MANN-HANDLING HISTORY:
GEORGE WASHINGTON, GNADENHUTTEN AND GENOCIDE

by
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Abstract

Introduction
The Gnadenhutten Massacre of March 8, 1782, in which, as the memorial shaft at Gnadenhutten states, 90 Christian Indians “triumphed in death,” remains the single most horrific incident of the Ohio Valley border wars. Although the details of the appalling affair have been well known, so far as possible, for many years, thanks to the work of early historians such as Heckewelder, Draper, Butterfield, and more recently Paul A. Wallace and Earl Olmstead, it is impossible to disagree with Butterfield’s comment that “No one of the prominent events occurring in the West during the Revolution has been written about with so much ignorance of the facts as Williamson’s expedition to the Tuscarawas... Nearly all published accounts from Doddridge to Roosevelt contain many errors. Among the Moravian writers, there is nothing lacking in coloring or in misstatements; and, with some of them, there is downright falsification” (Butterfield 1890: 163-164). On the other hand, the American participants in the event remained so close-mouthed in after years that there is no completely trustworthy account of the events on their side either. In regard to Dr. Barbara A. Mann’s work, it can only be said that this regrettable tradition continues.

Archaeological confirmation of the event, were any needed, occurred with excavation of portions of the site in 1973 by the late Jan Whitman and George Reymond (Crouch 1973: 4). But historical accuracy is more elusive, and it is especially disturbing to see a contemporary Indian activist twist and select facts for his own ends. In this letter Washington instructed Irvine to proceed to Fort Pitt with all convenient dispatch and “take such measures as may be necessary for the security of that post and for the defense of the western frontier, as your continental force, combined with the militia of the neighboring country, will admit.” Washington could promise no additional regular forces, so that offensive operations, except upon a small scale, were out of the question: but Irvine should keep himself informed of the situation at Detroit and the strength of the enemy there. As for reports from Colonel Gibson that the regulars at Fort Pitt were on the verge of revolt due to lack of provisions, clothing, and back pay, arrangements initiated while Irvine was at Philadelphia would relieve the grounds for complaint. There is clear evidence in this letter and elsewhere that the measures [being] taken referred to providing payment for the soldiers at Fort Pitt, yet somehow Mann (1997:166) is able to transmogrify these straightforward instructions into a coded message that these “measures” were “the genocide of the Delaware-Mahicans and the robbery of their harvest, horses and furs by an army detachment dispatched out of Fort Pitt.” According to her scenario, “back pay and provisions formed the motive

Her Story
According to Mann (2000: 46), “in early April, 1782 [actually, early March, 1782], General Washington, “learning that 106 starving women, children, and old folks — all but six of them Delaware — Mahican neutrals — had gone back to [the Moravian settlements along the Tuscarawas] to recover their food, authorized a raid out of Fort Pitt by Colonel David Williamson of the Pennsylvania Regiment.” Again, “Washington okayed a foray out of Fort Pitt by the Pennsylvania Regiment under Colonel David Williamson to intercept them [Delaware returning to the Tuscarawas region to retrieve their harvests]” (Mann 2001: 158). Yet again, “The Goshenochting genocide was the attempt by the Revolutionary Army out of Fort Pitt to ‘wipe out’ the Lenape and Mahican of Ohio, the better to serve the fine farm hands [sic] of the Muskingum Valley for European settlement after the Revolution.” Following the Gnadenhutten massacre, according to Mann, Williamson and his men “Gleefully hauled their ill-gotten booty — the stolen harvest, plus the people’s clothes, scalps, animals, and farm implements — to Pittsburgh, where they sold it for personal profit,” killing an additional 30 Delaware Indians along the way. This Mann-handling of history is repeated in more detail in her most recent effusion, along with very biased accounts of the Sullivan and Brodhead expeditions into New York and the earlier destruction of the Coshocton settlement by Brodhead, as well as George Rogers Clark’s expedition to Vincennes and various forays into Ohio (Mann 2005).

Her Method
Checking Mann’s sources for her remarkable assertions about Washington, beginning with her own self-citation, which she artfully describes as “a smoother secondary account,” we find that her original opinion was simply that “General Washington certainly knew of, and most likely authorized, the action” [italics added]. In fact, compelling and readily available evidence ignored or misrepresented by Mann documents that Washington neither knew of nor authorized the Gnadenhutten action. Further, the local militia led by Col. David Williamson was not “Revolutionary Army” but local Pennsylvania militia raised not at Fort Pitt but mustered at Mingo Bottom, seventy-five miles below presentday Pittsburgh (Olmstead 1991: 55). General Irvine, who took command of Fort Pitt in November, 1781, was summoned to Philadelphia by General Washington and was absent Fort Pitt from January 16th through March 25th, 1782, leaving it in charge of Col. John Gibson. In an April 12th letter to his wife, Irvine describes the Gnadenhutten Massacre, of which he first heard on his return to Fort Pitt on March 25th, as follows: “Things were in a strange state when I arrived [back at Fort Pitt]. A number of the country people [italics added] had just returned from the Moravian towns, about one hundred miles distant, where, it is said, they did not spare either age or sex.” In short, the Williamson Expedition was not ordered by General Washington, General Irvine, or Colonel John Gibson, did not proceed from Fort Pitt, and was not the work of the Revolutionary Army.

The only source for Mann’s claim that George Washington ordered the Williamson Expedition is her convoluted misreading of his March 8th, 1782, letter to Irvine, written, as she is aware, at Philadelphia on the very day of the Gnadenhutten atrocity; while Irvine was at his home in Carlisle, Pennsylvania (Butterfield 1882: 94-96). Touted as Washington’s “Order” for the raid, it is no such thing. In this letter Washington instructed Irvine to proceed to Fort Pitt with all convenient dispatch and “take such measures for the security of that post and for the defense of the western frontier, as your continental force, combined with the militia of the neighboring country, will admit.” Washington could promise no additional regular forces, so that offensive operations, except upon a small scale, were out of the question: but Irvine should keep himself informed of the situation at Detroit and the strength of the enemy there. As for reports from Colonel Gibson that the regulars at Fort Pitt were on the verge of revolt due to lack of provisions, clothing, and back pay, arrangements initiated while Irvine was at Philadelphia would relieve the grounds for complaint. There is clear evidence in this letter and elsewhere that the measures [being] taken referred to providing payment for the soldiers at Fort Pitt, yet somehow Mann (1997:166) is able to transmogrify these straightforward instructions into a coded message that these “measures” were “the genocide of the Delaware-Mahicans and the robbery of their harvest, horses and furs by an army detachment dispatched out of Fort Pitt.” According to her scenario, “back pay and provisions formed the motive
and the promise." She then cites historian C. W. Butterfield as supporting her contention that the Williamson Expedition was "an army detachment dispatched out of Ft. Pitt." But Butterfield does no such thing, stating that "James Marshal, lieutenant of Washington and Pennsyl

vania, ordered out, according to law, some of the militia to march across the Ohio and attack them ["British Indians" at the recently deserted Moravian towns on the Tuscarawas]." Perhaps most egregious is Mann's assertion that Wash

ington in this letter "personally assigned" the Virginia and Pennsylvania militias to Fort Pitt, when he did not. What the letter plainly states is that Washington could not promise more than a portion of the Virginia and Pennsylvanian regiments to Fort Pitt

As for provisions, Irvine's correspondence indicates no reliance upon the Moravian Delaware (although they had provided some provisions to his predecesor, Colonel Brodhead), casual references occurring in initial letters back to his wife in Carlisle, Pennsylvania: "Colonel Gibson talks of sending an Ohio pike ... I would send some in his but fear it could not keep - of which and wild turkey, we have great plenty." Again, December 2, 1781: "I hope the pike got safe [to Carlisle]. We have great plenty of them - venison and turkey and other pretty good living. We even have a pack of hounds and go frequently a hunting." (Butterfield 1882: 340-341). There is no denying that Fort Pitt was often short of provisions, but the Continental soldiers' chief complaint was not receiving their pay for months on end, and it is to this that Washington clearly refers in his letter of Dec 8, as one of his plan to recompense the local militia with plunder from the Indian village. An attempt to obtain payment for his troops was actually one of the chief reasons for Irvine's return to Philadelphia. But the county militia were not paid by the federal

government, and while Williamson's men found and took a great deal of plunder in the form of furs and horses at Gnadenhutten, they could hardly consider such "small" as Washington's or Irvine's pay

ment for their military service, since they did not expect pay from the Revolutionary government.

Mann copies the tone and method of her mentor, Ward Churchill, who swiftly if not deftly dismisses theories not to his liking as "patently idiotic speculations," "absurd contentions," "ridiculous," "nonsensical," and "astonishing," all in a single sentence [Churchill 1997:135]. Mann's work for the most part is more vendetta than history, further tarnished by sloppy scholarship. So uneven, ambiguous, and contradictory is the existing historical evidence that one can easily become bogged down in relatively minor discrepancies that at this late date are not easily reconciled or resolved, and it is almost impossible for anyone with a vested interest to refrain from selecting the evidence most favorable to their interpretation. Mann, however, not only picks and chooses but distorts and misrepresents, straying even further from the truth by denying or ignoring facts that appear incontestable.

Another typical example of such distortion and inaccurate scholarship is Mann's assessment of contemporary newspaper coverage of the massacre. She asserts (1997:168-169) that "Like most instances of military mass murder committed against Native Americans, the deed was presented in the eastern gazettes as a glorious American victory in a pitched battle with blood-thirsty warriors." This is not at all the case. Initial newspaper accounts were inaccurate in many details, often stating, for example, that the Indians were massacred while asleep in bed but hardly painting them as "blood-thirsty warriors." Mann similarly misrepresents the earliest newspaper account "as a glowing notice" posted by Williamson "crowing over his great victory against the 'Mingos.'" (Mann 2000:47).

There is no shred of evidence to suggest that the Pennsylvania Gazette [not the Philadelphia Gazette account (published the previous day in the Pennsylvania Packet, April 16, 1782) was written by Williamson and in fact it is very unlikely. Nor does it describe a great victory against the "Mingos" (who are nowhere mentioned in the article except for a reference to the mustering of the militia at the Bone Lick, but similarly Mann anachronistically and inaccurately describes New York coverage as "cheerleading over the event," and cites Loskiel as authority for the newspapers having found it "lamentable that the militia had been prevented from continuing on to Upper Sandusky, to kill the rest of the Moravian converts" (Mann 2005:167). This is a gross distortion of what Loskiel actually wrote: "the mur-

derers had been prevented, for the present, from proceeding to Sandusky" — no suggestion of any lamentation on the part of any newspapers. Mann either did not bother to examine any primary sources or deliberately distorts them. Of the two contemporary New York newspaper accounts available, that in the New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury (April 20, 1782, No. 159) reports the Moravian Indians as "murdered in a most inhuman Manner," also calling the murders "execrable." The New York Royal Gazette of April 24 (no. 581) simply extracts a letter from Pittsburgh that relates that the Christian Indians were "butchered." Neither account can be represented as "cheerleading," but Dr. Mann's definitions are often highly idiosyncratic, and she routinely defines words as well as events to suit her purposes.

For example, accounts of Col. Bowman's 1779 attack on Little Chilli

cote note that at one point in the retreat, some of Bowman's men protected themselves by wearing solid planks on their backs, puncheons torn from an Indian hut, and as the men reached safety, these puncheons were thrown away (Draper Manuscripts 5D 27:1-20). As Mann has it, these were the men's knap

sacks which they discarded. In the next sentence, paraphrasing Henry Hall's account of the plunder, Mann converts a shirt with "silver broaches into a shirt with stitches. Such relatively minor linguistic gaucheries might be discounted but there are more significant errors as well. In two consecutive sentences [...]John Bowman, an insignificant lieutenant of Kentucky in search of easy fame and booty, having tired of serving in Clark's shadow, reinvented himself as a militia colonel. Side-tracking 296 reinforcements intended for Clark to deploy at Vincennes, Bowman led them onto Shawnee lands. [...] Mann makes no mention of Bowman's act of fact or interpretation. Bowman was appointed the Colonel of the militia of Kentucky Co., Virginia, by Governor Patrick Henry in 1776; he assumed these not insignificant duties the following summer when he arrived at Harrodsburg. Subsequently, in 1778, Governor Thomas Jefferson commissioned him Lieutenant of Kentucky Co. and he became responsible for the general direction of military affairs in that region. No "re-invention" and no indication that he felt he was serving "in the shadow" of George Rogers Clark. In the face of Indian depredations, as early as 1778 Bowman, while under siege at Boonesborough, contemplated an expedi-

tion against the Shawnee, but the effort did not get under way until the following year. Bowman's men were recruited specifically for this foray and had no sense been intended to join Clark at Vin-
cennes. In fact, some of the men joining Bowman were returning up the Ohio River with mastodon bones from Big Bone Lick and had nothing whatever to do with Clark's expedition. Further, these local militia, throughout the history of the Revolution, were very difficult to control, a large part of the reason for the comparative failure of Bowman's expedition, and dispersed back to their homes well before Bowman eventually received a request from Clark to join him in Illinois.

Loskiel's (3, 183) claim that Indian scalps were "exposed to view" at the auction purportedly held at Pittsburgh becomes Mann's assertion that they were "waved about." Heckewelder's vague ref-
ference to human razor-straps being hawked “at or near Pittsburgh sometime during the Revolutionary War,” part of his lengthy, disingenuous, and unnecessary attempt to demonstrate that the Europeans were even more cruel than the Indians. Mann attributes specifically to the Gnadenhutten incident, with a careless, undocumentable flair worthy of novelist Allen Eckert, shifting such factoids around to suit her purpose.

Although her work is larded with footnotes, these vie with her text in terms of inaccuracy and fail to mask her unfamiliarity with the material. For example, archaeologist and historian Charles Whittlesey, who wrote a brief article on the Gnadenhutten massacre, is repeatedly called Charles MUTTERLY. Reverend Nathaniel Seiler, a Moravian Bishop, is cited as the Reverend Nathaniel BISHOP.

Historical accuracy aside, Mann's grasp of the use of metaphor is certainly not what it should be for a university instructor in English. Despite her adamant belief that Eurocentric concepts should not be applied to interpretation of Native American history and life (Mann 2003: 169-170) she follows the lead of “scholaractivist” Ward Churchill and mantra-like repeatedly uses the terms “genocide” and holocaust interchangeably to describe the Gnadenhutten Massacre and similar atrocities, even going so far as to claim that the term “holocaust” is of Iroquoian derivation! It is correct that Parker (1926: 126–128) headed his brief description of Sullivan’s “punitive expedition’ [also Parker’s words] as “The Holocaust,” but this is clearly a metaphorical use of the term used to emphasize the “scorched earth” nature of Sullivan’s expedition. [Parker also accurately described it as “a decisive campaign” and “an outstanding achievement of the Revolutionary War.”] The use and meaning of words gradually change, and there has been a great deal of “inflationary usage” of the term “holocaust” in recent years (Rosenbaum 2001). Mann is not the first to apply it to the history of the American Indian, but her argument might be better served by accepting the rather obvious fact that for most reasonable people the term Holocaust has come to represent that perpetrated by the German Reich, and simply concentrate on the genocidal aspects of American Indian history.

Similar to her problem with metaphor, Mann exhibits an inability to recognize the use of rhetorical irony when she latches out at the epitaph found on the Gnadenhutten monument, asserting that the deaths of the Christian Indians was no triumph for them but only for “Williamson and crew.” On the other hand she seems no less indignant at Moravian historian Loskiele’s observation of the unarguable fact that the Indians do not technically qualify as Christian martyrs since they were not murdered because of their religion but because they were Indians. Loskiele’s remark, incidentally, is tacit recognition of the genocidal nature of the Gnadenhutten incident some 150 years before the term “genocide” was coined.

In regard to the Gnadenhutten monument and cemetery, Mann’s nativist agenda is highlighted by the sly claim that the remains of the martyrs were buried “in a very traditional burial mound” by Delaware Indians who returned after the massacre (Mann 2005: 186). This is an attempt at fabrication and an outrageous rewriting of documented history. The remains were still lying on the ground as late as 1797, when Heckewelder and others revisited Gnadenhutten on a surveying trip. “Everywhere bones could be seen, & in the cellars of the houses, where some of the Brethren had been massacred & burnt, they were also to be found” (Jordan 1866: 141). According to De Schweinitz (1870; 647n1), in October 1799 the bones of the murdered Indians were reinterred in one of the cellars of the old town by John Heckewelder and David Peter.

History

A large part of Mann’s confusion about the causes of the Gnadenhutten Massacre can be assigned to her persistent refusal to distinguish between the Revolutionary or colonial forces stationed at Fort Pitt and the local county militias of the back country. Although she frequently cites the work of “triumphalist historian” Consul W. Butterfield, it would have been well to ponder one of the footnotes in Butterfield’s Washington-Irvine Correspondence, in which he makes clear that one reason for the failure of an earlier expedition against the Wyandots and Mingoos at Pluggy’s Town (now Delaware, Ohio) was “a want of concert” between the commander at Fort Pitt, [then] General Edward Hand, and the lieutenants and militia officers of the border counties of Virginia and Pennsylvania. As Butterfield observes, a very real distinction existed between the lieutenants of the various counties of these two states and the officers of the Revolutionary or continental militia who happened to be stationed therein. The former were appointed by the respective commonwealths and had control of and general supervision over military affairs of the county, receiving the title of Colonel, and such was Colonel David Williams. Under their orders were the officers of the various battalions of militia in the different counties (Butterfield 1882: 12n). This distinction between continental and county[ry] militia is carefully delineated throughout contemporary documents of the period and is a commonplace among historians. This important distinction has been most cogently explored by Sadosky (2001), who thoroughly defines and explores the distinct differences in social class and ideology between the two groups, though the distinction was implicit in accounts as long ago as Dodridge (1824), a distinction completely lost on Mann. Only on April 5, 1782, a month after the Gnadenhutten Massacre was General Irvine able to meet with the county lieutenants and get them to promise to exert themselves in drawing out the militia on his requisitions (Butterfield 1882: 104-105). In sum, neither Washington nor Irvine actually had the authority to command the local volunteer militia.

Mann’s assertion that the motive for the Gnadenhutten massacre was the militia’s desire for provisions and booty to compensate them for lack of provisions at Fort Pitt and that the militia were formally “ordered forth” on this mission from Fort Pitt [the implication being that they were so ordered by General Irvine or Washington] cites Butterfield’s account in his “History of the Girlys” (Butterfield 1890: 155, 239, 240). But if we actually check Butterfield, we find that (p.155) it was in response to the Wallace abductions, the capture of John Carpenter, and several other incidents, that James Marshal, lieutenant of Washington County, Pennsylvania, ordered some of the local militia to march across the Ohio and attack the Indians. Butterfield therein cites pages 239-240 of an entirely different work (contra Mann), the Washington-Irvine Correspondence, which documents that it was Marshal, “the highest military authority of Washington county,” who ordered the expedition. The documentation occurs in a series of subsequent letters between General Irvine, who was asked by the Pennsylvania Council to investigate the matter.

The immediate cause of the Williamson expedition was the kidnapping of Mrs. Robert Wallace and her children, not a desire to steal Indian provisions. Numerous historic sources document the fate of this pioneer mother and her children. On Feb. 10, 1782, Mrs. Wallace and her three children were taken captive at their cabin on Raccoon Creek, by a band of 40 Indians, including 30 Delaware and ten others believed to be Wyandots (Butterfield 1890:154). Two days earlier, Indians had killed John Fink near Buchanan Fort (Withers: 232-233), and soon after John Carpenter was captured on Buffalo Creek (Butterfield 1890: 155). Carpenter later escaped, but the Wallaces were not so fortunate. Before reaching the Ohio River, by some accounts, the Indians tomahawked Mrs. Wallace and her infant daughter. According to Heckewelder, however, the murders occurred after crossing the Ohio (Wallace 1958:190). The Wallace sons, aged ten and two and a half years were taken to Sandusky, where the elder died; the younger was eventually rescued. Wher- ever the Wallace murders occurred, even Heckewelder preserves the atrocious detail that the Wallace baby’s body was spitted from “from between the Leggs until the Neck, with its belly to the Indian Country & its Face towards the Settlement over the Head of Wall Creek.”

Mann’s take on the Wallace murders is a remarkable example both of sangfroid and
of the blase distortion of historical fact. Concerned by the possibility that "the metaphor in this bit of [Iroquois] League signage is still apt to fly by modern readers overwhelmed by its 'savagey,'" she explains at length that the opposite directions of face and belly symbolized the dishonesty of the European invaders, the face left pointing South, to where the child really belonged, while the belly facing Ohio was "a condemnation of greedy Europeans who starved League children literally to death, needlessly taking food out of their mouths to fill the bellies of illegal aliens!" (Mann 1997: 165). According to her, these "League troops" were merely intent on enforcing the 1775 Treaty of Pittsburgh and the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, both prohibiting homesteading north of the Ohio River: "Finding illegal settlers in Ohio, the League had executed the trespassing family," and she dismissed the Wallace murders as "a bad public relations move."

The problem with this mind-boggling argument is that these Indian depredations were visited on settlers living east of the Ohio River — the Wallace cabin was located in Raccoon Creek, in present-day Washington County, Pennsylvania, John Fink was killed on the Monongahela River, and John Carpenter was captured on Buffalo Creek, near present-day Wellsburg, West Virginia [although he was guilty of trespassing west of the Ohio], so that in these instances it was the Indians who were violating the Fort Stanwix and Pittsburgh treaties!

Genocide

Genocide can most generically be defined as the systematic killing of people because of their race or ethnicity. Most authorities would infer that "systematic" implies state-sanction and thoroughness [i.e., "finally" in the sense of not sparing women and children]. The fact that the Euro-American onslaught on Native Americans was gradual, conducted over a period of centuries, and generally much less "systematic" than the Jewish Shoah or Holocaust does little to disqualify it as genocidal, although Katz (2001) succinctly and successfully makes the case that the Holocaust "is phenomenologically unique by virtue of the fact that never before has a state so far-out, as a matter of intentional principle and actualized policy, to annihilate physically every man, woman and child belonging to a specific people."

The fact that comparable atrocities were committed on both sides does not excuse the massacre of innocent Delaware Indians at Gnadenhutten along with guilty Wyandot warriors and possibly some not-so-innocent Delawares. All were killed merely because they were Indian and in the wrong place at the wrong time. But the race hatred characteristic of the American frontier was not necessarily national policy at this point, though arguably it may have been at other times in the nation's history. The narrower question of whether George Washington deliberately authorized and promulgated the systematic murder of all Indians can be answered only in the negative. One must also be mindful that from the American point of view, the nation was at war with the British and, after four of the Iroquois nations ended their neutrality in 1777, with the British Indian allies until September 3, 1783. Thus, while the Sullivan campaign was undoubtedly brutal, much of Mann's criticism of the "scorched earth" policy ordered by Washington is irrelevant in this context. While Sullivan's men destroyed housing and provender, their actions were no different than that of Indians in their forays upon the American settlements. Further, it is well documented that Sullivan did not kill women and children.

Conclusion: The Wolves of the Forest

Mann is not the first to label Washington racist on the basis of flimsy evidence, misinterpreted or misrepresented facts, and statements taken out of context. According to revisionist historian Jennings (1988: 62-63), Washington would denounce Indians as "having nothing human except the shape," a quotation that, unfortunately, is not at all accurate. "What compunction," Jennings asks, "could a man with such attitudes have about the rights of Indian tribes or the welfare of Indian persons?"

Perhaps a rhetorical question, it certainly goes unanswered by Jennings, who was intent on documenting the fact that Washington, "by personality or purpose," seems to have stirred instant dislike among the Mingos accompanying him on his journey to Fort LeBoeuf in 1753. Interestingly, when Jennings retold the story of Washington's expedition to Fort LeBoeuf, (Jennings 1993: 290-291), the inaccurate quotation was omitted, as well it should, having been made years after the event at hand. Further, as Christopher Gist's journal makes clear, on their return trip, when Washington was nearly killed by an Indian, he prevented Gist from firing back, a telling incident omitted by the historian (Darlington 1893: 85).

What Washington actually wrote in his 1783 letter to James Duane, head of the Congressional committee on Indian affairs, was that "policy and economy point very strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their country; which, as we have already experienced, is like driving the wild beasts of the forest, which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall preying upon those that are left there; when the gradual extension of our settlements will as certainly cause the savage, as the wolf, to retire; both being animals of prey, though they differ in shape." This is no more racist than a descriptive remark he made to Governor Dinwiddie in 1756: "They prowl about like wolves, and, like them, do their mischief by stealth." Taken in context, Washington's proposal to Duane is actually more humane than the Congress' ultimate plan, which largely ignored his recommendation that the Indians be compensated for their lands.

Washington's "wolf" metaphor is no more racist that Joseph Brant's less well known remark explaining why he was unable to take more frontier women and children in the Minisink raid: "... the many Forts about the Place, into which they were always ready to run like ground Hogs." [letter to Col. Butler, July 29th 1779, Canada Archives, Haldimand Collection, B 100:210; reprinted in The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign in 1779, Colonel Broadhead, in Gratulating General Sullivan on the success of his New York campaign "against the Indians and the more savage torries," remarked that "Something still remains to be done to the westward, which I expect leave to execute, & then I conceive the wolves of the forest will have sufficient cause to howl..." (Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 12: 165). Such metaphors, taken in the context of their times, are no more racist and no less metaphorical than the simile in Byron's famous poem "The Destruction of Sennacherib": "The Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold, and his cohorts were gleaming in purple and gold." And what of John Hezekeweld himself, who, suffering at the hands of notorious frontier renegade Simon Girty, described Girty as "this white beast in human form?" (Heckewelder 1820: 333).

For once, Congress had it right when it thanked Washington and General Sullivan "for effectually executing an important expedition against such of the Indian nations as, encouraged by the councils and conducted by the officers of his British majesty, had perfidiously engaged an unprovoked and cruel war against the United States, laid waste many of their defenceless towns, and with savage barbarity slaughtered the inhabitants thereof." (Journal of the Continental Congress 15: 1169; italics added). Washington, perhaps with an eye on history, in a telling statement ignored by Mann and other Nativist activists, told Congress (April 4, 1783):

"I have only to observe that the late acts of cruelty mentioned in the speech have not been committed under my direction or by any party of Continental troops nor have they been sanctioned by orders from me. I rather think they have been conducted with the approbation at least, if not by the authority of individual states. How far this practice is consistent
with the rules of propriety or principles of policy, Congress must be the judge. For myself, I must confess my mind revolts at the idea of those wanton barbarities of which both sides have in too many instances been the unhappy witnesses."

Time and again it can be shown that Washington did not wage war against all Indians and often went out of his way to aid those who were not enemies of his country. As Wallace (1958: 170) wisely notes, "... there was a magnanimity exhibited towards their enemies by the principal participants in the Revolution." This certainly was true of Washington: his mind and his conscience were clear and he would have nothing but contempt for those who today twist facts in pursuit of their own political ends. Racism can take many forms, at its most overt ranging from the hate crime to genocide but it also can express itself more obliquely and more insidiously, even in such academic subjects as history, literature and literary criticism, as evidenced by Mann's unjustified diatribe against George Washington.

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THANKS TO GARY KAPUSTA

It is with great regret that with this issue Gary Kapusta is stepping down as ASO Treasurer. Because of not only personal health difficulties, but the loss of his mother and other family considerations, Gary Kapusta has reluctantly decided that he could no longer conduct his duties of Treasurer in accordance with the high standards he had set for himself. He has for ten years performed his office with professionalism and an efficiency seldom seen in a job that receives only thanks for payment. We will miss his advice and knowledge at our Board meetings.

Few of our members will ever know the important and crucial part Gary played in holding our Society together in the crisis of just a few years ago. Our Board of Directors was split eight to seven and came within a whisker of falling apart. At stake was whether the Board of Directors or the President controlled the Society. Fortunately, because of the efforts of Gary and other officers — we called ourselves the Concerned Eight — our Society survived and is today stronger than ever. Over those two or three years of crisis, the dedication and belief in our Society by Gary was the glue that held us together. He became, and still is, one of my best friends.

No single person did as much as Gary Kapusta in keeping our Society what it was intended to be — an association of people — amateurs, professionals and collectors — all having the common goal of learning about and making the world aware of Ohio archaeology. I can honestly say that without Gary Kapusta there might not today be an Archaeological Society of Ohio. Our Society will never again have a more dedicated, honest and sincere officer — we could all emulate him.

But we don't want this to sound like a goodbye at all. We hope that Gary's health will improve and that he will in the future be able to again serve our Society as a Trustee or in some other capacity. But in the meantime, Gary, don't forget us. It would be a happy day for everyone to see you again at one of our Board meetings. We owe you a debt of gratitude which can never be repaid.

The plaque shown here is in appreciation for Gary's untiring work for our Society.

Bob Converse