August 2004 Issue:

"Thoughts From SHAFR President Mark A. Stoler."

"Marshall, Leahy, and Casualty Issues-A Reply to Kort's Flawed Critique." Barton J. Bernstein


"Diplomatic History and American Studies." Robert D. Schulzinger

"Working Long Into the Night: Improving Education and Searching for Social Mobility in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan." Ron Briley


"What Is New at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum?" John Wilson

August 2004 Newsletter

Thoughts From SHAFR President Mark A. Stoler

On April 29 I participated in a fascinating one-day workshop, sponsored by the Security Studies Program at MIT, on the status of diplomatic and military history in the academy. The workshop focused on two papers: one by Professor Emeritus Edward M. Coffman of the University of Wisconsin-Madison on the status of military history; and the other by former SHAFR President and Professor George Herring of the University of Kentucky on the status of diplomatic history. Although both scholars noted serious problems, they also emphasized the fact that the status of their sub-fields was not as bad as many believe. To the contrary, diplomatic and military history both flourished during the 1990s in terms of student interest, expanded membership in SHAFR and the Society for Military History (SMH), and the variety, vitality and quality of scholarship as presented in their annual conferences, in books, and in their specialized journals, *Diplomatic History* and *The Journal of Military History*. All of this suggests that the two fields are quite strong and vibrant. To paraphrase Mark Twain, rumors of our death have been highly exaggerated.

Nevertheless, both scholars noted that very real and serious problems do exist. Herring believes the most serious are the “aging” of diplomatic historians and their non-replacement within university history departments as they retire-- clearly a result of the continued marginalization of diplomatic history within the profession. Although our fields of study are different, Coffman made clear that military historians face similar problems within academia.

The two groups also share some common and important scholarly ground. As Michael Hogan in last year’s SHAFR presidential address emphasized our common ground with social/cultural historians, so in my presidential address last June in Austin I focused on what we share with military historians—particularly in terms of the very close relationship between the causes and consequences of war on the one hand and its conduct on the other, and the role military officers have played and continue to play in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. We also share some common and important scholarly ground with members of the Peace History Society (PHS) who study past efforts to avoid and/or end wars.

Yet how many of us belong to the SMH and PHS as well as SHAFR? As a member of all three organizations and an officer in two of them, I admittedly speak here with a degree of self-interest and run the risk of attempting to universalize my own situation and values. Nevertheless, with common interests and common problems, is not a closer relationship between these three groups appropriate?

This relationship need not be limited to historians. Political scientists in the fields of international relations and security studies also share our scholarly interests. Indeed, the decline in the number of diplomatic and military history positions in academia has drawn the concern of these
scholars, such as those in the MIT Security Studies Program who sponsored the April 29 conference. Perhaps, then, it is time to apply some basic lessons from the history of international relations to our own situation. Nations possessing common interests and facing common problems tend to form coalitions: is it not appropriate and timely for us to do the same by forging an intra and interdisciplinary alliance to promote our common interests and tackle our common problems?
August 2004 Newsletter

Marshall, Leahy, and Casualty Issues-A Reply to Kort's Flawed Critique

by Barton J. Bernstein

I read with mixed feelings Michael Kort's spirited December 2003 essay, "Casualty Projections for the Invasion of Japan, Phantom Estimates, and the Math of Barton Bernstein." Responding to each of Kort's numerous charges would require a lengthy and tediously detailed essay, so I will focus primarily upon what seems to trouble Kort most in my interpretation of the casualty estimates for the invasion of Japan: my reliance upon Admiral William Leahy's diary entry for 18 June 1945 as an important alternative and supplement to the official minutes of the 18 June meeting at the White House. That high-level meeting between President Harry S. Truman and most of the military chiefs was called to discuss Olympic, the plan to invade the Japanese island of Kyushu, projected for 1 November 1945. Leahy's diary provides valuable information not included in the official minutes: namely, that General George C. Marshall estimated at the meeting that there would be no more than 63,000 U.S. casualties among the 190,000 U.S. combatant forces in Olympic.

Kort considers my decision to rely on Leahy's diary summary indefensible. He usually disregards my published reasons for relying on the diary as a reliable source for that key White House conference, and he charges me with "alchemy," with creating "phantom" estimates, and with putting words into major actors' mouths. Yet in his own analysis he relies upon strained readings, omission of crucial material, severely limited research, unfair and facile resolution of complicated matters, and invidious language and interpretations. He also mixes large issues with trivial ones and neglects relevant archival sources and much of the published work upon the casualty issue. Finally, he has serious problems with quoting accurately, revealing fundamental problems as a craftsman.

Admiral William Leahy's diary (from the Library of Congress and the Wisconsin Historical Society) contains a lengthy entry for 18 June, written either on that day or the next (we can't be sure exactly when). It includes a few paragraphs on the White House meeting and shows Leahy's reflections on some invasion- and occupation-related matters. The paragraph at issue--with emphasis added--is the second one quoted here. The others are included partly to ensure adequate context. The bracketed additions are mine:

From 3:30 to 5:00 P.M. the President conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Leahy, Marshall, Admiral Ernest King, and Lt. General Ira Eaker for General Henry Arnold], the Secretary of War [Henry L. Stimson], the Secretary of the Navy [James Forrestal], and Assistant Secretary of War [John J.] McCloy, in regard to the necessity and the practicability of an invasion of Japan. General Marshall and Admiral King both strongly advocated an invasion of Kyushu at the earliest practicable date. General Marshall is of the opinion that such an effort will not cost us in casualties more than 63,000 of the 190,000 combatant troops estimated as necessary for the operation (emphasis added).
The President approved the Kyushu operation and withheld for later consideration the general occupation of Japan. The Army seems determined to occupy and govern Japan as is being done in Germany. I am unable to see any justification from a national defense point of view for a prolonged occupation of Japan. The cost of such an occupation will be enormous in both lives and treasure.

Leahy's diary entry is an arresting archival source. I had thought about his reference to Marshall’s casualty estimate for approximately a decade, from about 1985 to 1994, before using it in public. During that time I also discussed it with about a dozen historians, including at least four military historians (three of whom had or would have at least the rank of lieutenant colonel). Among the problems, most agreed, was to figure out how Leahy's report on Marshall's estimate squared with what are usually considered the official minutes for 18 June, written by Brigadier General A. J. McFarland. It seems likely that Marshall’s estimate of 63,000 referred only to U.S. battle casualties in Olympic, and not to battle and nonbattle casualties, because the charts he discussed earlier at this meeting provided only battle casualties. (The term "battle casualties" refers to those killed, wounded, or missing in the fighting, and not to those incapacitated by illnesses or nonbattle injuries, both of which are categorized as nonbattle casualties.) If Marshall meant only battle casualties, as seems most likely, did the upper limit of 63,000 refer to the entire Olympic operation of perhaps about three months, or only the total for the first month or two? Besides the 190,000 combatant forces, what about the other U.S. troops (approximately 490,000 to 600,000) not counted as combatant forces but ultimately scheduled for involvement in the military operation? Most of the historians I consulted also agreed that any analysis of Leahy’s diary would require an assessment of McFarland's 18 June minutes on other matters (especially casualty issues) to determine whether they are sometimes incorrect or incomplete on important issues.

At first glance, the McFarland minutes seem to suggest that at the 18 June meeting Leahy was thinking of much higher battle casualty figures than Marshall’s 63,000: about 230,000–268,000. After all, in the McFarland minutes Leahy estimated that Olympic would result in casualty figures of 35 percent, based on what he stated as the rate among U.S. ground forces in the ongoing Okinawa campaign. In reply to Leahy's query, Marshall said in McFarland's minutes that the United States would have a total of 766,700 troops in Olympic. According to my early research, Leahy erred somewhat on the battle casualty percentage (it was at least a few points under 35 percent) for U.S. ground forces on Okinawa up to about 18 June. But that small error did not greatly change his apparent meaning. Allowing for that error, Leahy’s figure implied an estimate of about 230,000–268,000 battle casualties in Olympic. However, I concluded that he was implicitly applying the 35 percent to the 190,000 combatant forces (Marshall's operative number) and thus meant about 66,500 battle casualties.

In context, Leahy’s remarks very probably refer to 66,500 casualties. If Leahy had truly meant something in the 230,000–268,000 range and Marshall had suggested 63,000 or even 100,000 (allowing for many troops besides the 190,000 combatant forces), there would probably have been an open argument at the 18 June meeting. Even if Leahy meant battle and nonbattle casualties, as seems highly unlikely, and Marshall only battle casualties, as is highly likely, there would have been sharp disagreement. But neither McFarland's minutes nor any of the four individual diaries (by Leahy, Forrestal, McCloy, and Stimson) that refer to this meeting indicate such disagreement. For that matter, there is no mention of a disagreement at this meeting in any other archival material from that mid-1945 period or in later memoirs.

Normally, a historian would be inclined to privilege McFarland's minutes, which at first glance seem quite detailed about battle casualty
numbers. They even include from the early part of the meeting an elaborate chart on battle casualty numbers in other American military campaigns during the war. Only by going back to the archives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) files and elsewhere could I definitely determine that McFarland had put together the very detailed portion of the minutes (including the chart with at least fifteen specific numbers on U. S. and enemy casualty information for some earlier WWII campaigns) simply by inserting, usually verbatim, the text of the staff-prepared paper (with General John Hull's initials removed) that Marshall had read at the opening of the 18 June meeting. The text Marshall read had about thirty-eight numbers (mostly involving casualties), and McFarland had deleted the nine paragraphing numbers but retained all the others, including some dates, various ratios, and numbered parts of a crucial sentence.

Curiously, McFarland's minutes -did err in reporting the identity and nature of the paper that Marshall read aloud at that White House meeting. That paper, contrary to McFarland's claim in the minutes, was not a digest of JCS 1388, but a paper that departed from JCS 1388 on some important matters. Prepared by staff, this paper constitutes about the first two-fifths of the total McFarland minutes. The remaining three-fifths of the minutes presumably summarize much of the subsequent dialogue at the 18 June meeting and include some important details about Olympic. But there is no reason to conclude that this second section summarizes everything that might be important.

Leahy's statement about a 35-percent casualty rate in Olympic and Marshall's statement about the 766,700 U.S. forces both appear in the second section of the minutes, which McFarland presumably produced by rewriting at some later point the notes he took at the meeting. This section also includes Admiral King's casualty estimate for Olympic, which is not easy to interpret (see below). Presumably Marshall also gave his estimate of 63,000 casualties in this segment of the meeting, though it is not mentioned in McFarland’s minutes. The minutes were published, with a few deletions, in FRUS: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), I, pp. 903-10, and at least two sets of draft minutes, including one with handwritten interlineations apparently by McFarland, exist in various archives. Some draft minutes were also published in 1995 in a documentary collection edited by Dennis Merrill. Kort apparently relies on this volume and not the minutes at the archives.

Marshall’s figure of 63,000 casualties, drawn from Leahy’s diary, is considerably lower than what all the secondary literature published into the early 1980s seems to conclude that Marshall, Leahy, and others believed in mid-June 1945. Yet can one simply dismiss the figure Leahy ascribed to Marshall as some kind of error by Leahy? It would have been strange if Leahy had erred on this casualty matter, which greatly concerned him, and about which he had somewhat obliquely queried Marshall at the 18 June meeting.

Adding to the relevant evidence, in his 1950 memoir, I Was There, Leahy discussed the 18 June meeting and basically repeated the key sentence from his diary about Marshall's estimate of 63,000 casualties (p. 384). The only change in that sentence between Leahy's 1945 diary entry and his 1950 memoir is that in 1950 Leahy put Marshall's opinion on likely casualties in the imperfect tense ("was") instead of in the extended present ("is"). That minor revision makes it doubly clear that Leahy was summarizing Marshall's opinion from the 18 June meeting and not just some opinion Marshall uttered before or after that conference.

In various articles published in the mid- and late 1990s I sought to explain the context of Leahy's summary, Marshall's likely meaning, and Leahy's own battle casualty estimate (about 66,500) at the 18 June meeting. Because my analysis clearly rested on interpretation rather than unreflective empiricism I sometimes used words like “probably,” “apparently,” and “strongly suggests.” In such a complicated matter
involving multiple sources, it was important to communicate to readers the reasons for my judgments on the sources and their meaning. Kort seems briefly approving of but ultimately dismayed by my careful verbal hedging. Presumably he would prefer an easier target, for he sometimes disregards my thoughtful, careful phrasing and distorts what I stated.

Kort’s argument on the issue of the minutes, when stripped down to essentials, involves variously contending or assuming that McFarland's minutes for 18 June, despite their considerable ambiguity (which Kort does not admit) on the crucial issue of casualty numbers, are clear and complete on what Marshall meant and on what Leahy understood and meant. Kort is unimpressed by the fact that Leahy's diary entry, in focusing in part on Marshall's casualty estimate, emphasizes one of the three major matters (the other two were surrender terms and the need for the invasion) that concerned Leahy at the meeting. Leahy's diary reveals that he had apparently gotten a useful answer from Marshall (the 63,000 estimate), though McFarland's minutes do not record that answer by Marshall.

Kort seeks to impugn Leahy's diary as a reliable source by describing it unfairly as "haphazardly organized." He dismisses Leahy's diary summary of Marshall's comments on the grounds that it is "hearsay" and that the present-tense phrasing of the key sentence means that Leahy was summarizing Marshall's pre–18 June thinking, not his 18 June analysis. Kort also contends that since McFarland's minutes were "reviewed," they must be full (and thus reliable) summaries of all important matters (especially casualty issues). Furthermore, he claims that the abundance of specific numbers in the minutes indicates that McFarland could not have missed Marshall's estimate of 63,000 if Marshall had uttered it at the meeting. Finally, Kort points out that according to the minutes, Marshall said that he thought it "wrong to give any estimate in numbers." Therefore Kort is certain that he would not have done so.

To many readers, Kort's objections may initially seem reasonable and even compelling. However, years before he published this critique, I had considered all these points, along with many others, and after careful thought and research--research that Kort, to judge from his article's text and endnotes, apparently did not do--rejected them as unconvincing, strained or flimsy. Consider Kort’s "hearsay" charge. Because they were not written by any of the eight active participants in the 18 June meeting, McFarland's minutes are subject to the same "hearsay" standard invoked by Kort and cannot be characterized as “indisputably” the most reliable account of the meeting. Unless it was proved that Leahy, Marshall, or someone else (other than McFarland) from that key June meeting had reviewed and approved McFarland's minutes, there can be no basis for preferring one source (McFarland's minutes) over the other (Leahy's diary).

Years ago, in anticipating Kort's contention about "reviewed" minutes, I investigated whether McFarland's minutes had been reviewed by Leahy or by any or all of the seven other participants at that White House meeting, including Marshall and Truman. Despite checking in many archives (at least nine libraries involving over twenty collections), I could find no evidence that any one of the eight key men from that White House meeting ever reviewed these 18 June minutes, and I found substantial indirect evidence that Truman, Leahy, Marshall, Stimson, and the JCS as a body did not.

Significantly, Kort does not cite any evidence on this key matter of reviewed minutes. He proceeds by assertion, using the word "reviewed" (p. 5) as an adjective modifying the phrase "official minutes." But did anyone besides McFarland review the minutes? Certainly there is every indication that Truman never saw the 18 June minutes in 1945 or at any time during his White House years. The then-director
of the Truman Library, Ben Zobrist, informed me on 16 April 1986 that the library did not have these minutes in manuscript copy in its Truman archival files or in its related materials. In about 1994, eight years after my written inquiry, the library, presumably to supplement published materials, did finally obtain copies of the final and the draft minutes from another archive. The library then put those archival copies into the Truman Library's "Miscellaneous Historical Documents" collection, which is what archivists refer to as an artificially constructed collection. Because Kort cites these materials in his endnote (see his note 8, which draws on Merrill's published edition of mostly archival-type documents located at the Truman Library), it is unclear whether Kort knows and understands the significance of how the Truman Library rather belatedly obtained xerox copies of these manuscript minutes, which neither Truman's own files nor his associates' files at the library actually include.

Having dealt with Kort's ideas about "hearsay" evidence and "reviewed" minutes, let me move to his argument about Leahy's use of the present tense in the crucial diary paragraph on Marshall. To argue on the grounds of Leahy's employment of the present tense, as Kort does, that Leahy was only summarizing Marshall's earlier view and not dealing directly with his statement from the 18 June meeting is certainly peculiar. Kort simply avoids the plain meaning of Leahy's language and fails to understand the context of that second paragraph in Leahy's diary. The casualty issue was an important subject at the meeting. Why would Leahy summarize only Marshall's earlier view prior to the meeting, put the summary in the present tense, and not really deal with Marshall's statement at the June meeting? And how does Kort know it was an earlier view and not also a later view? His contention on this matter is strained, and its implausibility is deeply underscored by Leahy's use of this diary entry in his 1950 published memoir. Curiously, Kort never mentions that Leahy's 1950 memoir used his 1945 diary entry.

Kort also argues that McFarland's minutes must be judged as reliable, and Leahy's diary entry as unreliable, because McFarland "was [not] shy about taking down numbers" (p. 4). Kort even devotes almost half a column on p. 5 to citing some of the numbers in McFarland's minutes. But there is a fatal problem with Kort's contention. Most of the numbers he (often obliquely) refers to from the McFarland minutes did not emerge from McFarland's "taking down numbers." Rather, McFarland simply inserted in nearly verbatim form the number-laden text that Marshall had read aloud at the meeting. Marshall's text was just retyped, with some underlining and paragraphing numbers removed, to constitute most of the first two-fifths of McFarland’s minutes. McFarland did not have to write or copy a single number to produce that number-laden segment, which includes over twenty-two numbers involving casualty data.

Because Kort apparently never did the necessary archival work, he did not discover how McFarland constructed these minutes or that McFarland erred in identifying the source as the JCS 1388 digest. Because Kort relied uncritically on the McFarland minutes, Kort apparently does not know which part is taken verbatim from a staff paper and which part is a summary of meeting comments, presumably from notes. Of the numbers referred to by Kort from the minutes, only about five were from the second, lengthier section of McFarland’s minutes, which presumably depended on McFarland’s notes. Had Kort understood how the minutes were constructed, he might have recognized that his point about the abundance of quoted numbers in McFarland’s minutes might boil down to this dubious proposition: McFarland could not err and Leahy could, even though Leahy cared greatly about casualty numbers and about Marshall's casualty estimates.

Kort is quite correct to note that Marshall stated at the meeting that it "is considered wrong to give any [casualty] estimate in numbers." Yet is
that what Marshall actually did, according to McFarland’s minutes? No. Marshall's prepared text, while avoiding an exact number, actually
did give an upper limit in numbers for American battle casualties for the first thirty days of Olympic. According to McFarland’s minutes,
Marshall said that "the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon," and his chart specified 31,000 battle
casualties on Luzon. How could Kort ignore this in his assessment?

Compare the statement by Marshall about the first thirty days of the invasion of Kyushu to the estimate Leahy ascribed to Marshall. In his
diary Leahy wrote, summarizing Marshall, that "[Kyushu] will not cost us in casualties more than 63,000. . . ." Like Marshall's estimate for
the first thirty days, that, too, is an upper limit and not truly an overall estimate.

Had Kort noted in this segment of his article (p. 5) Marshall's casualty estimate of up to 31,000 men for Olympic's first thirty days
immediately after mentioning Marshall's warning against providing casualty numbers, Kort might not have dismissed Leahy's diary. But
Kort's closest mention of this casualty estimate is at least twenty-five lines away from his quotation of Marshall's no-estimates statement.
Intentionally or not, Kort thus obscures the crucial relationship between what Marshall said he would not do and what he actually did.

In summary, Kort's argument against trusting Leahy's diary on Marshall's casualty estimate of 63,000 is not sustainable. Indeed, the case is
stronger for trusting Leahy’s diary on Marshall’s figure than it is for using only the minutes assembled by McFarland. It certainly strains
credulity to disregard Leahy's diary and to conclude, as Kort does, that Marshall did not make such a comment at the White House meeting.

For those interested in the casualty numbers dispute and the problems of interpreting evidence, it may also be useful to consider, at least
briefly, the statement in McFarland's minutes (FRUS: Berlin. I. p. 907) about Admiral King’s estimate of casualties in Olympic at the 18 June
session. In McFarland's paraphrase of King in these minutes, which closely parallels King's own 1952 memoir, Fleet Admiral King, written
with Walter Whitehill (p. 606), King stated that "a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would be somewhere between the number experienced
by General MacArthur on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties." At first glance, that statement may seem clear, but there is considerable
ambiguity. Was King giving a casualty estimate for only the first thirty days of Olympic, as I think? Or for the entire Olympic operation, as
seems less likely? Did he mean only battle casualties, as I think likely, given Marshall's use of the battle casualties chart? Might King have
meant casualties for ground and naval forces on Okinawa, which seems unlikely in view of his comment about MacArthur's forces on Luzon
and in view of the rest of the 18 June dialogue as summarized in McFarland's minutes?

Such questions about McFarland's minutes, in this case involving King, led me to recognize years ago that McFarland's minutes were neither
clear nor complete on important issues. If King or Leahy had, in a diary, provided clarifying material on King’s 18 June comments, would we
have to reject that diary source on King because the information was not in McFarland's minutes? In my judgment, no. Had Kort dealt with
the problems involving King's casualty estimate statement as summarized in McFarland's minutes, Kort might have understood the dangers of
using McFarland's minutes as if they were precise, clear, and complete on casualty estimates.

Because Kort in places seems to misunderstand or ignore my published explanations for relying on Leahy's diary, and sometimes seems to
deny that I noted and explained the crucial differences on casualty matters involving Leahy's diary and McFarland's minutes, readers may
wish to reread Kort on this matter and then examine my published statements, most notably in the Pacific Historical Review (Nov. 1999, pp. 569-75). As I indicated on p. 572 of that essay, there are multiple sources on the 18 June meeting, and no single source can be fully, and exclusively, relied on for interpreting casualty estimates. Why did Kort omit this statement from his article? Might it have undercut some of his charges and forced him to admit what he chose variously to ignore or deny? Did Kort violate standards of fairness and accuracy by this omission?

On the basis of McFarland’s 18 June minutes Kort also asserts that Leahy’s explicit statement about a 35 percent casualty rate for U.S. combatants in the Okinawa operation included nonbattle as well as battle casualties. That seems highly unlikely. If Kort does not think the concern at the 18 June conference was primarily about battle casualties, as opposed to both battle and nonbattle casualties, he should carefully reexamine the pre-18 June documents leading into the key JCS 1388 series, other preliminary work by various military staff assistants and committees, and, most important, the number-laden chart used by Marshall at the meeting. That chart, which is in the published minutes (FRUS: Berlin, I, p. 905), provides only battle casualty information, as I have indicated. It never even mentions nonbattle casualties. If the main issue on the 18th also involved nonbattle numbers, as Kort argues, why weren't nonbattle casualties listed in the detailed chart for five previous military campaigns? Why didn't someone in the June meeting ask specifically for that nonbattle casualty data for the previous American military operations in order to gain a better picture of the total casualty costs of Olympic?

Kort’s argument for including nonbattle casualties in the casualty rate estimates also runs contrary to much of the published scholarship on the war, including the work of Herbert Feis in his 1961 and 1966 volumes on the A-bomb, Ronald Spector in his 1985 book on the Pacific war, William O'Neill in his 1993 volume on the war period, and Robert Ferrell in his 1994 biography of Truman. But even if Kort is correct, and Feis, Spector, O'Neill, Ferrell, and many others are wrong on this matter, Kort's conclusion will probably not advance a deeper understanding of the basic issue of estimates for battle casualties at the 18 June meeting and may well deflect attention from the major issue of estimating American battle casualties.

Kort's emphasis on casualties in the Okinawa campaign may lead him astray on another matter. His contention, which reaches beyond a discussion of Leahy’s 35-percent estimate, is that it is more meaningful to combine battle and nonbattle casualties. Although both kinds of casualties can lead to death and both do deplete the ranks of available fighting men, conflating the two can greatly distort matters, as Kort acknowledges me saying. He is correct in noting that about 115,000 American nonbattle casualties in WWII died from their wartime injuries, but he minimizes a crucial matter: that the rate of death for U.S. nonbattle casualties was far lower in WWII than for battle casualties. The difference was overwhelming.

The rate of death from the approximately 965,000 American battle casualties was under 31 percent—meaning 292,000 dead. In sharp contrast, the rate of death from nonbattle casualties was under .6 percent. Total nonbattle casualties for the American army in World War II exceeded 16.9 million, but the total resulting death figure was under 84,000. For that reason the distinctive categories of battle and nonbattle casualties are important for analysis and for considering the implications of casualty estimates and reports. As the army's Medical Statistics in World War II shows (pp. 25-35), a U.S. soldier wounded on the battlefield in that war was on average about fifty times more likely to die than a
soldier categorized as a nonbattle casualty. Adding together battle and nonbattle casualties, as Kort urges, would totally obscure profound differences about comparative risks and about depleting or sustaining U.S. forces.

Kort properly points out that nonbattle casualties, like battle casualties, are removed from the fighting force. But for how long? Normally, except in the comparatively rare fatal cases, the nonbattle casualty in the army was generally removed for a much shorter period than the battle casualty--probably about eighteen to nineteen days on average. The non-fatal battle casualty in the army was generally out of action much longer--apparently on average over one hundred days. *Battle Casualties*, among other sources, provides illuminating data on these subjects (pp. 21-31). As this example illustrates, Kort often fails to delve deeply enough into issues. He assumes, in dealing with complex matters, that the answers are simple and within easy reach. Judging from his article, he did very limited research. Some archival work and much wider reading will be necessary if he is to avoid various errors of omission and commission.

To support his contention that Leahy meant battle and nonbattle casualties, Kort quarrels about the number of U.S. ground troops involved in the 1945 Okinawa operation. He asserts that when used as a denominator, with U.S. casualties on Okinawa as a numerator, that number can establish whether Leahy's 35 percent was correct for Okinawa as of 18 June 1945. However, Kort usually does not use 18 June data for total casualties, but data for the entire operation. That operation, though officially ending on about 22 June, actually continued for about two weeks after 18 June, with continuing American casualties. Thus Kort is padding the numerator, probably by a few thousand.

Kort also goes wrong on other matters. Norman Polmar and Thomas Alien err greatly in their 1995 book on the invasion plans and in their summary article on casualties by stating that there were 100,000 U.S. troops involved in the Okinawa "assault force." They implicitly use that questionable number as the denominator in their calculation of the American casualty rate on Okinawa. Focusing on more than twenty troubling problems in Polmar and Alien's work, my twenty-nine-page critique of their study in *Peace & Change* (April 1999) contends briefly, in a relatively minor point in about a dozen lines of text (p. 229) plus a shorter endnote (17), that the actual size of the American force was "about 154,000" for the early Okinawa period (which is what Polmar and Alien seem to mean by the "assault force") and that the total number later rose "as high as 227,000."

Had I used a larger number than "about 154,000" for the denominator, Polmar and Alien would have been even farther off on their casualty rate percentage, since a larger denominator would obviously have produced a percentage well under 35 percent. Thus, by using the "about 154,000" figure, despite some ambiguity in the sources suggesting the possibility of a higher number in the denominator, I was operating against my own interests and possibly understating somewhat the magnitude of Polmar and Alien's error. Little did I expect to be attacked for such kindness on a minor matter where there was some ambiguity in the sources.

Kort focuses energetically on the number 154,000. He generally disregards my hedge ("about"), never mentions my explicit statement that the number later rose to 227,000 (though he acknowledges that I said the number rose), and faults me for using 154,000. Relying heavily on the official army history (Roy Appleman et al., *Okinawa: The Last Battle*), he asserts that the correct number for the assault force is definitely 183,000. He seems to think that this conclusion is not subject to challenge on evidentiary grounds.
Kort is so sure that I erred, and that the figure must be 183,000, that he apparently never did the necessary work in the archives and is presumably unaware that the monthly army publication *Health*, in its 31 May 1945 edition (p. 16), listed 154,000 as the preliminary estimated average U.S. troop total for the first 58 days of the Okinawa campaign. *Health* seemed to me a reliable source. Put together partly by Dr. Michael DeBakey, who would become the co-author of a valuable book on WWII casualty matters (*Battle Casualties*) and an important heart surgeon, *Health* produced a monthly report series that seemed closely attentive to troop and casualty numbers and carefully calculated casualty rates for U.S. forces. Because I worried whether *Health* was precisely correct, however, and because I had also seen a 9 June 1945 report from the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff that indicated a number of 165,500 for the first two months, I intentionally used the phrase "about 154,000." The OPD report seemed a bit high on some other numbers, so I was concerned that it might be too high on the Okinawa number, especially if one was seeking to determine the size of the assault force. I also thought that the official army history, with its higher number for the Okinawa invasion force, was somewhat ambiguous about the size of the actual assault force (see p. 26 and appendix C, including footnotes).

Perhaps I made a mistake by not citing in my late-1990s articles the major source (*Health*) for my estimate of "about 154,000" and by not explaining why determining the number of American troops in the "assault force" on Okinawa or the total ground forces for April, for April–May 1945, for the period up to 18 June, or for the ninety-one-day campaign (April-June) is so difficult. In my 1999 *Pacific Historical Review* article (p. 571), I briefly deal with some of these problems and note that the "total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April" (a force that was very probably larger than the assault force) apparently averaged more than 170,000. However, when I was crafting articles in the late 1990s it seemed to me that my essays already had so many numbers that it would be a mistake to include another highly detailed set of figures that were not essential to the larger analysis. Sometimes seemingly minor omissions, the result of intellectual parsimony, may later make an author vulnerable to sniping.

More recently, I also found a surprising report in naval records that gives a much lower figure for the first-day American landing force, which might be what Polmar and Alien mean by "assault force." But that naval archives paper also had some handwritten emendations written in May 1945 or possibly later, so it would probably be impossible to assess its reliability or significance without substantial research.

Those interested in a deeper appreciation of the complications involved in researching numbers for U.S. ground troops in the "assault force" on Okinawa, for all of April, for April–May 1945, for the period up to 18 June, and for the entire campaign might want to consult, among other sources: (1) the official army history, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, including the charts in appendix C and their footnotes; (2) the 31 May 1945 issue of *Health*; (3) later issues of *Health*; (4) OPD files in Record Group (RG) 165 at the National Archives (NA); (5) reports in the records of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations in RG 38 at the NA; and (6) the book co-written by DeBakey and Gilbert Beebe, *Battle Casualties*, especially pp. 50-51. Other archives contain various reports on the campaign, and certainly the files of the Surgeon General include material relevant to Okinawa casualty numbers. Those interested in this problem must also carefully assess: (1) evidence about the number of U.S. casualties on Okinawa at various key dates; (2) what was actually known about the relevant numbers at various bureaucratic levels in Washington on 18 June; (3) what Leahy knew that day; and (4) what reasons particular historians cite for reaching their conclusions.
Fortunately, no important conclusion on mid-1945 casualty estimates for the invasion of Japan depends on whether the accurate number for the assault force in early April is 183,000 or 154,000 or less. Kort has gotten into a minor issue. He then mishandles the problems of evidence, apparently by not doing the hard research, oversimplifies, and fails to understand the dimensions of the problem.

Kort also argues that it is incorrect or unreasonable to focus, as I did briefly, on the separation of Japanese military forces on southern Kyushu and northern Kyushu in late July 1945 and to note the comparative numbers in each geographical area. He does not address the key question of whether a successful U.S. air force interdiction strategy, designed to block the Japanese shift from north to south, would have substantially impeded the progress of Japanese reinforcements to the south. John Ray Skates, in The Invasion of Japan, treats this subject briefly for the period up to early August 1945 (p. 144). Kort's own judgments seem inadequately informed by the relevant scholarship and by important archival material. Although he quotes two documents—one from 29 July and the other from 1 August 1945—from General MacArthur's staff about the possible flow of Japanese troops from north to south on Kyushu and into Kyushu from elsewhere, he does not quote MacArthur's own contrary judgment on these matters. Why not?

On 9 August, a little more than a week after the two staff assessments quoted by Kort, MacArthur sent his own analysis to Marshall. MacArthur cabled that the U.S. Air Force operations on Kyushu would largely immobilize Japanese troops in their positions on Kyushu, and thus, by implication, a north-to-south flow would not be a problem, nor would a flow into Kyushu from elsewhere. Kort never mentions this cable, part of which has been quoted by me in print (see Pacific Historical Review, Nov. 1999, p. 586). It is also available in various archives.

Perhaps Kort would rebut MacArthur's judgment. MacArthur did tend to be unduly optimistic, and he certainly wanted the Olympic operation, so he was reluctant to be wary--at least on paper, and in reports to Washington. MacArthur may have been too optimistic on this matter of effective interdiction, but Skates, who is not pro-MacArthur, seems to reach a similar conclusion: the north-to-south flow would not have been substantial. Regardless of whether or not Kort would argue against MacArthur and Skates, his omission of MacArthur's judgment and Skates's view is significant.

Even as Kort tilts against my efforts to distinguish the size of the Japanese forces in southern Kyushu from those in the north, he never tells readers that the central point of my 1999 article in the Pacific Historical Review was not about comparative Japanese troop numbers in the north versus the south. Rather, I was speculating that the large Japanese force in southern Kyushu in mid-August 1945 would very probably have led Washington to reconsider Olympic if the war had not ended then. Indeed, it seems possible that Olympic would have been canceled and plans shifted to a new invasion site. Kort's omissions of context, of MacArthur's important message, and of Skates's relevant book seem to be part of a larger pattern. Kort's apparent strategy is to present virtually a litigator's brief, excluding contrary evidence and all material that might lead to a broader, more judicious analysis.

Kort also has some other difficulties. He frequently misquotes various sources. Drawing upon about seventeen lines from a 1 August document (Kort, pp. 9-10), he makes at least six errors in quoting. He also misquotes a report from 29 July (Kort, p. 9). In addition, his first three quotations from me (Kort, p. 4) contain errors (see the text keyed to notes 3-5), as does the first endnote (2) in which he quoted me. In summary, he errs in every set of quotations—six in toto—that I checked, and I quit checking at six. His errors, though minor, reveal...
remarkable carelessness and certainly do not inspire confidence.

To get a good sense of Kort's scholarship in other ways, readers should look closely at a seemingly minor matter in his essay that is actually quite revelatory of his peculiar tactics. In endnote 2 Kort discusses but fails to summarize accurately my 1986 comment about the dangers of inferential thinking in certain situations. He greatly distorts my meaning and fails to report that I was not opposing the general use of inference as a part of historical analysis. Who would? I was opposing the use of inference for conclusions as a substitute for first consulting the relevant archival material. Consultation of archival sources does not mean that all readers will agree on interpretation, but using those documents, as I was contending, is far wiser than disregarding them and seeking to infer what they may state. By generally disregarding archival material Kort sometimes falls prey to the error that I warned against in 1986 and that Kort misrepresents in endnote 2: using inference as a substitute for necessary archival research.

For those interested in independently assessing Kort's judgment, claims and scholarly standards, let me advise looking closely at his summaries and the quotations in his text and endnotes and then checking back on what he is purportedly drawing upon and citing. Equally important, those interested in the subject at hand should read more broadly and take note of what Kort omits and how infrequently he goes back to the relevant archival collections to check his interpretation. Some dismaying tactics will become apparent in his treatment of matters both large and small.

Stressing Kort’s errors, inadequate research, distortions, dubious judgments, and omissions is not tantamount to claiming that I got everything right on the complicated casualty issues. I tried hard, discussed the issues privately with a number of historians of various interpretive persuasions, and sometimes revised my judgments in print and critiqued some of my earlier work (see, for example, Pacific Historical Review 1999, p. 563, note 4, and Peace and Change 1999, p. 240, note 5). There is undoubtedly still room for thoughtful challenge and dispute and broadening the framework of analysis, but such efforts should be intelligent and fair-minded, careful and well-researched. Kort's deeply flawed essay seldom, if ever, meets the standards for serious, responsible academic discourse.
August 2004 Newsletter

Part of a New Direction: The State Department's Office of the Historian and its Conference on the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

By Steven Galpern and Laurie West Van Hook

The Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, has embarked on many new and unprecedented paths in the twenty-first century under the leadership of Marc J. Susser, the department's historian since January 2001. Along with Ted Keefer, general editor of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, and David Herschler, deputy historian, Susser has rejuvenated and expanded the work of the Office of the Historian in three short years. With its second annual conference at the Department of State, entitled "The United States, the Middle East, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," held on January 12-13, 2004, the Office of the Historian moved closer to its goal of becoming a center for the study of foreign policy and diplomacy in the United States.

For more than a generation, the Office of the Historian focused primarily on preparing the *Foreign Relations* series and providing policy-supportive historical studies for department principals. But the 1991 *Foreign Relations* statute required the entire staff to redouble its efforts in the production of the series at the expense of other endeavors. During the late 1990s, the Office was severely understaffed as a result of department-wide personnel and budget cuts, as well as attrition. By 2000 there were a mere twelve historians in the Office. They worked primarily on *Foreign Relations*, while policy studies were reduced to sporadic high-priority projects. Since Susser's arrival in 2001, the leadership of the department and the Bureau of Public Affairs - which includes the Office of the Historian - has committed extensive resources to the Office in order to meet its legislatively mandated mission to produce *Foreign Relations* volumes thirty years after events occur. As a result, the Office has undergone extraordinary growth and revitalization. Of the thirty-eight historians currently on staff, twenty-six have joined since February 2001. The Office of the Historian has become one of the biggest recruiters for the profession in the last three years and is now the largest employer of diplomatic historians in the country. These historians research, compile, declassify, and edit *Foreign Relations* volumes, conduct policy-supportive research, and initiate and implement historical outreach programs while pursuing their own scholarly goals, participating in conferences, and teaching part-time at universities in the Washington, DC, area.

Today the Office is working to fulfill three programmatic goals: to publish *Foreign Relations* volumes within the thirty-year time period required by law; to respond quickly and effectively to requests from department principals for policy-related research studies; and to play an appropriate role in the efforts of the Bureau of Public Affairs to reach a "broader, deeper, and younger" audience.
To expedite the publication of *Foreign Relations*, the department has reached an agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency on the unique position of Joint Historian, whose task is to promote the interagency cooperation essential to the production of the series. The number of people working on the series has increased significantly, but it will take several years to compensate for past staff shortages and catch up to the statutory deadline. The staff is currently researching and publishing fifty-six volumes for the Nixon-Ford administrations (forty-one print and fifteen electronic-only volumes, all of which will be placed on the Internet). Although the focus is now on the Nixon-Ford years, planning has already begun for the Carter administration, and a team of historians has gone to Atlanta to explore the records at the Carter Library.

During the first three years of the current administration, which coincided with the revival of the Office of the Historian, the Office has responded to many more short- and long-term requests to provide policy-related research for department principals, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, as well as for the White House and the National Security Council. From the end of World War II through the early 1990s, the staff of the Office's Policy Studies and Outreach Division was as large as the *Foreign Relations* series staff and often produced over a hundred research studies and projects a year. During the remainder of the 1990s, however, the dwindling size of the staff and the statutory mandate imposed by the 1991 *Foreign Relations* statute led to a decline in the Office's ability to produce policy-related studies. Fortunately, in the last three years, this important facet of the Office of the Historian's work has been revived as staff numbers have returned to the levels needed to provide proper historical support for the department's leadership. The secretary and other department principals have taken a personal interest in special historical studies on such subjects as the coalition against terrorism, NATO, U.S.-Russian relations, the Iraq and Afghan wars, and the history of the department and its components. In the past year the Office has responded to various requests dealing with issues the United States has faced in the rebuilding of Iraq.

Research studies on significant foreign policy problems and current issues have proven useful and highly cost-effective for the department. They provide an accurate, authoritative, and comprehensive record of major events, policies, positions, commitments, and assurances. They can support complex negotiations, provide a basis for "lessons learned" analyses, and help explain and defend policies to Congress, the media, and the public. The staff of the Office of the Historian brings two special forms of expertise to this type of analysis: knowledge of and experience in dealing substantively with Department of State files and records, including classified records, and a specialized knowledge of diplomatic history, institutional practice, and geographic areas across the globe. In short, staff historians have the ability to provide department principals with history "in the service of current policy." The staff of the Policy Studies and Outreach Division is not yet up to full strength, so all historians work on policy-related research as needed. The growing diversity of expertise among the new staff, combined with the increasing number of requests by the department's leadership, has made this an increasingly important aspect of the Office's work.

Finally, the Office of the Historian fulfills the department's goal of reaching a "broader, deeper, and younger" audience in a variety of ways. The Office now handles more than a thousand inquiries annually and responds on a daily basis to requests by department offices and overseas posts, other agencies, and the public for information about the official historical record of U.S. foreign policy. The Office has also created educational materials for college, high school, and middle school. In 2002, working with a group of teachers from the National Council for
the Social Studies, the Office initiated a series of historical educational videos, along with accompanying curriculum materials, for teachers of social studies in secondary schools. So far, the Office has completed one video on terrorism, and a second, on the history of diplomacy, is nearing completion. These videos are part of a developing series entitled "Doors to Diplomacy." Future videos may cover topics such as cultural diplomacy during the Cold War, sports diplomacy, the media and diplomacy, and diplomatic crises case studies. In a related effort, the Office has been involved with the department's youth website, which includes a historical timeline and two prototype learning packages with accompanying curriculum materials on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Americanization of the Vietnam War. Members of the Office also participate as judges in National History Day, evaluating projects by students from all over the nation, and staff historians speak not only at professional academic conferences, but also at middle and secondary schools, universities, and teacher conventions.

The Office also initiated a new type of outreach program that is truly an exercise in cultural diplomacy. In conjunction with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office is preparing to publish a joint documentary volume on the era of détente. The volume focuses mainly on backchannel exchanges between then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin from 1969 to 1972 and will show both the American and the Russian records of individual discussions. Publishing these documents side by side will provide new insights into and shed new light on a critical period in diplomatic history. During the past two years a working group from the Office made two trips to Moscow to meet their Russian Foreign Ministry Historical Office counterparts and also hosted a Russian visit to Washington, DC. A conference highlighting the volume's publication is planned for late 2005.

Another of the Office's key initiatives has been to bring together academic scholars with government historians and public policy specialists and to link *Foreign Relations* to the latest in scholarly research. Over the past two years the Office has hosted scholarly conferences on major issues in the history of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy. The first such undertaking was a conference on the 1954 coup in Guatemala, which was held in May 2003 to mark the publication of a long-anticipated retrospective *Foreign Relations* volume and the simultaneous release by the CIA of a major body of documentation on the 1954 coup. For that conference, approximately twenty scholars from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Guatemala gathered to discuss the latest historiography of the coup and its implications. A Guatemalan scholar who participated in the conference at the department subsequently invited members of the Office of the Historian to participate in a conference that he and the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry arranged in October 2003 at the University of San Carlos, in Guatemala City, on the subject of the coup and the broader issues of the Guatemalan revolution.

A second and larger conference, on "The United States, the Middle East, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," was held on January 12-13, 2004, at the Department of State in conjunction with the release of *Foreign Relations* Volume XIX: *Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*. Ambassador David Satterfield, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, opened the conference with a speech detailing the current state of relations and negotiations in the Middle East. The role of history resonated within the context of the current climate. The conference brought together over forty scholars from the United States, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Canada, Britain, and Austria--some from academia, some from government agencies (including the State Department, the CIA, and the National Security Agency) and think tanks. Both junior and senior scholars, many meeting for the first time after years of reading each other's work, presented papers and participated in discussions on
the latest work being done on the 1967 war. Interest in the conference exceeded expectations. At times there were more than two hundred people in the audience, among them academics, representatives from several government agencies and public policy foundations, members of the public (some of whom who traveled great distances to attend), and embassy officials from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.

In hosting the conference the Office had the enthusiastic support not only of its own leadership in the Bureau of Public Affairs, but that of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and embassy personnel in the Middle East. In view of the threat currently posed by terrorism, a liaison with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security was required, and strict security precautions were maintained at all times. The logistics of planning and hosting a conference that attracts widespread interest are infinitely more complex when it is held in the Department of State. Everyone attending the conference who was not affiliated with the State Department had to forward identifying information in order to register, check in through the security gates, and be escorted at all times during the conference. Running a conference on schedule is difficult under the best of circumstances, but it is harder when people must check in and out during the day, wear badges at all times, and be escorted everywhere—even to the restroom.

The high level of media interest in the conference also meant that special accommodations were necessary for print and television journalists, among whom were representatives from ABC/Nightline, NBC, CBS, CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera, AP, UPI, Knight-Ridder, USA Today, the Financial Times, and various press agencies in Israel, Lebanon, Germany, and France. The Office could not determine many of their needs until hours before the conference began. Not surprisingly, press interest was greatest at the start of the conference for the speech of Ambassador Satterfield, the presentation of the new Foreign Relations volume, and the first panel on the issues of intelligence and the USS Liberty. On the first day of the conference, six cameras recorded the proceedings, and C-Span broadcast live. During breaks between panels, the press often interviewed conference participants in the conference room.

The Foreign Relations volume that occasioned the conference was compiled by Harriet Schwar, who retired recently from the Office of the Historian. It begins in May 1967, when Egyptian troops began moving into the Sinai, Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser requested the withdrawal of U.N. forces from the border with Israel, and the U.S. government began to move into crisis mode. It concludes with the passage of U.N. Resolution 242 in November 1967. Schwar used the records of President Johnson, the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Naval Security Group and included a wide variety of documents reflecting the kind of intelligence that reached Johnson and his advisers, especially before and during the war. While some documents were denied or censored, she believes that the most important documents were released and that the withheld material would have added very little of substance.

The volume focuses on the view from the White House and makes it clear that Johnson and his advisers saw the Middle East crisis very much in the context of the Cold War. For example, although Schwar was not able to find the National Security Agency instructions to the U.S. signals intelligence ship Liberty, she believes that the Soviets' intentions were uppermost on Johnson's mind as the ship headed toward the eastern Mediterranean during the prewar crisis. Piecing together fragmentary intelligence from the hours surrounding the attack with follow-
up reports written in the weeks after it, Schwar shows that when the Israelis attacked the ship with aircraft and torpedo boats on June 8, causing severe damage and many casualties, Washington was not sure at first who was responsible, but when word came through several hours later that the Israelis had done it, the White House sent a message to Moscow via the hot line to ensure that the incident did not touch off a broader conflict.

The significance of the Cold War context emerged as one of the most fascinating threads of the conference. The conference committee received numerous compelling proposals from historians trained not only in Middle Eastern history, but also in European and Russian history. Access to newly opened records from Soviet and former Communist bloc archives fostered the development of new insights into historical issues surrounding the 1967 crisis that emphasized the global impact of the war. Of course, as many scholars at the conference pointed out, both the Russian and Middle Eastern governments - especially the latter - must provide greater access to their archives before scholars can give a fuller account of the 1967 crisis. Nevertheless, in the course of the conference various scholars gave nuanced accounts of issues related to the Cold War, such as whether the Soviets wanted an Arab-Israeli war or how the Jordan River and water scarcity played into the Cold War dynamic.

Conference participants also examined the larger impact of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Scholars agreed that the catalyst for the chain of events leading up to the war was the Soviet warning to Egypt that Israeli troops were gathering on the Syrian border, which was not true. Yet disagreements arose over what the Soviet Union intended when it gave Egypt this false information. Based on his conversations with high-level Egyptian officials from the period, Ambassador Richard Parker, who was political officer in Cairo at the time, concluded that Soviet officials did not deliberately provide Egypt with misinformation to advance their own agenda in the region. In stark contrast, Israeli scholar Isabella Ginor characterized the Soviet warning as "deliberate misinformation," part of a plan "approved at the highest level of Soviet leadership to elicit Egyptian action that would provoke an Israeli strike." Israeli action, she argued, would justify Soviet intervention against Israel. She based her assertions on evidence from Soviet and other Warsaw Pact documents, as well as on the memoirs of contemporary actors. On the other hand, Galia Golan stated that it was difficult to make the case that Brezhnev intended to provoke Nasser into a full-scale war: he would have considered that too risky. Rather, she said, the Soviet leadership wanted to bolster the Syrian regime and hoped that Egypt, which had a mutual defense pact with Syria, would offer Syria greater support. On a related issue, both Egyptian scholar Mostafa Elwi Saif and British scholar Laura James considered the impact of the decisions made by President Nasser on the escalating political crisis leading up to war with Israel. Despite their contrasting methodologies, they agreed that before the war, Nasser viewed the United States as Egypt's primary enemy and considered it a much greater threat than Israel.

Scholars trained in European history also took advantage of archival material in Europe and Russia to examine the 1967 war. Austrian scholar Rolf Steininger used Brezhnev's address "On the Soviet Policy Following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East," presented to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on June 20, 1967, to show that the events transpiring in June 1967 resulted from "grave miscalculations" on the part of the Soviet Union about its ability to manage its Arab clients. He argued, however, that the Soviets hoped that the conflict would last longer so that they could assume the role of peacemaker and help the United States broker an Arab-Israeli
agreement. Will Gray of Texas Tech and Carole Fink of Ohio State used East and West Germany, respectively, to analyze the Cold War dynamic. Gray stated that scholars too often view the Cold War in rigidly bipolar terms, thereby obscuring its complex, multilateral nature. He cited the case of East Germany, which acted independently of the Soviet Union during the war. Although East Germany played a pivotal role in "coordinating European socialist support for the Arab states before, during and after" the conflict in hopes of receiving diplomatic recognition from some Arab states, no recognition was forthcoming, and the Soviets curtailed its diplomatic freedom. In contrast, Fink demonstrated how the war expanded the diplomatic freedom of West Germany and bolstered its policy of Ostpolitik. The inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to manage the crisis, in conjunction with the fracturing of the Western alliance, allowed West Germany to release itself from the bipolar framework that had shackled its foreign policy for two decades and enabled it to pursue more adventurous diplomatic initiatives.

Panelists also showed how the effects of the war circled across the English Channel and the Atlantic and back to the Persian Gulf. British scholar James Vaughan argued that the British preference for "non-intervention" had to give way because of Britain's role as the "chief Western partner" of the United States in the Middle East. Pressure to maintain the Anglo-American relationship precluded any effort to remain uninvolved, especially once U.S. officials made it clear that they would need British support to help manage the crisis. Nevertheless, the consequences of an Arab oil embargo and the closure of the Suez Canal reminded British officials that disengagement from the region was necessary. U.S. Department of State historian, Steven Galpern, filled in the details of this last point, demonstrating that Britain's inability to obtain Middle East oil via pipelines and the Suez Canal--in addition to a politically-driven run on the pound sterling by Arab states--spurred the currency's devaluation in 1967. The upshot, he explained, was Britain's retrenchment not only of sterling as an international trading and reserve currency but also of its forces East of Suez, which created great financial and strategic problems for the United States.

John Ciorciari, an American scholar studying at Oxford, kept the focus on oil but shifted the lens back to the Persian Gulf by demonstrating how the war affected the balance of power on the Arabian Peninsula and relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Broadly speaking, he argued that while it seemed that the war caused a shift in power from the Soviet Union and its radical Arab clients to Israel and to the United States and its conservative Arab allies, the shift was in fact ephemeral. The conflict radicalized the Palestinian movement and other Arab nationalist groups and threatened to destabilize the conservative Arab states. These developments forced Britain to withdraw from the Gulf and paved the way for deeper Soviet penetration into the Middle East. As for U.S.-Saudi relations, political and economic interests compelled Saudi Arabia to bring its oil embargo to a quick end despite U.S. ties with Israel, because of Saudi King Faisal's belief in a Communist-Zionist conspiracy.

All of the scholars who examined the effect of the war on Johnson's Middle East policy agreed that his administration developed a closer relationship with Israel than those of his predecessors, Kennedy and Eisenhower. Arlene Lazarowitz of California State-Long Beach commented that domestic political constraints influenced Johnson's thinking. David Lesch of Trinity University described the president as "sympathetic and even empathetic" toward the Jewish state. Both Lesch and Peter Hahn of Ohio State argued that the administration was preoccupied with anti-Soviet containment in its policy toward the Middle East, and that concern led it to seek a strategic balance of power between Israel and the front-line Arab states. The effect of the Israeli victory on U.S.-Israeli relations remained unresolved. Lazarowitz asserted that the victory solidified the American-Israeli partnership on the Johnson administration's terms, but Hahn described the victory as a
"major setback" for Johnson, since it demonstrated the "limit of his power to control international events." Lesch contended that the Johnson administration lost interest in the region after the United Nations passed Resolution 242 (which provided the basis for the "land-for-peace" framework that still exists today) and that Johnson was satisfied that the measure had put the Arab-Israeli issue "back in the icebox" where it had been before the war. Jordanian scholar Hisham Khatib argued that the war produced no victors - only "losers and bigger losers," among them the Arab states, the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians. He pointed to the crucial role that a statesman can play in crisis management and asserted that less confused decision-making by the Egyptian leadership and a stronger United Nations secretary general would have prevented the crisis.

Khatib's paper was part of the final panel, which focused on the lasting regional and international impact of the war. Israeli journalist and historian Tom Segev and Americans Kristin Tassin and Sean Foley addressed the Palestinian question. In earlier remarks, Israeli scholar Lily Polliack had asserted that Johnson's foreign policy had neglected the Palestinian issue. Segev focused on a series of meetings between Israeli and Palestinian leaders soon after the war, basing his comments on the personal records of Ambassador Moshe Sasson of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. He characterized these discussions as a missed opportunity for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, which was scuttled by internal disputes on both sides, and noted that Israel failed to offer "real independence" or "meaningful self-rule" to the Palestinians. He also argued that for two decades the Israelis had viewed the Palestinians as a "diplomatic nuisance" to be discussed annually at the United Nations, but the 1967 war moved them "back into the center of the conflict." Kristin Tassin described how Palestinian armed resistance grew exponentially in the wake of the war and how the Arab defeat revived Palestinian nationalism, which in turn helped fuel the burgeoning guerilla movement. Sean Foley focused on Lebanon, asserting that the shift in Palestinian guerilla activities to Israel's northern neighbor from the defeated Arab states destabilized a border that had been quiet for roughly twenty years. Many observers had once believed that Lebanon would be one of the first Arab countries to sign a peace treaty with Israel, but he concluded that Fedayeen attacks on Israel from Lebanese bases - and Israeli retaliation - precluded any such agreement.

Overall, the conference highlighted new and exciting research being done in the history of the region and the international order. Yet it also showed how ripe the time period is for further study. The Office of the Historian plans to publish the conference proceedings later this year and will post a tape and transcript of the proceedings on the Department of State's website at www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/. The Office staff has enjoyed hosting conferences and connecting with the profession in a new way. The next few years hold yet more growth and new initiatives, and staff members look forward both to continuing the production of Foreign Relations and to breaking new ground in other areas.
August 2004 Newsletter

*Diplomatic History* and American Studies

By Robert D. Schulzinger
Editor-in-Chief *Diplomatic History*

We have been grappling for at least a generation to define the limits of the history of American foreign relations. The field encompasses far more than the study of power and government. It is an approach to history that includes time, change, memory, identity, language, culture, and comparisons to other nations and other eras. Michael Hogan's 2003 SHAFR presidential address is only the latest of many fruitful efforts to redefine our field and reach out to others exploring similar subjects.

Seeking a practical way of translating these efforts into action, Tom Zeiler (the executive editor of *Diplomatic History*) and I decided to reach out to the American Studies Association. In July we invited Amy Kaplan, president of the ASA, to join the editorial board of our journal. She happily agreed.

Kaplan's work explores the language of power and resistance in the history of U.S. expansion and empire. She focuses on words, metaphors, and the social construction of meaning. Her documents are texts—novels, newspapers stories, and the speeches of the prominent. Her work is important, since it seeks to uncover the origins of the motives and outlook of people in power and of those whom power affects.

That the ASA elected her president speaks to the dramatic changes that this branch of the study of the United States has undergone in the past thirty years. Originally American Studies included history and literature, with some film thrown into the mix. The field was created before the Second World War but came into prominence in the early Cold War years as an exemplar of American exceptionalism. Then came the sixties and seventies. Practitioners of American Studies were among the first to undermine the basic assumptions of American exceptionalism. As cultural studies swept through most of the disciplines of the humanities, American Studies was transformed. It investigated all aspects of life in the United States with a skeptical and critical eye.

When Tom and I talked with Amy, she suggested that we attend the annual meeting of the ASA in October. We jumped at the opportunity.
When the two of us began editing *Diplomatic History*, we wanted to reach out to as many other related disciplines as possible, so this seemed like an ideal way to cross disciplinary boundaries. It's one thing for an editor to read about work in progress being presented at a conference. We do that all the time, and we often ask writers to submit their work. It is far more intense actually to meet the author and hear the work presented with all the back-and-forth of commentary and questions.

We arranged to spend three days at the ASA meeting in Hartford in mid-October. The theme of the meeting was "Violence and Belonging." We went with hopes and anxieties not unlike those of a graduate student going to a professional meeting for the first time. Physically the meeting had problems. Hartford has seen better days, and it is not really equipped to handle a large convention. We stayed at the overflow hotel, which was across an interstate highway and about a third of a mile away from the meeting headquarters. Most of the sessions took place in the nearly abandoned Hartford Convention Center, which has stood without a permanent tenant since the NHL Hartford Whalers left town about fifteen years ago. The building was cold, drafty and dark. The acoustics were pretty bad, and the concrete floors the hardest I have ever walked on.

But the accommodations hardly mattered. We've all been to meetings and spoken at universities, colleges, and institutes where the facilities are not Ritz quality, and some of us have been privileged actually to meet at the Ritz. There is no relationship between the quality of the building and the quality of the ideas.

So what was the quality at the ASA? In the broadest sense, it was like every academic or other professional gathering: intense, exciting, enlightening, irritating, and boring—often all at the same time. The meeting was huge. There were over 230 sessions, and each one had at least five and sometimes as many as seven presenters. Over 1400 people were on panels. The ASA runs five concurrent one-hour-and-forty-five-minute sessions each day. They begin at 8:00 A.M. and end at 5:45.

When I chaired the SHAFR program committee, I heard concerns that three sessions per day would be too much for anyone to take in. I tended to agree at the time. Then in Hartford I spoke to a colleague in American Studies from the University of Colorado who is a regular attendee at the ASA, and she informed me that she and her fellows would not have it any other way. She had been coming to the meeting for twenty years and regularly spent at least two of the four days going to all five sessions.

Among the presenters there was quite enough pomposity and preciosity. I remember listening in rapt attention, and then irritation, and finally dismay to a magnificently tailored professor of English literature speak beautifully, articulately and passionately in complete sentences and without notes for twenty minutes. It was only after six or seven minutes that I realized I had not understood anything the man said. Perhaps he was auditioning to revive the 1950s routines of Professor Irwin Corey, the World's Foremost Authority. Then there was the session entitled "Theorizing Meat." There in two words were summarized most of the old-fashioned concerns about cultural studies: its practitioners have an excessive interest in theory and pay too much attention to the physical body.
It is easy to mock, but it is not very useful. An ethnographer of SHAFR from the ASA could probably find as many trivial, self-referential, and self-important presentations at our annual meeting as we did at theirs. We did not go to Hartford to find out what American Studies did not have to say about issues of interest to historians of foreign relations. We went to learn how we could broaden the scope of our journal and what our colleagues can learn from and teach others. In that sense we were richly rewarded by our visit.

Some of the sessions we attended on subjects relevant to foreign relations were marvelous. They opened our eyes to new ways of looking at traditional subjects of interest. Some were comparative or transnational in the best sense of the terms. A session on World War II and the construction of memory included papers on the photo journalist Margaret Bourke White's rhetoric of fashion during the Second World War. Another traced the exchange between the memory of World War II and the present in the 1950s and 1960s in Kurt Vonnegut's World War II novels. Two Japanese historians used survey research to explore the transnationalization of the memory of World War II. One of the papers used interviews with Japanese and American visitors to the Arizona memorial at Pearl Harbor. The author discovered how Japanese and American visitors, some of them veterans of the war but most of them born after 1945, projected their school-book learning of the war onto their visits to the memorial. Another Japanese historian explored the ways in which the Japanese and American print and television media in the 1990s used their countries' nationalist narratives of the war to justify refusing to apologize for atrocities their countrymen had committed during the conflict. In Japan, the sense of victimization at Hiroshima and Nagasaki blocked apologies to Korean comfort women. In the United States, heroic narratives of the Pacific War overwhelmed the efforts of the Smithsonian to present a historically nuanced exhibit on the bombing of Hiroshima.

A session on "Civilizing Missions and U.S. Empire" also showed how cultural studies can inform rather than obscure subjects that historians of American foreign relations have wrestled with for nearly a century. A student in the Department of Cultural Studies at the Claremont Graduate University presented an excellent paper on what cigar labels said about imperial dominance in the late nineteenth century. She had found pictures in old magazines of cigar bands and boxes manufactured in Tampa and Havana. They showed a feminine Cuba, occasionally seductive, more often terrified and vulnerable at the hands of rapacious Spain, being saved by Americans. An English professor explained how the poet Wallace Stevens used and changed the language of American colonial dominance in the Caribbean. This session also included a remarkably old-fashioned paper about American Samoa. The subtitle was "The Happiest Colony of the United States." The author went on at length about how the Samoans had welcomed the arrival of the first American missionaries, then the U.S. Navy, and finally one hundred years of American rule. They rejoiced in their American status and embraced a succession of good rulers.

A session on "Race War in Twentieth-Century U.S. History" included three excellent papers on three different wars: the Philippine-American War, World War II, and the Vietnam War. The author of the first paper provided a dense description of how the racial and racist language of the war changed as the fighting intensified. He had found a large collection of letters home from American soldiers in the Philippines. When the soldiers first arrived, they spoke respectfully of the Filipinos. Once fighting erupted and the Americans came under fire, their language turned bitter and the racist epithets flew. Another paper revisited the question of American racism in the Pacific and European theaters during the war. Twenty minutes is hardly enough time to scratch the surface of this vast subject, but the author presented ideas that others can work
with for years. There were profound differences in racial attitudes between American fighting men in the field and their trainers and superiors back home, but as the war went on both became increasingly racist. Finally, there was a compact paper about Asian-American opposition to the War in Vietnam. The author used interviews, poetry, films, novels, archival research in the newsletters of numerous antiwar groups, and some personal reminiscences to create a fluid portrait of Asian-American opponents of the war. Like many of the other best papers, this one described changes over time. It highlighted dilemmas of ethnic and national identity and also examined the gender conflict that arose in this segment of the antia war movement, as it did among white and black antiwar activists in the 1960s. In addition, it had a transnational aspect, because the author wrote about the emotional turmoil afflicting Asian-American fighting men as they confronted other Asians in Vietnam and then examined the attitudes of fighters from the National Liberation Front and People's Liberation Armed Force, who did not always know what to make of Asians coming across the Pacific to fight them.

There was also a very worthwhile session on veterans. The session title could cause more traditionally minded academics some annoyance, filled as it was with references to the body and the corporation: "Veterans Bodies, Bodies of Veterans: American Veterans and Masculinity in the Twentieth Century." But the papers at the session more than fulfilled our hopes that there was much that American Studies can teach diplomatic history. One author looked at painting, cartoons, and film of the 1920s and 1930s to show how images of the wounded or disabled contributed to feelings of revulsion for the Great War. Another looked at World War II veterans' literature of wounds, disability, and neuroses to describe the crisis of postwar masculinity. Another wrote movingly of expatriate veterans in the Great Depression who questioned their identity as U.S. citizens and their status as modern men.

These papers have something real, important, and provocative to say to historians of U.S. foreign relations. We have asked their authors to submit them or related work to Diplomatic History, and we hope that our readers will see the fruits of this research. We shall also continue to attend the ASA annual meeting. We have created a panel on new trends in foreign relations for the 2004 meeting in Atlanta, where convention facilities should be more satisfactory. But that hardly matters. The members of the ASA are doing worthwhile and exciting work. It has been a pleasure to talk with and learn from them.
Working Long Into the Night: Improving Education and Searching for Social Mobility in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

by Ron Briley

It is approaching ten in the evening, and after a twelve-hour teaching day, Sevda Nasirova is tutoring a young man at the dining room table in the home she shares with her parents, son, and nephew. The English lesson is being conducted by candlelight, as the city of Lankaran, Azerbaijan (population approximately 75,000) is experiencing one of its frequent electricity outages. Nasirova is tired, but she needs the extra cash that tutoring brings in, for public school teachers in Azerbaijan earn the equivalent of thirty American dollars a month. Like all dedicated teachers, Nasirova also perceives education as a mission. She believes her tutoring will result in higher test scores for her students and provide an avenue for escaping poverty in a country where the unemployment rate is near 30 percent.

As a participant in a U. S. State Department program promoting cultural exchange with the Eurasian republics of the former USSR, I went to Azerbaijan in the fall of 2003 to observe public school education. I lived with an Azeri family and accompanied Nasirova to Lankaran School Number 4 each morning at eight o'clock, six days week. Like most Middle Eastern nations, Azerbaijan has a large population of young people, so its schools are overcrowded. Lankaran School Number 4 is no exception. It accommodates several thousand students, dividing them between morning and afternoon sessions. To support her family, Nasirova works both sessions, completing her school day in the early evening hours.

Nasirova and her colleagues work under conditions many American teachers would find intolerable. The enormous three-story school building houses all grade levels, and even with split sessions the dimly lit corridors and narrow staircases are overflowing with students. Electricity is problematic throughout the school day, but neither students nor teachers allow the poorly illuminated environment to interfere with the learning process. A small computer lab with approximately half a dozen computers donated by international educational foundations serves teachers and students alike, although electricity problems and slow connections limit the use of technology. Perhaps even more surprising, Lankaran School Number 4 has no copier machine. Many teachers in the United States would miss the opportunity to reproduce supplementary materials more than they would computer access. There are no televisions or VCRs in the classrooms, and it proved impossible for me to play an audiocassette of Woody Guthrie's "This Land is Your Land" because a tape player could not be located. But the greatest infrastructure challenge for the Azeri schools lies with the peeling paint, rotting floorboards, broken windows, and toilets forever in need of cleaning.
The general pedagogical techniques employed by the hard-working faculty of Lankaran School Number 4 are still to a great extent those of the Soviet bureaucratic educational establishment. The emphasis is on rote memorization; discussion and problem solving are not highly valued. With few teaching materials available, teachers rigidly follow the texts, most of which date from the Soviet era. The English textbook for upper-level students concentrates on grammar. The literary selections include John Reed, Abraham Lincoln, Mark Twain, and Jack London--selections that emphasize the strong progressive and anti-imperialist traditions in American letters and literature.

Like the dated textbooks and Soviet-era teaching methods, the contemporary political culture of Azerbaijan also impedes educational innovation. A portrait of former president Heydar Aliyev adorns every classroom and serves to remind students of the constraints placed on freedom in their country, where democracy has a brief and turbulent history. Following a declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Popular Front mounted a determined effort to topple the government of former Communist leader Ayaz Mutalibov and installed nationalist academic Abulfaz Elchibey as president. However, military setbacks against the Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh produced considerable discontent with the once-popular president, paving the way for Heydar Aliyev to be elected head of state in October 1993. Aliyev was formerly head of the KGB in Azerbaijan and a member of the Politburo in Moscow until his ouster by Gorbachev.

An astute politician, Aliyev renounced his Communist party membership, bolstered his power base in the Naxcivan region, and pursued a more aggressive policy against the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, where a cease-fire was declared in 1994. Fostering a cult of personality in which his portrait adorned every public building and classroom in the nation, Aliyev won a second term as president in 1999, although opposition parties questioned the election's legitimacy. Diagnosed with a heart condition, the president traveled to Cleveland for surgery and was not seen in public for almost a year. Nevertheless, he remained a candidate for reelection in 2003 until his withdrawal in favor of his son Ilham.

Initially appointed by his father to head the state oil company, Ilham was elevated to the post of prime minister in 2003 by the rubber-stamp Parliament when the elder Aliyev's health apparently worsened. (He died in December 2003.) The Aliyev regime's media machine set to work to erase Ilham's playboy reputation. A ubiquitous poster produced by the ruling New Azerbaijan party shows the grand old man of Azeri politics instructing his young son, who poses with a hand under his chin while solemnly contemplating the wisdom being handed down to him by the nation's leader. It is a reassuring image for those who fear the disorder that accompanied independence and the Soviet withdrawal, but to the opposition parties of Azerbaijan it is symbolic of dynastic rule.

Ilham coasted to victory in the presidential election of October 2003. The official results released by the government election bureau showed him receiving approximately 80 percent of the vote, while Isa Gambar, the leading opposition candidate, was able to garner only 12 percent. On October 16, opposition parties, maintaining that Gambar had actually polled somewhere near 70 percent of the vote, called for massive protests against the government, and crowds gathered at the parliament building in Baku. The protests were violently crushed by police. At least two people, one a young child, were killed. Government television termed the protests and ensuing violence the work of hooligans.
Labeling the protests unconstitutional, the government began to arrest opposition party leaders and journalists. Meanwhile, the state television constantly featured images of Ilham Aliyev receiving messages of congratulations in a coronation-like atmosphere. All mention of the violent suppression of dissent disappeared from public discourse. Election monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe prepared a preliminary report asserting that the "overall election process still fell short of international standards in several respects." The American Embassy in Azerbaijan issued a statement of concern about "post-election violence and what appears to be a wave of politically motivated arrests."

During a heated discussion with the local superintendent of schools, I remarked that, like the 2000 presidential election in the United States, the disputed election was a teaching moment and could be used to encourage students to formulate their ideas on the democratic process in Azerbaijan. The superintendent retorted that seventeen-year-olds did not have opinions. Such sentiments do not bode well for the future of education or democracy in Azerbaijan.

The emphasis placed on test scores is also an indication that intellectual curiosity is not a value cherished by the educational system in Azerbaijan, where university admission is determined solely by standardized test scores. Grade point average, teacher recommendations, and student activities (athletics, the arts, and clubs are not part of the school day) do not factor into the admission process. In the classroom, subjects not included in testing are simply deemed not worth exploring. Most educators would be dismayed by the Azeri system, because they recognize that high test scores and achievement are not always synonymous. However, it should be acknowledged that in the United States legislation like the No Child Left Behind Act is moving education in this direction by increasing reliance on testing and imposing more standardized curricula.

Although they recognize that testing is the name of the game in Azeri education, teachers who have studied abroad, like Nasirova, are introducing innovative techniques in the classroom, involving the students in what American educators might term cooperative learning. Nasirova has a reputation as the teacher who sits upon her desk instead of standing and reciting in front of the class. The director of Lankaran School Number 4 has also launched a program for greater parental involvement in school governance. Yet the greatest hope for Azeri education remains the enthusiasm of young people for learning.

While the system may encourage rote learning, the students I encountered demonstrated considerable curiosity regarding life in the United States. Always courteous, they inquired of my family, school, and state. They questioned the American occupation of Iraq, expressing amazement that as an American citizen I was free to criticize the foreign policy of my nation. And all of these conversations were conducted in English. While many American children struggle with the study of language, these children know at least three languages—their native Azeri tongue, Russian, and English, which is now mandated in the schools. It was most impressive to see a sign over the blackboard in one classroom reading "An intelligent person must know at least one foreign language." It should also be pointed out that in this largely Shi'ite Muslim nation, the education of boys and girls is valued equally. However, it does appear that there is some cultural bias toward a greater
tolerance for masculine misbehavior in the classroom.

Despite the overemphasis upon testing and what many in the United States would consider primitive conditions, these children want to learn, and teachers like Sevda Nasirova are facilitating their education with innovative methods. But to fully serve the needs of Azeri children, the schools need better support from the state. Oil reserves in the Caspian Sea along the eastern boundary of Azerbaijan are estimated to have a potential worth of trillions of dollars. To foster the development of these resources, the Aliyev government has signed lucrative contracts with British and American oil companies.

The government has clearly decided that for now, its interests are best served by an alliance with the United States. It has joined President Bush's "coalition of the willing" and requires English in the schools. One can only hope that this decision signals a desire for rapid progress and will one day lead to an adequately funded public education sector with decent pay for teachers. However, in Lankaran the newest public building is not a school but rather an impressive two-story headquarters for Ilham Aliyev's New Azerbaijan party. The schools crumble while political cronyism reigns. This situation, which is repeated all too often in the United States, will not serve the needs of Azeri youth, and the United States may someday face the consequences of failing to sponsor meaningful political change in Azerbaijan. Sevda Nasirova and her students deserve better.
As Lyndon Johnson's man in Saigon in 1966, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge advanced an intriguing constitutional notion about who in the government could and could not leak information to the press. His view on leaks, which occurred as regularly then as they do today, and the action he took to stop them nicely illuminate key elements in the justification for and nature of "official" leaking.

Once the American intervention in Vietnam was in full swing in 1965-66, hundreds of reporters flocked to Saigon to report on the conflict. Many of them cozied up to possible sources—mainly American officials, civilian and military, working in the South Vietnamese capital—and courted them as best they could. Inevitably, some of the courtships produced leaks of information from officials to journalists, and the leaks became the basis of stories the journalists sent back to the United States. Understandably annoyed and often embarrassed by such unwelcome disclosures, Ambassador Lodge also worried, quite properly, that the leaks might reveal operational movements of American forces.

Accordingly, in an April 1966 meeting of the Mission Council in Saigon, the ambassador directed the heads of American agencies in South Vietnam to issue firm injunctions against such behavior to those in their charge. "U. S. Military representatives and government civilians," he admonished, "must be careful lest they be taken in by smooth press operators." At the same meeting, Lodge also clarified the principle that underscored his objection to unauthorized disclosures. "Leaks to the press," he said, "are a presidential prerogative." Only the president or his representative could constitutionally leak. If anyone else in the government leaked information, he or she "would be usurping Presidential prerogative." (1)

To his chagrin, Lodge discovered in November that the result of his April injunctions had been to put but a little finger into a huge hole. The leaks continued unabated. As a result, Lodge told his colleagues, "highest authority," meaning President Johnson, had shown increasing concern over the disclosures. A message from the president to the American embassy in Saigon specifically mentioned three such leaks, one of which reported the deployment of American forces to the Mekong Delta. Lodge, attempting to lead by example as well as by precept, then stated emphatically that he "would never leak any information to the press without the President's express approval and that no member of any [American ] Mission Agency had the right to do so" unless Lodge, as the president's representative in Saigon, first gave his approval. Those in the government simply could not pre-empt the president's right to choose what and when to leak. In his last words to his colleagues on this topic, delivered more in sorrow than in anger, Lodge concluded that "conduct of this sort showed a disregard or ignorance for
constitutional prerogatives of the Executive Branch of Government and shows a lack of restraint which is not only unfortunate but reprehensible." (2)

What is interesting about Lodge's comments is that the ambassador did not argue against the propriety or legality of leaks per se, as long as the president or his representative authorized them. As a matter of fact, Lodge worked from the premise that leaks, some perhaps of a confidential nature, played a recognized part in the policy process and that the president could leak information to the press whenever he believed it necessary to do so. This stricture, applied to the present, surely enables one to say, as our occasional friends the French do, plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.


August 2004 Newsletter

What Is New at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum?

by John Wilson

Located on the University of Texas campus in Austin, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum houses over forty-five million pages of manuscripts, an extensive audiovisual collection, and oral history interviews with more than a thousand individuals.

The Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, which form the core of the library's holdings, include the White House files of Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency (1963-1969) and papers from his service as a congressman (1937-1949), senator (1949-1961), and vice president (1961-1963). In addition, the library holds the papers of several hundred other individuals, including family, friends, and associates of Lyndon B. Johnson and members of his administration. Most of the material pertaining to foreign relations is from the presidency, and within that, the National Security File (NSF) is the largest single source. This file was the working file of President Johnson's special assistants for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostow. Documents in the file originated in the offices of Bundy and Rostow and their staffs, in the various executive departments and agencies, especially those having to do with foreign affairs and national defense, and in diplomatic and military posts around the world.

Parts of the National Security File have long been available for research, but due to ongoing processing and declassification, new material is continually making its way into the publicly available files. I would like to tell you a little about what is new and about the processes involved in making new material public.

A basic distinction we often need to explain is the difference between processing and declassification. Processing refers to all the things we do in order to make material initially available to the public. One of things we do is withdraw all the documents that cannot be opened, due to either national security classification or donor's deed of gift restrictions. All withdrawn documents are listed on a withdrawal sheet that stays in the front of the folder. In the NSF, a large majority of closures are for national security reasons. Processing often occurs at the folder level, so some folders in a box may become available years before the rest of them. Systematic declassification occurs during processing. That means we review everything and open what we can. After processing, additional declassification of individual documents occurs as researchers file mandatory review requests. In almost all cases the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not apply, since the vast majority of our holdings are donated historical materials, not federal records. Mandatory review operates under authority of the executive order governing security classification (currently E.O. 13292).
We had little authority to undertake systematic declassification prior to the late 1990s, so files processed in earlier years contain a higher percentage of security classified withdrawn material. Rather than go back and systematically review all the closed material in those files, we wait until researchers file mandatory review requests for items and review them at that time.

One interesting new addition to the traditional declassification process here at the library is the Remote Archives Capture Project. RAC was created by an interagency group in an effort to meet the declassification deadlines of Executive Order 12958, signed by President Clinton in 1995, by providing electronic copies of classified material from institutions outside the Washington, DC, area to agencies to review there. The RAC team visited the library in early 1999 and scanned about 500,000 pages of material, primarily concerning intelligence and military matters. The material is gradually being returned to the library, with mixed results. Most of the newly declassified material is in files that had not been processed before the scanning. Often the RAC review decisions on documents from processed files simply reaffirm previous review decisions without releasing anything new.

In the National Security File, the date a folder is processed is added to the finding aid, so scanning through the finding aid is the best way to see what is newly processed. You may borrow a paper copy of most finding aids by mail. The National Security File and some related personal papers finding aids are available on CD as Microsoft Word files. Some sections of the NSF finding aid are available on the LBJ Library web site, through links in the list of holdings at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/holdings/content.asp.

There is no comprehensive method of reviewing recent mandatory review actions. Because mandatory review occurs at the document level and is tracked primarily by the requestor's name, maintaining a list would take a lot of time and effort. We would rather devote that time to processing new material. However, there are options. One of our cheerful and knowledgeable archivists may be able to provide information on a particular topic, and he or she may know of some recently declassified material. If certain folders in the finding aid look particularly appealing, researchers can order copies of the withdrawal sheets. Annotations on the withdrawal sheet will give the date of any declassification actions on each document. If the document is not fully open, the withdrawal sheet provides all the information necessary to request declassification. For documents that are open, researchers can use the information to order photocopies.

While not an exhaustive listing, the following covers much of what we have processed from the National Security File in the last three years.

In the Country Files segment, several African countries that previously were completely unprocessed are now available (Mali, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia). The Files of Edward Hamilton and International Meetings and Travel File also contain new material relating to Africa. The "Crisis" section of the Middle East Country files, processed in 2000, adds more detail regarding the Six Day War, a frequent research topic. In the same area, the Jordan Country File was processed in 2001. We processed a substantial part of the Cyprus Country File in 2000, and in 2001 Belgium joined the processed list, nearly completing the European section. While some of the USSR Country File has been available for quite some time, we added a significant portion in 2001. We have added some scattered folders to the Vietnam Country File, more of it pertaining to negotiations than anything else.
The most processing in a single file occurred in the Special Head of State Correspondence File. While much of this correspondence is greetings and other protocol-type messages, there are some documents of substance as well. A larger percentage of substantial messages can be found in Head of State Correspondence File, which also has some new material.

Quite recently we processed the remaining unprocessed portions of the Intelligence File. While a large portion of the material remains classified, we count it as progress since fewer of the folders titles are now sanitized!

The Files of Spurgeon Keeny, Robert Komer, Charles Johnson, Arthur McCafferty, and Alfred Jenkins have significant additions. Arms control is a major topic in the Keeny material. The new Komer material relates to the Middle East, Africa, and counter-insurgency policy. The Charles Johnson material relates to outer space and ocean issues. The McCafferty files pertain to staffing and administration of the White House Situation Room. The Jenkins material relates primarily to China.

In the Agency File, State Department section, "President's Evening Reading" contains some new additions. This consists of State-prepared daily reports to the president with paragraph summaries of current events around the world.

While the National Security File is typically the first stop for anyone researching foreign affairs at the LBJ library, there are numerous other collections of interest. Once again, we are looking only at material made available in 2000 or later. In the Papers of Francis Bator, there is some material pertaining to NATO, non-proliferation, and "military matters." This material is a little atypical of the file overall, which deals more with monetary policy/balance of payments. In the Papers of Bromley Smith, a section on National Security Council meetings is now available. The NSC material duplicates much of what is in the NSF, NSC Meetings File, but adds some additional background and includes the handwritten notes from which the typed notes in the NSC Meetings File were made. Occasionally there are interesting differences between the two versions. A large accretion (thirty-five or so archives boxes) to the Papers of William Gibbons has given us copies of documents from originals housed at several different repositories. They are chronologically arranged, and all deal with Vietnam.

Items currently in the works are box 1 from the Papers of Morton Halperin (chronological file 1966-1967, with subjects including NATO, military assistance, reversion of Ryukyus, Vietnam), box 168 from the NSF, Vietnam Country File (State Department daily world summaries, 1967-1968), boxes 258-264, NSF, Country File (Korea/Pueblo), and NSF, Files of Robert Komer, box 13 (Chester Bowles correspondence, CENTO).

No listing of recently processed material would be complete without mentioning recordings of telephone conversations. About two-thirds of these recordings are now available, covering November 1963 through March 1966. Additional releases are forthcoming and will be announced on our website as the release dates are set. While Johnson himself is largely absent from the written record, he dominates the recordings. More information and a detailed finding aid are available on our website, www.lbjlib.utexas.edu. The site includes a few sample
tracks you can hear. A larger sample of interesting excerpts is available on a CD from the LBJ Museum Store.

Once we have finished processing the telephone recordings, we plan to begin work on the recordings of meetings held in the Cabinet Room. The earliest recorded meeting was on 2 February 1968, the last on 9 December of that year. In all, there are about 200 hours of recordings of meetings, many concerning Vietnam. Portions of recordings of three meetings concerning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia are available because they were published several years ago in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volume on Eastern Europe.

One last item worth mentioning is our oral history collection. While we are no longer recording interviews, we will continue to add new transcripts to the collection as interviewees agree to release them. You can borrow oral history transcripts by mail. We also have an ongoing project to put them on our web site as Adobe pdf files. About eighty interviews are currently available on the web, including those with George Ball, Robert McNamara, Clark Clifford, Nicholas Katzenbach, Walt Rostow, and Dean Rusk. Since 2000, seventy-nine interviews with twenty-seven people have been opened, including Arthur Krim, Cartha (Deke) DeLoach, Horace Busby, J. Willis Hurst, Jack Albright, James Adler, James Jones, John Chancellor, John Gronouski, Joseph Laitin, Lucien Conein, Marie Fehmer, Mary Margaret Valenti, Palmer Hoyt, Peter Braestrup, Robert G. (Bobby) Baker, Thomas H. Kuchel, Vicky McCammon, William Knowland, and William J. Jorden.

Should you decide to visit the library, please contact us ahead of time both for information and to set up an appointment for your orientation interview.

Contact information:
Reading Room (512) 721-0212 or 0213
Fax (512) 721-0169
E-mail Johnson.library@nara.gov
Mail: 2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas 78705
August 2004 Newsletter

www.shafr.org: A Resource and an Opportunity

By Robert S. Robinson

The official website of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) recently moved from the Ohio State University server to a commercial server, and in the process it acquired a new, streamlined URL: www.shafr.org. This new web address is intuitive and easy to remember, and SHAFR can retain it indefinitely. As the one responsible for the day-to-day maintenance of the new web-site, I see it as a resource and an opportunity for SHAFR members.

As a resource, the website is designed to make broad-ranging information easily available to the society's members and the general public. The links provided on www.shafr.org can be divided into five categories:

**General Information:** The website contains a wide variety of information related to the society. There is a frequently-updated News page that reports significant events and announcements, and a Calendar that provides notice of upcoming SHAFR meetings, events, and deadlines.

**SHAFR Governance:** A number of pages provide information on the structure of the organization itself. The Officers page gives an updated roster and brief biographies of SHAFR leaders including the President, Vice-President, and Council Members. A list of the current assignments for SHAFR's 15 standing committees is displayed under Committees. Finally, there is a link to the recently-revised version of the By-laws of the organization.

**Conferences and Prizes:** The Annual Meeting page provides information on SHAFR's annual meetings, including links to the official conference sites maintained by the host institutions of recent and forthcoming meetings. Also, the Conferences and Calls for Papers page has information on opportunities for SHAFR members to present their research. Lastly, the requirements and deadlines for SHAFR's fourteen research fellowships and prizes are found on the Prizes and Fellowships page.

**Publications:** The website includes a link to the homepage of Diplomatic History, the journal of record in the field, which is maintained by Blackwell Publishing. It also contains under Newsletter a full-text archive of the SHAFR newsletter Passport (and its predecessor) since September 2000. Finally, under the link American Foreign Relations since 1600: A Guide to the Literature is information on this benchmark publication, including instructions for ordering a copy.
**Links:** the *Links* page provides links to reviewed, external websites that are potentially important to those interested in the history of American foreign relations. There are links to academic journals that focus on international affairs, to non-governmental organizations, to area-specific research tools, and to a number of archives. And there are links to other web-sites devoted to international history topics. For example, there is a link to a site created by Nathan Citino at Colorado State University, which itself has links to books, journals, newspapers, and primary sources about the Middle East.

I have been pleased to notice that many SHAFR members and other web browsers have already uses the resources of www.shafr.org. Since the transition to its new location, the website has averaged more than 45 visits and more than 300 hits per day, and these numbers have been steadily increasing.

SHAFR members have the opportunity to enhance the SHAFR web-site in three important ways. First, members are encouraged to contribute to the *Links* page. Any member who maintains a web site with information about or links to important research tools in diplomatic history is encouraged to submit links to these pages. Adding such links to the SHAFR web-site will enhance the quality of the site, promote professional cooperation among members, and advance the Society’s goals of promoting excellence in scholarly research.

Second, SHAFR members are encouraged to submit links to their graduate programs in diplomatic and international history. The *Links* page on the SHAFR web-site includes space for links to web-sites on M.A. and Ph.D. programs in the field. Currently, however, this site is woefully under-populated. SHAFR members at universities granting graduate degrees can enhance the visibility of their own institutions and serve the needs of potential students researching their educational options by publicizing their programs through the web-site. Submitting such links could pay real dividends.

Third, SHAFR members are encouraged to help launch the so-called Syllabus Initiative. This initiative envisions posting on the web-site, behind a *Syllabus Initiative* link on the home page, a dynamic collection of syllabi for undergraduate and graduate courses in diplomatic history. When the *Syllabus Initiative* link gets up and running, SHAFR members will be able to click on a link for a course they will teach (for example U.S. Foreign Relations since 1945) and find a collection of syllabi used by their colleagues in the field. Such a valuable resource will assist new professors and instructors by providing a starting point in their course preparations. It will also allow more senior members to rethink the structure of their courses by comparing them to those of their colleagues.

Submitting links and syllabi is easy. To submit a link, simply e-mail to webmaster@shafr.org a message containing the URL and a brief description of the proposed page. These pages will be vetted for quality and professional content and posted promptly on the Links page. To submit a syllabus, e-mail it to webmaster@shafr.org or mail a paper copy to the SHAFR Business Office, The Ohio State University, Department of History, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 W. 17th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210. Submissions will be posted promptly on the Syllabi page.
The success of our efforts to enhance the SHAFR web-site in these three areas is entirely dependent on the willingness of SHAFR members to submit relevant materials. I hope that members take advantage of the opportunity to participate in creating a valuable and dynamic reference work for themselves, their students, and their colleagues. Please take a moment to consider how you can help.