strategy, force goals, and resources] on a systematic, regular basis. As you know, since 1961 the Department of Defense has operated a programming system which directly relates strategies and war plans to forces, and forces to resources and their costs, all projected at least five years into the future. A number of other NATO countries have been moving in the same direction. Now we have a real hope that the entire NATO organization will adopt these procedures.\(^{41}\)

He emphasized the importance of building Western conventional forces, especially on the central front, of providing stockpiles at a general 90-day level, and of correcting deficiencies in equipment and modernization.\(^{42}\)

McNamara’s focal point, however, was a plea for additional European, not American, contributions. In 1963, he stated:

\begin{quote}
The presently programmed United States forces, together with the present forces of other NATO countries, would not be able to contain an all-out conventional Soviet attack without involving the use of nuclear weapons. \textbf{We must do everything in our power to persuade our Allies to meet their NATO force goals} \textbf{[to provide] alternate possibilities.}\(^{43}\)
\end{quote}

There were continuing reductions of American expenses and substantial troop withdrawals. In March, 1966, McNamara told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the military aid program would provide only 3.5 per cent of its funds to Europe—this in contrast to its distribution of more than half its total investment since 1950 in the NATO build-up.\(^{44}\) American force
reductions occurred not only to meet mounting commitments in South Viet-Nam, but also to reduce balance of payments deficits. A series of offset agreements had provided for German payments of between $600 and $650 million annually for military equipment and services through Fiscal Year 1967. Even with these agreements the net adverse balance of payments resulting from United States defense expenditures in Western Europe for fiscal years 1964–67 averaged approximately $500 million per year. In May, 1967, a new accord terminated German offset payments at the previous level, and permitted the United States to redeploy approximately 35,000 ground troops and airmen.

The Kennedy and Johnson administrations supported a number of measures for NATO nuclear co-operation, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and without intending to relinquish control of American nuclear weapons. In one category were several attempts at "hardware" sharing, or actual transfer of nuclear systems. During the period 1961–67 the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was increased by almost 100 per cent. Although Thor and Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from Europe by 1963, the United States committed several Polaris submarines to NATO in 1962 and 1963.

The most publicized American hardware initiative was the multilateral force (MLF) project. The MLF reportedly originated in the recommendations of a 1960 study directed by Robert R. Bowie of the Harvard Center of International Affairs and received its major impetus from partisans connected with the Department of State. Among the recommendations of the Bowie study was the suggestion that the United States might make available to NATO a fleet of Polaris submarines to be manned by international crews.

The idea of a seabound MRBM force for NATO was reflected in Secretary of State Herter's offer of December, 1960, and was endorsed with qualifications by President Kennedy at Ottawa in May, 1961. It was repeated by Secretary of State Rusk at the NATO Ministerial Councils in December, 1961, and May, 1962. In October, 1962, and again in December, a team headed by
Gerard C. Smith, former Assistant Secretary of State, and Rear Admiral John M. Lee discussed the proposals with America's allies in Europe. In December, 1962, Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan met at Nassau and gave further support to the idea of a NATO "multilateral force," which would include Polaris submarines as one of its elements.48

The administration's emphasis had been on an American Polaris submarine contribution to a force which would be multinational, in the sense of being composed of diverse national components rather than internationally manned elements. Following the Nassau conference, the MLF proper gathered momentum. As the plan took final shape, the United States proposed to its European allies that some targets of longer range, which had been covered by IRBM's in Britain, Italy, and Turkey, and manned bombers—both now obsolescent—be covered by a fleet of twenty-five merchant-type surface ships, each carrying eight Polaris A-3 missiles with a range of approximately 2,500 miles. The fleet would be assigned to SACEUR, individual ships commanded by Allied officers of different nationalities, and the crews composed of mixed complements from several Allied nations. The United States would provide the missiles and warheads, while most of the ships would be built in foreign yards.49

During 1963, the United States moved to withdraw its Jupiter and Thor missiles from Britain, Italy, and Turkey, and Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant, Gerard Smith, and Rear Admiral Lee, accompanied by a group of technical experts, made two trips to Europe to discuss the multilateral force. In addition, a naval group, headed by Admiral Claude V. Ricketts, Vice-Chief of Naval Operations, visited naval establishments in several European capitals. These missions seemed to have limited success. Nevertheless, in October an MLF Working Group was formed, consisting of Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In October, 1964, an American guided missile destroyer, originally the "USS Biddle," renamed the "USS Claude V. Ricketts," was officially launched as a test ship for the MLF and
began a training voyage with a mixed crew of Americans, Brit-
ish, Dutch, Germans, Greeks, Italians, and Turks (Table 2).

The European nations demonstrated little enthusiasm for the MLF. By December, 1964, a treaty was ready, but only Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands appeared ready to join the United States as initial signatories. This low European response did not inspire American decision-makers to make nuclear concessions but rather implicitly to abandon the project. As early as 1963, President Kennedy was reported to have said, “If the Europeans don’t want it, then the hell with it”; and in December, 1964, President Johnson approved a National Security Council Memorandum which formally slowed the MLF campaign. Among the provisions of the Memorandum were stipulations that no new nuclear arrangements for the Alliance would be approved which did not have the approval of Britain and Germany, and which had not been at least discussed with France; that “pressure tactics” were to cease; and that the United States would not

**TABLE 2**

**National Complements Assigned to “USS Claude V. Ricketts”***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Duties Performed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>Commander, communications, gunnery, administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Engineering, missile handling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Assistant combat information, weapons handling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Damage control, fire control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Combat information, First Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Navigator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Anti-submarine officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

impose arbitrary "deadlines" for the acceptance of any of its proposals.\textsuperscript{52}

In the area of "consultative" sharing, the United States, at the Council of May, 1962, agreed to the "Athens guidelines." Secretary General Stikker recalled that:

For the first time, the United States assured NATO of the availability of certain weapons, and the United States and the United Kingdom both declared their willingness to furnish full information on the organization and control of NATO nuclear defenses held in their hands. We agreed on certain guidelines to apply in case nuclear weapons had to be used, and on consultation in the Council on the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{53}

In May, 1963, the United States supported the decisions taken at Ottawa, establishing on SACEUR's staff a deputy responsible for nuclear affairs and a SACEUR Liaison Group to the Joint Strategic Planning Staff at Omaha. In May, 1965, Secretary McNamara proposed to the Allies the formation of the Select Committee of Defense Ministers to study ways to provide more Allied participation in nuclear planning and decision-making.

None of these projects represented an inclination by the United States to give up ultimate control of its nuclear weapons. In the consultative projects, Allied inputs would have to be cleared through American decision-makers. In the projects of hardware sharing, the United States maintained possession of its nuclear arsenal even though it bore a NATO label, through the right of veto and physical and electronic controls.

This restrictive policy included the MLF. Although the missiles and nuclear warheads might be under joint ownership and custody, the decision to fire would be taken "by unanimous vote of a control group representing the major participants."\textsuperscript{54} McNamara stressed the importance of retaining the American veto, within the context of a "basic policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The consent of the United States," he said, "would have to be obtained prior to the firing of any one of the
nuclear weapons jointly owned and controlled by the participating nations." 

Over the years, domestic opposition to NATO programs, though fragmented, remained significant. Resistance to the initial policy of force contributions had been dispersed with the passage in April, 1951, of the Senate Resolution which approved the appointment of General Eisenhower as SACEUR, the stationing of American forces in Europe, and greater use of the military resources of Germany, Italy, and Spain. The efforts of such figures as former President Hoover, Joseph Kennedy, and Senators Taft and Wherry had been insufficient to bring about American withdrawal from Europe and the establishment of an American Gibraltar.

The platforms adopted by the national conventions of both parties during the 1968 presidential campaign generally endorsed NATO. The Republicans stated that "NATO must be revitalized and strengthened," while the Democrats believed that to keep the North Atlantic Community "strong and free, we must further strengthen our ties and be constantly alert to new challenges and opportunities." In spite of such high level approval, however, the major specific proposal, put forward by the Democrats, was not for increased American effort but rather for "a substantially larger European contribution to NATO." 

Nevertheless, American contributions to NATO continued to draw important fire. Force reductions were urged and the economic burdens of NATO deplored in the Senate by figures centering around the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, MacIntyre, Mansfield, Morse, Russell and Symington. During early 1967, almost half the Senate, including all thirteen members of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, joined Senator Mansfield as co-sponsors of a resolution calling for substantial reduction of American troops stationed in Europe.

In the House the same criticisms were propounded by Representative Hébert of the House Armed Services Committee and Representative Ford, Chairman of the House Republican Con-
ference. The House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended in February, 1967, that there be "a substantial reduction in U.S. Armed Forces in Europe."  

A Republican Co-ordinating Committee—including Eisenhower, Goldwater, Nixon, Dewey, Landon, Senate and House Republican leaders, five Governors, and six national committee-men published a report in September, 1965, which advocated that the United States cut its troops in Western Europe in order to protect the balance of payments. They suggested that the Europeans supply the bulk of the conventional forces, with the United States providing only a small detachment, and that the American commitment be backed mainly by strategic airlift.  

Restrictions on nuclear sharing, in the context of NATO or elsewhere, were upheld particularly by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The JCAE had strongly endorsed the policy of non-proliferation, and had been influential in accomplishing the removal of the Thor and Jupiter missiles in 1963 and in changing the MLF proposal to include surface strips rather than nuclear submarines as launching platforms for the joint Polaris force.

United Kingdom

In Great Britain there were some losses and few gains in NATO legitimacy. Successive governments—Conservative and Labour—either withdrew or talked of withdrawing British NATO force contingents; and British participation in NATO nuclear programs went only so far as the intersection of the price for American nuclear assistance and the desire to maintain ultimate control of a British nuclear force. Nevertheless, major domestic opposition to NATO, subsumed by the Labour left wing and its supporters, seemed to lose much of its impetus.

The British government following the war had maintained occupation forces in Germany. As part of the London and Paris Agreements of 1954 under which Germany entered NATO, Great
Britain agreed to leave on the Continent the effective strength of the forces assigned to SACEUR, except in case of acute overseas emergency or of excessive financial burden.

As early as 1951–52, however, the British had thought of force reductions. Under the supervision of Prime Minister Churchill's military assistant, Sir Ian Jacob, the three British Service Chiefs had drafted a global strategy paper which emphasized the importance of tactical nuclear weapons and which looked forward to a British force contribution which might be as low as 50,000 men. This paper was approved by Churchill and the Cabinet "in virtually the same form in which it had been submitted." 61

In 1957 Defense Minister Duncan Sandys, without consulting the Allies, promulgated a White Paper on defense policy which announced a cut in the British Army on the Rhine from 77,000 to 64,000 men within the succeeding twelve months, and ultimately to 45,000 men to be armed with atomic artillery. In addition conscription was to be abolished by 1962. Although Britain finally limited these cuts to 22,000 men, further reductions in 1964 left only approximately 51,000 in the BAOR.62

British participation in NATO nuclear programs compensated the United States for its nuclear aid without relinquishing final national control of British nuclear capabilities. During 1958, the British government implemented the decision of the Council in December, 1957, which called for the deployment of IRBM's in Europe, by accepting the emplacement of four American missile complexes, including sixty Thor missiles. While the vulnerability of these above-ground, liquid-fueled missiles carried the disadvantage of making them a prime target, the British were rewarded by passage of the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act which allowed the American government to make available nuclear weapons designs and materials to nations which had already made "substantial progress" in nuclear technology.

In spite of their advanced nuclear capabilities, which had produced nuclear and thermo-nuclear warheads, the British had
found it difficult to modernize their long-range delivery systems. In 1957 they had begun development of the Blue Streak missile, similar to first-generation American vehicles like the Thor and Jupiter; but had abandoned it in February, 1960, in favor of the American Skybolt Air-to-Surface Missile which was to be carried by the British V-Bomber force. In December, 1962, the American government decided to cancel the development of the Skybolt missile for technical reasons; and at a meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau, the British received Polaris. The United States agreed to "make available on a continuing basis Polaris missiles [less warheads] for British submarines" and to "study the feasibility of making available certain support facilities for such submarines." The United Kingdom Government, on the other hand, was to "construct the submarines in which these weapons will be placed" and to "provide the nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles."  

At the Athens Council in May, 1962, the British had joined the United States in agreeing to provide the Allies with certain types of information and in subscribing to a set of NATO guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons. Through the Nassau agreement and the decisions at the Council meeting of May, 1963, it was decided that the new British Polaris force, the British V-Bomber forces, three American Polaris submarines, and tactical nuclear forces in Europe would "be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force and targetted in accordance with NATO plans." At Nassau, however, "the Prime Minister had made it clear" that, while the British forces were to be "used for the purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in all circumstances," this was not to be the case "where Her Majesty's Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake."  

Although the Nassau communiqué had used the term "multilateral force," the reference was to a combined force of the type decided at Ottawa and not to the American proposal for a mixed-manned fleet which was later labelled the MLF. The British had agreed to the first of these but were unenthusiastic
about the second. The joint communiqué which followed the meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan at Birch Grove at the end of June, 1963, “noted with satisfaction the decisions reached at the recent NATO meeting in Ottawa.” With regard to the MLF, they agreed that further discussions should proceed, but “without prejudice to the question of British participation in such a force.”

Immediately prior and subsequent to coming to power in 1964, Labour leaders had promised to strengthen or at least maintain the existing strength of the BAOR. In March, 1962, Harold Wilson told the House of Commons that “Britain had gravely defaulted on the commitment to NATO, and the main reason was inadequate manpower.” Near the end of 1964, Denis Healey promised to raise the BAOR from 51,000 to 55,000 men. Once in office, however, the drain in foreign exchange caused by BAOR expenditures in Germany came to represent an increasing problem. As a result of the earlier Sandys withdrawals the outflow had been temporarily reduced, but had then gradually remounted to a 1966 high of £94 million. In March, 1965, Wilson told Commons that, until the preceding twelve months, BAOR foreign exchange expenditures had been substantially met by German purchases of British equipment, but that in the past year, the situation had seriously changed—with foreign exchange expenditure rates increasing and German offset purchases declining. He implicitly threatened BAOR reductions by expressing his hope that Britain’s “European allies, and may I say I hope our creditors, those who lend to us over the years, will recognize how much of our continuing balance of payments deficit is due to this onesided military financial commitment to the common defense.” In May he returned to “the heavy cost of military expenditures overseas. I have made clear a number of times,” he said “that this must be brought down. Part of it is, of course, a question we are looking at in connection with the wider defense review, but a start must be made in relation to our heavy costs in Germany.” On July 20, the British and German governments signed a protocol which extended the existing
offset agreement until March, 1967, with the Germans agreeing to spend £150 million during the new period. But again the same pattern of rising foreign exchange expenses and insufficient German purchases caused new British anxieties, leading to reports that the British government had decided on cuts of 15,000–20,000 men unless the German contribution were substantially increased.™

Although the British government never emphasized the point, most of the foreign exchange drain represented by the BAOR in Germany had actually been offset by the presence of American and Canadian forces in Great Britain. In the face of the acute problems of the Pound Sterling, the American government "apparently agreed to spend $35 million more than planned on arms and services in Britain in 1967 while United States–United Kingdom–West German talks on troop deployment, strategy, and offset agreements" continued; and the British agreed temporarily to postpone the cuts. Nevertheless, in May, 1967, the British government concluded an agreement under which it would reduce the BAOR by a brigade group of 5,000 men and withdraw one air squadron from Europe.™

During the course of 1968, the British Government announced the details of a new defense policy that involved the movement of British forces "from their stations overseas" and their concentration in Europe. Within this context, land, sea, and air commitments to NATO were to be heavily increased; but such commitments consisted mostly of additional "earmarked" forces, which were not to be an integral part of the BAOR and which would be stationed in Britain.™

In the election campaign of 1964, Wilson had supported NATO command and control of strategic nuclear forces, while opposing the MLF and that part of the Nassau agreement that called for the replacement of Skybolt with Polaris submarines.™ In November, once in power, he reiterated his views. "Throughout the discussions of the last two years," he said, "we have expressed our full support of the clause in the Nassau Agreement which
envisages the collective principle. We have expressed our opposition to the proposal put forward under that clause which envisages a mixed-manned surface fleet." Finally he blamed the Polaris provisions of the Nassau agreement for a "costly proliferation of efforts and energies." 74

The proposal which he put forward in December for an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), however, seemed to add little new to NATO and subtracted no British nuclear control. The components of the ANF were to be the British V-Bomber force except those aircraft needed for commitments outside the NATO areas; the British fleet of Polaris submarines; at least an equal number of American Polaris submarines; and some mixed-manned element in which non-nuclear powers could take part. These elements would be committed for the life of the Alliance and would operate under a single authority in which all participating countries would be represented. Britain, the United States, and France, if she decided to participate, would, however, retain a veto over the elements of the force and the control system. 75

Some gain for NATO legitimacy occurred in the defeat of the major British domestic opposition to NATO—the Labour left wing—by Labour leadership and by the apparent failure of the Left to wield significant influence once Labour acceded to power.

It was under a Labour government that Britain had, in 1949, become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and had first become involved in NATO defense planning, but this was not accomplished without intra-party dissidence. In an attack on the North Atlantic Treaty, Konni Zilliacus, M.P., had stated that action under Article 5 "would not only affect the authority of the Security Council, but would destroy that body, shatter the United Nations, split the world, and plunge humanity into war." Not only was the Atlantic Treaty "inconsistent with the purposes, principles, and obligations of the Charter," it was also "contrary to Labour Party policy and the Labour Party's mandate to make peace." 76 Aneurin Bevan and two of his followers
had resigned in opposition to the Government's rearmament policy, arguing that the economic costs were far too great for the limited defensive gains.

In the following years, defense issues remained in dispute between two Labour factions—the Morrison-Gaitskell faction that supported NATO, rearmament, and the production of the H-bomb, and the Bevanite faction that opposed them. This breach appeared to be healed at the Labour Party Conference of 1957, when Bevan was appointed Shadow Foreign Secretary and spoke in support of the British national deterrent within the framework of the Western Alliance. 77

The co-operation of Bevan, however, seemed to liberate the Labour left wing and ushered in a period of increased interparty warfare on defense issues. In 1958 the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed. Including intellectual figures such as Bertrand Russell, E. M. Forster, J. B. Priestley, and A. J. P. Taylor, the Committee expounded a program that centered upon unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and withdrawal from alliances envisaging the use of nuclear weapons—i.e., NATO. Within the Labour party, these views were pressed by the Victory for Socialism group and a core of leaders who included Michael Foot, Barbara Castle, Tom Driberg, Ian Mikardo, and Frank Cousins. 78 By 1959 the movement had sufficient strength so that a total of eighty-nine back-bench Labour members of parliament signed a motion opposing the transfer to Britain from France of NATO-assigned American fighter bombers and nuclear warheads. 79 In September, 1960, the Trades Union Congress passed a unilateralist motion; and in October the Labour party Conference, meeting at Scarborough, passed two resolutions calling for unilateral British nuclear disarmament.

Gaitskell had opposed the Left, and his defeat at Scarborough by small majorities on both resolutions led to an organized counterattack through an intraparty movement called the Campaign for Democratic Socialism. At the Blackpool Conference in 1961, he reasserted leadership control of the party, achieving the reversal of the previous year's decisions and the endorsement of
the National Executive Committee's Policy for Peace supporting British co-operation with American deterrent forces within the NATO framework.  

Although the CND continued to exist and to call for British withdrawal from NATO, both it and the Labour Left had, for the time being at least, lost their bid for significant political influence.

Germany

The German pattern of legitimacy for NATO again was one in which the losses and gains merged. The German government was the only government which had committed all of its forces to NATO, and Germany supplied the largest single complement of Allied forces. Nonetheless Germany did not attain its agreed force level, resisted possible increases in its quota, and grew increasingly reluctant to reimburse Allied governments for foreign exchange losses suffered from the expenditures of their troops stationed in Germany. The government of the Federal Republic supported the NATO program of nuclear co-operation, but it did so in the context of its own nuclear abstinence. While some gain in legitimacy might be indicated by the decline and dispersal of domestic opposition to NATO and its military program, it was equally reasonable to interpret this in terms of apathy.

At the Council session of September 26, 1950, Allied Foreign Ministers agreed that "Germany should be enabled to contribute to the buildup of the defense of Western Europe." Two years later, on May 27, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany signed a treaty through which the German contribution would be incorporated within the structures of a European Defense Community. On the same day, representatives of the NATO governments signed a Protocol extending guarantees to the members of the EDC.

The French government was not eager to approve rearma-
ment within the framework of EDC, and on August 29, 1954, the French National Assembly, by a procedural motion, refused to approve the ratification of the EDC Treaty. Conferences were immediately held in London and Paris to seek alternative means of bringing Germany into the framework of Western defense. On October 23, the Council endorsed the decisions of these Conferences, whose accomplishments were summarized in the Paris Agreements of the same date. Under these Agreements Germany attained full sovereignty, and the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany was terminated, though the occupying powers retained certain rights, among the most important being to station troops there at prevailing strengths. Germany was to have a national army, fully integrated into the NATO military structure; possible dangers were to be offset by British pledges to maintain on the Continent, except in extreme cases, the effective level of forces presently assigned to SACEUR. Germany and Italy were invited to join the Brussels Treaty, which changed its name to Western European Union (WEU). Within WEU was established an Agency for the Control of Armaments, one function of which was the policing of a German undertaking not to manufacture atomic, biological, chemical, and certain other categories of weapons on its territory. The new WEU was to work within the NATO framework, without duplicating NATO's military staffs.

In May, 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany officially became a member of NATO. Under the London and Paris Agreements the German government had agreed to raise and contribute to NATO armed forces of twelve ground divisions, including about 500,000 men. While the twelfth division was finally produced in April, 1965, Germany never completely fulfilled its force quota. In 1956 the German Government reduced the target for the Bundeswehr to 350,000 men and only restored the cut under the pressure of the Berlin crisis of 1961. Subsequently Defense Ministers Strauss and von Hassel both publicly stated their opposition to further increases, in response to rumors that the United States was pressing Germany to increase its contribu-
tion to over 700,000 men. By 1967 the manning level was still only approximately 460,000, and during the second half of the year press reports indicated that the German government had decided to diminish even this number.\(^{82}\)

Although German governments welcomed the presence of Allied troops in Germany, expressing anxiety about possible withdrawals, and although they had paid occupation and support costs to certain Allies since the war, the Germans became increasingly reluctant to reimburse their Allies for foreign exchange losses caused by the presence of their troops on German soil. Since the late 1950's the Germans had not reimbursed the French; and in negotiations with the British and Americans their emphasis had been on limiting payments. In September, 1966, Chancellor Erhard travelled to Washington and pleaded that, after the existing agreement for offset payments terminated in mid-1967, Germany would be unable to extend it at the current rate. His failure to obtain more immediate relief contributed to the collapse of his government. In May, 1967, provisions for German offset payments were substantially softened.\(^{83}\)

The German government supported NATO programs of nuclear sharing in the context of its own national nuclear deprivation. At the time of the Paris Agreements, Chancellor Adenauer had agreed that Germany would not manufacture atomic weapons on its territory; and he initially had opposed NATO's substitution of nuclear for conventional forces. Nevertheless, the government's position changed as it experienced increasing difficulties in meeting its obligation of raising 500,000 troops. NATO plan MC 70 provided the framework within which Defense Minister Strauss and Foreign Minister Schroeder defended, and on March 25, 1959, the Bundestag approved, the arming of the Bundeswehr with tactical atomic weapons—a possibility which had been admitted in September, 1956, by Chancellor Adenauer.\(^{84}\) The stationing of MRBM's in Europe, under the aegis of NATO, was subsequently supported by public officials including Adenauer, von Hassel, and Generals Heusinger and Speidel. In line with the concept of "atomic co-responsibility," the MLF
proposal and the Special Committee of Defense Ministers also received the backing of successive German governments. In June, 1967, Schroeder, who had assumed the post of Defense Minister under the Kiesinger government, told the Federal Armed Forces League that German renunciation of a nuclear delivery capability "would contradict" both "the strategic concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," and "German security interests." He emphasized that "the Federal armed forces must have the same mission of deterrence and defense as the forces of their neighbors and allies. They must have the same armament at their disposal."  

Within Germany, major domestic concern with NATO had come in the form of opposition in the mid-1950's from the SPD—drawing on support from trade unions, the radical wing of the Evangelical Church, and some professors, writers, and scientists. In the NATO context, the SPD opposed German rearmament, conscription, and the stationing of atomic weapons on German soil. Opposition waned, however, after July, 1958 when the SPD grassroots campaign "Kampf dem Atomtod" resulted in its clear defeat in the North-Rhine Westphalien election. A year later the Bad Godesberg SPD Congress issued a revised foreign policy platform which accepted the principle of national defense; and on June 30, 1960, Herbert Wehner spoke in the Bundestag supporting German rearmament and full participation in NATO.  

By 1966 opposition to NATO's military program was fragmented. What remained existed mainly in splinter parties of the far left and far rights—the Deutsche Friedens-Union (DFU) and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD). The DFU represented a remainder of the SPD opposition coalition of the mid-fifties. Supporting a pacifist anti-NATO program, the DFU drew most of its following from left-wing elements of such groups as writers, journalists, university professors, and students. Opposite and complementary to the DFU, the NPD emphasized a nationalist anti-NATO outlook. Part of its following also came from universities, for example, the University of Erlangen; but in addition it called on the memories and aspirations of such groups as war veterans and Eastern European refugees.
The decline and fragmentation of opposition to NATO in Germany, as in Britain, did not necessarily imply great gains in NATO legitimacy. It could equally well be interpreted in terms of apathy toward an issue which seemed to have become frozen in the Cold War and offered little opportunity for immediate political gains.

France

Losses in legitimacy were most marked in France. The governments of the Fourth Republic had initially supported NATO as a framework for the American defense guarantee. Subsequently, German rearmament within NATO and the possibility of a new "peripheral" American strategy weakened this attachment and contributed to French initiation of its own atomic military program. In addition, the Algerian war brought withdrawals of NATO-committed forces.

These separatist tendencies were accelerated under the Fifth Republic by the policies and style of General de Gaulle. In the face of American refusal to institute a tripartite global political-security organization, the French government publicly withdrew from NATO military activities and privately opposed their development. In nuclear affairs, it rejected both consultative and hardware types of sharing, stressing instead the importance of national control and independence. Domestically there was little opposition to Gaullist policy. Diplomats and military officers remained silent; opposition parties in the Assembly were weak and divided; and local communities economically damaged by Allied departure from French soil considered the NATO policy beyond the purview of petition.

Initial French government support for NATO—as a device to bind the United States to the defense of Western Europe—was expressed in a famous statement by Premier Henri Queuille, in which he said that "Western Europe must be able to count on the United States." If American forces were not present in Europe to prevent the old cycle of occupation and liberation, then "the consequences would be terrible. The next time you
would probably liberate a corpse, and civilization would probably be dead. If we can count on sufficient force to prevent the Russian army from crossing the Elbe,” he concluded, “then European civilization can breathe again.” 89

American Secretary of State Acheson later recalled that “it was the French, under Robert Schuman who came to the meeting in London in May, 1950, with an extensive proposal which went a good deal further than the NATO setup later went. This was for a common budget, a common command, an army setup almost like that of the European army of some years later and almost complete integration of the military forces of all of the European forces (sic) and the United States, and a financial unity through budget and taxation systems.” 90

French enthusiasm did not extend so far as to include the rearmament of Germany. Under pressure from the Allies, and especially the United States, to accept German rearmament within NATO, Foreign Minister Schuman at a series of NATO Council meetings in September, 1950, “pointed out privately to Acheson, his own agreement on German rearmament would have been meaningless because he could not have obtained the consent of the Deputies. Three more months of delicate negotiations, skillfully conducted within the Council of Deputies by Spofford, were required to gain French consent to the principle of allowing Germany to raise an armed force.” 91

The French government’s alternative, presented to the deputies on October 24, 1950, was the Pleven Plan which called for a European Army in a European Defense Community. It met a united front of French domestic opposition. “The left-wing Socialists were hostile to the rearmament of Germany, the Nationalists to the dissolution of the French army, and the Communists to the entire Atlantic policy.” 92 In August, 1954, the French Assembly finally voted down the EDC; but in December it agreed to German entry to NATO under the Paris Agreements. Originally the government had introduced EDC as a substitute for German membership in NATO; now four years later the Assembly was induced to accept German membership in NATO as a substitute for EDC.
In the light of German rearmament and the American New Look in defense, which implied a possible reduction of American forces in Europe, the French government took steps to promote French security through its own atomic military program. Although the first French atomic five-year plan had been instituted in 1952 under the Pinay government, it was the Mendès-France government, in 1954, which undertook preliminary studies and development decisions concerning a French atomic bomb. These decisions were substantially reinforced, beginning in 1956, by the governments of Guy Mollet, Maurice Bourgès-Manoury, and Félix Gaillard. They moved to construct the French atomic bomb, the isotope separation plant at Pierre-lalette, and the aircraft of the first atomic generation.\(^93\)

With the beginning of the war in Algeria in November, 1954, the French force commitment to NATO was reduced. In its efforts against the NLF, by 1956 the government had withdrawn the equivalent of four divisions from Europe leaving only two divisions for NATO.\(^94\)

The advent of General de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic augmented French fissiparous tendencies. As early as February, 1952, General de Gaulle—still in retirement—had been skeptical about NATO. He struck one of the few notes disturbing the harmony of the Lisbon Council when he publicly stated:

> It seems elementary that, in assuming the risk of eventually being the battlefield of the West, in placing henceforth our bases, our ports, our communications at the service of the grand enterprise, we receive from the Americans and the British precise commitments concerning the places, dates, and dimensions of their cooperation in case of aggression. No? Then no commitments! \(^95\)

In his letter of September 17, 1958 to President Eisenhower, De Gaulle suggested that the establishment of a tripartite global security organization including the United States, Great Britain, and France was his price for continuing support of NATO. This body would “establish and put into effect strategic plans of
action, notably with regard to the employment of nuclear weapons. He thought it would also be possible to foresee and organize, among the three governments, eventual theaters of operation and subordinate theaters." De Gaulle "declared that France would henceforth subordinate to its achievement any development of French participation in NATO, and would if necessary propose a revision of the North Atlantic Treaty." It became clear, through Eisenhower's reply of October 20 and a series of discussions and exchanges of letters, that the American government rejected the bargain. On September 5, 1960, De Gaulle responded in a press conference with the statement that the North Atlantic Treaty should be revised on at least two points. The first was "the limitation of the Alliance to the single area of Europe." Here De Gaulle repeated his demand for a tripartite strategic and political organization for global affairs. The second point involved a shift from "integration in the defense of Europe," i.e. NATO, toward greater national independence.

Beginning in 1959 De Gaulle had begun to make good his threat by a series of specific military withdrawals. In March the French government informed the Council that those French naval forces in the Western Mediterranean which had previously been earmarked for NATO—about one-third of the French fleet in that area—would remain under national command in time of war as well as peace. In June, General de Gaulle prohibited American nuclear stockpiles on French territory; and nine squadrons of American fighter bombers were transferred to bases in Britain and Germany. In 1962, the French Naval Deputy to SACEUR, Admiral Barjot, died, and the French government appointed no successor. In June, 1963, France informed NATO's Secretary General that she would withdraw the naval units earmarked for the Atlantic and Channel Commands; in 1964, French officers who had previously been assigned to NATO naval commands were redesignated as French liaison officers; and in May and July of 1965, the French government announced that neither its national forces nor its officers in
Allied headquarters would actively participate in the SHAPE exercise Fallex for 1966. 99

Over the years the French government undertook less publicized acts of opposition to NATO institutions and programs. In 1962, it used the Annual Review Questionnaire to announce that it did not intend to return to NATO the divisions transferred to Algeria. On July 25, 1963, French Ambassador François Seydoux told the NATO Council that France rejected Secretary General Stikker’s plan for the conduct of the Force Planning Exercise by the NATO Secretariat and insisted that the Exercise take place under the direct supervision of the Council. Beginning in November the French government refused to agree to successive drafts of the Military Committee strategic plan—MC 100 and MC 100/1—which attempted to bring together the doctrines of massive retaliation and flexible response, even though the later version had been specially altered to provide a compromise with French strategic views. In October, 1965, it was reported that De Gaulle had refused approval for the construction of a permanent NATO military headquarters in the western suburbs of Paris, an $8 million project designed by French army engineers under Brigadier General Michel Lafferrerie, the head of the SHAPE logistics division, whose blueprints had been approved in May by General Lemnitzer. During this period the French seemed little inclined to participate in the Five Year Rolling Defense Program, and France refused to earmark a battalion or air squadron for the ACE Mobile Force and vetoed NATO-wide financing of its exercises. 100

The French government supported neither consultative nor hardware types of nuclear sharing. France did not subscribe to the Athens guidelines and French decision-makers claimed that consultation with the United States was largely ineffectual. Although the French had been members of the Standing Group and of the SACEUR Liaison Group at Omaha, high officers felt that they had received little information about American or British targetting and no voice in target designation. When the Special Committee of Defense Ministers was proposed, Ambas-
sador de Leusse informed the NATO Council that the French were not interested in participating; and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville resisted the idea of making it a permanent NATO Committee.\textsuperscript{101}

Nor was France eager for sharing of nuclear hardware within the NATO framework. When, in the context of the Nassau conversations with Macmillan, Kennedy proposed to give France Polaris missiles if the French would endorse the proposed NATO nuclear force, De Gaulle rejected both parts of the package. On the one hand, De Gaulle explained that France had neither the warheads nor the submarines to go with the Polaris missiles. On the other hand, the NATO nuclear force seemed to De Gaulle to go against the very raison d'être of the French nuclear effort, the desire to dispose “in our own right of our deterrent force.” “It is true,” he stated “that France might theoretically retain the ability to take back in our hands, in the supreme hypothesis, our atomic weapons incorporated in the multilateral force. But how could we do it in practice during the unheard of moments of the atomic apocalypse?” \textsuperscript{102}

Subsequently the French government opposed both the American MLF and the British ANF proposals. National control and independence in French nuclear policy also were necessary not only to guard against presently perceived enemies, but also against possibly unfaithful Allies. One could “very well imagine,” De Gaulle had stated in 1959, that “Western Europe might be destroyed from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington.”

Returning to this theme four years later he said,

no one, nowhere, can know in advance whether in the event of a conflict, the atomic bombs would or would not be used at the start by the two principal champions; whether, if they did use them, they would use them in Central and Western Europe only, without striking each other directly and immediately. In light of this enormous and inevitable uncertainty, France must herself have the means of directly reaching any State that would be her aggressor.\textsuperscript{103}
As early as November, 1964, there had been rumors that De Gaulle had ordered studies of the effect of a general French withdrawal from NATO and had informed American Ambassador Bohlen of his intention to leave NATO by 1969. At the Ministerial meeting in the spring of 1965 the Allies were reported to have put planners to work on the construction of a European defense system without France. On September 9, De Gaulle publicly declared:

So long as we consider the solidarity of the Western peoples necessary for the possible defense of Europe, we will remain the allies of our allies. But at the expiration of our present commitments—that is, at the latest in 1969—we shall end the subordination which is described as integration, which is provided for by NATO and which puts our destiny in the hands of foreigners.

At a press conference on February 21, 1966, he stated:

Without reneging on her membership in the Atlantic Alliance, between now and the ultimate date laid down for her obligations, which is 4 April, 1969, France will continue progressively to modify the arrangements at present in force so far as they concern her. What she did yesterday in this respect in a number of fields she will do tomorrow in others.

On March 7, President de Gaulle sent a letter to President Johnson in which he said that "France is determined to regain on her whole territory the full exercise of her sovereignty, presently diminished by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by the utilization of her airspace, to cease her participation in the integrated Commands and no longer to place her forces at the disposal of NATO." More specific implications of French military withdrawal were spelled out in the ensuing exchange of notes between France and her Allies.

The French government on July 1 withdrew all French land and air forces assigned to NATO, a total of approximately 88,000 men, as well as the five submarines which represented the entire
remaining French naval contribution to the Alliance. Most of
the French forces deployed in Germany remained there follow­ing
the negotiation of a bilateral agreement between the French
and German governments, but certain aircraft and surface-to-air
missile units, as well as selected ground forces, returned to
France. The French Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central
Europe, General Jean Crépin, was withdrawn; AFCENT was con­
solidated; and Crépin was succeeded by German General Graf
von Kielmansegg. French personnel assigned to Allied head­
quarters, mainly SHAPE and AFCENT, were replaced by liaison
missions. French students and staff left the NATO Defense Col­
lege. Allied bases, installations, and units not under direct French
authority—including SHAPE, AFCENT, the NATO Defense College,
and individual national facilities—were transferred from France,
generally by April 1, 1967. In addition, France required authori­
izations for Allied flights over French territory, which previously
had been granted on an annual basis, to be renewed monthly
through 1967. In September, 1966, France announced its inten­
tion to withdraw from NATO'S Annual Review Committee and on
October 1, the French government reduced its participation in
the Alliance's Military Committee to a liaison group. Although
France retained the right to sit on the Defense Planning Com­
mittee, it no longer participated. On January 1, 1967, it ceased to
contribute to "most" military budget expenses, though it con­
tinued to pay its full share of 17.1 per cent for NATO'S early
warning system.¹⁰⁸

Within France there was little evidence of strong attachment
to NATO in the face of De Gaulle's military disengagement.
Resistance at the Quai d'Orsay, if it existed at all, consisted of
private footdragging. For the military, the withdrawal from NATO
was a much lighter blow than had been the retreat from Algeria;
and there was compensation in the growing French nuclear
capability. Conflicts between the military services centered more
on the implications of nuclear weapons for service roles than on
NATO. Thus the French Chief of Staff, General Ailleret replied
to a public dispute between Generals André Martin, Air Force
Chief of Staff, and Louis le Puloch, Army Chief of Staff, by stating that national strategy was a combined “stratégie aéroterrestre” but, in any case, anterior to and independent of alliance strategy. Subsequently Ailleret declared the adoption of “la défense ‘tous azimuts.’” According to the new strategic doctrine France aimed to have a long-range missile force capable of deterring aggression originating in any point of the compass. Obviously NATO Allies were not excluded.109

**TABLE 3**

**VOTE FOR ADOPTION OF THE MOTION OF CENSURE**
**BY FRENCH ASSEMBLY GROUPS, APRIL 20, 1966** *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Assembly Groups</th>
<th>Group Vote</th>
<th>Group Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groupe Socialiste</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe du Rassemblement Démocratique</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe du Centre Démocratique</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not inscribed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe d’Union pour la Nouvelle République-Union Démocratique du Travail</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe des Républicains Indépendants</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe Communiste</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>137</strong></td>
<td><strong>482</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Among French political groups, there was only weak opposition to De Gaulle’s NATO policies. In April, 1966, a motion of censure against the government’s NATO policies received 137 votes in the Assembly, 242 being required for passage. The roll call division, presented in Table 3, indicates that these votes came mainly from the Socialists, who had originally sponsored the motion, and from the Groupe du Rassemblement Démocratique and the Groupe du Centre Démocratique, legislative groups centered around the Radical, UDSR, and MRP parties. The
government's majority, on the other hand, which rested on UNR-UDET forces was swelled by support from the Communists, who had always been hostile to NATO.

Those groups most obviously damaged by De Gaulle's policy were the local communities from which the Allies were withdrawing. It was estimated that 18,000 French workers would have to find new employment; and the American departures alone would affect regional economies by the loss of 65,000 American servicemen and their families. Local mayors and municipal councils, however, did not appeal to the government to reconsider its NATO decision, but rather to reconvert the bases to French military use. When a Comité National de Défense du Personnel des Bases Alliées organized demonstrations in Paris by displaced workers from the Allied bases in October, 1966, the main objective was not a return to NATO, but pressure on the French government to provide compensatory socio-economic measures. In the Assembly elections of March, 1967, areas like Toul and Orléans, which were losing American bases, elected Gaullist candidates.
The failure of integration in military forces described in the preceding section could not be laid at the leadership’s doorstep. NATO leaders supported the military force program with an ideology which covered a wide range between general aims and specific, concrete proposals. This ideology defined its broad goals in terms of Allied peace and security. At a slightly lower level of generality was a strategy which moved from almost exclusive emphasis on the deterrent threat to a mixture which included the possibility of defense. Finally the leadership promoted a series of specific NATO structures and tasks beginning with relatively traditional military areas, moving to include the realm of nuclear co-ordination, and ending with an attempt to preserve what had already been built. This ideology, at the more general levels, could be expected to appeal to all the Allies—peace and security were common goods, a developing mixture of deterrence and defense could take to midstream and hopefully avoid all but the most extreme currents in the shifting strategic debate. Ultimately, however, the ideology implied important specific sacrifices from, first, the Europeans, and then the United States; and here it promoted opposition.
Successive SACEURs took precedence over the Secretaries General in promulgating the ideology, though the latter also lent support. In December, 1950, the Council had appointed United States General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Eisenhower had served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe (1944–1945), supervising the long-awaited Allied landings in Normandy which had begun the liberation of Europe; had been Chief of Staff of the United States Army between 1945 and 1948; and was presently serving as President of Columbia University. The impetus which he brought to his task is indicated by a memorandum which he wrote before assuming the new position.

I shall reluctantly accept command responsibility if:
1) German agreement secured,
2) All countries make fixed commitments,
3) Maximum authority and opportunity to SHAPE (no limitation as to area except in most general way—same as to functions.)

During 1952, General Eisenhower was succeeded as SACEUR by General Matthew B. Ridgway, who came directly from his position as head of the United Nations forces in Korea.

Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Lord Ismay laid the early ideological groundwork. At the most general level were the paramount goods of peace and security. In the face of “an aggressive imperialism that has more than once announced its implacable hostility to free government,” General Eisenhower stated, “we strive to erect a wall of security for the free world behind which free institutions can live.” General Ridgway stressed the broad goal of NATO as the “preservation of peace and security” against the Communist threat.

Slightly less general was the delineation of NATO strategy,
emphasizing deterrence without immediately providing defense and implying substantial distance from the ultimate goals. Theoretically Eisenhower's defense was to be provided by a “shield” of air and ground strength, the bulk of which would be located in central Europe. On the flanks—in Italy, Denmark, and Norway—there would be smaller air, ground, and naval forces. Nevertheless, Eisenhower admitted that “as of today, our forces could not offer prolonged resistance East of the Rhine barrier.”

In such a situation the deterrent sword provided by American reserves and air power was crucial. Eisenhower told Congress that the United States could not “concentrate all our forces in any one sector, even one as important as Western Europe.” Rather “we must largely sit here with our great mobile, powerful reserves, ready to support our policies, our right, our interests, wherever they may be in danger in the world.”

For Ridgway, defense also seemed less immediately feasible than deterrence. He defined his objectives:

First, to deter aggression by building up our military forces to such a degree that potential breakers of the peace will consider their chance of successful attack doubtful.

Second, to insure, insofar as possible, that in the event we are attacked, we defend the people and the lands of the NATO nations.

He noted that “a full-scale Soviet attack within the near future would find the Allied Command Europe critically weak to accomplish its present mission.”

At the level of specific NATO structures, the Annual Review was singled out for special attention. Eisenhower felt that an “annual review of the full nature and composition of our military programs should be accomplished.” Lord Ismay stated that “the Annual Review is one of the most important tasks performed by NATO. It is indeed the main instrument for co-ordinating the defense effort of the Alliance.”

As for particular tasks, which called for concrete Allied contributions, Eisenhower and Ridgway asked for land force im-
proofment in terms of active divisional strengths and combat readiness, redeployment, better training and proper backing by support troops, proper ammunition and supply levels, and reserve training and mobilization. They requested that the number of modern aircraft be increased and that naval forces be strengthened. Recalling the decisions reached by the Ministers in February, Eisenhower stated that the Allied governments "must convert the Lisbon program into actuality." 7

Eisenhower believed that the energy to achieve these tasks could come from a dialectical interplay of the "enlightened self-interest" of all participants. "There was, in the long-term sense, hope for none," without "joint and vigorous defense action."

For the continental nations, there was only the specter of a godless tyranny that would stamp out freedom with machine-like efficiency. . For Britain, there was the prospect of a new enemy across the Dover Cliffs, an enemy who could bring back the rockets, submarines, and bombardment on an intensive scale. For the United States and Canada, the future could promise ever-greater danger of attack, requiring endless sacrifices and defense costs which would ultimately break their economies. 8

Lord Ismay made the same point when he said that "aggression in Europe and the danger to Europe is nearer in terms of distance and time than it is to the Americas, but for them it is just as mortal in the long run." 9

The upward co-operative spiral was to be initiated by the United States and to spark increasing efforts by the European Allies. "What we are trying to do," Eisenhower said "is to start a sort of reciprocal action across the Atlantic. We do one thing which inspires our friends to do something, and that gives us greater confidence in their thoroughness, their readiness for sacrifice. We do something more and we establish an upward-going spiral which meets this problem of strength and morale." 10

Nevertheless, the ideology seemed to aim at co-opting the United States at the expense of the Europeans. A strategy which
emphasized deterrence, without providing an immediately credible defense, neglected European fears that the Continent might once again be liberated only after being overrun. Furthermore, the Europeans were ultimately to be called upon to supply most of the manpower. Britain and France were the major European targets; but force gains were important factors in leadership support for the entry of Greece and Turkey and the rearmament of Germany first within the context of the European Defense Community, and then under NATO. The United States would initially supply troops, but Eisenhower made it clear that this was to be mainly an "emergency measure." "While it was agreed, unanimously, that some American ground forces should remain indefinitely in Europe, each government was informed that as soon as Europe could raise, train, and deploy an adequate ground force, the major portion of the American contingent would be returned to the United States." Testifying before Congress in 1951, Eisenhower doubted whether the American force contribution would ever completely "get to zero," but he assured Senator Smith that this "would be the objective in any planning in which I took part." "Fundamentally and on a long-term basis," he believed, "each important geographical area must be defended primarily by the people of that region."

General Ridgway left SHAPE in 1953 to take up a new position as United States Army Chief of Staff and was replaced as SACEUR by General Alfred M. Gruenther, who had been Chief of Staff at SHAPE under both previous incumbents. Gruenther, in turn, was relieved in 1956 by General Lauris Norstad. Norstad was an officer of the United States Air Force and had served in Europe since the establishment of the Allied Command in 1951, first as Commander-in-Chief of United States and Allied Air Forces in Central Europe and then as Air Deputy at SHAPE. His succession to command promised to carry on the Eisenhower tradition, mixing with it a new emphasis on airpower and modern technology. On January 2, 1963, Norstad handed over command to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, then Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
During these later years, the leadership shifted ideological ground. Peace and security continued to be the broad goals, but the strategic mixture now included not only deterrence but also the possibility of defense, and structures and tasks were not only conventional but nuclear.

The general goals of peace and security remained the ultimate appeal. “NATO has checked Soviet aggression,” General Norstad said, “because it has made the preservation of peace and security of its members a matter of common interest and common responsibility.” General Lemnitzer repeated the theme: “Peace in the NATO area has been maintained,” he noted “and the military security provided by our collective efforts—the security so necessary to stability—certainly ranks high among the factors that have brought about the growing economic prosperity and well-being of so many nations of NATO.”

Less generally, the early strategic imbalance between deterrence and defense was gradually redressed by an increasing defensive emphasis. General Gruenther appealed for European support when he estimated that the shield, consisting of “highly trained covering land forces,” should provide a “cushion of time” following the failure of deterrence, allowing the mobilization of reserves who would be “brought into action immediately after the outbreak of hostilities.” “Hard-hitting air forces” would provide tactical support and Allied long-range air forces would conduct powerful retaliatory attacks deep into enemy territory against industrial and other vital targets.” General Norstad rejected the notion of a “trip-wire” or “plate-glass window” shield in favor of “a ‘shield’ force of size and strength, charged with the vital mission of defending all NATO territory and all NATO peoples. A defense that failed to protect our European allies from invasion,” he said “would be no defense at all.” At the minimum Norstad’s shield would “force a pause” which would clearly establish the incidence of aggression, would emphasize its cost and consequences, and thus establish the credibility of strategic retaliatory forces by bridging the “gap between all or nothing.”
By the time of General Lemnitzer, deterrent credibility was to be based not only on "an invulnerable means to retaliate, in kind, against a nuclear attack." It also implied "an evident capability to meet and defeat Communist forces." 18

As part of their sharpened defensive perspective, later leaders gave increasing emphasis to forward defense. General Eisenhower had first spoken of a forward strategy, but could only hope to hold the west bank of the Rhine. General Gruenther moved across the Rhine in 1954-55; and by 1961 General Norstad could say, "I believe we are now approaching the position where we can move to a true forward strategy. I do not think it is acceptable to any one of our countries that part of its territory should be given up." 19 Secretary General Spaak stated that, "for political and moral as well as military reasons, there was only one strategy which the Alliance could adopt: the member countries must be protected along their frontiers and right up to the iron curtain." General Lemnitzer restated that the forward strategy was "the only kind of strategy that is acceptable to the nations of NATO," though he also qualified his statement by pointing out that "this does not mean that we deploy our forces right along the iron curtain, but it does mean that we will be in contact with the forces immediately upon crossing into NATO territory." 20

The leadership buttressed its emphasis on forward defense by supporting the expansion of specific structures and tasks which were both conventional and nuclear. The structural emphases of the earlier period were carried over and developed. Thus in 1963 Dirk Stikker justified an extension of the Annual Review, the NATO Force Planning Exercise, by arguing that it would help to provide "precise and vigorously considered forecasts based on realistic planning assumptions." Moreover it would be instrumental in making NATO's five year force goals "visibly compatible with the resources expected to be available and vice versa." General Lemnitzer believed that the Force Planning Exercise had "the particular advantage of enabling the Allied nations and the major NATO Commanders to work out, jointly, our force goals for future years. It is hoped that the final result will be the
adoption of goals which provide forces of the types and numbers considered necessary by the military authorities, and which can also be accepted as politically and economically feasible by the national political authorities.” Manlio Brosio agreed that “strategy, resources, and forces have to be examined and reconciled collectively among the allies, through agreed force planning procedures.”

Although insufficient data exist to be certain, it is likely that Stikker strongly backed a program of structural reform and consolidation. To the NATO Parliamentarians he suggested that the Allies “should think very hard” about whether it was “still right that the main nucleus of civil affairs should be on one side of the Atlantic and the main nucleus of military affairs on the other.” Following his retirement he became more specific, recommending reapportionment of command positions to give the Europeans greater voice, abolition of the Standing Group, expansion of the authority of major commanders, building “into the International Secretariat a military organization which would take over a large part of the tasks now performed by the Standing Group,” and the transfer of the Military Committee to Europe, where it should “meet in permanent session in the NATO headquarters.”

In different combinations, NATO leaders maintained and extended ideological stress on traditional tasks. General Gruenther requested more active and reserve forces, extension of conscription, and improvement of air defense. Norstad urged increases in the number of active-duty combat-ready divisions; strengthening the personnel and equipment levels of existing and deployed combat units; correction of shortages in support units; and improving the status of reserves and reinforcements, both combat and support, and integrated air defense. Lemnitzer accentcd the importance of maintaining adequate force strengths and manning levels; conscription periods over twelve months; increases in weapons and equipment; and improvements in command and control and air defense capabilities. Stikker joined the military commanders in pointing to the necessity for integrated air defense.
New programs were also important. The leadership emphasized forward deployment of troops and the creation of a special ACE Mobile Force, which could be quickly moved to trouble spots in forward areas. General Norstad referred to the AMF as a “fire brigade” which could get to trouble spots along the Cold War border “firstest with the mostest.” “Although in the mobile force the ‘mostest’ may be relatively small in numbers,” Norstad admitted “in terms of timely application, in terms of potential fire power, it could be more than the most which has ever been employed in this manner up to this time.”

During March, 1960, Norstad proposed three battalions as the AMF’s original strength—with complements from the United States, Britain, and France. Later the force could be expanded with contributions from other nations. By December, 1961, Norstad indicated that he was ready to move to a more ambitious mobile force in terms of national representation and manpower, hoping to have by April, 1962 “representation from four or five countries and to have, for instance, in terms of the ground forces involved, as many as 3,000 men in four, five or six reinforced battalions. We would hope also to have corresponding air force units,” he said. Furthermore, he strongly emphasized the AMF’s need for logistic standardization. “We cannot have five different commands. We cannot have five different kinds of troops with support equipment. We cannot have five different kinds of ammunition,” he said. “We must have true standardization of equipment.”

Norstad made it clear that he was reorganizing those forces which already existed, rather than requesting new ones. He told WEU that the ACE Mobile Force “will add materially to our strength, without adding to the cost, because it is being made up of forces that are in existence.” Elsewhere he had noted that “it’s nothing we pull off and put on a shelf. These units will be part of other operating units, where they belong, but they will be so trained and equipped, as a second-hat function for them, that they can be used promptly and effectively for this.” Nevertheless, some additional military expenditure would be required, and Norstad stressed the desirability of common NATO financing.
He believed that, "those nations which contribute forces should not, because of the increased effectiveness of their contribution, be expected to shoulder the additional burden of paying what are clearly common expenses." 26

General Lemnitzer continued support for the Mobile Force. "I consider," he said, "that the AMF is making a very valuable contribution to the deterrent effectiveness of Allied Command Europe. Moreover, it represents a guarantee that no NATO country, however remote its location, stands alone against the common threat." He hoped that the units assigned to the AMF might in the future serve on a relatively "permanent basis." Finally, like his predecessor, General Lemnitzer pressed for NATO funding. "The most troublesome question," he said, "arises in connection with the special financial problems resulting from the AMF's international character. This is especially marked with regard to the costs of maneuvers and exercises—especially the expenses of transportation to the area of operations and return. A solution on an inter-allied basis is obviously called for." 27

The leadership was ambivalent toward the exchange of conventional forces for nuclear weapons which was embodied in the succession of NATO force plans. On the one hand, it was unenthusiastic about the conventional losses; on the other, it welcomed the nuclear gains. General Ridgway had publicly opposed the abandonment of the Lisbon force goals; and important planning officers under his successor, General Gruenther, would have preferred to maintain the Lisbon reserves had it been feasible. By 1954, however, it had become clear that the Allies were unlikely to fulfill the Lisbon targets; and NATO's new force plan, MC 48, was based on an assessment of the forces which nations appeared willing to supply. General Gruenther's directive to the study group preceding the formulation of MC 48 emphasized the necessity to formulate a plan which would not "shake the economies of the participating nations." 28

In 1957, SHAPE completed the Allied Command Europe, Minimum Forces Study, 1958–1963, which was to be the basis for MC 70. General Norstad used the analogy of a sand castle
to make it clear that he vigorously opposed further force reductions.

The talk about paring down the deterrent strategy reminds me of a game I used to play as a child, a game called "Castle of Sand." We put a penny in a tumbler, packed the tumbler with damp sand, and turned it upside down over a plate. Lift the tumbler, and there was the "castle," with the penny on top. Now we took a knife, and each of us in turn had to pare away some sand, without bringing down the penny. It was easy at first. You could make bold slashes at almost no risk at all. But it soon became dangerous to pare even a few grains. And eventually, of course, somebody made the fatal cut. Down fell the castle, penny and all, and the loser paid a forfeit.

Nevertheless, toward the end of Norstad's term, MC 26/4 endorsed further cuts. After his retirement, Norstad told Congress, "I fought for forces, and I fought to maintain forces that were over there (in Europe) on the basis of the military requirement." When he was asked if "the over-all allied ground forces in Europe are adequate at the present time," Norstad replied, "I am speaking from a distance of three years but I would say that they are inadequate they have less now than when I was there and I did not have enough."

General Lemnitzer was equally outspoken. "I can see no military justification for the reduction of forces in Europe," he said. When asked if reduction of ground forces, and the military strategy which this implied, had been recommended by him, General Lemnitzer replied, "Absolutely not." Furthermore, General Lemnitzer made it clear that the program of dual basing, under which the United States had redeployed troops from Europe to the United States with the idea of flying them back to Europe in an emergency, was no substitute for troops on the ground. "While dual basing does not reduce the troop commitment to NATO," he said, "it does degrade our in-theatre capability and therefore reduces our readiness to meet an attack with little or no warning." In view of the "Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia" during 1968, he hoped that the NATO nations would
reverse "a dangerous trend within the organization that had weakened the conventional forces under his command." 31

SACEUR's opposition to conventional contraction went together with support for increases in nuclear capabilities. To be sure there was a feeling that the losses in the first area were not completely offset by the gains in the second. General Ridgway maintained that "the new tactical nuclear weapons would not only demand more manpower but would also increase the cost of defense to the taxpayer." General Gruenther cautioned that "new weapons frequently have the effect of adding new problems and new tasks without eliminating those that previously confronted us." 32

Nevertheless, the SHAPE study which preceded the adoption of MC 48 in 1954, had concluded that future warfare would inevitably be atomic. General Gruenther publicly said "we have determined that our strategy in the center requires the use of atomic weapons whether the enemy uses them or not, and we must use atomic bombs to redress the imbalance between their forces and ours and to achieve victory.' When General Norstad was asked, "If you were prohibited from using atomic weapons, could you defend Europe?" His reply was, "In the event of a general war, the answer is 'No!' The answer is 'No!'" Thus, a new defensive concept was devised which incorporated the change in anticipated available resources. Under the earlier outlook, defense was to have been accomplished by "waves" of forces from the Lisbon reservoir. The new perspective viewed the military situation in terms of "structures." "Engaged" nuclear weapons would link the lowest and highest levels of violence and reinforce the credibility of the Western deterrent. 33

From the start SACEUR had been concerned that the United States provide nuclear information to its Allies. Eisenhower had chafed under American legal restrictions. "The matter of nuclear strength and possible deployment was troublesome from the beginning," he said. The McMahon Act of 1946, controlling the production of fissionable materials, the manufacture and storage of nuclear weapons, and the transfer of such weapons to other
nations, "prevented us from making any workable agreements with our partners in NATO respecting nuclear weapons—indeed it was difficult and embarrassing, because of the restrictions imposed upon us, even to discuss the matter intelligently and thoroughly." In spite of these hindrances, discussion took place at SHAPE, during General Eisenhower's tenure, concerning the implications of battlefield nuclear weapons for European defense; and Eisenhower noted that "the effect of the nuclear deterrent was taken in account in all our joint planning." 34

Subsequently, General Norstad praised the advance of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, "which permitted the use on an allied basis of more atomic information than had been allowed previously." At the same time he noted that "the restrictions imposed by that act still prevent NATO forces from training on a fully realistic basis or developing the operational capability and readiness status required, particularly in view of the many types of modern atomic-weapons system which are now becoming available." To further improve the situation, he endorsed changes in the Act which would "provide greater latitude for the dissemination of essential information within this Allied Command." 35

SACEUR also showed a growing concern for an adequately stocked nuclear armory. Generals Gruenther and Norstad lobbied in Washington during the mid-1950's for the creation of a "NATO atomic stockpile" through which the United States would retain control of atomic warheads, but would distribute to its Allies nuclear capable delivery vehicles, train Allied military personnel in the use of these vehicles, and help to develop a supply system for them. These efforts were relatively successful. Commenting on the Allied Command Europe, Minimum Forces Study, 1958-1963, which preceded MC 70, Norstad stated that "we plan to introduce just as rapidly as possible, the new types of weapons such as the rockets and missiles of various kinds. We, of course, are primarily interested in what might be called the tactical or battlefield type of weapon. I think I did say recently that we propose to go from about 30 battalions at the present
time to say about 100 battalions by 1963." As for higher levels of violence, following the December, 1957 Heads of Government Council, SHAPE carried out studies which presented a military requirement for MRBM's stationed in Europe, in addition to the Thor and Jupiter bases in Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Publicly, Norstad advocated that "mid-range ballistic missiles, land and sea based, and with great mobility, should be made available to NATO as a part of the weapons modernization program, to meet the presently assigned functions of this command." On December 6, 1959, in a speech at the University of Southern California, Norstad proposed making NATO the "fourth nuclear power" through the creation of a multi-national atomic authority. He developed this idea further on March 2, 1960, at a press conference at SHAPE; on October 12 in Coventry, England; and on November 21 to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. To the Parliamentarians Norstad said that "consideration should be given to guaranteeing to the Alliance the availability of a basic pool of atomic weapons, those essential to the direct defense of Europe, and to giving all nations of the Alliance an essentially equal voice in the control of these particular weapons." Subsequently he made public the proposal that a NATO Executive Committee might be assigned nuclear responsibility. Such a committee would be presided over by the Secretary General and might include the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and perhaps one or two additional participants.

Norstad clarified several aspects of his plan to the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations after his retirement. In the first place, he noted that "the weapons I am talking about should be basically tactical," and that the purpose of his proposal was to provide "for the proper political decision for the use of what actually exists." "The critical and immediate problem" for Norstad was "not with some new longer-range strategic force of yet undetermined purpose and pattern, not with the deployment of weapons which do not bear directly on the NATO task, not with an MLF, for
instance. "Rather the problem was, "how do we answer the European questions as to the availability and the control of weapons already deployed and, in a way, engaged." 39

Replying to a question from Senator Mundt, Norstad asked if he might "respectfully disagree that we have a satisfactory procedure at the present time, because at the present time we do not." NATO's atomic stockpile represented "a satisfactory procedure for making present weapons available—for supplying them. That is clean," said Norstad. Still lacking, however, was "a satisfactory procedure in terms of the alliance exercising its authority, and this is something which the United States does not dictate." To augment NATO's authority, Norstad believed that machinery should be established which could authorize the use of American nuclear weapons, even though custody of bombs or warheads might remain under American control. "Let's keep our own custody," he said, "but let's let them collectively participate in the decision by which a limited number of weapons would be used in the NATO context, and, if possible, when they would be used." The decision-making procedure should be such that there would "be a certain minimum number of weapons which will be available even if the United States, which is most unlikely, would positively dissent from the decision and not commit its own forces." 40

The primary decision-making body, the Executive Committee, would consist of heads of government, who would establish a permanent subordinate group of "people who would live with the subject, actually live with the subject, in whom the Prime Minister or President or Chancellor had great confidence and to whom he had direct access." Norstad asserted that the creation of this group would only formalize existing custom. "This proposal for a Heads of State group was not pulled out of the air," he said. "This is confirming practice, at least practice during my time. These are the people with whom I maintained the contact. These are the people whom, when I got into difficulty, I called on the telephone or I went to see, or they called me on the telephone." 41
Proposals for making NATO a fourth nuclear power were discussed at a number of meetings by Norstad, Spaak, Stikker, and Konrad Adenauer at Stikker's villa in Menaggio-Loveno, and Norstad's collaborators backed him up. Spaak called for a 'common nuclear policy' and an Atlantic "nuclear force." Stikker supported a system of NATO nuclear control in which, "without prejudicing the rights of the producing countries, the political decision on the use of nuclear weapons could be taken, after an appreciation of the necessity for it by supreme allied commanders, by a majority of weighted votes." The idea of NATO as a nuclear power could be expected to appeal to the European allies. In particular, Norstad's proposals aimed to forestall the development of a German drive to attain an independent nuclear capability by presenting an indirect road on which Germany might keep pace with nuclear developments. Norstad and Adenauer had discussed the issues as early as 1957, and these conversations provided an impetus for Norstad's thinking. Norstad recalled that:

The Chancellor was the first to raise with me, in 1957, two questions which he said had been raised in the Federal Republic as well as in other countries in Europe. One was: If all these countries organized their defense on a foundation of nuclear weapons, was it not reasonable for the European countries to ask that a certain number of weapons be firmly committed, on the basis that they would not be withdrawn by unilateral decision of the United States? The other was: should not NATO have some degree of influence, perhaps even control, over the conditions under which the weapons would be used. No one said at the time that they wanted control, they just said due influence.

I sought to provide a specific answer to the questions. My proposal was that we establish an Executive Committee within NATO consisting of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The Secretary General could be chairman and Germany would have a special relationship to this group which would have some control over any nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

The subsequent development of an independent French nuclear capability added fuel to the German fire. At one of the Menag-
gio meetings Adenauer said that if a solid system of nuclear co-operation were not developed "nobody would be able to prevent Germany in the future from creating such a system for itself. And Germany could do that better and sooner than France!"  

France was the leadership's second major target. Norstad speculated that the French "sense of grievance" over exclusion from American nuclear secrets might have created a situation in which "the nuclear responsibilities on NATO authority will have to be broadened." He noted that "the French desire for a stronger voice in the strategy of the West is a broad one, and includes a particular interest in her exercising a major influence in any decision involving the use of atomic weapons." Norstad's Executive Committee would hopefully satisfy French ambitions. Before Congress in 1966 he recollected that "a few years ago when first presenting this idea I thought it might go some way toward meeting the requirements of certain countries, France for instance, since it recognizes the special position of the three Standing Group nations. I am frank to admit that this was one of its purposes when it was first developed."  

Spaak summed up the appeal—both specific and general—which the plan might have. The possibility that NATO might become "the fourth atomic Power in the world," said Spaak, would be "a new milestone for the Alliance."

It constitutes a valid and lasting answer to the problem of the atomic armament of Germany.

It is also an answer to the queries and the anxieties of France.

It may put an end to the dangerous controversies now developing in the United Kingdom.

It constitutes for the Alliance as a whole, and more particularly for Europe, a tremendous increase in its power.

Nevertheless, the leadership's proposals ultimately ran into American opposition. During the 1950's the United States had co-operated by liberalizing its nuclear security policy to allow
first the dissemination of certain types of information, and later the deployment of tactical nuclear delivery systems with the forces of its Allies. This policy had been capped by the announcement in the Heads of Government communiqué of December, 1957, that “NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need,” and “that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.”

President Eisenhower on February 3, 1960, had seemed to indicate further advances in American policy when he suggested that American laws still restricting nuclear co-operation should be liberalized. But after Senator Anderson and Representative Holifield warned that they continued to support the 1958 Atomic Energy Act, the White House promptly denied that any policy change which would further loosen American nuclear control was contemplated. In April, 1960, Secretary of Defense Gates’ proposals for establishing a European land-based Polaris force and for increasing SACEUR’s nuclear discretion also implied concessions to the NATO leadership. At the ministerial meeting in December, however, Secretary Herter appeared more cautious when he proposed that the Polaris force be submarine based and suggested that it depended on prior Allied agreement on an indeterminable multilateral system of political control.

With the change of administration in Washington, a direct clash occurred between the NATO leadership and the United States government. The Kennedy administration felt that its policy of non-proliferation and centralized control ruled out a NATO nuclear force which was not ultimately subject to American veto. Administration reluctance to make NATO a nuclear power according to Norstad’s vision was clearly stated by Secretary of Defense McNamara, who said that he “would not favor” Norstad’s plan. “I think it would be unwise,” he said, “to divide the nuclear force of NATO into two categories without a proper linkage between them, granting to one group of nations authority to use one category and another group of nations or a
single nation authority to use the other category. Nuclear war is indivisible.' He continued, "I know of no single member of NATO who would recommend that the authority to utilize nuclear weapons be granted to three to five other nations of NATO. Nor do I know of any member of NATO that would wish to see the United States delegate its veto power to any other member of NATO or to any grouping of NATO nations."  

Norstad's attitude towards NATO's nuclear capability probably led Washington to press for his retirement. On the other side, Norstad, after he left SHAPE, publicly opposed the American and British counter-proposals—MLF and ANF—on the grounds that they neither added to SACEUR's immediate nuclear capability nor met a "very legitimate" European desire for greater control of the use of nuclear weapons. Norstad said, "I have never been favorably inclined toward an MLF." When asked about the ANF, he replied, "The same thing—it is a strategic force. We should not for almost a thousand reasons think of creating a new strategic force, because you just cause more trouble than it is worth." He was also highly skeptical about NATO's Special Committee of Defense Ministers. To be useful, he believed that the Committee could not "be just an exchange of ideas or exchange of information or participation in broad, general planning." "I am not suggesting that the McNamara Committee is kidding itself," he stated, "but unless it comes to some conclusion which would permit the Europeans to participate actively in a decision, I do not think it could be successful." Finally, he said, "I wish them well. I hope they will come to something. I am not complaining or criticizing the McNamara Committee."  

Following the departures of Spaak, Norstad, and Stikker, the NATO leadership continued to support Atlantic nuclear co-operation and the idea of an Atlantic nuclear force, but with less vigor. General Lemnitzer suggested that he "would of course welcome any augmentation of ACE nuclear capabilities," indicating that a mix of surface ships, submarines, and land vehicles might, eventually, be most appropriate. Manlio Brosio called for Atlantic nuclear co-operation and decreasing emphasis on multi-
ple nuclear vetoes, while nevertheless recognizing American nuclear independence.  

During these later years, the leadership's ideology implied sacrifices—and resistance—from both Europeans and the United States. The increased emphasis on defense and a forward posture aimed to meet important European fears of being overrun; but, at the same time, it implied force contributions mainly from European nations which had not filled their agreed quotas. The series of nuclear force proposals aimed at increasing European access to the most modern military technology, but also required the United States and Britain partially to relinquish their monopoly of the West's deterrent force.

By 1966, the leadership shifted the major specific focus away from areas of conflict, such as the nuclear issue, and toward the task of preserving the military organization which had been painfully built by those who had come before. Here, following the French withdrawal, NATO leaders appealed to the Fourteen who remained, asserting that there could be neither peace nor security, neither deterrence nor defense, without "some kind of organization in peacetime." "We cannot afford in any future war to buy time by selling space," said Brosio. "If we do not prepare for the moment of danger, there can be no effective defense when and if it comes. Not only this, but since our defenses must not only be effective, but be seen to be so, there can be no credible deterrent, to provide which is the Alliance's essential function in time of peace."  

**DECISION-MAKING**

In spite of the insistence with which the leadership pressed these appeals, it was resisted by national governments, whose instructed delegates dominated NATO's decision-making councils.

One of the most balanced and most effective leadership mechanisms was the Temporary Council Committee which was appointed late in 1951 to reconcile NATO's military requirements with the political and economic capabilities of the Allies. The
TCC quickly delegated its work to an Executive Board of three, the members of which combined the roles of instructed delegates and independent experts. The participants were Averell Harriman of the United States, Sir Edwin Plowden of the United Kingdom, and Jean Monnet of France. While delegates of the larger nations thus controlled decision-making, the status of independent expertise enjoyed by the Board was indicated by its informal title of the Three Wise Men.

On the basis of questionnaires distributed to Allied governments concerning defense programs and economic resources, the TCC arrived at recommendations for increased national contributions to the defense effort. According to Lord Ismay, “specific proposals” were made for “force targets and military standards, which are to be considered as firm goals for the coming year and as provisional goals and guidance for the years thereafter.” Nevertheless, Lord Ismay admitted that, “not all member countries were happy about the TCC conclusions and there was a feeling, among some governments, that the defense capabilities of the larger members of the Alliance had not been explored with sufficient thoroughness.” In particular the Belgian government believed that a recommended 8 per cent of Belgian GNP for defense in 1952 was inequitable and the Italians thought they had been unfairly treated. Even in France, where additional defense spending had been accepted by Monnet, the increase was later rejected by the French Cabinet.

In spite of its limitations, the TCC study led to the Lisbon force goals of 1952 and to the establishment of more permanent force planning institutions—first the Annual Review Committee and then the Defense Planning Committee and the Defense Planning Working Group. All of these later bodies were dominated by instructed delegates. The Defense Planning Committee included the national permanent representatives, the other two bodies were comprised of lesser-ranking members of national delegations, with representatives from the International Staff, the Standing Group, Military Committee and the Major NATO Commanders.
Little is known about the actual effectiveness of the Annual Review procedure, even though Lord Ismay has described and praised it in some detail. According to Lord Ismay, the Annual Review Committee established NATO definitions in terms of force categories, expenditures, and costs, submitted questionnaires to nations, analyzed their replies, and attempted to reconcile them with NATO military recommendations. By way of evaluation, Ismay stated:

The Annual Review is one of the most important tasks performed by NATO. It is indeed the main instrument for coordinating the defense effort of the Alliance. It has proved an efficient means for collecting precise information, sifting it, drawing conclusions from it, and then acting. Through the Annual Review, deficiencies in equipment, units below the required standard, bottlenecks in production and other weaknesses can be quickly identified; the cost and economic impact of proposed remedies can be estimated, and a means provided for reaching agreement on what is both desirable and practicable.

Furthermore, he noted that “in the final report on the 1953 Annual Review there were 84 separate recommendations addressed to the various governments; nearly half of these had been accepted before the end of the Ministerial session which adopted the new force goals.” Unfortunately Ismay did not indicate the scope of these recommendations relative either to national capabilities or to those recommendations which were not accepted.57

It is more than likely that the Annual Reviews between 1953 and 1961 and the Triennial Review of 1962 were not as effective as the leadership might have hoped. First, in spite of traditional leadership pleas for increased defense efforts, the force goals embodied in NATO’s military plans were consistently reduced. Second, the movement which began in 1961 to change NATO strategy away from the doctrine of massive retaliation led Dirk Stikker to propose on August 27, 1962, that a special study be undertaken which would relate strategy to the defense needs
and the defense capabilities of the Alliance—a job which one might have thought would have been performed by the Reviews of the preceding decade. On May, 1963, Stikker followed up his earlier proposal by presenting a detailed plan for the implementation of the new study. Directly under the authority of the Secretary General there would be a mixed planning group including representatives of the Staff/Secretariat and the military authorities. This group would have extended powers of investigation to assemble facts on the state of national defense forces. The members would submit questions to Allied governments, circulate in national capitols, and get the views of political and military leaders. Before the end of 1963 NATO military authorities would furnish a resumé of (1) the effects of the military situation on NATO until 1970, and (2) suggested eventual modifications of NATO strategic concepts and force levels. By the spring of 1964 the mixed planning group would have completed a critical analysis of the resources and budgetary provisions of each NATO country, studied the estimates of NATO military authorities, and submitted a suggested NATO strategic doctrine and force plan to the Council for adoption.

The Ottawa Council of Ministers on May 24 "directed the Council in Permanent Session to undertake, with the advice of the NATO military authorities, further studies of the interrelated questions of strategy, force requirements, and the resources available to meet them." This statement left ambiguous both the detailed subjects of study and the instrumentalities for conducting it.

On July 25, in the Permanent Council, French Ambassador Seydoux vetoed the Stikker plan for two basic reasons—first, Stikker proposed to undertake a technical study of force levels when agreement had not been reached in the area of strategy, reversing natural priorities; second, such a study should be conducted not by the Secretariat's experts but rather by national delegates. In greater detail, he argued that it was abnormal that the same group should decide both the strategic concept and the
level of forces required; the Ottawa communiqué had recognized their interdependence but had not authorized their simultaneous study. The object of the exercise was to establish the equilibrium of nuclear weapons and conventional armament; but the proposed study assumed that the strategic problem had been solved. One should instead begin with the strategic study. Parallel to it could be a study of existing resources as long as it was conducted by a group with political responsibility. To confide to a group of international experts the right to inquire into national services and weigh financial and defense policies of national governments was unthinkable. Not only was it bound to be ineffectual because no government would co-operate, but it would substitute for and downgrade the fundamental organs of NATO, the Permanent Council and the Military Committee.

The American position on the plan is not entirely clear. Secretary of Defense McNamara had privately supported Stikker at the early stages of the proposal; and had backed Stikker's plan at Ottawa; in July, 1963, American Ambassador Finletter, along with British Ambassador Shuckburgh, was reported to favor it. Nevertheless, in the face of strong French resistance, the United States government, and McNamara in particular, were said to have gone back on the original agreement for a leading role by the Secretariat.

In any event, the Council decided that the Force Planning Exercise would emphasize not strategy but defense capabilities and that it would take place, not under the international aegis of the Secretary General and his experts, but under the Permanent Council's national delegates. The Permanent Council was constituted as the Defense Planning Committee and beneath it would work the Defense Planning Working Group, composed essentially of the same personnel who sat on the Annual Review Committee. Eventually Secretary General Brosio was appointed Chairman of the DPC, and the Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance (later renamed the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning and Policy) was made Chairman of the DPWG. An important infusion of technical expertise came
from the RAND Corporation, which developed a NATO force planning cost model in the fall of 1964 as an analytical tool to support the Force Planning Exercise; but its independence was open to question in view of RAND's long-standing relationship with the United States Department of Defense.63

The results of the Force Planning Exercise do not appear to have been significantly better than those of the preceding Reviews. One possible benefit was the extension of the Review procedure to cover a five-year period. In December, 1965, the Council of Ministers approved in principle the establishment of a Five Year Rolling Defense Program. In January, 1967, the new procedure went into effect, aiming at 'projecting Alliance force goals and country plans five years ahead each year,' and using compilations of national defense data which were supposed to be broader and deeper than preceding ones, including special entries for contract maintenance and research and development. A second possible gain was a new emphasis on cost effectiveness injected by the United States Defense Department and RAND.64

Nevertheless, NATO's five year plans remained dependent on national procedures. Although the American Defense Department drew up plans on a five-year basis, Congressional authorizations and allocations were for one year; in Germany the Ministry of Defense had begun to plan five years ahead, but budgetary authorities and Parliament remained behind; in France the effective defense loi de programme ran for six years, 1965 through 1970.

More seriously, the Force Planning Exercise failed to produce observable substantive benefits. It did not resolve the strategic debate between the proponents of massive retaliation and those of flexible response, though a strategic document to replace the ill-fated MC 100/1 was adopted after the French military withdrawal. Even in the area in which it had eventually concentrated, the Force Planning Exercise could not be seen to have exercised appreciable influence on national policies.

As approved at Ottawa in 1963, the Force Planning Exercise
had aimed at formulating Alliance force goals for the period 1966–70. Between June and July of 1964, SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCCHAN had submitted recommended force goals for this period, consisting of “A” and “B” levels. The major emphasis in both plans concerned modernization (missiles, motorization, armor) and degree of readiness. While the A levels represented what the military commanders felt were their minimum military requirements—given their assigned mission and enemy capabilities—the B levels were more nearly based on immediately available capabilities. In December, 1965, the Council of Ministers agreed to accept a revised set of B goals as the planning basis for the new Five Year Rolling Defense Program. By mid-1967 even these levels appeared unrealistic.

Similar to the decision-making pattern in force planning was that in nuclear affairs. The Special Committee of Defense Ministers and its Working Groups, which were formed in 1965, and the more permanent structures which superseded them in December, 1966—the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group—were all composed of national representatives, though extremely important ones. The NDAC and the NPG convened under the Chairmanship of Secretary General Brosio at the level of either Defense Ministers or Ambassadors, but the policy impact of these meetings remained unclear, in spite of the fact that discussion occurred on various subjects—for example, strategic nuclear forces, antiballistic missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, atomic demolition munitions, the role of host nations in Allied arrangements for the planning and use of nuclear weapons.

As for NATO’s military institutions, one analyst incisively observed that “the Military Committee and the Standing Group are negotiating agencies made up of instructed delegates.” The Military Committee met twice a year at the level of Chiefs of Staff; and in permanent session nations were represented by high officers with national staffs. The Standing Group, “in spite of its apparent unity is a ‘trinity,’” said French General Valluy. “Whatever their intelligence, their competence, their
personal authority, their sense of the present, their will to succeed, the delegations are unable to defend anything else, in the last resort, than the official doctrine which comes to them from Paris, Washington, or London, which, in professional jargon, one calls 'national guidance.'” 68 Neither the internationalization of the Standing Group’s planning staff, nor the subsequent replacement of the Standing Group by an international planning staff under the Military Committee changed the situation; agreement still ultimately depended on the decisions of the national delegates for whom the staffs worked.

Within the Military Committee and the Standing Group, leadership by SACEUR and the Secretary General existed but was circumscribed. Through formal plans, through more informal contacts with individual national chiefs of staff, and through international horsetrading, SACEUR exercised influence within the military institutions. Thus Vandevanter states that “a basic proposal from SACEUR, modified and approved by the Standing Group and the Military Committee, has become the most common method of formulating plans and policy for the Alliance.” 69 The Secretary General also exercised some influence through contacts with SACEUR and the Chairman of the Military Committee, especially when questions of political feasibility were involved.

The leadership’s influence, however, was sharply hedged by the requirement for unanimous decision. “The normal pattern of dispute in the upper chambers is for the majority group to accept SACEUR’s position against a small, sometimes partisan minority.” This cleavage was aggravated by the fact that “delegates know they can hardly go wrong by holding to the country positions, but they can damage their reputation by accepting a compromise solution.” 70

The difficulties involved are illustrated, perhaps in exaggerated form, by the behavior of French delegates. During the period of the Fourth Republic, French representatives were only moderately instructed. Subsequent to De Gaulle’s accession, however, the situation changed, both through increasingly de-
tailed guidance and through governmental repudiation of compromise solutions agreed to by its representatives. Thus, in November, 1963, the Military Committee had ready MC 100, to which all the representatives had agreed. At this time Admiral Max Douguet, the French representative, told the Military Committee that he had received instructions from his government to withdraw his approval. The Chairman of the Military Committee, German General Adolf Heusinger, persuaded him to fly home and to attempt to get an alteration in his directive; when this failed, the Military Committee produced MC 100/1, which aimed at a compromise with the French. Again Admiral Douguet flew home and again the French government refused to approve. When the paper was presented to the Council, the French interjected a formal veto.

Potentially, the greatest opportunity for international leadership existed in the NATO military headquarters, especially SHAPE with its central position, where military personnel from the different allied nations theoretically worked as a NATO international staff; but even here the leadership's goals were weakened by the clash of nationalities and the limited impact of technical experts.

The fault did not lie in a lack of distinction on the part of incumbent SACEUR's. All of the Supreme Commanders were eminent American military officers. On the other hand, different Supreme Commanders brought with them personal liabilities. Eisenhower, though Americans praised his "international frame of mind," appeared too old to some European officers. Some also felt that Ridgway was insufficiently "political," and he was known to have had serious differences with British Field Marshal Montgomery. Gruenther was reputed to have made friends wherever he went, but Norstad was criticized for his "cold personality." 71 Lemnitzer was a relative newcomer. With the brief exception of Ridgway, the post of SACEUR had been held for a decade by men associated from the beginning with the establishment of SHAPE and the whole military structure. Lemnitzer could duplicate neither Eisenhower's charisma nor the ties
of Gruenther and Norstad with a man who was the original SACEUR and, subsequently, President of the United States.

Perhaps more important was an undercurrent of feeling that SHAPE was essentially an American headquarters in which Europeans had little voice, and no avenue of objection except withdrawal. On the one hand, the United States' allies might be pleased by SACEUR's reported tendency "to become a kind of spokesman for dissatisfied Europeans in Washington." On the other hand, they might also be discontented with the United States' extraordinary influence in the common headquarters. Such influence sprang from a number of sources. First, it was estimated that the United States supplied 30 to 35 per cent of the personnel for the SHAPE staff, and a considerably larger proportion for SHAPE support units. Second, English was the dominant language, putting Continentals at a disadvantage. Third, American dominance was fostered when, to "get the job done," the formal international organization was bypassed and American contact points were used. Partly this resulted from the rigidity of a structure where positions were allocated on a national basis and reorganization was almost impossible. Partly it resulted from situations of stress which led to by-passing the relatively cumbersome international staffs. Fourth, separate communications channels and cryptographic systems, together with "U.S. only" documents, established an atmosphere of national separateness.

With the passage of time, such American dominance grew increasingly unpalatable to the European Allies. During earlier years the United States had provided substantial military and economic assistance, as well as high military analytic skills. Later, American assistance dwindled, and it seemed that the "bright young men" in the Pentagon, rather than the officers at SHAPE, represented the cream of American military thought.

Within SHAPE, there were indications of national instruction in the form of explicit "National Military Representatives" for each NATO nation except Iceland. The office of the NMR was generally responsible for administrative support of its own na-
tionals stationed at SHAPE and such matters as the requisition of replacement personnel, the processing of efficiency reports, disciplinary matters, and the arrangements for visits of SACEUR to its home nation or the visit of its nationals to SHAPE. The NMR served as a repository for particular classified materials which had not been released to the other Allies and also as a means of entry into national communications systems. Most significantly, the NMR represented a direct and authoritative national policy-making input into the Allied headquarters, especially for smaller nations badly represented on the SHAPE staff. For some nations, the NMR was the ranking national officer.  

Instruction even seemed to carry over to the officers serving directly on the SHAPE staff, particularly but not exclusively in the case of France. During the years of the Fourth Republic, French military officers under SACEUR consulted with national government officials, but mainly on an “information” basis. Frequently the Supreme Commander himself would request that they do so, in order that he might know the government’s position on a particular project. In later years, however, the French military were forced to comply closely with the more negative line of national policy.

Occasionally SACEUR called in outside experts in the attempt to advance his ideological goals, with variable results depending on the prestige of the expert and the scope of the goals. General Gruenther’s emphasis on air defense was undoubtedly important in the formation of a planning committee to investigate the feasibility of establishing an ‘electronics center’ in Europe to assist SHAPE. The committee was headed by Dr. Carl F. J. Overhage, Director of the Lincoln Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; “and composed of civilian scientists who, at Lincoln or elsewhere, had been closely involved in United States air defense planning.” It reported to the American Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Donald A. Quarles, on September 1, 1954, and the Overhage report was crucial in obtaining American government support
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for and ultimately the creation of, the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center.75

The results were less impressive when, in 1958, SHAPE commissioned a study by Dennis McMahon, Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Edinburgh University, on the relationship between length of service and military efficiency. As a result of field interviews of American, Belgian, Canadian, British, Dutch, French, and German forces, McMahon concluded that twelve months were necessary for adequate training of privates, and eighteen months for non-commissioned officers and detachment commanders. Additional training of up to four months was essential for full combat readiness. From these findings SACEUR argued that an eighteen-month period of national service was required for an "acceptable state of combat effectiveness," but there was no evident national response.76

COALITIONS

The barriers which were built into NATO's decision-making mechanism not only hampered attempts at strong international leadership but also reflected the fact that NATO leaders depended for support on a coalition whose membership was limited and held serious reservations about the implications of the military force program. The bulk of the Alliance's tangible military strength was supplied by a few governments. The United States and Germany furnished over half of the forces for the vital central front; the United States and Britain provided the entire nuclear capability assigned to NATO. Through time, supporting governments became increasingly uneasy about the economic burdens of maintaining their forces and unwilling to expand existing levels. While they might agree to various additional forms of nuclear co-operation, they were no more eager than before to relinquish ultimate control of their nuclear weapons. Finally, domestic support of international leadership was uncertain and contradictory. SACEUR might occasionally use generals
and admirals against recalcitrant civilian administrations or civilians against parochial military establishments, but such backing tended to be neither strong nor positive enough for leadership reliance.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, the leadership was able to rely on this coalition to weather immediate crisis. In the wake of the 1966 French withdrawals, the other fourteen members banded together, with key roles played by the Secretary General and by the United States, Britain, and Germany. Following the French government's notes in March, 1966, there was established a caucus of the Fourteen to discuss all aspects of the problem—including the implications for American nuclear warheads committed to French troops under SACEUR, the status of French troops in Germany, air defense, and communications. On March 18 the Fourteen issued a common declaration reaffirming their continued support for the Alliance's military structures and tasks:

The North Atlantic Treaty and the organization established under it are both alike essential to the security of our countries. The Atlantic Alliance has ensured its efficacy as an instrument of defense and deterrence by the maintenance in peacetime of an integrated and interdependent military organization, in which, as in no previous alliance in history, the efforts and resources of each are combined for the common security of all. We are convinced that this organization is essential and will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute.⁷⁸

The French withdrawal from the Defense Planning Committee provided the opportunity to transfer the activities of the caucus into a more formal setting. Beginning in the latter part of 1966, the reduced DPC assumed responsibility for broad oversight of NATO's military affairs, supplanting the caucus of the Fourteen, and to some extent the Council itself, as the Alliance's focal decision-making body. Symbolic of the DPC's new importance was its first meeting in December, 1966, at the level of Foreign, Defense, and Finance Ministers, prior to the traditional Ministerial Council. The Council itself continued to be con-
cerned with matters of relatively pure political consultation, those military areas in which France continued to participate, the administrative oversight of non-military programs, and negotiations between France and the Fourteen.\(^79\)

International leadership was important in the formation of the original caucus. Secretary General Brosio decided not to assume the Chairmanship of the Fourteen in order that he might be able to maintain his role as the impartial Chairman of the whole Council; nevertheless, he attended its meetings, almost in the capacity of a fifteenth member. In response to an early request from the Fourteen, who had originally met in the confined quarters of Belgian Ambassador de Staercke's office, Brosio provided them with meeting rooms, microphones, simultaneous translation, and other secretarial services. There were no French members of Brosio's office whom it might have been embarrassing to exclude, and Brosio supplied a few of his people to provide Secretariat co-ordination. Brosio was also instrumental in upgrading the DPC, arguing that—in order to avoid an impending constitutional crisis over continued French participation in the Council—the DPC should act as the Council in military matters.

The core of the Fourteen comprised the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.\(^80\) Consultations took place in Bonn, centering around the continued stationing of French troops in Germany—including for the United States, Ambassador George McGhee and John J. McCloy; for Britain, Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts; and for Germany, Ministers Schroeder and von Hassel. The German reply to France on May 3 stated that the retreat of French forces stationed in the Federal Republic from SACEUR affected their rights to be stationed in Germany, and that they no longer had such rights under the agreement of October 23, 1954. The Federal Republic wished to conclude with France new agreements permitting the maintenance of French forces on German territory if satisfactory arrangements could be found concerning military tasks and functions in the common defense.\(^81\)

The United States played a crucial role. American Ambassa-
dor Cleveland had originally suggested the meetings of the Fourteen, although he emphasized the importance of leaving a "door open for France." President Johnson gave top-level American backing to the Fourteen and the maintenance of an empty seat. In his reply of March 23 to General de Gaulle, Johnson stated that the United States was determined to join with "the other 14 member nations of NATO in preserving the deterrent system of NATO—indeed in strengthening it in support of the vital common purposes of the West." At the same time Johnson found it "difficult to believe that France, which has made a unique contribution to Western security and development, will long remain withdrawn from the common affairs and responsibilities of the Atlantic. As our old friend and ally," Johnson said, "her place will await France whenever she decides to resume her leading role."

The American government subsequently applied limited sanctions. In its reply of April 12 to the second French aide-mémoire, the United States informed the French that upon their withdrawal from the jurisdiction of SACEUR, they would cease to have access to American stockpiles of atomic weapons in Germany. This was expected to affect the nuclear capabilities of the F 100 aircraft and Nike and Honest John missiles under the two-key system.

In spite of such initial cohesion, the coalitional core seemed to have limited vigor over the long run. On December 21, 1966, French and German Foreign Ministers Couve de Murville and Brandt exchanged letters which confirmed the Franco-German agreement on the stationing of French military forces in Germany, but there was no explicit mention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Moreover, notwithstanding resistance from SACEUR, by mid-1967 two of the core members had decided to reduce their Europe-based troop commitments to NATO. Beginning in October, 1966, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany had been engaged in discussions centering around the implications of the forces stationed in Germany for
national balances of payments. In May, 1967, the results of the discussions were announced. The United States proposed to "redeploy" to the United States "up to 35,000 military personnel." Under a complicated scheme, two brigades of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division and an appropriate share of support units, "totalling approximately two-thirds of a United States division force" would be repatriated, while at least one brigade of the division would remain in Germany at all times. The three brigades were to succeed each other in rotation for temporary duty in Germany and would be united there once a year for exercises. A similar plan provided for the rotational redeployment and annual exercise of four out of nine squadrons of the three tactical fighter wings based in Germany. The British government intended to withdraw a brigade group of 5,000 men from the BAOR and one air squadron. Subsequently it was reported that the Belgian and Canadian governments intended to follow the Anglo-British example by reducing their own German-based contingents.86

Continuing balance of payments deficits were to be partially offset by a complex series of arrangements. The German government intended "to continue procurement of military goods and services in the United States on a scale significant in relation to the German defense effort," but did not intend to "match the United States foreign exchange expenditures in Germany for military purposes." The Bundesbank undertook to invest $500 million in special medium term United States Government securities during the period from July, 1967, to June, 1968, and declared its intention "to continue its practice of not converting dollars into gold." In addition the Federal Republic agreed to make "offsetting purchases in the defense and civil sectors which are expected to amount in all to nearly $150 million." The United States Government proposed to make "an additional $19.6 million of military purchases in Britain between April 1, 1967, and March 31, 1968," in order to help the British meet their foreign exchange costs in Germany.87

In the following months, there were signs that even these
arrangements might not hold, Germany seemed to be preparing substantially to reduce its standing forces; and the New York Times issued a report, which the Department of Defense subsequently denied, that the United States was deploying to Vietnam one American-based division, previously "earmarked" for NATO in case of emergency.\textsuperscript{88}

Not even the personnel complement at SHAPE was secure. Consolidations undertaken in 1963 and 1964 had attempted to trim the headquarters into firm military condition. The relocation of 1967 and French withdrawal from the command involved further, undesired, losses. As for the major subordinate commands, General Lemnitzer announced in November, 1967 that "organizational changes at the headquarters of Allied Forces Central Europe have been completed with a realization of over 1,000 personnel economies, while at the same time increasing the efficiency of the structure."\textsuperscript{89}

\textbf{FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER}

In the area of military forces, interests seemed to converge under the conditions of the perceived Soviet threat of the late 1940's and early 1950's: Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Communist pressures on Greece and Turkey, the Soviet Union's refusal to participate in the European recovery program, the formation of the Cominform, the French and Italian strikes, the Czechoslovakian coup, the Berlin blockade, the Soviet explosion of an atomic device, and the North Korean attack on South Korea. Subsequent crises assisted in the maintenance and expansion of NATO's military structures and tasks.\textsuperscript{90}

Some apparent crisis gains, however, were wiped out during more routine periods when interests increasingly conflicted. Thus tension over access to Berlin seemed to have mainly transitory effects. In 1962 British Prime Minister Wilson pointed out that, "when we had the (Berlin) crisis last year, there was an intense diplomatic activity. But once the deadline was removed, Western statesmen seemed to heave a sigh of relief and lose any sense of urgency."\textsuperscript{91}
General Norstad reported that, since the start of the Berlin crisis, the Alliance's conventional forces had grown by approximately 25 per cent. A large part of this gain came from the United States, which increased its troops in Europe from 226,000 in 1959 to approximately 270,000 at the height of the Berlin build-up; but by summer 1966, the number had dropped to 211,000. Another part of the total Allied expansion resulted from German progress in filling the quota to which it had agreed upon entering NATO. The German government, however, did not feel that the Berlin situation required it to expand that obligation. As for the French, De Gaulle remained intransigent. Norstad stated that during 1959 and 1960, "only nine squadrons of the American Air Force were trained and equipped to deliver atomic weapons to their targets. They represented NATO's actual nuclear power at that time. They were located at six air fields in eastern France," Norstad continued. "We asked the French for permission to supply those bases with atom bombs. The answer was no."

Integration of military forces was ultimately blocked by the highly political nature of the issues involved. National military establishments had important implications for international prestige and were the ultimate means for the defense of national territory and regimes. Other centrifugal tendencies that increasingly effected the military force program were (1) the varying diplomatic commitments of the United States in Asia and Latin America, of the British east of Suez, and of the French in North Africa, (2) the differential vulnerability of various nations to specific forms of military attack according to their proximity to the Soviet Union, and (3) different stages of nuclear development, in which nuclear "haves" were differentiated from nuclear "have-nots."

Even at the economic level, which might have provided a technical impetus for spill-over into the diplomatic-military arena, the issues remained highly political. As Table 4 indicates, national defense expenditures represented significant shares of Gross National Product, ranging from 14.7 to 3.2 per cent in 1953 and from 9.8 to 1.2 per cent in 1967. Interests diverged
both in terms of the expenses of providing military forces and in terms of foreign exchange gains and losses implied in the stationing of troops on foreign soil.

**TABLE 4**

**Comparison of Defense Expenditures in NATO Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>DEFENSE EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is based on a standard definition of defense expenditure that does not necessarily cover the same items as national defense budgets. For example, such items as military pensions, military research and development, and costs of establishing strategic stockpiles are included in the above figures.


Any attempt to arrive at a "technical" formula for equitable contribution by strictly economic standards was misdirected. Even in the area of national capability there existed problems in definition and measurement involving such issues as convertibility, foreign exchange rates, internal distribution of income, exemptions and allowances. Ultimately the only sanctions in such procedures as the Annual Review and the Force Planning Exercise were normative—moral pressure and mutual criticism, and these failed to exercise significant influence on national policies.
Armaments collaboration was vaguely implied by Articles 2 and 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 2 stated that the Parties "will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them;" Article 3 declared that the parties "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

**INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY**

In November, 1949, the first NATO institution was established in the field of defense production, the Military Production and Supply Board, consisting of national delegates meeting in committee at frequent intervals. In December, 1950, the MPSB was replaced by a Defense Production Board, which strengthened the earlier committee system in two ways. First, the heads of national delegations were to be continuously present in London. Second, Mr. W. R. Herod, of the United States, was appointed Co-ordinator of Defense Production and placed at the head of an international staff.¹

Under the successive auspices of the MPSB and the DPB, a
series of “Task Force” studies were undertaken. Nine teams of senior production specialists visited NATO arms-producing countries in late 1950, conferred with national government officials, examined national facilities, and drew up reports recommending means of increasing production. The DPB recommendations which emerged from these studies covered “artillery and infantry support weapons, tanks, transport vehicles, engineering equipment, escort vessels and minesweepers, and advocated production additional to that already planned by the countries themselves.” In early 1951 a Military Agency for Standardization was established in London, under the Standing Group, to promote the standardization of operational and administrative practices and war material.

With the creation of the NATO International Staff/Secretariat in 1952, the activities of the DPB were assumed by a Production Division, headed by an Assistant Secretary General. The aim was “to use available resources to the best possible advantage by correlating the production programs of the member countries multilaterally at the planning stage.” Production activities fell into three main categories:

1. long-term production planning;
2. acting as expert broker for the exchange of information, and guiding technical studies;
3. participating in the Annual Review, which involved analysis of equipment requirements and resources for current and future years.

During the spring of 1954, the Council established a Defense Production Committee, which “was composed of production counsellors from each national Delegation and was attended by a representative of the NATO military authorities.” Its task was to supervise NATO production activities and the work of the International Staff in this area.

Following the Suez and Sputnik crises, the Council, meeting at the level of the Heads of Government in December, 1957, decided to undertake new and intensified efforts in the field of
production and logistics. The final communiqué emphasized the importance of "standardization and integration" of logistic support and defense equipment. It noted the scheduling of a ministerial armaments conference in 1958; called for increasing coordination of Allied 'research, development, and manufacture of modern weapons; including intermediate range ballistic missiles;' and recorded the offer of the United States to undertake significant sharing.*

At the Defense Ministers' meeting the following spring, "European member countries" submitted proposals for concrete cooperative action, which were sent to the Defense Production Committee for consideration. The Council then extended the Defense Production Committee's terms of reference to include problems of research and development; and the DPC's name was changed to the Armaments Committee. The Council also created a group of civilian and military representatives "from both national and international sources" to recommend a future course of action. The report of this Group resulted in the adoption by the Council, in November, 1959, of a standing set of procedures for "the implementation of future projects for research, development, and production of modern weapons and equipment." 5

In 1960 the name of the relevant branch of the International Staff/Secretariat was changed to the Production, Logistics, and Infrastructure Division. Within this Division, the Armaments Directorate came to include a Co-ordinator for Production and Logistics, and sections for General Studies and Co-ordination, Aircraft, Equipment and Ammunition, Electronics, Missiles, and Naval Affairs.

In May the Twenty Projects Exercise began. The NATO Defense Ministers, at their spring meeting, directed the Armaments Committee to draw up a select list of projects which would be suitable for closer co-operation in research, development, and production. Subsequently, "the Committee reviewed a number of ideas submitted by countries and by the International Staff, and drew up a list of projects which showed some signs of being
suitable for cooperative effort. For those enterprises which commanded sufficient support for immediate action to be taken, bodies known as Ad Hoc Mixed Working Groups were set up. More than twenty of these groups focused on a "variety of arms and equipment, ranging from advanced types of aircraft, missiles and armored fighting vehicles, data handling, night vision, and combat intelligence equipment."

In those areas where some depth of agreement was possible, NATO agencies were created. In December, 1957, the Council had established a Panel on the Codification of Equipment; in April, 1958, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO) for the provision of spare parts; and in 1959 the NATO Hawk Production Organization and the NATO Sidewinder Program Office. In 1960 the NATO Supply Center (NSC) was set up; in 1961 the NATO Starfighter Production Organization and a NATO Group of Experts on the Production of the Mark 44 Torpedo; in 1962 the NATO Bullpup Production Organization and a NATO Steering Committee for the Production of the AS 30 missile.

In October, 1965, a high level committee, designated AC 253, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary General, James Roberts, was established for the purpose of reviewing NATO activities in arms research, development, and production as well as defense science. In June, 1966, the Council of Ministers approved the Committee's report, which called for the abolition of the Armaments Committee and the establishment of a new institutional framework. At the top of the new organizational pyramid was a Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) which was expected to meet about twice a year to formulate high-level policy. Between meetings the National Armaments Directors Representatives (NADREPS) would maintain continuity. Below the CNAD were three military service Armaments Groups—one each for the Army, Navy, and Air Force—to consider military criteria, and a Defense Research Group focusing on co-operative research. Working groups were to be established in those areas where significant collaboration was
expected; by mid-1967 two such bodies had been formed to work on ground terminals for tactical satellite communications and on army battlefield radar.¹

Toward the end of 1967, as part of a general reorganization of the International Staff/Secretariat, the Production, Logistics, and Infrastructure Division was renamed the Defense Support Division. Finally, in October, 1968, it was announced that a NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) would be created to provide advice to CNAD and to represent a forum for the exchange of ideas and information between NATO officials and Allied industrialists.¹° This group held its first meeting in Brussels in January, 1969.

In spite of institutional change, there was no evidence of substantial growth in binding procedures by the summer of 1967. The strictures of unanimity were to some extent bypassed by the possibility of likeminded nations joining together in non-comprehensive Working Groups or NATO Production and Logistics Organizations (NPLO’s); but unanimity was re-enforced by procedures which existed both outside and within such bodies. At higher levels were the former Armaments Committee and the new Conference of National Armaments Directors, where all participants had to agree in order to arrive at a decision. Within the NPLO’s, the Regulations for NATO Production and Logistics Organizations provided that “the principle of unanimity shall apply to all decisions having financial implications, regarding questions of general policy or concerning the approval of staff selections at the A.5 level and above.”¹¹

Moreover, NATO tasks showed little evidence of substantial and sustained expansion. Most NATO production programs—the Fiat G 91, Bréguet Atlantique, and the F 104G aircraft; the Hawk, Sidewinder, Bullpup, and AS 30 missiles; and the Mark 44 Torpedo—had been approved in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. In the mid-1960’s these projects were approaching completion without agreement having been reached on Allied co-operation for succeeding generations. While such activities represented substantial budgetary outlays, the London Times
estimated that they were still less than 5 per cent of national arms budgets. Compared with the handful of weapons which had come under the NATO star, there remained huge and diverse armories which were either nationally produced for national procurement, or which were sold abroad under various licensing arrangements without formal connection with NATO. These ranged all the way from intercontinental ballistic missile systems to the smallest types of ammunition.

**AUTHORITY**

Deficiencies in institutional autonomy were complemented by barriers to NATO authority. Although a complicated set of NATO procedures grew up around the armaments program, authority remained largely indirect, concentrated in the hands of national governments and their representatives. When NATO decisions were reached, nations were not enthusiastic about their implementation.

The limitations in direct authority were illustrated by the provisions for joint arms production. The heart of the NATO procedure had been laid down in a series of documents, the most important of which was a paper approved by the Council on November 4, 1959, entitled "NATO Co-operation in Research, Development and Production of Military Equipment." According to this procedure, there were nine theoretical stages through which a NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) should pass. In all of these stages, prominent roles were played by national governments or their representatives.

Stage one involved research prior to the establishment of a requirement. Here a nation or agency of NATO was to make a proposal, which would be studied by other nations and the appropriate NATO commands and agencies to decide whether or not it should be accepted as an NBMR.

In Stage two, an NBMR would be issued. The Standing Group, composed of national representatives, would co-ordinate the activities of national governments and the main NATO com-
manders; study draft plans and decide either to reject the proposal or publish it as an NBMR.

Stages three, four, and five included studies of operational characteristics, studies of technical specifications, and the selection by multi-national agreement of the best solution. Ad Hoc Mixed Working Groups of national delegates would make decisions here. The Staff/Secretariat would provide the Chairman and Secretarial services, and a major NATO Military Commander would be designated as the Project Military Advisor (PMA); but neither the NATO civilian or military bureaucracies would exercise formal authority.

In Stages six through nine a prototype would be manufactured, there would be military testing and evaluation, production would take place, and the weapon would undergo operational trials. These would be national activities, although they might be carried out under NATO administrative supervision. Here again the Standing Group would have special responsibilities.

The dominance of nations and the lack of direct administration inherent in this procedure was pointed out by one associated observer. Once NATO had approved a proposal as an NBMR, he said, then the control or authority of NATO as such was limited to the administrator and observer functions of the International Staff and the advisory role of the major NATO commander concerned (the Project Military Advisor).12

The reforms of AC 253 did little to downgrade the role of national governments. Neither SHAPE nor the International Staff/Secretariat received increased responsibilities. While the Military Committee was reduced to an advisory role, and the Standing Group was abolished following the French military withdrawal, the new armaments structures were composed mainly of national representatives. Moreover, nations, not NATO, remained the ultimate buyers of armaments. International funding existed for the salaries and wages of the civilian international staff and for infrastructure; in armaments there was neither a NATO budget nor a central NATO procurement agency.

The NBMR procedure, drawn up in such complexity, was
never completely utilized. The Bréguet Atlantique was the only project developed from its earliest stages within NATO. However, the Atlantique predated the NBMR procedure and was less the result of than the inspiration for its adoption. Between 1959 and 1966, 49 projects advanced through the early stages and were promulgated as NBMR’s: yet none passed beyond stage five. No NBMR resulted in joint production under the NATO flag. Rather, the major function of the procedure seemed to be as a catalyst for further work outside of NATO, where seven NBMR’s were met or partially met by equipment built by one or more NATO members. Of the remaining 42 NBMR’s, 23 remained under study, while 19 achieved no result or were allowed to lapse.

The very limited effectiveness of NATO authority in the area of armaments—both outside and within the scope of the NBMR procedure—can be further illustrated by considering in detail specific cases of arms co-operation associated with NATO.

**Fiat G 91**

In 1954 a board of officers assigned to SHAPE and AFCENT headquarters initiated studies on an aircraft which would be "simple, inexpensive, but robust capable of operating in ground support and reconnaissance roles and also of undertaking certain types of interdiction and counter-air missions." Allied aircraft industries were invited to submit aircraft design proposals. Following more detailed development of the military requirements for the weapons system, ten designs were received from firms in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

In 1957 five prototypes were ready for evaluation; the Chairman of the NATO Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD) appointed a committee of test pilots from France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States to conduct flight tests and to evaluate the planes. AGARD specified three of these—one French and two Italian—as "most nearly fulfilling SHAPE’s operational requirements." AGARD’s Chairman, Dr. Theodore Von Karman, in a private opinion,
recommended the Italian entry, the Fiat G 91; and SACEUR, in November, announced that the G 91, powered by a Bristol Orpheus turbojet engine, “had been adopted as the standard lightweight tactical strike reconnaissance aircraft for employment in the European theater of NATO.”

In the summer of 1958 an experimental international squadron equipped with the G 91 carried out tactical tests in Italy; and it was planned that the trials would be moved to NATO’s Central European area where the experimental squadron would train with AFCENT forces, and would consist of pilots and ground crews from France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Turkey.

Subsequently forty G 91 aircraft were bought by the governments of Germany and Italy.

United States Assistant Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles publicly offered aid for European research and production leading to European aircraft construction; and the United States helped to finance the construction of various prototypes, contributing $4 million for the development of the Bristol Orpheus engine and $5 million for the development and construction of the entries of the French firms of Bréguet and Dassault. In December, 1958, NATO announced that “in consideration of the orders placed by other countries, the United States will procure fifty G 91 Lightweight Strike fighter aircraft for deployment with the forces of its Allies,” but there was no public evidence that the United States had ever purchased any of the aircraft for its own use.

In spite of the fact that British firms had submitted designs and that the British Orpheus Turbojet engine was included in the design of all aircraft proposed for the strike fighter program, the United Kingdom ordered no aircraft.

Two French aircraft—the Bréguet 1001 Taon and the Dassault Etendard VI—had been among the final three contenders, and French partisans were bitter over the ultimate selection of the Fiat. They claimed that the Bréguet Taon had been a better aircraft; that there had been last-minute changes in competition requirements; that, since nobody had met in full the NATO
requirements, all three finalists should get the NATO label; and that the American government had provided strong pressure for the selection of the G 91 for reasons which had less to do with the military merit of the aircraft than with the political, economic, and social situation in Italy. The French representative on the evaluation committee disagreed with the committee’s report and choice; and the French government procured no G 91’s. 

Bréguet 1150 Atlantique

Since its entry into service with the United States Navy in 1944, the American P2V Neptune aircraft had been supplied to many European countries for maritime reconnaissance missions and anti-submarine warfare. With the postwar obsolescence of the P2V, the American, British, and French governments began studies looking toward a replacement.

Beginning in 1956, NATO became involved in the search, and early in 1957 the Defense Production Committee set up a Group of Experts. Working with the NATO military organization, this Group developed technical specifications for a new aircraft. Aircraft firms in Allied countries were requested to submit designs. Fifteen projects were entered in the competition, and on January 30, 1959, the Armaments Committee declared the French Bréguet 1150 Atlantique the winner. Five nations—Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States—assumed responsibility for the financing and supervision of the program. Firms from these nations and the United Kingdom participated in the production of various parts of the aircraft.

At the time the project was approved by the Armaments Committee, the Allies had made provisional procurement estimates of between 126 and 144 aircraft—France 70, Netherlands 20, Germany 18, Portugal 12 to 24, Norway 6, Belgium up to 6. Ultimately, however, a total of only sixty aircraft were produced for France and Germany.
NBMR's 3 and 4

In 1958 began the drafting of the military requirements for NATO V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing) strike reconnaissance and tactical transport aircraft which were to become NBMR's 3 and 4.

By June, 1961, NBMR 3 was promulgated with the estimate that approximately 1000 V/STOL strike reconnaissance aircraft would be required. On January 10, 1962, the competition was closed with about a dozen projects submitted by firms in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. At this point the NBMR procedure reached a standstill. "The NATO Committee found its task of adjudication virtually impossible because of the disputes between the various national delegations. The French Government, in fact, let it be known that whoever won the competition, it intended to equip the Armée de l'Air with the Mirage III-v. According to NATO sources, the British Government revealed similar intentions concerning the Hawker P-1127." Not only were the French and British reluctant to honor the results of the competition, but the Germans hinted that they planned independent development of the VJ-101 D, tests for which began during the same year.

In the case of NBMR 4 there was a similar weeding out, ending with a short list of two or three candidates, at which point the major participants declared their disinterest.

Other Aircraft and Missile Programs

In other programs, the NATO decision-making system was largely bypassed. National and sub-national actors created co-operative projects outside NATO's institutional framework which were later placed under the NATO flag.

In the cases of the Hawk surface-to-air missile, the Sidewinder
air-to-air missile, the Mark 44 torpedo, the F 104 G Starfighter fighter-bomber, the Bullpup air-to-surface missile, and the M 72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon, several Allies initially agreed to buy an already existing American product. The AS 30 air-to-surface missile endorsed by NATO was originally French.

NATO agencies were created to supervise a variety of joint production and licensing arrangements; but these agencies represented little more than devices of international trade. All nations participating in the joint arrangements purchased the items involved—a significant difference from other NATO programs. Nevertheless, this accomplishment was less indicative of the authority of NATO institutions over the different actors than of the fact that the desire to purchase had been the basis for the original agreements.

Small Arms

In 1945 the four major operational rifle calibers were the French 7.5 mm., the American 7.62 mm., the British .303 cal., and the German 7.92 mm. By September, 1951, following independent national studies, the United States, Britain, France, Canada, and Belgium had agreed on the main military characteristics for interchangeable ammunition for a standard infantry weapon. In December, 1953, the Council endorsed the choice of the five nations, the 7.62 mm. cartridge, as the NATO Common Round. At the end of 1954 the five signed an agreement in Ottawa standardizing the 7.62 mm. size for machine guns and rifles. Subsequently, the Belgian Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre designed a piece to fire 7.62 mm. ammunition, which was subsequently designated the standard NATO rifle.

The cartridge agreement was not even honored by the initial signatories. In June, 1964, the French decided to equip their army with an automatic rifle using 7.5 mm. ammunition. The new Belgian rifle was purchased by only four Allied governments, including Belgium, Britain, and Canada. Moreover different non-standardized versions of the 7.62 mm. rifle existed.
One analyst reported: “none of the standard fastenings or threaded parts on the inch version of the 7.62 rifle are interchangeable with the meter version. Nor, in fact, are the magazines interchangeable.”

Codification

The NATO Codification System was “a classification and identification process (including a standard set of names and a series of thirteen digit numbers) that all signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty agreed to use in identifying their military equipment, particularly that equipment used by two or more countries or purchased by one or more countries from one another.”

Between 1952 and 1956, working groups of the Military Agency for Standardization drafted two agreements (STANAG 3150 and STANAG 3151), which established a uniform system of supply classification and item identification for Allied material. In addition, they recommended the creation of a NATO Panel on the Codification of Equipment for co-ordination and the establishment of rules for the application of the system. In January, 1957, the two STANAG’s were promulgated; and in December the Council approved the establishment of the Panel, which was to be composed of the heads of national codification agencies or their representatives. A small secretariat was created in the Production and Logistics Division of the Staff/Secretariat to service the Panel. In 1960 the first European Symposium on NATO Codification was held in The Hague.

Under the terms of the STANAG’s, the United States Federal Systems of Supply Classification and Item Identification were adopted as the bases for the NATO systems. All signatories agreed to use the two systems, although the method and rate of application were to remain matters for national discretion.

The agreements were ratified by Germany on June 26, 1957; by France on November 19, 1959; by the United States on March 18, 1960; and by the United Kingdom on January 9,
Nevertheless, by the end of 1961, national implementation remained highly uneven. Table 5 shows that full implementation occurred only in the United States, the country whose national system was the basis for the NATO arrangement.

**LEGITIMACY**

Such weakness in NATO authority went together with a pattern of legitimacy in which actors increasingly supported NATO programs only as they promised expediential benefits.

**United States**

During the early years of NATO, the United States supplied its Allies with grant aid in military equipment under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Acts of the early 1950's. By 1958, according to one estimate, over half the heavy equipment in use by the Europeans had come from the United States or Canada; and one phase of American aid, Off-Shore Procurement, had been used to finance the building,
in European facilities, of equipment to be distributed to the Allies.\textsuperscript{32}

To co-ordinate this effort, the United States government initially favored strengthening NATO's position in the field of armaments. In December, 1950, the London \textit{Financial Times} reported that "Mr. Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of State, envisages the appointment as Chairman of the (Defense Production) Board, of a production specialist with powers in the economic field parallel to the military powers of General Eisenhower." \textsuperscript{33}

Table 6 shows, however, that American assistance to the Allies declined with the passage of time. Faced with balance of payments problems, policy-makers in the Departments of the Treasury, Defense, and State came to favor increasing European defense contributions. Representatives of the American aircraft industry supported the trend by arguing that financial aid should be reserved for those nations which bought or produced American aircraft.\textsuperscript{34}

The Atlantic arms market offered an attractive opportunity for American contracts. The military equipment which the United States had provided under the original aid program was used and approaching obsolescence; German rearmament was in full swing.

Thus the United States switched its position from the 'patron saint of the mid-1950's to most-active competitor of the early 1960's.' One of the earliest indications of the American shift was a sudden reversal of American policy in July, 1958, which allowed American firms to enter bids in the terminal stages of the design competition for a NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft.\textsuperscript{35}

Although it was initiated under the Eisenhower administration, the American military sales program took on a special intensity with the advent of President Kennedy, the main impetus coming from the Department of Defense. In 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara publicly announced the establishment of a formal program to increase military exports, and foresaw that approximately three-fourths of the sales market might be found
### TABLE 6

**U.S. Military and Economic Assistance to NATO Allies, 1946–1966** *(In Millions of Dollars)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>$1,909.1</td>
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<td>...</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>$15,183.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>$12,294.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,250.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,217.1</strong></td>
</tr>
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in Europe.\textsuperscript{36} The foreign sales results, which represented a "600 per cent increase in annual military sales over the levels of the 1950's,"\textsuperscript{37} are presented in Table 7.

The Defense Department program sought to mix military sales with the Alliance in a combination which left some doubt as to which was more important. At a meeting of the Committee on Military Exports of the Defense Industry Advisory Committee (a liaison group with private industry sponsored by the DOD), the program's director, Henry Kuss, defined the American objective: "Win the Game in Europe by Managing Problems, Organizing Sales Effort." He called for a collective effort to maximize American sales to $60 billion in the next ten years.\textsuperscript{38}

On May 30, 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara hinted at a less aggressive posture by proposing the creation of a "NATO-wide common market in defense products at competitive prices." This proposal implied that the United States might be willing to waive the 50 per cent price differential imposed on off-shore procurements for American use.\textsuperscript{39}

Any European hopes for substantial change, however, were probably dampened by a news conference in September. Here Secretary McNamara justified the sales program and implied its continuance by stating that it "provides the United States with the opportunity to influence the size and composition of our Allies' military forces and the proportionate distribution of their manpower and economic resources between defense efforts and other high priority programs of social and economic progress."\textsuperscript{40}

The continued sales emphasis of the new common market perspective was made more explicit in the edition of Military Export Guide dated October 30, 1965, which quoted Henry Kuss. Looking ahead in the period 1965–75, Kuss predicted that American allies would purchase a minimum of $10–15 billion in military requirements from the United States, that over $5 billion in combined American and allied requirements would be handled through international production and development programs, and that all this was to be the result of the "common market approach."\textsuperscript{41}
<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commitments</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Europe and Canada</td>
<td>1,323.1</td>
<td>1,222.1</td>
<td>1,064.6</td>
<td>1,304.7</td>
<td>1,365.6</td>
<td>2,452.6</td>
<td>8,732.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Far East</td>
<td>165.3</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>139.8</td>
<td>360.0</td>
<td>139.9</td>
<td>272.7</td>
<td>1,152.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NESA</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>230.4</td>
<td>348.0</td>
<td>314.0</td>
<td>972.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>162.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>45.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>...</td>
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<td>.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>...</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,518.3</td>
<td>1,376.7</td>
<td>1,262.0</td>
<td>1,969.7</td>
<td>1,936.9</td>
<td>3,039.3</td>
<td>11,102.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In connection with the American shift from an aid to a sales policy, the United States government supported specific NATO projects involving joint Allied production of American weapons systems: the F 104 G aircraft; the Hawk, Sidewinder, and Bullpup missiles; the Mark 44 Torpedo, and the M 72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon.

On the one hand, Table 8 indicates that the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Value of Program (In Millions of Dollars)</th>
<th>U.S. Government Contribution (In Millions of Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F 104 G</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidewinder</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullpup</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark 44</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


acted in accordance with its earlier policy by providing financial assistance for these American projects which came under the NATO flag. It also offered other types of benefits, as in the case of the Hawk consortium where "Americans supplied technical assistance, testing equipment, and valuable engineering drawings. The United States provided funds for equipment, waived reimbursement for R & D expenditures, and agreed to pay license fees and royalties. The United States also pledged itself to purchase some of the product for distribution as military assistance to other European countries." 42

Nevertheless, the United States government used such benefits as devices to attract buyers from rival products. Although exact figures are not available for all projects, it is likely that United States industry recouped the original contribution
through provision of related goods and services to those Allies who purchased particular NATO weapons systems. In the case of the F 104 G, one estimate placed total American revenue from license fees and sale of parts at approximately $1.15 billion.\textsuperscript{43} Even this figure may have been too low, since it possibly excluded West German payments to the United States for the training of F 104 G pilots at Air Force bases in Arizona and Texas, at an estimated cost of $46 million for fiscal year 1964/1965 and $16 million for each subsequent year.\textsuperscript{44} American support for the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization and the NATO Supply Center can be viewed in the same expeditious light. In 1959 Brigadier General Charles A. Helm, General Manager of NAMSO, announced the signing of a $25 million loan "in the form of a sales agreement between the United States and the Agency." Following the formal agreement establishing the NSC, the United States and German governments offered to provide "a spare parts inventory package of an approximate value of $40 million." In both cases, the United States could reasonably hope for the return of its investment through Allied purchases of spare parts for American equipment.\textsuperscript{45}

On occasion the United States purchased end products of pooled production for distribution to its Allies under the Military Assistance Program. Nevertheless, the American government never bought a product of NATO pooled production for the use of its own forces,\textsuperscript{46} preferring purely American equipment.

At the domestic level, the two major American groups which took an interest in NATO armaments and logistics were industrialists and legislators. In neither case were there apparent gains in legitimacy for NATO.

As part of the new sales drive, the American government attempted to strengthen the ties between American industrial representatives in Europe and the United States delegation to NATO. In August, 1963, a Defense Industry Export Advisory Group in Europe (DIEAGE) came into being, including approximately equal numbers of industrial and government members.
Its charter was provided by a directive from the Department of Defense and gave priority to export selling. It stated:

The Mission of the U.S. Defense/Industry Export Advisory Group in Europe is to provide:

A. U.S. Defense representatives in Europe a forum for consulting with representatives of American industry in Europe for the purpose of promoting 1) military export sales of U.S. produced material, and 2) cooperative logistics in Europe (including defense research, development, and production).

B. U.S. defense industry representatives in Europe with a forum for discussing directly with U.S. Defense representatives their problems, suggestions for mutual improvement of objectives, and any criticism attendant to prescribed logistics management policies and practices as they affect U.S. defense industry.

C. The Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants with a medium for assessing 1) mutual progress in the development of military export sales in Europe, and 2) recommendations for expanding and improving this effort.47

A directive from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated April 9, 1966, removed the word “Export” from the group’s title, and deleted references to sales from its charter. Nevertheless, participants believed that the fundamental character of the new DIAGE would remain the same. With the basic interest of industrial representatives in sales, no group which sought to provide liaison between them and the Department of Defense could avoid focusing on exports.

In any case, American manufacturers were not enchanted with NATO’s approach to business. The Military Export Guide for 1965 stated that “most United States contractors do not hold ‘NATO business’ in high esteem. The red tape, cumbersome budget processes, security problems, and resulting low profit yields are multiplied several times over those of doing business with the United States Government. In addition, jockeying by NATO governments to favor their country industries have ‘soured’
some contractors and made them reluctant to make large expenditures in money and effort processing 'NATO contracts.' 48

Interest by legislators was shown through occasional reports by Congressional committees dealing with NATO armaments and logistics. In May, 1963, the House Foreign Affairs Committee released a report on the activities of NAMSO criticizing the fact that SHAPE lacked the authority to see that its recommendations were carried out. In June, 1965, a Republican Congressional Fact Finding Commission recommended that there be closer co-ordination of effort in establishing common criteria of military procurement, in cost sharing, and in joint utilization of scientific and technological resources. In January, 1967, a staff study of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated that, "in Europe, American arms salesmanship has often been zealous to the point of irritation." 49

Nevertheless, such interest did not lead to effective support for concrete innovations in NATO armaments and logistics.

United Kingdom

British collaboration in NATO armaments programs was extremely limited. The United Kingdom was a full member only in the Bullpup and AS 30 programs. In the case of the Bréguet Atlantique, the British participated in the group which formulated the military requirement; Rolls Royce supplied the engine and De Havilland the propellers. Nevertheless, the British government did not purchase any of the aircraft. The Mark 44 torpedo was produced in and purchased by the United Kingdom, but under separate arrangements with the United States. In other cases such as the Lightweight Tactical Reconnaissance aircraft and NBMR's 3 and 4, Britain refused to purchase other nations' designs following the failure of British firms to win NATO competitions. 50

Britain's inability to use NATO armaments, as the U.S. had done, to combat balance of payments problems, led to a decline in support for the program as a whole. British leaders in the late
1950's had been relatively enthusiastic supporters of NATO arms co-operation. In April, 1958, Duncan Sandys presented a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers with a long list of projects for common production—including light submarines, antisubmarine warfare devices, mines and torpedoes, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, light and medium tanks, antitank missiles, supersonic jet aircraft, electronic equipment for radar, and a new machine gun capable of sustained fire. Two years later Defense Minister Watkinson suggested to the Defense Ministers that a renewed attempt at arms co-operation be focused on a more limited number of areas. While not all of these projects were to be produced by the United Kingdom, the Times estimated that Sandys' proposals were in part a response to a movement during this period toward Franco-German-Italian co-operation on armaments; and the Guardian assessed Watkinson's policy as an attempt "to limit the coming American drive to have a new series of American weapons adopted by NATO." 51

The Labour Government which took power in 1964 was increasingly critical of American salesmanship in the NATO arena. Prime Minister Wilson, addressing the Ministerial Meeting in May, 1965, stated that the closest Allied co-operation and partnership in defense production were required. At the same time he said that trust and interdependence were not compatible with high pressure salesmanship nor "subordination to individual national industries." 52

In December, 1965, the government published the Plowden Report on the condition of the British aircraft industry. The conclusions and recommendations of this Report pointed to an emphasis on European at the expense of Atlantic collaboration. While there might be instances of ad hoc British-American co-operation, particularly on large and complex projects, the Plowden Committee did not feel that there was "real prospect of a comprehensive program on aircraft development with the United States." The same was true for missiles. The United States did not need Britain and was less interested in co-operation than in competition. Present and immediate priority should
be given to the creation of a European aircraft industry in a European common market, centered around British-French collaboration, with strong German links. At a later stage there might possibly be “partnership” between European and American industry in an Atlantic market. Finally, to match the strong arms sales program focused around the American Departments of Defense and State, powerful British and European sales machinery was required.  

The Government's Defense White Paper of 1966 generally supported these conclusions of the Plowden Committee. It registered disillusionment with NATO, noting that “progress in multilateral development has so far been disappointing.” It stated that “the immense resources of the United States make it difficult for us to find projects of mutual benefit,” and that the advantages of collaboration with Allies whose resources are more comparable to our own are obvious.” Finally it pointed to specific instances of bilateral European (Anglo-French and Anglo-Dutch) co-operation—on an air-to-surface missile (AJ 168), a light strike trainer (the Jaguar), a variable geometry aircraft, and a three-dimensional surveillance radar—as models for the future.

The previous July, Prime Minister Wilson had told Commons that the Government intended to imitate the American office of International Logistics Negotiations, headed by Henry Kuss, and to establish its own office of Defense Sales, under Raymond Brown. Wilson presented this action as a response to the aggressive American policy. “There is a strong desire,” he explained, “that we should make more effective arrangements in placing British arms, particularly with our allies, because, as I said in my speech to the NATO conference, one of the things that have unbalanced the situation in the alliance was the high-pressure salesmanship of the Americans—as we found when trying to sell arms to France and Italy.

The major British domestic group concerned with the NATO armaments program was the aerospace industry. From the Bréguet Atlantique, Rolls Royce had received an estimated £10 million in orders, while £2 million went to De Havilland. In
spite of these gains, the failure of NBMR's 3 and 4 to progress beyond the stage of preliminary evaluation had a negative effect on the aerospace perspective. In order to enter the competition firms had undertaken substantial expenses estimated as high as £100,000 in some cases. When there was no authoritative outcome, airframe and engine companies lost interest in the NATO arena. While representatives would periodically visit such focal points as the British delegation and SHAPE, they were less hopeful of selling their product than they were interested in getting wind of developing consensus in the European arms market. In any case the major industrial sales effort, intelligence, and planning continued to center around the British government.

The Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC), opposed the recommendations of the Plowden Report. Nevertheless, it seemed to maintain the anti-Atlantic focus of the Plowden Committee, while preferring national efforts to European co-operation where possible. The SBAC criticized the Plowden Committee's implication that Britain should buy the largest and most complex aircraft from the United States under license, suggesting that, instead, such items could form the basis for joint European programs. Collaboration with Europe in other areas, however, should be tempered with sustained national research and development programs and Commonwealth collaboration.\textsuperscript{57}

Although the SBAC proposed that a European purchasing agency be established for NATO, the first element of the equation was substantially more important than the second. This became clear a few months later when W. T. Gill, SBAC President, pointed to the very limited success of NATO armaments programs because of American domination, and called for European aerospace co-operation in the frame of a European defense organization.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{Germany}

German purchases, as Table 9 demonstrates, provided the backbone of the NATO armaments program. The government of
the Federal Republic bought over 200 Fiat G 91's and 600 F 104 G's. It accounted for more than half the orders for the Bréguet Atlantique, at an estimated cost of approximately 400 million DM. It participated in the NATO Hawk, Sidewinder, and AS 30 programs, and conducted portions of its spare parts procurement through NAMSO and the NSC. ⁵⁹

Nevertheless, there were signs of decreasing German support for NATO armaments and logistics. During the 1960's large-scale

| TABLE 9 |
|------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Country          | 1960 †   | 1961 †   | 1962 †   | 1963 †   |
| Federal Republic of Germany | 175.52   | 70.87    | 397.07   | 575.00   |
| Netherlands      | 20 ‡     | 35.60    | 38.30    | 86.90    |
| Italy            | 20.00    | 36.00    | 42.40    | 57.60    |
| Belgium          | 7.4      | 14.94    | 38.94    | 50.22    |
| France           | 11 ‡     | 17 ‡     | 26 ‡     | 39 ‡     |
| United Kingdom   |          |          | 1.87     | 5.65     |
| United States    |          |          |          |          |

† Fiscal years 1960, etc., signify 1960/61, etc., for countries whose fiscal years do not correspond to calendar years.
‡ Secretariat estimate.

German rearmament seemed to be drawing to a close, and German policy became less oriented toward the continuance of large-scale procurement efforts than to the maintenance of existing equipment. If there was to be procurement, then the Germans wished it to be in areas of the most advanced technology—such as computers and space. ⁶⁰ In part German participation had been the result of American pressures for payments offsetting the foreign exchange costs of American troops in Germany. Purchases of American equipment, even under the NATO label, helped to fulfil German offset obligations. Increasing German resistance to these American demands represented the with-
drawal of a powerful program support. Furthermore, it appeared that German purchase of American equipment in the NATO context might bring with it unwelcome military pressures. When American Secretary of Defense McNamara reportedly suggested that German F 104 G Starfighters gradually phase their nuclear role into a more conventional one, German Defense minister von Hassel replied that "there are reasons of weight that cause us to assign only nuclear missions to the Starfighter fighter-bombers." 61

Although little evidence on national positions in particular negotiations is available, it is probable that NATO's failure to initiate new armaments programs in the mid-1960's was partly the result of mounting German reluctance. During the course of 1961 the West German government decided to issue its own military aircraft requirements, independently of NATO, for the first time since the end of the war. 62 An increasingly cynical attitude toward Germany's Allies was indicated by such remarks as that of Dr. Benecke, President of the Federal Office for Military Technology and Procurement who stated that the Allies all wanted Germany's best—they wanted her money ("Sie wollen alle unser Bestes—sie wollen unser Geld"). 63

At the domestic level, the NATO armaments program seemed to produce little tangible German support for NATO; rather it provided a useful stick with which various forms of opposition could strike at their political opponents.

The early NATO projects presented the opportunity for the German aircraft industry to rebuild and to catch up with its more advanced Allies in modern military technology. 64 Hans-Georg Schulze, Press Officer for the Federal Association of German Aerospace Industries, stated in 1961 that the Fiat G 91 and the F 104 G were "sufficient to occupy all the rebuilt larger plane factories." In the case of the F 104 G the German government accepted some financial losses in its ratio of contracts to contributions in order to entice Belgium and the Netherlands to participate, because Germany had insufficient domestic capacity to undertake a larger share of the project itself. 65
However, the German aerospace industry, once rebuilt, tended to be less enthusiastic about the type of co-operation which NATO represented. In the first place, the later NATO projects involved production under license of American products, while German firms were more interested in co-operative research and development which would provide them with information and training in the latest technology and the opportunity for a more competitive position in the international market. Second, some industrial representatives felt that their access to such NATO centers as SHAPE was limited by the fact that German military officers, sensitive to the legacy of the war, made special efforts to appear "integrated."

Although the NATO armaments program did not appear to have a significant impact on the German political community at large, the misfortunes of one of its products—the F 104 G—provided the opportunity for opposition attacks upon the German political establishment. Between 1961 and March 1966, the F 104 G had been involved in 51 crashes involving 27 dead. On March 24, 1966, Karl Wienand (SPD) criticized the Defense Ministry for failures in planning and management; and SPD members called for von Hassel's resignation during the Bundestag debate. In the autumn the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, Lieutenant General Werner Panitzki accused von Hassel of radically changing Panitzki's report on the F 104 G crashes before passing it on to the Bundestag Armed Services Committee. These events were part of the pattern of forces which led to Kiesinger's replacement of Erhard as Chancellor and von Hassel's loss of his position as Defense Minister. 68

France

French policy toward the NATO armaments program reflected an increasing disillusionment with and skepticism about the value of the program to French interests. In the case of the competition for the lightweight reconnaissance strike aircraft, France placed Bréguet and Dassault aircraft in the final round of
competition, only to see the award go to the Italian Fiat G 91. When the Bréguet 1150 Atlantique was later chosen as the NATO Maritime Patrol aircraft, Germany and the Netherlands were the only buyers. Defense Minister Messmer expressed French frustration on the occasion of the delivery of the first Atlantique to Germany. The French had been disappointed, he said by the “scarcity of orders, forty by France and twenty by Germany.” The Atlantique “has not fulfilled all our hopes,” he continued. “We shall in the future remember the results of this experience.” The pattern was the same in other aircraft programs. The F 104 G was purchased by the Allies instead of the Mirage III, resulting in bitter French memories. In spite of reaching the final rounds of the competition for NBMR’s 3 and 4, French aircraft did not ultimately receive the NATO label.

In two other programs where France participated the results were mixed. The Hawk program appeared to be relatively successful. Here the French military received a product which it considered to be superior; moreover, there were substantial industrial savings in addition to the educational advantages gained from participation in the program. The Mark 44, on the other hand, was less satisfactory, since the French were unhappy not only about delays in delivery, but also ultimately about the performance of the torpedo itself.

As for domestic support, the aerospace industry was perhaps more heavily dependent on the national government in France than in the other major Allied nations. A large number of firms—including Nord-Aviation, Sud-Aviation, SNECMA, SEREB—were nationally owned. Other firms, like Bréguet and Dassault, were heavily dependent on government financing and contracts. The experience of Dassault in the competition for the NATO Lightweight Strike Reconnaissance Aircraft, the F 104 G, and NBMR’s 3 and 4—and that of Bréguet, especially with regard to the Atlantique—could have done little to increase the legitimacy of NATO in their eyes.

Rather than increased NATO activities, officials like General Louis Bonte, chairman of the French National Committee for
the Expansion of the Aeronautical Industry called for aerospace industry mergers or "concentration" to compete with the American invasion of European markets and for "international collaboration" on a European level, especially with the United Kingdom.⁷⁰

LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

The low level of integration in NATO armaments occurred in spite of ideological advocacy by NATO leaders. SACEUR provided the greater share of leadership for arms co-operation, but NATO's Secretaries General also contributed strongly in the promulgation of an ideology which blended general abstract goals and specific concrete suggestions. The leadership endorsed arms collaboration for political, military, economic, and social reasons; and it particularly supported standardization and joint production programs. The appeal of this ideology, however, seemed to diminish as the quest for national competitive advantage replaced a mood of sacrifice for shared objectives.

At the highest level, General Eisenhower set the tone for the ensuing argument by defining the rearmament task in terms of "an integrated military, economic, and financial effort." General Gruenther called on the NATO countries "to establish on a long term basis that balance between military, economic, and social factors which will make us reasonably secure both from external attack by an aggressor and from internal disintegration resulting from poverty and discouragement." General Lemnitzer praised NATO's armaments programs for their utility "both in reducing cost to the nations and the Alliance, and in promoting military effectiveness." The broadest and most eloquent appeal was made by Secretary General Spaak. In the face of the challenge of peaceful coexistence, Spaak called on the Allies to develop a "true Atlantic Community" with political, military, and economic elements.⁷¹

More specifically, successive SACEUR's gave the greatest weight to military arguments for arms co-operation. Here they used the
same kinds of terms which had supported the military force program to justify their demands for additional military equipment. General Eisenhower's first annual report as SACEUR in 1952 pointed to the task of "forging the weapons" as part of the solution to the military problem posed by the Soviet Union and called on the North Atlantic Treaty nations to contribute the necessary equipment to the common defense. A year later General Ridgway was still concerned about the military implications of "major deficiencies in arms and equipment, logistical establishments, stacks of ammunition, and above all, in planes." In November, 1953, General Gruenther emphasized that "we still do not have adequate strength to defeat an all-out Russian attack," and called for a top priority program of air force development. General Norstad told a press conference in 1959 that the most important aspect of the minimum force plan, MC 70, was its call for new weapons.

I am asking for a great deal in the field of weapons. We have worked out what we call a minimum force concept, and it is truly a minimum force from the standpoint of the number of units. But the cost of that, price of that, is new weapons. New weapons. So we may have a program, and it’s our new plan which has been approved by the NATO countries, being worked on now, (which) carries us up to 1963. It can be called a new weapons plan.

General Lemnitzer subsequently pointed to the need to bolster military security through "increases in weapons and equipment and more modernization." A major recurring theme in these declarations was the need for improved weapons, and one of the chief obstacles to this goal was the lack of standardization. The WEU's Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments noted that "Generals Gruenther, Norstad, and Lemnitzer have continually drawn the attention of our Committee to the impossibility of taking effective action on the central front with troops from seven different countries with different weapons systems and logistics." If
identical equipment could not be obtained, then SACEUR at least wished to have inter-operability. General Lemnitzer explained that “the effects of standardization can be obtained to a considerable extent without resorting to uniformity of weapons and equipment if we do everything possible to achieve compatibility in the supplies they require.”

Finally, later SACEUR's supported the institutions and projects which came to comprise the NATO joint production program. As Air Deputy to the first three SACEUR's, General Norstad pushed hard for a light jet fighter to provide close support of ground troops; and it was during his own term of office that the competition for the Lightweight Strike Reconnaissance Aircraft and the selection of the Fiat G 91 took place. He called the joint production of the Hawk and Sidewinder missiles “a very constructive and forward step.” Norstad was also a strong proponent of V/STOL aircraft such as were embodied in the abortive NBMR’s 3 and 4, “and he pressed for an aircraft that would take off in three, five, six hundred feet, or something like that; so that if you don’t go straight up, you will go something like this (gestures with hand).” His successor General Lemnitzer cited NAMSO, the F 104 G Sidewinder, Bullpup, and Hawk programs as examples of useful arms co-operation.

Successive Secretaries General gave greater emphasis to the economic necessity for collaboration, especially in the area of joint arms production. Lord Ismay noted in his autobiography that when he took office, NATO's military arrangements were usually all right, but that there was a “lack of direction” in the fields of economics and production, which he tried to improve. Spaak underlined the exhorbitant costs of independent national efforts, warning that if each nation was forced to reinvest and reproduce what already existed in other Western countries, then the West would “be compelled one day to choose between the washing machine and the Sputnik; as it is intrinsically impossible in our democracy to sacrifice the washing machine, we shall be compelled to sacrifice our economic research and scientific progress and we shall all gradually dwindle to the status of
secondary powers." Stikker pointed to the "widely accepted view that integrated production of arms within the Western Alliance could effect notable economies while improving the capabilities and efficiency of Western defense. NATO has achieved something in this field," he said, "but far less than I believe is possible or wise." Manlio Brosio called for a "more balanced distribution of armaments production between the United States and Europe."

"On such action," he said, "not only the fate of the European armaments industry but also, and above all, the progress of science, research, and European industry in general is dependent." 78

The specific pattern of sacrifice implied by this ideology was one in which—initially—the greatest arms benefits seemed to go to the Europeans and the greatest burdens to the United States. During 1951, General Eisenhower justified this distribution in terms of a trade-off through which the United States would supply munitions and equipment while the Europeans would provide the bulk of the military forces. He told Congress that, "while the transfer to Europe of American military units is essential, our major and special contribution should be in the field of munitions and equipment." Comparing the situation with the dark days of World War II, he stated that, "it took a rifle and a man to go out and advance the cause of the Allies against the enemies we had. If the United States could provide merely the rifle and get someone else to carry it in order to do the work that was necessary, I was perfectly content. I believe in this thinking," he added, 'particularly today.' Even if the trade-off did not proceed evenly at once, the United States was still required to do its duty. "Each of us must do his part," Eisenhower said "We cannot delay, nationally or individually, while we suspiciously scrutinize the sacrifices made by our neighbor, and, through a weaseling logic, seek someway to avoid our own duties." 79

By 1952, however, Eisenhower recognized that this distribution of labor could not last forever. He supported the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee "for a more
efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defense program.” In strong language, he said that “Europe must become self-sustaining in military manufactures at the earliest possible date. America cannot continue to be the primary source of munitions for the entire free world!”

Later Supreme Commanders continued to call for American donations. General Norstad told the House Appropriations Committee in 1961 that “the need for the Military Assistance Program remains very real. By the new weapons it supplies, by providing equipment and training where they are most needed, by the various cost-sharing projects in which it participates, the Military Assistance Program, in this crucial year, is making its own vital contribution to NATO security.” General Lemnitzer brought the Committee the same message in 1967. “I continue to be a strong supporter of the military assistance program,” he said. “With regard to Europe in particular, it has helped to create deterrent forces among our allies—deterrent forces that have played a key part in maintaining peace and security, and in preventing any Communist military ‘adventures’ in that part of the world.”

Nevertheless, by 1967, the Supreme Commander admitted the legitimacy of the United States ‘major sales programs’ in more developed European countries such as the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Only in cases like those of Greece and Turkey, relatively less economically developed and strategically vital “on the critical southeast flank of NATO,” was there still a plea for “major grant aid programs.”

NATO armaments programs implied contributions and ultimately resistance not only from the United States, but increasingly from those European clients who were developing their own advanced armaments establishments. “Replying to a question once put to him, General Norstad stated that the three insurmountable obstacles to the joint production of armaments were first the United States, second the United Kingdom, and finally France. On a later occasion, he added that if the same
question were put to him today he would reply that the obstacles had since multiplied.”

DECISION MAKING

The leadership’s efforts to promote Allied armaments activities relied to some extent on decision-making structures that included independent technical experts. Nevertheless, such attempts remained frustrated by the delegates of national governments, who followed instructions from their home capitals.

Over the years, NATO leaders sponsored the work of agencies which combined expertise and independence in differing degree. Thus in his first annual report, General Eisenhower praised the work of the Defense Production Board Task Forces and the Temporary Council Committee for revealing the “true dimensions of the rearmament task” and providing an impetus for a “more efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defense program.” Under SACEUR’s leadership AGARD contributed to the selection of the Fiat G 91, and the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center helped to integrate jointly produced aircraft and missiles into an effective military force.

Yet such bodies had limited effect. Even the most important of them, the International Staff/Secretariat, seemed peripheral. There were indications that, under the tenure of Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics Ernest H. Meili (U.S.), between November, 1957, and June, 1959, the International Staff exercised more influence than during other periods. In particular the initiation of the Hawk project was laid to Meili’s efforts by European officials who claimed that he had visited European capitals and convinced originally skeptical defense personnel. During this period members of the Staff were particularly conscious of their catalytic role in producing agreement among the national delegates. Thus the Assistant for Missile Production in the Production and Logistics Division stated that “the Missile Section acts as a focal point and a catalyst “in
getting agreement on a given program through negotiation and compromise.' At the same time he was careful to note that the International Staff had "only the power of persuasion" and that its members required "infinite patience." 

By 1967 individuals on the International Staff no longer seemed to feel that persuasion and patience tended to pay the same kind of dividends, but rather that the Staff had relatively little influence on nations. The Staff's intermediary role also appeared quite limited. It provided Chairmen for the meetings of the Ad Hoc Mixed Working Groups, the most active elements of the old NATO armaments structure, only when specifically requested; normally these bodies were chaired by national representatives. The Staff made no formal recommendations, but rather exercised such influence as possible through informal communication and secretarial types of services. Staff members had no official contact with representatives of private industry, and the NATO Production and Logistic Organizations were quite independent of them.

Other institutions represented countervailing tendencies. Some of them—the Military Committee, the Standing Group, SHAPE, NATO military commands—carried over into the field of armaments the same forces of national instruction which existed in the area of military forces. The more specialized and civilian institutions were no better. Vandevanter describes how decision-making control had begun and ended with the dominance of national delegates.

By the mid-1950's NATO nations were greatly disillusioned about the future of coordinated defense production. The organizational structure had progressed through the following stages: 1) a very loose collection of individual, uncoordinated, national representatives (the Military Production and Supply Board); 2) a presumably powerful, but actually relatively impotent, Coordinator for Defense Production; 3) a prestigious but still powerless Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics of the International Staff aided by national delegations of technical assistants; and 4) a subministerial Defence Production Committee reminiscent in structure of the original
Military Production and Supply Board. Thus, after much experimentation, final authority was once again in the hands of a committee of national representatives.

The system as developed by the end of 1954, with the Defense Production Committee sitting at the apex of the collaboration process, was essentially the one that is in use today (1964), though the name was changed in 1958 to the Armaments Committee.\(^8^6\)

National representatives to the Armaments Committee tended to be military officers of the rank of Colonel or their civilian equivalents. Such individuals had relatively little leeway in their instructions with regard to specific projects, with room for negotiation only between the green line of the best position and the red line of unacceptability drawn by their home ministries. Only in rare cases, like the Hawk project, was there evidence that national representatives were persuaded of the merits of the project and induced national decision-makers to participate against their original inclinations.

The leadership was not happy with the results produced by the existing structure, and attempted to reform it. Secretary General Stikker formulated the "doctrine of flexibility" which opened the way to forms of association which were partial, rather than including representatives from all nations. He explained that "the doctrine of flexibility implies that no single member of the alliance can impose its course of action on the others; that several members can together take such action as they consider necessary; and finally, that the right of any one member to prevent the other members from taking an action they deem vital to their interests is excluded." The NATO Production and Logistics Organizations were the fruit of this tree. "NPLO's are joint efforts of certain individual member countries of NATO," Stikker said. "As such they are part of the entire NATO effort, but not every case is part of a unanimous effort."\(^8^7\)

Although the doctrine of flexibility attempted to cut down the number of instructed delegates sitting at any given table, it did little to bring them there in the first place; and the future of
NATO Production and Logistics Organizations seemed limited with the completion of many of the existing programs. Consequently the NATO leadership—specifically Brosio's Deputy, James A. Roberts—undertook the reform of the NATO armaments procedure through the mechanism of AC 253.

Roberts' major aim was to produce real co-operation in arms research, development, and production; and the way in which he hoped to do it was the abolition of the NBMR procedure and its replacement by one which was both flexible and binding. Roberts favored a system of partial membership which would overcome problems of unanimity; he also supported the principle of time limits on participation without contribution. If, by the second meeting of a given working group, a nation had not committed itself to participate in research and development expenses, he hoped that it might be required to withdraw.

The report by Brigadier General Vandevanter—an outside expert from the RAND Corporation—provided Roberts and his supporters with valuable ammunition. Vandevanter stated that the existing "institutional system" was incapable of coping with competition in cases where more than one nation had a candidate for joint production, since the NBMR procedure required not only buyers, but all potential sellers, to agree on a piece of equipment. In its place Vandevanter recommended a partial and binding "permissive system." Under this procedure influence in a given co-operative program would be roughly proportional to the amount each nation had committed itself to purchase.

Within the NATO bureaucracy Roberts was faced with a certain degree of apathy and opposition from those groups which stood to lose from the change. SHAPE, although not opposed, made little active contribution to a reform which ultimately scrapped the whole set of military requirements which it had helped to bring into the world. More personally involved was General Fischer, a French officer who had served as Director of Armaments on the International Staff/Secretariat and as Chairman of the Armaments Committee. Fischer was identified with the system under attack and favored leaving it roughly the way it
was. He opposed the reform, was not a regular participant at the meetings of AC 253, and—already beyond retirement age—left NATO after the report was approved.

AC 253, the high-level review committee, was the immediate medium for change. Although the representatives to this special committee were national delegates, they were higher level officials than those who usually served on the Armaments Committee. While they were heavily instructed, they came to NATO for extended visits of up to two weeks; and they were sufficiently well placed that they could, to some extent, produce changes in their instructions. Once Roberts had achieved agreement within this group, he visited the Military Committee in Washington and received its support.

The Council approved AC 253's report in June, 1966, but within a year's time one could legitimately wonder what had been accomplished. Following the completion of the exercise Roberts no longer maintained regular contact with the field of armaments, leaving this task to General Fischer's de facto successor. Under the new procedure, committees of national delegates remained the mechanism of decision-making. Implied tendencies toward reduced instruction by the establishment of the new high-level Committee of National Armaments Directors were offset by the fact that it was supposed to meet only twice a year and that the members of its more permanent subordinate group, the NADREPS, tended to be military officers with the rank of Colonel—a situation reminiscent of the old Armaments Committee.

The most radical idea presented in the whole debate had never even been seriously considered by AC 253. In 1965-66 Robert Rhodes James, a British historian, had been a NATO Research Fellow and had undertaken a study on Standardization and the Common Production of Weapons in NATO. Rhodes James had received access to NATO's classified files and according to rumor, had been personally commissioned by Brosio. In concluding his work, Rhodes James stated his "firm conviction that little success can be achieved in the field of major ab initio
joint equipment projects in the future without central funding arrangements, at least for feasibility and design studies.” He estimated that £50 million a year would probably be adequate to enable the new Conference of National Armaments Directors “to commission a number of important studies to determine whether projects were technically and economically viable.” Without such central funding, NATO remained completely dependent on national governments or individual firms for even the most basic initiatives.  

COALITIONS

The leadership’s inability to work through instructed delegates went with its failure to construct a broad or stable supporting coalition. During the early years of NATO, arms co-operation was implemented largely through American military assistance, which helped to raise European stock levels, provide some standardization through the dispersal of uniform American equipment, and rebuild European production facilities. In the late 1950’s the NATO program underwent a sea change as American grants receded; and NATO’s leaders placed heavy emphasis on the joint production projects. The United States and Germany represented the vortex of the new effort—with few exceptions the systems produced were American and the principal purchaser was the rearming Federal Republic. During the mid-1960’s this program also dried up; the United States grew less willing to co-operate on advanced systems or basic research; Germany had substantially completed its rearmament; and the Europeans insisted not only on participation in production but also in research and development at the frontiers of technology.

AC 253 was the leadership’s attempt to revitalize the springs of co-operation; and it drew major support from the combination of the United States, Britain, and France. As early as December, 1962, French Defense Minister Messmer had endorsed the doctrine of flexibility in armaments when he publicly stated that “it was nonsense to have a committee of 15 working on cooperative
projects and (that) it would be far more effective to confine production agreements to two or three powers.” Thorneycroft, his British counterpart had agreed. The American attitude was implied by Defense Department endorsement of Vandevanter’s study, which had recommended that a nation’s influence be proportional to its purchase of NATO armaments.

Although Canada and the Netherlands provided peripheral backing, most smaller nations, presumably the purchasers under the new system, were not eager for change. For such countries, the old NBMR procedure represented access to advanced technological information without cost. Through low-level forms of resistance, they attempted to undermine the impact of the proposed reforms.

In this situation, the leadership’s main objective was to prevent the coalescence of an opposition bloc. In his position as Chairman of AC 253, Deputy Secretary General Roberts held regular private meetings with the different national representatives, attempting to deal with national problems on an individual and detailed basis.

To obtain agreement, however, Roberts was forced to accept a watered-down program. Thus, on the subject of voting within the limited groups, the larger nations favored weighted voting based on contributions—along the model of stockholder voting—while the smaller countries wished the retention of unanimous decision-making. Ultimately voting was left to ad hoc arrangements by the members of each particular project, scarcely an improvement on what had gone before.

FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER

Integration and spill-over might have been expected from a political-technical mixture in the area of armaments and logistics. Resources in this sphere were limited to portions of national defense budgets; utilitarian sanctions and specialized personnel were involved in the research, development, and production of military material.
Nevertheless, the political element proved strong while the technical element was weak. Advances took place mainly in situations of crisis. Otherwise the benefits of co-operation were outweighed by its costs and by conflict of interest.

The initial crisis which had given impetus to NATO's military force program, the Soviet military threat of the late 1940's and early 1950's, was also behind initial American military aid to Europe. Under further pressure of the Suez crisis of 1956 and the launching of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957, steps were taken to broaden European participation. Thus in 1957 the Italian Fiat G 91 was selected as the NATO Lightweight Strike Reconnaissance Aircraft and work was in full swing for the NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

Suez and Sputnik provided much of the driving force for the heads of government meeting in December, 1957, and subsequently for co-operation on the Hawk and Sidewinder missiles. The press communiqué announcing the establishment of the Hawk Production Organization stated that "this marks the first success of the NATO policy, established in the December, 1957, NATO heads of government meeting, at which the US promised NATO nations help in establishing large scale production of advanced type weapons in Europe." A similar statement was included in the press release which announced joint production of the Sidewinder. "This represents further tangible progress under the NATO policy of co-ordinated production of armaments, originally proposed in a meeting of the NATO heads of government in December, 1957," it said.

Of the remaining production projects, the F 104 G was the only one which included either substantial innovation or financial resources. Although there is no concrete evidence, it is likely that the Berlin situation made the United States government willing to assist joint production and the Europeans eager to purchase this completely modern fighter-bomber, which could be used not only for air defense but also for various battlefield and interdiction missions.

In the absence of immediate crisis, however, co-operation
faded. Paul-Henri Spaak recalled that “When the Russians launched their first sputnik, it was thought that the West would be jolted into greater understanding of the true state of affairs,” and Eisenhower and Macmillan issued a communiqué calling for Western interdependence. “For a few weeks,” Spaak said, “there was an apparent awakening of interest, but it soon flagged, and although it would be unjust to say nothing has been done along the bold lines suggested, the measure of success achieved compares unfavorably with the issues at stake.”

Theoretically, there were substantial advantages to be derived from arms collaboration. Politically it should help to cement the Alliance. Militarily there should be a better fit between strategy and available means; increased tactical mobility from better availability of spare parts, fuel, and ammunition; and consolidated training. Economically, pooled efforts should involve cost reductions from economies of scale and shared costs of research and development. Technologically, the Allies would be provided with the best equipment available. Administratively there could also be gains in terms of tax and customs benefits, facility of control for classified material, and quasi-diplomatic privileges.

Such incentives for co-operation were neutralized by conflicts of interest at all levels. Politically, outright purchase of material implied for the buyer nation a loss of independence and prestige. In concrete terms, the sale of weapons often depended on the recipient nation accepting restrictions on use and transfer. Militarily, national defense establishments had different geographical commitments, strategies, existing stocks, and resources. Economically, national military procurement—while it represented a financial outlay subordinate to total defense expenditure—was, as Table 10 shows, a significant sum. Procurement on a non-national basis could have deleterious effects on national employment and the balance of payments; and larger nations were unwilling to bear large costs for smaller ones. Cutting across the political, military, and economic arguments against co-operation in armaments and logistics were strictures of scientific secrecy, the product of attempts to achieve, maintain, and increase tech-
nological leads for purposes of political prestige, military advantage, and saleability.

Moreover, technical progress in armaments could have fall-out effects in civilian sectors of the economy. This did not mean that the devotion of the same resources directly to the civilian sector would not produce the same or better results, but simply that military problems frequently offered the opportunity for government to support research which they otherwise might have neglected. If military research and development were left to other nations, from whom only the finished product were obtained, then the civilian fall-out benefits would accrue mainly to these nations.

There were also difficulties at a more modest administrative level. In the NATO situation production runs were not usually large enough to offset increased costs involved in the learning of new techniques, language differences, and problems of co-ordination; and NATO's unanimity rule created unwieldy management conditions.  

### TABLE 10

**National Expenditure on the Procurement of Military Equipment: 1960-1963**  
(In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960 †</th>
<th>1961 †</th>
<th>1962 †</th>
<th>1963 †</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17,519.00</td>
<td>20,850.00</td>
<td>22,120.00</td>
<td>23,470.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,823.56</td>
<td>1,844.77</td>
<td>1,974.36</td>
<td>2,155.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>1,270.92</td>
<td>1,092.22</td>
<td>1,592.40</td>
<td>1,933.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,065.34</td>
<td>1,037.82</td>
<td>1,021.02</td>
<td>1,411.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>121.00 ‡</td>
<td>140.00 ‡</td>
<td>180.00 ‡</td>
<td>220.00 ‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>95.69</td>
<td>127.50</td>
<td>129.70</td>
<td>168.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>46.12</td>
<td>52.60</td>
<td>75.36</td>
<td>84.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Fiscal years 1960, etc., signify 1960/61, etc., for countries whose fiscal years do not correspond to calendar years.
‡ Secretariat estimate.
The convergence of interest between sellers and buyers upon which the NATO armaments program finally came to depend was inherently unstable. Seller nations were interested mainly in moving existing products off the shelf with as little production participation as necessary to consummate the sale; and the United States, Britain, and France all had competing seller policies. Buyer nations, on the other hand, wanted not only extensive participation in production, but also in research and development phases, which the seller was unwilling to grant. At the same time they were inclined to buy less. Germany, which had played the part of consumer, had largely completed her postwar rearmament, and had her own armaments industry, estimated at between 35,000 and 40,000 people. Moreover, the German government was attempting to reduce its offset obligations to the United States, through which German military purchases partly counterbalanced American currency losses arising from the stationing of American troops in the Federal Republic. The smaller Allies, faced with the decline of American aid, were unable to make significant purchases. In this situation, a staff study for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that “the defense common market is little more than an area for arms competition between resentful pygmies and an affable giant.”

The continuation of the NATO armaments program and the reform proposed by AC 253 depended on an extremely modest base. For seller nations, NATO represented a forum in which they could hope to gauge export markets and in which they might promote sales. For buyer nations the NATO program represented an opportunity to maintain contact with the technology of the seller nations, particularly the United States, and to attempt to achieve either special terms with the sellers or counter-groupings against them.
The structures of the NATO infrastructure program date from 1951 when the Infrastructure Committee was formed to assume responsibility for infrastructure policy under the Council. Beneath the Infrastructure Committee were established a Payments and Progress Committee, administering controls over the expenditure of funds, and Working Groups for Signals; Airfields; and Petrol, Oil, and Lubricants (POL). With the formal creation of the International Staff/Secretariat in 1952, an Infrastructure Section was established as part of the NATO Production and Logistics Division; and the technical staffs of the Working Groups were brought into the Section, organized according to the same subject areas.¹

INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

By 1968, there had been changes in nomenclature and advances in structural differentiation and scope. The Infrastructure Committee and the Payments and Progress Committee remained the institutional core, but the NATO Staff/Secretariat's Infrastructure Section was now the Infrastructure Branch of the Defense Support Division, larger than any full NATO Division with the exception of its parent; and there were Sections in the
Infrastructure Branch to deal with Budget and Analysis, POL and Construction, Signals, Airfields and Naval Bases, and Missile Sites. Within SHAPE's Logistics Division was a small Infrastructure Branch; and a semi-autonomous set of agencies had been established, including the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment Management Organization (NADGEMO) and the NADGE Policy Board.

As Table 11 makes clear, there was task differentiation in NATO infrastructure. Starting with a program centered around

**TABLE 11**

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM
MAJOR PRODUCTS THROUGH 1965 *
(In Millions of Pounds Sterling)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airfields program</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals network</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel supply systems</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval facilities</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar warning installations</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defense ground environment (NADGE)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special ammunition sites (SAS)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile sites (SAM and SSM)</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other projects</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,225</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† The costs of airfields in Germany for Slices earlier than Slice VII are not included.

airfields and telecommunications, NATO had moved into the construction of war headquarters, fuel pipelines and storage systems, naval facilities, radar warning systems, NADGE installations, special ammunition storage sites, missile sites, and categories of smaller projects. Among more recent projects were a new political-military situation and consultation center to be located at Evêre, Belgium, and the development of NATO communications satellite facilities. A pilot satellite network was established linking SHAPE and AFCENT in Naples. Subsequently NATO was to develop a comprehensive SATCOM system to supplement and partially replace existing Allied communications capabilities.
TABLE 12

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM: SLICES I-XX *
(In Millions of Pounds Sterling)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Expenditures</th>
<th>Annual Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slice I</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slices II-VII</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>117.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slices VIII-XI</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slices XII-XV</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slices XV-XX</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


† In 1951, agreement was reached on a cost-sharing formula for financing the first NATO Slice of the common infrastructure program that had been begun under the Western European Union. Because of the earlier program, this increment was labelled Slice II.

In spite of such development in structures and tasks, it was not clear that institutional autonomy had significantly advanced. On the one hand, the requirement for unanimity might be avoided at lower levels—by upward referral of non-resolved issues from such groups as the Infrastructure Committee and the Payments and Progress Committee, and by the non-voting procedures within the Staff/Secretariat and the NATO military commands. Formal procedures for binding arbitration also existed. They provided that:

In the event of disputes not capable of solution by the (Payments and Progress) Committee, a Board of Arbitration may be appointed by the Secretary General. Its decisions are by majority vote, and no minority report is permitted; its decisions are final. In the event of the Committee itself not agreeing to go to Arbitration, the responsibility goes to the Council; if the Council, after three separate discussions, cannot agree, the Secretary General refers the dispute to a Panel of Independent Advisors who work on the same principles as the Board of Arbitration.
Yet unanimity remained the final rule. The arbitration procedures had been invoked only once since 1962; nations could not be bound at any level without consent which was at least tacit; and ultimate decisions were made by the Council, where it always remained possible that a national veto would be the last word.\(^3\)

Nor was it apparent that there had been task expansion. The largest part of construction on airfields, telecommunications, war headquarters, fuel pipelines and storage systems, and naval facilities had been programmed in the first nine Infrastructure Slices; succeeding projects—radar warning installations, air defense ground environment, special ammunition sites, missile sites, and others—were not added to a stable base of on-going programs but served partly as replacements. In absolute terms, the result was impressive; one could estimate that NATO would have spent approximately £1.5 billion for infrastructure by the end of 1969. Table 12 however, shows that the annual rate of expenditure decreased from an estimated £117 million for earlier program Slices to £45.6 million for later ones.

\[\text{AUTHORITY}\]

Not only was institutional autonomy weak. NATO authority was also limited in terms both of its balance between direct and indirect decision-making and its effectiveness.

Direct NATO authority was implicit in the system of budgetary authorization. Under a cost-sharing procedure initiated in 1953, national governments authorized contributions independent of individual project allocations. The scope of this procedure was extended by progressively enlarging the authorization period from the initial three years (Slices V–VII) to four years (Slices VIIb–XI and XI–XV) and then to five years (Slices XVI–XX).

Nevertheless, a complicated system of indirect decision-making, covering all infrastructure phases from initiation through utilization, operated in the allocation of these funds. National governments were responsible for most direct action, committees
of national representatives for control, and international military and civilian bureaucracies mainly for advice.

Under this system, nations were divided into hosts, on whose territory the project was to be constructed, and users, for whose forces the project was intended. The responsibilities of hosts and users clearly dominated all phases of decision-making. Host nations were accountable for:

1. Submitting program requests to the NATO Major Subordinate Commands
2. Providing land at no cost
3. Providing local utilities at no cost (except in the cases of certain missile sites for which NATO had adopted a cost-sharing formula)
4. Submitting detailed construction drawings and cost estimates to the Payments and Progress Committee together with the request for funds
5. Advertising for bids under the international competitive bidding procedure
6. Supervising construction
7. Preparing scale drawings of completed projects
8. Scheduling and participating in the Joint Final Acceptance Inspection
9. Furnishing contract documents and invoices for audit by the International Board of Auditors
10. Negotiating bilateral user agreements with foreign users
11. Submitting the latest cost estimates and other financial data in semiannual financial reports

User nations' responsibilities included:

1. Initiating the program request
2. Justifying program requirements and guaranteeing utilization

3. Co-ordination with the host during construction to ensure that the requirements were met

4. Participation in a Joint Final Acceptance Inspection

5. Maintenance of the completed project until it was assumed by a new user or by NATO if the facility became redundant

The major committees under the Council, composed of national representatives, were responsible for the control of host and user national governments. All proposed infrastructure programs passed before the Military Committee, which reviewed them in the perspective of military requirements and adequacy; the Infrastructure Committee, which considered eligibility for common funding and technical adequacy; the Payments and Progress Committee (PPC), which exercised budgetary control; and the International Board of Auditors, which concerned itself with fiscal integrity. Above all of these bodies was the Council, which acted as the main forum for negotiating cost shares and final authority for all matters not resolved at lower levels.

The military bureaucracies headed by SACEUR and SACLANT played a major advisory role at all stages of the infrastructure process. They forecast military requirements prior to the negotiation of cost-sharing agreements; they published annual guidance setting the aims of each annual Infrastructure Slice; they screened submitted projects against the issued guidance; they assigned initial relative priorities between projects; and they issued recommended Infrastructure Slices. They sponsored Annual Infrastructure Conferences and were represented in Infrastructure Committee meetings for Slice screening. They participated in site selection; the Joint Final Acceptance Inspection; the notification of the Payments and Progress Committee when all deficiencies were corrected; semiannual inspections of all
completed facilities to ensure satisfactory operation and maintenance; and declaration of usership changes in such cases as additional usership, national renunciation of usership, or the declaration of a facility as surplus to NATO requirements.

A subordinate advisory role was played by the International Staff/Secretariat. In preliminary planning, it reviewed SHAPE-recommended Slices for technical, financial, and eligibility aspects and forwarded its findings to the Infrastructure Committee. In the phases of contract and construction it participated in interim inspections and in the Joint Final Acceptance Inspection. In the terminal stage it conducted the final audit under the supervision of the International Board of Auditors.*

The effectiveness of this decision-making system seems limited when NATO decisions are compared with subsequent national deviations and exemptions. The corpus of NATO infrastructure rules evolved in piecemeal fashion, by precedent rather than direction; the rules were never codified, nor the precedents cross-referenced. At every stage of the infrastructure process—project eligibility criteria, construction standards, international competitive bidding rules, project authorization, audit standards and residual value—such rules appeared honored through breach as well as through compliance.

Eligibility criteria for projects existed, but they were partly undermined by a system of prefinancing. Under this system nations informed the PPC of their intent to construct a project which had not yet been submitted for programming in an Infrastructure Slice, which was contained in a Slice which had not yet been approved, or which was not within current NATO criteria. PPC acceptance of such projects signified that the host was eligible for reimbursement if the project became eligible for NATO funding and was included in a NATO Slice program. Beginning in 1963, the United States submitted prefinancing statements on all categories of infrastructure work not currently eligible for NATO funding.

Construction standards for projects also existed, but their impact was diminished by extremely flexible interpretation.
Such criteria were supposed to standardize the type of facility to be supported by the NATO infrastructure program. In practice there remained deviations both upward—for example, to support American aircraft varying from standard NATO aircraft in sophistication, weight, or other particulars—and downward when it was considered that unreasonable costs would result from the application of NATO criteria.

There were international competitive bidding rules, but they were not easily enforceable. Under these rules, host nations were supposed to include foreign enterprises in the bidding for infrastructure contracts and to make awards to the bidder offering the lowest price (under constant technical conditions). For civil engineering projects, this procedure was almost abandoned. Non-host nations rarely seemed to win such contracts, and host nations were less and less frequently required to submit international calls for bids. For electronics projects, the international competitive-bidding procedure was distorted by host taxes and tariffs. Theoretically host taxes and tariffs were neutralized by a blanket-tax rebate formula which returned to NATO a stable percentage on infrastructure contracts of all types. In practice, this tax rebate formula failed to allow for the much higher tax incidence on electronic imports.

The international competitive bidding rules were reinforced by a prohibition on the use of NATO funds to pay military salaries for construction. Increasingly, this prohibition was eroded by NATO allowances for payment of military per diem, temporary duty, and expenses of civilian employees.

Projects introduced into the system remained unapproved and uncompleted for increasingly long periods. While early projects were usually completed within three to five years of initiation, later and more complex ones like NADGE required over ten years to complete the cycle. Program inertia grew in spite of special acceleration, streamlining, and clean-up programs.

Following project completion, NATO audited the accounts; and by 1966 it had recovered approximately £14 million. Nevertheless, the International Board of Auditors applied sanctions only
in cases of major misallocation and tended to overlook mismanagement.

In the event that facilities would no longer be required by NATO, basic agreements existed which called for negotiations between the host country and the other partners to determine "residual value." No provisions, however, existed to enforce compensation. The French military withdrawal provided the first major test of this procedure and indicated its serious weakness. Beginning in spring of 1966 the French and the Fourteen began negotiations, but after two years the two parties seemed no closer to agreement on the "residual value" of most Allied facilities remaining in France than when they had started.9

**LEGITIMACY**

Related to the inadequacy of authority was the fact that legitimacy of NATO infrastructure showed no growth. At the national level, the United States exerted increasing pressure to reduce its major share of expenses. Other nations were unwilling significantly to expand their contributions and supported the program mainly in the areas where it benefited them directly. At the non-national level support was limited. Industrial groups interested in specific contracts gave expediential and ad hoc co-operation, while legislators and political groups were either apathetic or opposed.

The American share of infrastructure expenses was originally dominant, but later receded as the European nations were persuaded to take on larger burdens. Table 13—which depicts gross national contributions before the deduction of currency returns from infrastructure programs—shows that the United States subscription declined from almost 44 per cent of Slices II–VII to 25.77 per cent of Slices XVI–XX. Table 14 depicts net contributors—after the deduction of currency receipts from NATO infrastructure—for Slices I–VIII. The use of net contribution as an index of Allied participation makes apparent that, by 1958, the United States had been joined in the role of donor by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands.
At approximately this time Belgium also became a net contributor, and it is likely that France later crossed over the line. Table 15 shows that, during the early years of the infrastructure program, France was host for almost 25 per cent of NATO infrastructure, with concomitant gains to French industry. By 1965–66 France hosted only 6.6 per cent. Germany probably remained a net recipient. In spite of its increase in gross contribution to 21.86 per cent for Slices XVI–XX, the Federal Republic was host to 32.2 per cent of NATO projects and probably received the lion's share of the contracts involved.

Notwithstanding the broadening of the infrastructure base, national government policies reflected a growing unwillingness to support NATO infrastructure except when it was to their own immediate advantage. The United States originally contributed almost half the funds of the infrastructure program, seeing it as a means to encourage the general growth of the alliance and to provide military fixed facilities for the deployment of American troops and equipment. Gradually not only did the United States reduce its gross contribution share; it also gave greatest support to those undertakings in which prospects were best for sales of American equipment. In the early days a high percentage of infrastructure funds was spent on brick and mortar types of projects such as airfields, naval bases, training facilities, and pipelines. Here there were very limited American contracts for airfield equipment, communications materials, and electronic devices. In later efforts the United States stood to gain from a greater proportion of NATO investment in advanced equipment—for example, very low frequency (VLF) stations for submarine communications, high frequency single side-band radio links, radio relay systems in Italy and Turkey, a submarine cable in the Mediterranean. In the NADGE program, major components included special purpose computers, pencil beam radars, medium power radars of the FPS-27 variety, and supporting communications equipment.

The British gross contribution share declined slightly following NATO assumption of infrastructure responsibility from Western Union with Slice II; and the British government became
more concerned that the infrastructure program bring specific benefits. In the early years, Britain received NATO support for a significant number of facilities, particularly in Scotland; but subsequently, though the British continued attempts to get NATO funding, the Allies approved less work in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the British, like the Americans, eventually began giving lower priority to concrete-laying projects than to electronic ones. If there had to be construction of the first type, the British government preferred activity which benefited its BAOR—i.e., more construction of forward supply depots in Germany and less construction of pipelines on the Southeastern flank. In the electronics field, British aims were also similar to American, but tactics were different. Rather than "sell U.K.," the British aimed at "design penetration," hoping to achieve immediate adoption of British designs which would later create demands for British services.

As its host role declined, the French government eventually shared with the Anglo-Saxon governments a lack of enthusiasm for concrete-laying projects. Instead France supported tasks, such as NADGE, in which military benefits for air defense, economic benefits for French industry, and technological learning might all be combined.

The Germans emerged as major beneficiaries of the program. The government was enthusiastic about new concrete-laying projects in Germany, such as bridges and depots, though there were problems with land procurement under the federal system. At the same time, it favored modern technological co-operation from considerations both of military benefits and industrial-technological participation.

The major non-national actors concerned with NATO infrastructure were business concerns with a financial interest in contracts. Their support remained expediential and largely ad hoc. Industrialists in search of contracts lobbied at both the national and international levels—at national defense ministries, national delegations to NATO, and SHAPE. Their concern followed the contours of the NATO infrastructure program, with specific
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>43.679</td>
<td>36.98</td>
<td>30.85</td>
<td>25.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>...</td>
<td>13.72</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>21.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>45.46</td>
<td>15.041</td>
<td>11.87</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>13.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>12.758</td>
<td>9.88</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>10.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5.681</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>6.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>6.021</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>5.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>5.462</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>3.889</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2.767</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2.280</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Fifty per cent of the cost of Slice VII (b) was paid completely by Germany and the remainder was shared in accordance with the percentages indicated.
TABLE 14

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM
NET NATIONAL FOREIGN CURRENCY RECEIPTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL PROGRAM BUDGETS, 1951-1957 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Net Receipts</th>
<th>Net Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>22.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


national and industrial groups gaining or losing interest with shifts in the prospects for NATO contracts. Interest was strongest in such industries as construction, communications, and electronics which had been centers of infrastructure investment. Until the establishment of the NATO Industrial Advisory Group in 1968, the most formal institutional tie had existed between the American Delegation and the Defense Industry Advisory Group in Europe. As of 1967 DIAGE’s membership included not only aircraft executives but also representatives from companies interested in NATO infrastructure—for example, General Electric, Hughes, and IT&T.

Contractual relations traditionally existed between national Ministries supervising NATO infrastructure projects and individual industries concerned. With approval of the NADGE program, international consortia appeared for the first time in NATO infrastructure. The final stage of bidding was carried out by three large consortia headed by Hughes, IT&T, and Westinghouse,
respectively. In each of these groups, the consortium leader was in charge of the preparation and submission of bids as well as being responsible for the immediate supervision of work in the event of award of the contract. Neither of the losing consortia, however, survived defeat, and there was no indication that the winner—the Hughes consortium, rebaptized NADGECO—would outlive the completion of NADGE.

### TABLE 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE/ACE</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Legislators and political groups took less interest in the program. The NATO Parliamentarians mentioned NATO infrastructure by name only three times in their resolutions and recommendations (1957, 1958, 1959). American legislators emphasized the economic burdens that accompanied support of NATO’s infrastructure. In June, 1963, Senator Fulbright suggested that the Europeans should pay a larger share of infrastructure expenses; in April, 1966, Senator Douglas stated that the French government should reimburse the United States for evacuation
of military bases on French soil. In October, 1966, the Senate Committee on Government Operations said that if "the same inefficiency and misunderstanding that has affected U.S. participation in the NATO common infrastructure program in the past" were continued, "the United States stands to lose many millions of dollars as a result." The Committee believed it "imperative that such a disaster be avoided." Furthermore, the Committee thought that "U.S. relocation costs should be shared, to the maximum extent possible, by all the NATO allies and that the United States should not be made to pay more in the future simply because it provided more in the past."  

Elsewhere, apathy succeeded opposition for the British Labour Left and the German SPD, both of which had resisted, as part of a more general protest, construction of NATO infrastructure projects on their national soil.

LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

Although integration appeared to be limited, the infrastructure program was supported by the NATO leadership with an ideology including both general, sweeping ends and also more particular concrete activities that the Allies could undertake together. The most salient general aim, although obscured by more diffuse overlays and by lack of explicit statement, was the same as that for the NATO military force program—peace and security. Below this level, however, the justification for NATO infrastructure was more concrete than for NATO military forces. First, defense rather than deterrence received the place of honor; second, particular NATO military tasks, such as air defense, communications, and command and control, provided a general justification for specific programs of Allied military construction. This ideology could be expected to appeal especially to the European Allies, for whom it could be expected that defense would be of paramount importance should deterrence fail, and who would be reassured by tangible progress toward a defensive capability.
The broadest justification for NATO infrastructure came from the first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, who stressed not only military, but also financial and political benefits:

From the military point of view, a volume of infrastructure has been, and is being, built that would have been unattainable by national or bilateral plans alone. From the financial and constitutional point of view a remarkable new technique in the expenditure of money contributed to an international undertaking has been evolved. From the political point of view the realization of a common effort of such dimensions does resounding credit to the spirit of mutual understanding and joint purpose which has grown up in the Atlantic Community.\(^{13}\)

For early SACEUR's the program had a more focused general orientation. Eisenhower viewed NATO infrastructure as part of "the common defense." While the military forces would do the fighting, the task of infrastructure was included in that of "forging the weapons."\(^{14}\)

Less generally, in their reports commemorating the first and second anniversaries of SHAPE as an operational headquarters, Generals Eisenhower and Ridgway supported NATO military programs in air defense, and communications, and establishment of Allied military command and staff structures. Within these programs, they advocated and defended the inclusion of specific types of NATO military construction activity—the building of new airfields, jet fuel storage tanks, distribution pipelines to airfields, radar installations, radio-navigational aids, communications facilities, and headquarter sites. In addition, new supply depots, harbor facilities, and naval bases were urged.\(^{15}\)

The specific client group at which the program aimed seemed to be the European Allies. Not only would they benefit from new defensive capability; they could also rally behind Eisenhower's proposal that "a major and special contribution: in the field of "equipment" should come from the United States.\(^{16}\)

Later SACEUR's and Secretaries General, although they did not often refer to NATO infrastructure as such, continued to support general NATO military programs in air defense, communications,
and command and control. Implicit here was backing for specific NATO infrastructure activity in airfield construction and modernization; radar warning installations; surface-to-air missile sites; special ammunition sites; NADGE and its succeeding generations, and such innovations in communications as systems based on principles of radio wave reflection from different atmospheric layers, automatic switching equipment, and communications satellites.

General Gruenther was particularly concerned with air defense, claiming that “air defense has been one of the least effective operations of my command.” He proposed that the NATO Council grant SHAPE specific authority to co-ordinate a Western European early warning system and to consolidate it into four proposed regions (Northern, Southern, Central, and United Kingdom).

General Norstad also emphasized the importance of establishing an “integrated air defense.” In the words of his colleague Stikker, “The views of General Norstad were precise. They were simply that without integration there is no air defense.” General Lemnitzer stated that “We must ensure that the undoubted ability of modern air defense weapons to stop attacking aircraft is fully employed in an integrated defense of the Alliance.” “Forward bases and airfields” were an “essential part” of the strategic system. In reply to the argument that NADGE was obsolete because it was unable to bring down low-flying aircraft or missiles, Lemnitzer stated that aircraft remained effective until weapons “systems exist in sufficient quantity to repel air attack.” Until then, “the attacker’s aircraft are every bit as effective as they ever were.” Antimissile defense was a program for the future. Finally, for Dirk Stikker, “integration of air defense meant for NATO in Europe, one unified system.” “Integration,” he said, should comprise the joint detection, identification, interception and, if need be, destruction of enemy aircraft.”

In the area of communications, General Gruenther backed
the establishment of a system based on tropospheric and ionospheric scatter principles. General Norstad supported the NATO Forward Scatter Communications System, with tropospheric and ionospheric links. In addition, he noted that “the subject of command and control will continue to pre-occupy us.” Finally, General Lemnitzer emphasized “the importance of command and control procedures and communications networks, which are soundly conceived, and fully effective on a constant basis. Any and every improvement that is possible will be searched out and promptly adopted,” he said.18

While the United States was no longer eager to bear the brunt of the financial burden, this program could still exert an appeal for the European nations. Particularly in the area of integrated air defense, NATO infrastructure promised to provide defense advantages—detection of enemy aircraft and control of national air forces—which could not have been achieved within national boundaries.

With the French military withdrawal, a new broad canopy was added to the foregoing ideological justification. In addition to defense benefits appealing to the European Allies, Manlio Brosio pointed to NATO infrastructure as an important demonstration of the cohesion of the remaining Fourteen, who, by “working to adapt communications, infrastructure, and Agenices to the new situation” had “reasserted by deeds as well as words the necessity and vitality of NATO.” 19

DECISION-MAKING

The leadership was restrained in implementing its ideology by a decision-making structure in which instructed delegates had the last word. During the early years the leadership and its experts were sometimes able to exert a significant impact. Thus Lord Ismay recalled how he and three assistant secretaries-general helped in the negotiation of one of the initial cost-sharing formulas.
They dumped the whole problem in my lap, so I called in three assistant secretaries-general and each of us drew up our own list of what we thought the percentage of sharing should be, and then we averaged them out. I couldn’t for the life of me possibly say on what basis I acted, except that I tried to take into account all sorts of things like the ability to pay and whether the building would be going on in a country so that it would benefit from the construction and the money spent.

Then we got into the Council meeting in April of 1953, and everybody around the table thought it was a jolly good distribution except for his own, which they thought was too high. Anyway, we went around the table and finally got agreement of each to take what was given within 1.8 per cent of the total, and then we simply divided up that 1.8 per cent among the fourteen, and that’s all there was to it. That’s why all the shares are in those funny percentage amounts.20

Subsequent organizational development, however, upgraded national instruction at the expense of independent expertise. The most important decision-making role was played by individuals within the national delegations charged with special infrastructure responsibilities. These men briefed the permanent representatives when infrastructure issues reached the Council and sat on the Infrastructure Committee and Payments and Progress Committee. In general their behavior was determined by home Ministries which exercised control on general ceilings for national contributions and on specific projects of significant size or importance as precedents. Most infrastructure representatives were middle-level civil servants, the civilian equivalents of army colonels, who exercised little influence on the drafting of their instructions. Although national representatives responsible for infrastructure occasionally used discretion or deviated from guidance, this did not necessarily imply gains for the NATO program. First, such independence was likely to be granted only for smaller projects which national ministries believed to be relatively unimportant; second, national representatives were seldom able to modify their instructions to concede more than originally intended; rather, their bargaining tactics were frequently aimed at conceding less.
SACEUR was able to exert a direct influence and provide some impetus for objectivity at SHAPE. Thus one American concerned with infrastructure stated that, “SHAPE is under political pressure by everybody, and SACEUR seems to succumb to everybody except the United States. Many times he decides against American projects in favor of the Europeans, and you have to go through the American delegation to fight him. Sometimes I think the United States would get a better hearing if SACEUR were a German.” Nevertheless, the same variables of personality, American dominance, and national instruction which neutralized SHAPE as a vehicle for the military force program probably also weakened infrastructure. Wariness of subversion by the Americans, the importance of national policy, and ultimate control of the SHAPE officer by the national delegation are all implied by the following excerpt from an interview with a member of a European delegation to NATO Headquarters.

The officers going to SHAPE are handpicked by the Ministry of Defense and brainwashed before they are sent. On arrival they are briefed by me, and from time to time we contact each other. That doesn’t mean they have to push the national line. The United States puts a pretty tight curb on its people but other countries do it much less.

For example, the man comes in and I brief him on our position, what will be acceptable, not necessarily the maximum. Three months later that officer will take a completely different position. Then I have to go back to the Ministry of Defense and fight him.

The Comptroller for Infrastructure, an American member of the International Staff/Secretariat, acted as Chairman of both the Infrastructure Committee and the Payments and Progress Committee. Yet any independent impact by the International Staff/Secretariat was limited by the jealous watch of national delegates, and also by delegate skepticism about the Staff’s effective expertise and internal organization. Within the International Staff financiers had usually occupied the top positions; under them were both civil and electronics engineers. National
delegates claimed that it was difficult for the financiers either to shape or advance the recommendations of their subordinates and that the influence of the subordinates was limited by misorganization. For example, the airfield section was composed mainly of civil engineers with little capability for electronics aspects, while in the radar section there were mainly electronics engineers and a lack of electricians and mechanics to handle such projects as roads for the radar sites.

Secretary General Stikker tried to expand the role of the International Staff in the case of NADGE, but without success. Successive SACEUR's had supported the concept of integrated air defense which NADGE advanced; and the Allies were in favor of the project. One of the important remaining problems was that of maintaining security. Stikker was willing to undertake responsibility for the security of NADGE if he were given authority over the whole project. He suggested that a NATO Production and Logistics Organization be created as part of the International Staff/Secretariat, with a Director immediately responsible to the Secretary General. If NADGE were established to be independent of the International Staff/Secretariat—as was the case with the other NPLO's—then he would refuse security accountability.

Stikker had discussions in the initial stages of negotiation with the Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, John McCone, and received indications of American backing. Ultimately, however, his proposal attracted few favorable clients. National opposition, particularly from France, and American retreat resulted in the establishment of a NATO Production and Logistics Organization for which the Secretary General would not be directly responsible and for which he was granted only a species of "watching brief."

COALITIONS

There is insufficient evidence positively to identify either a coalition supporting NATO infrastructure or subcoalitions supporting most particular projects. Those facts which are available,
however, suggest that coalitional support did exist but was of limited use in furthering the goals of the leadership because of restricted membership and reluctance to agree to more than minimal programs.

The outlines of a general supporting coalition for the leadership's ideology are indicated by the differentiation between net contributor and net recipient nations. If net contributor status is equated with support, then the general infrastructure coalition probably consisted only of the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Within this group the United States exerted efforts to reduce its contributions and increase its share of contracts, while the others were reluctant to assume large burdens. Consequently, the size of the annual infrastructure program gradually decreased in spite of the support of the leadership.

In two specific sub-programs—NADGE and relocation following the French military withdrawal—the pattern was roughly similar. The major supporters of the NADGE program may probably be identified by national participation in the major industrial consortia bidding for the contract shown in Appendix C. The United States, Britain, France, and Germany were represented in each of the three groupings; Italy appeared twice; and Belgium and the Netherlands each appeared once. The winning consortium, Hughes, included all of these nations except Belgium.

As a result of divisions within the coalition, the NADGE program remained minimal. NADGE had originally been programmed in Slices XII–XV at an estimated cost of £100 million. The European Allies had favored it as necessary support for such aircraft as the F 104 G and as an improvement on existing systems of air defense. The United States, however, opposed it on both military and economic grounds; the Department of Defense estimated that the projected air defense and control system was already obsolescent and that triple the existing estimate would be required to construct one which was militarily acceptable. Following substantial delay, the United States
agreed in 1963 to allow NATO to begin planning, but only on condition that the program have an absolute ceiling of £110 million and that the entire American contribution be returned to the United States in the form of NADGE contracts. The other nations agreed, extending the agreement to include all contributing countries so that NADGE would produce no national foreign exchange benefits.\(^2^1\)

In the second specific program, De Gaulle’s military withdrawal faced the remaining Fourteen with the problems of relocating the major military headquarters—SHAPE and AFCENT—and the possible construction of bypass facilities for pipelines, communications, and the like. Financial problems were made more difficult by the gradual departure of France, a member of the general coalition, not only from the military force program but from infrastructure as well.

French officials in early 1966 emphasized that the withdrawal was not for infrastructure reasons, and that infrastructure was part of the “Alliance,” which De Gaulle had endorsed, rather than the “Organization,” which he had castigated. Following exchange of notes, however, the French position became more complicated. On the one hand, the government was eager to reap the benefit of infrastructure programs such as Forward Scatter and NADGE, which provided air defense data. On the other hand, it was unwilling to contribute to the expenses of relocating Allied facilities. As for facilities remaining on French soil, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville presented the issue when he said, “If there is what is known as residual value, questions of compensation will arise.”\(^2^2\) France’s position crystallized when the French government countered an anticipated Allied claim of residual value by its own plea for reconversion costs. As host the government contended that it had invested a significant amount in addition to the NATO contribution and that not all projects on French soil were directly to French benefit. Continued French participation in the NATO infrastructure program was problematical. French representatives to NATO were uncertain how far their writ would run and urged their Allies to
limit 1966 discussion to the 1967 program which they had the authority to approve, rather than probing 1968 intentions which they felt would draw unfavorable attention from the Elysée Palace. In September, 1966, the French government publicly announced that it would cease to contribute to the cost of most NATO infrastructure beginning January 1, 1967. In practice it continued to pay for NADGE and to participate in project authorizations by the Payments and Progress Committee on an ad hoc basis.23

The remaining Fourteen decided to move not only NATO's military facilities but its political headquarters as well. Under the Chairmanship of Deputy Secretary General Roberts, Working Group No. 1 of the Fourteen was established to investigate legal claims against France for facility relocation and loss of use; in mid-1967, after one and one-half years of study, the members had assessed the damage in billions of dollars and sent their report to their home capitals for consideration of further action.

While the Fourteen agreed on these broader issues, they were less dynamic about details. Following the French withdrawal from the blanket cost-sharing formula for Slices XVI–XX, the Fourteen began renegotiation. They were unable quickly to consummate a new compact; in the meantime they bargained on a project-by-project basis to share the expenses of activities in which France refused to participate.

Conflict over the financial burdens of relocation was more serious. SACEUR opposed taking relocation expenses from the regular infrastructure budget, which he claimed was already austere. Infrastructure, he felt, should be supported at the annual average of £45.6 million implied in the previously agreed cost-sharing formula for Slices XVI–XX; relocation costs should be met either from other budgets or from supplemental infrastructure authorizations. He was supported by the Germans who wanted most relocation expenses to come from the military budget, presented in Table 16, where their gross percentage was lower than in the infrastructure formula.

The United States, on the other hand, favored an annual rate
of expenditure substantially below £45.6 million and a heavy infrastructure contribution to relocation. This would leave room for meeting the relocation costs of American military facilities under NATO's pre-financing procedure. Britain also favored the lion's share of relocation costs being taken from the infrastructure budget. Britain's infrastructure portion was relatively small and there was a fairly rigid ceiling, in contrast to the military budget where the British contribution was higher and the ceiling was more flexible.

Eventually the American-British position won general support; and SACEUR's recommended Slice XVI was reduced by approximately 25 per cent. This meant that projects already underway were to be delayed and the number of new ones reduced. In any case, the new military headquarters were to be "streamlined" versions of the old ones, more efficient perhaps, but also smaller.
FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER

There is little evidence of the integration or spill-over in NATO infrastructure which might have been anticipated in a technically infused area. Identical or convergent interests could have been expected to be more prominent in infrastructure than in political consultation or military forces for a number of reasons: national military construction budgets represented only a fraction of national foreign or defense expenditures; military construction contracts involved the utilitarian sanctions associated with business activity; technical personnel such as military and civilian engineers played a more prominent role in this sector of activity than more traditional categories of diplomatic or military personnel. Nevertheless, the political element was strong and the technical element weak. Crisis was the context of important infrastructure progress; in other circumstances there was substantial conflict, interest convergence was unstable, and common interests were inherently non-expansive.

In the early years of the Alliance, the same Western perceptions of the Soviet threat which led to the military force and armaments programs occasioned the construction of supporting NATO airfields, communications, headquarters, fuel supply, radar, and naval, navigational and training facilities. Following Suez important funding was approved in February, 1957, for the construction of an extensive early warning radar network, a communications system based on principles of ionospheric and tropospheric forward scatter surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and special ammunition storage (SAS) facilities. The Berlin crisis gave new impetus to certain aspects of NATO infrastructure. Western weakness in the air was indicated by the fact that the air defense system of the German Democratic Republic brought down several allied planes over East Germany while the West was unable to maintain contact with them. The Allies responded during 1961 with an infrastructure acceleration program, centering around SAM and SAS facilities, and with the approval in principle of NADGE. Finally, the French withdrawal of 1966,
because it had implications for an important territorial link in NATO's chain of communications, helped to produce the Alliance's initial use of communications satellites.

In more routine circumstances, conflict of interest centered around the finances and technology of infrastructure. As Table

**TABLE 17**

**Estimated National Military Construction Expenditures**

*At Purchasing Power Parity Conversion Rates* *

(In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Defense Expenditures</th>
<th>Construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>$51,467</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4,398</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>5,178</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


17 suggests, military construction budgets, though a small proportion of national defense budgets, still represented substantial sums. National governments making these expenditures were unwilling to support NATO infrastructure at the expense of their own industries and workers. In areas of more advanced technology, nations like the United States were tight-fisted with their secrets. In some cases they did not even apply for prefinancing because of government unwillingness to reveal project details.

Interest convergence was increasingly undermined by conflict. Original convergence between user-host, contributor-recipient interests had been complex. Net user nations, which tended also
to be net contributors, benefited from the NATO infrastructure program through NATO funding of projects useful for defense, access across the territory of host nations, and host provision of land and utilities. Net host nations, which were usually also net recipients, received jointly funded defense installations as well as employment, business contracts, and foreign exchange gains through project construction and subsequent emplacements of Allied troops. This convergence gradually deteriorated. User-contributors such as the United States attempted to avoid program expansion, to reduce their financial shares, or at least avoid raising them, and to steer the program in directions which would help meet their particular military needs and involve larger shares of infrastructure contracts. At the same time they hoped to increase International Staff efficiency and control. Host-recipients tended to be more favorable toward program expansion, though poorer nations like Greece and Turkey found that NATO infrastructure's economic benefits sometimes proved to be less than the burdens, for example, of providing land and utilities. These nations, however, resisted attempts to increase NATO authority over their administration of NATO contracts, where loose procedures of accountability might hide significant profits.

Finally, the area of interest identity diminished with time. The common technical interest of the Allies was served by the fact that NATO infrastructure provided a viable war-time chain of command and logistics, as well as a base for peacetime military planning. Limits on this consensus were implicit when the NATO military force program, which logically preceded the NATO infrastructure program, failed to expand. In this situation common interest in new infrastructure itself naturally became smaller. Once facilities such as war headquarters, pipelines, air bases, and training facilities were in place—first in the central states and then increasingly in the peripheral ones—it became difficult to justify more than marginal increments or maintenance/modernization expenditures. Program expansion then became dependent on finding more elusive common interests in areas of the new technology.
The institutions of NATO science can be divided into categories of pure science, defense science, and military science. While there was a general pattern of structural differentiation and change in each of these areas, binding procedures did not develop past the unanimity rule, and ultimately the NATO Science program amounted to an approximate annual total of only $10 million.

INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

Pure Science

Following the Suez and Sputnik crises, and the reports of the Committee on Non-Military Co-operation and the Task Force on Action by NATO in the Field of Scientific and Technical Co-operation, the heads of government in December, 1957, approved the creation of specific NATO institutions in the area of pure science. They “decided to establish forthwith a Science Committee on which all of the NATO countries will be represented by men highly qualified to speak authoritatively on scientific policy. In addition,” they stated, “a scientist of outstanding qualifications will be appointed as Science Advisor to the Secretary General of NATO.” In March, 1958, the first Science Advisor to the NATO Secretary General took office and the Science
NATO Science Committee held its first meeting. The Science Advisor’s rank was raised to Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs in 1962. His staff gradually increased until by 1966 it numbered ten persons, approximately two-thirds of whom were concerned exclusively or primarily with pure science.

During this period the Science Committee created a subcommittee and a series of advisory groups. In 1959 it established the Subcommittee on Oceanographic Research, the Advisory Panel on the Advanced Study Institutes Program, and the Advisory Panel on Meteorology. In 1960 it created Advisory Panels on the Research Grants Program, on Defense Psychology (later to become the Advisory Panel on Human Factors), and on Operational Research, and in 1961 the Advisory Panel on Radiometeorology.  

Table 18 outlines the five major sets of activities which developed and cut across the pure science structures, providing resources for their tasks. In 1959 programs of Fellowships and Advanced Study Institutes came into existence; in 1960 a program of Research Grants began; in 1962 Operational Research was inaugurated; and in 1967 Human Factors were introduced.

The first of these, the Science Fellowship Program, had as its main aim “to increase the numbers of scientists and engineers trained in research, and to facilitate the exchange of graduate and post-doctoral research workers between member countries.” Most fellowships involved study abroad, but in some cases they were awarded for study in home universities. The dominant subjects of study were chemistry and physics, but engineering, mathematics, the medical sciences, biology, and geology were also “substantially represented.” The Advanced Study Institutes program supported summer schools “originally patterned after the annual summer schools in physics held at Varenna in Italy and Les Houches in France.” Subjects of study included such diverse topics as air-sea interaction, electronic aspects of biochemistry, quantum electronics and coherent light, and geophysics: the earth’s environment. The Research Grants Program stressed “international research rather than fellowships and
### TABLE 18

**ANNUAL EXPENDITURES ON NATO SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMS**

(In Thousands of Dollars)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<td>$1,750</td>
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<td>$2,500</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
<td>$2,600</td>
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<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>650</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research grants</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>735</td>
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<td>Operational research</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$1,150</td>
<td>$2,400</td>
<td>$3,600</td>
<td>$3,800</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$4,200</td>
<td>$4,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NATO Document: Annex 1 to AC/137-WP/22.*
meetings,” though “about 20 per cent of the program may be
devoted to helping scientific research in the less developed mem­
ber countries.” One of the largest projects involved the study of
the propagation characteristics of signals from satellites. It was
conducted under the direction of the National Research Council
Microwave Center in Florence, and scientists from the Universi­
ties of Paris, Manchester, and Athens, and from the Norwegian
Defense Research Establishment, the Ionospheric Institute of
the German Postal Service, and the United States Air Force
Research Laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts participated.
Another large grant, under the direction of the University of
Bristol, focused on the study of cosmic rays with balloons. Other
smaller projects involved the co-operation of only two or a few
laboratories from different nations, or—in the case of countries
like Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Iceland—purely na­
tional research efforts. The Operational Research Program em­
phasized the application of scientific methods to the study of
business problems, both military and civil, in order to provide
executives with quantitative bases for decisions. NATO supported
“a series of visits by consultants to countries where there was an
insufficient awareness of the value of this approach,” a Graduate
Apprenticeship Program “to enable young scientists to spend one
or two years periods in operational research centers in some of
the NATO countries,” and a series of international conferences
each year, ranging “from introductory courses to more special­
ized discussions on particular topics.” In later years, these confer­
ences were “almost entirely concerned with problems of direct
interest in a military context.” Finally, the Human Factors Pro­
gram concentrated on psychological and social-psychological
processes in defense and non-defense contexts. The Advisory
Panel hoped to promote information exchange and advanced
instruction through conferences, symposia, Advanced Study In­
stitutes, seminars, visiting lectureships, and study visits. In addi­
tion NATO aimed to support the conduct of co-operative research.4

In spite of these developments, binding institutional proce­
dures remained anemic. Neither the Assistant Secretary General,
his staff, nor the Advisory Panels were formally able to manipulate nations against their will. Although the first two could make recommendations and influence outcomes, and although the Advisory Panels adopted an informal pattern of majority decision-making, the decisions in NATO's pure science program were ultimately made by the Science and Civil Budget Committees, where the unanimity rule gave each nation a veto on projects and policies to which it might be strongly opposed.

Moreover, the total pure science program exhibited a period of initial growth but then stabilized at a low level relative to national programs. As Table 18 (above) shows, between 1959 and 1966, pure science programs were supported by a budget which rose from $1.15 million to $4.2 million. In the years between 1962 and 1966, however, the budget remained in the area of $4 million, and there were indications that it was being undercut by rising price levels. A Science Committee document reported that, in "comparison with the 1963 programme viewed as a whole, the 1964 programme represents a constant budgetary level but is somewhat smaller both in the number of fellowships and in the number of months of study that it supports. While the total cost has remained level (+.3 per cent), total fellowships have declined by 3.2 per cent and total months of study by 8.0 per cent." 5

Defense Science

In 1964, a new Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, Dr. John L. McLucas, was appointed. McLucas came to the position from the United States Department of Defense, where he had been Deputy Director of Research and Engineering for Tactical Warfare Programs. A new emphasis on defense science was represented by McLucas' appointment. The four men who had preceded him in the posts of Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs and Science Advisor had all been academic, physicists from major American universities—Prof. N. F. Ramsay (Harvard), Prof. F. Seitz (Illinois), Prof. W. A.
Nierenberg (Berkeley), Prof. W. P. Allis (MIT)—rather than defense scientists. McLucas, in a news interview which he held upon assuming office, said that he hoped to see the NATO science program shift toward a greater military emphasis and toward greater alignment with NATO’s military needs. The Defense Research Directors Committee (DRDC) would meet three or four times a year and would concern itself with programs such as modern tanks, Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft, electronic data processing, anti-submarine warfare, air defense, aircraft identification equipment, long-term scientific studies, defense research seminars, and the spread of operations research techniques. Furthermore, he hoped for a greater defense emphasis in such fields as communications, ionospheric studies, meteorology, and data processing.  

The dominant structure in NATO defense science was the Defense Research Directors Committee, which was composed of officials from national defense research establishments. Initially an informal annual assembly, the DRDC was eventually given regular NATO status and held its first meeting in October, 1964. The terms of reference of the DRDC directed it to: consider future weapons requirements and co-operate in research programs that would provide the necessary knowledge for the development of these weapons; provide advice to the Military Authorities and the NATO Council on the application of advances in science; review for the benefit of the NATO Military Authorities the possible military consequences of current and forecast advances in technology and the application of these to weapons development.

The DRDC developed no binding procedures; it took no concrete action nor did it recommend specific activity to governments. Its major project was the updating of several technological forecasts in a series which had reviewed the state of fourteen areas of military technology and projected the findings into the 1970’s. Related projects included emphases in the areas of NATO Basic Military Requirements, air defense, aircraft identification, communication satellites, and military operational research.
DRDC activities were supported by no substructure of committees similar to that of pure science, by only half the number of international staff, and by no independent budgetary allocation. The studies undertaken by the DRDC were the product of work by the national agencies which were represented by the DRDC members.

The high level committee which had reviewed NATO activities in arms co-operation, AC 253, had also considered NATO defense science. In its report which the Council approved in June, 1966, the Committee called for the abolition of the DRDC and removal of military aspects of science from the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs. In its place the report recommended the establishment of a Defense Research Group (DRG) to be responsible to the Conference of National Armaments Directors and to be connected with the division of the Secretariat headed by the Assistant Secretary General for Armaments and Infrastructure.

In the summer of 1966, Dr. McLucas left NATO, taking with him two members of the defense science staff. By autumn 1967, no successor had been appointed, the post being occupied for a year by an "acting" assistant secretary general chosen from within the Science Division.

At the last meeting of the DRDC in December, 1966, provision was made for the initial assembly of DRG. When the DRG met in March, 1967, its mission had been downgraded and Science Division participation reduced. While it would continue to emphasize basic defense research, the attempt to formulate NATO Basic Military Requirements had been abandoned. Whereas the Chair had previously been occupied by Dr. McLucas, the new DRG Chairman was the Norwegian representative, Mr. Finn Lied, and the Acting Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs attended only as an observer.

Military Science

Three technical research structures were responsible to the NATO military authorities. The first of these, the Advisory Group
for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) was recommended in February, 1951, by an Ad Hoc Conference of NATO Research Directors; existed for a trial period of two years under United States logistic support; and became a NATO Standing Group Agency supported by NATO funds in 1954. In February, 1955, the second body, the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center was officially opened at The Hague. During its early years it was sustained financially by the United States and administered by a Dutch non-governmental research agency, RVO-TNO. Following a Council decision in February, 1960, the Air Defense Technical Center was maintained by NATO’s military budget; in March, 1963, it severed ties with RVO-TNO and became an International Military Organization immediately subordinate to SACEUR and in October, its name was shortened to SHAPE Technical Center and its mission enlarged to include not only the limited area of air defense but also the whole spectrum of “defensive and offensive operations relating to Allied Command Europe.” The third group, the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center (SASWREC) was commissioned by SACLANT in May, 1959, at La Spezia, Italy, under initial American funding. In October, 1962, the council adopted a Charter designating SASWREC as an International Military Organization under SACLANT’s continuing policy direction; and the transfer to NATO occurred during the first half of 1963.8

The structure of AGARD included a National Delegates Board, a number of technical panels and committees appointed by the NDB, and a permanent staff of about fifteen experts in Paris. Its mission was to bring together the leading personalities of the NATO nations in the fields of science and technology relating to aerospace for the following purposes:

(a) Recommending effective ways for the member nations to use their research and development capabilities for the common benefit of the NATO community;

(b) Providing scientific and technical advice and assistance to the Standing Group in the field of aerospace research and development;
(c) Continuously stimulating advances in the aerospace sciences relevant to strengthening the common defense posture;

(d) Improving the co-operation among member nations in aerospace research and development;

(e) Exchanging of scientific and technical information;

(f) Providing assistance to member nations for the purpose of increasing their scientific and technical potential;

(g) Rendering scientific and technical assistance, as requested, to other NATO bodies and to member nations in connection with research and development problems in the aerospace field.

AGARD placed special emphasis in the areas of aerospace, avionics, combustion and propulsion, flight mechanics, fluid dynamics, structures and materials, and technical information; an International Consultant and Exchange Program; technical meetings, symposia, and colloquia; and a series of surveys and technical studies under the AGARDograph program. In support of these activities, the total annual AGARD budget was approximately $1 million.

The SHAPE Technical Center, as it existed in 1967, was under the direction of SACEUR, who received advice from a Scientific Committee of National Representatives. STC's task consisted of two major segments: first, there were problems of air defense, communications and data handling, areas of concern since the mid-1950's; here STC was concerned with the ACE High communications system, the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) project, and NATO satellite communications. Secondly, STC activity centered on analytical problems of current ACE systems in such fields as operational research and systems analysis.

STC had a staff of approximately 90 scientists, 80 technicians, and 150 support personnel, drawn from all of the Allies except Iceland, Luxembourg, and—beginning in 1966—France. Its budget was about $3 million annually.

The SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center (SASWREC) came under the policy direction of SACLANT, assisted
by the SASWREC Scientific Committee of National Representatives which was to "assist SACLANT in establishing the Center's work programme and provide the Center with scientific and technical advice in the field of anti-submarine warfare." The Center's mission was
to provide scientific and technical advice and assistance to SACLANT in the field of anti-submarine warfare, and to be in all respects responsive through SACLANT to the requirements of NATO naval forces in this field. As a subsidiary function the Center may, without prejudice to its main task, render scientific and technical assistance, within the approved programme, to NATO nations requesting aid with anti-submarine warfare problems. The Center shall perform the following functions:

(a) operational research and analysis;
(b) research and limited development (but not engineering for manufacture) in the field of anti-submarine warfare, including oceanography;
(c) advisory and consultant work;
(d) exploratory research;
(e) such other related tasks as may be necessary.\(^1\)

SASWREC's task centered around the goal of antisubmarine warfare to seek, find, and destroy enemy submarines. It involved data collection in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, with tests for water temperature, salinity, and bottom conditions; the evaluation of present ASW systems; and the projection of future ASW requirements. Various groups at the Center worked in support of these assignments. The oceanography group was the largest and utilized both a smaller workboat and the 2,000-ton research vessel "Maria Paolina," which was run by the Italian government and leased to the Center, and represented a laboratory extension of the La Spezia facilities. Of special importance was a study of the Straits of Gibraltar with reference to the problems of cross-currents, temperature, salinity, and the nature of the ocean bottom. An operations research group studied such subjects as convoy formation and search patterns. Finally there were
groups whose activities were focused around sound propagation and target classification.

SASWREC was originally staffed by 19 scientists. In early 1966, 50 scientists were included in an authorized personnel complement of 205, and the annual budget was between $2 and $2.5 million.\textsuperscript{12}

Binding institutional procedures were weak in each of the three agencies. Ultimate decisions, influenced by advice from the military commanders and various committees of national representatives, remained with the Military Budget Committee, where nations preserved their right of veto.

\textbf{AUTHORITY}

The lack of substantial institutional progress was complemented by slight evidence of increase in NATO's authority, either in terms of direct administration or of effectiveness.

The major NATO pure science effort was the Science Fellowship Program, where NATO administration was indirect, with grants applied for and administered through national agencies. Thus the NATO Scientific Affairs Division stated that

the Science Committee exercises general supervision over the Programme, but the detailed administration is carried out by an agency in each country, which, in many cases, is the same agency administering other national fellowship schemes. These agencies select the Fellows, determine and pay their stipends and travel expenses, and negotiate with the universities in other countries to gain acceptance for them. Selection is based entirely on scientific merit and ability, but practices vary from one country to another.\textsuperscript{13}

The only tangible accomplishment of the NATO fellowship program was an indication that its establishment had led the governments of Greece and Turkey to set up national science councils, a goal of the Armand report, in order to administer applications and grants for their own nationals.\textsuperscript{14}
NATO's Science Committee, subcommittees, and the International Staff directly administered the smaller portion of the pure science effort: advanced study institutes, research grants, and operational research. Table 18 (above) shows that, between 1959 and 1966, the budgets of these activities increased both absolutely and relative to fellowships. The real share of the directly administered programs was further expanded by the transfer of a growing proportion of their administrative expenses to the fellowship budget. Nevertheless, NATO did not maintain tight control over its projects. In the Advanced Study Institutes and Research Grants programs, NATO guidelines emphasized international attendance and international collaboration; but following approval of their requests, NATO awarded money to individual program directors who then redistributed it without strict supervision by, or strict reporting to, the Organization on either the extent to which the original proposal had been implemented or the specific degree of international co-operation which had taken place.

In defense science there was also little evidence of NATO authority. The major activity of the DRDC was making studies which culminated in conclusions rather than explicit recommendations for action. There is no public reason to believe that whatever implicit recommendations were contained in these studies achieved a serious positive effect on government policies.

The military agencies also concentrated on studies, with no formal recommendations to member nations. Some impact was achieved by AGARD, which took part in the selection of the Fiat G 91 as the NATO Lightweight Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft, and by STC, which participated in the original design, implementation, and operation of the ACE High communications system and played a role in the development of NADGE and NATO SATCOM. Even here, however, influence depended on support from the NATO military commanders and on the voluntary agreement of national decision-makers.
LEGITIMACY

The deficiencies of NATO science in institutional autonomy and authority accompanied a lack of significant progress in legitimacy. At the national level, there were increases in the number of net contributors, but nations were reluctant to expand the size of the program. At non-national levels, support came mainly from scientific groups and the NATO Parliamentarians, but had little impact on the program.

The general pattern of national support for NATO science was one in which the United States bore the brunt of the initial burden, but reduced its share as other nations could be persuaded to take it up. While contributor nations increased in number, they showed no disposition radically to expand the science program.

In pure science, this pattern is hinted at by Table 19, which shows gross national contribution percentages, without allowance for different program benefits. Thus in 1959 the United States' gross contribution was half the pure science budget; by 1964–1967 this had been reduced to less than one-quarter. Table 20 presents net national contributions to the NATO Fellowship program, with allowance for national distribution of fellowships. It shows that in 1960 the United States was alone in providing net fellowship support; but by 1967 it had been joined by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Although comparable figures are not available, a similar pattern probably existed in Research Grants. During the years through 1966, NATO had awarded 235 research grants, 159 of which had involved international co-operation. The 76 remaining projects, which were purely national, were distributed among net fellowship recipients: Turkey received 34, Greece 19, Portugal 14, Italy 6, and Iceland 3.

In defense science, the United States again provided the initial support, but the Allies were less eager to increase their contribution. Not only were they unwilling to give money for a separate budget; they were also reluctant to supply additional
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<td>1.090</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.1972</td>
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* Undisclosed source. Abbreviations used above are as follows: F = Fellowship Program, ASI = Advanced Study Institutes, RG = Research Grants.
### Table 20: Part I

**NATO Fellowship Program: Net National Receipts and Contributions As Percentages of Total Program Budgets, 1960-1967**

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* Undisclosed source. Abbreviations used above are as follows: R = Receipt, C = Contribution.
personnel for the international staff. In 1964 Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs McLucas requested staff assistance from the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. In spite of his personal visits to London and Ottawa, the British and Canadian governments rejected the requests. The United States was somewhat more helpful, eventually sending three officers, but lack of support from the Allies resulted in these officers being only tangentially attached to NATO. The Allies refused to authorize the NATO salary contribution provided for under the special remuneration agreement in effect for U.S. nationals, and the United States government was forced to bear the entire expense. By the summer of 1966 the United States had withdrawn these individuals.

In the military technical programs, the United States initially established and financially supported all three agencies, or their precursors—AGARD in 1952, the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center in 1954, and SASWREC in 1959. Subsequently, as these agencies came under the aegis of NATO, other nations assumed part of the American contribution.

The pattern of legitimacy was such that net contributor nations to the NATO science program—those which did not receive their full financial contribution back in the form of scientific program benefits—tended to combine their financial support with resistance to rapid expansion. Thus a considerable number of countries contributed to the pure science program while at the same time opposing broad program growth, arguing that such aims of NATO science as political cohesion, Western scientific progress, and information exchange were amply served by budgetary increases keeping pace with the cost of living. When task expansion in excess of this guideline was proposed, national delegates were quick to invoke the greater legitimacy of the OECD or UNESCO for international scientific endeavors. Net recipient nations—those whose contributions were less than their program benefits—tended to advocate more rapid expansion, seeing program growth as a form of economic aid and income redistribution.
The most important source of domestic support for NATO science came from scientific bodies. The agencies shown in Appendix D were among those that contributed administrative services and occasional financial supplements to the pure science program. Scientific groups, both governmental and non-governmental, gave expediential support to the program because they saw it as a useful tool for extracting financial support from their national governments. Scientists felt that money taken away from NATO would be totally lost to science, and would not be reinvested in other national or international scientific programs. Nevertheless, they admitted the greater legitimacy of OECD or UNESCO as a frame for new international programs.

At the supranational level, there was verbal support from the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, mostly in the context of pure science projects. According to one analysis, the NPC between 1956 and 1963 passed twenty-eight scientific and technical resolutions in which the ratio of concrete policy proposals to platitudinous or procedural statements was exceptionally high. Yet the NPC seemed to have little positive effect on national policies. National executive officials tended to view many NPC proposals as utopian; legislative bodies were not eager to contribute money; and most legislators remained unaware of the NATO science program.20

LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

The lack of integration in science came about in spite of leadership support. Over time, most NATO leaders promoted NATO science, though with an ideological mix which included exhortation in terms of general, relatively abstract goals, but also often concentrated heavily on more tangible and more limited objectives. At the highest level of generality, scientific cooperation was defended in the name of the Atlantic Community and as a response to the Soviet scientific threat. At a lower level of abstraction, the leadership promoted joint efforts for reasons of social welfare and defense capability. Next came justification in
terms of defense programs which NATO science was supposed to support. Most specifically the leadership identified those concrete tasks and structures which should be the center of co-operative action and implied the specific client groups at which the program was aimed.

The widest range of appeal was that expounded by Spaak, under whom the NATO Science Program formally began, who spoke in terms of the Atlantic Community, Atlantic integration, and response to the challenge of the Soviet Sputniks. In September, 1958, he wrote that “the organization of scientific cooperation” should be accomplished “as quickly as possible. In a word,” he continued, “the Atlantic Alliance should become the Atlantic Community.” A few months earlier he had called the second Soviet Sputnik “another potential risk in the field of scientific research and technical development.” He summoned the West to respond by “procedures beginning in mutual assistance and wide-scale cooperation and moving towards the goal of integration.”

Below this level of generality, Spaak emphasized that Allied scientific co-operation was the only way in which a modern defense could be achieved without sacrificing the benefits of social welfare. Posing the issue in terms of the choice between “Sputnik and the washing machine,” he went on to say that the “dual effort to maintain and increase the standard of living of our peoples and to make constant progress in the fields of science and defense cannot be continued by any one Western country alone—and when I say any one Western country, I mean even the most powerful and prosperous of them. If we want to go on doing both these things we must unite and we must collaborate.”

More specifically, Spaak laid special emphasis on the activities of pure science. In his speech to the NATO Parliamentarians in 1960 he not only supported existing pure science programs but also the “magnificent idea of an Atlantic Institute of Science and Technology.” By 1960, however, Spaak was openly discouraged about NATO science. He confessed to the Parliamentarians that
“things are not exactly as I should like, because our progress, in spite of all our efforts, is slow in spite of often being along the right lines.”  

Subsequent Secretaries General moved to ground which had a less sweeping view than the terrain he had staked out. In lieu of Spaak’s formula of Atlantic Community, response to the Sputniks, defense, and welfare, Stikker and Brosio stressed a subtask of defense—arms standardization—as a rationale for Allied scientific co-operation. Stikker pointed to NATO’s failure to achieve “standardization of weapons” and stated that, “as the pace of progress becomes so rapid that there is more than a little truth in the scientist’s epigram ‘if it works it’s obsolete,’ we are being driven further, almost in spite of ourselves, towards a greater measure of cooperation in development and production. The best way of achieving this,” he said “is to get agreement at the earliest possible stage and indeed, if it can be achieved, before detailed designing even starts.”  

Brosio repeated the same theme, saying that the goal of “standardized armaments” required “cooperation at the earliest possible stage, before national attitudes have hardened” and intensification of “activity in the fields of pure science and initial research.”  

As for specific tasks and structures, Stikker emphasized the establishment of an International Institute of Science and Technology, while Brosio advanced the cause of the Defense Research Directors Committee. Stikker hoped that the International Institute would “be given the strongest support.” Brosio said that he regarded the DRDC as a “major step forward in the field of allied cooperation.”  

Although military leaders made few public statements directly in support of scientific co-operation, they tended to favor it for defense reasons. In a broad vein, General Norstad praised collaboration in science as a means of responding to the Soviet technological threat and maintaining a convincing deterrent. “The Soviets have underway a mighty technological program that is a stern challenge to NATO, to its military planners, and to its scientists and leaders of industry,” he said. Allied co-operation in sci-
ence and technology represented one way of "answering the challenge. It is here that the great burden must fall," he believed, "if we are to maintain a convincing deterrent in the face of Soviet pressure over the long haul."  

On a more specific level, the military backed tasks—such as air defense and standardization—which implied joint efforts. SACEUR and SACLANT supported AGARD, STC, and SASWREC, as indicated by General Gruenther's relatively public role in establishing the antecedent of STC, the SHAPE Air Defense Center. Following the conclusion of the McMahon study on the duration of national service, General Norstad proposed further study of human factors within the framework of the NATO science program. He stated:

We have scientists working in all of our establishments, working on the "gadgetry," the equipment, the system of this business, but we don't have, in these times, the scientists really working on the problems of the man. I have discussed this with Dr. Ramsay, the Scientific Advisor to the Secretary General of NATO, and suggested to him that this is one field to which the Scientific Committee very properly could devote some attention.

The specific clients to which the leadership's ideology was designed to appeal must be deduced, since there is little explicit evidence. Although Spaak's formulation was general enough to appeal to all—and although he noted that "even the most powerful and prosperous" ally, i.e., the United States could not afford to go it alone—it is likely that his ideology was designed particularly for the European nations. Scientific co-operation would help them modernize defense capabilities in spite of their limited resources. Thus Spaak's linkage of science, defense, and welfare suggested that a co-operative program might cost his European clients less in the long run than independent national efforts. The narrower ideology of Spaak's successors was probably planned to appeal more specifically to the same audience. Defense remained salient; and Stikker, in justifying the Interna-
tional Institute of Science and Technology, stated that “the European countries now find it individually impossible to rival the scientific resources of the United States and the USSR. Only united can they maintain their levels and enhance their traditions.”

Even for the Europeans, however, the ideology implied sacrifices. Specific tasks and structures such as fellowships; summer courses; oceanographic, meteorological, and human factors programs; the Atlantic Institute of Science and Technology; the DRDC; AGARD; STC; and SASWREC meant immediate resource contributions, and corresponding client resistance.

DECISION-MAKING

In spite of the leadership's hopes and wishes, the dynamic of Allied co-operation was blunted within NATO's structure for scientific decision-making, which contained imbalances between independent experts and instructed delegates.

Initially, four major advisory groups advanced the leadership's ideology. The first of these was the Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, appointed by the Council in May, 1956. In its report the Committee emphasized the importance of developing scientific and technical co-operation through concrete action and recommended that a conference be convened composed of one or at most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental from each country.” In the aftermath of Suez, the Council meeting in December, 1956, approved the Report of this Committee and in June, 1957, formed the second group, a Task Force on Action by NATO in the Field of Scientific and Technical Co-operation, headed by Dr. J. Koepfli of the United States. In November, the Task Force recommended the creation of a NATO Scientific Committee, the appointment of a NATO Science Advisor, and encouraged the establishment of NATO military technical agencies.

Two years later the Science Committee, seeing as part of its task to study the "ways whereby science in the Western World
could be strengthened," sponsored the formation of a third advisory group. This group, headed by Louis Armand of France, and financed jointly by NATO and the Ford Foundation, met between September, 1959, and June, 1960. Among the recommendations of the Armand Report were several with implications for the NATO Science program, including the suggestion that an International Institute of Science and Technology be created. The recommendation by the Armand Report for the establishment of an International Institute led the Council to authorize the Secretary General to appoint, before the end of 1960, a fourth group to study the question. Again jointly financed by NATO and the Ford Foundation, the group met under the chairmanship of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of the United States. In October, 1961, the Killian Group presented its report to the Council, recommending the Institute's formation.

These groups proved productive in advancing the leadership's ideology in direct relationship to the immediacy of the Suez and Sputnik crises. At the same time, their effectiveness was related to the balance which they maintained between independent experts and instructed delegates. The recommendations of the Committee on Non-Military Co-operation and the Koepfl Committee led to the creation of the NATO Science Committee, the post of NATO Science Advisor, and the establishment of the military technical agencies. The Committee on Non-Military Co-operation was composed of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway—Lester Pearson, Gaetano Martino, and Halvard Lange—whose combination of superior delegate status and superior expertise was indicated by their informal designation as a second incarnation of the Three Wise Men. The Koepfl Committee mixed national delegates to the Science Committee with eminent scientists independent of NATO or national government control in a six to four proportion. The ten participants in the Koepfl group included representatives to the NATO Science Committee from Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. By contrast the major specific recommendation of the later Armand and Killian Committees—the creation of an International Institute of Science and Technology—re-
mained unimplemented; and here the national delegates were heavily outweighed by the independent experts. The Armand Committee's twelve members included only four delegates to the NATO Science Committee, from Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Killian Committee, with seven participants, had only one NATO Science Committee representative, from Germany.

As the NATO science program developed, the leadership tried to use other experts in different ways—with varying degrees of success. One of the earliest such attempts about which public evidence exists was connected with the creation of the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center. General Gruenther's emphasis on the improvement of air defense led him to appoint an international team of officers at SHAPE, chaired by a European, to consider the problems of Allied Command Europe. In addition, the United States Air Force sponsored an air defense planning group, chaired by Dr. Carl F. J. Overhage. The SHAPE committee pointed to the need for advanced technical development in air defense; and its recommendations formed the basis for the more specific proposals of the Overhage Committee which, in turn, led to the establishment of SADTC.34

Another effort was the appointment of Dr. McLucas as Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, which was less fruitful, partly because of internal administrative tensions. Dirk Stikker had been dissatisfied with the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs who had preceded McLucas and had asked American Secretary of Defense McNamara to supply a more dynamic individual. When McLucas arrived from the Department of Defense, he found nothing in his terms of appointment which indicated his responsibility for defense research; and he requested very specific instructions from Stikker concerning the extent and limitations of his authority, particularly with respect to the field of armaments and infrastructure.

At this point Stikker retreated. In advancing NATO science, he did not wish to diminish the position of the Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics, and Infrastructure—Mr. Johnson Garrett, an American financier. Stikker believed it im-
portant to safeguard the administrative integrity of NATO infrastructure, which he considered one of NATO’s most successful activities, and which he felt had been financially administered in an exemplary manner. Stikker had already decided on his own resignation, and he informed McLucas that he would have to deal with the next Secretary General. For the interim he drafted a memorandum with the assistance of Garrett and the Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance, outlining McLucas’ primary mission as defense science. This memorandum carefully avoided giving McLucas a dominant position in the area of armaments and infrastructure and was neither changed nor replaced when Brosio arrived.

Secretary General Brosio took a different tack with a project which began in mid-1966. At the June Ministerial meeting, Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani warned the Council of the consequences which would result if the “technological gap” between Europe and the United States were not reduced. The Italian government submitted supporting documents during the fall, and the Ministerial Council in December instructed the Permanent Representatives to prepare a report for the spring Ministerial session. In March, 1967, the Permanent Council created AC/262, a Special Working Group on International Technological Co-operation, which was to be under Brosio’s Chairmanship. Under its terms of reference, the Working Group was to:

1. Further define the problem
2. Outline the activities of other international organizations
3. Outline measures for further implementation
4. Investigate what concrete NATO action was possible, especially in the area of defense technology

This working group represented a forum within which Brosio could quietly probe the possibility of expanding the ideology and program of NATO science. He attempted to emphasize, at differ-
ent levels of generality, an over-all increase in scientific and technical co-operation; promotion of co-operation in all possible contexts; and a special role for NATO.

Brosio delegated day-to-day responsibility to M. André Vincent, a French member of the International Staff/Secretariat who served as Director of Economic Affairs. Vincent collated and redrafted material submitted by the national delegates—particularly by the Belgian delegate, Dr. Spaey—and, in some parts of the final report, made original contributions.36

The delegates to AC/262 came from the various national capitals. Some of them were high-ranking individuals—the American delegate was Robert Bowie, who had played a major part in the development of the MLF—and had some room for independent maneuver. Nevertheless, they tended to be instructed concerning possible concrete plans for NATO and especially about finances.

These instructions left little room for constructive NATO action. The United States and United Kingdom did not wish to increase their financial contributions; France was not eager to beat the drum for NATO by supporting new enterprises; the Germans were wary of being caught between the United States and France. Most support came from Italy, which had made the original proposal; from Belgium, which was the new site of SHAPE and the political headquarters; and from countries like Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, with little money to contribute.

During the course of the debate, the American delegation produced a plan which, while it did not threaten substantial new financial outlays, seemed to aim at increasing the co-ordination of the science program and at making it more relevant to NATO's central aims. It also attempted to increase the defense aspect of the pure science program while decreasing the purely military aspect of the scientific agencies. The plan included:

1. An Atlantic Technological Center concerned with operations research, systems analysis, and strategic studies (The SHAPE Technical Center might serve as the basis for a
European computer center available to Central and Eastern European countries. This facility should promote East-West contacts and might even produce intelligence.)

2. An Atlantic Aerospace Center centered around AGARD

3. An Atlantic Oceanographic Center which might include SASWREC

4. An Atlantic Center for Community Affairs, which might focus not only on the Atlantic Community but also on the intra-Western European and East-West relations

SACEUR opposed this proposal. He neither wished to be consolidated into the civilian structure nor to lose NATO's military science agencies. The SHAPE Technical Center, for example, provided him with valuable services in the fields of communications satellites, battlefield jamming, radar, and air defense.

In June, 1967, the Council of Ministers received the report of AC/262 and passed a “resolution of international technological cooperation.” This resolution made general comments concerning efforts at national, European, Atlantic, and wider levels. When it came to the role of the Alliance itself, the Council merely “noted with satisfaction” NATO's existing scientific and technological activities and invited the Permanent Council “to pursue its studies” and report further. 37

Within the more permanent machinery, decision-making was ultimately dominated by instructed delegates. The members of the Science Committee and its subordinate bodies—although most were connected with universities or research institutes (See Appendix E), although many held established scientific reputations, and although a few, like Sir Solly Zuckerman had high domestic political influence—were appointed by their home governments and responsible to them. With regard to substantive matters, they retained some room for bargaining in the interagency politics leading to the formulation of their instructions and for their alteration in case of disagreement; with regard to financial ceilings, they usually had little leeway, particularly
since the final decisions lay not with the Science but with the Civilian Budget Committee. The members of the Defense Research Directors Committee were all members of national government agencies (see Appendix F).

Officers responsible for day-to-day science affairs within the national delegations combined high instruction with low expertise and status. The member of the national delegation charged with scientific affairs was likely to have had little or no scientific training. Usually, NATO Science was a collateral duty rather than a full-time assignment; in those cases in which it was a primary duty, the person assigned to the task was often one of the most junior members of the delegation.

In the areas of pure and defense science, the leadership’s experts were the members of the Science Division of the International Staff/Secretariat. In pure science, they played a subordinate role to the Science Committee, pushing for several programs—data abstracting, for example—without success. The members of the Science Division concerned with defense science between 1964 and 1966 were mostly American nationals paid entirely by the American government.

Decision-making for the military technical agencies, although it included an independent input, was also dominated by instructed delegates. SACEUR and SACLANT provided major policy direction for STC and SASWREC. Nonetheless, the Standing Group was the ultimate authority in AGARD: the Military Budget Committee made final budgetary decisions for all three agencies; recommendations and advice came to AGARD from the National Delegates Board, to STC from the NATO Armaments Committee and the STC Scientific Committee of National Representatives, and to SASWREC from the SASWREC Committee of National Representatives.

COALITIONS

The leadership’s efforts were stifled not only by decision-making unbalance, but also by a pattern of weak coalitional support.
There is insufficient evidence to be certain about the specific portions of the leadership's ideology which were supported by particular groups, but one may infer varying attraction from the pattern of national membership in the subordinate bodies of the Science Committee presented in Table 21. If participation is a measure of interest, then different combinations of national governments sponsored programs in Oceanography, Operational Research, Meteorology, Radio-Meteorology, Human Factors, Advanced Study Institutes, Research Grants, and Lecture Programs.

Perhaps more significant is the nature of the general coalition supporting the entire NATO science program, which can be deduced from the pattern of national financial contributions. The core of this coalition was the United States, which gave the bulk of initial financial support for the various aspects of the science program. As the United States became less eager to bear the lion's share of the financial burden, the coalition broadened to include the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In some programs, such as SASWREC, other countries—Denmark, Norway, and Italy—also contributed. But the greater coalition was unenthusiastic about substantial program expansion, and budgets for pure science and technical agencies remained relatively small.

The limits of coalitional support were indicated in December, 1960, when Paul-Henri Spaak reported to the Council on the Herter proposal for a NATO ten-year plan. One of his recommendations was that there be a substantial increase in the NATO science budget. The Council rejected the suggestion.

Coalitional bounds were also shown by the failures of the International Institute of Science and Technology and the defense science program. The formation of an International Institute of Science and Technology, which had been supported by the Armand and Killian Reports and by the NATO Parliamentarians in 1958 and 1960, implied a significant financial increase in NATO Science. NATO announced that "some 1,000 students, 400 academic staff and 1,000 supporting staff are envisaged. It is
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<td><strong>6</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5</strong></td>
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* NATO Doc. AC/137-WP/37, May 22, 1967
estimated that the capital cost would be about $56 million and the annual running costs about $17 million." The proposal was never implemented. While the United States appeared willing to contribute almost half the initial sum, the other members of the general coalition were less eager. Britain and France were not only financially reluctant but also feared a possible drain on their own national pools of scientists.

In the case of defense science, the supporting coalition was undermined by a counter-coalition. The United States Department of Defense had been an important force behind the appointment of Dr. McLucas as Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs and the establishment of the defense program as a vehicle for the development of arms co-operation; the major European governments had given initial assent. Over time different programs developed supporters in areas where national research seemed deficient. The United States favored the study of V/STOL planes and aircraft identification, the French were anxious to pool efforts in communications satellites, and the British came to favor efforts in joint air defense. Nevertheless, a counter-coalition of opposition and apathy arose which sapped the vigor of the program. Leading this movement within the Staff/Secretariat was General Fischer, the Co-ordinator for Production and Logistics, in charge of NATO arms production, who opposed the development of a competing program in the scientific side of the house. Fischer was able to rally a growing number of followers behind him. Among these were the European Allies who increasingly came to mistrust McLucas as a spearhead for American arms sales, and turned to Fischer, because he appeared to represent a more authentic Continental interest in co-operative research and development. The United States Department of State had never been really enthusiastic about the McLucas appointment, since it allowed the Department of Defense to dominate the position of Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, hitherto under State's control. Even Defense's initial support weakened. While it eventually
provided him with staff assistance, the delay was such that McLucas was gone almost before the last man arrived.

FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER

There appeared to be neither integration within nor spill-over from the area of NATO science, though one might have looked for a significant technical dynamic here. The share of resources involved could be classified as moderate; in no nation, as Table 22 shows, was the gross expenditure on research and development substantially equal to more than 4 per cent of the gross national product. Furthermore, one might expect that economic and normative sanctions, centering around scientific grants and the scientific ethic would be dominant and that highly trained technical personnel would play a significant role.

However, political conflict proved strong and technical consensus weak. Crisis brought a temporary convergence of actor interests in support of a NATO science program; but, with its passing, interests were sufficiently congruent to support only a small common effort.

Actor interests converged under the pressure of the Suez crisis, in which the Soviet threat, coupled with American opposition to Anglo-French intervention, was a primary causal factor behind Council acceptance in December, 1956, of the recommendations of the Committee of Three for closer Allied cooperation in the scientific field. The launching of Sputnik I in October, 1957, provided a second-stage boost to the program by leading to the implementation of the Koepfli Task Force Report. NATO’s Scientific Affairs Division reported that the "psychological shock of this event resulted in the Task Force's Report being presented directly to the heads of government of the Alliance at their meeting in December, 1957. The Report's recommendations were accepted, and both a Science Advisor and Science Committee were appointed to follow up the recommendations of the Task Force." 41
### TABLE 22

**Estimated National Gross Expenditure on Research and Development, 1963/64**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>GERD in Millions</th>
<th>GERD Compared with GNP</th>
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<td>According to National Currencies</td>
<td>Equivalents in U.S. Dollars</td>
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<td>1963–64</td>
<td>21,075.0 †</td>
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<tr>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>5,745.1 †</td>
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<td>459.5</td>
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† Includes an element of OECD estimation.
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Distribution Of Expenditures</th>
<th>Source Of Funds</th>
<th>From Abroad or Unspecified</th>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>7</td>
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*The Overall Level and Structure of R&D Efforts in OECD Member Countries: A Study of Resources Devoted to R&D in OECD Member Countries in 1963/64* (OECD: Paris, 1967), p. 57. The abbreviation GERD refers to Gross Expenditure on Research and Development.
As the sense of crisis diminished, actor interests diverged. The science program, particularly in defense areas, implied cooperation in areas where the most advanced nations—the United States, United Kingdom, and France—were reluctant to reveal information which provided them with political and military advantages and which had been purchased at high cost. Interests also conflicted on economic issues. Gross expenditure on research and development, however small in relation to other sectors, still included substantial financial sums, as Table 22 suggests. Moreover Table 23 indicates that national business enterprise and higher education played important roles in national science. Here considerations of national full employment and balance of payments, of industrial secrets and security, worked against possible common benefits which might have been attained through pooled effort.

Interest converged sufficiently to support only a low-level program compared to national efforts, which totalled $27,239 million for the twelve Allies listed in Table 22. In pure science NATO resources were approximately $4 million and half a dozen permanent international staff members; the budgets of the NATO military technical agencies were probably little more than $6 million. At this level, the economic and normative incentives centering around the appeals of project grants and the scientific ethic could be relatively effective; and the program could be supported by convergent interests between two groups: contributors, who recognized the legitimacy of a low level of economic aid, and recipients at national, subnational, or supranational levels, who received financial or institutional payoffs—as well as by a common interest in Western political-military cohesion, scientific progress, and information exchange.
There is scant evidence that integration has occurred in NATO. One cannot, of course, ignore the fact that NATO performed useful services in each of the five sectors which have been considered. The organs of political consultation established another link in the bilateral and multilateral system of international communication. The military force program signalled to the Soviet Union that the Allies intended to defend themselves against armed attack; activities in armaments and infrastructure also implied Allied resolve. NATO science contributed not only to selected military activities but also gave encouragement to the development of civilian knowledge and skills.

Nevertheless, the preceding survey has indicated that, while structures and tasks in each area changed and became increasingly differentiated, binding institutional procedures remained weak and there was limited task expansion. NATO authority remained mostly indirect and of limited effectiveness; there was little authoritative decision-making on matters of major importance to the participants. Legitimacy did not grow to the extent that actors were willing to support sizeable joint activity except when it was directly in their own interest.

Of the three assumptions concerning integration in NATO which were initially presented, one was partially confirmed, one
was disconfirmed, and one was accurate. First, it was assumed that integration would be associated with a style of Alliance leadership that skillfully combined (a) ideological ambiguity and clarity, (b) decision-making by independent experts and instructed delegates, and (c) coalitional membership which varied between programs. On the positive side, successive Secretaries General and SACEUR’s did promote the construction and maintenance of NATO institutions and tasks with an ideology which, in the aggregate and in two of five specific areas of activity, blended ambiguous, abstract, general goals, with clear practical guidance for specific programs. Their doctrine leaned to generality in political consultation, was a complex combination of general guidelines and specific goals for military forces and armaments, and tended toward specificity in infrastructure and science. However, this ideology not only supported organizational gains for NATO, but also, on the negative side, implied sacrifices from organizational clients. For this reason, in spite of its ideological advocacy, the leadership and its experts were undermined by instructed national delegates, who maintained a dominant position in the decision-making structure, and by weak supporting coalitions.

The second “functionalist” assumption proposed that integration would be unlikely in those sectors of alliance activity which were most political, but would be more possible where technical elements were involved. Contrary to expectations, integration occurred in no area of alliance activity—not even armaments, infrastructure, or science, which presented strong prima facie technical credentials. Possible technical tendencies toward integration in such substrata were outweighed by the political forces inherent in the Alliance’s diplomatic-military focus.

Third, it was suggested that spill-over was unlikely because the actors’ interests would not be sufficiently convergent through time to generate a self-sustaining consensus promoting alliance growth, that integrative advances might take place in crisis periods but would be undermined in more routine circumstances. In fact, no alliance spill-over occurred; institutional innovations
appeared and actor interests converged significantly only under crisis pressure. As successive crises faded, sufficient convergent and common interest remained to hold together for the time being what had already taken shape, but there was not enough to provide significant expansion.

Separating the wheat from the chaff, we may reach a refined conclusion that the most integratively significant NATO accomplishment has been the development and differentiation of NATO structures and tasks and that the principle supporting factors have been leadership ideology and the impact of a crisis situation. Unfortunately leadership ideology and crisis can not be so clearly defined, nor the links between them and institutional innovation so tightly drawn, as one might wish. Both elements are icebergs, significant segments of which remain invisible. The presentation of leadership ideology, by reason of the research blocks imposed by a long diplomatic military tradition of secrecy of state, overemphasizes public pronouncements at the expense of more secret statements and maneuvers which may have been more significant. A concentration on crisis incidents or crisis periods neglects the underlying tensions which made them into crises, and which may have exercised an incremental influence more significant than the discontinuous impact of the crises themselves.

The consequences of these two factors must also be considered with caution, for the effects of leadership pronouncements and crises on institutional innovations is not always clear. International leadership may publicly express institutional goals and these may be instantly implemented. It is, however, more likely that leadership ideologies will be expressed privately at one stage and publicly aired only later. At this subsequent time, the leadership’s position may be presented less in the form of ideological advocacy than as support of decisions already taken. Further, the ideologies of leaders no longer on the scene may exercise a delayed impact as new events give them added relevance. The impact of crisis on institutional development is also blurred. The effect of specific crisis incidents is not limited by discrete tem-
poral boundaries; while an atmosphere of crisis may induce immediate institutional advances, the memory of crisis past may provide an input for institutions yet to come. Furthermore, the numerous crises of the postwar generation seem to leave only 1953–55, 1958–59, and 1963–65 as non-crisis years.

Bearing these qualifications in mind, we may pull together, rearrange, and supplement the material presented in the preceding chapters. For each of several periods in the Alliance’s history, NATO institutional innovations, the ideology of the leadership, and the nature of the international situation will be considered in turn.

During the period from the signature and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 through 1952, the basic structures and tasks of NATO were established, with special emphasis on the sectors of military forces, armaments, and infrastructure. In September, 1949, the Council met for the first time and created the Defense Committee which, in turn, was to set up the Military Committee, the Standing Group, and the Regional Planning Groups. In November the Council created the Defense Financial and Economic Committee and took note of the establishment by the Defense Committee of a Military Production and Supply Board.

During 1950, Greece and Turkey accepted invitations from the Council to be associated with Mediterranean defense planning and for the first time communiqués mentioned the hope that Germany might contribute “manpower and resources” to the “build-up of the defense of Western Europe.” The Council created a group of Deputies, and appointed General Eisenhower SACEUR. It also approved the Defense Committee’s long-term defense plan and forward strategy, as well as the first draft of a medium-term defense plan. Finally it replaced the Military Production and Supply Board with a Defense Production Board.

In May of the following year, the Deputies announced that the North Atlantic Council was to become the sole Ministerial body of NATO through the incorporation of the Defense Committee and the Defense Financial and Economic Committee. Dur-
In September an agreement covering the status of civilian National Representatives and International Staff was signed. In the military sphere, General Eisenhower activated SHAPE and ACE in April; and two months later, the Deputies adopted a status of forces agreement covering the position of the military personnel of one NATO nation serving on the territory of another. In November, the NATO Defense College was inaugurated.

In military economics, the Finance and Economic Board was set up to consider economic and financial aspects of the NATO defense program. The Temporary Council Committee was established and appointed its Executive Board, the Three Wise Men. NATO took over the infrastructure program, which had begun under the Western Union Defense Organization, when the Infrastructure Committee was created and reached agreement on the financing of Infrastructure Slice II, which included the construction of airfields and communications facilities.

The Military Agency for Standardization was created as a subsidiary agency of the Standing Group. Finally the establishment of AGARD was recommended by an Ad Hoc Conference of NATO Research Directors. In the sector of political consultation, as well as civilian economics and cultural activities, a Committee on the North Atlantic Community was formed.

Meeting in Lisbon in its ninth Ministerial Session, the Council at the end of February, 1952, proposed "reciprocal security undertakings" between NATO and the gestating European Defense Community, with the EDC "working within the framework of, and reinforcing" NATO. The Council also took note of the fact that, on February 18, Greece and Turkey had acceded to the Treaty and had agreed that their ground and air forces assigned to NATO would operate under SACEUR.

This ninth Ministerial Session was the one which the Council stated marked the transition "from the planning to the operational stage." The Council, while continuing to hold periodic Ministerial meetings, was to function in permanent session through the appointment of permanent representatives. Furthermore, the Council would "assume the functions hitherto per-
formed by the Council Deputies, the Defense Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board,” and would take over their staffs. Finally a unified international Secretariat was to be located near SHAPE, at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris. At its head was to be a NATO Secretary General.4

In the sphere of military planning, the Council relied on the report of the Temporary Council Committee and agreed on the Lisbon force goals, “specific defensive strength to be built this year, and on a definite programme of measures to be taken to increase defensive strength in following years.” 5 The responsibilities of the Standing Group and SACEUR were increased in the fields of logistical planning and equipment priorities, and the Council accepted the report of the Committee on the North Atlantic Community which called for better political consultation, as well as increased economic co-operation, the expansion and liberalization of trade and the movement of labor, and closer ties with the OEEC.

During the rest of 1952, NATO’s structure continued to evolve. The Civil Budget Committee and Military Budget Committee met for the first time. The first Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief Channel Command (CINCCHAN) were appointed, and the Mediterranean Command was approved. The procedures of the Temporary Council Committee were institutionalized through the formation of an Annual Review Committee which was to reconcile NATO programs with political-economic capabilities. The Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee was established. In addition, Infrastructure Slices III and IV were agreed for cost-sharing and were to include airfields, communications, war headquarters, a NATO pipeline system, and naval facilities, radar navigational aids, and training installations.

During this period international leadership existed only in relatively undifferentiated form; and co-operative Western action depended largely on the tacit co-ordination provided by crisis incidents. In the Brussels Treaty’s Western Union Defense Organization, set up in 1948, Field Marshall Montgomery
had served as Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee. When the NATO Council Deputies were established in 1950, the American representative, Charles M. Spofford, was made permanent chairman. Only between 1950 and 1952, with the appointment of General Eisenhower as SACEUR and Lord Ismay as Secretary General, did full-fledged Allied leadership roles emerge. Once in office, however, General Eisenhower, General Ridgway (who succeeded him in 1952), and Lord Ismay expounded an ideology emphasizing that peace and security might be attained through allied military force, armaments, and infrastructure programs, and their efforts helped to give direction to NATO’s growth.

In the sector of military forces, the requirements of deterrence and defense led SACEUR to support increases in army divisional strengths, combat readiness, redeployment, training, support, and reserves. Moreover, Eisenhower and Ridgway attempted to bolster air defense and naval forces. They also called for rearmament and for the Allied military, economic, and financial effort necessary to forge the weapons to equip NATO’s military forces and to remedy Allied material deficiencies. In addition, infrastructure was included in the weapons to be forged. Air defense, communications, command and control facilities all had to be built; and SACEUR specifically asked for airfields, fuel storage tanks, distribution pipelines, radar installations, radio navigational aids, an Allied communications network, supply depots, harbor facilities, and naval bases.

Lord Ismay joined Eisenhower and Ridgway and strongly supported the Annual Review, stressed the economic necessity for joint arms production, and pointed to the political, military, and economic gains to be realized from NATO infrastructure.

The main impetus not only for the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty but also for the early development of NATO had come from the deepening international confrontation between East and West following the Second World War. While this tension seemed eased on May 9, 1949, when the Soviet Union lifted the Berlin blockade in August, well ahead of Western
Integration and Disintegration in NATO

anticipation, the Soviets broke the American nuclear monopoly by exploding their first atomic device. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean attack on South Korea was perceived as a new intensification of the Communist threat.

In May, France had proposed to the Council that there be created a tightly organized NATO military establishment. The attack on South Korea was an important catalyst in the realization of a modified version of this plan. Dean Acheson related that the French plan was discussed at our meeting in London in May of 1950. During that summer we all went to work upon this project. One of the things that brought this beyond the realm of theory was the attack on Korea. This was the first time that force had been openly used by a Communist satellite, armed, prepared, trained, and instigated by the Soviet Union, to accomplish its purpose. This threw a chill through Europe. Everybody said we must get on with the program. Therefore, in the fall session, the United States produced a plan creating what later became the NATO organization, then chiefly referred to as the United Command.6

"The real clincher," Dean Acheson said, "was the attack on Korea. Korea was the first time that the Russians had clearly used power to change a situation in which we were vitally interested. After that, everybody said, 'You had better watch yourselves, this is very dangerous.' "7

Between 1953 and 1955 the ideology of NATO's leadership was effective only in achieving forms of expansion which seemed limited in comparison to what had come before. During 1953 the infrastructure program, which it had supported and which had already undertaken substantial Allied construction on the basis of annual funding, was buttressed by the signature of the first three-year cost-sharing agreement. The following year the Council, recognizing the impossibility of reaching the Lisbon force goals, approved MC 48, which began the substitution of nuclear armament for manpower. While the new plan reflected the conviction of General Gruenther, who had assumed com-
mand at SHAPE, that the Allies required an atomic strategy and an atomic stockpile, it also included manpower losses about which he was less enthusiastic.

Perhaps the major tangible gain for NATO during this period was the provision for German entry into the Alliance through the London and Paris Agreements of 1954. The twelve active divisions which the Germans promised to supply represented a response to the pleas of successive SACEUR's for additional forces and made the manpower cuts of MC 48 a little less disturbing. Nevertheless, the impact of German entry was diminished by the fact that the forces would only become available over several years and also by the fact that the French had rejected the European Defense Community. It had been hoped that the EDC would not only incorporate the Germans into but also represent a major institutional gain for European defense.

During the same year the Council established a Defense Production Committee, similar to the Military Production and Supply Board which had been abolished three years before. The new committee would presumably help to advance the armaments goals which the original leaders had introduced, and which General Gruenther later adopted, but it also represented a return to a system in which national representatives held final authority.

In 1955, a European air defense and early warning system was approved; and the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center was created to give SACEUR technical advice. Both of these developments could be traced to the heavy emphasis which General Gruenther had placed on air defense; nevertheless the European system, which had only been approved in principle, would take five years to become operational; and the SADTC had at its disposal very limited resources.

The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference also held its first meeting in 1955. A year later the Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, with which Ismay co-operated, would cite the need for improved contact between the NPC and NATO Headquarters. Because it was basically a legislative rather than execu-
tive body, however, the NPC would be of relatively peripheral utility in the improvement of joint diplomatic policy-making, which all of NATO’s Secretaries General were to emphasize. The fact that the NPC was not even officially connected with NATO further diminished whatever role it could hope to play.

The lack of substantial institutional advance in the years 1953–55 coincided with a reduction in East-West tension. These were years of change and ambivalence in Soviet policy. The challenge of the West seemed to abate in 1953, with the death of Stalin and his replacement by Georgi Malenkov; the signature of a treaty of friendship and collaboration between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey; and the conclusion of the armistice in Korea. In 1955, however, Malenkov was replaced by Bulganin and Khrushchev, a shift the meaning of which was not immediately clear. The Malenkov regime had ended the state of war with Germany. The new regime concluded the Austrian State Treaty and attended Geneva meetings with the West, both at the summit and at the level of Foreign Ministers. But negative omens were provided by the signing of the Warsaw Pact, which bound the nations of Eastern Europe in a military alliance intended to be the direct counterpart of NATO; the failure of the Geneva meetings to reach significant agreement; and the Treaty between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic at the end of the year granting the G.D.R. the prerogatives of a state.

The Western response was similarly mixed. Perhaps the best demonstration of shifting Western currents was provided by British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden. In August, 1954, the French Assembly refused to approve the European Defense Community. Eden played a crucial role in rescuing the German contribution to Western defense, acting as a catalytic agent for the achievement of the Paris Agreements in October, through which the Western European Union was established and Germany was invited to join NATO. A year later, however, Eden seemed to take a softer line by making a suggestion which might have neutralized the military benefits of German membership in
NATO. At the Geneva Summit Meeting in July, 1955, he proposed that "we should be ready to examine the possibility of a demilitarized area between East and West." Going into more detail, he stated:

There is the suggestion of a mutual security pact. There is the prospect of an agreement about the total of forces and armaments of the two groups both in Germany and in the countries neighboring Germany. This would be subject to reciprocal supervision. There is the concept of a demilitarized area.  

During the following two years, 1956 and 1957, the leadership's ideology pointed the way to ground-breaking moves in the sectors of political consultation and science, and to expansion of the older Alliance programs of military forces, armaments, and infrastructure. Lord Ismay's farewell address and Spaak's emphasis on Atlantic political interdependence helped support the political recommendations of the report of the Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, which the Council of Ministers endorsed in December, 1956. This report recommended establishing a Committee of Political Advisors; empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices for the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes; instituting an annual political appraisal by the Secretary General; and close co-operation with the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. In 1957, the Political Committee was created and Lord Ismay became the first of a series of Secretaries General who would offer good offices to settle disputes over Cyprus. In future years Secretaries General regularly submitted annual reports and joined SACEUR's in annual appearances before the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference.

Spaak's emphasis on Atlantic scientific co-operation, particularly in pure science, had a similar effect. The Committee on Non-Military Co-operation had recommended a conference to propose specific measures for future scientific and technical cooperation and the Koepfli Task Force was formed in 1957. The most significant results came from the meeting of heads of government in December, 1957. After Spaak had assumed office
as NATO Secretary General in May, he had been approached by Prime Minister Macmillan with the suggestion that it would be an auspicious start to his tenure if President Eisenhower could be persuaded to attend the December session of the Council. In October, Macmillan, later joined by Spaak, had visited Washington; and Eisenhower had accepted their proposal. To justify the summit meeting, which was now to include leaders of other Allied nations as well, an agenda was constructed around the theme of Atlantic interdependence. A prominent item on this agenda was Atlantic science, and in December the heads of government decided to establish the NATO Science Committee and Science Advisor recommended by the Koepfli group.

In military forces, the focus by Generals Gruenther and Norstad on a NATO atomic stockpile, and Spaak's support of a common nuclear policy, helped to produce MC 14/2, which set forth a unified NATO strategy based on the use of nuclear weapons. They also influenced the decision by the special meeting of the heads of government in December, 1957, that NATO should have stocks of nuclear warheads and IRBM's at its disposal.

Most of NATO's leaders including Norstad and Spaak, publicly stressed the necessity for standardization and joint production of Allied armaments. At their meeting, the heads of government endorsed "as high a degree of standardization and integration as possible in all fields" and the "coordinated production of advanced weapons." During the course of 1957, a Panel for the Codification of Equipment was established; STANAG's 3150 and 3151—which created a uniform system of supply classification and item identification for Allied material—were promulgated; the Fiat G 91 was selected as NATO's lightweight tactical strike reconnaissance aircraft; and studies were initiated for a NATO maritime patrol aircraft. Ultimately a whole series of joint production projects would be implemented. Finally, in the area of infrastructure, the focus by NATO military commanders on air defense, communications, and command and control promoted the inclusion in Slices VIII–XI of funds for an early warning radar network, tropospheric and ionospheric forward scatter com-
munication systems, and facilities for surface-to-air missiles and special ammunition storage sites.

These advances occurred against a background of renewed stress. In 1956, Soviet policy had appeared to harden. Although Khrushchev had condemned the excesses of the Stalin regime at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Soviet leaders were stern in the face of growing Eastern European unrest. When the June riots in Poznan, Poland were followed by the Hungarian revolution in October, control was re-established by Soviet military intervention. Moreover, Anglo-French military activity in the Suez Canal area was met by Soviet threats of counteraction, which, combined with American opposition, led the British and French to withdraw. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched its first satellite, Sputnik I, into space. Well ahead of comparable Western development, this technological achievement held obvious implications for long-range nuclear delivery systems. These developments demonstrated that the Soviet threat was still real, that it could be triggered by events in non-European areas, and that it was backed by a dynamic scientific capability.

Institutional progress which occurred in NATO during 1958 and 1959 did not significantly advance leadership goals and seemed to represent either incremental growth or spin-off from earlier decisions. In the political sector, an Atlantic Congress took place, which drew together for a unique meeting 700 delegates from all sectors of activity from all NATO nations, but which had no observable impact. Militarily, MC 70 and MC 48/2 continued the trend which had been established by MC 48 and MC 14/2. American Thor and Jupiter ICBM’s, in accordance with the 1957 decision of the heads of government, were placed in Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Previous statements of the heads of government in the areas of armaments and science continued to be followed up. They had endorsed arms standardization and co-ordinated production, and a number of projects had subsequently advanced. Now the title of the Defense Production Committee was changed to the Armaments Committee
and the Council approved the creation of a NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, a NATO Hawk Production Organization, a NATO Sidewinder Program Office, and a procedure for formulating NATO Basic Military Requirements. The pure science structures which the heads of government had established came to life; and the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center was commissioned under American auspices.

The limited institutional innovation during these years probably resulted to some extent from the fact that 1958–59 represented a second period of Soviet transition and ambivalence. In late March, 1958, Khrushchev replaced Bulganin at the head of the Soviet government. In November, he challenged the West by announcing that the Soviet government wished to terminate the Four-Power Agreement on the status of Berlin. The following month, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France rejected Khrushchev's proposals; and the NATO Council issued a communiqué fully associating itself with their position. Nevertheless, the following year seemed to bring some thaw in Soviet-Allied relations. The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union met in Geneva over the summer, emphasizing the problems of Germany and disarmament. In September, at Eisenhower's invitation, Khrushchev visited the United States and conferred with the American President at Camp David.

During this period, sparks of disengagement which had previously been struck produced a sizeable flame. The central figure in the discussion was perhaps Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki. On October 2, 1957, Rapacki presented an official proposal for disengagement to the United Nations General Assembly. In December he followed it up with diplomatic notes, and confirmed it on February 15, 1958, in a memorandum delivered to Britain, France, the United States, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Following detailed Western analysis and argument Rapacki announced a second version of his plan on November 4, at a press conference in Warsaw.

The debate on disengagement which occurred during
1958–59 was more far-reaching than anything which had come before. Though the expansion was less clear for the Eastern nations—where the Rapacki Plan in its several versions seemed to stifle rivals—it was more obvious in the West. Eugène Hinterhoff's inventory of disengagement proposals from the end of World War I through most of 1959 provides a rough indicator of the direction in which the wind was blowing. Nine projects are recorded for the Eastern nations for the seven and one-half years between April, 1947 and December, 1954; eight proposals for 1955; four for 1956; and nine projects prior to Rapacki's announcement in 1957. In the period from October, 1957, through December, 1958, Eastern spokesmen presented eleven designs and during the first nine months of 1959 they proposed thirteen. Twenty Western schemes are listed for the eight and one-half years between April, 1946 and December, 1954; seven for 1955; fourteen for 1956; seventeen for 1957; twenty-nine for 1958; and thirty for the first nine months of 1959.10

It is not surprising that NATO failed to expand in this atmosphere. On the one hand the debate seemed to bring with it a release of much of the tension of the previous period. Secondly most disengagement proposals explicitly or implicitly included a reduction in NATO's importance and strength. Finally differences of opinion existed among the officials of Allied governments concerning how far it would be prudent to go. The British were the most enthusiastic about the possibilities for limiting forces and weapons in an agreed area of Europe. German Chancellor Adenauer and Defense Minister Strauss were strongly opposed. Between these two poles fell the United States, which tended toward the British position, and France, which aligned itself with the Germans.

The situation of General Norstad illustrated the difficulty which the NATO leadership experienced in traversing this thicket. Norstad originally joined Adenauer and Strauss in opposition to current disengagement proposals; and in late 1958 he claimed that he would be unable to fulfill his mission if the Rapacki Plan were adopted. Subsequently, however, after apparent persuasion
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by American Secretary of State Herter, Norstad endorsed the establishment of observation posts on both sides of the East-West border. Although Herter was to have cleared this idea with German Foreign Minister von Brentano, Strauss remained opposed, especially since Norstad's proposal involved the use of German territory for the observation posts and thus implied acceptance of a divided Germany. Chancellor Adenauer shared Strauss's position and was supposedly highly displeased with Norstad.\textsuperscript{11}

In spite of such differences, the next four years produced fairly broad NATO growth and innovation for which leadership ideology was again able to point the way. Spaak's emphasis on increasing scope and depth of foreign policy co-ordination led to the establishment of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group in 1960. In the sector of military forces, virtually every Supreme Commander had urged the improvement of air defense; in 1960 the NATO European air defense command, approved in principle five years earlier, was finally established. General Norstad's forward emphasis resulted in the constitution of an ACE Mobile Force in 1961. Stikker was a major proponent of the Force Planning exercise to equilibrate NATO strategy and capabilities, and Lemnitzer supported him. The Council adopted a new minimum force plan, MC 26/4 to run through 1966, expanded the Annual Review into a Triennial Review, and created a Defense Planning Committee and Defense Planning Working Group to elaborate future requirements.

Spaak, who resigned in 1961, Stikker, and Norstad were all agreed on the desirability of strengthening Allied nuclear sharing and capabilities. Their campaign led first to Athens where, in May, 1962, the Council adopted guidelines for nuclear consultation. A year later, at Ottawa, the United States and Britain committed long-range nuclear striking components to the Alliance, and a Nuclear Deputy to SACEUR and a SACEUR Liaison Group to the Joint Strategic Planning Staff in Omaha were created. Although it was not formally connected with NATO, an MLF Working Group was established in late 1963.
The emphasis by Norstad, Spaak, and Stikker on joint production and standardization of armaments gave impetus to the Twenty Projects Exercise; aided the birth of the NATO Bullpup Production Organization and the NATO AS-30 Steering Committee; and led to the establishment of a NATO Supply Center. In infrastructure, Stikker added his weight to SACEUR endorsement of joint air defense facilities. With a special eye to possible trouble in Berlin, the Allies programmed NADGE in infrastructure Slices XII–XV and adopted a plan for infrastructure acceleration which had as its special focus surface-to-air missile sites and special ammunition storage facilities. As for the sector of science, Spaak and Stikker had both stressed the necessity for cooperation in defense research; the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center—with implications for military long-range nuclear capabilities—was given a NATO charter, and the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center—important for air defense infrastructure—became an International Military Organization under the direction of SACEUR. In addition, the title of the Secretary General's Science Advisor was upgraded to Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs.

The foundation for this development was provided by tensions during the years 1960–62, which brought home the fact that the Cold War might still present significant dangers and that nuclear interrelationships between enemies and between Allies were to be crucial in the new decade. During 1960, relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated. The May Summit Meeting in Paris failed after an American U-2 reconnaissance plane was brought down over Soviet territory. In June the Communist delegates left the Geneva Conference; and at the September meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Khrushchev’s personal behavior made clear the atmospheric change.

The political weather continued to worsen through 1961. On February 17, the Soviet government sent a note to the Federal Republic of Germany re-opening pressures for a Berlin settlement. In June President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev
met in Vienna with no substantive amelioration of the Berlin situation; in August the Communists erected a wall sealing off the Eastern sector of the city; the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing; in October Khrushchev extended the deadline for a Berlin settlement.

During the course of 1962, there occurred a climax of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. American intelligence in October revealed the presence of Soviet missile bases on Cuba; President Kennedy ordered a partial blockade; and the Soviet Union, unwilling to force the issue, agreed to dismantle the installations. In December, another showdown took place—between the United States and Britain—over the American cancellation of the Skybolt missile on which the future of British long-range nuclear striking power depended.

1964 and 1965 were years in which NATO and its leaders made few institutional gains. The planning staff of the Standing Group was finally internationalized. When the MLF failed, a Special Committee of Defense Ministers, with working groups, was added to NATO's structures for nuclear consultation. A high-level committee, AC 253, was established to review NATO's armaments program; and the Defense Research Directors Committee was given formal NATO status.

This lethargy coincided with another period of international relaxation. Beginning in 1963 Cold War relations had seemed once more to become uncertain. In June the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement in Geneva setting up a "hot line" between the two capitals. In July the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. concluded a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. On October 15, 1964, Khrushchev was replaced by a team of Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev. During 1964 and 1965 the major focus of East-West conflict shifted to Asia. A day after Khrushchev's replacement, Communist China exploded its first atomic bomb. As the struggle escalated in Vietnam, Chinese-Soviet rifts became increasingly apparent, and
Eastern Europeans, as in the case of Rumanian leader Ceauşescu, seemed to move toward greater independence.

During 1966 and 1967, NATO decided to relocate its political and military facilities; to establish a central communications and intelligence center; to create a Division of Defense Planning and Policy within the International Staff/Secretariat; to replace the Standing Group, on which France had a privileged position, with an international planning staff; to adopt, after a decade, a new common strategy; to implement the Five Year Rolling Defense Program beginning in 1967; to establish a new NATO force plan through 1970 and then through 1972; to provide NATO funding for the ACE Mobile Force; to create a Standing Naval Force Atlantic; to establish two permanent nuclear committees, the Committee on Nuclear Defense Affairs and the Nuclear Planning Group; to revamp NATO's armaments and defense science structures; and to construct a communications satellite link between SHAPE and AFSouth.

These changes occurred in the context of the crisis which was provided by President De Gaulle's abrupt announcement of his desire for French military withdrawal from NATO and NATO's military withdrawal from France. This threat came not from without but from within, indicating that the Allied solidarity which had faced the tests of East-West tension might yet be undermined in a period of uncertain détente.

Former NATO leaders spoke out publicly to identify De Gaulle's challenge as a crisis. General Norstad told Congress that, "in the year 1966, we have clearly moved from disarray to dissension to crisis. Let me emphasize and reemphasize," he said, "that this is a crisis, because we have been told in recent weeks that this is just another minor incident in the course of the long life of NATO. It is in fact a crisis." Paul-Henri Spaak wrote that "it is necessary to be realistic and see facts as they are. The Atlantic Alliance and its indispensable organization, NATO, are in the throes of a grave crisis. All those concerned with problems of international politics must realize what this means." Spaak con-
continued, "The European policy of the United States, that of Canada, and the policies of thirteen European states as conducted for nearly twenty years are all threatened. If the Atlantic Alliance cannot find a solution to its problems, then one of the most important accomplishments of the last twenty years—one on which the equilibrium of the world is based—is doomed to disappear," he said. "Thus the hour of reflection and of choice has come." 

In this situation Secretary General Brosio helped pull together the Fourteen, continuing ideological support for existing programs, but placing special emphasis on the preservation of the military organization and command structure.

**NATO IN THE 1970's**

At this point in history, it is possible to envision three major alternative futures for NATO. These three roads involve different degrees and forms of integration and are marked Atlantic Community, Atlantic Partnership, and Atlantic Alliance.

The day is probably past when the vision of an Atlantic political union, based on the federal institutions propounded by Clarence Streit and his followers, could seem a credible plan for the immediate future. At least for the decade ahead, the largest degree of plausible integration is probably embodied in a plan which can be labelled the Atlantic Community.

In a sense the picture of the Atlantic Community represents an expansion on the unrealized programs of past NATO leaders, most especially Paul-Henri Spaak. First, institutional structures and tasks are strengthened. Provision is made for the Council to meet regularly at the level of heads of government (perhaps once every two years) and at the level of deputy foreign ministers (once a month). An Atlantic Commission or permanent Committee of Three—similar to NATO's previous experiments with the Three Wise Men of 1952 and 1956—is established. A NATO Policy Planning Council is set up for long-range planning,
and under it are created committees dealing with particular geographical areas and restricted in membership to those nations with immediately relevant interests. In addition a NATO War Cabinet system is organized for crisis use, "with one senior Minister in every NATO government designated as the man responsible for participation in such a standby system." The unofficial North Atlantic Assembly attains formal sponsorship as an advisory body. Its Secretariat is greatly strengthened and it receives regular access to NATO official information.

While the MLF and its brothers probably sleep, an Executive Committee, consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, and one smaller rotating member, is established for nuclear decision-making, with authorization to act in emergencies for the Alliance as a whole. The Chairman of the Military Committee is given the title of NATO Chief of Staff and undertakes to oversee and co-ordinate the activities of the regional military commanders. A NATO Payments Union is created in order to redistribute the economic burdens involved in the stationing of foreign troops on German soil.

The Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support begins to receive an annual budget for a limited number of feasibility and design studies; and a NATO Satellite Organization is created under the Secretary General to supervise a joint telecommunication and reconnaissance satellite program. In scientific and cultural affairs, a NATO University provides facilities for co-operative study and research in all areas of learning.

Binding institutional procedures are strengthened by provisions for majority voting in all NATO committees, though votes are weighted. Each ally maintains the right of appeal to the Council, which renders its verdict by two-thirds majority.

NATO authority is increased by granting the international civilian and military bureaucracies greater scope for direct administration. NATO ambassadors, subordinate to the Secretary General, are accredited to the capitols of non-NATO Nations. NATO major military commanders have command authority in such areas as
logistics, deployment of forces, air defense, and possibly the firing of nuclear weapons in certain clearly defined tactical situations. In armaments, infrastructure, and science, the military and civilian staffs increasingly assume responsibility for the conduct of new programs.

NATO legitimacy also grows. Following De Gaulle, France resumes full co-operation in all areas of NATO activity. National permanent representatives to NATO are given formal national Cabinet rank and are national political figures of the highest importance. National contributions of money and personnel steadily mount; and nations contributing nuclear capabilities to the Alliance remove physical and electronic controls which formerly prevented independent NATO use. At the domestic level, political opposition to NATO remains isolated in splinter groups of the right and left; stable NATO associations of industrial, labor, and scientific actors appear.

The second possibility for NATO's future is the Atlantic Partnership. In part this represents an extension of President Kennedy's "grand design" for interdependence between the United States and a United Europe. "I will say here and now," Kennedy stated on July 4, 1962, "that the United States will be ready for a 'Declaration of Interdependence,' that we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union." Almost a year later in Frankfurt, he said, "It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually. Instead we have and now look forward to a Europe united and strong—speaking with a common voice—acting with a common will—a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner. It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us against fragmentation of our alliance." 17 The idea was carried forward by President Johnson. In his first address to Congress, Johnson
referred to the new "American dream" of "partnership across the Atlantic." 18

In part this plan also represented an elaboration on more cautious endorsements, like that of Secretary General Brosio. Brosio supported President Kennedy's "two-pillar approach" as "the most positive and far-reaching idea so far in the Atlantic relations field" and as "probably the most promising way to build a more balanced, solidly-based Alliance." At the same time, Brosio allowed for discontinuities in the process of European integration. He noted that "the second pillar would have to be set up gradually" and that "a lengthy, tentative and doubtless difficult series of discussions would be required before the plan matures." In Brosio's vision, Kennedy's "concepts should be accepted as a long-term solution as a bridge between the present concept of a multi-member alliance and the future idea of America and Europe becoming equal partners within a defense alliance." 19

The Atlantic Partnership's institutional characteristics are similar to those of the Atlantic Community, but rearrangements are added which give much greater weight to Europeans. 20 Should the élan of European unification be recaptured following De Gaulle's departure, European political co-operation may take form either around a European Political Community or the expansion of the framework of the Franco-German Treaty. One can imagine the revival of the idea of the European Defense Community, or at least a strengthening of the Western European Union; moves toward a European Nuclear Force based on French and British capabilities; and consideration of a European Technological Community to co-ordinate defense research and development. In this situation, there are provisions to represent the new entity of Western Europe and to regroup the other Allies congruently. Institutions are altered to represent corporately the North Americans, Canada and the United States; the Western Europeans, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and perhaps the United Kingdom; and the Border States, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal,
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and Turkey. The new EDC, ENP, and ETC are either housed directly under the new NATO roof or linked with NATO through WEU.

If European reunification remains in the doldrums for some time, Europeans still make gains within NATO. Thus the position of SACEUR changes from American to European hands, although nuclear planning and control are under an American Deputy. Within NATO's military organization, command positions are reapportioned to give Europeans a much larger representation.

In either case, the authority of the NATO bureaucracies and NATO legitimacy continue to grow along the same lines as in the Atlantic Community.

The third picture, that of the Atlantic Alliance, is a painting in which the brush strokes of President de Gaulle are clear. Although NATO's status quo may remain unchanged for some time, sooner or later some disintegration occurs. Both sides of this portrait have been suggested by Brosio's analysis of the effects of the French military withdrawal. On the one hand Brosio implied that the status quo remained much the same. "Actually, France has withdrawn from only the Organization's integrated military part," he said, "She still participates in the civil and political organization—the Council, several Committees and several agencies. Perhaps we should avoid subtleties by merely saying that France remains both an Alliance member and a participant in certain parts of its Organization.

The Organization from which France has partly withdrawn has continued to live." At the same time, Brosio recognized disintegrative tendencies in a NATO of multiple tiers. "Events have induced the fourteen countries to establish what may be described as a two-tier organization. By belonging to certain Alliance bodies and abstaining from participation in certain others, France's tier is that of a special-status Ally." He continued, "at best, the idea of different classes of allies is not at all popular with at least several member governments, even if the classes are loosely conceived and freely selected by the individual allies. At worst, such a system might be an open invitation for member
countries to opt for the widest possible independence and to refuse the stricter, costlier path of tighter integration. In both cases it would probably have a divisive effect."  

In the picture of the Atlantic Alliance, the Europeanization of NATO eventually goes so far as substantially to weaken American participation, transforming NATO into a primarily European grouping. Institutionally, this means the establishment of an Atlantic Summit in Washington, where Europe may be collectively represented, to supervise the Alliance’s civil and military affairs in a general way. Direct oversight of the European Command, however, is exercised from a European capital by Europeans; and the International Staff/Secretariat is close by. American participation in Allied headquarters is progressively reduced, except perhaps in nuclear affairs, until United States officers perform mainly liaison and observer functions. Should the European Nuclear Force come into existence, there are close ties with the United States and Canada, but the ENF is still autonomously controlled.  

One can then envision the gradual disappearance of NATO into a web of special relationships. The Alliance is composed of several categories of members, acting together and pooling resources in varying degrees depending on particular interest in the activity involved. At an advanced stage one sees diminishing participation or individual withdrawal of NATO’s peripheral members: Portugal, Iceland, Greece, Turkey, Canada. In addition there occur the reduction or elimination of meetings of government delegates, from the Council downward, and the abolition of the International Staff/Secretariat and NATO’s military headquarters.  

France may continue half in and half out of NATO. Although no longer an active member in many Alliance programs, the French may still participate in early warning and air defense activities, as well as retaining their seat on the NATO Council or at the NATO Summit. After De Gaulle it will probably be difficult for his successor to make immediate changes. Gaullists should find it politically uncomfortable to repudiate at once a policy
with which they had been closely associated. Opposition candidates may find more political profit in domestic than in foreign reforms. Moreover, the General's successor will be hard put to match his international dynamism and may be content not to undertake new and disturbing initiatives. Should any French participation in NATO remain, and should the exigencies of coalition politics demand aggressive action—on nationalist, neutralist, pacifist, or economic grounds—the French may, however, finish the job.\(^{25}\)

In any case, NATO authority continues to be conspicuous by its absence and NATO legitimacy eventually declines. Should Western European unification recapture the political tide, the Europeans decide increasingly to travel outside NATO's umbrella, without American help or interference. With or without European unification, the United States and Britain leave military forces on the continent for some time, but gradually cut their number. The German army is reduced, perhaps to eight divisions and turned into a largely professional body, "backed with sizeable militia type forces for static defense."\(^{26}\)

The decline of NATO may, but will not necessarily, coincide with an East-West settlement of European differences. NATO may have a role in achieving a general security treaty and may even serve in a reduced capacity as one supercomponent of a new European system. Nevertheless, individual national governments would still sign the document, with the United States, Britain, perhaps France, and the Soviet Union possibly serving as guarantors. Alliance strength may be reduced by disengagement either before or after signature involving: the substantial dismantling of command structures on both sides, withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from Central and perhaps Western and Eastern Europe, agreement on force ceilings within a specified area, denuclearization of Germany and perhaps other Central European nations.\(^{27}\)

The road to a general European settlement, however, will probably remain under construction for some time. The building of bridges seems the obvious first step, with calculated promotion
of cultural, social, scientific, and economic links between East and West Germany and between the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. Yet ultimately, the success of gradualism in uniting all of Europe will still depend on several uncertain assumptions. Most obviously, the creation of the greater European security community relies on continued moderation in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It is by no means certain that the Soviet leadership, having passed through the transitional period following Khrushchev’s departure, will not reconcile its differences with the Chinese and undertake increasingly aggressive policies in Europe. The military intervention in Czechoslovakia during August, 1968, indicates that it might be premature to assume that either the Soviet Union or the other states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are ready to move quickly and decisively along the highway of détente. Second, the future of the Common Market remains ambiguous. While substantial EEC advances seem blocked for the next several years, it is possible that it may regain forward momentum in the 1970’s. It is still too early to say whether such a development would help or hinder the formation of a broader Europe. Third, it is not sure that Germans will content themselves with building bridges until the millenium, when the European security community will already have been established. One can indeed imagine a new and more aggressive German leadership hurrying reunification by moving quickly and forcefully to the East. Such a development might seriously damage an atmosphere of general European détente. Finally French policy after De Gaulle is not completely predictable. While it remains unlikely, it is not altogether impossible that a Rightist government will come to power and seek to recreate strong ties with the West. In the end the weakening of NATO and the building of bridges may merely result in the resolidification of existing divisions.

Given these three alternative sets of possibilities for NATO, it seems possible that some of the institutional innovations of the Atlantic Community or the Atlantic Partnership may be realized, but improbable that the heavier integrative burdens in
either version of the future can be achieved. It is more likely that either relatively empty versions of one or the other will develop or that the Atlantic Alliance will be the mold for NATO in the 1970's.

NATO leaders may formulate ideologies which support the Atlantic Community or the Atlantic Partnership. At a general level the leadership emphasizes the common danger, using variations on the domino theme, in which no piece falls alone. In situations of external crisis, it is pointed out that the threat is relevant to all Allies, not only to that Ally immediately under attack; in situations of internal crisis, NATO leaders show that defection from the ranks not only increases the dangers to the remaining members but also to the defector. At the specific level, the leadership calls for particular structures and tasks of the Atlantic Community or the Atlantic Partnership. As for clients, nations under immediate external threat agree to leadership suggestions which seem to make more certain the commitments of their Allies. In situations of internal strain, the possibility of mass defections persuades core members to support leadership platforms promising to maintain cohesion.

Future crises may provide fertile soil for institutional innovation. The ultimate external crisis is World War III, a situation presenting a wide range of violent options, some of which may be particularly relevant for the Alliance: Soviet nuclear strikes on European targets, but not American ones; Soviet nuclear strikes on American targets, but not European ones; poststrike Communist advances into Western Europe; prestrike Communist advances into Western Europe. At a lower level of struggle, external crises may include escalation of East-West conflict in Asia to the extent that European governments feel themselves in serious and immediate danger; armed conflict in Eastern Europe between, for example, Soviet forces and those of Romania or Yugoslavia, involving dangerous redistributions and activities of Soviet troops; new Soviet ultimatums demanding permanent settlement of the status of the two Germanies and Berlin; blockades of land and air access routes to Berlin, possibly
leading to armed conflict; unintended escalation of incidents at the Berlin wall; substantial Communist military assistance to revolutionaries in Greece or Turkey; border incidents in Denmark or Norway; Soviet breakthroughs in offensive missilery, in antiballistic missile defense, or in antisubmarine warfare neutralizing all or part of Western long-range nuclear capability.

Among future internal crises, one possibility involves French cessation of what remains of its co-operation in NATO and signature of a bilateral friendship and non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. Included in such a treaty may be provisions for political co-operation in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa; military co-operation in the preparation of plans to counter possible threats from the United States; armaments co-operation in research, development, and procurement; infrastructure co-operation in building a satellite communications system linking Eastern and Western Europe; and scientific co-operation in the exploration of space. Another possible candidate for such a treaty is a West Germany which has placed the goal of reunification ahead of its border claims and differences with the East German regime.

Such combinations of leadership and crisis may lead to structures and tasks of the Atlantic Community or Atlantic Partnership, but it is less probable that stable patterns of binding institutional procedures, authority, and legitimacy will appear. This study has produced no evidence that innovations in NATO institutions are likely to generate this kind of development. Conflict has outweighed consensus not only in NATO areas like political consultation and military planning, but also in more usually technical areas, armaments, infrastructure and science. There are no indications that conditions have been different in areas of NATO activity which were not selected for special emphasis—economic co-operation, co-ordination of air traffic, civil emergency planning, cultural co-operation, or even information activities. It appears visionary in most circumstances to expect such components of the Atlantic Community or the Atlantic Partnership as majority voting; corporate representation of West-
ern Europe; greater direct administration by civilian and military bureaucracies (NATO Ambassadors subordinate to the Secretary General, NATO military commanders with substantial command authority, armaments, infrastructure, and scientific program control); permanent representatives of Cabinet rank; steadily increasing national contributions of money and personnel; the removal of national nuclear controls; and stable NATO-centered subnational groupings.

While the NATO leader may ardently wish a more integrated future, he has available no important coercive or utilitarian sanctions. He is unable to compel actors to follow directives which they prefer to ignore or to undertake actions which they are reluctant to implement. He controls no significant budget which he can use to reward the faithful and punish the wayward. Ultimately, the leader's only major tool is the normative power of his ideology, through which he can appeal to the common perceptions and aspirations of the Allies.

Nevertheless, the leader's achievement of institutional innovation, or even the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance, may be significant accomplishments by themselves. In crisis, actors may exhibit "bandwagon behavior," a self-reinforcing sequence of increasingly polarized activity which can lead not only to new NATO structures and tasks, but can also proceed in an opposite, disintegrative direction.28 The leader's ideology is a fragile barrier indeed should there develop a sudden rush to neutrality or surrender. Bandwagon behavior, and the problem it poses for leadership, is illustrated by the elaboration of one internal crisis scenario, the signature of a Franco-Soviet treaty of friendship and non-aggression. With the French decision to cross the ice in the Cold War, other nations—particularly Germany—become anxious to reach the other side before it melts completely. France makes the German choice more obvious by playing on desires for reunification and by using the French position in the European Economic Community as a bargaining lever. As Germany moves to accept the gambit, its EEC partners—the Benelux nations and Italy, if not Britain—cannot afford to remain far behind, and
may even push ahead. In the end the United States—faced with the difficult choice between the benefits of NATO in a European setting which tends to détente, and NATO's costs in terms of sharing nuclear control, provision of military forces, and economic contributions—decides to withdraw.

During the course of NATO's history, international crises have provided much of the impetus for the growth of the Alliance, while institutionalized leadership has helped to channel this energy in constructive directions. The 1970's will probably bring new crises, new opportunities, and new dangers for NATO's leaders. Ultimately, as Machiavelli long ago pointed out, the leader will have to pit intelligence and will against the vagaries of fortune. Machiavelli's Prince received ample compensation, but the rewards to the NATO leader are likely to be less attractive. While he may establish new institutions, he will probably not create authority or legitimacy. Thus he seems destined either to seemingly endless construction of the Alliance's formal edifice or, should his proposals fail to meet the challenges of the future, identification as a scapegoat for its collapse. In this perspective he more closely resembles Sisyphus or Prometheus.
Special Representatives to NATO Council
Meeting on February 15, 1967*

BELGIUM  Mr. Pierre Harmel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
DENMARK  Mr. Hans Soelvhoej, Minister without portfolio
GERMANY  Mr. Schütz, Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ITALY    Mr. Lupis, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NORWAY   Mr. Jacobsen, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NETHERLANDS  Mr. de Ramitz, Director General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TURKEY   Mr. T. Menemencioglu, Ambassador, Member of the High Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
UNITED KINGDOM  Mr. George Thomson, Minister of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
UNITED STATES  Mr. Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary of State, State Department

*Agence France Presse, February 15, 1967. No data were presented for Greece, Ireland, or Portugal.
Studies on the Future Tasks of the Alliance: Subgroup Topics and Rapporteurs*

**EAST-WEST RELATIONS**
Mr. J. H. A. Watson, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom
Mr. K. Schütz, Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany

**INTERALLIED RELATIONS**
Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister of State, Belgium

**GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY**
Mr. Foy Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State, United States

**RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES**
Dr. C. L. Patijn, Professor in International Political Relations, University of Utrecht, Netherlands

### NADGE: Major Industrial Consortia*

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<td>Associated Electrical Industries (A.E.I.)</td>
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*Subcontractors but not full members of the consortium.*

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National Agencies Administering the NATO Science Fellowship Program*

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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Undervisningsministeriet</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Commissariat Général au Plan et à la Productivité, Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Ministry of Coordination, Technical Assistance Service</td>
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<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Menntamáláraouneytid</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Ministère de l'Education Nationale</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Nederlandse Organisatie voor Zuiver Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Committee for Scientific Personnel</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Presidencia de Conselho</td>
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<td>Science Research Council</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>National Science Foundation</td>
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Affiliations of Representatives to NATO Science Committee*

BE

BELGIUM  Professor P. Bourgeois, Université Libre de Bruxelles

CANADA  Dr. C. S. Beals, retired

DENMARK  Professor L. T. Muus, University of Aarhus

FRANCE  Professor L. Néel, Centre d'Etudes Nucléaires de Grenoble

GERMANY  Professor Dr. Ing. E. Pestel, Lehrstuhl und Institut für Mechanik, Technische Hochschule, Hannover

GREECE  Professor Dr. Ing. M. Angelopoulos, National Technical University, Athens

ICELAND  Professor S. Hallgrimsson, retired

ITALY  Professor A. Giacomini, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome

LUXEMBOURG  Professor A. Willems, Grand Ducal Institute, Luxembourg

NETHERLANDS  Professor Dr. H. W. Julius, Central Organization for Applied Research T.N.O., The Hague

NORWAY  Professor H. Mosby, Geofysisk Institutt, University of Bergen

PORTUGAL  Professor C. Alves Martins, Center of Economics and Finance, Gulbenkian Institute of Scientific Research, Lisbon
TURKEY  
Professor Dr. M. N. Ozdas, National Research Council, Ankara

UNITED KINGDOM  

UNITED STATES  
Dr. I. I. Rabi, Pupin Physics Laboratory, Columbia University, New York

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>General Major Vranckx, <em>Directeur Général du Centre d'Études Militaires de la Défense Nationale Belge</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Dr. A. H. Zimmerman, <em>Chairman, Defence Research Board</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Colonel V. V. Mouritzen, <em>Secretary of the Defense Research Board</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Professor J. E. Dubois, <em>Directeur des Recherches et Moyens d'Essai</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Professor Dr. Ing. H. Schardin, <em>Ministerial Director, Ministry of Defense</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Brigadier General A. Avramidis, <em>Director, National Defense Staff</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>General Massimo de Palma, <em>Président du Comité Technique et Scientifique</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Professor G. J. Sizoo, <em>Chairman, Defense Research Committee</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Dr. Finn Lied, <em>Director, Defense Research Institute</em></td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Contre-Amiral J. Neto Milheirico, <em>Secrétaire Général Adjoint de la Défense National, et Président de la Commission de Coordination de la Recherche pour la Défense</em></td>
</tr>
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Appendix F

Turkey
General Enver Demokan, Director of Research and Development, Ministry of National Defense (ARJE)
Colonel Ali Utka, Assistant to the Director of Research and Development

United Kingdom
Sir Solly Zuckerman, C.B., F.R.S., Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence
Sir William Cook, Deputy Science Advisor (Projects)

United States
Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense and Engineering

INTRODUCTION

1. "President de Gaulle's Letter to President Johnson (7 March)," and "French Aide-Mémoire to the Fourteen Other NATO Members (10 March)," NATO Letter, XIV, No. 5 (May, 1966), 12-23.


5. See Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 131-33. The differentiation of authority and legitimacy runs contrary to usage in traditional political theory, where authority must include a component of legitimacy. In such theory, compliance without legitimacy is not authority but coercion. This traditional distinction seems well suited to a philosophical discussion of the nature of political obligation. It has seemed less helpful when the task at hand has been merely to identify obedience and support.


9. For development of the concept of spill-over, see Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, chapter viii; *Beyond the Nation-State*, p. 48; Lindberg, pp. 10, 289; Sewell, p. 310. Crisis is defined as a situation in which a significant segment of relevant political actors perceives that fundamental values of the system—or even its future existence—are seriously threatened. Such crisis may result from events which are either external or internal; e.g., activities by alliance enemies or non-members, or activities by participants in the alliance itself. See footnote 1, p. 311 below.

10. See Deutsch *et al.*, pp. 156, 190–91, 202; George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 108; Riker, pp. 210, 231, 242. One might also think of spill-over as occurring between subareas of a given sector. Nevertheless, this has seemed too fine a distinction for the level of measurement possible in the present study.

11. It is beyond the scope of this study to enter into the historical debate concerning ultimate responsibility for the outbreak of the Cold War. The major issue of contention is whether the Soviet Union or the United States originally showed itself aggressive and expansionistic and thus provoked the other side to take measures to defend itself and counterattack.

For our purposes the major point of importance is that, regardless of original guilt, once the initial cycle had been played, the Cold War began in earnest and perceptions of threat on both sides were probably valid.


15. Ibid., p. 188; Freymond, p. 59. The Irish and Swedish governments, although never formally invited, had earlier and informally made clear their


CHAPTER I

1. Also applicable is Article 1, which states: “The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”


Other similar and related bodies were not visibly more effective. These included:

(a) The Atlantic Treaty Association, representing national voluntary organizations supporting NATO. The Constituent Conference of the ATA met at the Hague in 1954 to draft a Constitution and issued a Declaration of Atlantic Union.

(b) The Atlantic Congress, which the NPC organized in London during June, 1959, and which was attended by 700 delegates from all major sectors of activity from the NATO nations. The final Declaration of Principles and Proposals made recommendations for NATO development in political, military, economic, and cultural areas.

(c) The Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations, which met in Paris in January, 1962, and which included approximately ninety representatives appointed by the legislatures of the NATO countries. The Convention agreed on a Declaration of Paris, which supported long-range advance in all spheres of NATO activity. A second Declaration of Atlantic Unity was issued in April, 1962 and represented a follow-up to the Convention. It was endorsed
by most of the signers of the original Declaration and stressed the basic aims of the Atlantic Community.

(d) The Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders, created in 1963, which sponsored regular international meetings.


10. The Secretary General also attempted to mediate in the fisheries dispute between Iceland and Britain, but his very limited success is indicated by NATO's official commentary: "It would be an exaggeration to say that NATO's efforts have made it possible to reach a solution on the question of Icelandic fisheries." NATO Information Service, NATO: Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1965), p. 79.


28. NATO Secretariat, “Effect of Decolonization on the Atlantic Alliance,” p. 7. This paper forms part of “Decolonization and the Atlantic Community: Second Study Conference of University Professors from Member Nations of the Atlantic Alliance, Convened by the Atlantic Treaty Association at the Headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization September 3–8, 1962” (mimeo.).


31. *Times* (London), February 22, 1962; October 4, 1962; Assembly of Western European Union, Document 256. *Le Monde*, October 6, 1962, estimated that in the six months prior to October, 1962, percentages of the free world’s trade with Cuba were distributed: Greece 22 per cent, Britain 18 per cent, West Germany 11 per cent, Norway 10 per cent.


43. Another aspect of the crisis was suggested by the International Herald Tribune of June 20, 1967, which carried a controversial article by Joseph Alsop. Alsop reported that the French government was attempting to use the crisis to take over American and British oil interests in Arab countries. The French government was supposed to have proposed the nationalization of American and British oil concessions and to have offered subsequent French help in management and marketing.
44. Buchan, Crisis Management, p. 25.
54. Stikker, Men of Responsibility, pp. 336, 357.


60. Paul-Henri Spaak, Speech at a Meeting of the Political Committee (B) of the Atlantic Congress, June 8, 1959 (mimeo.).


64. Stikker, Men of Responsibility, p. 336.


75. Ibid., p. 3.

76. Ibid., pp. 6-8.


78. For prior expositions of this idea, see Paul-Henri Spaak, “The Political Future of NATO,” Address to the Imperial Defense College, London, November 2, 1959 (mimeo.), pp. 16-17, and Speech to the Atlantic Congress, Tours, September 8, 1959 (mimeo.), p. 3.


The status of expert groups is set forth in NATO General Guidance for NATO Groups of Experts (Paris, 1955), p. 5: “The members of Groups of Experts created by any of the Committees of the Council remain national representatives and act within the framework of the directions given by their own governments. They have no international status.”

86. Paul-Henri Spaak, Address to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, November 18, 1960 (mimeo.), p. 11. See also Le Monde, November 7, 1959 and September 22, 1960.


89. Paul-Henri Spaak, Address to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, November 18, 1960 (mimeo.), p. 8.

CHAPTER II

1. North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, September 17, 1949 (mimeo.).
4. Iceland, having no military establishment, was allowed to be represented by a civilian, and Luxembourg was represented by Belgium. Following its withdrawal, France maintained a liaison staff. See Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1967–1968 (London: 1967), p. 15.


18. Ibid., pp. 21–22; F. W. Mulley, M.P., The Politics of Western Defense (Southampton: Camelot Press, 1962), pp. 122–23; Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, “NATO Force Goals, the Contributions of NATO Members, Conscription Policies of NATO Members,” Congressional Record, daily ed., January, 1967, p. 588. More specifically, Osgood says that, “in February, 1952, the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Lisbon, approved the most ambitious force goals of NATO’s history: 50 divisions, 4000 aircraft and 704 major combat vessels in 1952 and, provisionally, 75 divisions and 6500 aircraft in 1953, to be followed by 96 divisions and 9000 aircraft in 1954, with about 35 to 40 divisions to be ready for combat at all times (including 25 to 30 on the central front) and the rest to be capable of mobilization within a month. The Council approved the contribution of 12 West German divisions to these forces within the framework of the European Defense Community, toward which Great Britain, the United States, and the other NATO countries not participating directly in EDC would assume the same obligations as toward NATO. (The projected force goals did not include the indigenous troops needed to defend Greece and Turkey, whose accession to NATO was now formally recognized.)” Osgood, NATO, p. 87.


20. Fox and Fox, p. 22; Osgood, NATO, p. 75; Library of Congress, “NATO Force Goals . . . .,” p. 588; Robert H. Estabrook, Washington Post, December 14, 1961; Published references to the 1961 plan refer to it as MC 96; however, interview respondents identified it as MC 26/4. Most interview respondents could not identify MC 96. Two of them stated that it had focussed on early release to NATO military authorities of nuclear weapons, but had never been approved by the Council.


26. NATO Information Service, NATO, pp. 93–94; Atlantic Community News (March, 1967), Hanson Baldwin reports that all German forces are
permanently assigned to NATO, while other Allied forces are assigned only in emergencies or during maneuvers. "NATO's Uneven Steps Toward Integration," Reporter, XXXII, No. 5 (March 11, 1965), 33. High ranking military sources denied this.


32. Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, "NATO Force Goals . . . " p. 588. It had also been stipulated, either in these plans or others, that the forces would have stocks of supplies adequate to maintain them in the field for 90 days.


34. It would be beyond the scope of this study to analyze the legitimacy of the NATO military force program in terms of all those political actors who concerned themselves with the problems of Western defense. At the international level alone, a sample of such groups might include the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, the Assembly of the Western European Union, the International Socialist Congress, the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties of the Common Market, the Catholic Church, the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, and the International Confederation for Peace and Disarmament. Rather, the present discussion of legitimacy concentrates on the policies of the four major governments and on the most politically salient domestic groups in each nation.


52. Ibid., chapter vii.


56. The Atlantic Community Quarterly, VI, No. 3 (Fall, 1968), pp. 450-51.


64. Ibid., p. 15.


67. "British Forces in Germany Communique," Atlantic Community Quarterly, IV, No. 3 (Fall, 1966), 450.

68. Times (London), March 5, 1965.


Notes to Pages 76–82

73. Times (London), March 4, 1964.
74. Ibid., November 24, 1964.
75. Ibid., December 17, 1964.
78. Snyder, pp. 82–84; Beer, pp. 225–26.
79. Times (London), June 27, 1959. This original total was later reduced to 43 signatories after pressure by Gaitskell and the party whips.
82. Richardson, p. 75; Die Welt, August 1, 1962; Stuttgarter Zeitung, April 12, 1966. International Herald Tribune, July 7 and August 16, 1967. David Binder in the International Herald Tribune of July 25, 1967, identified Defense Minister Gerhard Schroeder as the source of the original reports and as the chief opponent of the reductions within the German government. See also Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 1967 (London, 1968), p. 12.
88. At the end of April, 1968, NPD strength in Land Assemblies was:
Baden-Württenberg 9.8 per cent, Bremen 8.8 per cent, Hesse 7.9 per cent, Bavaria 7.4 per cent, Lower Saxony 7 per cent, Schleswig-Holstein 5.8 per cent, The Bulletin, April 30, 1968.


91. Martin, p. 658. See also Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, pp. 33-34.


95. Le Monde, February 26, 1952.


107. For texts of the early notes, see NATO Letter, XIV, No. 5 (May, 1966), 22-27. See also NATO Letter, XIV, No. 11 (November, 1966); Le Monde, May 6, 1966.


"La defense 'tous azimuts'" seemed to be pointed particularly at the Germans, who were singled out for special emphasis in the columns of Le Monde, and reacted strongly against the new formulation. See "Défense dirigée" or 'Défense Tous Azimuts,'" Revue de Défense Nationale, December, 1967 and Alastair Buchan, "Battening Down Vauban's Hatches," Interplay, I, No. 10 (May, 1968), 5-7.


CHAPTER III


9. Press Conference, Palais de Chaillot, April 2, 1957 (mimeo.).


18. General Lyman Lemnitzer, "Forward Strategy Reappraised," *Survival,* III, No. 8 (January–February, 1961), 23–24. This statement was made while Lemnitzer was still Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.


20. Paul-Henri Spaak, Address to the University of New Hampshire,


24. General Lauris Norstad, Speech in Hamburg, Germany, April 21, 1961 (mimeo.).


27. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Address to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, Addresses by Speakers: 1964, p. 36.


32. Quoted in Osgood, NATO, p. 107.


34. "Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Senator Henry M. Jackson..."
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40. Ibid., pp. 82–84.

41. Ibid., pp. 82–84.

42. The most publicized of these Menaggio meetings occurred on September 9, 1960. See C. L. Sulzberger, New York Times, November 23, 1960, February 1, 1961, March 4, 1961; Osgood, NATO, p. 404; Stikker, Men of Responsibility, p. 333. Frequent assemblies were facilitated by the facts that the Belgian Ambassador to NATO, Andre de Staercke, owned a villa on Lake Maggiore which Spaak visited, and that Adenauer had a home at Cadenabbia on Lake Como.


47. Paul-Henri Spaak, Address to the Imperial Defense College, October 21, 1960 (mimeo.).


49. Osgood, NATO, pp. 230–33.


52. New York Herald Tribune, May 6, 1963; Atlantic Community Quart...

53. Ibid., p. 76.


55. Ibid., p. 21.


64. Ibid., p. 5; North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué, NATO Press Releases M1/65/4 and M3 (66) 3, May 12, 1965 and December 16, 1966.


66. Hockaday, p. 7; NATO Press Releases (67) 4, April 7, 1967 and (68) 3, April 19, 1968.


70. Ibid., pp. 44, 46.


72. François Ducheñee, Beyond Alliance (Boulogne-sur-Seine: Atlantic Institute, 1965), p. 58.


74. Thomas, pp. 68–71.
77. See Vandevanter, Studies on NATO: An Analysis of Integration, pp. 45–47.
80. One interviewee ranked Allied cohesion in the face of French withdrawal: (1) United States, United Kingdom, Germany, (2) Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, (3) Greece, Turkey, (4) Canada, Norway, (5) Others.
82. Stars and Stripes, April 19, 1966.
90. See Chapter VIII below.
CHAPTER IV


2. Ibid., pp. 79, 128.

3. Ibid., pp. 121, 128-29.


5. NATO Information Service, NATO, pp. 124-25.

6. Ibid., p. 125. A further input to these developments was provided by the report in December, 1962, of a high level working group which had been appointed by the Council in May to “examine the existing machinery” for co-operation in arms research, development and production, and to suggest improvements. The group suggested approximately twenty projects for future co-operation, not all of which received preliminary acceptance by the Council. NATO Press Release M1 (62)4, May 6, 1962; Times (London), December 17, 1962.


11. NATO Documents MC (59), CM 82/2, CM 82/3, CM 8/4. See also Rhodes James, p. 27.


13. The only two to get even this far were NBMR’s 3 and 4—but at Stage 5, NATO decision-making bodies refused to favor any single aircraft and the projects stalled. See p. 141 below.


30. Ibid., pp. A-1, 7; NATO Information Service, NATO, p. 130.


36. *Military Export Guide* (Washington, D.C.: American Aviation Publications, October 30, 1965), Pt. II, Sec. 1. A staff study for the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations described the workings of the drive. “Since its establishment in October of 1961, a Defense Department office called International Logistic Negotiations (ILN) has been the center of U.S. military sales. In 1964 the Director of ILN, Henry J. Kuss, was promoted to the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense as the result of his success in boosting military sales. ILN’s sales force of some 21 professional officers is organized into four teams—red, grey, blue, and white—each charged with particular functional and regional responsibilities. The white team, for example, devotes almost its entire efforts to selling military equipment to West Germany in an effort to offset by military sales the approximately $775 million it costs the United States in dollars to keep our troops in the Federal Republic (West Germany has bought some $3 billion worth of military equipment in the last 4 years). The measure of ILN’s success is the 600 per cent increase in annual military sales over the levels of the 1950’s.” U.S.
Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy: Staff Study Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations (90th Congress, 1st session, January 25, 1967), p. 3.

37. U.S. Senate, Arms Sales, p. 3.
38. Official Memorandum.
42. Vandevanter, Co-ordinated Weapons Production, pp. 43-44; See also NATO Press Release (59) 8, June 18, 1959.
45. NATO Press Release (59) 10, June 28, 1959; NATO Press Release (60) 2, March 4, 1960. Stars and Stripes, June 17, 1960, reports initial NSC responsibility for five American aircraft—the C47, C119, T33, F84, F86. It is not certain whether the United States actually recouped all of its investment. In October, 1962, the American government withdrew the processing of MAP support through NAMSO because the U.S. European Command was disturbed over inefficiency and long procurement times. (Official Memorandum). See also, Vandevanter, Common Funding in NATO, pp. 88-89.
46. Vandevanter, Co-ordinated Weapons Production, p. 29.
50. Henri Anglès d'Auriac et al., Organisation des programmes internationaux de production intégrée, Collection des sciences sociales et administration des affaires #7 (Institut de Sociologie, l'Université de Liège, 1966), p. 128.
52. NATO Press Release M1 (65) 1, May 11, 1965.
55. Quoted in U.S. Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, p. 9.
58. NATO’s Fifteen Nations, XI, No. 4, 26-31.
63. Kristall (Hamburg), October 25, 1964.
64. In the case of the F 104G Defense Minister Strauss supported the project and Finance Minister Erhard opposed it precisely over the issue whether or not it was desirable to rebuild the German aircraft industry. See Gerald Freund, Germany between Two Worlds, pp. 163-64.
74. Lemnitzer, Address to the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, Addresses by Speakers: 1963, p. 32.


82. Ibid., pp. 646-47.

83. Western European Union, Joint Production of Armaments, p. 7.


85. Major General Don R. Ostrander, "NATO Joint Missile Production," NATO Letter (December, 1959), quoted in Vandevanter, Co-ordinated Weapons Production, pp. 37-38 who also notes that, in the case of "the Hawk and the Sidewinder, the International Staff was more active than later on."

86. Vandevanter, Co-ordinated Weapons Production, p. 13 (italics mine).


88. Vandevanter, Co-ordinated Weapons Production, pp. 91-93.

89. Rhodes James, p. 22.

90. Times (London), December 17, 1962.


94. Ibid., p. 54; Plowden Report, p. 9; Flight, May 26, 1966 and June 2, 1966.

95. U.S. Senate, Arms Sales, p. 9.

CHAPTER V


2. Rhodes James, p. 20.

3. Ibid., pp. 20-21. See also Vandevanter, Common Funding in NATO, p. 61.

4. See Wing Commander P. G. M. Ridsdale, RAF, "Military Infrastruk-

6. Under the standing infrastructure procedure, the bids submitted in the International Competitive Bidding Procedure included taxes and tariffs; and the contract was awarded on the basis of the bid—minus a tax rebate, plus 5 per cent administrative expenses after the deduction of the tax rebate.

The size of the tax rebate was decided through separate negotiations with each country and was based on a calculated percentage of taxes which the government could earn on infrastructure contracts. Once the negotiation was completed, the figure remained as a stable percentage for infrastructure contracts of all types.

Under this procedure, industries from the host nation obtained a bidding advantage. For example, the French rebate was 12 per cent of the amount of infrastructure contracts awarded; however, in the area of communications and electronics the taxes were much higher than the agreed tax rebate. French customs on American electronics equipment were up to 35 per cent on some items. French companies, however, paid no customs on those projects for which France was host.

7. See Vandevanter, *Common Funding in NATO*, p. 54.

8. For several years the Standing Group made reports to the Council exploring various measures to increase the slow rate of implementation in the infrastructure program. While these reports terminated in 1962, the Infrastructure Committee applied measures which alleviated the problem in certain areas.

First there was the Acceleration Program. In 1961 SACEUR complained of delayed construction of Special Ammunition Sites and Surface to Air Missile sites. Investigation showed that the greatest delay between program approval and completion occurred in Germany. Here there were problems in land acquisition and German administrative procedures which sometimes required as many as 100 separate actions before Infrastructure facilities could be put out for bids. In order to eliminate delays, the Acceleration Program provided on-site screening by SHAPE, the International Staff, the user and host nations, and the custodial nation; provided advance funding approval for all SAS and SAM projects nominated by SHAPE for the procedure; and paid up to 15 per cent over the normal costs of these works to accomplish their completion by the end of 1962. Over 200 projects were implemented under this program; most of them terminated by January 1, 1963, though a few dragged on till mid-1963.

Second there was the Streamlining Procedure. The Acceleration Program, having accomplished its purpose, was abandoned at the end of 1962. Its success led SHAPE and the International Staff to request the Infrastructure Committee to preserve as much of the procedure as possible. The Infrastructure Committee agreed that, for projects nominated by SHAPE, the on-site screening and other accelerated procedures not adding to the cost of the project would be retained.

Third, there was Operation Cleanup. From 1961–65, the United States was reluctant to accept in the P&P Committee any joint final inspection reports of SAS or SAM facilities because it felt that acceptance would preclude the expeditious correction of operational deficiencies, which were numerous, especially on sites built before the issuance of SHAPE criteria. The
host nations felt that detailed (Type B) estimates and approved fund requests were necessary before they could be assured reimbursement for the correction of deficiencies. The preparation of such estimates for the large number of projects involved, however, presented an enormous burden for already overloaded user construction administrative staffs.

In March, 1964, the United States requested that all deficiencies on already completed projects be corrected on a one-time basis and that new rules apply from then forward, to which the Infrastructure Committee agreed, setting a three-month deadline for reporting deficiencies. The United States, after an initial screening by the International Staff and SHAPE, presented basic lists containing urgently needed items to permit the completion of facilities to the Infrastructure Committee, which accepted them in February, 1965. Under the agreement the host countries were to correct the deficiencies approved on each site by SHAPE and the International Staff and present the bills after the work was completed. The program got underway in mid-1965 with the hope that all SAS and SAM sites would be fully operational within a year.

9. By early 1968 France had agreed to pay the United States approximately $13 million for military surplus material left behind at French bases when American troops withdrew. In addition France had also agreed to purchase former NATO headquarters facilities in Paris for $17.5 million. While the Fourteen were happy with both settlements, they had relatively little to do with the NATO's military infrastructure. See Atlantic Community News (March, 1968), p. 4.

10. Vandevanter, Common Funding in NATO, p. 69;


16. See p. 163 above.


18. Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft, Oberstleutnant Gerd Stamp, Strategie der NATO: Aus der Sicht der Obersten Befehlshaber Europa (Kulmbach: Albert Hertel, 1961); Norstad, Press Conference, SHAPE,


In reality contributors and recipients did not completely disappear but were only drastically rearranged. Approximately one-third of the total sum was expected to go for installations and check-out. Here Greece and Turkey would receive more than they had contributed because of local civil engineering requirements. Germany agreed to offset such deficits by up to 25 per cent of its equipment production share. See William Beller, “NATO Plans SAGE-Type System,” *Missiles and Rockets* (October 12, 1964), p. 15.

The same foreign exchange equalization provisions were incorporated in plans for Phase Two of NATO’s SATCOM. See Anne Sington, “NATO ‘SATCOM’” NATO Letter, XVII, No. 3 (March, 1968), p. 20.


**CHAPTER VI**

1. The criterion which divides pure science from defense science is whether a particular activity comes under the jurisdiction of the Science Committee or the Defense Research Group. The third NATO science program is labelled “military science” and includes activities under NATO military authorities such as the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development; the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center, La Spezia; and the SHAPE Technical Centre.


4. Ibid. See also an earlier version of this paper, “NATO and Science,” NATO Doc. AC/137-WP/22, October 19, 1965, pp. 4–9.


7. These forecasts were begun in 1961 as NATO Long Range Scientific Studies under the leadership of Dr. Theodore von Karman and were hammered out in the course of two international conferences. Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, “Military Research Problems,” NATO’s Fifteen Nations, VII, No. 3, 34-41.


15. At its meeting in June, 1966, the Science Committee expanded the proportion of the overhead allowance of the Fellowship budget from 1 per cent to 1.5 per cent. Although the Science Committee stipulated that any excess be used to increase the number of fellowships, it was more likely that the administrative expenses of the other programs would increasingly be met from this expanded allowance and that the administrative allowances of the other programs would, in turn, be used to expand their substantive activities.


18. The computation and comparison of national financial contributions to the NATO pure science program is beset with pitfalls.

For the Fellowship Program it was necessary to transform gross contribution into net contribution through deduction of financial program benefits, and to take account of differing donation and distribution formulae within the program. Other factors for which no allowance was made due to their marginal importance include unused budgetary allocations, payment in varying mixtures of national currencies, and changing currency convertibility ratios.

No attempt was made to introduce such control factors as Gross National Product, with its varying computations; internal tax burden; the stability of foreign exchange; or international expenditures outside the NATO area, since it was felt that such a task lay outside the scope of the present study.

Figures on research grants are included in NATO Scientific Affairs Division, NATO and Science, Appendixes IV and V. Not included are 28 research grants sponsored by the Subcommittee on Oceanographic Research.
19. Because American wage scales tended to be higher than European ones, a special agreement had been concluded for the payment of American nationals. Under this arrangement, the American government paid the salaries and allowances of its own nationals who were seconded to NATO. NATO then credited the United States with the amounts which it would otherwise have paid these employees at the NATO salary scale, and deducted the credits from the United States’s annual budgetary assessment. Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 1952–1957, pp. 122–23.


32. Increasing the Effectiveness of Western Science (Brussels: Fondation Universitaire, [1960]), Preface, p. 18.

33. Proposal for an International Institute of Science and Technology:
CHAPTER VII

1. Furthermore there are many facets to crisis, not all of which seem relevant in the NATO context. One aspect is the threat which crisis presents to fundamental values; this is included in our earlier definition (footnote 9, p. 281 above). Two other dimensions—length of time and origin of the event—appear less applicable.

With regard to time, it is obvious that a crisis "incident" can not be excessively long. Yet a series of connected crisis incidents, though they may extend over a period of years, may make up a crisis "period," crowded with threatening activity. The postwar period which formed NATO's temporal environment presented an almost continuous succession of incidents—especially during the years 1946-1952, 1956-1957, 1960-1962, 1966-1967—which appeared to threaten NATO's participants. The problem of access to Berlin alone, which deeply concerned the Alliance, has been defined to include only five years of "inactivity or extinction" (1954-1956, 1958, 1963) during the fifteen years 1948-1963. See Charles A. McClelland, "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963," in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 179.

As for the origin of the crisis event, this has seemed to make relatively little difference in NATO. NATO has been threatened both externally and internally by the intermittent intensification of the perceived Communist danger and by the divisions represented by Suez, Nassau, and De Gaulle's military withdrawal. It is not apparent that the origin of a given incident was necessarily related to the magnitude of the perceived threat, nor that the origin always made a significant difference in terms of NATO integration.

2. North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, September 26, 1950 (mimeo.).


10. See Hinterhoff, Appendix 10, pp. 414–42. Hinterhoff presents separate listings for the full-scale debate which occurred in the British Houses of Commons and Lords, which may somewhat inflate the figure for 1958. Nevertheless, this may also give appropriate weight to the fact that such a debate took place at all.


In some senses, Atlantic Community may be a misnomer. The prospective Community is both less and more than Atlantic—less because it does not include all of those nations which border on even the Northern Atlantic Ocean, more because it includes some which do not. Furthermore, no consideration is given to other forms and organs of Atlantic co-operation, for example, economic activity and the role of the OECD. Nevertheless, the configuration of NATO here presented merits its name, both because of Spaak's previous usage, and also because it represents the highest degree of integrative progress to which it presently seems that NATO can aspire.


23. See Beauref, pp. 193-94.


27. Such an East-West settlement may also include: non-aggression provisions; agreement on the legitimacy of the present German borders; provision for all-German institutions, if not for immediate or complete reunification; creation of a European Security Commission, responsible for surveillance and supervision of European security arrangements and troop configurations. In addition an East-West Political Assembly and an East-West Economic Assembly may be established, possibly incorporating existing regional organizations in each half of Europe.


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