By asking you to go back to (portions of) my 1995 book, *Norms in International Relations*, I took seriously Ted's suggestion that we look back with a critical eye on something we'd written a while ago. In the early '90s, identity barely featured on the IR agenda, so I make no apologies for its underdeveloped use. Rather, I will highlight here the almost-implicit role the concept plays in that study then comment on a few related dimensions of debate about methodology that have arisen in the subsequent years. For these purposes, I am considering a number of issues under the rubric of methodology, including research design, clarity of hypotheses and concepts, and techniques of data gathering. I will use social science vocabulary here but that shouldn't be taken as a rejection of postpositivist perspectives.

The main role identity plays in the *Norms* study relates to the selection of cases. In my attempt to understand international reactions to apartheid, I divide six cases into three clusters. The first half explore the emergence of a norm of racial equality in three international organizations, the second the role of that norm in the foreign policy making processes of three states. The chapters in each cluster, furthermore, pair along an identity dimension: the UN and US chapters link, as do the Commonwealth and UK, and Organization of African Unity and Zimbabwe. I argue that states make policies in the context of international political communities, which themselves represent distinct identities. For South Africa, three identities matter most: global (UN/US), imperial (CW/UK) and African (OAU/ZW).

I take these three identities for granted in selecting those pairings. In other words, I do not treat identity as an explanatory variable. Indeed, I applied the identity label long after creating the research design, in which I conceptualized everything in terms of political community – just one indication of how little anyone at the time used the term identity to mean anything other than nationalism. When I was polishing the manuscript, the term had become common enough (in part thanks to Wendt's "Anarchy" article) that it seemed like a useful term to explain the logic of my case selection. It's not surprising, then, that I don't develop the concept of identity in the bulk of the project but, rather, declare in the conclusion that we should theorize identity more.

One avenue for that further theorizing would be to explain the origins of those assumed South African identities. Of course that would be a completely different project rather than a revised version of the book. Not surprisingly, this is one direction my current research explores. I won't go into more detail about that here in favor of focusing on issues more directly related to the original project.

There are a number of implicit analytical claims that could have been developed more, or at least should be developed more by anyone interested in using some of my arguments for other cases. For example, I imply that variation in identity matters in terms of the content of normative debates and the implications of policies. At times South Africa cared more about its relationship with the US than Britain, or the Commonwealth rather than the UN, and rarely ever (but occasionally a bit) about Africans. The study was not
designed to test hypotheses about whether one identity matters more under some circumstances than others, or whether one kind of identity matters more than the others; these would be useful questions to explore. I would suggest looking at Dan Thomas's *Helsinki Effect* (Princeton, 2001) as one example of how to make this notion of identity-as-constraint a bit more explicit than I do, since there are significant similarities in the overall goals of our two projects. Neither of us, however, develop the identity argument sufficiently, I think.

On the other hand, one advantage to taking identity as an assumption remains the ability to distinguish between identities and interests. Too often theorists flag the importance of the social construction of identities-and-interests without distinguishing between them. Since I take South Africa's three identities for granted, they do not vary over time. I am able, therefore, to make arguments about the evolution of interests that are distinct from any change in identity. Since I discuss the relationship between identities and interests more in my discussant comments, I won't elaborate on this issue here.

Another set of questions revolves around data collection – the evidence we associate with identity. I successfully evaded this issue in my book because I took identities as an assumption. Since I've yet to hear any complaints from those who know the South African case about the accuracy of those assertions, I've never had to justify my labels. More surprisingly, I also pretty much evaded this methodological issue in terms of "norms." I analyzed discourse (primarily public documents) in my book, but I could avoid extended epistemological debate because the norm I traced was "obvious." After falling asleep many afternoons reading through UN documents that reiterated for thirty years the same exact phrases, I couldn't imagine anyone disputing the existence of my norm. I didn't even need to get into details about why I rejected formal content analysis.

I got off easy. In the subsequent decade, debates about methodology have gotten more sophisticated, which I think is good, even if I now have had to spend a lot of time reading and thinking about the research design for my South African identity project. I can't expect to find "obvious" identity discourses in part because of the multiplicity and fluidity of what I am seeking to reify as "state identity." (That's not to say that norms also can't be contested, but that's a different issue.) We do need to use discursive evidence if we want to make explanatory claims about the connections between ideas and actions. Ted's book goes into this issue at length, so I won't replicate that discussion here other than to say that I agree with much of he says (even if I do not follow the exact same methodological path in my study of South African identities).

One thing I am less comfortable about, however, is the presumption that identity research should focus on discourses about the "other." I find it equally important to look at contending definitions of "us," that is, one defininion of "us" in relation to alternative visions of "us," and not solely in relation to "them." How we delve into the self/other dichotomy (leaving aside for the moment the myriad problems of treating it as a dichotomy) will strongly influence which sources of discourse we choose to privilege in our analyses.
Thus to say that we're using discourse analysis, however, leaves open a bunch of questions, including which texts (such as elite versus popular) and what type of analysis (hermeneutical or semiotic, for instance). Then there is the question of whether we need to combine discourse analysis (of whatever type) with additional behavioral and/or psychological evidence. Much depends on what questions we ask. Are we seeking to describe the presence or absence of identities (sometimes categorized as "how" questions)? Or are we looking for patterns of changes in identities linked somehow to policy making processes ("why" questions)? Are we taking identity to be an individual characteristic (of state leaders, societal members, or others) or a relationship? Many of the workshop's panels cover such issues, so I will not get into them here other than to flag that choices made at the ontological level will have significant implications for how we use discourse analysis.

Bottom line: I don't think it's a option not to use some form of discursive evidence. The two main methodological questions then are: what type of discourse analysis, and in combination with what (if any) other techniques of data collection? I remain open to persuasion about the value of both qualitative and quantitative tools.