



*The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations*

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## December 2005 Newsletter

### Fear and (Self-) Loathing in Lubbock, Texas, or How I Learned to Quit Worrying and Love Vietnam and Iraq

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The United States lost the Vietnam War because “the American people came to hate the war” and, hence, “they hated themselves.” One might expect such an observation from a talk-show host or new-age guru, yet those words were uttered not by television’s Dr. Phil, but by Dr. Keith Taylor of Cornell University, one of our more esteemed historians of Vietnam studies.(1) Dr. Taylor’s belief (which cannot truly be called an analysis) reflects an increasing trend in studies of the Vietnam War toward attempts at rehabilitating southern Vietnam(2) and its leaders, justifying the American war on Vietnam, and devising better excuses for the failure to defeat the Vietnamese Communists and retain a state below the seventeenth parallel.

Taylor expressed his views recently at the Vietnam War Symposium sponsored by the Vietnam Center at Texas Tech, where such ideas, which are increasingly popular in public discussions of Vietnam, have become the *de facto* party line. Separate from the professionally run archives there, the center clearly resembles a right-wing think tank, although it seeks academic legitimacy and claims to represent views on Vietnam, as its director James Reckner says, from across the political spectrum. While it is true that Reckner has given a voice to officials from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and some antiwar groups such as the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), the vast majority of voices heard at center events represent the far right to the near right. In the past decade or so, the center has featured a laundry list of hawkish military and diplomatic officials, representatives of the southern Vietnam and Laos regimes, a number of representatives from POW-MIA groups, the Swift Boat Veterans, and a host of scholars defending the war and castigating those who opposed it. At the conferences(3) I have attended, well-established and respected scholars like George Herring, Randall Woods, and David Anderson seem to have constituted the left fringe of the proceedings—probably a unique experience for all of them. Since the center was established by a number of Vietnam veterans and has included a number of influential retired officers and government officials on its board, this bias is neither surprising nor illegitimate, but representatives of the center in Lubbock have a duty to make their mission and purpose clear.

Of course, the issue is bigger than what goes on in Lubbock. Over the past few years there has been a revival of Vietnam revisionism. While the war was undeniably unpopular while it was being fought, in the 1980s candidate Ronald Reagan called it a “noble cause,” and Army Colonel Harry Summers published the best-selling *On Strategy* to defend the war and give impetus to the “stabbed in the back” thesis that has become *de rigeur* among many conservatives. Just in the past half-decade or so, scholars and researchers like Michael Lind, Lewis Sorley, Ed Miller, Mark Moyar, Ron Frankum, B. G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley, and Keith Taylor, among others, have argued that the war was indeed

a noble cause, that Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel was a viable and stable state, that the war was not fought disproportionately by the poor, that the U.S. military won in the field but was undermined at home, and that poor decisions and leadership in the United States—not the skills and appeal of the Vietnamese Communists—were the main reason for American failure. Today, with the United States facing increasingly dismal prospects in Iraq, such messages cannot be dismissed merely as poor history, for they are being used in the political arena to justify not only the war in Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s, but American foreign policy and intervention per se.

### **Refighting the Last War**

The best-known scholarship on the Vietnam conflict produced in the decade or so after the war ended, such as the work of George Herring, George McT. Kahin or Gabriel Kolko, was highly critical of the war, and most of the books on the war published since then have tended to be critical of U.S. policy on many levels. In the early 1990s, however, historians began to reappraise and apologize for John F. Kennedy's role in Vietnam, arguing that the young president was actually committed to withdrawing U.S. troops.(4) More recently, Philip Catton, Ed Miller, and others have suggested that America's hand-picked leader in southern Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, was actually a capable leader, and his ouster and death, sanctioned by the United States, was a major mistake, for he was developing a stable regime below the seventeenth parallel. Indeed, at a session chaired by Keith Taylor during the 2004 meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), Ron Frankum and Mark Moyer spoke glowingly of Diem, with only a few concerned questions from the audience of experts.(5)

In the late 1990's B.G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley, Lewis Sorley, and Michael Lind, among others, published forceful justifications of the war and revised existing interpretations of the men who led and fought it. In their view, American soldiers suffered from "stolen valor" and had their "history" and their "heroes" robbed from them by the media, politicians and activists who opposed the war. Moreover, Lind and Sorley contend that the United States actually won the war militarily but lost because weak politicians were unwilling to defend southern Vietnam against the 1973-1975 onslaught from the North. They also argue that American intervention in Vietnam was in fact essential to the containment of communism during the Cold War.(6)

Most of the recent work on Vietnam is still critical. However, it would be a mistake, perhaps a grave one, to write off the revisionist authors as a fringe element. The positions they have taken received powerful reinforcement in the public sphere during the 2004 campaign, when the Republican-funded Swift Boat Veterans for Truth successfully attacked, if not smeared, the Democratic candidate, Senator John Kerry, a Vietnam vet himself and the recipient of three Purple Hearts. Though Kerry tried to highlight his Vietnam service, traveling with a "band of brothers" who had served with him on a swift boat in the Mekong Delta and turning his nominating convention into a military parade, the Swift Boat vets charged that he had lied to receive two of his medals and claimed his 1971 antiwar testimony (which Kerry ran away from) as spokesman for the VVAW was disloyal.

Nearly thirty years after the war ended in a victory for the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in April 1975, Vietnam was once again a compelling national political issue. Kerry had hoped to use his story of Vietnam to take him to the White House, but the Swift Boat vets created an alternative version of both Kerry's service and the war. The battle over a war in Indochina that had been so painful and costly decades ago was once again joined.

## Keith Taylor's Vietnam: Emotions without Evidence(7)

Amid the power of the Swift Boat attack on Kerry, which was mounted, ironically, in defense of an administration headed by two draft-dodgers, questions about the history of Vietnam take on a new urgency and importance. If a tragic war that was so unpopular while being fought can be presented so positively and can affect a presidential campaign in a subsequent generation, then there are historical forces at work that need to be reckoned with.

Keith Taylor is not recognized as a leading scholar of the war period, but his views are well received and representative of a much larger body of scholars and public figures—from the Texas Tech people to the Swift Boat vets—who are spoiling for a fight, or a re-fight, over Vietnam. Accordingly, it is essential to look at the arguments Taylor makes and repudiate them forcefully and quickly.(8) As these new versions of Vietnam's history gain currency and are taught in high school and university classes, they may facilitate more invasions. After Iraq, perhaps the United States will take on Iran, North Korea or Venezuela.

What is immediately striking about Taylor's critique is its passion and anger. He is mad at Kennedy and Johnson for what he believes were half-hearted efforts to win in Indochina. He is upset at those without his "sense of honor" who dodged the draft, and he is disturbed by those who did not support the war, even if it was "a consequence of poor leadership." His arguments, like those of many other revisionists, are based on emotions, on what he *feels* should have happened, on sympathy, pity, or hatred for the soldiers, Vietnamese, U.S. leaders, or antiwar protestors—hence his belief that self-loathing Americans caused the United States to fail in Vietnam. But it is a huge leap to say that virtually an entire nation and a generation hated America and hated themselves. The vast majority of those who opposed the war did so for well-considered reasons, and among them were "average Americans" such as ministers, businessmen, students, military officers, and many thousands of soldiers. Many of the most radical showed their respect for our society and customs by refusing draft induction and accepting the consequences. To say that Americans hated their society and themselves is intellectually immature and an insult to those who tried to stop the war because of the way it was ripping apart Vietnam and American society.

Yet Taylor maintains that he is proud that he is "not among the self-loathing Americans who notice people in other countries looking to us for leadership and see nothing but neocolonialism and imperialism." Just where are all these people who are looking to "us" for leadership? Surveys often show that over 90 percent of people in other countries are hostile to American actions, institutions or symbols. Maybe Taylor should look at, say, southern Vietnam, where so many people were apparently so eager for U.S. leadership that they took up arms to attack those of their countrymen who collaborated with the Americans, staged a series of *coups d'etat* to oust American client regimes, and waged a brutal long-term war against U.S. forces. Taylor's opinions on Vietnam sound much like those of George Bush and others who, in the aftermath of 9/11/01, decided that the attacks in New York and Washington occurred because "they" hate "us" because "we have freedom" or because "we're so good."

The emotional underpinnings of Taylor's views surface once again when he takes up the subject of the way the war was fought. One of the bigger flaws in American planning for Vietnam, we learn, was a "lack of attention." As Taylor says, "I believe that Kennedy made bad

decisions about Vietnam because he was not paying sufficient attention and Johnson did so because it was not his priority.” Yet one of the problems for those researching Vietnam is the sheer mass of material dealing with the war, probably many millions of pages. This massive record testifies to the vast amount of attention given to Vietnam by national leaders and confirms its priority in state affairs. Yet Taylor “believes” that American leaders suffered from attention-deficit disorder, that Kennedy, who saw Vietnam as a way to reclaim credibility lost in Laos and Cuba, and Johnson, who agonized over the war daily and probably went to an early grave because of the stress it caused him, did not take Vietnam seriously enough.

Taylor also believes that the United States was trying to help the southern Vietnamese establish democracy, and he laments that the “governments opposed to a non-Communist Vietnam were able to mobilize their populations without regard to dissent.” Does he mean to say that the nations of Western Europe and Scandinavia opposed to the war were also “opposed to a non-Communist Vietnam” and did not allow political dissent within their systems? He goes on to assert that “one of the fundamental long-term aims of the United States was to develop the right to dissent” in southern Vietnam, as in other countries around the world. One cannot really mock this view, because it is too repugnant to be humorous. Are we to really believe that Castillo Armas, the Shah of Iran, Suharto, Pinochet, Middle Eastern monarchs, Israeli authorities in Palestine, the South African apartheid regime, Pol Pot and others supported by the United States were developing the right to dissent, or that the very authorities who produced McCarthyism, COINTELPRO, and Homeland Security were trying to extend democracy? One expects to encounter such opinions on right-wing talk radio or in the books of John Gaddis(9), but not in the lecture halls of Cornell.

Taylor’s tirades do not stop at Vietnam. He also emotes about 9/11 and the current war. Because we have hated ourselves ever since Vietnam, he says, we were vulnerable and the terrorists knew it. “9/11 happened because we were weak.” Now, with the war in Iraq foundering, Taylor is having a bad flashback, because he sees the so-called Vietnam Syndrome resurging: “I saw people at pointy-headed universities indulging as self-hating Americans,” and “it seemed awfully familiar.”(10) Again, emotions run into the brick wall of history. Even if a “Vietnam Syndrome” really existed (which is doubtful) or, if it did, lasted more than a few years, one cannot look at U.S. global policies for the past two and a half decades and proclaim them weak. Consider American arms sales to Iran, meddling in Afghanistan, and support for terrorism in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. From Reagan’s illegal wars in Latin America, to the Gulf War and sanctions afterwards, to the invasion of Iraq, the United States has not been reluctant to use military power in the past three decades, and military spending remains enormous. The Pentagon’s current \$441 billion annual budget exceeds the rest of the world’s spending *combined*.(11)

More significant, however, is that when Taylor asserts that the terrorists struck on 9/11 because the United States was weak, he is substituting affective concepts like weakness and evil for historical analysis. Al-Qaeda’s actions are unjustifiable, but it is perilous to ignore the motives and history behind them. To untold numbers throughout the world, the proximate causes of 9/11—American bases in Saudi Arabia, U.S. support for Israel’s repression of Palestine, and the destructive sanctions against the people of Iraq—rang true. To most people across the globe, 9/11 did not happen because the U.S. was “too weak” but for precisely the opposite reason: because it so indiscriminately used its strength and power against weaker countries. Even if Taylor is right, and “pointy-headed” professors and activists (a category which apparently excludes mild-mannered professors of Vietnamese history at Cornell) are now upset because the United States has awakened from

its weakness and is giving the world the leadership it seeks, it is folly to try to explain away the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and doubts about American policy in Iraq simply as products of self-loathing and weakness without examining the reasons for the enmity that so much of the world feels for the United States.

Even if the defense of Vietnam put forth by Taylor and the other apologists for the war is emotive and bathetic, emotions and symbols are powerful and real to believers, and therefore it is important to look critically at their arguments. Facts may be “stupid things,” as Ronald Reagan once said (in an alleged misstatement), but evidence does have more legitimacy in our epistemology than do values or desires. So what then are Taylor’s specific points along the continuum of self-loathing anti-Americanism?

He begins by claiming that there are “three axioms” in the dominant antiwar interpretation of Vietnam “subsequently taken up at most schools and universities as the basis for explaining the war.” They are, first, that there was no legitimate non-Communist government in Saigon; second, that the United States had no legitimate basis for intervention in Vietnam; and finally, that the United States could not have won the war under any circumstances. This is the “ideological debris” of the antiwar movement, not “sustainable views supported by evidence and logic.” But how did Taylor arrive at his conclusions? Were they the result of vast research in presidential libraries, poring over documents in the National Archives, long sojourns to study the holdings of military collections? No, he says. “What enabled me to do this,” to conclude that these axioms were “debris,” was “that I finally came to terms with my own experience.” So there we have it: Taylor’s long and intimate journey—from soldier, to grad student in Ann Arbor, where he “simply subscribed to the dogmas of the antiwar slogans then fashionable,” to professor at an elite university who has seen the light about America’s noble purpose in the world—is the basis for his “evidence and logic.” But let us test these axioms and Taylor’s other claims using the criteria of evidence and logic.

Taylor asserts that it is a “foundational tenet of the Communist version of national history” to say that Ho Chi Minh represented the only “legitimate or viable” government in Vietnam after 1945. He also claims that the southern government, under Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors, had established a real state. What does the evidence say?

If we are to believe George Herring, David Anderson, George Kahin, Gabriel Kolko, Dave Marr, William Duiker and many others, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, both nationalist and Communist, ultimately led the resistance to French(12) colonial rule and to Japanese occupation, politically and militarily. We know that Ho advocated inclusion, often defying his more sectarian comrades, and was willing to join forces with any individual or group opposing the French. We know that in 1945 and 1954 Ho declared Vietnam independent, quoting from the U.S. Declaration of Independence, and made overtures through the OSS and in private letters to Harry Truman appealing for American support but was ignored.

We also know that virtually every American official understood that Ho was overwhelmingly popular and would easily win any real election, as even President Dwight Eisenhower conceded.(13) The subsequent history of the war testifies to the appeal and effectiveness of the nationalist-Communist coalition. By almost any “expert” standard, the contemporary consensus about Ho’s popularity, along with the durability of his appeal, would constitute evidence of legitimacy and viability.

Taylor's argument about the viability of southern Vietnam as a state, which was the gist of the 2004 SHAFR panel mentioned above (with Philip Catton and others agreeing in print), is more troubling. Just as disturbing as the assertions that were made during that session, which the panelists essentially conceded were not backed by hard evidence, was the lack of critical commentary from the audience, which was full of scholars of the Vietnam War. Politeness has its place, but it would not have been bad form to point out that these assertions flew in the face of what we know and have no basis in fact.(14)

Lamenting the "good old days" of Ngo Dinh Diem is the first of the revisionists' tactics. Diem, they argue, was not a puppet of the United States and was on the verge of developing a real state below the seventeenth parallel. But we know that while in office he created a kleptocracy, and the Ngo family put 78 percent of the American aid it received between 1956 and 1960 into the military budget, while using no more than 2 percent on health, housing, or welfare programs, which are essential to modernization.(15) To solidify their power, Diem and his brother Nhu formed the Can Lao, or Personalist Party, made the military responsible for protecting the family regime, closed newspapers, retook land that had been redistributed to peasants, militarized the civil order, and imprisoned and executed tens of thousands of alleged dissidents.(16)

By the early 1960s Diem's repressive regime had set into motion two major lines of opposition. Clearly, his attacks had had an impact on the guerrillas, and besieged southern cadres pressured the Politburo in the north to establish the National Liberation Front (NLF). But more important, Diem had alienated so many southerners that he had also prompted a broad internal campaign against his rule that has been overlooked by the apologists. Not only did many southerners join the NLF, Diem's own military and government officials began to seek his ouster. The opposition political parties and the *coups d'etat* staged against him were organized not by the Communists, but by *his own people*. Finally, it was *his own generals* who overthrew and killed him in November 1963, with U.S. acquiescence. And in the aftermath of the coup it was generals in the ARVN, not Ho or the Viet Cong, who staged an *opera bouffe* in Saigon featuring about a dozen governments over the next fifteen months. How does this add up to stability, legitimacy or effectiveness? How does providing the Ngo family junta with billions of dollars in aid and military equipment, and tolerating Diem's repression until late 1963 constitute abandonment? How does the ouster of Diem, by *his own people*, constitute a grave turning point in a war that was inexorably headed toward failure from the first?

If the rehabilitation of Diem is the first of the revisionists' tactics, then the claim that southern Vietnam was a viable state is surely the second. James Carter has shown compellingly in his dissertation, "Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State-Making in Southeast Asia," that there never was a real state below the seventeenth parallel, one that could exist on its own without massive infusions of American military and economic aid, without Americans building both a political and physical infrastructure, creating a currency, covering up for the defects of its leaders, staging phony elections, dropping 4.6 *million tons* of bombs on an area the size of New Mexico, and so forth. Nationhood involves more than a titular head of state and an army. It requires sovereignty, a degree of consensus, development, and international legitimacy, among other criteria, and since southern Vietnam lacked the essentials, the United States had to try to invent them, with results that were really not surprising to those who were involved in decisions about Vietnam at the time.

Taylor would argue, of course, that Carter is merely one more "pointy-headed" scholar. But Senator Mike Mansfield was an expert on

Vietnam and an early Diem supporter, and in 1965 he said that the United States was “no longer dealing with anyone [in Saigon] who represents anybody in a political sense. We are simply acting to prevent a collapse of the Vietnamese military forces which we pay for and supply.” That same year Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said that there was “no tradition of a national government in Saigon. There are no roots in the country. . . . I don’t think we ought to take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to regardless of what the Saigon government does.”(17)

In early 1965, Johnson, who was apparently giving Vietnam a modicum of attention, considered committing combat troops, but General William Westmoreland was skeptical, observing that “we would be occupying an essentially hostile foreign country.” General Victor Krulak, the Marines’ Pacific Commander, expressed himself more bluntly to the undersecretary of the Navy, saying that “despite all our public assertions to the contrary, the South Vietnamese are not—and have never been—a nation.”(18) Even more striking was the observation of a young congressman from Illinois in 1966. “Twelve years have elapsed since we began contributing economic assistance and manpower to . . . Vietnam,” he said. “Yet, that nation continues to face political instability, lack a sense of nationhood, and to suffer social, religious, and regional factionalism and severe economic dislocations. Inflation continues to mount, medical care remains inadequate, land reform is virtually nonexistent, agricultural and education[al] advances are minimal, and the development of an honest, capable, and responsible civil service has hardly begun.” Thus Donald Rumsfeld laid out in some detail a strong argument against the viability of the southern state.(19)

Robert “Blowtorch Bob” Komer, pacification guru and hawk, did not pull any punches either. “Hell, with half a million men in Vietnam, we are spending twenty-one billion dollars a year, and we’re fighting the whole war with Vietnamese watching us; how can you talk about national sovereignty?” Paul Warnke, a defense department official and longtime establishment policymaker, agreed, pointing out that “the people I talked to [in Vietnam] didn’t seem to have any feeling about South Vietnam as a country. We fought the war for a separate South Vietnam, but there wasn’t any South and there never was one.”(20)

After the rehabilitation of Diem and “South” Vietnam, Taylor and his colleagues employ the last tactic of the revisionist campaign. They look at Vietnam from an American perspective and find that the United States had a legitimate basis for intervention and could have been successful had it chosen different strategies, political and military. But again, there are stupid facts in the way.

Taylor seems to argue that American intervention in Vietnam was legitimate because “nurturing baby democracies in a world awash with tyranny” is the duty of the United States. Calling the Diem regime “democratic” is a bastardization of the term, but more to the point, there are international conventions governing the rights of a nation to intervene in the affairs of another. On that score it is difficult to see any justification for the U.S. invasion of Vietnam. Even if one accepts the legitimacy and viability of the southern state, Vietnam was at best (or worst) a civil war, and with no sanction from the United Nations or any other controlling body, America’s military invasion does not meet the test for accepted intervention.(21)

Of course, the right to intervene ultimately becomes a political question. For the Kennedy and Johnson invasion of Vietnam to have been legitimate, however, it would have had to have a coherent rationale, a clear goal, and a viable strategy. Perhaps most important, there would have had to have been international recognition of the need for such action. But those criteria just do not exist in the record. The U.S. failure



to attract “many flags” to the war effort is well established.(22) Only through the carrot of military contracts and other economic compensation did the United States persuade South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to join the war. There was no international support for the intervention, nor was there any definite goal in mind other than to prevent the people of Vietnam from choosing the leaders they wanted, because those leaders were almost certainly going to be Communists.

Folded into Taylor’s argument that the war was legitimate is the belief that it was winnable. He blames the outcome of the war on “poor strategic thought and deficient political courage,” and he throws several barbs at the antiwar movement. It is not clear how Taylor measures LBJ’s deficiency in courage, but he appears to believe that LBJ decided to “persuad[e] the enemy to give up rather than [do] what was necessary to obtain victory.” He refused to mobilize the economy for war and call up reserves, and he “allow[ed] war policy to be inhibited by a misreading of the likelihood of Chinese intervention.” This is pretty standard stuff, promoted by Richard Nixon and others since the early 1980s, and scholars have dealt with it all.(23)

I suspect it would surprise the millions of Vietnamese who lost loved ones to hear that LBJ merely decided to “persuad[e]” the enemy to give up rather than take measures “necessary to obtain victory,” whatever they might have been. Indeed, the claim that Johnson’s initial forays into Vietnam were “gradual” or “limited” ignores fundamental political and physical realities. What kind of commitment should Johnson have made in those crucial months of 1964 and 1965? 500,000 soldiers? Would Congress or, more important, the public have supported such a massive commitment to such a small, peripheral country? Even during the crucial July 1965 deliberations on the war, the military’s biggest disagreement was over the activation of reservists, not troop numbers. And where would all these troops and arms and equipment have gone, had Johnson not pursued “limited war” and “graduated escalation?” As late as 1966, with nearly 400,000 U.S. troops in country, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara still described Vietnam as “primarily an agricultural country; the only major port is Saigon. The deployment of large U.S. military forces, and other friendly forces such as the Korean division, in a country of this sort requires the construction of new ports, warehouse facilities, access roads, improvements to highways leading to the interior of the country and along the coasts, troop facilities, hospitals, completely new airfields and major improvements to existing airfields, communications facilities, etc.”(24)

Obviously, we have to judge the war by what we do know. We know that most military officials were never enthused or optimistic about the war and had grave misgivings about the political and military conditions in Vietnam. We are aware of the skill and tenacity of the enemy, and his ability to strike, melt back into the population, and quickly hit again. We agree that the Vietnamese enemy had an impressive capacity to withstand huge casualties and had a sturdy reserve that could be called on to replenish losses. We know that the physical infrastructure of southern Vietnam was so underdeveloped that it could not have sustained a more rapid or massive deployment of U.S. manpower. We know that the world—including traditional U.S. allies—either did not support or openly opposed the invasion. We know that the war took a huge toll at home. Over 58,000 Americans died, and government spending on the war led to a global financial crisis. We know that the United States unleashed the greatest concentration of firepower ever used against a small country and ended by training most of its destructive power upon its putative ally, Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel. And we know that southern Vietnam never had a stable government, billions of American dollars and half a million American soldiers notwithstanding.

What don't we know? First, we don't know how the People's Republic of China would have reacted to a more aggressive war. It would have been folly to try to predict Mao Zedong's actions during the Cultural Revolution. Nor do we know how American soldiers, who were beset by drug problems and racial conflict and were often opposed to the war themselves, would have responded to more aggressive missions and higher casualty rates. We cannot say for certain how the rest of the world would have responded to an even more destructive American intervention in Indochina. And, perhaps most important, we have no idea what the fallout at home would have been to a more rapid escalation of a war that never went well and was highly unpopular and costly. Just because Keith Taylor says that the war was winnable, that Kennedy and Johnson did not pay enough attention to Vietnam, that China would have sat idly by, that a more dynamic strategy or a strategy of pacification (which is it?) would have made the difference, does not make it so.

Finally, Taylor and the other revisionists take aim at the antiwar movement, antiwar politicians, and the media. Had Americans supported the war and not been so self-loathing, U.S. troops would have been able to fight without restraint or undue political considerations, with higher morale, and they would have succeeded in Vietnam. Again, this takes agency away from the Vietnamese Communists and places the outcome of the war squarely in America's hands. It also substitutes right-wing apologia for research and evidence. As Taylor himself points out, the majority of the American people supported the war strongly up until the Tet Offensive in early 1968. In fact, the army's own study of media matters found that the press was not unduly adversarial or aggressive for the most part, that, "government and media first shared a common vision of American involvement in Vietnam" until the war turned sour and journalists became more critical.(25) Similarly, most politicians were on board at the outset, as evidenced by the overwhelming votes in favor of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. And public opposition to the war was and is not a clean-cut proposition. While millions of Americans from all walks of life opposed the war, plenty supported it as well, and many held negative views of both the war and antiwar protestors. Often, if the war seemed to be going well, more people supported it; when things seemed to be going badly, the numbers in opposition rose. The Vietnamese, not the Americans, held the initiative, militarily and politically.

But Taylor and others like Lind and Sorley persist in their analysis. Tet was a great American victory undermined at home, they contend, ignoring Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Earle Wheeler's view that "it was a very near thing" and Army Chief Harold K. Johnson's admission that "we suffered a loss, there can be no doubt about it."(26) And so it goes. The withdrawal of 1973 and defeat of 1975, they argue, was another case of political officials and the American people, in effect, surrendering while on the verge of victory. Weak politicians, confused media, and self-loathing antiwar Americans dominate this ideological discourse. The Vietnamese could have had an effective government if only Ngo Dinh Diem had not been ousted. The government of southern Vietnam was stable and legitimate. Never mind that it was so internally riven that it changed heads of states and regimes on a regular basis and had to be maintained by American money and blood. Attention-deficit suffering U.S. leaders also deserve fault for not fighting to win, although no one seems to know what that means, nor can they describe it, since it did not happen.

## **Memory and History**

"The struggle of man against power," the Czech playwright Milan Kundera wrote, "is the struggle of memory against forgetting." And so,

thirty years after the liberation or fall of Saigon, we are still struggling to determine what we should remember about Vietnam and whether it has any lessons to teach us today. If Swift Boat partisans and self-loathing explanations come to dominate the discourse over this past war, if the ideological detritus of the Texas Tech Vietnam Center gains more public and academic acceptance, then the doors are open to the increased politicization of history in support of interventions and wars, and the legacies of those who fought the war and fought against the war are stained. If the war in Vietnam can simply be explained away by labeling its opponents as “self-hating” or accusing them of “weakness,” we have lost our history and abdicated our responsibility to learn from the mistakes of the past and to help create a better world. The distance between My Lai and Abu Ghraib, as we have seen, is not as great as it might seem.

If one of Taylor’s self-hating antiwar Americans were to stand up and say “all American soldiers in Vietnam were baby-killers and war criminals,” that person would, with justification, be summarily and harshly repudiated. Yet those who support the war can make ugly blanket statements about self-hatred and anti-Americanism among those who opposed the war in Vietnam or the invasion of Iraq and pass them off as Ivy League scholarship. I will continue to rely on evidence, the archives, the work of George Herring, George Kahin, Gabriel Kolko and others. I cannot help but conclude that Vietnam was a moral and political disaster, and that it is essential that we remind everyone we can of that, if only to make sure that those who would use Vietnam for other purposes, like justifying war and interventions and human-rights abuses, do not do so without challenge.(27)

\* I would like to thank James Carter, Ginger Davis, and Bill Walker for their comments and suggestions on this article.

(1) Taylor is the author of *The Birth of Vietnam* (Berkeley, 1983, reprinted 1991), which has become one of the standard histories of Vietnam up to the tenth century in English. His field is Vietnam studies, which is distinct from Vietnam War studies and generally focuses on Vietnam’s history before the arrival of European colonialists.

(2) As I have written elsewhere and will explain below, I think it is proper to describe the area of Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel, the demarcation line established by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China, among others, at the 1954 Geneva Conference, as southern Vietnam rather than the Republic of Vietnam [RVN] or the Government of Vietnam [GVN]—as U.S. officials and, subsequently, U.S. scholars have. To call the area below the seventeenth parallel the RVN or GVN conveys a level of legitimacy that I believe does not exist. That southern Vietnam was a viable and real state is a key point in the analysis set forth by Taylor and others. Needless to say, I think otherwise, as do many other historians of Vietnam. On this point, see especially Gabriel Kolko’s *Anatomy of a War* (NY, 1985) and a dissertation recently completed under my supervision at the University of Houston by James Carter titled “Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State-Making in Southeast Asia.” Carter shows with impressive evidence that the United States did not conceive of Vietnam as an independent state but as a project, a country to be essentially invented both politically and physically—in terms of its government, infrastructure, currency, foreign affairs and other accouterments of a modern state.

(3) Information about the center and its past events can be accessed at <http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/index.htm>. Despite the appearance of some speakers critical of the war, it is hard to look at rosters of past events and not see a decided right-wing tilt.

(4) Arthur Schlesinger’s Pulitzer Prize-winning *A Thousand Days* (NY, 1965), which was published before the massive escalation that went terribly wrong, deals with Vietnam rather matter-of-factly, but in 1978, with the outcome known, he argues in *Robert Kennedy and His Times*

(NY, 1978) that JFK was preparing a withdrawal or de-escalation. See also John Newman, *JFK and Vietnam* (NY, 1992); Howard Jones, *Death of a Generation* (NY, 2003); Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life* (NY, 2003); Fred Logevall, *Choosing War* (Berkeley, 1999); David Kaiser, *American Tragedy* (Cambridge, MA, 2000); and Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars* (NY, 2002). For a thorough repudiation of these Kennedy apologists, see Noam Chomsky, *Rethinking Camelot* (Boston, 1993), and Lawrence Bassett and Stephen Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War," in Thomas Paterson, ed., *Kennedy's Quest For Victory* (NY, 1989), 223-52.

(5) Philip Catton, *Diem's Final Failure* (Lawrence, KS, 2003); Miller and Moyar papers presented at Texas Tech conferences on Vietnam; Ron Frankum and Mark Moyar papers delivered at 2004 meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, Austin, Texas. Unfortunately, the papers from that session have not been posted on the H-Diplo website at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reports/>.

(6) B. G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley, *Stolen Valor* (Dallas, 1998); Michael Lind, *The Necessary War* (NY, 1999); Lewis Sorley, *A Better War* (NY, 1999).

(7) I would like to thank my good friend William O. Walker III, now at the University of Toronto, for helping me develop my thoughts on this section. Taylor, by making an emotive argument resting on this concept of self-loathing, is engaged in what International Relations/Political Psychology scholars call attribution theory. If "we" don't like a particular group, then "they" are "disposed" to act against "our" interests, like those who opposed the war. It then becomes only a short, illogical leap of faith to identify them as self-loathing, thereby creating an adversarial "other." Those in "our" favor, the well-meaning Diem clique or American soldiers who "wanted to win the war," for example, fail but are well intended. It is the "situation" in which they find themselves that makes failure more likely. That situation is compounded by the self-loathers. The responsibility for failure never rests with America's authoritarian clients or with U. S. officials.

The "self-loathing" paradigm has contemporary resonance as the spectrum of permissible dissent over U.S. adventurism increasingly narrows—and that is why the lines of thought opened by the Texas Tech crowd and Keith Taylor are in fact quite important, despite the small numbers of their proponents thus far. The recourse to seeking charges of treason, real or metaphorical, against those who oppose Bush's foreign policy is a way of stifling dissent in the name of the new American century. Terror is too dangerous for there to be freedom at home while it is pursued via intervention abroad.

(8) The subsequent critique of Taylor will be based on his article, "How I Began to Teach About the Vietnam War," *Michigan Quarterly Review*, Fall 2004, his talk at the Texas Tech conference, "When Americans Hate Themselves: Another Way to Remember the Vietnam War," and an article about the Taylor presentation in the *Lubbock Avalanche-Journal*, 19 March 2005, pp. A1 and A8.

(9) See John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); and Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (NY, 1997). Even many establishment thinkers, such as David Kennedy and the late James Chace, have taken issue with Gaddis's work, which puts the onus of the cold war solely on the Soviet Union, apologizes for apparent American misdeeds in that era, and contends that Americans have acted out of a desire to extend liberty and freedom globally. Listen to the Gaddis-Kennedy exchange at [http://www.nytimes.com/audiopages/2004/07/25/books/20040725\\_GADDIS\\_AUDIO.html](http://www.nytimes.com/audiopages/2004/07/25/books/20040725_GADDIS_AUDIO.html). See Chace's review of Gaddis, "Empire, Anyone?" *New York Review of Books*, 7 October 2004, excerpt at [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article\\_id'17454](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id'17454).

(10) Taylor in *Lubbock Avalanche-Journal*, 19 March 2005, A8.

(11) See graph at <http://www.globalissues.org/images/USvsWorld2004Top25.gif>; *New York Times*, 14 May 2005.

(12) See, for instance the older biography of Ho by Jean Lacoutre, or the more recent and comprehensive work of William Duiker.

- (13) Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (NY, 1963), 337-38; see also Army Plans and Operations position paper, "U.S. Position with Respect to Indochina," 25 February 1950, Record Group 319, G-3 0981 Indochina, TS, in National Archives. Also in Robert Buzzanco, *Masters of War* (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 31.
- (14) Lest anyone ask "well, why didn't you speak out," I have to admit to briskly walking out of the room just moments before the entire panel ended. On more than one occasion I have spoken up—"pissed in the punch bowl," as a friend describes it—and frankly don't like the role of crank. There were many others who could have contributed and I didn't see the need to do so and begin the equivalent of an intellectual pie fight. Perhaps I was craven, but I'd probably do the same again. And in some way, this article is my penance for my silence in Austin.
- (15) David Anderson, *Trapped by Success* (NY, 2002), 133.
- (16) The following treatment of Diem is taken from my *Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life* (Malden, 1999), 56-58.
- (17) Mansfield quoted in George Kahin, *Intervention* (NY, 1986), 345. Lodge quote in *Foreign Relations of United States, Vietnam, III, 1965*, 193, and also in Carter, "Inventing Vietnam."
- (18) Westmoreland and Krulak quoted in Buzzanco, *Masters of War*, 190 and 257.
- (19) Rumsfeld in "An Investigation of the U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Vietnam," *42nd Report by the Committee on Government Operations, October 12, 1966*, 127.
- (20) Komer quoted in Lloyd Gardner, *Pay Any Price* (Chicago, 1995), 303. Warnke quoted in Christian Appy, *Patriots* (NY, 2003), 279.
- (21) See especially Telford Taylor [a prosecutor at Nuremberg], *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy* (NY, 1970), and Richard Falk, ed. *The Vietnam War and International Law*, 4 vols. (Princeton, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1976).
- (22) See Christos Frentzos's dissertation at the University of Houston, "From Seoul to Saigon: U.S.–Korean Relations and the Vietnam War."
- (23) Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (NY, 1985). See also William Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (NY, 1976); Harry Summers, *On Strategy* (Novato, CA, 1982); Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (NY, 1978); Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam* (NY, 1982).
- (24) McNamara quote is in *Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, January – February 1966*, 12.
- (25) Quote is from promotional materials for William Hammond, *Reporting Vietnam: Military and Media at War* (Lawrence, KS, 1998).
- (26) On this topic, see chapter 10, "The Myth of Tet: Military Failure and the Politics of War," in Buzzanco, *Masters of War*.
- (27) The importance of this was reinforced recently when the editors of H-Diplo, the listserve in our field, refused to allow a colleague to post a referral to my original article in *Counterpunch* because, they said, it was inappropriate to the field and presentist. How can an article about a major research center on Vietnam and the way historians look at the war not be appropriate? The editors also refused even to engage my questions about this decision. With such gatekeeping, we should all be concerned about the nature of the history we do.

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## December 2005 Newsletter

### Making History Relevant for the Intelligence Community

Colonel William J. Williams, USAF

Why should a government agency have a history office? No government agency is required by law to have one. The Federal Bureau of Investigation did not even have a historian on its staff for most of the 1990s, and only recently did it reestablish a history office. Those federal agencies that employ historians do so not to comply with laws or regulations, but because they believe that there must be some value in establishing a history program.

Of what value is a history office to a government agency? Sherman Kent, a history professor from Yale who left academia to play a major role in the early development of the Central Intelligence Agency, addressed this issue in 1952. "In my view," Kent said, "the only reason for reconstructing the history of a government agency is to further the operational efficiency of that agency. This cannot be history for history's sake. It must be history for the improvement of today's and tomorrow's operations."

I first saw this quotation during a visit to the CIA history office shortly after I became Chief of the Center for Cryptologic History at the National Security Agency. As a career intelligence officer in the Air Force, I never expected to have an opportunity to run a government history office. I did, however, have a lifelong interest in history. I had majored in the subject as an undergraduate and during a break in my military career earned a master's degree in history. After several years as an intelligence officer, I made use of my master's degree and applied for a position on the history faculty at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs. Accepted for duty at the Academy, I was later selected for a government-sponsored Ph.D. program and earned my doctorate at the University of Washington. I taught history for several more years at the Academy and then returned to the "line of the Air Force" and other intelligence assignments.

As the time approached for my final Air Force posting before retirement, the commandant at the NSA's National Cryptologic School saw my military record and noted my intelligence background as well as my doctorate in history. Having a Ph.D. in history himself, he wanted the history program at NSA to have a greater impact on the organization, and he invited me to take on the task of expanding its purview. Seeing this as a great opportunity to bring together my backgrounds in intelligence and history, I applied for the position.

My immediate challenge, after arriving at the NSA headquarters complex at Fort Meade, Maryland, was to figure out what the history office should do. To learn from those already supervising history programs in the intelligence community, I visited the historians at the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, the Army's Intelligence Security Command, and other defense-related agencies. It was the CIA program, however—and Sherman Kent's quote—that most intrigued me.

I asked the chief historian at CIA to give me an example of how his history office improved "today's and tomorrow's operations." In response, he showed me a point paper his historians had recently prepared to meet a requirement he had received from the CIA's leadership. At that time, both the CIA and the Department of Defense (DoD) were preparing to conduct operations related to the global war on terrorism. Coordination between the two organizations was obviously important, and as the CIA's senior leaders began this process they asked the history office to produce a summary that showed how the CIA and DoD had cooperated on similar operations in the past. The CIA leadership was not looking for a 200-page monograph in a year and a half, but for a 5- to 7-page executive summary in a week and a half.

I was impressed with the product. Organized into major points, it was brief and easily read, and it included appendices offering additional information. I remember thinking how well prepared the CIA would be for any discussions with the DoD, and I imagined a scenario in which DoD representatives might say, "Let's do it this way," only to have a CIA official respond, "We tried something like that in 1980, but it didn't work for these reasons. We believe this approach provides a better way to proceed."

The CIA's history office, of course, is not the only one that provides this type of historical support to its leadership. At the Pentagon, the Air Force's history office has a detachment that constantly responds to historical inquiries from the most senior levels of the Air Staff. The Army's Center of Military History (CMH) provides the same type of service. Over the past few years, for example, the CMH has produced 2- to 5-page information papers on topics such as "historical examples of [American forces] disarming insurgents," "the Army's experience with constabulary duty," and "public perceptions of U.S. efforts at adjudication of alleged crimes committed by members of the armed services against foreign nationals." One only has to think of the Army's ongoing activities in the Balkans and Mideast to see the relevance of such information to current operations.

This, in short, is the kind of historical support that can make a history program relevant and valuable to a government agency. And this is the kind of historical support the Center for Cryptologic History should provide at the NSA. One of the first things needed to achieve this goal was a clear mission statement. The CCH is fortunate to have a relatively large staff for a history office—six historians and a three-person publication shop. We did not, however, have a clearly defined mission. The staff helped develop a two-part statement that addresses what the center should be doing:

- Provide objective, meaningful historical support to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service leadership and workforce to enhance decision making, cryptologic knowledge, and esprit de corps.
- Preserve and advance an understanding of cryptologic history for the United States Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, other government agencies, academia, and the general public.

Part of the second section is admittedly "history for history's sake," but providing support to Clio at large while focusing primarily on the agency's requirements is also in the federal government's (and the nation's) interest.

One challenge at the NSA was that with one notable exception—the National Cryptologic Museum—the history program did not have a very high profile among the workforce. The museum, which is located on the site of an old motel just outside the NSA fence line, opened to the general public in December 1993 and hosts over 50,000 visitors a year. It is supported with NSA resources and personnel, and it is the most visible part of the agency's history program, yet it is not part of the history office. It falls under the Public Affairs Office in the NSA's Corporate Communications Strategy Group. The Center for Cryptologic History, meanwhile, is associated with the National Cryptologic School in the agency's Associate Directorate for Education and Training. The third part of the history program—the archives—is subordinate to the NSA's Office of Policy, which also supervises the records management program.

To help ensure that these different parts of the history program function in a coordinated and effective manner, the NSA created a high-level advisory group, the NSA Advisory Board's History, Literature and Museum Panel, to oversee all parts of the agency's history program. The panel's members include the heads of each of the three organizations that "own" a part of the history program (the National Cryptologic School, Corporate Communications, and the Office of Policy), the chiefs of staff of the agency's major operational divisions, senior executives from a variety of agency directorates, a flag-rank military officer, two senior retired officials, and two senior-executive representatives from the CIA. The panel's charter calls for it to "provide recurring assessments of the [NSA] history program" and to submit "an overall evaluation of the history program" annually to the NSA's Director, Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden. The panel is also tasked with making "recommendations for improving [the] impact and effectiveness" of the history program.

The History, Literature and Museum Panel helps give the history program visibility at the agency's highest level and also demonstrates the importance the NSA's top leadership assigns to history. But the existence of the panel and support for history from the topmost leadership are not enough to make the history program successful or relevant. The Center for Cryptologic History is now focusing on creating a culture among the workforce and through all levels of management in which there is an awareness of the agency's history and an appreciation for the value a historical perspective can provide.

A powerful way to increase the visibility of history is to take advantage of the capabilities of what has become the single most important piece of equipment on almost every employee's desk: the computer. Like other government agencies, the NSA has an internal computer network that ties together all the agency personnel working at Fort Meade, as well as those assigned to field sites away from the Baltimore/Washington, D.C., area. The first thing an NSA employee is likely to do after arriving at work is to turn on the computer and log onto "NSA Net." The webpage that comes up initially, the "NSA Daily" page, provides links to key sites, information about recent developments of interest to the work force, short illustrated articles, and a regular feature called "History Today."

Every workday, "History Today" provides a different historical vignette that relates in some way to cryptology. The popularity of this feature among NSA employees has been nothing short of astounding. Many employees report that it is the first thing they read every morning. Several very senior executives have told me that when they are out of the office for travel or vacation, they make it a point to catch up on the "History Today" articles they missed while they were away. Tag lines at the bottom of the feature suggest CCH publications or products that provide additional information on the historical story, and the center receives requests every day--sometimes dozens, sometimes even hundreds--for copies of historical publications. Employees can also send questions or comments about "History Today" to CCH, and they do, almost every day. Informal surveys rarely turn up anyone who is not familiar with this historical on-line feature.

"History Today" has been a tremendously powerful tool for increasing the visibility of cryptologic history at the NSA. It also reveals that there is a latent interest in history among a very large number of employees, and that if historical information is easy to access and presented in an interesting way, as it is on "History Today," there will be a ready audience for it.

CCH has also taken other steps to raise the visibility of the history program for the workforce. One important initiative has been to start an orientation program at the National Cryptologic Museum for every newly hired NSA employee. In the past, new employees would report to an administrative in-processing facility where parking was hard to find, and their first impression of the NSA was a blizzard of paperwork. Now the new hires' first day begins at the museum, where they are welcomed by a senior executive, given the oath of office, and then sent off for an hour-long guided tour of the museum. The message emphasized in the tour is that their cryptologic predecessors changed the history of the world. Some are skeptical about this claim at first, but when they see how brilliant cryptologists broke the ciphers and codes used by the Germans and Japanese during World War II and how the intelligence derived from these sources helped to defeat the Axis powers in campaign after campaign, they can appreciate the importance of the work they are about to begin. Critique forms from the new hires that take the museum tour are overwhelmingly enthusiastic and positive. Many, in fact, mention their desire to return to the museum later (perhaps with family and friends) to learn more about their cryptologic heritage.

Our hope is that the exposure provided by "History Today" and the museum orientation for new hires will help create a culture of historical awareness among the NSA workforce. Other initiatives designed to accomplish this goal include historical posters that are part of a "History in the Hallways" project, a cryptologic history course offered several times a year, historical articles in NSA's quarterly publication for employees and their families (*The Key*), and a user-friendly historical website on the internal network. These initiatives help us move towards accomplishing two goals in our mission statement: enhancing cryptologic knowledge and esprit de corps. But it is also the history program's mission to enhance decision making, and this requires getting the NSA's leaders at all levels to appreciate the value of having a historical perspective.



One way to do that is to introduce a history component into leadership training at the NSA. A historical approach to teaching leadership is common in professional military education programs at non-commissioned officer academies, command and staff schools, and the war colleges. At the Air Force Academy, both the Behavioral Science Department and the History Department offer courses designed to help cadets hone their leadership abilities, the former by focusing on behavioral research and models, the latter by studying how (and why) historical leaders succeeded and failed. Career military personnel, in both the officer and enlisted ranks, have long believed that it is worthwhile to study great military leaders of the past such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal and Caesar; or George Washington, Napoleon, and Lord Nelson; or George Marshall, Douglas MacArthur and Dwight Eisenhower. Learning why such leaders were sometimes victorious in combat, and why sometimes they were not, is a central aspect of professional military education.

At the National Security Agency, most leadership training at the National Cryptologic School's Center for Leadership focuses on the behavioral science approach. What behavioral skills does a leader need? What types of exercises and discussions can help students learn those behaviors and put them into practice? This kind of training can lead to powerful learning experiences, and feedback from those going through the NSA's leadership courses has been positive. But there is also a growing recognition that history can provide a useful complement to this type of leadership training.

NSA supervisors being groomed for eventual promotion into the senior executive ranks participate in what is called the "Senior Leadership Candidate Development Program." History is now becoming a part of the curriculum for these leaders of the future. For example, they recently participated in a day-long history session that included a couple of short presentations on cryptologic successes and failures during World War II, a case study on Pearl Harbor that enabled them to see problems with the way intelligence was disseminated prior to the attack, and a classified case study that put them into the position of historical NSA leaders who had to deal with a serious problem in intelligence reporting. Those participating found these historical cases fascinating learning experiences, and their feedback on the critique forms was extraordinarily positive. Similar case studies are now being used in the orientation program for NSA's newly elevated senior executives.

Plans are also underway to take the senior leadership candidates on what the Army calls a "staff ride" to the Antietam battlefield. There they will learn how intelligence—both very good and very bad—played a central role in shaping the way General McClellan maneuvered the Army of the Potomac. And by understanding how McClellan interacted with his intelligence leaders (Pinkerton detectives hired by the Union forces), the NSA's future leaders will gain some valuable insights into issues that still challenge intelligence professionals and commanders today.

Working with the NSA's Center for Leadership to introduce history into such programs helps the Center for Cryptologic History create a historical awareness among selected members of the agency's current and future leadership. Our intent is to have these leaders find their engagement with history to be worthwhile so that they recognize the value of having a historical perspective as they make decisions that will shape today's and tomorrow's cryptologic operations. As more leadership candidates go through these programs, it is our hope that our ability to create a culture in the agency's top levels that values history and uses it to help accomplish the agency's mission will increase.

Our ultimate goal is to have NSA leaders turn to us for historical support as they plan and conduct operations. History offices at CIA, the Army, and the Air Force (and, I am sure, other agencies) have been generally successful at accomplishing this. At NSA we still have much to do to get to this level of providing historical support to decision-makers, but establishing a culture of history is not an overnight process. The steps we have taken, however, have been positively received, and we are encouraged by the progress we have made.

There is more, of course, to the NSA history program than what has been discussed here. We have prepared illustrated lectures for courses at the National Cryptologic School, given guest lectures at war colleges, supported the creation of museum displays, helped prepare training videos with historical themes, put together history webpages for NSA's unclassified website ([www.nsa.gov](http://www.nsa.gov)), provided a representative to the

Interagency Working Group on Nazi and Japanese War Crimes, helped NSA organizations learn how to document a crisis, conducted hundreds of oral history interviews, and sponsored a biennial cryptologic history symposium open to the general public (the next one is scheduled for October 2005). We have also published numerous pamphlets, brochures and monographs on cryptologic history at both the classified and unclassified levels.

Does the NSA get a return on its investment in its history program? Unfortunately, there are no easily available statistics to point to. The worth of a history program cannot be measured like win-loss records or batting averages in baseball. The true measure of success will be how effectively the National Security Agency accomplishes its mission and whether the experience of the past helps the agency conduct its operations. The Center for Cryptologic History is taking steps to make the history program more visible and relevant at the NSA, but much remains to be done. What is encouraging is that no one has told us to stop (or significantly cut back) what we are doing, and we are often asked to provide additional historical products and services. That trend suggests we are going in the right direction.

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# December 2005 Newsletter

## Learning to Bow and Recycle

Tom Zeiler

Within twelve hours of arriving in Tokyo, Japan, I got my first taste of a different culture. It was typical of the experiences that lie at the soul of the Fulbright program.

Up early our first morning, I looked out the window of our second-story apartment to see a garbage truck approaching. We had accumulated some cans, bottles, and magazines during the trip over, and so, doing the sensible thing, I put them in a bag and simply dropped it from the window on a waiting pile of trash in the street below. OK, so I'm a heathen (and the Fulbright staff rightly admonished me), but the learning curve shot up when the sacred rite of Tokyo garbage recycling soon became apparent. A few days later, when I walked out the trash, some neighbors joined me at the curb for instruction on the intricacies of recycling. Combustibles are not to be mixed with noncombustibles; big plastic bottles are put in separate bins from small ones; and never combine cans with glass bottles. Never, ever throw a bag from a window.

Whenever I took out the trash over the next year, two or three women from the block would miraculously appear to assist me; if I were a stranger before, now I was an infamous, though redeemable, interloper on harmony and correct process, which the Japanese hold so dear. This was my first lesson in Fulbright-style "mutual understanding," and my education never ceased.

The lesson my family and I will remember best is that perspective is important. First off, we learned more about the United States and ourselves, gaining a view of America that comes from living abroad. Sure, we missed the Red Sox triumph (though luckily I was able to watch it in the offices of Major League Baseball Japan), and we seemed remote from the presidential election, but it was stimulating to place events at home within an Asian context.

Second, the more we grasped at customs and behavior, the more questions we had about Japan. Yet everyone was so accommodating to us, even the watchdog recyclers, that groping toward discovery was enlightening in itself. Above all, we seized the chance to make the most of a very different culture. My wife, for example, took Japanese language lessons, calligraphy, flower arrangement, and pottery, while also working out under the gaze of Arnold at a Gold's Gym. I dabbled in longbow archery, although I realized my personality lacks the

appropriate Zen qualities. Still, it was just pure fun to do these things, and they enabled us to meet new people outside and inside of the workplace.

Fulbright fellowships come in varying forms, depending on what is offered in the country of choice. Japan offers half-year or full-year (eleven months) teaching-only grants (for those of us who have no language skills and/or knowledge of the country), research support (you must be able to conduct your work in Japanese, which can be facilitated by partnering with a native academic), or a combination of the two.

As a lecturer, I split my four-course-per-semester load (a graduate seminar, an undergraduate seminar, and two lecture courses) between two universities, teaching ninety-minute classes in each course once a week. I had the freedom to teach whatever subject I wished, although the challenge of teaching in English to students who listened politely but clearly did not understand much of what I said necessitated strategizing about lectures. My students were generally more competent at reading than understanding the spoken word, and certainly speaking was their weak point. This has to do with their English training as well as their customary deferential behavior in class. The language barrier required adaptation on my part. I had students write down answers to questions so they could read them in class, and I taught them how to conduct a debate but allowed it to take place in both English and Japanese phases.

Still, I think undergraduates are undergraduates wherever they are in the world. These students might have slept a bit more in class (apparently, Tokyo residents get fewer hours of sleep at night than anyone else on earth), but they greeted me charmingly in unison when I entered the room and expressed a sense of wonderment when my wife and I invited a group of fifty from both universities to our apartment for a party. They had never visited a professor's house, and they were thrilled by such relaxed American attitudes. It was great for us, too, for they adopted our children, and each one brought food or drinks, even after I told them not to bring a thing. Yet on the whole, the Japanese students were very much like American students. They smiled and chattered before class, loved to socialize with professors and each other at drinking parties, tried every trick (all disappointingly familiar to me) to avoid working or taking exams, and dressed in styles that made me kick myself for throwing away my bell-bottom jeans years ago. Many of the guys wore ski caps, which has always struck me as odd. But I'm getting older.

Being in Japan during the sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War II, as controversy about Japan's role in the conflict erupted in Asia, provided us with excellent classroom opportunities to discuss history's relevance. I learned the depth of Japanese pacifism when we discussed the atomic bombings, and I discovered the extent of the appreciation the Japanese have for American policies after World War II and their widespread disgust with American policies today. Thus, as in any good teaching experience, we all learned, students and professor.

Beyond teaching, the Fulbright program provides a world of opportunities. Paying for a year in Tokyo was an initial worry, but the program gave us a healthy housing allowance, a stipend that more than accounted for the prohibitive costs of the city, full school tuition for both children, and an extra family allowance. Conference travel and teaching support money were available, if needed. We thus lived very comfortably and were able to travel extensively. We visited much of Japan by taking two ski trips, traveling to an island three hours south of

Tokyo, and spending numerous weekends away with new friends (both Japanese and foreign) and even some University of Colorado alumni. We also went to Guam, and from Guam I took off with three planeloads of veterans and their families to spend a day on Iwo Jima (a moving experience that commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of that horrendous battle). We also spent two weeks over Christmas in Vietnam and two more in April in China.

In addition, because I teach a course on American history and baseball, and because the Japanese are baseball-crazy, the public affairs section of the American Embassy in Japan sent me to the five consulates around the country to speak on U.S. — Japanese relations and Seattle Mariners outfielder Ichiro Suzuki. That experience introduced me to a variety of people — journalists, fans, sports executives, and television reporters — I would not have otherwise encountered on campus. There were educational advantages, too. Because I had contacts with the embassy and with Major League Baseball's Japan office, I hosted former Mets manager Bobby Valentine, now captain of a Japanese team, in one of my classes. As one of America's major celebrities in Japan, he created quite a stir.

But what about family life? Specifically, how did the kids manage with all these new experiences? Just fine. Our children, a boy of eleven and a girl age seven, made friends with many Japanese and other students at their English-speaking international school, learned Japanese, and certainly discovered the meaning of living in a huge metropolis as they suffered through a one-hour commute, each way, on two trains and a bus. They did this alone, for Tokyo is very safe, although their two grandmothers are still scolding me for maltreatment of their grandchildren. Their daily trip included a train change in Shinjuku station, reportedly the busiest station in the world, with three million people going through it every day. Only once did they get separated. They remembered the emergency plan, however: get off at the next stop and wait until your sibling arrives on the following train. My seven year old daughter jumped on a train one morning and the doors closed before her brother could enter. She got off, crying, in Ikebukuro, a station with a scant two million daily visitors, and nobody came up to help (unfortunately, many Japanese whose English is poor are afraid to make a situation worse by intervening, even when they see a child in distress), but her big brother rescued her a few minutes later when his train arrived. I have yet to tell their grandmothers about this event out of a fear of being banished from the family. Still, the kids were no worry, and even essential at times, for like dogs in a park, they attracted attention from the kid-crazy, cute-obsessed Japanese, and prompted conversation.

A willingness to adjust is the key to a wonderful time overseas. We knew as little about Argentina, our first Fulbright experience, as we did about Japan, but it did not matter. The Fulbright program is perfect for the blissfully ignorant! In Japan we soon became expert at enjoying an *onsen* (hot springs), bowing and saying "excuse me" in almost every sentence, and making our way around the most efficient urban transportation system in the world. We had wonderful food (including great Italian and French food and some things that are better left to fraternity houses, such as cod sperm sac), spent a lot of money, saw amazing things, and participated in community events. For instance, I was recruited one day to carry an extremely heavy portable shrine, called a *mikoshi*, into our local Shinto temple; because I was taller than everyone else I had to carry most of the weight. The best thing was that there was always somebody around to help us adjust and learn.

Fulbrights are for scholars and students of all post-secondary school ages. For information on getting started on the application process, check

out the Fulbright website at <http://exchanges.state.gov/education/fulbright/commiss.htm>. And remember to separate those newspaper inserts from the main sections when you take out the trash.

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## December 2005 Newsletter

### The View from Ottawa: Researching U.S. Foreign Policy in Canada

Greg Donaghy

While Canadian records are an obvious and necessary source for American historians working on bilateral relations with Canada, I am often surprised by the dismissive reaction of many scholars of U.S. foreign policy to the suggestion that a visit to Ottawa might add considerably to their research. Few countries in the world have such similar political, cultural, and economic values as Canada and the United States. This convergence has made them especially close allies for much of the period since 1945. In the decade after World War II Canada's relative economic and military strength made it a useful American ally in NATO, where it was one of the three founding nations, and at the United Nations, where its accomplished foreign minister, Lester B. Pearson, was often helpful in American efforts to mobilize the world body behind the West. Canada was the fourth largest Western contributor to the conflict in Korea, was active at the 1954 Geneva Conference, and enjoyed a unique perspective on the wars in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia by virtue of its membership in various international supervisory commissions, which lasted until the spring of 1973.

While Canadian power faded during the 1960s as Europe and Asia recovered fully from the war, Canada remained an active internationalist and a willing, if sometimes difficult, U.S. partner. A committed peacekeeper, Canada was involved in almost every international peacekeeping operation between the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Canadian troops were kept particularly busy minding Western interests in the Middle East and Cyprus from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s. Successive Canadian governments pursued a strong free-trade policy and actively cooperated with Washington to promote a liberal international trade order through multilateral instruments like the GATT/WTO, the OEEC/OECD, and the World Bank. This shared outlook on the world economy accounts in part for President Gerald Ford's decision to sponsor Canada's membership in the G-7 in 1975.

From the American perspective, Canada's contribution to the U.S. effort to create a liberal world order has been important on occasion but rarely decisive. Usually, Washington could afford to proceed as it wished, without paying too much attention to its much less populous northern neighbour. This has never been true for Canada, whose economic or political fortunes have often been profoundly affected—sometimes inadvertently—by American decisions. Consequently, Canadian policymakers have made it a priority to know what their

American colleagues were thinking and doing the world over. Canadian politicians, diplomats and soldiers, as well as trade and treasury officials, have cultivated close, productive relations with their American counterparts, sometimes attending the same graduate schools and frequenting the same vacation retreats in northern Canada or Florida. Comparing notes and trading information, Canadians worked hard at developing an appreciation of the divisions among American policymakers, of the distribution of power in Washington, and of the likely course of American policy. The Library and Archives of Canada (LAC) in Ottawa contains many of their observations and conclusions and represents an extraordinarily rich source of documentary information on the evolution and implementation of American foreign policy.

Researchers interested in examining Canadian records should begin at the LAC's webpage, <http://www.collectionscanada.ca/index-e.html> , where an online finding aid, dubbed ArchiviaNet, can help scholars both identify and order the government and private records that they need. Those interested in international affairs should focus first on the departments of External Affairs (Record Group 25), Trade and Commerce (RG 20), Finance (RG 19), and National Defence (RG 24). The records of the cabinet and the Privy Council Office (RG 2), which oversees policymaking within the bureaucracy and provides nonpartisan advice directly to the prime minister, are also vital. With the exception of Privy Council Office (PCO) records, material from each of these departments through to the 1980s has been shipped to the LAC, though not all material has been entered into the online finding aid. This is especially true of the LAC's more recent accessions. The PCO declassifies cabinet documents and minutes under a thirty-year rule, with the latter available online at the LAC website. It has also retained its central registry files for the period after 1959. Researchers who do not find what they are looking for should contact the responsible archivist. Names and contact information will be provided if researchers request this information through the Reference Inquiry Form found at: <http://www.collectionscanada.ca/contact/index-e.html> .

Having identified the relevant records, researchers should be careful to order them by file rather than box or volume number as this will hasten declassification, an often slow and confusing challenge at the LAC. Not all material transferred to the archives is declassified by the originating department, which leaves it to LAC staff to review and release material in response to individual requests. This process proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Canada's access to information and privacy legislation, modeled on similar U.S. laws, and may include lengthy consultations with the originating department and other governments, depending on the nature of the files under review. Rising demand over the past few years has placed a severe burden on the LAC, which, despite recent efforts to address this problem, still has a declassification backlog of almost eighteen months.

Researchers should not get too discouraged, however, on learning that a requested file is "closed" and must be processed through the LAC's infamous "Access to Information Unit." "Closed" can actually mean several different things. As the open/closed description is normally applied at the box or volume level and not to individual files, access officers may find that a requested file is actually open, transfer it to an interim box, and make it quickly available. "Closed" may also refer to a file that has been reviewed and partly declassified since closed material is normally stored with its original file. In this case too, a review officer would remove the closed portion of the file, place the remainder in an interim box, and make it available, normally within a few weeks. Unfortunately, however, "closed" sometimes means precisely that, and the long wait times involved in clearing material can make it very difficult for historians working on more recent or



specialised topics. Needless to say, it can be very useful to consult regularly with access staff on the status of requests. Researchers may even wish to point out similar records from other collections that are available elsewhere.

The personal papers of Canadian politicians and officials are not subject to the access and privacy legislation, although LAC archivists normally apply the spirit of the legislation to government documents within private collections. While collections from policymakers active in the 1950s and the 1960s are largely open, more recent collections remain closed, requiring researchers to seek access from donors or their literary heirs. Nevertheless, the rules governing personal collections often remain a little more flexible than the regime in place for official papers, and with the help of a supportive donor and a friendly archivist, researchers can find their way into a surprising number of collections.

Although working conditions and service at the Library and Archives of Canada have declined over the last decade or so, it remains a congenial place to conduct research. The bright and airy reading room, with its panoramic views over the Ottawa River, remains one of the best working spaces for researchers in the world. Open from 7 A.M. to 11 P.M. seven days a week, the LAC's reading room is also one of the most accessible. Unfortunately, as most of its material is now stored off-site, retrieval times are often long, with material ordered after 10:30 A.M. usually unavailable until the following morning. A decision to move much of the LAC staff to a new suburban facility means that archivists too will soon be off-site, with obvious consequences for researchers needing assistance. Photocopying is permitted but is neither cheap nor fast. Regular orders, which can take as long as eight weeks to process, cost 40 cents Cdn/page, while overnight rush orders can be had for 80 cents Cdn/page. In contrast with most major archives, the LAC is still wrestling with the question of digital cameras, which remain banned.

There are other sources for good material on international affairs in Ottawa. Several government departments, including the PCO, Foreign Affairs, and Environment Canada, offer informal access programs through which senior graduate students and academics are sometimes allowed to consult closed material on a background basis. Although normally restricted to Canadian citizens, these programs have occasionally been able to help American scholars gain limited access to restricted Canadian records on a number of subjects, including the trafficking of illegal drugs, North American environmental regulation, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) at the Department of National Defence operates a small but excellent military archive, which contains a good deal of material on continental defence as well as on NATO and Canadian peacekeeping operations. Happily, DHH has its own declassification authority, which means that records can often be made available expeditiously. DHH maintains a website at:

[http://www.dnd.ca/hr/dhh/engraph/home\\_e.asp](http://www.dnd.ca/hr/dhh/engraph/home_e.asp) . The Bank of Canada, the country's central monetary agency, also maintains a very good archive, with considerable material on international financial issues. More information on the Bank's archives can be found at [www.bankofcanada.ca/archives/english](http://www.bankofcanada.ca/archives/english) .

Finally, researchers who cannot get to Ottawa might be interested to learn of the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER)*, published by the Historical Section of Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC). Inspired by *FRUS*, the Canadian series is designed to give scholars a

comprehensive record of the government's major foreign policy decisions and their underlying rationale. The first six volumes, which stretch from 1909 to 1939, trace Canada's effort to become an autonomous dominion within the British Empire. Volumes 7 through 11 document Canadian diplomacy during World War II, while subsequent volumes, which now cover the period until the late 1950s, follow Canada's diplomatic fortunes in the Cold War, which provides them with a thematic unity. Widely available in libraries in the United States and Europe, recent volumes are also posted online at [www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/departement/history](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/departement/history) . A limited number of printed volumes for the post-1945 period may be purchased through Government of Canada Publications at <http://publications.gc.ca/control/publicHomePage?lang=English> .

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## December 2005 Newsletter

### What We Teach and How We Teach It: Indications and Opportunities from the SHAFR Survey of Teaching

Richard Hume Werking and Dustin Walcher

When confronting the SHAFR Survey of Teaching several months ago, some of our colleagues may have been reminded of Samuel Johnson's famous assessment of John Milton's *Paradise Lost*: "None ever wished it longer than it is." If so, the connection is understandable. The survey contained 106 questions, not counting those in the supplement, and some of them were open-ended. Nevertheless, some 150 hardy souls responded and completed many of the questions, furnishing data on more than three hundred courses dealing with the history of American foreign relations.

SHAFR's Teaching Committee conducted the survey from April to June of this year, with indispensable support from the SHAFR business office. As noted in the introductory letter from Teaching Committee chair Mark Gilderhus, the purpose of the survey was to ascertain *what* courses were being taught and *how* they were being taught. Members were encouraged to respond to the survey via the SHAFR website, while a paper version was published in *Passport*. Six respondents chose to use the paper version, and their responses were entered into the online database by the graduate assistant.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the survey's response rate. Although SHAFR has about 1,500 members, a large number of these individuals do not teach, according to SHAFR executive director Peter Hahn, and hence would not have been in a position to respond. Moreover, since SHAFR does not maintain data on its members showing occupation, longevity of teaching experience, highest degree earned, etc., it is far from certain how representative the respondents are of the whole SHAFR membership or even that portion of the membership that teaches undergraduates.

This article provides a summary of some of the survey results. We encourage you to view for yourself the responses available on the SHAFR website at [www.shafr.org](http://www.shafr.org). Along with a copy of the questionnaire, numbers and percentages are posted for the responses to the questions for which respondents were asked to select a single answer (e.g., "type of college/university where you teach"), and there are lists of answers to the more open-ended questions (e.g., descriptive titles of courses offered). A follow-up article analyzing correlations among some of the

variables and responses may appear in a future issue of *Passport*.

## **Part I**

*The web survey was divided into three parts to enable respondents to answer one part at a single sitting and take up other parts later. Part I of the web version comprised questions 1-69. Part II continued the main body of the survey and had its own numbering sequence, 1-37. Part III, the survey supplement, was designed to gather for additional courses the same information sought in portions of Parts I and II.*

### **Section I. Faculty and Institution Information**

*Numbers on the left below are the question numbers used in the web version of the survey; answers are not provided here for every question.*

**3. Member of SHAFR?** Yes: 99%. No: 1%. (N=151)

**4. Year that you began teaching at the college level?** The answers in the aggregate were surprising: the median year (with half the respondents beginning teaching before, half after) was calculated to be 1993. Three-quarters of the respondents began their teaching career in 1981 or later, one-quarter in 1999 or later. The earliest year given was 1962, the most recent 2005 (four such respondents). (N=153)

**5. Highest degree?** Ph.D.: 90%. Master's: 9%. Baccalaureate ("B.A. Honours"): 1% (a single respondent). (N=154)

**7. Full-time/Part-time?** Full-time: 87.5%. Part-time: 12.5%. (N=152)

**8. Male/Female?** Male: 82%. Female: 18%. (N=150)

**9. Type of college/university where you teach?** (N=154)

Doctoral/research: 46%

Masters: 24%

Baccalaureate: 20%

Community College: 5%

Other: 5%

#### 10. Length of school's term? (N=151)

Semester: 85%

Quarter: 11%

Other: 4%

### Section II. Basic Course Information

*In this section, respondents were asked to answer six questions about each of their undergraduate courses that deal to a significant degree with the history of U.S. foreign relations. The main body of the questionnaire was designed to collect information for three courses, and the supplement had space for three more. Hence the frequent appearance of three question numbers on the left in this section.*

*These numbers track the pertinent questions in the main part of the survey; where applicable, the few answers from the supplement (which drew seven respondents) have been folded in. In the sections below (questions #12 through #64 and in Part II, #2 through #23), the answers to a particular question have almost always been combined for all courses. With about 150 respondents and a total of 323 courses identified, the "typical" respondent thus provided information on two courses.*

*In a couple of instances, the process of rounding resulted in percentages that do not total exactly 100%.*

12., 18., & 24. **Descriptive course title?** Some 207 of the 323 responses fell

into one of five categories, as follows:

a. Twentieth-century U.S. Foreign Relations: 64 (with chronological coverage

usually beginning with the 1890s, or 1900, or the 1910s)

b. 1945 to present: 45

c. Vietnam: 44

d. U.S. Foreign Relations, beginnings to present: 27

e. U.S. Foreign Relations, beginnings to 1914 or 1920 or 1900: 26

13., 19., 25. **Distance education?** No: 97%. Yes: 3%. (N=313)

14., 20., 26. **Typical class size?** (N=309)

a. fewer than 18 students: 18%

b. 18-30 students: 36%

c. 31-50 students: 29%

d. 51-80 students: 6%

e. more than 80 students: 11%

15., 21., 27. **With teaching assistants?** No: 81%. Yes: 19%. (N=313)

(Hence 54% of these classes had 30 students or fewer. While 17% had more than 50 students, 19% had teaching assistants.)

16., 22., 28. **Typical enrollment by major?** Mix of History and other majors: 87%.

History majors only: 7%. No History majors: 6%. (N=310)

17., 23., 29. **Typical enrollment by level of student?** (N=314)

Chiefly juniors or seniors: 70%

Chiefly sophomores or juniors: 13%

Chiefly freshmen or sophomores: 7%

Other: 10%

### **Section III. How Courses Are Taught**

#### **A. Required Materials**

31., 32., 33. **Principal textbook?** Responses numbered 305. Of these, 253 indicated use of a textbook. The two most commonly used texts were Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History* (with 50 references) and Walter Lafeber, *The American Age* (with 28). The full list is available on the website.

34., 35. 36. **Other principal readings that are especially important or interesting?** Of the 273 responses, only 9 indicated that no additional reading was used. For details, see the website.

37., 38., 39. **Principal viewing/listening?** Of the 199 responses, 37 indicated that they did not use such materials. Again, see the website for details.

40. **In addition, any especially effective primary sources?** There were seventy responses, with most of them listing one or more documents; eighteen responses noted the use of various online collections. Most frequently cited was the time-honored *Foreign Relations of the United States*, including its online version, with 19 mentions.

One particularly interesting example offered by a respondent: "NY Times front page article from Dec. 1943 that discussed plan of sending interned Japanese-Americans to the midwest to teach farmers to bathe and be clean is always a hit."

#### **B. How Courses are Taught: Types of Assignments**

41., 49., 57. **Research papers (i.e., students going beyond specified readings)?**

(N=255)

10 or more pages each, including primary sources: 49%

Fewer than 10 pages each, including primary sources: 26%

10 or more pages each, secondary sources only: 15%

Fewer than 10 pages each, secondary sources only: 11%

(Hence at least 255 of the 323 identified courses (79%) required research in materials beyond those specified by the professor; of these, three-quarters required research in primary sources.)

42., 50., 58. **Book reviews?** No: 53%. Yes: 47%. (N=298)

43., 51., 59. **Article reviews?** No: 76%. Yes: 24%. (N=291)

44., 52., 60. **Other writing assignments from *specified* readings?** (N=227)

Fewer than 5 pages each: 67%

5-10 pages each: 25%

More than 10 pages each: 9%

45., 53., 61. **Require use of electronic resources?** No: 65%. Yes: 35%. (N=308)

46., 54., 62. **Require examination of specialized websites?**

No: 77%. Yes: 23%. (N=304)

47., 55., 63. **In-class student presentations?** No: 54%. Yes: 46%. (N=308)



48., 56., 64. **Group projects?** No: 78%. Yes: 22%. (N=307)

65, 66. **Do you use 'how-to' books for any classes? If so, which one(s)?**

No: 71%. Yes, recommended: 20%. Yes, required: 9%. (N=148)

Forty-one responses provided specific examples. The most frequently referenced works were William Strunk, Jr. & E. B. White, *The Elements of Style* (16 respondents); Richard Marius, *A Short Guide to Writing About History* (7); Jules Benjamin, *A Student's Guide to History* (6); and Kate Turabian, *A Manual for Writers* (6).

67, 68. **Do you use course-management software for any classes? If yes, for what purposes?** No: 54%. Yes:

46%. (N=149)

The most common uses were to post syllabi (94% of respondents did so), to post assignments (91%), and to send students email (75%). Other possibilities were chosen or offered by fewer than half the users.

## **Part II.**

### **Section III C. How Courses are Taught: Use of In-Class Time**

*Respondents were asked to provide the percentage of time spent in class on six activities for each course they identified above. Naturally, such percentages varied according to the size and type of class taught.*

*Below are the percentages for each activity, across all course types and course sizes. The answers for each question were copied onto a spreadsheet and sorted in order to determine the median and quartile values (the values between the median and one end of the range). The last figure in the long row is the number of "zero" answers that respondents gave for the activity.*

*For example, for "professor's lecture" half the responses provided 50% or a lower figure, while half gave 50% or a higher figure; the percentages ranged from 0-95% (with no one claiming to lecture for 100% of the time); one-quarter of the responses were at 37.5% or below, three-quarters at 70% or below; and 17 of the 286 usable responses reported that zero time was spent on this activity.*

*These and other data may be analyzed more thoroughly in a future article. For instance, one would generally expect more lecturing in*

*classes with larger enrollments, less in smaller classes. But our analysis in this article does not distinguish between what is done in or with classes of different types and sizes.*

*Questions 2-23 in Part II were devoted to this section of the questionnaire.*

**Professor's lecture:** M=50%. Range: 0-95%. Q1: 37.5%. Q3: 70%. # of "0": 17.

(N=286)

**Class discussion:** M=25%. Range: 0-96%. Q1: 15%. Q3: 33%. # of "0": 1.

(N=275)

**Small group activities:** M=5%. Range: 0-38%. Q1: 0%. Q3: 10%. # of "0": 77.

(N=178)

**Student presentations:** M=5%. Range: 0-60%. Q1: 0%. Q3: 10%. # of "0": 76.

(N=193)

### **Viewing or listening to**

**audiovisuals:** M=10%. Range: 0-33%. Q1: 5%. Q3: 15%. # of "0": 35.

(N=212)

**Testing or other evaluation:** M=5%. Range: 0-25%. Q1: 3%. Q3: 3%. # of "0": 42.

(N=235)

Two of the replies to the **Comments/Clarifications?** question in this section **were as follows:**

"I tend not to use videotapes, but provide visuals through PowerPoint that spark discussion. I have found that student presentations vary so significantly in quality that they can waste time. When I do arrive in lecture at a topic I know a student is writing about, I ask them to lead the discussion (briefly), if I feel they are capable."

"Students have to do research for a character within one of seven groups (press, US military, US government, Peace protesters, South Vietnamese, NLF, North Vietnamese) and then they are responsible for an end of the semester press conference set in December 1969. Notes (with citations) and bibliography are due as well."

### **III. D. How Courses Are Taught: General**

*In this section, respondents were asked to respond to a series of open-ended questions. The results may be viewed on the SHAFR website. The questions and a few of the answers are reproduced below.*

#### **24. What topics, themes, or interpretive frameworks most interest your students currently? (e.g., World War II, gender, NGOs, personalities of leaders, military, economics?)**

(N=130)

"US military intervention/foreign policy, globalization, human rights."

"Students are most interested in anything that can be related to the present. They also like the novels and technological-moral issues, and a certain segment are always into the wars, especially World War II, Vietnam, and the Civil War."

"Students enjoyed Cold War themes (reflecting my own interests) in the foreign policy class; overall, students really get into political history and even military history, though I cover less of that in my surveys; interestingly enough, though, they tend to do better on social history topics when exam time comes."

"My personal reactions, particularly how wrong my opinions have often been, to political, economic, and diplomatic events since about 1960."

#### **25. Are there new topics, themes, or interpretive frameworks that you expect to introduce into one or more of your courses in the next year or two?**

(N=92, with 72 responding in the affirmative)

"In an undergraduate class of 250 students it's difficult to be fancy. As we move on, I am more and more inclined to start the course from 1945 and come up to the present rather than stop at 1991."

"What I want to ensure is students think critically about foreign policy and have support from documents for their positions. I have added more on the Middle East."

"I tried tourism, which turned out to be a big flop."

**26. Are there new required readings or viewing materials that you expect to introduce into one or more of your courses in the next year or two? (N=85)**

"Nick Cullather's book on Guatemala, mentioned by Robert Shaffer in that good December Passport article."

"Not thrilled with Sherry, which at times is too much a polemic and a bit heavy on the holy race-class-gender trinity. But no other book covers the breadth of subjects that he does over as long a period. In the past, I have used "The Manchurian Candidate" in place of "Dr. Strangelove" for the Cold War class, and I hope to introduce "The Fog of War" this year, using materials developed by SHAFR."

"Was contemplating Kristin Hoganson's book on the Spanish-American War; I can only feasibly switch out one book a semester given my own work load, so that's one I may consider in the future; perhaps Walter Hixson's Parting the Curtain to integrate culture and diplomacy."

"I change my readings every semester/year to stay fresh. Also to defeat plagiarism-repeat papers."

**27. Are there new assignments? (N=72)**

"More research--lost skill."

"The kind of assignment Shaffer discussed in that article--especially having students compare Bemis with Williams."

"Smaller, more frequent writing assignments, sometimes written in the first person as a memo recommending a specific policy to the president at a key turning point."

"I often require students to create a "Major Problems" chapter on a topic not covered in the assigned reader--complete with introductions, documents, essays, and bibliography."

"None that I've planned. I feel 'bad' about not assigning a research paper, but our students actually can work with primary sources quite well given our own departmental emphasis; I assign book reviews in part because they are less equipped to deal with secondary sources and understanding their use in developing new arguments or areas of research, not to mention framing big historical issues."

"I have begun to insist on non-American (translated) primary sources to be included in final papers. They are available on the web. In some cases I am asking for foreign-language sources. I am working with colleagues in the modern languages department to link assignments using foreign-language primary documents. This is an issue we need to take more seriously, even at the undergraduate level."

"No. The revised papers (after class discussion and my personal critique) tend to be of very high quality."

**28. Are there new in-class teaching methods? (N=68)**

"Not really. I enjoy, maybe too much, explaining the concepts and ironies in international affairs. What could be more fun than Reagan and Gorbachev?"

"Using more in-class, low-stakes writing assignments to assess how well students are absorbing material."

"Expanding small group assignments, including peer review of written work."

"Introducing 'syndicates' for fortnightly meetings. Students will work in the same group over the course of the semester and present their findings to the class."

"This dog is too old to learn new tricks. I get by just fine with a map and a piece of chalk."

"No--the ones I use appear to continue to work very well."

**29. If applicable to your situation, in a few words please describe how the advent of electronic resources (e.g., full-text journal articles, primary sources, other websites) has affected your teaching or how your students learn. (N=94)**

"JSTOR is their nearly unique source of articles and reviews here. They are very well versed in using the web--the challenge is to implant

circumspection in choosing legitimate sources of information."

"They/we do not have access to JSTOR etc. I try to keep them off the computer and into their books."

"Nothing has had a greater impact on my undergraduate teaching, and on undergraduate research, than this. I am able to get 75-80 undergrads (with TA support) per class to do nothing but research assignments--no exams, etc. but all research--which would not be possible for me to do without electronic access to research materials. These projects start small, with assigned topics (for example a short paper on the use of the internet in public diplomacy by a nation other than the USA) and build to an individual 20 page research paper by the end of the quarter."

"Not at all--don't use them."

"Very important to me. My courses are moving towards full web integration, with online discussion groups, links for each week's readings, and extensive use of JSTOR and pdf-format articles."

"I really don't care for internet sources and I discourage my students from using them in papers."

"At a small liberal arts college with a small library, electronic resources have allowed the teaching of research techniques in upper level seminars that more closely approximate those at large universities. As a result, I am finding it easier to get students into graduate programs and, once there, they tend to thrive because they have already seen all the necessary research tools."

"Great! Except for Google, which is a temptation unto 'evil.'"

"It has not affected my teaching at all. It HAS affected how my students conduct research."

"I use material available on the web in all my classes. Online maps have been extremely helpful. I play Johnson audio tapes, available through the CSPAN web site. I give assignments that ask students to use various web resources, such as documents on the Korean War available on the Harry S. Truman Library web site, as the basis of analytical writing assignments."

*[The next two comments brought home to the survey's principal composer an unconscious assumption built into the question's wording that reflected the fact that he went through school and began his teaching career decades ago.]*

"As a new professor, I make extensive use of electronic resources, but this isn't 'new' to me, it's just how I was trained as a student from the mid-1990s-present."

"Full text journal articles, digitalized sources and web sites have been available since before I started teaching. I take them for granted, as do my students, and we avail ourselves of them."

**30. If you require your students to use these electronic resources, which ones do you consider most important? (N=66)**

Heavily represented in the answers are websites of one kind or another, JSTOR, other journal articles, and the *Foreign Relations* series.

**31. Are there other materials you would like to see available online, or more easily accessible online than at present? (e.g., all of the FRUS series, certain collections of photographs) (N=79)**

In the closest thing to unanimity found in the answers to this survey, 60 of the 79 respondents specified the *Foreign Relations* series.

There was also this reply: "Not certain, as I prefer that they learn to use the library and open books."

**34. In what ways is your teaching evaluated other than the traditional end-of-semester student evaluations? (e.g., mid-term student evaluations, "one-minute papers," peer visits to classes) (N=98, with 28 explicitly indicating none)**

Peer visits were mentioned by 44 of the respondents (not including those cases when they seemed to be used only as part of the promotion process).

**35. With enough time and resources, what would you like to do differently, if anything, in terms of topics/themes/frameworks, materials, assignments, in-class activities, evaluation, or other? (N=96)**

The most frequently identified areas were the following. Thirteen respondents would like to do more with discussion, twelve would do more group work, and ten more writing.

**36. SHAFR AND TEACHING**

*The last section of the survey invited respondents to tell the Teaching Committee how SHAFR might assist them with their teaching. Once again, all responses are on the SHAFR website. The respondents to this question appeared strongly interested in having SHAFR help to support their teaching.*

**The SHAFR Task Force on Teaching is considering recommending to the SHAFR Council a number of initiatives to promote and**

**support teaching, such as a regular column in *Passport*, workshops or programs at annual meetings, and the like. A “Syllabus Initiative” has begun, is growing, and is accepting contributions at <http://www.shafr.org/syllabusinitiative.htm> .**

**What topics would you most like to see addressed by these activities (e.g., use of particular documents or types of documents, especially worthwhile audiovisual products, bibliographic instruction combining the traditional with the modern electronic library, innovative assignments or in-class activities, etc.), and in what venues? (N=97)**

"Survey students five or ten years after graduation and ask them what they learned in college that's been especially worthwhile, and why; and what changes they'd suggest."

"A SHAFR web site that would offer not just links to other sites that have primary materials, but primary materials themselves, which would include anything in the public domain such as maps, charts, photos, documents, etc."

"All the listed topics would be GREAT. Also: assessing Web sites; 'lessons learned' from long-time successful professors."

"It would be terrific to see more essays in *Passport* or DH, and SHAFR panels devoted to the art of teaching. I have always felt that those of us at liberal arts colleges are on the fringes of SHAFR."

"Novel ways to approach certain topics; examples of interesting/different assignments; lists of monographs undergraduates can grasp and will read. This could be presented at the SHAFR or even through special email--teaching bulletins."

"A more extensive web portal dedicated to teaching resources and links."

"I'd like to see sessions at SHAFR conferences about teaching. Other major professional associations have such sessions. Topics to be addressed could include new electronic resources and new kinds of assignments that electronic access makes available. I'd also like some attention to readings that have been particularly successful. I'm always looking for books and articles that stimulate student interest."

"Document use, use of technology, assignment sharing (including in-class activities), good AV items would all be good topics. The *Passport* column would be good, esp. focused on teaching, encouraging presentations at the annual meetings (perhaps even an open sharing session), or update "column" distributed via H-Diplo."

\*\*\*\*\*



In order to avoid summoning again the ghosts of Samuel Johnson and John Milton, this report is now concluded. Although complete responses are available on the SHAFR website, the Teaching Committee hopes that this article will provide SHAFR members with a useful overview of the survey. As noted above, additional analyses of the survey results may appear in future issues of *Passport*.

Readers with questions, comments, or suggestions are invited to contact either author (see addresses below) or the Teaching Committee via chair Mark Gilderhus of Texas Christian University ([M.Gilderhus@tcu.edu](mailto:M.Gilderhus@tcu.edu)). The committee expresses its appreciation to all who took the time to respond to the survey. We believe that it will have been time well spent if the survey and its results contribute to the growing conversation about teaching the history of American foreign relations.

*Richard Hume Werking is Library Director and Professor of History at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis ([rwerking@usna.edu](mailto:rwerking@usna.edu)). He was the survey's principal designer. Dustin Walcher is a doctoral candidate in the History Department at The Ohio State University ([walcher.8@osu.edu](mailto:walcher.8@osu.edu)). He designed and implemented the web version of the survey and managed it once it was launched.*

*The authors would like to thank the many individuals who made the survey possible: Peter Hahn, Mitchell Lerner, and Julie Rojewski of the SHAFR Business Office; George D. Kuh, Thomas F. N. Laird, and John Kennedy, all of Indiana University, who shared generously their expertise, drawn partly from their experience conducting the Faculty Survey of Student Engagement and similar surveys; the Ohio State University Library; Professor Keith Swigger, Texas Woman's University; Dr. Peter Gray, Director of Academic Assessment at USNA; Professor Craig Symonds of the USNA History Department; Robert Robinson, doctoral candidate in history at Ohio State, who set up the web pages on the SHAFR site; and the many other individuals at USNA, Ohio State, and elsewhere who provided advice, other assistance, and encouragement.*

The Department of State website (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/c1716.htm>) identifies 53 *FRUS* volumes in electronic form, only four of them with coverage before the Kennedy administration (three for portions of the Eisenhower administration and one for the Truman years). The State Department apparently has no plans to go back and digitize the older volumes, so the University of Wisconsin Library is attempting to fill this gap by digitizing *FRUS* volumes covering the years before 1961. As of this writing, 157 of them are available on the website of the UW Library at <http://digioll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/About.shtml>.

Teachers who would like assistance in assessing websites will probably appreciate *Choice* magazine's ninth annual issue reviewing what it considers "some of the most important sites in major disciplines." A book-reviewing journal, perhaps best known to faculty in all disciplines for its "reviews on cards," *Choice* has been published since 1964 by the Association of College & Research Libraries. See *Choice*, Web IX, vol. 42, no. 12 (2005), 4-5, for details about this annual web-review issue. Many SHAFR members will likely be interested in some of the worthwhile sites reviewed in the History, Geography, Area Studies, Political Science, and International Relations sections of this same issue (see pp. 187-217).

In addition to Mark Gilderhus, members of the Committee are: Carol Jackson Adams, Ottawa University; Catherine Forslund, Rockford College; Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University–Newark; John McNay, University of Cincinnati; Richard Werking, U.S. Naval Academy; and Thomas Zeiler, University of Colorado.

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## December 2005 Newsletter

### SHAFR SCHEDULED FOR THE LAND OF OZ

Ted Wilson

Yes, Dorothy, the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations annual meeting will convene next year in Kansas. As the call for papers recently sent to all members of the society indicates, the next SHAFR conference is scheduled for June 23-25, 2006, at the University of Kansas (KU). The program committee, headed by Frank Costigliola of the University of Connecticut, is making excellent progress in organizing a stimulating list of scholarly sessions and special events, and we trust that many of you will join us in Lawrence.

My happy assignment as local arrangements chair is to extend a cordial invitation in this brief space on behalf of the SHAFR Council, the Local Arrangements Committee, and KU to come to historic Lawrence for the conference. We also invite you to take advantage of the opportunity, should that prove appealing, to conduct research in one of the various repositories at KU or within easy driving distance. And finally, we offer the special thrill of a sojourn in Lawrence, now and for the foreseeable future pluckily upholding its “free soil” traditions.

#### **Lawrence, KU, and the surrounding region**

Lawrence, Kansas is a community of 80,000 located some thirty-five miles west of the Kansas City metropolitan area and twenty-five miles east of Topeka, the Kansas state capital. Founded in the 1850s chiefly by “Free Staters,” settlers sponsored by Amos Lawrence and the New England Emigrant Aid Society, Lawrence was an outpost of abolitionism huddling on the slopes above the Kansas River. It was at the center of

the conflict known as “Burning Kansas” and thus played a pivotal role in the coming of the Civil War. Arising from the ashes after being burned and pillaged by Quantrill’s Raiders in August, 1863, Lawrence secured its future three years later by winning the bid for the first public university when Kansas achieved statehood. Though many had hoped that Lawrence would be named the state capital or at the very least be assigned the state prison, over time Lawrencians became reconciled to the university atop Mount Oread, a hogback ridge rising ninety feet above the Kansas River bluffs.

One hundred and forty years later, Lawrence is flourishing, celebrating its diversity and doggedly protecting its identity as a political and cultural oasis against the westward march of the Kansas City metropolitan area. A recent article in the National Geographic Traveler singled

out Lawrence as one of four dynamic river towns worth a visit. “Set in undulating green hills, with public artwork on every corner, sophisticated shops, and a wide range of live music every night of the week, the vibrant college town of Lawrence blows the Kansas-is-flat-and-boring stereotype right out of the water,” the article proclaimed. “A variety of boutiques, galleries, coffee houses, book stores, and bistros create a “boho-hip feeling” along the town’s main thoroughfare, Massachusetts Street, or “Mass,” as it is known.” Since Lawrence has been avowedly “wet” since the 1970s, there is also a plethora of bars (of special note is the Free State microbrewery) catering to students, locals, and visitors.

SHAFR 2006 will be held in the recently refurbished Kansas Union and nearby Adams Alumni Center on the eastern edge of the main campus, a ten-block walk from downtown. Parking will be provided between the Union and the Alumni Center. The KU

campus, sprawling across and down all sides of Mount Oread, has been acclaimed as among the most beautiful in the country and features such attractions as the Spencer Museum of Art, the Spencer Rare Books Library, the Hall Center for the Humanities, and the Dole Institute of Politics. KU currently enrolls 29,000 students—26,000 of them on the Lawrence campus—and has internationally known programs in international relations, Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, Latin American Studies, and East Asian Studies.

Collections of significant interest to scholars of American foreign relations at KU include the papers of Kansas senators Robert Dole, Frank Carlson, and James Pearson, the papers of international affairs commentator Ernest Lindley, the Wilcox Collection of political ephemera, especially valuable for the American peace movement, and Vietnam protest literature. The Kansas State Historical Society in Topeka houses the papers of numerous individuals and agencies relevant to the history of American foreign policy. And of course, Lawrence is centrally located for those desiring to work in the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, the Federal Area Records Center in Kansas City, the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.

## **Getting here**

Lawrence is reached easily by automobile. The city is located between Kansas City and Topeka and has three exits off Interstate 70 (the Kansas Turnpike). Just a forty-minute drive to the east, Kansas City is a crossroads for I-70, I-35, and I-29. The most convenient airport is Kansas City International Airport (MCI), located north of Kansas City and a little more than an hour from Lawrence. All of the main rental car companies have offices at MCI, and pickup/dropoff is relatively painless. MCI is served by such major airlines as American, Continental, Delta, Frontier, Midwest, Northwest, Southwest, United and US Airways. Shuttle service from several operators is available (the price is currently \$29-\$30 one way and \$59-\$60 round trip), and contact numbers will be provided well in advance of the meeting so that bookings can be confirmed.

## **Accommodations**

Blocks of rooms for attendees have been reserved in two downtown hotels, the historic and recently renovated Eldridge, housed in a building that dates back to the Civil War era, and the Marriott Springhill Suites, a nearby riverfront hotel. These hotels are conveniently located to Massachusetts Street and shops and restaurants. The conference rate ranges from \$77.00 (double occupancy) at the Springhill Suites to \$120.00 (all suites) at the Eldridge. Blocks of rooms have also been reserved in several motels on the west side of campus, with prices in the \$55.00-\$70.00 range, including breakfast. Although all hotels and motels are within walking distance of the campus, free shuttle service will be available each morning and evening to return attendees to their accommodations. Shuttles will also be available to transport attendees to and from the opening reception/plenary session at the Dole Institute on Friday evening and the social occasion that will close SHAFR 2006 at the Lied Center on KU's west campus on Sunday evening.

### **Culinary Options**

SHAFR 2006's scheduled events include the opening reception/plenary session at the Dole Institute, a luncheon on Saturday, June 24, in the Kansas Union, at which Randall Woods will deliver his presidential address, a Sunday luncheon at the Union featuring Professor Mahmood Mamdani of Columbia University, and a Sunday evening social occasion, with Kansas City-style barbeque and all the trimmings, in the Lied Center (air-conditioned and with great vistas) on KU's west campus. For lunches and evening meals, Lawrence presents a wide array of dining options: Thai (sample Zen Zero's noodles or the upscale menu at the Thai House, both on Mass), innumerable Tex-Mex restaurants, several well-regarded and inexpensive Indian restaurants, various Chinese, Mongolian, Japanese, and Asian fusion eateries (the oddly named "Scarlet Orchid" is excellent), Italian (both pizza/pasta and such upscale locales as Teller's and Paisano's), numerous steak and chop houses (Ten in the Eldridge and the Hereford House, to name but two), Kansas City-style barbeque, and, for serious foodies, Pachamama's just off Mass. Liquid refreshment may be found along Mass in restaurants, brewpubs, and bars offering live music, such as the Bottleneck, the Eighth Street Taproom, the Gaslight Tavern and the Jazzhaus.

### **Area attractions**

The Kansas City metropolitan area is home to many cultural and educational venues. Of particular note are the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, the Kemper Gallery, the Kansas City Art Institute, the Liberty Memorial and Museum (the nation's official World War I memorial), the KC Jazz Museum, and summer programs at the Starlight and Lyric theaters. For those who enjoy the ambience of a major league stadium (and are willing to watch a Triple-A team), the Kansas City Royals will be hosting the Milwaukee Brewers over that weekend at the "K," located on the east side of Kansas City, Missouri.

For the SHAFR 2006 Local Arrangements Committee:

**Ted Wilson**, Professor of History, University of Kansas, Chair

**Carol Jackson Adams**, Assistant Professor of History, Ottawa University

**Nicole Anslover**, doctoral student, University of Kansas

**Alice Butler-Smith**, Assistant Professor, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth

**Dennis Merrill**, Professor of History, University of Missouri-Kansas City

**Hal E. Wert**, Professor of History, Kansas City Art Institute

**Lawrence Yates**, Emeritus Professor, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth

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# December 2005 Newsletter

## Program Update for SHAFR's 2006 Annual Meeting

Frank Costigliola

On behalf of the SHAFR Program Committee, I am pleased to report that the program for the 2006 annual meeting of SHAFR, to be held June 23-25 at the University of Kansas in Lawrence, will include several noteworthy sessions and events. The committee is working hard to make the 2006 conference memorable and it encourages every member of SHAFR to attend.

The program will consist of a core of conventional sessions on all aspects of U.S. diplomatic/foreign relations history in all areas of the world and in all time periods. The quality of the panels so far organized suggests that conference attendees will have a rich menu of sessions from which to choose.

The conference will also feature several signature events:

- On Friday, June 23 there will be a trip to the Harry S. Truman Presidential library. The tour at the Truman library is designed particularly for SHAFR members who have not yet had a chance to do research there. A similar excursion to the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential library is planned for Monday, June 26.
- At the Saturday luncheon, SHAFR President Randall Woods will deliver his presidential address, entitled "Politics and Idealism: Lyndon B. Johnson and International Affairs."
- A plenary panel will feature Walter LaFeber and Emily Rosenberg speaking on the historical roots of post-9/11 foreign policy. Michael Hunt and Robert Schulzinger will comment, and Arnold Offner will chair the panel.
- A second plenary is entitled "Doing International History across the Scholarly Generations," and it features Mark Bradley, Carolyn Eisenberg, Robert McMahon, and Jeremi Suri. The two senior scholars, Eisenberg and McMahon, will each present a paper that critiques the work of one of the younger scholars, and vice-versa.
- Mahmood Mamdani of Columbia University, an eminent scholar of Africa and of human rights issues, will give a talk at the Sunday luncheon. Matthew Connelly will introduce Mamdani.
- Seven additional panels are already organized. Robert Brigham, George Herring, and Fredrik Logevall will present a session entitled "

Reading Vietnam.” Peter Hahn, Mary Ann Heiss, and Douglas Little are doing a panel on the Middle East. Nathan Citino, David Ekbladh, and Nils Gilman (with David Engerman as commentator) will offer “Modernization, Liberalism, and the Totalitarian Threat.” There will be a panel on Korea with Greg Brazinsky, James Matray, Yasuyo Sakata, William Stueck, and Robert Wampler. A panel entitled “Empire, Globalization, and Sport” will feature Theresa Runstedtler, Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, and Thomas Zeiler giving papers, with Christopher Endy as commentator and Walter LaFeber as chair. Former graduate students of Robert Ferrell -- including Garry Clifford, Arnold Offner, and Theodore Wilson – will present a session honoring and appraising the work of this giant of our field. Lawrence Kaplan will offer a perspective as Ferrell’s near contemporary. There will be a roundtable on the challenges of making the transition from Ph.D. student to employed professional. The panel consists of recent Ph.D. recipients Curt Cardwell, Scott Laderman, Jennifer See, and Douglas Selvage.

While the deadline for submitting paper/panel proposal passed on December 1, it might prove possible for the committee to consider additional proposals on a space-available basis. And while the deadline for graduate students to apply for assistance from the conference travel fund has also passed, it is possible that surplus funds might still be available in early 2006. Interested parties may contact me to consult on either of these matters.

In addition to offering a sterling program, the 2006 conference will also feature many opportunities to enjoy a good time, as Ted Wilson and the rest of the local arrangements committee have arranged a blue grass band, a barbeque, and many other chances to get to know one of the great mid-west college towns. (See accompanying article for more details.)

If you have questions about the conference program, please contact any member of the committee:

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