## Table of Contents

**Abstract** .......................................................... 3

**Acknowledgments** ................................................. 4

**Chapter I: Introduction** ........................................... 5

**Chapter II: Review of Selected Literature** ......................... 9

**Chapter III: Assessing the Changing City Role in Gentrification** ..................................................................... 25

**Chapter IV: Weinland Park** ........................................ 40

**Chapter V: Conclusions, or Do Alternative Futures Exist?** ........................................................................... 50

**Appendix** .................................................................. 54

**Works Cited** ............................................................ 64
Abstract

From initial curiosity and empirical observations to theorizing and pragmatic assessments, gentrification – the phenomenon of middle-class reinvestment in downtrodden inner-city housing – has long served as a focal point of scholarship and debate in urban geography. However, despite fifty years of study, gentrification research has largely minimized the role of an ever-important actor: local governments and their affiliated planners.

This project examines the changing role of local governments in fomenting gentrification. I advance the hypothesis that the greater city role has arisen from the rise of neighborhood planning and the decline of the Keynesian protectionist state. Analysis begins by evaluating the history of local government involvement in urban revitalization. The research then turns to a case study of Weinland Park, a University District neighborhood undergoing changes that suggest revitalization in the near future. Activity in Weinland Park illustrates the rise of gentrification as an accepted planning method of both city planners and the non-profit community in revitalizing urban neighborhoods.

Research methods employed include both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Demographic data, provided by the US Census, county auditor, and local development department, is analyzed to contrast today's revitalizing neighborhoods with previous gentrification projects. Protocol-based, IRB-approved interviews with key informants provide on-the-ground context for understanding the role of local government.

While Hackworth and Smith (2001) assign a temporal classification scheme to the city role, evidence from Columbus indicates that not all neighborhoods experience the same city involvement. In particular, spillover gentrification seems to warrant less city attention than revitalization in more-outlying areas.

This research shows that local governments are undertaking an increasingly large role in facilitating gentrification processes. Evidence demonstrates that municipalities are working hand-in-hand with developers to identify potential redevelopment opportunities, enacting creative finance regimes to encourage speculation in inner-city neighborhoods, and stimulating commercial investments that appeal to potential gentrifiers. However, research also indicates that numerous programs are available to both the city and the non-profit community that can mitigate the negative effects of gentrification (ie, involuntary displacement). The essay concludes with an evaluation of these efforts and a normative argument on the most judicious city role.
Acknowledgments

I am deeply indebted to a number of talented and professional individuals who assisted me throughout the Honors Thesis process. First and foremost, Larry Brown has been a world-class advisor, mentor, and friend; without his assistance, this project would have languished under the weight of too many ideas and too few conclusions. Catherine Girves provided a rock of support throughout the research process and was the first to relate the Weinland Park experience to me. Additionally, the defense committee of Dr. Brown, Dr. Bill Ackerman, Dr. Hazel Morrow-Jones, and Dr. Kevin Cox provided excellent insights and exposed the many lacunae in my argument. Catherine Girves, Robert Caldwell, and their “Friday Night Bunch” exposed me to the human side of Weinland Park, a neighborhood too many characterize solely by the steady stream of negative press clippings about the activities of a select few ne’er-do-wells.

I owe my fascination in urban geography to the outstanding faculty at Ohio State, especially Bill Ackerman. His teaching and mentorship during my years at OSU-Lima proved invaluable to my later success in Columbus.

Finally, I thank family and friends who never doubted my ability to pull it off. Their support has always been the foundation of my educational success. A special thanks to R. Webb and K. Earley who provided invaluable proofreading support.

With that said, all stylistic, grammatical, and factual errors in this document remain my own.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The Nature of the Problem

This thesis describes structural changes in the processes supporting gentrification, specifically the role of city governments. While adopting a largely temporal framework to illustrate changes in the city role, I explain the shortfalls of a purely temporal approach.

My hypothesis is that the city has taken an increasingly large role in gentrification processes since the recession of the early 1990's, and its role has changed in three important ways. First, the rise of Neighborhood Planning has adjusted the scale of urban redevelopment to the local level. Secondly, public-private partnerships are combining municipal coercive power with private capital to redevelop neighborhoods. Thirdly, eminent domain is enjoying a resurgence as an accepted method of acquiring land for private redevelopment.

Analysis begins by examining different themes throughout the gentrification literature. I then turn to the city role throughout urban redevelopment processes, from urban renewal to contemporary gentrification efforts. In Chapter 4, I describe the impact of municipal-led gentrification on Weinland Park, a University District neighborhood undergoing reinvestment that illustrates the increased city role in private market redevelopment. I state my conclusions in Chapter 5 and seek alternative futures for neighborhoods undergoing gentrification, and conclude the thesis with a normative argument on how the city can best maximize the positives of
gentrification while minimizing its negative effects.

The Society Hill Experience

As one of the first gentrification projects in North America, Philadelphia’s Society Hill has received significant attention from planners, developers, and urban scholars (cf. Smith, 1979; Cybriwsky, Ley, and Western, 1986). The relationship between a new class of cultural elites, the nascent discipline of ‘city planning,’ and a location near contemporary and historic power centers give Society Hill’s gentrification a unique flair.

Credit for Society Hill’s conceptualization as a redevelopable neighborhood belongs to a group of young, wealthy intellectuals known as the “Young Turks” (Cybriwsky, Ley, and Western, 1986). Unsatisfied with Philadelphia’s notoriously corrupt municipal leadership, its members sought to mold downtown into a respected environment that would spawn a larger urban revitalization in other inner-city neighborhoods. To achieve their new urban vision, the Young Turks employed multiple levels of the city’s coercive apparatus, including the relatively new discipline of city planning.

The revitalization of Society Hill locates its antecedent in historic preservation efforts begun by old-money interests in the 1930’s and the political machinations that allowed these preservation-minded individuals to wrest control of Philadelphia’s power structure (Cybriwsky, Lee, and Western, 1986). Their ‘City Policy Committee’1 aimed to find solutions to urban blight and government malfeasance that increasingly focused on rational planning. The organization successfully influenced the 1943 hiring of CPC charter member Robert Mitchell as the new City

1Despite its official-sounding title, the organization lacked any coercive power or municipal mandate.
Unlike the City Planning Committee, the City Planning Commission was a municipal entity that had received broad powers of design and review from Philadelphia’s 1951 reformed city charter (Cybriwsky et al., 1986). Furthering their connections to the city’s power apparatus, the organization employed an reform-based campaign against Philadelphia’s entrenched Republican regime to elect its own Joseph Clark to the mayoralty in 1952.

Utilizing urban boosterism, eminent domain, and funding from all levels of government – all under the guise of rational planning – the Young Turks accomplished a dramatic transformation of the Society Hill neighborhood (Smith, 1979; Cybriwsky et al., 1986). Federal urban renewal funding, coupled with local matching funds, were used to obtain and demolish properties too deteriorated for reinvestment.

**The Weinland Park Experience**

Weinland Park’s path to revitalization both diverges from and shares interesting commonalities with that of Society Hill. The neighborhood, on Columbus’ Near North Side, has experienced a long period of disinvestment, dating back to the postwar era and its rapid decline of inner-city areas. While its location between the CBD and the Ohio State University gives it optimal access to professional employment opportunities, Weinland Park suffers from a poverty rate over 50% and an owner-occupancy rate near 10% (Census Bureau). However, recent activity and geographic realities indicate that Weinland Park is primed for revitalization.

Like Society Hill, Weinland Park’s prospective revitalization owes much of its credit to city planning. The release of three neighborhood plans concerning the area have identified potential redevelopment sites and highlighted the neighborhood’s access to employment, trendy

---

2Unlike the City Planning Committee, the City Planning Commission was a municipal entity that had received broad powers of design and review from Philadelphia’s 1951 reformed city charter (Cybriwsky et al., 1986).
commercial ventures, and the already-gentrified neighborhoods of Italian Village, Victorian Village, and Harrison West (Department of Development 1997; 2006; Campus Partners, 2002). Additionally, financial assistance provided by the City to renovators and new homeowners provides incentives for a revitalization in Weinland Park.

This work examines the changes that have occurred between Society Hill, whose renaissance began in 1957, and Weinland Park, a neighborhood at the cusp of revitalization – and maybe gentrification. Subsequent chapters will examine both the philosophies underlying gentrification literature and how research has described the municipal role in gentrification. Changes underway in Weinland Park serve as the paradigm of Municipal-led gentrification, where the city and quasi-public institutions (in this case, The Ohio State University) provide a significant impetus for revitalization.
Chapter II: Review of Selected Literature

This chapter presents a largely chronological summary of gentrification research from the 1950's to the present, focusing on four themes that have defined scholarship on urban housing revitalization. The most intense period occurred during the theoretical formulations of the 1980's, when two schools of thought emerged: demand-side explanations largely motivated by neoclassical economics and positivist/quantitative methodology, and supply-side commentaries that drew on Marxist influences and class-conflict models.

Superceding any temporal or topical classification of gentrification scholarship has been an ongoing debate on the semantics and lexicons of urban renewal. Gentrification is the most specific and widely-used term, denoting the process of disinvestment and subsequent reinvestment in inner-city neighborhoods. However, gentrification carries negative connotations for many, creating images of displacement, neighborhood-based cultural warfare, and class struggle (Smith 1986, 1996). Another popular term, (urban) revitalization has seen both broad and narrow usage. In the broad sense, it describes any significant investment in downtrodden neighborhoods that improves the overall character of the area. This investment can include financial contributions to help fund community-based organizations, new real estate ventures locating in the neighborhood, or property

\[ \text{\copyright 1980 London for a more detailed classification system of explanatory gentrification theories. The dual-theory framework I employ here has been adopted by most gentrification researchers.} \]
upgrading by either existing residents or newcomers. However, narrowly, (urban) revitalization refers to property upgrading that does not involuntarily displace existing residents, but instead promotes mixed-income communities consisting of long-term, working class residents and newer, middle class gentrifiers (cf. powell and Graham, 2002). Urban renewal has largely been applied to the federally-funded programs of the 1950's that cleared large tracts of the worst inner-city slums in favor of parks, highways, and real estate developments. Additionally, some scholars use urban renaissance to describe overall positive changes in inner-city environs⁴; however, this term is primarily associated with gentrification supporters who wish to cast the phenomenon in a positive light.⁵

I. Initial Curiosity and the Case Study Mentality

The most commonly applied definition of gentrification comes from sociologist Ruth Glass’ (1964) empirical observations of changes in inner-city London neighborhoods. Despite its formulation over forty years ago, her definition encapsulates the physical, geographic, and political realities of controversies of ‘gentrification:’

One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes – upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages – two rooms up and two down – have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become elegant,

⁴Including either form of revitalization (mixed-income or gentrification) and urban renewal-style new construction.

⁵For this work, gentrification will refer to revitalization processes that involuntarily displace (or will likely lead to involuntary displacement), revitalization (or urban revitalization) will describe any process that reverses patterns of neighborhood decline, and urban renewal will characterize the government-funded demolition programs of the post-war era. Urban renaissance will refer to the overall phenomenon of inner-city reinvestment, with an emphasis on changes throughout the urban system.
expensive residences. Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period. . . have been upgraded once again . . . Once this process of “gentrification” starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed.

(Glass 1964: xviii)

Glass’ definition outlines two explicit, and one implicit, conditions necessary for gentrification. First, a sufficient stock of disinvested inner-city housing must exist. This housing stock presents an opportunity for the conversion from “shabby, modest mews” to “elegant, expensive residences.” Secondly, a class of individuals must exist for whom ‘gentrification’ is both financially feasible and culturally acceptable. Some factor – be it social, economic, or a combination of both6 – provides the motivation for gentrifiers to abandon their peaceful, suburban residences and fling themselves headfirst into inner-city areas that others in the social cohort find unsuitable for

However, Glass’ coining of ‘gentrification’ postdated the first inner-city housing revitalization projects by nearly a decade. Hoover and Vernon’s (1959) work in New York City described luxury apartment conversions in midtown Manhattan. These conversions had accompanied New York City’s rise as a global financial capital in the post-war era, but, more importantly, they demonstrated a reversal of upper-class suburbanization, a historical trend described by Burgess (1925), Hoyt (1939), and Adams (1970). This historical atypicality motivated a generation of urban scholars to further their understanding of the nascent phenomenon.

One of the first questions to challenge gentrification scholars concerned the extent of

6Much debate has argued whether gentrifiers are socially or economically motivated (or some combination of both). This debate is considered later in the literature review, but remains largely tangential to the overall argument of this thesis.
gentrification on both the inter- and intra-city scales. This debate coalesced into the case study tradition, a series of academic portraits describing individual cities experiencing revitalization in their inner-city districts. These portrayals chronicled each neighborhood’s path to revitalization, the actors involved, and the political and social consequences of the upheaval. Largely, they avoided such politically-sensitive issues as displacement and social conflict, instead opting for the political sterility of empirical observation (Smith, 1986).

The aggregate of these case studies shows that, by the early 1980's, gentrification was a widely-occurring phenomenon, and had rearranged the geography of poverty and wealth in some larger, older, Eastern cities (cf. Laska and Spain (eds.), 1980). In Philadelphia, federally-funded urban renewal and municipal efforts to attract social and economic elites to the inner-city had transformed a blighted neighborhood into Society Hill, the city’s newest and chicest housing development (Smith, 1979; Cybriwsky, Ley, and Western, 1986). Likewise, an organic process in ethnically-mixed (but racially-homogeneous) Fairmount transformed an immigrant neighborhood into a culturally-sophisticated enclave near Philadelphia’s major universities, Penn and Temple (Cybriwsky, 1978).

Scholars outside the American context have also applied empirical case studies as a useful gauge of gentrification activity. Glass (1964) describes the nascent changes in London’s inner-city housing market, as the ‘gentry’ transformed working class neighborhoods into elite quarters. Writing when many scholars were developing a negative view of gentrification (on account of its

displacement effects), Cybriwsky, Ley, and Western (1986) describe the political actions initiated to protect and promote Vancouver’s affordable housing in the midst of urban redevelopment. Taking a more theoretical approach in the same volume, Williams (1986) contrasts the experiences of American, English, and Australian gentrification projects, emphasizing the racial conflict that often accompanies the arrival of (predominantly white) cultural elites.

Black (1975; 1980) employed a different tactic to gauge the extent of gentrification. His 1975 Urban Land Institute survey found that urban revitalization was affecting the inner-city of both large and small municipalities, with an average of 441 units renovated per city (Black, 1980:9). However, the large quantity of smaller centers included in the survey affected this average, as smaller cities (those under 100,000 in population) constituted 125 of the 260 municipalities surveyed. Regardless, Black’s work showed that a majority of cities with populations over 100,000 were experiencing some form of inner-city housing renovations, with cities east of the Mississippi River experiencing the greatest changes.8

As the 1980's dawned, scholarly research had largely taken a positive outlook on gentrification. Many viewed the nascent phenomenon as a herald of a ‘back to the city’ movement, one that would reverse historical patterns of inner-city decline and prompt a late-century ‘urban renaissance’ (Laska and Spain (eds.), 1980). However, many scholars were unsatisfied with the empirical observations that had dominated gentrification research for the previous decades, and sought to build a more-theoretical framework to explain what drove a segment of the middle-class population, albeit small, to choose voluntarily an urban existence.

8Black largely avoids explanatory arguments for why certain cities were experiencing higher rates of revitalization than others, but does mention that much renewal was interwoven with historic preservation efforts (Black 1975, 1980).
II. Demand-side Explanations

While some researchers sought to validate gentrification as a physically small but socially significant phenomenon, more theoretically-minded scholars developed explanations for the sudden shift in urban housing markets. The first theoretical, explanatory works concerning gentrification emphasized the cultural shifts in the baby boom generation (the first of whom had arrived at adulthood in the 1970's) as the motivation behind urban housing choices. Early theories had attempted to locate a series of attributes in the new urban ‘gentry’ that would explain housing choices that contested the housing demands of previous generations (Clay, 1979; Berry, 1985).

Quantitatively, these researchers often employed factor analysis to delineate a series of socioeconomic variables that separated gentrified neighborhoods from their unrevitalized peers (cf. Jackson-Mergler, 1984). While each factor analysis provided idiosyncratic differences unique to the environment analyzed, three attributes dominated demand-side explanations (Kern, 1981; Berry, 1985).

First, households without children. Potential home buyers without children (and especially those who expect to abstain permanently from childbirth) are not repelled from the stereotypically poor schools in inner-city neighborhoods. Additionally, as Berry (1985) describes, couples and individuals who make a conscious decision to forgo childbearing place a greater emphasis on interpersonal relationships outside the home, which are easily fostered through neighborhood interactions.

However, key informants, some of the original gentrifiers from the 1970's, commented that magnet programs at many inner-city schools have drastically increased the quality of education at those often-reviled institutions, remarking that “The best schools [in the local public school district], in my opinion, are within walking distance from my house.” Admittedly, these informants, a heterosexual couple, have no children, so their observations are not based on first-hand experience in the schools.
associations\textsuperscript{10} and entertainment opportunities common to downtown areas. Research has also indicated that childless households were more willing to locate in neighborhoods deemed ‘unsafe,’ with the implication that having children brings safety into focus as an attribute of a perspective house.\textsuperscript{11} Those couples who expect to have children in the future are usually drawn to rental opportunities in gentrified neighborhoods, as renting gives tenants an opportunity to enjoy their childless years in ‘trendy’ neighborhoods and an easy escape to better schools and less crime in the suburbs once they have kids (Gale, 1980).

Secondly, unmarried adults. This cohort has a smaller likelihood of having children in the household, but Kern (1981) argues that unmarried adults place a greater emphasis on external social relationships, even when they head families with children. Opportunities for cultivating these new relationships are best found at social clubs and other nightlife establishments commonly found in the central city (Kern, 1981; Berry, 1985).

Thirdly, higher educational attainment and professional employment. Demand-side theorists argued that the experience of a liberal arts education cultivates a greater appreciation for the cultural amenities of inner-city neighborhoods, such as historic architecture, locally-owned businesses,\textsuperscript{12} theaters, and art galleries (Clay, 1979; Kern, 1981). Williams (1986), not traditionally regarded as a demand-side scholar, argues that urban universities provide exposure to fast-paced city life, a

\textsuperscript{10}Numerous researchers have identified both the presence and importance of neighborhood associations in gentrification, cf. Mesch and Schwirian, 1996.

\textsuperscript{11}The same informants from (6) observed that the nationwide crime decreases of the 1990’s had left them feeling safer in their surroundings.

\textsuperscript{12}Especially contrasted with ‘big-box,’ mega-chain suburban retailers – Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Target, among others. These businesses have long avoided inner-city locations because of prohibitive land prices and lack of nearby affluent consumers.
welcome transition from most students’ banal, suburban upbringing.

Several changes in post-war Western (in general) and American (specifically) have motivated these cultural shifts. The dramatic rise in college enrollment throughout the baby boom generation has exposed more baby boomers to the more progressive values common to college campuses (Berry, 1985). These liberal values have induced the homosexual community to adopt a greater public profile that, in the face of conservative criticism (which has found its strongest locus in suburban neighborhoods), has allowed the gay community to construct cultural enclaves in the inner-city neighborhoods where few (conservative) suburbanites dare to venture (Kern, 1981; Berry, 1985; Lauria and Knopp, 1985).

However, the cultural shift that has received the greatest attention from most demand-side theorists (cf. Berry, 1985) is the dramatic rise of women’s economic parity and social rights. The striking rise of women’s professional employment in the post-war era has allowed females greater latitude in the construction of their social roles – be they mother, wage-earner, or both. Compounding their increased professional and social liberty was a society more accepting – culturally and legally – of birth control, from contraception and abortion. Taken as a whole, these developments – economic parity, de facto legal equality, and wider access to birth control – women gained control over decisions concerning when to have children and how many children (if any) to bear.

To demand-side scholars, gentrification is the physical manifestation of these cultural shifts (Clay, 1979). By holding greater concern for external relationships and the social life than school

13 Despite the Equal Rights Amendment’s failure, a measure which would have given women equal protection under the Constitution, the courts began defending women’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Newton, 2007).
quality or neighborhood safety, potential gentrifiers are drawn to inner-city neighborhoods which, importantly or not, provide greater accessibility to downtown professional employment.

III. Supply-side theories: a Marxist rebuttal

When demand-side theories had reached their empirical zenith in the early 1980's (cf. Clay, 1979; Jackson-Mergler, 1984; Laska and Spain (eds.), 1980), a new generation of critical geographers emerged, drawing their critiques of the existing gentrification debate on Marx and Engels. These emergent scholars criticized previous research as excessively positive about the future of gentrification while ignoring the social costs it engenders (Smith and Williams, 1986). Additionally, supply-side theorist chastised the previous movement for ignoring the processes that both create gentrifiable housing and concentrate it in the inner-city.

As their label indicates, supply-side research focus on the creation of disinvested inner-city housing and the processes that allow middle-class, cultural elites to acquire and rehabilitate these properties to suit their (cosmopolitan) tastes. As a whole, these scholars are more pessimistic about gentrification as the cure to urban ills. Instead, drawing from Marx, they view gentrification as yet another method of bourgeois domination over the displaced and powerless proletariat. Research has indicated that the first residents displaced by gentrification are the poor and the elderly, who are simultaneously the least powerful to resist the ‘occupation’ of their neighborhood and the most ill-suited, physically and financially, to relocate (Smith, 1986; 1996).

Expanding beyond Marxist discourse, Neil Smith (1986; 1996) has favored the analogy of an ‘urban frontier’ as a modern-day version of Turner’s ‘Frontier Thesis.’ Where Turner viewed the conquerment of the unbridled Western frontier as the recurrent motivation of American expansionism, Smith argues that gentrification is an attempt by middle-class, cultural elites to
Numerous gentrification scholars have remarked that the lack of American market controls has made abandonment a quintessentially American phenomenon, although Williams (1986) also notes widespread abandonment in Australia (cf. Beauregard, 1986; Berry, 1985; Smith, 1986). To Smith, if the persistent locus of development capital in the suburbs creates gentrifiable housing, the spatial concentration of certain types white collar employment in the central city entices potential gentrifiers to locate in the neighborhoods that ring the central business district (1986). Smith sees central city employment locations as particularly attractive to the highest strata of corporate executives, those whose occupations require direct, face-to-face communication.

The sum of Smith’s ‘rent gap’ theory lies in his explanation of the cyclical movement of capital (1986). From Marx, Smith inherits a view of capitalism that emphasizes the continual states of crisis that capital accumulation engenders. To avoid catastrophe, capitalists must continually

---

14 Numerous gentrification scholars have remarked that the lack of American market controls has made abandonment a quintessentially American phenomenon, although Williams (1986) also notes widespread abandonment in Australia (cf. Beauregard, 1986; Berry, 1985; Smith, 1986)
reinvest in the built environment\textsuperscript{15} at locations where the greatest profit can be realized with the least risk. Throughout the immediate post-war period, the suburban built environment proved the logical locus for investment with its low land costs and low associated risks generating a high rate of return. However, following Smith, federal urban renewal programs of the 1950's, which allowed the state to absorb some of the risks of urban investments, coupled with rapidly rising suburban land costs swung the investment pendulum back to the inner-city. Ignoring the historically atypical federal role, the excessive and successive suburban investments of the post-war era made urban investment relatively cheaper. Thus, the cyclical nature of capital has swung from urban areas (in the pre-war period) to the suburbs (in the post-war era), with investment’s return to the city throughout the 1970's and through today.

A separate, less-conflict driven, supply-side theory has been developed by Berry (1985). Although less rigorously advanced than the work of Smith, Berry’s theory emphasizes the role of the housing market in creating excess supply relative to absolute household growth. Excessive (suburban) supply leads to abandonment in the inner-city, but withdrawals from the inner-city housing market can counteract economic ‘loosening’ effects of abundant suburban housing starts. Concluding with a demand-supply hybrid approach, Berry (1985:95) argues that gentrification is driven by young professionals’ attraction to white-collar, central city employment and by ‘tight’ housing markets where inner-city abandonment (‘scrapage’ in Berry’s parlance) surpasses outer-city excess housing supply.

\textbf{IV. Post-recession Scholarship: From consensus to alternative formulations}

\textsuperscript{15}Smith argues that the built environment provides an investment “where profit rates remain higher and where it is possible through speculation to appropriate ground rent even though nothing is produced” (Smith, 1986:30).
While the flurry of gentrification theorizing had declined by the late 1980's, a emergent specter – economic recession – provided a new basis for scholarship in the early 1990's. Bourne (1993) asked if economic downturn, especially one affecting the upper-middle echelons of society, spelt ‘the demise of gentrification.’ Real estate values plummeted from the dizzying heights reached in the previous decade as negative equity eliminated the speculative nature of the 1980's real estate market.

Gentrifiers were often hit hardest by the economic downturn and property value devolution. As profits shrunk, the first positions eliminated – entry-level professional – were the same positions most likely occupied by the stereotypical gentrifiers (Lees, 2000; cf. Clay, 1979). Additionally, gentrifiers had both created and occupied the speculative housing ventures of the previous decade, and the decline in property valuations saddled the new urban middle-class with excessive mortgage liabilities.

While some doubted the resiliency of gentrification, others predicted that the slowdown in housing markets was more influenced by temporary economic factors than by larger structural issues. Smith (1996:46) argued that ‘it would be a mistake to assume, as the language of de-gentrification seems to do, that the economic crisis of the early 1990's spelt the secular end of gentrification.’ In fact, as Lees (2000) makes clear, the post-recession 90's witnessed an resurgence of revitalization activity, with inner-city housing values in selected neighborhoods rising again toward their previous zenith in the gentrification-happy 1980's.

As the pace of gentrification increased throughout the 1990's, research on the topic floundered under the ‘weight’ of a ‘theoretical logjam’ between supply- and demand-side theories (Bondi, 1999; Lees, 2000). Some noted scholars (Ley, 1996; Smith, 1996) continued to advance
their respective theories in lengthy monographs, others sought to synthesize between the two arguments (Lees, 1994; Boyle, 1995). The latter phenomenon owes its existence to a new generation of researchers, not affiliated with the heavy theoretical debates of the 1980's, who commented on the drastic variations in portrayals of gentrification, from unabashed optimism to blunt criticism (Redfern, 1997). Stepping beyond purely theoretical debates, this younger class of scholars began to examine issues largely sidelined by the political, ideological, and theoretical clashes of the 1980's.

However, the continued resiliency of gentrification scholarship in the post-recession era has not gone unchallenged. Bondi (1999) sharply criticized urbanists’ fascination with gentrification as a product of their own aspirations for an urban renaissance. Continuing her critique, she finds that gentrification research has failed “to open up new insights” and as such “maybe it is time to allow it to disintegrate under the weight of these burdens” (Bondi, 1999:255). Specifically, she finds these “burdens” as the inability of researchers to integrate coherently supply- and demand-side arguments. Admittedly, the rate of gentrification research has fallen since the theory-heady days of the 1980's; however, scholars have gained significant understanding of the many processes that both support and oppose nascent gentrification movements.

A particularly important strain of research has focused on the institutions that both foment and support the gentrification process. Wyly and Hammel (1999) focus on the role of mortgage capital and new trends in American public housing policy as revitalization mechanisms for

\[16\text{Supply-side for Ley, demand-side for Smith.}\]

\[17\text{These have included feminist, African-American, and homosexual perspectives on gentrification (Taylor, 1992; Knopp, 1995; Bondi, 1998), and international comparative studies (Carpenter and Lees, 1995), among others.}\]
gentrification in the post-recession era. For them, federal legislation mandating public access to mortgage records has reduced discriminatory financial practices in inner-city neighborhoods.\(^{18}\) Additionally, HUD’s HOPE VI initiative has worked to ‘change public housing as we know it’ by demolishing the worst public housing projects, reducing density, and integrating a variety of incomes into new developments (HUD 1999). These new HOPE VI communities, Wyly and Hammel argue, are reducing inner-city blight by deconcentrating (through decreasing density) severe poverty, and therefore making surrounding neighborhoods more attractive to gentrification.

Moving beyond the federal scale, a number of scholars have also alluded to a changing city role in the gentrification process. Wyly and Hammel (2000) examine the function of the Chicago (Public) Housing Authority (CHA) in identifying and promoting the revitalization of Cabrini Green, one of that city’s public housing projects.\(^{19}\) Exercising HUD’s newly-found mixed-income dogma, the CHA demolished its salvageable units, reduced density, and sought ‘partial gentrification’ as a mechanism to develop mixed-income neighborhoods. From a public policy standpoint, Wyly and Hammel argue that municipalities have accepted gentrification as a method for creating mixed-income areas. Furthermore, they assert that public policy now solely reacts to private market impetuses – in this case, real estate and developers’ speculative interests – and thus has abandoned its previous role as protector of public interests from private injustices.

\(^{18}\)Commonly known as ‘redlining,’ this form of racial, economic, and, most importantly, spatial segregation had long been a resisting force to gentrification, cf. Clay, 1979.

\(^{19}\)But not the worst. That distinction belonged to the Robert Taylor Homes, on the city’s traditionally poor south side. With local recognition that the area’s demographics (largely African-American) and crime statistics could not support mixed-income development, Robert Taylor was demolished, its residents scattered, and its former site reconstituted as an industrial park (Wyly and Hammel, 2000:187).
Wyly and Hammel’s works parallel numerous studies, dating from the 1980's, that have evaluated the state’s role in gentrification (Smith, 1996). More recently, Hackworth and Smith (2001) examined changing gentrification processes in New York City, finding that both the federal and local government structures are undertaking an increasingly active role in gentrification in that city. Drawing from political geography, they motivate the state’s increased role through the rise of neoliberalism and Keynesianism’s subsequent demise. Neoliberal governments, at both the federal and local scale, have abandoned advocating for the interests of those lacking efficacy in favor of a private-model approach to governance. While neoliberalism finds its origins and the 1970's and its ascent in the Reagan and Thatcher governments of the 1980's, Hackworth and Smith argue that the dismantling of Keynesian government protections had not reached a critical mass of sorts until the 1990's, when public interest protectionism finally gave way to (neoliberal) private-market collaboration.

Overall, while insignificant to comprehensive housing trends, gentrification has long served as a focal point of research throughout academia. Perhaps so much scholarly interest has arisen from the political controversies it engenders, or it might stem from the historical atypicality of middle-class, cultural elites voluntarily choosing to purchase and rehabilitate disinvested homes in dilapidated neighborhoods. Nonetheless, gentrification has sparked countless debates, led to well-formulated theories and alluring counter-theories, and enjoined broad swaths of the academy to analyze the phenomenon’s causes, effects, and processes. This chapter has shown that gentrification literature – notwithstanding changes in the gentrification process – has long been influenced by prevailing themes. The following section will provide an assessment of how gentrification has changed on-the-ground, beginning with 1950's urban renewal and continuing to current attempts to
realize an urban renaissance.
Chapter III: Assessing the Changing City Role in Gentrification

A common thread in the gentrification literature, albeit one which has failed to receive sufficient attention, is the role of the state in supporting revitalization. Given gentrification’s numerous, well-publicized negative consequences, the state’s role often serves as a fault line between a clash of cultures, identities, and values (cf. Smith, 1996). Compounding the state’s involvement have been temporal shifts since the revitalization of Society Hill fifty years ago (Smith, 1979), or as Lees (2000:16) puts it, “gentrification today is quite different to gentrification in the early 1970's, late 1980's, even the early 1990's.”

This chapter chronicles five eras of gentrification. Focus is placed on the historically-variegated role of the state, particularly the local state, although the functions of other actors are considered. Following the historical survey, I present motivations for the dramatic resurgence of direct state support for market rate housing in urban environments – that is, gentrification – and locate the changing city role in already-gentrified neighborhoods of Columbus, Ohio.

However, it seems that the city’s support of gentrification can be expressed in different manners. In one sense, the city can *actively* and *directly* support gentrification through low-interest loans for housing rehabilitation (cf. Clay, 1979). Additionally, cities can *indirectly* assist in gentrification through initiatives that improve the quality of life for existing residents in the near future and make the neighborhood more attractive to reinvestment in the more-distant
future. Furthermore, municipalities can adopt a *laissez-faire* approach to gentrification, one that neither supports gentrification nor assists existing residents in their displacement (a variety of implicit support Smith (1996) describes). This chapter seeks to portray active municipal support for gentrification, both direct and indirect, and while implicit assistance to private-market revitalization is not specifically discusses, one should remember that no city government has sought to impede gentrification, although some have countered its negative effects (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001).\(^{20}\)

I. **Urban Renewal**

While many scholars do not consider urban renewal as gentrification in the classical sense, few can doubt the impact that renewal enacted on the inner-city landscape (Smith, 1996). Employing eminent domain to assemble large tracts of land, the federal government funded local efforts to demolish the nation’s most distressed urban neighborhoods, many of which were sold to private interests as prime redevelopment opportunities (Nager, 1980).\(^{21}\) When local opposition became too vocal and urban renewal reached its end, it had cleared almost 1,000 square miles of inner-city territory, eliminated 600,000 housing units, and displaced nearly two million residents (Kaplan, Wheeler, and Holloway, 2004).

Urban renewal finds its origins in the federal Housing Acts of 1934 and 1937, but the program did not take on its destructive flair until the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 (Nager, 1980).\(^{22}\)

---

\(^{20}\)However, smaller-scale government entities – such as empowered, coercive neighborhood associations – have successfully blocked gentrification projects (cf. Hackworth and Smith, 2001).

\(^{21}\)Urban renewal also cleared land for public housing projects and interstate highways (Nager, 1980).
The former Acts established the federal government’s role in housing markets, particularly the creation of affordable housing in inner-city areas. This legislation encouraged inner-city disinvestment both through providing Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages, which overwhelmingly favored suburban development and through the construction of high-rise, inner-city public housing. Subsequent legislation in 1949, 1954, and throughout the 1960's provided a role for private developers, expanded funding to non-residential land uses, and extended funding to community development opportunities (Nager, 1980).

However, if the federal government provided much urban renewal’s financial backing, municipalities governed the local spatial decisions concerning which neighborhoods would receive funding (Groberg, 1965; Fusch, 1980; Jackson-Mergler, 1984). Moreover, federal legislation stipulates further state authorization and local expenditures that precluded the involvement of the national government. In a rather optimistic essay on the ability of urban renewal to enact change – in contrast to urban renewal’s many critics (cf. Anderson, 1964), Groberg argues that “the program depends completely on active local political support” and that “the federal government neither operates any bulldozer, nor acquires any property for any urban renewal project” (1965:213). Since urban renewal relies on local, elected governments making decisions about local land use changes, Groberg sees less opportunity for bureaucratic mismanagement and a lack of accountability.

Groberg’s optimism stands in contrast to ample literature critical of the inner-city destruction wrought by urban renewal. Stanback and Noyelle (1982) identify 1960's historic preservation movements, which predate 1950's housing policy but expanded in the postwar era, as a populist reaction to the ahistorical nature of contemporary urban redevelopment. While
initial urban conservation efforts were largely conducted by incumbent residents, many of these historic preservation movements would meld into the first gentrification projects as neighborhood outsiders began buying and rehabilitating property (Clay, 1979; Stanback and Noyelle, 1982).

Urban housing policy of this era did not always signify demolition. New York City’s attempts to attract artists to SoHo, and later TriBeCa, constituted a radically different, through effective (from the city’s standpoint), form of redefining the urban landscape (Smith, 1986). However, the ‘trendification’ of artist’s enclaves represented a uniquely New York phenomenon, as no other city was able to enact urban renewal through attracting so narrow a class of residents.

Popular criticism against urban renewal gained traction through the 1960's and effectively ended the program by 1970 (Stanback and Noyelle, 1982). Lower-class residents publicly campaigned against their government-funded displacement, while those not dispossessed of their residences blanched at the callousness of the bureaucracy in demolishing historic structures. Additionally, many questioned the normative appropriateness of the relationship forged between government and the private sector in urban renewal, where the government assumed the cost of demolition and sold the cleared tracts to developers (Nager, 1980).

II. Incumbent Upgrading

The failure of urban renewal to enact a widespread urban renaissance, and the popular reaction that followed, ended government involvement in market-rate redevelopment – for a time. Until the 1990's, the state largely confines its active role in the housing market to affordable developments (that is, public housing), while promoting market-rate redevelopment through block grants and enterprise zones (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Many scholars have
argued that the clearance of the most devalorized urban tracts assisted early gentrification efforts by removing the strongest blighting influenced from inner-city neighborhoods (Beauregard, 1986). With the highest-crime neighborhoods demolished and replaced by highways and high-rise apartments, cultural elites saw opportunities to create new urban communities in the existing housing stock.

However, not all revitalized neighborhoods witnessed a large influx of outsiders. Instead, some areas saw their existing residents, with incomes buoyed by postwar prosperity, elect to remain in the neighborhood (Clay, 1979; Fusch, 1980). For these individuals, historic ties to a geographic place trumped impulses to leave the inner-city for the suburbs. Incumbent upgrading describes the historic preservation movement realized through existing residents rehabilitating property (Fusch, 1980). While its physical effects are largely similar to gentrification, incumbent upgrading forges a different culture of revitalization as few inmovers arrive and involuntary displacement does not occur.

III. Classical Gentrification

As its name implies, classical gentrification embodies the ‘traditional’ processes of gentrification identified by early scholars. This process commences when a group of hip, anti-establishment Bohemian-types establish residences in a neglected area (Clay, 1979; Berry, 1985). As information spreads about the neighborhood as ‘up-and-coming,’ increasingly wealthy

\[ \text{It is worth noting that most neighborhoods to experience incumbent upgrading had largely avoided severe urban blight and the arrival of an African-American population (Clay, 1979). One might imagine that these residents would not have remained had their neighborhood undergone a more dramatic decline.} \]

Writing prior to the gentrification explosion of the 1980’s, Clay determined the contemporary municipal role in gentrification as highly variable (1979:27-29). Writing from a demand-side perspective, Clay fashioned gentrifiers as the stars of the inner-city revitalization spectacle, with other actors – developers, realtors, financial institutions, neighborhood groups, and all levels of government – secondary to the plot.

Clay divides local government support into three activities. Firstly, he distinguishes state-funded infrastructure improvements, or, in his parlance, “major resource allocation to the neighborhood” (Clay, 1979:27). These improvements comprise enhanced public areas, more efficient transportation, and cosmetic changes, all designed to create a neighborhood more attractive to investors and ripe for reinvestment. Clay argues that these improvements were more common to neighborhoods that had undergone urban renewal programs (read: widespread demolition), presumably because municipalities view new infrastructure construction as less burdensome than upgrading existing streets, sidewalks, and parks.

The second category of municipal support for gentrification concerns “neighborhood marketing” (Clay, 1979:28). Specifically, these help manifested itself as house tours, parks, fairs, and historical district recognition. In 1979, Clay viewed this assistance as a budding phenomenon and not widely used; however, current evidence from all cities undergoing

---

gentrification (and those who wish to encourage gentrification) displays that neighborhood marketing has only increased in popularity (Smith, 1996).

Clay’s final classification of municipal support concerns indirect municipal subsidy for gentrification. A popular program then involved the establishment of creative financing arrangements that, while modest, reduce the costs often occurred when purchasing and renovating a disinvested property. These often took shape in two forms and only applied to spatially-limited areas. First, many cities sold municipality-owned vacant parcels at reduced rates with certain conditions favoring home ownership and rehabilitation. These conditions usually stipulated that a potential owner must live in the property, that it could not be resold for a period of $n$ years, and that the owner must make improvements to the property. Secondly, cities often offered below-market rate loans for home rehabilitation; these loans were open to both in-movers and existing residents. Clay optimistically views these programs as major impetuses for change writing that “even limited subsidies create a model for change in a particular neighborhood. These models are not overlooked by potential buyers” (1979:28).

Hackworth and Smith (2001) argue that Keynesian governmental controls, especially those emanating from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), made

---

24 Clay argues that neighborhood marketing might remain a popular technique as it is relatively inexpensive on the city’s behalf – that is, the city only serves to disseminate the information, while employing the (volunteered) creativity of neighborhood residents (1979:28).

25 In a key informant interview, a Columbus planner describe the city’s program as providing loans for structures containing up to four residential units, provided the owner lived in one of them.

26 It is worthwhile to note that Clay, like other contemporary scholars, takes an optimistic view of gentrification.
affordable housing a more pressing concern for the state. Additionally, one must also consider the sporadic and limited nature of gentrification during the 1970's. Although many cities were experiencing revitalization (cf. Black 1975), the impetus behind most gentrification projects – the arrival of artist-types and the subsequent ‘trendification’ of the neighborhood (after Berry, 1985) – was particularly hard to locate at the municipal level.

Synthesizing Clay’s portrayal of the municipal role with other scholarly works covering the same period (cf. London, 1980; Laska and Spain (eds.), 1980) one sees the 1970's city both highly interested in promoting gentrification yet unable (or unwilling) to provide large amounts of supportive capital. While a financial support for gentrification, reduced-rate loan programs were open to all inner-city residents, not only gentrifiers. These programs often supported incumbent upgrading programs of the same era, where existing residents renovated their own homes without a significant in-migration of gentrifiers and resulting cultural shift.

IV. Private-led Gentrification

Following the economic downturn of the late 1970's, gentrification “surged as never before” (Hackworth and Smith, 2001:466) as the process spread both from isolated neighborhoods to previously disinvested areas and from cities at the apex of the urban hierarchy down to smaller and less influential locales. Accompanying the intensification of gentrification at the urban level was its “integration . . . into a wider range of economic and cultural processes” (Hackworth and Smith: 468) as public consciousness about feasible, privately-funded urban revitalization grew.

And, I would argue, into academic processes, as the amount and quality of gentrification literature surged in the 1980's (cf. Laska and Spain (eds.), 1984; Berry, 1985; Smith and Williams (eds.), 1986).
The defining characteristic of 1980's gentrification was the entrance of private (re-)developers as the catalysts for gentrification. While these market entities had, in Classical Gentrification, merely reacted to the ‘trendification’ of certain urban neighborhoods following the arrival of gentrifiers (cf. Clay’s (1979) model of gentrification), they now led the way in creating (and conquering) the urban frontier (cf. Smith, 1986). New York City redevelopment advertisements promoted the “Taming of the Wild, Wild West” (Side of Manhattan, that is) and offered residents an opportunity to “Join the Ruling Class” (at the Monarch, a redeveloped condominium high-rise on the Lower East Side) (Smith, 1996:14, 93). Motivating the increased private role, one must consider that gentrification had ascertained mainstream status by the onset of the private-led era. Having reached a critical mass of already-gentrified neighborhoods, the city’s remaining disinvested neighborhoods were ripe for redevelopment. Able to draw on larger amounts of capital than individual gentrifiers, private entities could enact change faster, and could redevelop high-rises whose size prohibited previous revitalization.

The state role during the private-led gentrification era declined from the timid support given during the 1970's. Interviews with planners indicate that, as public opposition against gentrification grew during the 1980's, cities withdrew low-interest loan programs that existing residents viewed as subsidies to gentrification (also cf. Smith, 1996). Those cities which had not experienced extensive gentrification became more aggressive in their attempts to attract redevelopment capital to inner-city areas. Some municipalities employed their federally-funded, locally-controlled Community Development Block Grants (CDBG’s) as catalysts for urban

28Most likely, public opposition increased as gentrification became an increasingly well-known phenomenon (Smith, 1986; 1996).
redevelopment. These funds were often used to demolish abandoned, structurally-unsound housing units and improve infrastructure – initiatives that both improve the conditions of existing residents while also encouraging outsider investment.

V. Municipal-led Gentrification

The recession of the late 1980's and early 90's and the subsequent devolution of real estate prices brought the juggernaut of private-led gentrification to a sudden halt. Declines in housing prices struck speculative environments particularly hard (Lees, 2000), leading Bourne (1993) to question if the economic downturn had spelt “the demise of gentrification” while Bagli (2001) coined “degentrification” to describe potential re-disinvestment of revitalized neighborhoods. However, following the resulting economic recovery of the mid-1990's and the ensuing dizzying pace of internet-driven economic growth, gentrification again surged into inner-city neighborhoods (Smith, 1996; Wyly and Hammel, 1999; Lees, 2000;).

With the rise of gentrification in the mid-90's, many scholars realized that post-recession gentrification processes differed significantly from those in previous eras, and that increased state involvement appears to be the most salient characteristic of 1990's-style urban revitalization (Lees, 2000). Hackworth and Smith (2001:468) write that “after a curious departure from direct involvement in gentrification during the [1980's], the state has become more interventionist in the [1990's].” Coupled with these shifts are changes in federal affordable housing policy and increased globalization and technology development in the real estate industry, which has allowed larger developers to participate in gentrification projects across multiple cities (Wyly and Hammel, 2000; Hackworth and Smith, 2001).

Three aspects of the state’s role in municipal-led gentrification distinguish this era:
1. Neighborhood Planning. The rise of neighborhood planning has minimized the redevelopment scale for cities, leading to greater knowledge production about individual reinvestment opportunities. The release of a neighborhood plan also allows the news media to focus on an area as ‘up-and-coming.’

2. Public-Private Partnerships. These partnerships combine municipal coercive power and government-supported grants with private funding for redevelopment.

3. The resurgence of eminent domain. Cities are increasingly using eminent domain to acquire land for private redevelopment (or often for redevelopment through public-private partnerships). Additionally, municipalities are transferring the power of eminent domain and other coercive abilities to smaller-scale public entities, such as neighborhood commissions. These commissions act in the city’s stead to approve or reject rehabilitations, zoning variances, and new construction.

Beyond the city level, HUD’s HOPE VI program represents an important component abetting the rise of municipal-led gentrification. This new approach to public housing is redeveloping the department’s most-distressed properties, embracing the mixed-income philosophy, and reducing the absolute number of project-based public housing units nationwide (Wyly and Hammel, 2000). New HOPE VI developments are more architecturally-pleasing compared to the agency’s previous ‘warehouses of the poor.’ Mixed-income neighborhoods dilute the blighting influence of the extremely poor, work to eliminate the negative connotations outsiders associated with public housing, and remove the stigma associated with public housing as ‘housing of the last resort’ (HUD, 1999). Government-provided data indicates that the crime
rates in neighborhoods surrounding HOPE VI projects have drastically dropped compared to their pre-revitalization figures (HUD, 1999).²⁹

A Revanchist City?

Smith (1986, but especially 1996) has long advanced an argument detailing the tragedy that has befallen inner-city residents following the collapse of Keynesian government controls and the rise of the “revanchist [that is, revenge-seeking] city.” Weaving Marx’s conflict framework with Turner’s Frontier Thesis, Smith constructs a society vengeful against those who ‘stole’ the inner-city from the respectable classes. He writes that

More than anything the revanchist city expresses a race/class/gender terror felt by middle- and ruling-class whites who are suddenly stuck in place by a ravaged property market, the threat and reality of unemployment, the decimation of social services, and the emergence of minority and immigrant groups, as well as women, as powerful urban actors.

(Smith, 1996:211)

From popular culture, Smith’s theory shares much of its motivation with Tom Wolfe’s Bonfire of the Vanities (Smith 1996:212-3). Wolfe’s novel documents the travails and hopelessness of an upper-class Manhattanite as he undergoes prosecution in the socially-distant (though physically-near) Bronx for a crime he did not commit. His experiences with empowered – and corrupted – minority

²⁹However, these figures also span the nationwide decrease in crime rates throughout the 1990's.
politicians and social actors\textsuperscript{30} in the Bronx courtroom evince the motivations behind the revanchist attitude of upper-class whites.

Moving beyond Marx and Turner, one can witness a temporal aspect to Smith’s revanchism construction. His analysis clearly draws from the global economic shifts of the 1970’s brought increased unemployment, unmanageable volatility, and ‘stagflation’ to the American economy (Harvey 2005). Continuing this argument, the denouement of post-war economic prosperity terrified the American middle class, the beneficiaries of wage growth, low unemployment, and a rising quality-of-life for three decades. This erosion of economic security turned the (white, male) American middle class into, in its own perception, an injured species – one forced to seek revenge against those who have wronged it.

Smith employs a variety of socio-economic components to motivate his revanchist city. He draws upon the rise of popular crime-drama TV programs, such as “Cops” and “America’s Most Wanted,” and the 24-hour “Court TV” network to explain the nation’s fascination with crime and punishment. Tom Wolfe’s \textit{Bonfire of the Vanities}, a scathing criticism of the newfound political power of minorities in an urban context, illustrates the despair felt by upper-middle class whites at their loss of political efficacy. More concretely, Smith relates city-sanctioned police brutality in the Tompkins Square (anti-gentrification) Riots of 1988\textsuperscript{31} and New York City’s long-running campaign

\textsuperscript{30}These personalities include one obviously modeled after a well-known, New York-based African-American preacher (Smith 1996:213).

\textsuperscript{31}To combat the homeless and other transients who had made Tompkins Square Park, on Manhattan’s Lower East Side, home, a local community association instituted a 1 A.M. curfew on the green space on June 28, 1988. On July 11\textsuperscript{th}, the NYPD removed those who refused to comply with the order and relocated the homeless to a smaller section of the park. Intermittent protests occurred throughout the month of July, but a significantly-larger demonstration on August 6\textsuperscript{th} led to the police charging the park and the ensuing riot. Most have attributed the
against visible indicators of homelessness as further evidence of municipalities’ crusade against their own citizens. Expanding beyond the city, Smith finds a virulent strain of anti-homeless action throughout the 1990’s, with efforts undertaken by cities as varied geographically, culturally, and politically as Miami, Atlanta, and San Francisco (1996:225).

Incorporating the ‘revanchist city’ into municipal-led gentrification jaundices a particular (anti-) city opinion of recent changes in gentrification structure. While Smith raises legitimate questions about the appropriateness of a strong municipal role in gentrification, he bases the majority of his argument on the New York City experience -- a locale where the city’s population, density, and long history of gentrification create a unique political environment for conflict resolution. Evidence from cities further down the urban hierarchy indicates that the city’s increased role has not received the level of popular scrutiny as it has in NYC (cf. Wyly and Hammel, 2000; Hassen, 2005).

A Temporal Basis?

Examination of the literature appears to indicate a highly temporal basis to the different eras of gentrification. Hackworth and Smith (2001) go as far as to argue temporal exclusivity to their classification scheme of gentrification. However, research in Columbus indicates that other models, but especially Classical Gentrification, are highly operable within certain contexts.

Interviews with planners and gentrifiers have indicated that the city has largely been absent from the gentrification of Merion Village, a neighborhood immediately to the east and south of German Village. German Village was one of Columbus’ first inner-city areas to undergo curfew implementation to the community association’s attempt to open up the Lower East Side of Manhattan to gentrification, which the presence of so many homeless and vagabonds impeded. Some protestors on August 6th were seen carrying signs that read “Gentrification is Class War” (Purdham, 1988)
revitalization (cf. Fusch, 1980), and my interviews indicate that Merion Village’s proximity to an already-gentrified neighborhood has driven recent changes in its demographic and physical composition. One gentrifier indicated that “that city hasn’t done anything for me. They don’t need to” while another recent arrival to Merion Village said “the area itself is a draw [to the neighborhood], not some government subsidy.”
Chapter IV: Weinland Park

Located on Columbus’ Near North Side, the Weinland Park neighborhood has epitomized the patterns of growth and decline that have historically defined inner-city areas (cf. Kaplan, Wheeler, and Holloway, 2004). The neighborhood’s rise as a working-class community easily accessible to nearby factories, downtown, and The Ohio State University made its sturdy, albeit common, housing a draw to early residents. However, postwar suburbanization and urban decline left Weinland Park with a disproportionate share of poverty and its associated problems: crime, disinvested housing, and lack of opportunities. A representative of the local redevelopment commission once noted that “all of urban America - and its challenges - can be encapsulated in Weinland Park” (Crabbe, 1998). While recent trends indicate that the neighborhood is primed for revitalization, its rebirth remains in the formative state with a malleable conclusion.

This chapter describes the history, current state, and planned future of Weinland Park. First, drawing on Solove’s (2002) oral history research, I construct the neighborhood’s evolution from an urban village to an urban problem. Second, I evaluate news sources and use key informant

32The Weinland Park neighborhood derives its moniker from the park near the center of the area and immediately to neighborhood elementary school’s south. The park itself was named after Edgar Weinland, a member of the first graduating class of Ohio State’s Law School and the Columbus City Councillor who advocated for the annexation of the Near North Side, including what would become Weinland Park (Solove, 2002). The neighborhood’s boundaries are Chittenden Ave. to the north, High St. to the west, 5th Ave. to the south, and the Conrail Tracks to the east.
interviews to chronicle current changes in Weinland Park. Third, I assess planning documents and relevant interview findings to describe the changes envisioned for Weinland Park. Both current activity and those changes envisioned in planning documents illustrate the rise of Municipal-led Gentrification and its effect on urban neighborhoods.

**History of Weinland Park**

The Weinland Park neighborhood developed as the City of Columbus annexed property along North High Street in the late 1800's (Solove, 2002). A predominantly working class area, the majority of its housing was constructed from 1900 to 1920, with most units in the Standard American style of architecture with some, more decorative Georgian Revival structures (Fusch and Ford, 1983). Employment opportunities at the Near North Side’s many factories – Columbus Coated Fabrics, 3M, and the Jeffrey Manufacturing Company, among many smaller-scale manufacturers – attracted the initial wave of working-class, ethnically-mixed residents.

Demographic and economic changes affected Weinland Park following World War I, and the neighborhood remains in transition today. The Great Migration brought African-Americans to Columbus and Weinland Park in search of higher-paying manufacturing jobs throughout the first half of the twentieth century but especially during World War II (Lemann, 1992). The postwar years witnessed further racial integration as white flight and disinvestment affected inner-city areas throughout the US, including Weinland Park. However, the neighborhood retained relative racial balance as recently as 1990, when the Census indicated that over half of the neighborhood’s population was white (cf. Appendix I, Table 1.2). From 1990 to 2000, the white population dropped by more than a third, while the neighborhood lost 12% of its population during the same time period (cf. App. I, Table 1.3).
Oral histories provide a unique glimpse into Weinland Park’s recent downturn. Residents report that the arrival of crack cocaine in the 1980's initiated a downward spiral of rampant joblessness, disinvestment, and gang activity (Solove 2002). Many who could afford a move to the suburbs, but whose neighborhood ties had encouraged them to remain in Weinland Park, left as the situation deteriorated. Until their ouster in 1995, the Short North Posse ruled the Weinland Park neighborhood through its ruthless gang violence and brazen drug trafficking (Crabbe, 1998). Additionally, a decline in manufacturing employment reduced middle-class employment opportunities.

Lacking any political influence, Weinland Park was unable to oppose the siting of 575 Section 8 federally-subsidized low-income housing units within the neighborhood in the 1980's (Sterrett, 2003; Ohio Capital Corporation for Housing). Such a large quantity of public housing only exacerbated the existing decline and contributed to further disinvestment throughout the 1990's. Moreover, residents of Windsor Terrace, Columbus’ worst public housing project, were moved into Weinland Park Section 8 during the HOPE VI-funded rehabilitation of their former residence. Many Weinland Park residents expressed that these new arrivals disrespected their new (albeit temporary) residences, increased the crime rate, and depressed the area’s quality of life (Solove, 2002).

**Neighborhood Planning**

A defining characteristic of Municipal-led gentrification – and one especially relevant to Weinland Park – is the embrace of neighborhood planning as a redevelopment tool. Within the past ten years, three city council-approved plans have studied the neighborhood, identified potential

---

33 These oral histories were gathered in 2001-2 through a service-learning class at Ohio State taught by Dr. Golden Jackson-Mergler and consolidated by Solove (2002).
redevelopment sites, and articulated acceptable and unacceptable future land uses (Department of Development 1997, 2006; Campus Partners, 2002). These plans represent important instruments for change, and, as city-endorsed, the developments they envision speak volumes about the municipality’s goals for the neighborhood.

The *University Neighborhoods Revitalization Plan: A Concept Document (UNRP)* was the first neighborhood-based document to assess the Weinland Park area, albeit within the context of the University District (Dept. of Development, 1997). This document identified Weinland Park as a blighting influence on the entire University District and noted that “many prospective students and their parents, especially high-ability students, are deciding not to attend Ohio State due to a setting that is perceived as disintegrating and unsafe” (Dept. of Development, 1997:20; my emphasis). The *UNRP* made more than 250 recommendations (Sterrett, 2004), and its qualification as *A Concept Document* describes the overall tone: relative to other neighborhood plans, the document is larger and yet less specific on individual redevelopment opportunities.

Campus Partners’ *A Plan for High Street: Creating a 21st Century Main Street* (2000) conveyed a redevelopment strategy for the University District’s commercial core that (in contrast to *UNRP*) identified specific sites well-suited for reinvestment. The plan covered High Street from 5th Ave., at the southwest corner of the Weinland Park neighborhood, north to Lane Ave. Its primary call was for increased density and mixed-use commercial/residential land uses along the artery. However, while the plan included a significant stretch of High St. along the Weinland Park area, planners largely sought input from students and not Weinland Park residents. One can see evidence of this misstep in Campus Partners’ list of potential (ie, acceptable) commercial land uses: arts cinemas, ‘trendy’ clothing stores, and aerobic studios are not usually considered large draws for
older, established families (Campus Partners, 2002).

The culmination of the Department of Development’s efforts in Weinland Park came to fruition with 2006's *Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan (WPNP)*. The *WPNP* identified the neighborhood’s extensive Section 8 housing and low owner-occupancy rate (near 10% per Census 2000 data) as the greatest impediments to revitalization (Dept. of Development, 2006). To this end, the plan identified numerous sites throughout the area where conversion from rental to owner-occupied property was realistic. Additionally, the Plan determined the neighborhood’s brownfields as excellent opportunities for *municipal-private partnerships* (cf. Municipal-led Gentrification) for construction of new, market-rate, owner-occupied housing. Examining a diagram of the redevelopment opportunities presented in the *WPNP* (cf. Appendix IV), one can see a distinctly spatial pattern of reinvestment along the neighborhood’s fringe. 34

**Recent Changes and Current Activity**

A number of developments beginning in the mid-1990's and continuing to the present have encouraged redevelopment in Weinland Park. Planners have identified the area’s unique location between downtown and the university and adjacent to Columbus’ hottest gentrification markets as inducements to positive change; however, the area’s high crime rate, widespread identification as a slum, and proximity to blighting brownfields have thus far prohibited any revitalization (Campus Partners). The arrival of new actors in the neighborhood represents an increased city role, and recent changes illustrate the rise of Municipal-led gentrification as a means of revitalizing the most-distressed neighborhoods.

34 It is important to remember here that Weinland Park is bordered to the south by the already-gentrified Italian Village.
The 1994 rape and murder of Ohio State student Stephanie Hummer set into motion a process which would culminate with the establishment of Campus Partners for Community Urban Redevelopment, a university-city partnership seeking to enact private sector-driven change in the University District (Hassan, 2002; Campus Partners). Ideally, Campus Partners could combine the city’s coercive power with the university’s brain trust (and considerable endowment) to identify potential redevelopment sites and facilitate reinvestment in the neighborhood. In reality, while accomplishing important milestones, the organization has suffered from extensive controversy and biting criticism from students, residents, and private entities (Chandler, 1999; Christopher, 2001).

Despite representing the entire University District, a solid majority of Campus Partners’ redevelopment activity has focused on the Weinland Park neighborhood. The organization’s South Campus Gateway project transformed a blighted campus bar district into a vibrant mixed-use area (albeit one devoid of any historical connections). To redevelop the 7.5 acre site, Campus Partners relied on the city’s power of eminent domain and a $20 million contribution from the university to compensate owners (Sterrett, 2003).

The South Campus Gateway embodies the core processes of Municipal-led gentrification. Initially, the city identifies an area as downtrodden and yet redevelopable; in response, it initiates the neighborhood planning process to locate investment opportunities and propose potential and acceptable future uses. Neighborhood planning also increases the public’s awareness of potential redevelopment and can identify an area as ‘up-and-coming.’ Secondly, the city works with a private

---

35Interestingly, few students live in Weinland Park, and those who do primarily rent dorm-style apartments on Chittenden and 11th Aves. Campus Partners’ fixation on the Weinland Park neighborhood – instead of the predominantly student-occupied neighborhood to the north – has been the source of much controversy (cf. Chandler, 1999)
In the South Campus Gateway, the role of private redeveloper is jointly played by Campus Partners and the University; Campus Partners provides the necessary logistic and management functions while the University supplies financial backing.

Admittedly, in my interviews, even the most ardent affordable housing advocates conceded that Weinland Park had an excessive share of Section 8 units, saying “the amount of Section 8 had to decrease, but we have to wonder: where are those residents going? No other developer to acquire the necessary land and complete any legal hurdles that may obstruct redevelopment. If necessary, municipalities employ their coercive power – in this case, eminent domain – to secure land from opposing owners, property which they subsequently sell to the redeveloper.

The Gateway project only marked the beginning of Campus Partners’ role in the Weinland Park neighborhood. Having recognized Weinland Park’s significant Section 8 housing stock as an impediment to revitalization for some time, Campus Partners began an effort to acquire, or at least reform, the neighborhood’s subsidized housing stock. Through a series of political maneuvers, Campus Partners worked with a separate non-profit to purchase and renovate the previous owner’s entire Section 8 portfolio – some 1,335 units throughout Columbus (Sterrett, 2003). Presenting their strategy as a model for effective Section 8 housing management, Campus Partners was able to receive $1.2 million in federal funding to cover “legal, consulting, and architectural fees,” among other outlays (Sterrett, 2003).

Again, striking parallels exist between Campus Partners’ actions and the Municipal-led Gentrification framework. Once more, the initial impetus for change lies in the University Neighborhoods Revitalization Plan, which raised concern about the effectiveness of the previous Section 8 owner (Department of Development, 1997). Additionally, the sale of the Section 8 portfolio promised both to reduce absolute number of Section 8 units and provide $25,000 worth

---

36 In the South Campus Gateway, the role of private redeveloper is jointly played by Campus Partners and the University; Campus Partners provides the necessary logistic and management functions while the University supplies financial backing.

37 Admittedly, in my interviews, even the most ardent affordable housing advocates conceded that Weinland Park had an excessive share of Section 8 units, saying “the amount of Section 8 had to decrease, but we have to wonder: where are those residents going? No other
of rehabilitation per unit (Sterrett, 2003). This action correlates with Wyly and Hammel’s (2000) chronicling of public housing policy in Chicago, where the city also sought to reduce absolute number and increase the attractiveness of remaining units. The use of federal funding to support gentrification follows a long history of federal funding for municipal revitalization efforts.

However, important differences exist between Municipal-led Gentrification and the transfer of Section 8 ownership. On a philosophical level, while Municipal-led Gentrification is associated with neoliberalism and privatization of government functions, the sale of the Section 8 portfolio from a private entity (Broad Street Management) to a non-profit (OCCH) represents a deprivatization not accounted for in the framework. Continuing a larger outlook, one must consider if the actions surrounding the Section 8 units represent a limit to private-market involvement in affordable housing. However, further evidence over a longer time scale must emerge before one draws definitive conclusions on the suitability of private or non-profit administration of affordable housing.  

However, the most significant investment in Weinland Park has only begun. In December of 2006, the city of Columbus and Campus Partners purchased 17.4 acres of the former Columbus Coated Fabrics (CCF) site at Weinland Park’s eastern margin (Wagenbrenner Development Corp., 2007). CCF had lain vacant since its previous tenant, Decorative Surfaces International, filed for

____________________
neighborhood is taking more Section 8 tenants.”

An interview with a neighborhood resident not in Section 8 showed that, while most CPOMS Section 8 units have undergone rehabilitation at least once, the entity is still frequently moving residents around to complete repairs unfinished or poorly done from the first round of remodeling. I fear that, from a community development mindset, this constant shuffling of tenants will prohibit the linkages among individual, place, and residence that can create community cohesion.
bankruptcy in 2001. As of May 2007, Campus Partners’ contractors have completed both asbestos removal from the site and the demolition of remaining structures has commenced. Due to the site’s size and extensive environmental contamination, its redevelopment has seen a particularly strong municipal-developer partnership and this, coupled with the site’s future planned use and its estimated effect on the neighborhood, only provides more evidence for Municipal-led Gentrification.

Following the recommendations of the *Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan*, the CCF site is being redeveloped as market-rate, middle- to upper middle-class condominiums and apartments (Dept. of Development, 2006; Wagenbrenner, 2007).\(^{39}\) Campus Partners and the city of Columbus, as well as a former tenant of the site, are providing funding for environmental reclamation and demolition of the site. Provided the project receives $3,000,000 in Clean Ohio Revitalization Funds (CORF),\(^{40}\) the Wagenbrenner Development Corporation will construct 507 residential units: 369 condominiums, with an expected average value of $154,532 (but with some models valued over $200,000) and 138 apartments with an average value of $120,312 (Wagenbrenner, 2007).

One can imagine the effects – both positive and negative – that this development will have on the Weinland Park neighborhoods, where the current median home price of the 864 existing residential structures is $82,500 (Census Bureau, 2000; Franklin County Auditor). A community developer told me that “[the Columbus Coated Fabrics redevelopment] will provide the necessary critical mass of new investment to turn Weinland Park around.” However, others point to the likely

\(^{39}\)Cf. Appendix II for a breakdown of funding outlays for the CCF site.

\(^{40}\)CORF is a state-funded program aimed at redeveloping Ohio’s many brownfields. Because the Wagenbrenner Company has submitted and completed successful CORF applications before, all of my informants believe that they will receive state funding, although the recipients will not be announced until August (Wagenbrenner, 2007).
gentrification and subsequent displacement that will follow the CCF construction. A neighborhood activist asked rhetorically “if they [the city, Campus Partners, and developers] know what they’re doing” – that is, gentrifying the neighborhood with municipal support.
Chapter 5: Conclusions, or Do Alternate Futures Exist?

This work has shown, through both an innovative survey of the literature and my own research in Columbus, that the city role in gentrification has re-surged from its 1980's doldrums while remaining highly variegated over time. In doing so, I support Lees’ (2000) contention that today’s gentrification projects differ from those of previous eras, and, while I hold reservations regarding the revanchism present in Smith’s (1996) construction of the city, I have identified some similar processes occurring both in New York City and in Columbus. However, significant structural considerations present in the housing markets of these two cities impede any direct comparison between them.

I fear that previous chapters have largely ignored an important element related to the rise of Municipal-led Gentrification; that is, local opposition to the process. To conclude this thesis, I present strategies that residents, neighborhood groups, and other non-profits have put forth to
mitigate the negative effects (involuntary displacement) of all forms of gentrification. Finally, I advance a normative argument that both supports the city as a vital and appropriate actor in gentrification while expressing doubts about its current actions.

Northside Community Development Corporation (NCDC) has provided affordable housing opportunities in both new builds and existing housing since 1991 (Columbus Collaborative). Through homeowners’ assistance programs, the CDC has opened the possibility of homeownership to a class underserved by the existing housing market. Additionally, its recent efforts have focused on the lease-to-own model, where a prospective homeowner accrues equity and credit through leasing a property for fifteen years\(^{41}\), with the option to sign a fifteen year mortgage for the remaining balance due on the house\(^{42}\). Ideally, a resident could build significant equity in the home over the lease period and could sign the mortgage for a significantly affordable rate. Unfortunately, NCDC’s leadership is currently in shambles following the departure of its executive director and the board of director’s decision not to fill the vacant position.

Another proposed counterweight to gentrification in Weinland Park is Community Land Trusts (CLT’s).\(^{43}\) Traditionally used for malls and upscale condominiums, CLT’s allow low-income homeowners to own their house, while the non-profit administering the CLT owns the land.

\(^{41}\)Lease payments go towards the value of the house. For example: a tenant who leases a $150,000 property for 15 years, paying $500 per month, would have paid off $90,000 of the house’s cost at the end of the lease. If the (low-income) tenant decides to sign a mortgage for the property, he has a much greater chance of approval, and could receive a lower interest rate, on a $60,000 mortgage than a $150,000 mortgage.

\(^{42}\)My interviews have shown that a similar program has been successful, with 60% of the original tenants continuing with the initiative through the fifteen year mortgage.

\(^{43}\)The information on Community Land Trusts came from a local neighborhood activist who is attempting to organize one in Weinland Park, and from Medoff and Sklar, 1994.
underneath the house. The non-profit entity administering the CLT controls the selling price of housing units under its discretion, usually pegging their yearly increase in value to the inflation rate or some similar economic barometer.

Many planners argue that Weinland Park’s supply of Section 8 housing serves as a buffer to any displacement caused by gentrification, as these housing units remain under contract for periods of 20-30 years. Moreover, the Weinland Park units had their contracts renewed in the early 2000's, so they will remain in affordable housing until 2020 at a minimum. However, more adamant defenders of affordable housing question the amount of Section 8 that will remain after 2020 or 2030; these activists use a longer time frame when anticipating future affordable housing needs.

All of these efforts fit within two frameworks concerning gentrification mitigation: mixed-income neighborhoods and ‘partial’ gentrification. Mixed-income neighborhoods, while the recipients of considerable study, have failed to materialize on a large scale without significant state support (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001). ‘Partial’ gentrification, largely advanced by the Brookings Institute (cf. Kennedy and Leonard, 2001), seeks to utilize the city’s coercive power to guarantee affordable housing in gentrified neighborhoods. This working-class housing not only reduces involuntary displacement, but also promotes mixed-income communities.44

Moving towards a more judicious city role, I cannot help but realize the city’s unique position as a gentrification actor. On one hand, the city holds the potential – both coercive and financial – to mediate between the two opposing positions in gentrification. Through Community Land Trusts and legislated mixed-income communities, municipalities hold the power to reduce the negative

44Surveys of gentrifiers have shown (Gale, 1980) that gentrifiers value mixed-income neighborhoods for their intrinsic value. However, one can imagine that gentrifiers’ response to a survey questionnaire and their true feelings toward living amongst the poor may differ.
effects of involuntary displacement. Additionally, through their planning apparatus and ability to corral federal and local funding into urban improvements, cities can identify redevelopment sites and provide grant outlays to make redevelopment feasible even in the most distressed areas. Unfortunately, the evidence from Columbus (this volume), New York (Hackworth and Smith, 2001), Chicago (Wyly and Hammel, 2000), and other areas indicates that Municipal-led Gentrification has yet to embrace the mixed-income ideology on a large scale. However, one must aspire that new waves of gentrifiers will insist on mixed-income neighborhoods and that empirical evidence continues to support the economic and intrinsic benefits mixed-income areas offer. If not, the politically polarizing effects of gentrification will only continue to color the many positives that revitalization and reinvestment can bring to inner-city areas.
## Appendix I: Gentrification Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>Urban Renewal</th>
<th>Incumbent Upgrading</th>
<th>Classical Gentrification</th>
<th>Commercial-led Gentrification</th>
<th>Municipal-led Gentrification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First sign of</strong></td>
<td>Federal government indicates desire to raze neighborhood.</td>
<td>Initial catalyst spurs existing residents to improve own properties</td>
<td>Artists and ‘Bohemians’ seek neighborhood as a refuge from society.</td>
<td>Developers purchase properties over ‘speculation’ of rising land values.</td>
<td>Publication of Neighborhood Plan suggestive of revitalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First to move in?</strong></td>
<td>Bulldozers.</td>
<td>Few inmovers drawn by preservation.</td>
<td>Bohemians.</td>
<td><em>Future Redevelopment signs</em></td>
<td>City planners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who provides most financial capital?</strong></td>
<td>Federal government</td>
<td>Existing residents</td>
<td>Incoming residents</td>
<td>Private developers and real estate interests.</td>
<td>Larger developers and real estate interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involuntary displacement of existing residents?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Usually not</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Often, but greater opportunities for mitigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal role</strong></td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples from Columbus:</strong></td>
<td>Flytown</td>
<td>Grandview</td>
<td>German Village, Olde Towne East</td>
<td>Victorian Village, Italian Village, Harrison West.</td>
<td>Weinland Park, Franklinton, South Linden.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Construct
Appendix II: Census Data

Table 1.1: Weinland Park population, 1970 and 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1970 population</th>
<th>2000 population</th>
<th>Abs. change</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6746</td>
<td>4810</td>
<td>-1936</td>
<td>-28.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Bureau.

Table 1.2: Weinland Park racial characteristics, 1990 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Census Tract 16</th>
<th>Census Tract 17</th>
<th>1990 Total</th>
<th>Census Tract 16</th>
<th>Census Tract 17</th>
<th>2000 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White, abs.</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>2202</td>
<td>3011</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>1476</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (%)</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black, abs.</td>
<td>1544</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>2311</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>2447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (%)</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, abs.\textsuperscript{45}</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (%)</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2383</td>
<td>3081</td>
<td>5464</td>
<td>2077</td>
<td>2733</td>
<td>4810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Bureau.

Table 1.3: Racial Change in Weinland Park, 1990 to 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Census Tract 16</th>
<th>Census Tract 17</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White, abs.</td>
<td>-333</td>
<td>-726</td>
<td>-1059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (%)</td>
<td>-41.2%</td>
<td>-33.0</td>
<td>-35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black, abs.</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (%)</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, abs.\textsuperscript{45}</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, (%)</td>
<td>156.7%</td>
<td>198.2%</td>
<td>189.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, abs.</td>
<td>-306</td>
<td>-348</td>
<td>-654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (%)</td>
<td>-14.7%</td>
<td>-11.3%</td>
<td>-12.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Bureau.

\textsuperscript{45}The Census Bureau changed its racial data collection in 2000 to accommodate those of more than one race. Those answering more than one race in Census 2000 are tallied here in the ‘other’ category, which partially explains its increase over 1990 data.
### Table 1.4: Economic and Demographic Data, Weinland Park and Columbus, 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Weinland Park</th>
<th>Columbus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>4810</td>
<td>711,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td>$15,381</td>
<td>$37,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Housing Value</td>
<td>$82,500</td>
<td>$99,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent White</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent African-American</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Owner-Occupied Housing</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Vacant</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Household Size</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Bureau.
Appendix III: Tasks, Funding, and Sources for Columbus Coated Fabrics site rehabilitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquiring Property</td>
<td>$385,000</td>
<td>city of Columbus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Assessment</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>Campus Partners and city of Columbus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleanup and Demolition</td>
<td>$1,559,911</td>
<td>city of Columbus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>Hexion Specialty Chemicals (^{46})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>$3,900,000</td>
<td>city of Columbus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matching Funds</td>
<td>$1,896,936</td>
<td>Wagenbrenner Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-state investment</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>(all previous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State CORF Funding (in application)</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
<td>State of Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated total cost of cleanup, demolition,</td>
<td>$47,500,000(^{47})</td>
<td>(all previous, plus additional private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infrastructure, and construction</td>
<td></td>
<td>(financial) capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Construction Cost</td>
<td>$35,500,000</td>
<td>Wagenbrenner and private financial capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated annual property taxes generated</td>
<td>$499,652</td>
<td>New residents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{46}\)Hexion is the successor to Borden, Inc., the former operator of the CCF site and the culprit of much of the site’s environmental destruction.

\(^{47}\)Those costs above and beyond existing funding will be provided by Wagenbrenner Development Corp. through their own capital or private financing.
Appendix IV: Revitalization Pressure in Columbus Neighborhoods

Revitalization Pressure in Selected Inner-City Neighborhoods

Legend

- Little Evidence for Future Revitalization
- Significant Revitalization Occurring
- Distant Plans for Future Revitalization
- Gentrified
- Some Evidence for Future Revitalization
- N/A

Source: Author’s Construct
Appendix V: Weinland Park Redevelopment Plans

NB. The South Campus Gateway was completed in 2005, while demolition on the Columbus Coated Fabrics site began in May 2007. No other sites have yet seen appreciable revitalization.
Appendix VI: Proposed Redevelopment for Columbus Coated Fabrics Site

Appendix VII: Weinland Park Parcel Transactions

Weinland Park: Year of Last Parcel Transaction

Legend

- No Data
- 1920 - 1993
- 1994 - 2001
- 2002 - 2005

Sources:
Data: Franklin County Auditor
Map: Author’s Construct
These graphics show the dramatic rise in property transactions within the past fifteen years. One should remember that 1994 marked the establishment of Campus Partners, while that organization began acquiring property for the South Campus Gateway in 2002.
Appendix VIII: Largest Landowners, in number of parcels, in Weinland Park

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Number of parcels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Properties of Ohio[^48]</td>
<td>Section 8 Management</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resatka Family (SalesOne Realty)</td>
<td>Rental Property</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckeye Real Estate</td>
<td>Student Housing</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Columbus</td>
<td>Vacant Land</td>
<td>26[^49]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Partners</td>
<td>8th and 9th Ave. Redevelopment</td>
<td>25[^50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haller Family and associates</td>
<td>Rental Property</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uptown Village Realty</td>
<td>Rental Property</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Bruggeman</td>
<td>Rental Property</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northside CDC</td>
<td>Affordable Housing</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Franklin County Auditor

[^48]: Includes property owned by its affordable housing partners (including Ohio Capital Corporation for Housing (OCCH) and Red Capital Mortgage) but managed by Community Properties.

[^49]: Includes twelve vacant residential parcels and 14 parcels associated with the Columbus Coated Fabrics site.

[^50]: Does not include the four (large) parcels of the South Campus Gateway, to which the OSU Board of Trustees holds the deed.
Works Cited


City of Columbus, Department of Development 1997. University Neighborhoods Revitalization Plan. City of Columbus.


Ohio Capital Corporation for Housing. Broad street portfolio restructuring; Community Properties: the acquisition and redevelopment plan. Undated presentation.


Washington: Citizens Commission on Civil Rights.


Spain, D. Indicators of urban revitalization: racial and socioeconomic changes in central-city housing. In *Back to the City*, S. Laska and D. Spain (eds.), 27 - 41. New York: Pergamon Press.


Wagenbrenner Development Corporation. 2007. CORF Application for Columbus Coated Fabrics Site Redevelopment. Columbus: Wagenbrenner Company.


