

Understanding Culture Matching Effects in Advertising

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By

Huidong Yang

The Ohio State University

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Project Advisor: Richard Edward Petty, Andrew Lionel Luttrell

Abstract

Previous studies have shown that when persuasive messages contain appeals that match readers' personal traits or characteristics (e.g., affective/cognitive bases of attitudes, attitude function and self-schema), the message can change people's attitudes more. Matching the cultural values between messages and readers is another approach that can make the message more persuasive. Our study specifically focuses on the mechanism behind matching individualism-collectivism difference in cultures. That is, an individualistic person may find individualistic messages to be more persuasive than collectivistic messages, and vice versa. In other types of matching effects, matching produces more persuasion because it increases readers' level of thinking (Brannon & McCabe 2008; Petty, Wheeler & Bizer, 2000; Wheeler, Petty, & Bizer, 2005). We believe that culture matching effects can lead to more persuasion for the same reason. That is, matching individualistic and collectivistic values in advertisements to a person's own values leads to more persuasiveness only when the arguments are strong because matching really influences thinking toward the messages. In this study, we manipulated whether an advertisement appealed to individualistic vs. collectivistic values and whether the arguments in the message were strong or weak. We also measured participants' individualism-collectivism differences using an established scale. The data partially supported our hypothesis; participants high in collectivism showed increased processing for the collectivistic (vs. individualistic) advertisement. However, the data for individualism did not show a significant preference for individualistic (vs. collectivistic) messages. These findings may be useful in advertising and health promotion that for matching effects to maximize its persuasiveness, we should also give strong arguments to the readers.

Understanding Culture Matching Effects in Advertising

Persuasion has been a popular topic of study in social psychology for decades. It happens everywhere across many different contexts, including politics, business and daily life.

Advertising is one valuable domain in which to study persuasion because the main goal of an advertisement is to change customers' attitudes and convince them to buy particular products. Moreover, with the prosperity of the global market, international advertising has become a critical part of marketing, and understanding advertising for markets situated in different cultural contexts is therefore increasingly important.

Previous studies have examined the effects of messages with appeals that match or mismatch internal characteristics of the reader (for a review, see Briñol & Petty, 2006). The initial view of matching effects was that a person's attitude toward the topic of a message changes more when the message matches something about the person than when there is a mismatch. A message can match many different characteristics. For instance, a message can match the function of a person's attitude, the affective or cognitive basis of the attitude, or the person's self-schema (see Petty, Wheeler, & Bizer, 2000). First, we will review the initial research demonstrating simple effects of matching on persuasion, and then we will review the more recent approach of examining the effects of matching on message processing. Finally, these two approaches to matching will be applied to the unique effects of culture on persuasion to better understand the role of culture in attitude change.

First, early research showed that when a message matches the function of an attitude, it fits the reason the attitude is held or the purpose the attitude serves, and facilitates persuasion. People hold an attitude because it serves needs such as social adjustment, ego defense, value expression and utility (Katz, 1960). Various studies have found that matching the persuasive

appeals in a message to the audience's attitude function can make the message more persuasive (Ridge, Meine & Haugen, 2006; Lavine & Snyder, 1996). For example, Ridge et al. (2006) showed participants messages arguing in favor of volunteering. When these messages matched the function of the participants' volunteer-related attitudes (social-adjustive, value-expressive, knowledge, ego-defensive, and utilitarian functions), the messages were perceived as more effective and better liked than mismatched messages, producing more positive emotions and behavioral intentions toward volunteering. Additionally, self-monitoring, which refers to individual differences in concern of situational appropriateness, reflects the function of people's attitudes; high self-monitors tend to judge a product based on image (social-adjustive function), and low self-monitors tend to judge a product based on quality (utilitarian function). Consistent with other function matching studies, high self-monitors are typically more persuaded by advertisements stressing product appearance than low self-monitors, but low self-monitors are more persuaded by advertisements stressing product quality than high self-monitors (DeBono & Snyder, 1985; Petty & Wegner, 1998).

Another type of matching can occur for affect vs. cognition-based attitudes. Both affectively based attitudes and cognitively based attitudes can be positive or negative evaluations of the objects, but affect-based attitudes are generated from emotions such as happiness or anger, while cognition-based attitudes are associated with beliefs about the objects, such as usefulness or harmfulness. When people with affect-based attitudes read an affective message, they are generally more persuaded than when they are given cognitive messages (e.g., Edward & Hippiel, 1995). This is also true even if people only think that their attitudes are more based on affect or cognition, independent of the attitudes' actual bases (See, Petty, & Fabrigar, 2008). Similarly, people high in need for cognition are more receptive, recognize and generate more positive

attitude toward cognition-based messages whereas people high in need for affect are more persuaded by affect-based messages (Haddock et al. 2008). Clarkson, Tormala & Rucker (2011) also showed that a matched message attack (i.e. affective messages attacking affect-based attitudes and cognitive messages attacking cognition-based attitudes) produce greater persuasion than mismatched message attacks especially when people are certain of their initial attitude.

The importance of the reader's self-view, the beliefs he or she has about him or herself, in persuasion has also been proposed. For example, when a brand possesses traits that match the consumer's self-schema, the consumer develops more positive attitudes toward the brand than when they mismatch the consumer's self-schema (Aaker, 1999). Researchers have also found that when messages matched the reader's levels of extroversion or need for cognition, under the conditions that the message contained compelling arguments, the readers were more persuaded by these messages (Wheeler, Petty & Bizer, 2005). Self-schema matching is also shown to be effective in health related areas. The matching between health messages and participants' motivational orientations, such as avoiding negative consequence or approaching beneficial outcomes, led to more persuasion by the message (Mann, Sherman, & Updegraff, 2004). Additionally, when messages are congruent with participants' need-for-cognition self-schema (i.e., the message emphasizes that it does or does not require careful thought), the participants demonstrate greater desire for receiving AIDS information than when the messages mismatched their need for cognition (Brannon, McCabe, 2008).

In the global economy where there is substantial cultural diversity, the significant role of culture in persuasion cannot be overlooked. Various persuasive styles have been found to be more prominent in some cultures than others. For example, the U.S., USSR and Arab countries are dominated by three persuasion styles respectively: factual-inductive, axiomatic deductive and

intuitive-affective (Glenn, Witmeyer & Stevenson, 1977). In addition, advertisements that directly compare two brands are more popular in individualistic countries such as the U.S., while advertisements that indirectly compare two brands are more dominant in collectivistic countries such as Korea (Cho et al., 1999; Jeon & Beatty, 2002). Among these diverse styles, some strategies seem to be more effective than others due to the cultural differences. For instance, direct comparative ads are more effective in collectivistic cultures but indirect comparative ads are more effective in individualistic cultures (Cho et al., 1999; Jeon & Beatty, 2002). Moreover, in East-Asian culture, where prevention is more of a focus, people are more persuaded by loss-framed health messages than gain-framed health messages, but in Britain, where promotion receives more attention, people are more persuaded by gain-framed health messages (Uskul, Sherman, & Fitzgibbon, 2009). Across these many ways in which messages can match cultural values, meta-analytic review has concluded that culturally-adapted advertisements are generally more persuasive and better liked than culturally-unadapted advertisements (Hornikx & O'Keefe, 2009).

There are many cultural dimensions that an advertisement can be congruent with. However, among numerous cultural differences, the difference between individualism and collectivism is thought to be the most fundamental (Han & Shavitt, 1994). Individualistic culture stresses personal goals and benefits, whereas collectivism praises the sacrifice for the group. Further, researchers have found that people in individualistic cultures perceive individualist messages as more persuasive, whereas people in collectivistic cultures perceive collectivistic messages as more persuasive (Han & Shavitt, 1994; Zhang & Gelb, 1996). Thus, current literature appears to suggest that when the cultural appeals in a persuasive message match the reader's cultural values, the message becomes more persuasive. When considering people who

experience either individualistic culture or collectivistic culture, and those who experience both cultures equally (biculturals), people who have adopted one culture only favored the appeals that matched their own cultures (individualistic or collectivistic), but biculturals react positively to both independent and interdependent cultural appeals (Lau-Gest, 2003). This is likely because biculturals have integrated cultural values in both cultures, making them both equally accessible.

Despite a wealth of research showing the persuasive advantage of matching messages to the characteristics of the perceiver, such as matching to one's culture, the reasons behind matching effects in the cultural domain have received less attention. Drawing from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), some researchers have suggested that matching effects can increase the reader's level of thinking toward the message (e.g., Petty & Wegener, 1998; Petty et al., 2000). For instance, some researchers directly measured participants' thoughtfulness and claimed that people who did not enjoy effortful thinking increased their level of thinking when they reviewed a message that matched (vs. mismatched) how they view themselves (e.g., a message appealing to wisdom shown to people who see themselves as wise), indicated by number of thoughts generated in response to the message (Brannon and McCabe, 2008).

Another way to assess whether matching increases thinking used in prior matching studies is to compare persuasion by strong arguments to persuasion by weak arguments. The ELM proposes that people who think more are more persuaded by strong (vs. weak) arguments, compared to people who do not think much (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). That is to say, the more the person is thinking about that message, the more persuaded the person is by strong arguments compared to weak arguments. Applied to matching effects, when messages match (vs. mismatch) the perceiver's characteristics, participant's preference for strong arguments vs. weak arguments can indicate their level of thinking. Some studies have used this approach by showing that

matching messages with participants' self-schema causes greater persuasion by strong arguments than by weak arguments, indicating increased processing. For example, in the previously mentioned study by Wheeler et al. (2005), when weak arguments were considered, matching to participants' level of extroversion and need for cognition produced more positive attitudes toward strong arguments than weak arguments. Additionally, research that followed up on the work regarding loss and gain-framed health messages showed that matching messages to motivational orientation actually produced argument quality effects rather than simple persuasion effect (Updegraff, Sherman, Luyster, & Mann, 2007). Similarly, in attitude function matching, matching also leads to greater persuasion by strong arguments than by weak arguments (Petty & Wegener, 1998).

Thus, existing research shows that matching persuasive message to various characteristics can not only lead to more persuasion but can do so because it promotes more elaborative thinking. This means that persuasion would be increased by matching when the arguments are strong but decreased when the arguments are weak. The key hypothesis for the current study is that matching messages to cultural values will increase thinking. Therefore, we reason that matching a message to a person's sense of individualism or collectivism would also increase the level of effortful thinking. In addition, according to the ELM, this increase in thinking would result in a stronger effect of argument quality on persuasion. In other words, we predicted that when people read persuasive messages that match with their individualistic (vs. collectivistic) cultural values, they would show increased thinking, indicated by more positive attitudes in respond to strong messages than weak messages compared to the mismatched condition (i.e., an interaction of matching with argument quality).

Given the challenges in conducting cross-cultural research, however, in this study, we will measure individual differences in individualism and collectivism. Although it is true that this variable is an important dimension on which cultures vary, people within a culture can also vary in individualism and collectivism (see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Therefore the predictions for this study are that individualistic people will process individualistic messages more than collectivistic messages, and that collectivistic people will process collectivistic message more than individualistic messages. More specifically, in the matching conditions, we expect that participants will show more positive attitudes when they receive strong (vs. weak) arguments, but in the mismatching conditions, we expect a reduced effect of argument quality.

Method

Participants and Design. One-hundred thirteen Ohio State University undergraduates (63 male) enrolled in introductory psychology who received credit toward fulfilling a course requirement participated in the study. We deleted the data of three participants (2 males and 1 female) because they did not pass an attention check (described shortly) leaving a final sample of 110. Sessions were conducted in computer labs in groups of one to eleven participants at a time. Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (individualistic vs. collectivistic messages) x 2 (strong vs. weak arguments) between-subjects design with measurements taken for the third independent variable, individual differences in individualism and collectivism.

Procedure. Upon agreeing to enroll in the study, participants began a study presented completely on computers. They were told that we were interested in their attitudes about an advertisement, and they could read the advertisement as they do in daily life. Participants were exposed to one of the four advertisements for a fictional camera company and were asked to rate their attitudes toward the camera being advertised. We manipulated two elements of the

advertisement: the headline and the specifications of the camera (i.e., arguments in favor of the product). Every advertisement used the same imagery. The headlines framed the advertisements as either individualistic or collectivistic messages, and argument strength was manipulated within the specifications of the camera. Advertisements with strong arguments described high-quality, precisely described features of the camera whereas advertisements with weak arguments stressed irrelevant information and obviously low-quality claims. After reading the advertisements, participants were asked to indicate their attitudes toward the product on several semantic differential scales. Finally, all the participants filled out the individualism-collectivism scale (Shulruf, Hattie, & Dixon, 2007).

Predictor Variables.

Persuasive Message Frame. To manipulate the individualistic vs. collectivistic nature of the persuasive messages, we used different headlines for each message. Individualistic messages used a headline that read “Treasure Moments of Pure Self-Expression” whereas the collectivistic messages used a headline that read “Share Special Moments with Your Friends and Family.” These headlines were adapted from those used by Zhang and Gelb (1996). The headlines were listed at the top right corner of the advertisements, above the specifications of the camera (see Appendix A).

Argument Strength. To manipulate the argument strength, we varied the strength of the camera specifications included in the advertisements. Strong messages had precise technical descriptions of the camera that convincingly suggest that the camera is high-quality, such as “16.7 Megapixel High-Sensitivity CMOS sensor.” Weak messages mentioned information that was not closely related to the camera quality such as “Brand new digital camera for you.”

Individualism and Collectivism. We measured participants' individual differences in individualism and collectivism by using a scale developed by Shulruf, Hattie and Dixon (2007). It is a 30 question scale with questions such as "I see myself as 'my own person'" and "It is my duty to take care of my family even when I have to sacrifice what I want," with responses given on 6-point Likert scales, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This scale has demonstrated a 2-factor structure, measuring individualism and collectivism, representing two independent constructs. The scales for collectivism showed good internal reliability ($\alpha = .64$), so we averaged responses together to form an overall index of collectivism such that high numbers indicated high collectivism. We also averaged responses to form an overall index of individualism such that high numbers indicated high individualism, which also showed good internal reliability ($\alpha = .83$).

Dependent Variables.

Attitudes. Scales were created to measure the attitudes toward camera by asking participants to rate the Optika Camera from "bad" to "good," "negative" to "positive," "against" to "in favor," and "unfavorable" to "favorable" on 7-point scales. These four scales showed good internal reliability ($\alpha = .93$), so we averaged responses together to form an overall index of attitudes toward the product.

Attention Checks

Attention Check Question. We set up an attention check question embedded in the other questionnaire items to examine participants' attention by directly asking them to select the fourth response option on a 5-point scale. We deleted the data of three participants (2 males and 1 female) because they did not pass the attention check.

Results

To understand our data better, we analyzed them in two ways. We first used multiple regression analyses, treating individualism and collectivism as continuous measures and then conducted a 3-way ANOVA, creating discrete groups based on individualism and collectivism scores. Overall, as expected for a sample living in the United States (a relatively individualistic country), a within-subjects t-test reveals that scores on the individualism scale ($M = 4.86, SD = .61$) were higher than scores on the collectivism scale ($M = 4.43, SD = .62$), $t(109) = 5.25, p < .001$. Consistent with previous research, we also found that individualism and collectivism were not correlated, $r(109) = .05, p = .62$. Because these scales are not correlated, they will be treated separately in subsequent analysis.

First, to test the effects of matching to individual differences in collectivism, the data were submitted to a multiple regression analysis in which advertisement type, argument quality and collectivism were entered as predictors of attitudes. Two-way interaction terms and the three-way interaction term were entered in steps 2 and 3 of the model, respectively. Results are interpreted in the first step of the model in which they appear.

We found a significant main effect of argument strength such that strong arguments ($M = 5.32, SD = 0.79$) led to more positive attitudes than weak arguments ($M = 4.77, SD = 1.10$), $B = -.56, t(102) = -3.13, p = .002$. There was an unexpected main effect of collectivism such that higher scores on the collectivism scale predicted more positive attitudes toward the product, $B = .38, t(102) = 2.67, p = .009$. More important and consistent with our hypotheses, these effects were qualified by a marginally significant 3-way interaction of advertisement type, argument strength and collectivism, $B = 1.00, t(102) = 1.76, p = .08$.

To understand this interaction, the data were examined at high and low levels of collectivism (see Figure 1). There was a significant 2-way interaction of advertisement type and

argument strength for high-collectivism participants (+1 SD above mean), $B = 1.13$, $t(102) = 2.30$, $p = .02$. At high collectivism, attitudes in response to strong arguments were significantly more positive than attitudes in response to weak arguments for collectivistic advertisements, $B = -1.05$, $t(102) = -3.10$, $p = .003$, but not for individualistic advertisements, $B = .08$, $t(102) = .23$, $p = .82$. For participants low in collectivism (-1 SD below mean), there was no interaction between message type and argument quality, $B = -.11$, $t(102) = -.22$, $p = .83$. However, argument quality affected attitudes for both types of messages. There was a significant simple effect of argument strength for individualistic ads such that participants low in collectivism showed more positive attitudes toward strong arguments in individualistic ads, $B = -.74$, $t(102) = -2.01$, $p = .05$. These participants also showed more positive attitudes toward strong (vs. weak) arguments for collectivistic ads, $B = -.63$, $t(102) = -1.85$, $p = .07$.

Second, to test the effects of matching to individual differences in individualism, the data were submitted to another multiple regression analysis in which advertisement type, argument strength, and individualism were entered as predictors of attitudes. Once again, two-way interaction terms and the three-way interaction term were entered in steps 2 and 3 of the model, respectively. Results are interpreted in the first step of the model in which they appear.

Again, there was an overall main effect of argument quality such that strong arguments led to more positive attitudes toward the camera than the weak arguments $B = -.55$, $t(102) = -2.99$, $p = .004$. The overall 3-way interaction, however, was non-significant, $p = .30$.

To understand this interaction, the data were examined at high and low levels of collectivism (see Figure 2). Although the 2-way interaction at high individualism (+1 SD above mean) is also non-significant, $p = .64$, there is a significant 2-way interaction between argument strength and message type at low individualism (-1 SD below mean), $B = 1.10$, $t(102) = 1.96$, p

= .05. At low individualism, attitudes in response to strong arguments were more positive than attitudes in response to weak arguments for collectivistic ads, $B = -1.27$, $t(102) = -2.92$, $p = .004$, but there was no difference for individualistic ads, $B = -.20$, $t(102) = -.59$, $p = .56$.

Analyzing individualism and collectivism separately with a regression approach has both benefits and drawbacks. Regression is a good tool for continuous measures, but in this study, treating individualism and collectivism as separate continuous measures leads to unclear interpretations related to cultural differences. First, because the two measurements are independent, one can be both high in individualism and collectivism. Therefore, a collectivistic message can be a match or mismatch for these people. Second, one can be both low in individualism and collectivism. Treating these variables independently can lead to difficulty of defining “individualists” and “collectivists” in different cultures. Therefore, we created a new variable indicating the within-subject difference between the two scales.

First, a new variable “difference” was created by subtracting each participant’s score of individualism from collectivism, generating a new scale such that a high score represents someone who is relatively high in collectivism but also low in individualism, and a low score represents someone who is relatively high in individualism but also low in collectivism. Then this new variable, argument quality and message type was entered in multiple regression. There was a trending 3-way interaction, $B = .66$, $t(102) = 1.57$, $p = .12$, and a significant 2-way interaction for people who are high in collectivism but low in individualism (+1 SD), $B = 1.10$, $t(102) = 2.19$, $p = .03$. At high collectivism/low individualism, attitudes in response to strong arguments were significantly more positive than attitudes in response to weak arguments for collectivistic advertisements, $B = -1.24$, $t(102) = -3.40$, $p = .001$, but not for individualistic advertisements, $p = .67$. The 2-way interaction for people who are high in individualism but low

in collectivism (-1 SD) was not significant, $p = .97$. These results were consistent with the previous analyses where we analyzed individualism and collectivism independently.

To focus on people who are particularly one-sided in individualism and collectivism, we defined the upper quartile and lower quartile as “collectivists” and “individualists” respectively. Only “collectivists” and “individualists” were entered in the analysis, and data in the middle were not considered. We chose to focus on these most extreme participants because it more closely represents traditional cross-cultural comparisons and because there is likely to be more error in predicting matching among people who do not identify strongly with one orientation over another. Data were submitted to a 2 (message type: collectivism vs. individualism) x 2 (argument strength: strong vs. weak) x 2 (culture orientation: individualists vs. collectivists) ANOVA.

Results reveal a significant main effect of argument quality such that attitudes toward the camera were positive in the strong arguments condition ($M = 5.23$, $SD = .87$), compared to the weak arguments condition ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.10$), $F(1, 57) = 5.68$, $p = .02$. There was also an unexpected main effect of culture orientation such that attitudes were more positive among collectivists ($M = 5.23$, $SD = 1.06$) than among individualists ($M = 4.67$, $SD = .91$), $F(1, 57) = 7.16$, $p = .01$. More importantly, the 3-way interaction here was significant, $F(1, 57) = 3.98$, $p = .05$. The 2-way interaction of argument quality and advertisement type for collectivists was marginally significant $F(1, 27) = 3.83$, $p = .06$. Collectivists who saw a collectivistic ad had more positive attitudes toward the camera when the arguments were strong ($M = 5.90$, $SD = .96$) than when the arguments were weak ($M = 4.47$, $SD = .85$), $F(1, 27) = 6.95$, $p = .01$. There was no effect of argument strength, however, when collectivists saw an individualistic ad, $F(1, 27) =$

.002, $p = .97$. The 2-way interaction between message type and argument strength was non-significant for individualists, $p = .39$.

Discussion

Our study provided evidence that matching the cultural appeals in a persuasive message to the reader's individualistic or collectivistic values can lead to more thinking about the message. Specifically, people high in collectivism showed more positive attitudes toward a product when given strong (vs. weak) arguments for it when they read collectivistic (matched) advertisements than when they read individualistic (mismatched) advertisements. People low in collectivism, however, did not show different amount of thought in response to individualistic vs. collectivistic messages.

Results also showed an unexpected main effect of collectivism on attitudes. One explanation for this is that cameras are a socially visible product (i.e. camera is generally a collectivistic product in nature, though there is a recent trend of people taking many self-pictures for social media posting). Previous research has argued that customers' evaluations of a product depend on not only the cultural appeals in the advertisements, but also on how the product is used (Zhang & Gelb, 1996). Some products, such as cameras, are used in public conditions while private products such as toothbrushes are used personally. Processing of messages relevant to a product can be decreased by incongruency between advertisement appeals and individual's cultural value but enhanced by the congruency between advertisement appeals and product use condition.

The results for individualism matching were less conclusive than those for collectivism. Participants high in individualism did not show a matching effect. One possible explanation for that is that the individualistic advertisement did not actually reflect individualistic values.

Therefore, it was possible that the framing of individualistic ads were not as strong as collectivistic ones, so they did not generate a clear match. Another possible explanation could be due to participants' familiarity with individualistic message in the U.S. Previous studies have shown that advertising in the U.S. is dominated by individualism (Han & Shavitt, 1994), and our participants were all students living in an individualistic country (the U.S.). Thus, participants are probably more accustomed to seeing individualistic messages than collectivistic ones. Because collectivistic messages are more novel, they may have captured more attention for collectivistic participants, compared to individualistic advertisements for individualistic participants. Even though individualistic messages and collectivistic messages could be equally strong, due to people's lower sensitivity to individualism in advertisements, the perception of individualism in messages may not have occurred, failing to produce a matching effect. In future research, including a manipulation check for the framing of individualism/collectivism could prove helpful.

To investigate further, there are several ways to extend the results of this study. Conducting this study cross-culturally can be especially helpful. First, we can test the possibility that people are less sensitive to matching effects when the matching variable is the norm for messages. If the hypothesis is true, we should be able to replicate similar results in another cultural setting. More importantly we would expect more of a matching effect for individualistic messages for people in relatively collectivistic cultures who are themselves high in individualism. That is, the novelty of individualistic messages would be able to cause more thought from participants.

Second, future research should consider individualistic, personal use products (e.g., toothbrushes) to see if this helps produce a stronger individualism matching effect. We would

also expect that there would also be a main effect of individualism on attitudes if such products were used in advertisements.

Finally, comparing people in collectivistic countries to people in individualistic countries can be more informative than just measuring individualism and collectivism. This is because directly researching residents from a particular culture can better represent that culture and produce more generalizable conclusions.

In conclusion, our results for collectivism supported our hypothesis that the matching between the cultural appeals in an advertisement and readers' cultural values generated more processing of the message. However, more research should be conducted to better understand matching effects among people high in individualism. Specifically, salience of individualism, matching of product type, and sample size are the factors that should be attended in future cross-cultural study. This knowledge will not only clarify the reason why previously documented culture matching effects may occur but also extend to various applied domains. If a business hopes to tailor its advertising to a specific culture to increase persuasion, it should make sure that the arguments are strong.

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Figures




Figure 1. The effects of argument quality on attitudes for individualism-framed and collectivism-framed advertisements for participants scoring low on a measure of collectivism (1 standard deviation below the mean) and high on collectivism (1 standard deviation above the mean).




Figure 2. The effects of argument quality on attitudes for individualism-framed and collectivism-framed advertisements for participants scoring low on a measure of individualism (1 standard deviation below the mean) and high on individualism (1 standard deviation above the mean).

Appendix A

INDIVIDUALISTIC, *strong arguments*



Treasure Special Moments of Pure Self-Expression

16.7 Megapixel High-Sensitivity CMOS sensor

Capturing stunning 1080p Full HD video in stereo sound with a dedicated movie button

Optika HS System for exceptional low-light performance

OPTIKA

INDIVIDUALISTIC, *weak arguments*



Treasure Special Moments of Pure Self-Expression

Brand new digital camera for you

Allows you to take many pictures on the same memory card

Take up to 10 seconds of video with a dedicated movie button

OPTIKA

COLLECTIVISTIC, *strong arguments*



Share Special Moments with Your Friends and Family

16.7 Megapixel High-Sensitivity CMOS sensor

Capturing stunning 1080p Full HD video in stereo sound with a dedicated movie button

Optika HS System for exceptional low-light performance

OPTIKA

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