Imperialism and the Political Economy of Climate Adaptation in the Philippines

Undergraduate Research Thesis

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with honors research distinction in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio State University

by

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April 2023

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Abstract

The Philippines is recognized as one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change. Its position in the Tropical Cyclone Belt and the Pacific Ring of Fire means the country is continuously battered by seismic shocks, tropical cyclones (TCs), monsoons, and El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) episodes. Seismic shocks occur daily and twenty TCs enter the Philippine Area of Responsibility every year. As global mean temperatures increase, these extreme weather events have become more frequent and intense, pushing the limits of the country’s capacity to withstand these hazards. It is right, then, that since 1994, the Philippine state has developed an extensive climate bureaucracy to mainstream policies for climate change adaptation, climate resilient development and disaster risk reduction. However, by opting for technical tools and “best practices,” the state continues to obscure the structural roots of impoverishment of the Filipino masses. As an historical symptom of its political economy, the state enables the penetration of capitalist climate governance. How then, did the Philippines arrive at this conjuncture?

In this paper, I conduct a critical historical analysis of its political ecology. The Philippines had been “liberated” by colonial and imperial powers for over four centuries—that cannot be ignored. As such, I discuss the Philippines’ experience under Spanish colonial and American imperial regimes using the theoretical frameworks of Karatani Kojin and Kohei Saito. I argue that American Imperialism enabled the Philippines’ emergence as a capitalist nation-state by entrenching its post-colonial class regime within elite governance and by ensuring its economic, political, and cultural dependence. This reflects a blind acceptance of capitalist climate governance, which is set against the socially just adaptation of the Filipino masses.
Acknowledgements

I could not have completed this thesis without the dialogue and support from my professors, mentors, fellow organizers, friends, and family. To my advisor and former professor, Joel Wainwright, I am grateful for your excellent guidance throughout this project. Your teachings and your belief in me, as a student and a new researcher, kept me confident and inspired. To professors, Bart Elmore and Max Woodworth, I was truly honored to have you on my committee. Your time and critical feedback helped make this paper the best that it could be. To my dear friends and organizers with the Ohio Youth for Climate Justice, I am so glad I met you. You nudged me on my path as an organizer, helping me find my voice in this paper. I will never forget that. To all those I met in the Philippines, our discussions were beyond fruitful and energizing. You helped me become familiar in a world that I did not know. Last but not least, to my partner, my Ates, my parents, and my Titas and Titos in California and the Philippines—without you, I could not have managed the host of physical and mental challenges that I faced on this journey. To all of you, thank you. May we fight for a future of justice, liberated from our chains, bound in reciprocity.
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIL  Anti-Imperialist League
AFP  Armed Forces of the Philippines
CCA  Climate Change Adaptation
CCC  Climate Change Commission
CNS  Capital-Nation-State
CPP  Communist Party of the Philippines
DAR  Department of Agrarian Reform
DENR  Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DND  Department of National Defense
DRR  Disaster Risk Reduction
EDSA  Epifiano de los Santos Avenue
EDCA  Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
ENSO  El Niño Southern Oscillation
ESA  Emergency Shelter Assistance
GPH  Government of the Philippines
INDC  Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPRA  Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act
ISI  Import-Substitution Industrialization
LBJ  Lyndon B. Johnson
LGU  Local Government Unit
MDT  Mutual Defense Treaty
MIC  Military-Industrial Complex
NBZ  No-Build Zone
NCCAP  National Climate Change Action Plan
NDC  Nationally Determined Contributions
NDRRMC  National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NDZ  No-Dwell Zone
NEDA  National Economic and Development Authority
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NRC  National Resilience Council
OPARR  Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
OSP  Offshore Procurement
PAGASA  Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration
PCSD  Philippine Commission on Sustainable Development
PDRF  Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation
PSB  Postal Savings Bank
RAY  Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda
SONA  State of the Nation Address
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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Introduction

The State of the Philippines: Capitalism and Ecological Crisis

Are we backward because we are corrupt? Or is there a more basic reason for our economic poverty? Is corruption the cause or is it merely an effect? The attempt to make corruption the primary problem of our national life seeks to make us forget the real cause of our degradation and of our apparently inherent propensity for corrupt activities.

–Renato Constantino, *Neocolonial Identity and Counter Consciousness*

For the month of July 2022, I went to the Philippines with my family. Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the son of the notorious dictator who declared martial law over the Philippines in the seventies, was just elected as the new president. Tensions were high; I was afraid. Nonetheless, my mom and I went to observe the State of the Nation Address on July 25, where we saw protestors by the hundreds (maybe thousands) march along Commonwealth Avenue, from Quezon Memorial Circle to Tandang Sora Avenue. That was where they were permitted to march by state’s national police. We heard the passionate shouts of the people, encompassing a range of demands: “Climate justice now,” “Free Daisy Macapagan,” “Never again to martial law,” “Join the Katipunan (Makibaka),” among others.

The archipelago is honored with a long history of revolution and rebellion. The Philippine Revolution of 1896 was one of the first anti-colonial rebellions in Asia, the Communist Part of the Philippines is one of the most respected and enduring movements of the far left in Asia, and EDSA, the “People Power Revolution” that took down Marcos Sr. is a fond memory for my family and the Filipino diaspora. The “Filipino” inherits centuries of revolutionary passion and boldness, and I was eager to see it radiate throughout the SONA protests. I thought to myself, was this what the famous “People Power Revolution” was like?

1 (1978, 129)
Could this be the beginning of another EDSA? It was an innocently naïve question. For, as soon as the chants started, they ended just as quickly. We reached the end of the march at Tandang. Within thirty minutes, everyone disappeared, as if it never happened.

I was honored to see the SONA protests that day, to catch a glimpse of the hope and fervor that fuels the Filipino people. They are cognizant of their history and they commend the struggle of the masses, but almost a year has gone by now, and Marcos Jr. is still the president and socio-economic and political conditions remain the same. In fact, Marcos Jr. just permitted U.S. military forces to access four new bases on the archipelago, three in Northern Luzon (Santa Ana, Cagayan, and Isabela) and one in Palawan near the South China Sea (Lendon, 2023). The U.S. also agreed to allocate more than US $82 million to improve the five already existing military bases (Calonzo, 2023). It was in adherence to the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the U.S. and the Philippines, a treaty that embodies the illusory nature of Philippine sovereignty.

The Filipino people did not ask for such an agreement, nor did they have any say into whether it would go through². But concern for the people come after the concern of containing China to Marcos Jr. and the U.S. state. Indeed, “politics” in the Philippines has fallen very far from what it used to be, from before the archipelago gained its independence. Though hope and fervor impassion the Filipino people, the prospect of toppling the oligarchy gets further out of reach as time goes on. They have no power. That is the reality. However, that does not have to be the future. Such is one of the pillars that drive my research in this paper: to hope for change, we

² Some of the Filipino Diaspora in Seattle and San Francisco protested against this expansion of the EDCA on April 27, coinciding with the anniversary of the agreement’s signing on April 28 in 2014 (BAYAN, 2023). Activists and protestors in Manila also denounced Marcos Jr.’s agreement in a May Day demonstration outside the American embassy (Bechtel and Gutierrez, 2023).
must understand the past, we must understand how the Filipino people arrived at their conjuncture.

The Philippines have been “liberated” four times in four centuries—once by the Spanish, once by the Japanese, and twice by the Americans. During the American presence and its time as a commonwealth, the Philippines had seen rapid development coupled with intense and persistent inequalities in wealth and income. Centuries of political control has created within the Philippines an indiscernible western influence and ideological confusion to a degree that is not found in other parts of South-East Asia (Rodgan, 2021). On top of that, the Philippines is consistently cited as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change (Eckstein et al., 2021). It is positioned in the center of the Typhoon Belt, meaning the country is continuously battered by tropical cyclones (TCs), monsoons, and El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) episodes. In 2019, 21 TCs entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility, eight of which made landfall, displacing over 6 million people (PAGASA, 2020). As global mean temperatures increase, these extreme weather events become more frequent and intense, endangering the country’s food and human security (IPCC AR6).

As such, it is appropriate that as early as 1991, the Government of the Philippines (GPH) not only acknowledged global warming and “the right of the Filipino people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,” (President of the Philippines 1991) but it also laid the foundations for today’s extensive climate bureaucracy, which consists of a myriad of action plans and multilateral frameworks, such as the creation of the Climate Change Commission (CCC) through the “Climate Change Act of 2009.” The Act declared:
It shall be the policy of the State to enjoin the participation of national and local
governments, business, nongovernment organizations, local communities, and the public
to prevent and reduce the adverse impacts of climate change and…incorporate a gender-
sensitive, pro-children and pro-poor perspective in all climate change and renewable
energy efforts…in the context of sustainable development. (GPH, 2009)

As the sole climate policy-making body of the GPH, the CCC is responsible for the review and
enactment of its comprehensive and seemingly progressive framework for climate resilient
development, prioritizing adaptation assessments and measures, disaster risk reduction, the
dissemination of knowledge from the national to the local level, the participation of a diverse
range of actors, and the guidance of technical experts, among other things.

From the state’s first administrative order in 1991, followed by its 1994 ratification of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and now to the
Commission that operates today, the Government of the Philippines seems dedicated to
sustainable development and adaptation. From its recent statement of Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs), the state is aware of the need to integrate ‘gender
mainstreaming,’ the participation of local communities, intergenerational equity, and so on, into
such development plans (GPH, 2015). On paper, climate change response is a top priority for the
Philippine State, which is determined to achieve progressive change.

Why then, did Global Witness rank the Philippines as the third-deadliest country for land
and environmental defenders in 2021 (Global Witness, 2021)? Why, despite extensive legislation
on climate adaptation, does the Philippines suffer so much from the climate crisis? In this thesis,
I argue that U.S. imperialism defined the political economy of climate adaptation in the
Philippines in two crucial ways. First, it enabled the internal solidification of the Capitalist-
Nation-State system such that it upheld the post-colonial class regime. Second, it externally enforced the Philippines’ peripheral position in an ecologically polarizing world system. In this paper, I will analyze the Philippines’ history under Spanish colonialism and American imperialism, followed by a discussion of the state’s climate bureaucracy and its response to the devastating Typhoon Haiyan. I explore how this interplay of political economic factors coalesced into a Philippine state that proves incapable of adapting in ways that challenge the post-colonial status quo, thereby leaving the Filipinos in a permanent state of impoverishment, displacement, and endangerment.

Such incapacity to adapt coincides with the curious and systematic development of authoritative populism and human rights violations, epitomized by the most recent presidency of Rodrigo Duterte. Through his War on Drugs, crackdowns on dissent directed towards the state grew exponentially, subjecting thousands of the urban poor to kidnappings and extrajudicial killings and coinciding with the disappearance or deaths of at least 168 land and environmental defenders within the war’s first few years (YACAP, 2021). In 2020, Duterte’s enactment of the Anti-Terror Bill only emboldened such acts of state violence and intimidation, enabling the extensive ‘red-tagging’ and illegal detentions of climate activists for suspicion of being communists and terrorists. These acts continue under the Marcos presidency. As of November 2022, there were 828 political prisoners. The following December, the human rights group, Karapatan, documented 17 cases of extrajudicial killings (AP News, 2022).

Climate volatility and political volatility are mutually reinforcing, and the Philippines is a case in point. Why? The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says,

Vulnerability of ecosystems and people to climate change differs substantially among and within regions, driven by patterns of intersecting socioeconomic development,
unsustainable ocean and land use, inequity, marginalization, historical and ongoing patterns of inequity such as colonialism, and governance (IPCC AR6 SPM: 12, emphasis added).

Not only is climate change in the last few decades unprecedented over many thousands of years, but the distribution of responsibility and crisis is disproportionate across the planet and across social class. Those in the Global South and the low-income population are facing the majority of climate repercussions despite contributing the least and having fewer means of adjusting. The Philippines cannot sufficiently mitigate the repercussions from climate change on its own—it can only adapt.

Therefore, ensuring climate resiliency cannot be done without ensuring social resiliency. While state violence expands and political stability regresses, socioeconomic conditions, climate vulnerability, and infrastructure remain persistently weak. The political economy of the Philippine State is not aligned with its stated dedication to progressive change; with the election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the state’s path towards climate resilient development seems more unstable than ever.

The Philippine state seems arrested by a clientelist elite, in turn subject to foreign and multinational interests. Despite its progressive claim, approaches to climate change adaptation have failed to address the structural causes of dispossession, land concentration, and ecosystem destruction, thus enabling the rampant debilitation of those on the ground to truly address and adapt the Philippines to global warming. To understand this conjuncture, it is necessary to investigate our ecological crisis as a contradiction to capitalist logic. Any other frame of references “would be like trying to model hurricanes without a theory of thermodynamics or an understanding of the effects of changing ocean temperatures” (Wainwright and Mann, 2018: 66).
Therefore, the object of my analysis is the capacity of the Philippine State to adapt to the infamous Typhoon Haiyan, and the state’s current, historicized, and political ecological condition that has shaped such capacity.

**Research Mandate and Literature Review**

If we wish to evaluate the Philippine state’s capacity to adapt through an analysis of contemporary climate politics, we must recognize climate change as a comprehensively political problem and as a necessary conjuncture of its socio-historical situation (Wainwright and Mann, 2018; Malm, 2021; Saito, 2022). Therefore, it is crucial that we conduct a critical historical analysis of its political ecology. This task can be done in several ways—of its most crucial for this case study, a discussion of Filipino history vis a vis Kojin Karatani’s Capitalist-Nation-State framework to which we turn soon—but it is perhaps beneficial to set the scene with an Ecological Marxist perspective. In doing so, we will conceptualize the Philippines’ place in the metabolic relation between nature, society, and humanity and we will be able to establish the fatal connection between imperialism and climate change.

It is with this Marxist approach that we have a base understanding of how humanity’s relationship with nature was wholly reorganized within a new social formation. Karl Marx writes in his first volume of *Capital*:

> Capitalist production…disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e. it prevents the return to the soil of the constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing…it hinders the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil. Thus it destroys at the same time the physical health of the urban worker, and the intellectual life of the rural worker…; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a progress towards ruining the more long-lasting
sources of that fertility…Capitalist production, therefore, only develops the technique and the degree of combination of the social processes of production by simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the worker. (Marx, 1867: 637-8)

Bound in classically liberal ideas of the human domination over nature while also presupposing the metabolic rift between the two, capitalism spurs ecological damage and crisis, sustaining constant social and political ills across the world. Tethered to the conditions of its own destructive self-reproduction—which itself continues to crumble—capital’s valorization challenges the very survival of mankind through its direct ignorance of nature’s limited metabolism.

Thus, one of the theoretical frameworks that shape my analysis is Kohei Saito’s (2022) discussion of Marx in the Anthropocene. He, along the likes of István Mészáros and Rosa Luxemburg, expand on Marx’s idea of metabolism to reveal capitalist accumulation as a socio-historical process that necessitates ecological destruction for the sake of its paradoxical universality. He writes:

Marx defined ‘labour’, the most fundamental category of Marxism, in relation to the metabolism between humans and nature…This metabolic process is, first of all, a natural-ecological process, which is common to any historical stage, because humans cannot live without working upon nature through labour…In this sense, human metabolism with nature is a ‘natural necessity’ that can never be suspended…[they] are, however, not simply confined by the given environment. They can reflect upon their own interaction with it…a social structure emerges in the course of human history that is mediated by communication, cooperation, norms, institutions, and law. Metabolism between humans
and nature is, seen from this perspective, simultaneously a socio-historical process whose concrete forms significantly vary according to the structural relationships that exist in different times and places (2022: 19-20).

Manipulating and molding social metabolic relations between humans and nature, capitalist and precapitalist formations, centers and peripheries produces metabolic rifts that only deepen as a result of its contradictory nature. The modern capitalist social structure is preconditioned on the unequal exchange between humanity and nature, a Marxist analysis sheds light on our current conjuncture by reframing the discussion of climate change into one concerning relations of power and exploitation.

We live in a spatial rift. Through capital’s social division of labor, there is a center and a periphery, an antagonism between town and country, whereby ecological harm and consequence continuously shifts onto the latter. As Saito writes:

Robbery agriculture does not exist without the social division of labor unique to capitalist production, which is based upon the concentration of the working class in large cities and the corresponding necessity for the constant transport of their food from the countryside…environmental degradation, in terms of both the living conditions of the working class in the city and soil exhaustion in the countryside accompanied by the misery of peasants, represents a typical consequence of the antagonistic spatial separation within a capitalist country (2022: 26).

As we consider these continual shifts, we arrive at the issue of colonization and uneven development, an issue that has too long been separate from matters of climate change and ecological Marxist analysis. Though it has been the most violent externality to result from the capitalist mode of production, it is a topic that is most subject to ignorance.
For human life reorganized under capitalism favors the center over the periphery and is so dependent on the outward shifting of ecological risk and consequence. And so, we have one world that relies on the brute exploitation of the periphery and another that is left to deal with the consequences of an unsustainable center. The Philippines lives in the latter condition. Therefore, it is my task to show how the Philippines arrived at this position and how it is handling it. Only then can we hope to posit a future where it finally exits its current situation and enters a democratic and climate just world.

To do this, I turn to Kojin Karatani’s (2014) *The Structure of World History*. We must analyze Filipino history and the establishment of the country as periphery because at our current conjuncture, we have not only an ecological crisis as the result of a social formation that has existed for only 300 years, but an unjust displacement of poverty, wealth and human rights on a global scale that regularly favors one group over another. As Michael Foucault said in a 1972 conversation with Gilles Deleuze, “No one, strictly speaking, has an official right to power; and yet it is always excited in a particular direction, with some people on one side and some on the other” (Foucault and Deleuze, 1972). Humanity has been reorganized on a level of international hierarchization that is so mutually reinforced by its existence that, to many, it is unclear how it even came to be.

Karatani provides an insight into this dilemma, by reinterpreting our modern world system along the lines of modes of exchange in human-human relations. This is contrary to dominant leftist discussions that center on the modes of production, but as he establishes, that limited frame of reference does not enable us to understand precapitalist societies, much less capitalist economies. Rather, he posits that the mode of production is organized through modes of exchange. According to Karatani, there are four modes of exchange: first is the “gift-
countergift” (mode A) that emerges between stratified, amicable communities. It is unfree and binding, but wholly reciprocal. Second is the exchange of “plunder-redistribution” (mode B), which emerges when one community dominates another. Redistribution can take the form of social welfare or public order, but it is essentially conducted to ensure the continuous plunder of the community—it is unfree and unreciprocal, as one body always has more power than the other.

Third is commodity exchange (mode C), which emerges between communities that mutually recognize each other’s freedom. Unlike mode A, it is not obligatory; unlike mode B, it is not violent. That being said, mode C may be engaged “freely,” but it is by no means an equal relationship. Commodity exchange occurs between the money-form and the commodity, which creates relations of credit (the holder of money) and debt (the holder of commodity)—these are not equal positions. The last mode of exchange is that which transcends all three modes, mode D. Calling it the return of mode A in a “higher dimension,” mode D is a truly free and reciprocal relationship. Although this mode has not yet achieved dominance in any historical social formation, Karatani finds traces of it in the early, communistic stages of universal religions such as Christianity and Buddhism. While mode D is a topic of extensive discussion and a great source of hope, it is not my task to observe how mode D is and could be present in Philippine society, but I hope my analysis of other modes of exchange may contribute to a future discussion on the emergence of mode D as a strategy in the fight for climate justice.

The emergence of capitalist modernity coincides with the moment that social relations came to be dominated by commodity exchange (free and unreciprocal relationships). It was at this point that all modes A, B, and C were altered in an unrecognizable form, each afforded with

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3 Karatani outlines this in more detail in his fourth chapter on World Money (93-97)
their own set of powers and goals (Karatani, 2014: 11-14), but all bound to one another. This is the ingenious form of the Capitalist-Nation-State (CNS)\(^4\), characterized by a Borromean knot whereby all depend on one another, and yet each acts independently. It is a formidable dialectic that ensures the dominance of mode C through the commodification of the labor-power commodity (Walker and Kawashima, 2018) and land. In other words, CNS emerged, aided by the “world-economy” structure of Core-Semiperiphery-Periphery, wherein the core extracts surplus and accumulates wealth from the periphery through the logic of commodity exchange (Karatani, 2014:159-163).

I point to an overlap between Karatani and Saito in this concept of the emergence of CNS. When transhistorical exchanges are placed in the context of CNS, the mutually reinforcing nature of Saito’s three metabolic rifts and their subsequent shifts become much clearer, understood beyond a simple relationship between humanity and nature. As CNS emerges from exchange relations between human beings, it thus illustrates how the logic of a capitalist system becomes universal; the process of which relies on the ecologically unequal exchange not just between humans and nature, but between humans themselves. The capitalist system gives rise to a totality of problems and cannot be treated individually. The climate crisis is a social, political and economic crisis. Both Karatani and Saito’s perspective is necessary. To analyze the climate crisis solely as a relationship between humans and nature is to risk neo-Malthusian conclusions that blame those who suffer the most. It also bears the risk of technocratic hyper-optimism that eagerly fails to consider any political and economic change. As Mészáros wrote, “And finally, to say that ‘science and technology can solve all our problems in the long run’ is much worse than believing in witchcraft” (Mészáros, 2014: 29).

\(^4\) I use “CNS” when describing the structure of the modern world system, I will use “capitalist nation-state” to describe a singular state.
I attempt to merge these frameworks into an analysis of the political economy of climate adaptation in the Philippines, which begins with revealing the relations of power that reign over the masses. And so, we turn to Karatani for a brief analysis of Filipino history which enables its further consideration in the wider, global context of ecological imperialism.
Chapter 1

Imperial History of the Philippines: A Karatanian Approach

Official history is written by the ruling class in its own image. It is, in most cases, propagandistic and narcissistic.

—Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited*\(^5\)

The emancipation of the oppressed is inconceivable without breaking and melting down the chains of this reified historical consciousness…and the reconstitution of the power of consciousness as a liberating force…

—István Mészáros, *Neocolonial Identity and Counter Consciousness*\(^6\)

A critique of history is not a simple summary of events, a biography of particular individuals, or a recounting of social or ecological crises. It is an attempt to grasp the structures of domination that have developed a particular consciousness in a peoples’ current conjuncture. In doing so, it sets out to demystify the ideals that drive or paralyze a nation and its people and the inauguration of these ideals into hegemony. However, it is the urgent task of peripheral historical materialism to also constitute a new consciousness conducive to the emancipation of the masses. It is thus the foremost task of the following section to offer the beginnings of a critique of Philippine history, in the hopes that future deliberation and study may result in a discussion on the revolution of the consciousness of the Filipino people.

Pre-Colonial Foundations: Hierarchy and Class

We start with the Philippines’ colonial experience under the Spanish empire. The question at hand is this: what was the legacy of the Spanish colonial state? As I will demonstrate, Spain could not transform the Philippines into a capitalist nation-state. Rather, it could only establish a

\(^5\) (1978, 266)

\(^6\) (1978, 3)
feudal mode of production, supported by a class regime on the basis of racial hierarchy. The colonial state dominated through mode B, yet mode A retained a particular strength, locally known as *utang na loob*. It is with this particular context of the Spanish colonial experience that the Philippines was predisposed to American imperialism and to its transformation into a full-fledged capitalist nation state.

In the early days of Spain’s colonization of the Philippines, there were already proposals to abandon it. Though bountiful, the resources of the archipelago did not project the same economic prosperity as did the colonies in South America. The Church advocated to retain the Philippines, for its potential of missionary undertakings and for its proximity to China and Japan. This geographical misfortune explains why it would remain a Spanish colony for the next three hundred and fifty years, and why America continues to try and control it to this day.

For over two hundred years, the Spanish were uninterested in developing the internal economic capabilities of the Philippines. In line with the precapitalist and mercantilist reasoning of the time, they were content to have Manila as the entrepôt of its galleon trade between China and Mexico (Constantino, 1975: 55). The Spanish state concentrated its operations in Manila, indifferent to what happened outside of the center. Yet, systematic control over the rest of the islands was nonetheless essential, so they established policies of *reduccion* and the *encomienda* grants—systems that, respectively, resettled Filipinos for the purpose of Catholic conversion and consolidated them under the control of ‘deserving’ Spaniards through royal grants, usually conquistadors or the religious orders of the Church (Litonjua, 2001: 374). At this point, the *encomendero* did not formally own the land but nonetheless enforced a feudal mode of production wherein they enforced corvee labor, tribute collection and pacification to quell dissent.
The friars were the main agents responsible for resettling the Filipinos for reducciones. Sometimes they would offer the Filipinos gifts, free housing, and honorifics to the native chiefs of the respective barangays, or clusters of Filipinos. Other times, they would resort to force, and the barangays would resettle out of fear and in search of protection. It should be noted that the friars and encomenderos were in conflict for the entirety of the encomienda’s existence, though the details of their conflict is outside the scope of this paper. The main purpose of the two, and of acknowledging their existence, is to comment on the totality of the means of plunder and redistribution upon Spanish arrival—a process that highlights the unification of the Church and the State.

The encomienda and reducciones systems afforded authority to the Spanish over the Philippines through mode B. The plundered the lands of the Filipinos and maintain its division via state force, then by promising their protection and ensuring their consent through the Church. The friars formally abolished the encomienda system in the 17th century, not to ease the outright exploitation of the Filipinos but to ensure a more unified administration of the Spanish state (Sison, 1970: 82). Subsequently, the encomienda’s abolition deepened the authority of the Church by allowing for the privatization of land under the friars as well as their political and economic authority over it. These forms of administration worked to bring the entire archipelago under Spanish control, though it did not afford centralized hegemony to the colonial state.

Equipped with the power and knowledge of their indispensability, the friars quickly ascended into absentee landlordism, and their political power even transcended that of the colonial state. Their power was total and oppressive; they facilitated taxation, schooling, health, the municipal budget, and they regularly intervened in provincial elections (Ibid.:22). However, they did not govern the provinces. By exploiting the traditional forms of hierarchy that existed
before Spanish colonization, the friars contributed to a new form of the ruling class, composed of native Filipinos, yet worthy of colonial recognition, known as the *principalía*. This process operated as such,

[Reduccion] was achieved in part through the application of…pressures on the chiefs and their families, thus acknowledging and therefore confirming their higher status and authority. Missionaries worked on chiefs and their families to move to the *cabeceras* so that they might set the example for others. Their presence at the *cabecera*, that is, at the center of colonial power in the locality, provided these chiefs with opportunities to further entrench themselves in positions of dominance within the native community.

(Constantino, 1975: 60)

Rosa Luxemburg comments apropos pre-capitalist societies that the differentiation of rank within communities promotes dissolution through the development of inequality and despotism (Hudis, 2010: 78). Philippine history proves this line of thought correct. Through force or rather, through mode B, the *encomienda* and *reducciones* accelerated this process of social and racial stratification to meet colonial needs. In doing so, they reorganized Philippine society and social relations to act according to the desires of a world-empire\(^7\), yet at the same time, they weakened the central authority of the Spanish state.

Since the friars took on the absentee landlord position, the *principalía*, consisting of both past and present *gobernadorcillos* (“elected” governors) and *cabezas de barangay* (native chiefs of *barangays*), took on the task of governance. They operated with a level of autonomy and personalization, due to the geographical conditions of the archipelago and the relative indifference of the Spanish bureaucracy in Manila. As such, they engaged in patron-clientelism:

\(^7\) The most concise discussion of a “world-empire” is found in Karatani’s *Structure* (160-162).
exchanges of personal loyalty. They facilitated the mode of exchange A that governed society before Spanish arrival, a degree of Karatani’s “gift-countergift reciprocity.” These conditions reorganized the mode of production into one of client feudalism, whereby Filipino tenants referred to their landlords and politicians as their “protectors,” and their debts as utang na loob, a “debt of the soul,” (Kerkvliet, 1977: 6)—a debt that could never be fully repaid:

[Filipino officeholders] called upon townspeople to perform whatever labor services they chose, whether to repair roads or buildings, or even build their houses and cultivate some crops. On the other hand, to receive such deference, loyalty, and labor in the first place, the official had to consistently display their paternalistic power. If they wanted labor to be performed, they held a barangay feast and a fiesta before announcing which projects were to be done…from their own personal pockets, officials also financed schools, town celebrations of the patron saint, donated lands to the local church or sponsored the rebuilding of the public market. They also doled out small loans or offered legal aid to distressed workers and peasants. (Go, 2008: 97)

 Operating in a hybrid of mode A and B, the principalía always had the option of resorting to coercion to extract labor, tribute, or power, but it was no longer the first option nor was it the most beneficial to retaining their social status as patron. The officeholder instead relied on a network of friends and followers, often members of the local police, and their respective debts of loyalty to sustain their political power (Ibid.: 96). Sometimes they would resort to bribery and intimidation. These means to holding political office transgressed from the small gobernadorcillo to the highest eligible positions of the colonial state.8

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8 Utang na loob is by no means an essentialist Filipino value, but rather one that has been molded to the needs of the current historical political context.
Formally recognized as part of the Spanish colonial state, the *principalía* were not only responsible for governing the provinces outside of Manila, but they also enjoyed economic privileges that came from the exploitation of the Filipino masses. Traditional schemas of debt were then modeled to fit the needs of mode B, enabling the *principalía* to sustain their political power, through which they accumulated more economic privilege, inciting a cycle of socio-economic ascendancy through the principle of reciprocity, laying the foundations for the unification of Capital and State. However, it must be noted that the *principalía* was not the State entity, insofar as the Capital-Nation-State is concerned. Rather, the *principalía* was afforded their power by the racial antagonism between the Spaniards and the *indios* and the retention of traditional native hierarchy (Go, 2008). The *principalía* did not function to sustain the dominance of commodity exchange nor was their power born from it; they wielded the fruits of economic power after they had been endowed with high political power. As it happened, the *principalía* represents the foundation of class stratification, but we must remember that their basis lies in racialized difference.

The Fall of the Galleon Trade, Rise of the Hacienda, and Emergence of Class

The Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade was the economic lifeline of the Spanish colonial state and the source of privilege for the Church and the *principalía*. The prosperity afforded by the galleon trade would suffice for the Spanish—the internal economic development of its colony was not necessary for centuries. The main beneficiary of the galleon was the central administration in Manila (Constantino, 1975: 110), for it served as the crucial entrepot of commodities and currencies between the Americas and Asia. Through the galleon trade, the Philippines became “entangled with settler colonialisms throughout the Americas and the Pacific, the racial slave trade that circulated masses of African peoples…and the capitalist markets of
Western Europe” (Lumba, 2022: 15). Its existence, alongside the schemas of utang na loob among principalía, established the basis of the class regime that still operates today. However, outside of the feudal landlords, a distinct form of mass class consciousness did not come into being before the fall of the galleon trade in 1815. Instead, by the beginning of the 19th century, what emerged was a set of transitional social classes that divided the masses along the lines of race. We must have a basic understanding of this transitional state of the Philippines before we can understand the transgression of the 1896 Revolution and the mechanisms of American imperialism.

In line with the writings of Constantino and other Philippine historians and sociologists (Lumba, 2022: 22; Constantino, 1975: 120; Wickberg, 1964), it was amidst the fall of the galleon trade that the Chinese mestizo rose to prominence. They were historically placed in the middle of the five distinct social classes that existed before the revolution, as were divided on the basis of racial antagonism and tribute payment. They were the peninsular Spanish colonialists, the creoles who were Spaniards born in the Philippines, the mestizos of Spanish and native mix⁹, the mestizos of Chinese and native mix, and the native indios who were, of course, placed at the bottom of social pyramid (Constantino, 1975: 120), save for the principalia. By way of the galleon trade, Chinese mestizos penetrated and monopolized internal trade, thereby becoming an indispensable component of Philippine economy (Ibid.: 111). As the galleon’s prosperity declined before its formal fall in 1815 with Mexican Independence, the mestizos’ domination of commerce henceforth expanded and took on a new function as “mediators of capital,” for they facilitated the exchange of money and commodities between emerging foreign capitalist powers

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⁹The identification of “Filipino” has been debated among Philippine historians and sociologists. Constantino notes that it was this stratum that self-identified as the original “Filipino.” I classify “Filipino” as the stratum that emerged after the Revolution, that is, after the birth of the Nation. However, it is still debated as to what constitutes a Filipino (ilustrado political elite vs. urban peasantry, etc.) (Constantino, 1978: 117).
and the native agricultural producers (Lumba, 2022: 22), Spanish governors, friars, and the principalia.

Indeed, it was also during the gallon’s fall that England rose as a hegemonic capitalist power (Arrighi, 1994), and through the galleon trade and the commercial activities of the Chinese mestizos, British goods penetrated the internal Philippine economy outside of Manila\(^{10}\). This spread of foreign capital was of course, against the mercantilist wishes of the Spanish state, but inevitable due to the distance between Manila and the rest of the colony, the autonomy of the principalia, the colonial state’s indifference to Philippine economic development, and its subsequent failure to create a unified hegemonic currency throughout the archipelago (Lumba, 2022). The Spanish state’s political grip was slipping. In fact, Constantino says, “Ever since the defeat of the Spanish armada in 1588, Spain had begun to suffer a decline from which she never recovered” (Constantino, 1975: 110). The world started to realize the dominance of the mode C; and in the Philippines, the Spanish colonial state, having enjoyed a lengthy monopoly over its colony’s commerce, came to recognize the necessity of monetary authority by way of capital—of which the Spanish had none. Foreign capital proliferated throughout the Philippines, and because of the colonial state’s anarchic monetary structure based on a de facto system of currency exchange, foreign commercial power proved devastating to its survival (Lumba, 2022: 18).

What might Karatani say about this point in Philippine history? Before the end of the galleon trade, commodity exchange certainly existed within and between barangays and the core, in Manila. However, he would perhaps contend that these forms of commodity exchange appeared as incidental to the other modes A and B—they took the form of tribute payments,\(^{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) As early as 1762, when Britain invaded the Philippines for a brief occupation until 1764. Since then, British exports occupied a growing space on the galleon ships towards Manila, and a chunk of native goods (often created by Chinese mestizos) were brought out to Britain (Constantino, 1975: 113).
enforced by principia’s utang na loob or by friars’ covenant of fear. By the end of the galleon trade, the Spanish state’s authority lied in a hybrid mode of exchange based in force (B) and reciprocity (A). Yet, by way of the development of external world system, these modes of exchange became insufficient for Spain to retain its grip on its colony. Recall that Karatani says, …commodity exchange exists only with the support of the community and state…insofar as they are unable to be fully self-sufficient, the community and state both require it…Mode of exchange C also produces its own unique form of power. This is not something born of the state; rather, it is something that the state cannot do without. This power is, concretely, the power of money: the right to obtain some other thing directly through exchange (Karatani, 2014: 83).

The power of Capital, Nation, and State is one of “spirit” (Karatani, 2017), of ideation. It is a force that compels communities to act in accordance with its demands, but this is not an inherent power. Rather, this “spirit” attaches itself to the ‘thing’ being exchanged; the power of Capital comes from the commodity, but a commodity is born strictly of the exchange that guarantees its existence.11

The perpetuation of commodity exchange can only occur alongside the existence of reciprocal social relations and the simultaneous role of “plunderer” and “protector” taken on by the state. As commodity exchange began to exercise its own power, in the form of foreign capital from China and Britain, the colonial state’s authority was contemporaneously weakened. The world was gravitating to capitalism’s hegemony, for which the Spanish state became dependent

11 See also Science of Spirit (Karatani, 2021). Karatani describes the self-realization of the “Spirit” that attaches itself to the thing being exchanged. In my understanding, “spirit” takes the form of knowledge that emerges as an unconscious truth.
on Chinese labor and commerce; yet it was also threatened by their presence, demonstrated by racial colonial policies prohibiting the growth of the Chinese population.  

The rise of capitalism in the late 18th century made Spain anxious of its hegemony on the world stage and in the Philippines, for the rest of the world was succumbing to the sovereignty of capital and money—as Karatani would put it, the rule of subordination through voluntary, mutually-consented contracts, rather than fear (Ibid.: 83). Capitalist imperialism (C) was proving more powerful than territorial colonialism (B). As a result, the Spanish state established the hacienda system, a mode of production that garnered large-scale cultivation of commercial crops, such as tobacco, indigo, sugar, abaca, and others, and the linkage of the Philippines to foreign commerce (Sison, 1970: 83). It also included a number of reforms to afford the colonial powers an alternative source of income, for the galleon had been destroyed. Inevitably, such an attempt to catch up to the other rising capitalist powers demanded extensive consolidation of larger and larger lands, for plantation agriculture became more profitable and landowning became more appealing.

The hacienda’s shift to an export economy of specified crops intensified the exploitative experiences of the masses by retaining the feudal social formation of pacification and consent-bearing through religion and landlord oppression, extortion of rents, and usury—but on a larger scale. As Sison recounts: “the colonial government dictated confiscatory prices for the

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12 For more information, see Chapters 2 and 3 in Wickberg (1964).
13 Profits from land consolidation were realized through technological development of agriculture and its subsequent increase in land rents, which Sison writes: “It is very common that mainly or only the tenants shoulder the expenses incurred in preparing the seedlings, plowing and harrowing, planting, irrigation, fertilization, pest control, harvesting and threshing…He can unilaterally decide to ‘improve’ the land…and then require the tenants to pay back to him in the form of higher land rent the expenses which he alone had accounted.” (Sison, 1970: 93) Profits were also realized by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Ibid.:25), and the rise of sugar prices (Krinks, 2002).
14 For more information on land-grabbing, see (Constantino 1975, 125), “Land-grabbing.”
commercial crops…the people who planted these crops had to get their staple food, rice or corn, from other areas.” (Ibid.) The Philippines’ traditional economies were becoming remnants of the past. Forms of the *hacienda* system would persist well beyond the American occupation.

This was a failed attempt to establish a form of monetary authority and to catch up to the rising capitalist powers of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The basis of the Spanish monetary system, the “Mexican dollar,” proved volatile after the galleon fell: economic insecurity washed over the archipelago. The colonial state’s rush to commercialize agriculture meant the intensive exposure of the Philippines to foreign capitalist powers, which had effectively accelerated the transformation of the internal economy. By the end of the nineteenth century, tobacco, sugar, and abaca constituted at least 80 per cent of the colony’s export earnings (Krinks, 2002: 26).\(^\text{16}\) However, this acceleration simultaneously weakened Spain’s chance at monetary authority; the colonialists even said, “Sad is that Spanish land. If one looks at its currency at its currency, Mexico appears. If one looks at the most prominent influence on the indigenous masses, China appears. If one looks at its most valuable commercial trade, England, Germany and North America appear” (Lumba, 2022: 16). Ironically, the *hacienda* reinforced Spain’s demise through the proliferation of foreign capital and her subsequent economic dependency.

The racialized education system, the emergence of a formal bourgeoisie, and the continued oppression of the masses also assured Spain’s demise in the Philippines. Large scale property ownership meant the intensive separation of Philippine society into an elite and the masses. Landlordism was extended to the religious orders, some members of the *principalía*, but mostly to the Spanish and Chinese *mestizos*. By the late 19th century, the *mestizos* had been

\(^{16}\) For more information on the acceleration of trade under the *hacienda*, see (Constantino, 1975: 137-139), “Economic Dislocations” and “Foreign Ascendancy”
dually recognized as both assimilated members of the native society and members of an elite that contributed to hispanization (Constantino, 1978: 119). Many of them married into the *principalía*, in terms of political economic role and race. They became the “brokers of colonial rule” vis-à-vis their formal recognition as paternalistic powers; and “exploiters of their people” (Constantino, 1975: 127) vis-à-vis their intermediary role in the exchange of foreign and domestic capital. Some of the smaller landowners and *principalía* and their respective semi-communal *barangays* became dispossessed and reduced to tenancy (Ibid.: 125). This was mostly the case in Negros; but a majority of the agrarian base remained independent (Krinks, 2002: 28). The *mestizos* and the *principalía*—already owning large tracts of land, dominating domestic trade, and being able to command the circulation of money—could soon afford an education in Manila and in the colonial metropole, for themselves and their sons. By the latter part of the 19th century, a new elite group emerged: the *ilustrados*.

**The Ilustrados and the 1896 Philippine Revolution**

The small, yet solidifying Filipino elite had accumulated property to protect, and with the capacity for education in colonial Manila and Spain, they inevitably confronted the European ideals of individual liberty and reason. Self-named after the Enlightenment, the *ilustrados* emerged from the class of *mestizos* and wealthy *indios*, emboldened by liberal political philosophy and endowed with the ambition of a future liberalized Philippines. Despite their wealth and status, they were still subject to classical racial antagonisms, and they continued to operate in schemas of *utang na loob*. *Ilustrados* like Jose Rizal, Apolinario Mabini and Marcel del Pilar therefore put forth the concept of *Razon*, an idea clearly emergent from Enlightenment

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17 Such as the Royal and Pontifical University of Santo Tomas, which still exists today.
reason that instead constituted humanity’s self-preservation vis-à-vis the facilitation of reciprocal relations and mutual help.

Subsequently, as an interdependent yet homologous regulative idea, the *ilustrados* condemned the Spanish state for violating the natural law of reason. They were receptive to capitalist development and saw the adverse effects it had on the Philippines, and thus demanded for an authority that could “wield the force of capitalism for the benefit of the colony” (Lumba, 2022: 27). A number of entries in the Filipino liberal newspaper, *La Solidaridad*, cited the “Spanish-Filipino exchange,” and wrote that the colonial state was failing to uphold its “mutual obligation” to help the Philippines (Go, 2008: 101), and that the Filipino people needed leaders of “superior *razon*, [who] will prevent individuals from usurping the rights of others” (Ibid.: 105). By way of the *ilustrados*’ articulation, the masses resonated with this concept, thereby fueling the collective anti-colonial sentiment and a form of nationalism.

For those who were not of the *ilustrado* class, economic ascendancy under Spain and the subsequent destruction of local industries and natural relationships developed an acute awareness to the injustice waged on the masses. Sporadic peasant revolts across the archipelago had been a constant in history, from the very moment that Spain arrived. But now, a great wave of resentment washed over the Philippines, manifesting a collective consciousness for the freedom and equality of the masses—freedom from social discrimination, racialized tribute, exploitative feudal relations, monopolistic theft of agricultural goods, and so on. This consciousness was shaped by uprising after uprising throughout the nineteenth century, such as the 1807 peasant revolt in Piddig, Ilocos Sur against the Spanish wine monopoly; the 1815 peasant revolt in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte against the *principalia* and feudal landlords; and the Religious Revolt of Hermano Pule in 1840 against the racial discrimination of the priesthood. Uprisings in Manila
and other urban centers also reflected the antagonization of class. However, this collective atmosphere proved only temporary and eventually, there were two opposing strategies to achieve “freedom:” reform or revolution.

The 1872 Cavite Mutiny was a catalyst for a reactionary Spanish state, but a revolutionary one for the Filipinos. There are many accounts of the causes and instigators of the mutiny, which are outside the scope of this paper, but its importance to Philippine history must be recognized. As Sison describes the mutiny, it was an act of rebellion by the workers at Fort San Felipe in Cavite, against their oppression and low wages (Sison, 1970: 25). The rebellion itself was short-lived, but the Spanish state took it as a need to quell the anti-colonial sentiment that was growing among the masses. Not only did the state torture and kill the rebels of the mutiny, it also arrested and publicly garroted the Filipino priests, Fathers Burgos, Gomez and Zamora—hence the term “GOMBURZA,” as this event is locally referred. GOMBURZA were the most prominent spokespeople for secularization and Filipinization of the clergy, the primary reformist movement for the equal recognition and beneficiary of Filipino elites. The state also persecuted other priests, lawyers, and businessmen—mostly of mestizo and ilustrado class—for fear of their desire for separation.

At this point, the identity of the ilustrados and the mestizos had two dueling sides: status on par with the Spaniards, race on par with the Filipinos. Thus, when the state attacked their class, it ignited a temporary unity with the masses, transcending the boundaries of class and social strata, culminating into a collective consciousness that aspired for liberation. Colloquially known as the “Father of the Philippines,” Jose Rizal spurred attention to and criticism of the

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18 For more information, see Chapter 9 in Constantino, 1975, “Progress and Protest.”
19 For more information, see John Schumacher’s “The Cavite Mutiny Toward a Definitive History” (2011).
oppressive colonial state with his works, *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo* among others.\(^{20}\) He was the leading proponent of the liberal Propaganda Movement, seeking reform whereby Filipinos are represented in the Spanish Constitution and parliament. Rizal’s trust in the colonial power led to his arrest and exile to Dapitan in 1892 (Ibid.: 26), after which the masses acted on their articulation of liberation: separation and revolution.

As the leading *ilustrado*, Rizal’s exile split the rest of the Filipino elite, erring some to align more closely with the goals of Andres Bonifacio, who saw armed separation as the only option. Others, usually the wealthiest *ilustrados*, formed the conservative group, *Cuerpo de Compromisarios* (Constantino, 1975: 156). For those who joined Bonifacio’s *Katipunan*, separation was necessary to inaugurate an authority guided by *razon* (Go, 2008: 107); Bonifacio himself had been inspired by the ideas of del Pilar and the French Revolution, the movement that unified modes A, B and C into the CNS. One might view the Revolution as a transcendence of class strata where divergent grievances formed one collective consciousness, but its leading ideology had been articulated and formed by the *ilustrados*. In August 1896, the *Katipunan*\(^{21}\) initiated rebellions on the outskirts of Manila and quickly swelled to tens of thousands of small landowners and *indio* peasants across the archipelago, all demanding for Filipino sovereignty, intraclass liberation, and the protection of civil liberties. It was a drive to mode D.

By 1897, the *ilustrados* created a revolutionary government (Constantino, 1975: 174), later named the Malolos Republic upon the alliance with the U.S., to replace the *Katipunan*, manifested and led by Emilio Aguinaldo. The *ilustrados* and other revolutionary elites considered themselves best fit for the “directors-cum-patrons” (Go, 2008: 107) of the young


\(^{21}\) Full name: *Kataastaasang Kagalong-galgang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* (Supreme Worshipful Association of the Sons of the People).
nation, by way of their superior grasp on reason. They subsequently ousted and executed Bonifacio for his rejection of their authority (Sison, 1970: 27). The leadership of an elite class eventually gave way to the betrayal of the revolutionary tradition and the opening of the Philippines’ doors to American intervention. Constantino describes it well:

> For the majority of the peasants who fought and died for the Revolution, independence meant an end to friar estates and the hope of owning a piece of land. The Revolutionary Government did confiscate the friar estates but not for distribution to the oppressed masses. Instead, the republic passed a law giving “men of means” and “local chiefs” the opportunity to administer these estates upon presentation of security in cash or in bond. The drift toward enfeudalization of the countryside…was thus continued with legal sanction during the Revolution. The elite were rewarding themselves with the first fruits of the Revolution (Constantino, 1975: 216).

Herein lies the most concrete foundation of the Philippine capitalist nation-state, and one of many betrayals the “revolutionary elites” committed against the Filipino people. An equally shameful betrayal was committed by Aguinaldo himself, in his acceptance of the Biak-na-Bato Pact with the Spanish government. He and other “revolutionary elites” agreed to exile in Hong Kong and to surrender their arms, in exchange for a large sum of Mexican Pesos and pardons. The Philippine government writes of this pact as “…continuing the revolution and gaining freedom from Spain…” (Republic of the Philippines, 1899) but in reality, it was a means to kill the revolution. These betrayals successfully manipulated mode A to mediate towards a full-fledged CNS, a society dominated by mode C.

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In the throes of the revolution, Spain’s hegemony met its end in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Sison says that the war was inevitable, for it stood in the path of American imperialist expansion (Sison, 1970: 64). Indeed, the U.S. Empire was just beginning, as the end of the Civil War had marked the supremacy of liberal ideology and the dominance of social relations based in the mode of exchange C. The Confederacy’s economic base of slavery was destroyed. And so, it was in this context that the U.S. intervened in the Philippines’ fight for sovereignty, promising support for Filipino liberation and independence—this support came in swaths of troop reinforcements that filled the Manila Bay and pressured the Spanish state (Constantino, 1975: 208). The pressure was so great apparently, that the Spanish state agreed to surrender the city to the U.S. provided that it was masked by a “mock” battle, and that all Filipino rebels were barred from entering. After Aguinaldo made the Kawit Proclamation, stating the Philippines’ independence, the U.S. had signed the Treaty of Paris at the end of 1898, wherein the Spanish state officially ceded the Philippines to the U.S. and ended both the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Revolution (Sison, 1970: 28). The Filipino people had a new colonizer.

Let us recapitulate the Spanish colonial experience. The CNS structure could not have taken shape in the Philippines as long as it was a Spanish colony. The colonial state had effectively disrupted the pre-existing social hierarchy such that, before the hacienda, racialized power begot wealth; now, wealth was becoming the tool to power, although that power is historically established by race. What remained, however, was the compelling authority of utang na loob. The principle of reciprocity remained too powerful, and the union between Capital, Nation, and State is governed by the principle of free relationships, not reciprocal ones. Second, until the 19th century, the Philippines was an economic afterthought to the Spanish, thus the
dominant mode of exchange of society was not commodity exchange. The colonial state relied on the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade, and though it completely transformed Manila, the rest of the Philippines did not contribute to its survival.

Now, what of the Nation? In the words of Hannah Arendt: “…conquest by a nation led either to the full awakening of the conquered people’s national consciousness…or to tyranny.” (1976: 128). The U.S. was a full-fledged capitalist nation-state when it conquered the Philippines, and “when a nation-state rules over another state or people, we have not empire but imperialism” (Karatani, 2014: 225), for the Nation is established in the resistance against the Capital-State. If Karatani is correct in defining the birth of the Nation, then it did not exist in the Philippines until its revolution in 1896. Even then, how might we define the Philippine Nation if its birth was overridden by a foreign power?

“Liberating” American Imperialism

While my analysis of Spanish colonial history is by no means comprehensive, it brings us to our next task: to understand the nature and legacy of American imperialism in the Philippines through an analysis of the structures of power that had been reinforced and left behind. I argue that the U.S. intervention of the Philippine Revolution destroyed any chance at a cohesive, national consciousness among the Filipino people. To this day, U.S. hegemony resonates throughout the Nation in a form that has manipulated the revolutionary tradition of the masses and retains a peculiar regard for their American ‘patron.’ The union of capital, nation, and state has left the Philippines’ modern political economy under a structure of semifeudalism: control over its means of production is oligarchic, and the capitalist nation-state is largely guided by a hybrid of mode A and B. The result is a manipulatory state that springs into action only to quell dissent.
Sison says that by the time the US entered the Philippines, it had already reached what is commonly referred to as, Lenin’s “highest stage of capitalism” (1970, 64). As Ken Kawashima explains:

With the rise of finance capital, the export of capital to colonies and foreign markets can take place easily, bringing back huge profits to the financial centers to the point where it becomes unnecessary for capital to transform the entirety of society under the axiomatics of a specifically capitalist commodity economy…both national and the colonial agricultural populations now constitute strata of an expanding formation of an international relative surplus population (Kawashima, 2018: 14).

Lenin defines imperialism by large, monopolistic investment into commodities of low value, resulting in chronic crisis within the subjected nation-state.

Karatani however, is critical of this definition of imperialism, perhaps as it errs on the side of productivist determinism. Rather, imperialism is an historical derivative that emerged from an altered “nature of the union between capital and the state” (Karatani, 2014: 272). The changes of this union reflect not only the form that capital takes (e.g., industrial capital), but also what the “world commodity” (Ibid.: 269) is and the means of economic intervention by the state. Citing Marx, Karatani explains that capital cannot realize its self-valorization on its own, as surplus value cannot be generated within a single value system unless it constantly destroys existing communities to integrate new proletarians (Ibid.:193). This was not the nature of the union between capital and the state until the emergence of industrial capital, when a rapid expanse in production induces domestic demand to fall and chronic crisis to set in. At this point, capital needed to expand into foreign markets which is impossible without the state. He writes,
as a result, that “the state intervenes even more heavily in the economy during the heavy-industry stage than before. This is how we entered into the age we now call imperialism” (Ibid.: 204).23

In 1898, the U.S. was an emergent economic power, expanding its reach into the potential extractive peripheries of the world, establishing centers of American-projected power. By the end of the Philippine Revolution, the Filipino people had transformed from a colonial subject into an imperial subject; “assimilation by force” had aroused a national consciousness, igniting a desire for sovereignty (Karatani, 2014: 225). The timing of events after the Revolution—Agunialdo’s Kawit Proclamation of independence in June 1898, the Treaty of Paris in December 1898, and William McKinley’s “Benevolent Assimilation” Proclamation just eleven days after—had made the Philippine masses and its revolutionary elite wary of the intentions of the Americans’ entrance. After Spain ceded Manila for twenty million dollars, American military reinforcements extended their stay—ordered by McKinley “to let the people of the Philippines know that the Americans came as ‘friends,’ and not conquerors…[and] to protect the people’s rights and properties” (Bailon, 2018: 2). They had assumed sovereignty over the archipelago.

The ensuing Philippine-American War, which occurred less than a month after McKinley’s innocent proclamation, was nothing but an atrocity. From 1899 to 1902, the U.S. had unleashed over 70,000 troops “to protect the people,” (Go, 2008: 93) as more than a quarter of a million Filipinos were slain (Sison, 1970: 28). We do not need to look any further than the

23 As I understand it, Lenin did not define imperialism beyond an observation of the modes of production and the circulation process. On its own, this analysis proved impossible to define the difference between industrial capital (the emergence of imperialism) and merchant capital. Karatani writes:

Merchant capital did not solely rely on spatial differences [to obtain profit]; it also used temporal differentiation between systems of value. For example, merchant capital would efficiently organize its own production process to increase labor productivity...It then took this product, whose production cost had dropped, and sold it at a high price in overseas markets, thereby obtaining surplus value...It is also true that industrial capital did not obtain its surplus value solely through technological improvements of production processes. After all, industrial capital also travels long distances in search of consumers or cheap materials and labor.
formation of the Anti-Imperialist League (AIL) in 1898 or the letters from American soldiers in the Philippines\textsuperscript{24} to understand the horror of this war in the eyes of U.S. critics. Mark Twain was one of many Americans who voiced a passionate opposition:

I left these shores, at Vancouver, a red-hot imperialist…I said to myself, here are a people who have suffered for three centuries. We can make them as free as ourselves, give them a government and country of their own, put a miniature of the American constitution afloat in the Pacific, start a brand new republic to take its place among the free nations of the world. It seemed to me a great task to which we had addressed ourselves…but I have read carefully the Treaty of Paris and I have seen that we do not intend to free, but to subjugate the people of the Philippines. We have gone there to conquer, not to redeem.\textsuperscript{25}

Although the anti-imperialist voice staunchly rejected the Philippines’ annexation, it shrank from criticisms on the capitalist foundations of imperialism; thus their wish for Filipino self-government remained a pious wish. Nonetheless, the U.S. capitalist nation-state realized that it needed to legitimize its presence in the archipelago, both for the Filipinos and for its citizens at home. Such is the form of imperialism— not just a war of expansion, but the struggle for hegemony.

The U.S. masked its economic incentives by occupying the Philippines with an ethos of transformism and racial uplift, “spreading civilization” so that the archipelago may also be dominated by mode C. This was partly owed to the global shift in discourse on colonial rule and the Progressive reform movement, which was making waves domestically (Go, 2008: 31-32).

\textsuperscript{24} For more detail on the anti-imperialist sentiment growing within the American troops on the archipelago, see Rowena Bailon’s “Challenging Imperialism: Soldier’s Letters and the Anti-Imperialist League” (2018).

Key figures of the imperialist project in the Philippines—Woodrow Wilson, William H. Taft, McKinley, and so on—proclaimed the “duty to moderate the process [of imperialism] in the interests of liberty; to impart to the peoples...our principles of self-help; teach them order and self-control; impart to them...the drill and habit of law and obedience.”

Thus began the tutelary project of teaching its new Philippine colony the art of American-style government. However, tutelary education was designed only for the “eligible class,” (Go, 2008: 53) and it was the ilustrado elite—owed by their natural capacity for razón—who stepped up to the task.

Recall that the Revolution began in some part due to the Spanish state’s perceived incapacity for razón. The Filipino elite had already defined concepts of independence and liberty along the lines of an idealized reciprocity between the ruler and the ruled, as long as the rulers were capable of ensuring this obligatory relationship. Thus, calls for “independence under [the] American protectorate” had proliferated throughout the ilustrados, accepting American sovereignty and tutelage as a reflection of the capacity to realize schemas of mutual exchange and relationships—the U.S. would offer its protection and the Filipino elite would offer its loyalty and prove its capacity to lead. Relations between Filipinos continued to operate along these lines, reflected in the words of a Philippine Commission member:

If the Philippine archipelago has a governable popular mass called upon to obey and a directing class charged with the duty of governing, it is in condition to govern itself. These factors...are the only two by which to determine the political capacity of a country; an entity that knows how to govern...and an entity that knows how to obey (Constantino, 1978: 123).

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27 For details and statements on Filipino expressions of acceptance of American sovereignty and how Governor Taft was seen as a patron, see (Go, 2008: 115-117).
American tutelage in the Philippines had not dismantled pre-existing clientelist relations among the elite but rather, had reinforced them in a new form.

**Occupation and the Tutelary Project**

The two principal agents of tutelage were the centralization of power in American hands and the public education system—together, they had worked to ensure political hegemony and economic dominance by the U.S. By way of the Organic Act of Congress and the Philippine Bill of 1902, a bicameral style of legislature was inaugurated as the central authority of the archipelago, reflecting the American style of governance. It established the lower chamber of the Philippine Assembly and the upper house of the Philippine Commission; although Taft had appointed some Filipinos to serve in the upper house, the commission’s governor-general as well as a majority of its seats were occupied by the U.S. For the local governments, the U.S. similarly held supervisory positions and also occupied the sole capacity to appoint Filipino municipal mayors (Go, 2008: 156). They facilitated municipal and provincial elections, but one had to own property to qualify as a voter or candidate (Krinks, 2002: 8), which meant that those seats in the central state and the local bureaucracy—whether elected or appointed—were reserved for those *ilustrados* who had been receptive to the U.S. intervention. Though ostensibly to encourage “democracy,” this structure achieved the opposite, entrenching local elites through personal connections and promises—*utang na loob*. The hierarchical system under Spanish rule was not destroyed, but repeated.

Higher education was also reserved for the propertied, but the public school system in the archipelago was treated as the precious tool that it was—a colonial tool for the pacification and assimilation of the Filipino people. Education is powerful, and this was not lost on the U.S. The war had not even ended when they rapidly expanded the public school system throughout the
colony, bringing in American teachers to spread American ideals and train young Filipinos to be good colonials, the pillar of which lied in its strict use of English. Of course, administration over the public school system, its curriculum, and the Department of Public Instruction lied solely in American hands—that power was never entrusted to any Filipino until independence. The implication of an American-oriented education was dire. Constantino says it best:

This does not mean that nothing that was taught was of any value. We became literate in English to a certain extent. We were able to produce more men and women who could read and write…a more wide-spread education such as the Americans desired would have been a real blessing had their educational programme not been the handmaiden of their colonial policy…the success of education as a colonial weapon was complete and permanent. In exchange for a smattering of English, we yielded our souls…made us forget our own nationalism…turned our heroes into brigands…(Constantino, 1970: 23).

As the ranks of young colonial supporters swelled, the U.S. boasted of the advancement that Filipinos achieved under American rule, a symbol of their benevolence and altruism. Forbes uses this statement from a Filipino student to praise the quality of American education:

We have learned why the lands of the Filipino lie uncultivated, and why the people struggle against poverty, superstition and ignorance; that if our country would be free from this poverty we must cultivate our rich soil, for their lies our wealth. We must raise our own food and make our own clothes, must export more than we import (Forbes, 1945: 197).

By the time the Philippines became a commonwealth in 1935, American education had produced a Filipino Nation to reflect their image.

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With these two pillars of its tutelary project and colonial rule, the U.S. had achieved cultural and political hegemony, which further enabled economic dominance over the archipelago through the reorganization of Filipino social relations around mode C. This reorganization took place in three major ways during the American presence. First, the “democratic” structure of governance that the U.S. established in the archipelago enhanced the hacienda system. It introduced an inaccessible titling process and eased the process of land acquisition in favor of American corporations and the landed elite (Krinks, 2002: 28; Litonjua, 2001: 378; Constantino, 1975: 299). This politically and economically integrated territories that were once autonomous, such as cordillera and Mindanao.

Second, the U.S. was obsessed with monopolizing control of the archipelago’s financial capital by dictating monetary reforms over its currency and banking systems. These reforms included the Philippine Commission’s approval of the Gold Standard Act in 1903, which established a gold reserve fund within the archipelago to maintain parity between the Philippine peso and the dollar (Lumba, 2022: 62). The fund could both provide loans for infrastructural projects in unsettled territories—which generated significant bonds for foreign investors and subsequently empowered U.S. financial capital—and enabled the faster exchange of currency for supplies and labor, which proved crucial for American military occupation (Lumba, 2022: 62).29 Another important reform was the rapid creation and spread of the centralized Postal Savings Bank (PSB), under the management of Cameron Forbes. The first branch was opened in Manila in 1906 and within the year, there were sixty-two branches across the archipelago. The PSB was crucial for how easy it made life for the American occupier, for the generation of surplus capital through its loans for infrastructural projects in Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, and Zamboanga, and above

29 For more detail on the implications of the Gold Standard Fund, see (Lumba, 2022: 87-91)
all, for the spatial reach that it granted to the American colonial state for purposes of surveillance, securitization, and pacification (Lumba, 2022: 79-87, 92). American monetary authority over the Philippines was hyper focused on perpetuating racial schemas of white paternalism and the Filipinos’ lack of market knowledge—such a narrative was essential, for it supported military pacification and ideological consent-building.30

Lastly, American free trade in the archipelago ensured the Philippines’ position as an extractive economy, dependent on the production of primary commodities for the settler core. Over three decades of trade with the U.S. was monopolistic in nature, enabling the domestic bourgeoisie to accumulate larger amounts of capital and diversify their interests in politically advantageous ways. The 1909 Payne-Aldrich Act and 1913 Underwood Tariff Act31 rapidly opened the Philippine economy. Exports to the U.S. rose from 13 percent in 1900 to 83 percent of total exports in 1940, and American imports rose from 9 percent to 78 percent (Krinks, 2002: 28), which consisted of manufactured goods. Five commodities accounted for that 83 percent, the largest of which was sugar32 and coconuts.

After the Philippines’ granted independence in 1946, the U.S. imposed neo-colonial military and trade agreements. The notorious Bell Trade Act of 1946 with its Parity Amendment in the Philippine Constitution set quotas on primary commodity exports to the U.S., pegged the Philippine peso in favor of the dollar, and gave American corporations equal rights to control

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30 The means by which the US achieved monetary authority are outlined in Lumba’s book, particularly Chapter 3. The U.S. sought after the integration of the “Native Filipino” into its banking systems, as it was another means for the surveillance of efforts for unconditional decolonization. I wish I could have gone into more detail about it, for whoever controls capital controls the world. Alas, it is a topic for future research.
31 The Payne-Aldrich Act provided for the free entry to the U.S. all Philippine exports, except rice, sugar, and tobacco. It was reversed by the Underwood Tariff Act, which removed all restrictions.
32 The Lopez family is one example of a politically entrenched bourgeois family, originally endowed with the wealth from sugar exports. Gina Lopez was the head of the DENR, active in prohibiting destructive mining operations, until her unfortunate death in 2019. See “The Lopez Family” in Media Ownership Monitor: https://philippines.mom-rsf.org/en/owners/individual-owners/detail/owner/owner/show/the-lopez-family/.
Filipino businesses and natural resources. Furthermore, the Philippines was devastated by three years of Japanese Occupation (1942-1945), for which the U.S. offered rehabilitation funds as long as it agreed to the Bell Trade Act (Krinks, 2002: 34). The act was later revised in 1954, but the Philippine economy had already become dependent on American aid and foreign loans (Sison, 1970: 67). Other crucial agreements between the U.S. and the Philippines were the 1946 Military Bases Agreement and the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The prior was the retention of US military bases on the archipelago, but the agreement ended in 1991 as a result of natural disaster and the breakup of the Soviet Union (CQ Almanac, 1991). The latter persists to this day and consists of a commitment to defend either party should an attack occur (Department of State, n.d.). The MDT enabled the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement and the 2014 EDCA, which provided protections for US military forces and allowed rotational access to all nine military bases on the archipelago respectively.

With these agreements, US business interests had an overwhelming presence in the Philippine economy, but they could not dominate it. They induced the Philippines’ economic dependence on trade with the US whilst leaving domestic capital’s logic of “booty capitalism” (Hutchcroft, 1998) fully intact. The state was not capable of disciplining this logic since the US’ intervention in the Philippine government and its imperialist trade policies locked the archipelago’s economy into a narrow agro-export basis (Glassman, 2018: 436). In effect, this cemented the colonial class structure of Spanish times and concentrated the power of the Filipino landed oligarchy. Their defeat of the peasantry in the Huk Rebellion in 1954 not only severely limited hopes for land reform (which continue to this day), it also disorganized and destroyed the masses’ base of social power.
Because of this, members of the oligarchy were afforded even more power, and could expand into other economic opportunities. They “were given an indirect boost by the import and exchange controls implemented by the Philippine Central Bank, and backed by U.S. leaders, in response to a balance of payments crisis in 1949” (Glassman, 2018: 457). The result was a full-fledged ISI program in the 1950s, which saw a 12 percent annual growth rate until 1958 and the new foundation of an industrial Filipino elite. The Philippines became as industrially capable as South Korea in the 1950s, with most of its exports being manufactured goods to Vietnam by the late 1960s (Glassman, 2014: 1176) but its economy was far from booming. The Philippine state could not discipline domestic capital, nor escape its economy from the narrow throes of agricultural export. Filipino leaders could not develop the urban-industrial economy and attract employment and US leaders refused to offer job opportunities and renumeration for unemployment (Glassman, 2018: 459). The result of such neo-colonial subjugation by US hands was a stagnant economy, at which point the new president, Ferdinand Marcos Sr. vowed to fix.

The US Military-Industrial Complex and the Pacific Ruling Class

In the post-World War II period, the economic booms of East Asia and the Pacific were of such spectacular proportions that the World Bank applauded the region as an “East Asian Miracle,” (World Bank, 1993) describing the ability of eight countries, namely Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong among others, to defy all odds and emerge from the periphery as strong, industrialized economies. Despite its industrial capacity, this did not happen in the Philippines. It is never considered a part of the “East Asian Miracle,” instead analyzed as ‘what went wrong’ in East Asia. In contrast to the ‘developmental states’ of late-industrializing nature, it is often called an “anti-developmental state” (Bello, 2004) or a “predatory state” (Litonjua,
2001), describing the atrocious dictatorship of Marcos Sr. Such is the fate of the Philippine narrative, found in the footnotes, used to describe a failure, or maybe even forgotten altogether.

This trajectory was not just a function of a failed ISI strategy nor corruption internal to the Philippine state or even to the Marcos dictatorship. It was a function of US–projected power in the Pacific, the Philippines’ so-called need for tutelage, and the semi-feudal class structure left behind from Spanish colonial times. Specifically, the formation of a Pacific Ruling Class helped shape the patterns of geo-politics and the subsequent “East Asian Miracle.” As Jim Glassman argues, the U.S. military-industrial complex (MIC) was a central force for this transnational alliance, inciting anticommmunist sentiment and authoritarian militarism. He writes:

Military capital was limited by the development of industrial capital, though longstanding development of specialists in violence meant that the region was rife with the social and institutional capacity for sustained warfare, a capacity actualized in numerous contexts of late-colonial and post-colonial social transition…class coalitions that tied leading Western investors, military elites, and representatives of the MIC to more ‘traditional’ ruling classes…were the norm in the formation of a Pacific Ruling Class (2018: 163-164).

This was a stark difference from the emergence of the Atlantic ruling class, which formed from the hegemonic incorporation of social-democratic forms (Ibid.:163).

The Pacific ruling class reflected a regional hierarchy of pre-existing class structures, geo-political positioning, and industrial relations that were reinforced by US-projected power (Ibid.:602) in their attempt to secure economic footholds and “polito-military arrangements” (Ibid.: 518) in the area. The 1966 Manila Conference (Ibid.: 513-517) solidified this transnational alliance, as a declaration from Pacific leaders of support for the US war effort in Vietnam. It was
thus the level of aid and the quality of commitment to the Vietnam war that crystallized the hierarchy of the Pacific ruling class.

The Philippines was at the bottom of this hierarchy. Marcos Sr. wanted to take advantage of the offshore procurement (OSP) opportunities provided to those allies of ardent commitment to the Vietnam War, such as Park Chung Hee in South Korea, to revitalize Philippine industrialization and achieve true land reform, but was sensitive to domestic criticism about Philippine involvement in the war (Ibid.: 474). He also wanted to renegotiate the crucial 1946 Military Bases Agreement with the US, which was a pillar of US-Philippine relations. Altogether, these factors reflected an unreliable ally to the LBJ administration.

Indeed, by the time of the 1967 Vietnam mission led by US Presidential Advisor Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor, Philippine leaders were not consulted on the war effort, leaving only those Asian allies who ‘endorse the essentiality of continuing the bombing campaign against the north,’ and ‘who are generally inclined to press it harder and with less regard for civilian casualties…’ (Ibid.) As a result, the Philippines had limited access to OSP opportunities and economic aid from the US, leading to the long-term inability to structurally transform its economy into one of dynamism like its Pacific and East Asian neighbors. They were left to their own.

However, when Marcos Sr. announced martial law in September 1972, US support came flooding back not for the Filipinos, but Marcos’ dictatorship.

The US business community in the Philippines had called for a ‘strengthening of presidential authority’ that would allow for creation of more ‘stability,’ and leading members were so satisfied with the results that by the time there was discussion of lifting
martial law in 1980 many evinced concern about abandoning practices that had served their interests so well (Ibid.: 481).

The dictatorship received US $30 million to US $500 million to support a counterinsurgency campaign against Muslim and nationalist forces in Mindanao, making it the “US-Marcos Dictatorship” (Ibid.: 482).

To reiterate, the U.S. reorganized Filipino social relations around mode C in three major moves: spatial political integration, monetary authority, and dominance over the Philippine economy. This worked not only to the benefit of the U.S. as the center of the capitalist world order, but also to that of the Filipino elite, who came to dominate land, power and capital. Of course, this would not have been possible without the influx of American military troops and infrastructure, nor without the power of colonial education, which provided the illusion of social mobility to avert criticism of the oligarchy of capital. As the story goes, U.S rule formally dissolved from the central state with the complete “Filipinization” of the bureaucracy and the transition to commonwealth status; but the damage had been done. American hegemony won over its subjects, the Philippines now operated as a capitalist nation-state, one that continues to be politically and economically dependent on its foreign patron.

It is worth revisiting utang na loob, for it is a relational schema that exists to this day. Even after the emergence of the CNS structure, clientelism persisted in the exercises of elite power. In my view however, it was not practiced to the degree of reciprocity that it once was during pre-capitalist times. By the time the Philippines was granted independence, exchanges of utang na loob no longer took the form of a debt bound in mode A, but a debt bound in mode C (Karatani, 2014: 129-130). Perhaps the Filipino elite observed an obligatory debt to its mass base insofar as they were elected, but once in office, the debt owed was to capital’s sovereignty,
achieved through “narrow self-serving ends” (Stanley, 1974: 5). These ends become particularly clear in the stories of the Japanese Occupation and the Marcos regime, when the domestic bourgeoisie collaborated with forces that violently exploited the Filipino masses.

Karatani says that the Nation is formed out of resistance to the capital-state, a return of the repressed mode A, a sentiment of solidarity in response to the destruction of the community. If Karatani is correct, then the Filipino Nation emerged after the U.S. had arrived, when the capital-state was formed. However, I argue that the Nation emerged as shaped by American hands, thus reflecting the entrenchment of the post-colonial hierarchy that was formed under Spanish rule. If we take the Nation both as a reflection of resistance to the capital-state and a desire for sovereignty, then it is enmeshed in the Filipino bourgeoisie’s clientelist manipulation of the state in pursuit of capital’s sovereignty. As Karatani says, “the nation-state is never created on a blank sheet. It is born on the ground of the already existing society” (Karatani, 2014: 226).

Thus, the solidification of the CNS structure by American intervention reflects the infusion of a post-colonial class regime and cultural schema together with the logic of capitalist development and production. America’s interruption of the Philippines’ revolution had effectively robbed the masses of building a nation according to Filipino means, instead enforcing a hegemonic logic that operates according to the antagonism of class strata for the benefit of the bourgeois class. Filipinos had lost any chance at transcending colonial forms of oppression. Like the Spanish before them, U.S. imperialists relied on the Filipino bourgeois to govern the masses; the difference was that the Spanish left the governing elite to their own, while the U.S. ensured that Philippine governance reflected their own image. The retention of post-colonial schemas and its fusion within the capitalist system has culminated in a form of governance that is adept to capitalist intervention, empowering generations of a shrinking elite.
Creating a government in their image was less for the aid of progress for the Philippines than it was a stepping-stone for America’s emerging modern world empire. By arresting Filipino national consciousness to align closely with that of America’s, they ensured the polarizing and ecologically imperial structure of capitalist development for the benefit of American hegemony. How did this path of polarization and ecological imperialism lead to the present-day Philippine state’s adaptation regime and the political economic implications of typhoon response? I take up this question in the next section.
Chapter 2

The Political Economy of Climate Change Adaptation

The transformation of our knowledge of nature is tightly linked to the transformation in the constellation of the social beings, which always changes with the socio-historical development of metabolism with nature…concrete human metabolism with nature…is mediated not only by material conditions but also by social relations such as glass, gender and race.

–Kohei Saito, *Marx in the Anthropocene*33

It is like designing a bridge—a universalist, participatory, climate ethics that crosses the chasm of the “world’s biggest collective action problem” to a global village on the other side—that we know will never be able to support our weight. From Kyoto to Paris, we are left stranded; hearts filled with hope, feet on crumbling soil.

–Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann, *Climate Leviathan*34

From my Karatanian interpretation of Philippine colonial history and its class structure, it is clear that the Philippine state is dictated by the logic of capitalist accumulation rather than the development of the Filipino people. However, this goes beyond the surface-level understanding of a state that prioritizes profit over people. Instead, I argue that the means by which the Philippines became a capitalist nation-state—that is, by establishing the hegemony of a clientelist elite—strengthened the dialectic between core and periphery, which is fueled by ecological imperialism. For the Philippines, such a dialectic enforces its ontological vulnerability through mechanisms of sustainable development. The result, as we will see, is a form of climate adaptation that obscures the state’s oppression along class lines.

An Intersection: Karatani and Saito

While Karatani’s framework provides us with a strong image of our modern world system, it is not entirely comprehensive. He does acknowledge Marx’s concept of metabolism

33 (2022: 89)
34 (2018: 127)
between humanity and nature at various points in *Structure*, saying that a failure to grasp “the problems of the exchange relations between people and the Capital-Nation-State form that these bring about, we will never be able to respond to these environmental problems.” (Karatani, 2014: 20) Now, however, we must take the discussion of human-human relations beyond into a discussion of relations between humans and nature. We now know that the CNS has penetrated the Philippines, but how does that explain its paradoxical vulnerability to climate change?

I claim that Karatani’s analysis of the world system is missing the crucial dimension of ecological imperialism. To address this, I will recapitulate Saito’s discussion of the metabolic rift. Saito claims of three dimensions of the capital-produced rift between humanity and nature’s social metabolism (material, spatial, and temporal), and three subsequent shifts that result (respectively, technological, spatial, and temporal). All three rifts and shifts are mutually reinforcing, but it is particularly through the spatial shift that Capital-Nation-State demands the practice of ecological imperialism as compensation for the irreparable and deepening spatial rift. As Saito writes:

Spatial rift creates externality by a geographic displacement of ecological burdens to another social group living somewhere else…By externalizing the material conditions of production, the working class in the Global North came to exploit others in the Global South…the ‘imperial mode of living’…is accompanied by ‘ecologically unequal exchange’ of free energy and materials…The negative consequences of the rift, such as exhaustion of resources, corporeal rift of slaves and environmental pollution, disproportionately emerge in those peripheries from which resources are constantly extracted and transported to the center. This is representative of the spatial shift as a way of organizing the entire world that can be aptly called the capitalist system (2022: 31-33).
American intervention in the Philippines was based in the mode of exchange C, for the archipelago only served as the means for the U.S. to emerge as a hegemonic world power. In line with Saito’s argument then, the implications of the American period established a spatial rift; that is, the creation of an ‘externalization society’ (Saito, 2022: 35) whereby the negative consequences from the overexploitation of natural resources by the core is disproportionately displaced onto the periphery. Surely, we see this on the global scale, as the worse effects of climate change are felt by those on the periphery; but it also occurs internally—the imperial motives of American capitalist development in the Philippines and the massive extraction of natural resources in the period of neoliberalism developed the archipelago’s own antagonism between town and country.\(^\text{35}\) That is, the urban population developed so rapidly that Metro Manila is home to some of the densest populations of informal settlements in the world, and they are unequipped to manage the ecological crisis.\(^\text{36}\)

Under American imperialism, the Philippines has been transformed into an ‘externalization society,’ whereby the survival of the capitalist nation-state is dependent on the imperialist mode of production, that is, the exploitation or “robbery” of the periphery for the benefit of the center. The logic is as follows: the core relies on the continuous accumulation of capital and the continuous access to cheap resources, materials, and labor-power, but it does not acknowledge the growing rift between humanity and nature. The ecosystem can bear only so

\(^{35}\) ‘Beautification campaigns’ of the 1970s dumped roughly 160,000 squatters to the outskirts of Manila, out of media view for events like the 1974 Miss Universe Pageant, President Gerald Ford’s visit in 1975, and the IMF-World Bank meeting in 1976. After the ‘People Power Revolution’ of 1986, 600,000 squatters were evicted without plans for relocation. In 1999, demolition crews attacked the slum of Dabu-Dabu in Pasay in preparation for the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, killing four people (Davis, 2017: 104).

\(^{36}\) Data surrounding the populations of informal settlers around Metro Manila often vary drastically, likely due to differences in how “slum” is defined. In 2014, the World Bank Philippines Urbanization Review reported a slum population of 5.8% (1.2 million people) of its total urban population. That same year, UN Data showed a slum population of 38.3% (7.9 million people, assuming similar estimates of Manila’s total urban population) (UNESCO, 2017).
much strain before it completely crumbles. Thus, the metabolic rift is also characterized by the creation of new technologies that ensure access to cheap resources—such as fertilizers to maintain the integrity of the soil—but these only work to further shift the consequences of the crisis onto those populations who remain subjected to the imperialist mode of production. The “robbery” of humanity and nature is inherent to imperialism and to the logic of capital accumulation. And as long as our modern world system is dictated by the logic of the Capital-Nation-State, the role of each respective nation-state will always be concerned with making their external positions as advantageous as possible. This is inherent to the fundamentally polarizing structure of our modern world-system as it is historically projected by the Capital-Nation-State.

**Adaptation of the Capital-Nation-State**

From my discussion of the conjuncture between the Philippines’ political economy and its ontological vulnerability to climate change, we must now consider what this means for the Philippine state’s capacity to adapt. In this next section, I will provide an overview of the state’s “climate bureaucracy” (Smith, 2022) developed since 1987, its current National Climate Change Action Plan, the Philippine Development Plan, and a review of the literature concerning the state’s response to the archipelago largest tropical cyclone, Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda). Along with a brief discussion on the politics of mining adaptation, this review will shed light on the Philippines’ “adaptation regime” (Paprocki, 2021) and will analyze the effectiveness of its adaptation discourse. The state’s climate governance is extensive, reflecting the Philippines’ endless history of extreme weather events and disasters.

I argue that despite its elaborate rhetoric, the Philippine state’s mechanisms of adaptation fail to challenge structures of capitalist logic and accumulation, thereby obscuring the impoverishment of the Filipino masses. Mired in disaster preparedness and typhoon response, the
state idealizes adaptation to the bourgeois ideal of resilience and “sustainable development,” where refuge from the climate crisis comes hand in hand with economic growth. However, the historical conditions of the union between capital, nation, and state complicate this ideal, resulting in a contradictory spatial fix. Today, the Philippines sees neither refuge nor economic growth. For this reason, members of the UNFCCC and the Philippine state (like Rodrigo Duterte) have acknowledged the inadequacy of liberal climate adaptation but offer nothing to replace it. Adaptation in the Philippines is thus a tug of war, stretched between two opposing discourses: the hegemony of multilateral, liberal climate governance and the call for climate justice in response to the reality of its situation. As we will see, the state tends to champion the former and vilify the latter.

Contemporary climate adaptation is an ontological condition (Bankoff, 2001; Wainwright and Mann, 2018; Paprocki, 2021): to adapt indicates an inherent way of being that necessitates change. Adaptation has a structural functionalist tendency, establishing an ideal to which nation-states must and should adapt but obscuring from view the political context of that ideal (Wainwright and Mann, 2018: 70). As such, ideology and adaptation policies necessitate “vulnerability,” which reinforce an inherent, lesser position of those struggling to cope with climate change. This legitimizes “adjustments” to take them out of their vulnerability and weakness (Bankoff, 2001; Paprocki, 2021: 61). Adaptation, development and ideology occupy a dialectical exchange that reinforces the capitalist political economy.

It is hard to deny that, over the four centuries of exposure to western political economic ideas, the Philippines has internalized its vulnerability and institutionalized its peripheral position

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37 Specifically, Will Smith’s “Climates of Control: violent adaptation and climate change in the Philippines” (2022) discusses Duterte’s rejection of the liberal policies of previous presidents and of climate policy. In effect, Duterte champions a populism of a specific historical context, one that justifies policies of “violent adaptation.”
in the world system. Generations of Filipinos have been told that they are weak and incapable, which is why the country has looked outward to educate and employ its own, and continues to do so today. For instance, in the mid-1970s, Marcos Sr. launched its labor-export policy, the implication of which led to a massive outflow of Filipino workers until the late 1990s. In 2004, the number of Filipinos overseas was at 6.5 million, ten percent of the population at the time; remittances were at $6.9 billion (Bello, 2004: 11). As of 2021, the number of registered overseas Filipino workers was at 1.8 million while total remittances reached over $2.7 billion.38

Although the Philippines has embraced its historically-projected peripherality in the world system (Hornberg, 2007: 9) by inaugurating the Capital-Nation-State, this does not mean that Filipinos blindly accept its sovereignty. Climate justice circles and civil society is increasingly clear in its demands for “Filipinization” of industry, higher wages, indigenous rights, moratoriums on mining, and so on. The state itself—the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the “Climate Cluster,” and so on—is well endowed with the reality of its situation: its 16.4 percent poverty incidence, poor infrastructure, persistent food and health insecurity, and intensifying climate irregularities that are “outstripping the country’s capacity to withstand climate shocks” (GPH, 2021).

However, against the calls of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and some climate justice movements, the state’s refuses to critically analyze these circumstances and instead legitimizes vigorous implementation of adaptive measures in pursuit of green growth. One example is NEDA’s Zero Poverty by 2040 plan (*AmBisyon Natin 2040*), a plan so subsumed

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by the logic of capitalist political economy that it ignores the core needs of its people. On the surface, this ambitious plan was a shining beacon of Duterte’s presidency:

In 2040, we will all enjoy a stable and comfortable lifestyle, secure in the knowledge that we have enough for our daily needs and unexpected expenses, that we can plan and prepare for our own and our children’s future. Our family lives together in a place of our own, and we have the freedom to go where we desire, protected and enabled by a clean, efficient, and fair government (NEDA, 2016).

Meeting the needs of the masses is in and of itself a revolutionary act, but it cannot be done solely by promising economic growth, it must ensure social and political justice. Unfortunately, the pillars of AmBisyon seeks the security of life solely through bourgeois means, such as innovating the capacity of agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation (Ibid.: 3-4) without defining any critical strategy to ensure a just industrialization or attracting investment and developing human capital to its highest potential (Ibid.: 3).

State entities like the National Resilience Council (NRC), the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation (PDRF), and fifty other CSOs and NGOs (UN Philippines, 2021: 13-14) adhere faithfully to the multilateral frameworks of the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC’s Sustainable Development Goals, and the Hyogo and Sendai Framework. Although these frameworks are marginally in line with calls from climate justice circles, they ultimately signal the hegemony of capitalist climate governance and the idealization of the status quo. For instance, the NRC’s “Adopt-a-City” framework (NRC, 2021) was one of the pillars of the reconstruction effort after the infamous Typhoon Yolanda in 2014. The program, and the NRC itself, prioritizes private sector involvement in climate-resilient development, to “build capacity for evidence-informed risk governance” (Ibid.). The logic of public-private partnerships, science
and technology-based sustainable development, and multi-sectoral collaboration underlies the activities of all state agents involved in adaptation policymaking.

**Logic of the Philippine Climate Bureaucracy**

After EDSA in 1986 and the creation of the 1987 Constitution, worsening climatic conditions and the impoverished state of the Philippines created a crisis that was getting harder to ignore. Equipped with a new government, the state recognized the need for the “protection and advancement of the right of the Filipino people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature” (GPH, 1991). The task for the GPH was thus to protect the Philippines’ environmental resources and to advance its economic development. Since then, it has created a myriad of groundbreaking, yet imperfect executive orders, regulations, and governmental bodies to fulfill this task.

The DENR was one such major creation in 1987 that represented the state’s heightened awareness to increasing environmental problems. Mandated with the sole responsibility for the management, regulation, and protection of the archipelago’s natural resources, it is also the only agency capable of licensing the extraction of these resources (GPH, 1987). The creation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1988 provided, for the first time, plans to redistribute land to the peasantry in a ten-year period. However, several studies have shown that this promise failed. In 1992, the state created Asia’s first national council on sustainable development, the Philippine Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD) (Bello and

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39 See Chapter 2 of Bello’s *The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines* (2004) or “Agrarian Reform and Counterreform” in *The Food Wars* (2009: 63-67). As a result of “congressional haggling between lawmakers-landowners and the advocates of reform” (2004: 33), CARP itself was limited in what it could achieve. For instance, “it allowed landlords to retain five hectares of their property, plus three hectares for each legitimate heir” (Bello, 2009: 63). Not only that, the Philippine Congress was dominated by landlords, restricting CARP’s implementation. In the following decades, as EDSA continuously failed to live up to its name, there grew a profound disillusionment and disorganization in the peasant movement and the Left (2004: 75). This proved fatal in the face of a strong and politically powerful opposition comprised of landlords and an oligarchy of capital.
Malig, 2004: 219), headed in conjunction by the National Economic and Development Agency (NEDA) and the DENR. Other major state provisions were the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) in 1997 and the National Integrated Protected Areas System (GPH, 1992). The GPH also ratified the UNFCCC in 1994, the Kyoto Protocol in 2003, and later, the Paris Agreement in 2016.

In 2009, in response to the devastating effects of Typhoon Ondoy, the Philippine Congress enacted the “Climate Change Act,” wherein it mainstreamed climate policy across all aspects of national and local government policy formation and created the Climate Change Commission (CCC) as the leading governmental agency to coordinate and monitor adaptation and mitigation plans (GPH, 2009).\(^4\) The CCC is composed of two bodies: the Climate Change Advisory Board, consisting of key sectoral representatives and government agencies, and the National Panel of Technical Experts, consisting of the country’s leading scientists. In 2010, the state created the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) to develop and mainstream disaster-resilient action plans from the highest national government to the lowest LGU (GPH, 2010). Together, the CCC and the NDRRMC make up the “Climate Cluster,” chaired by the DENR and the Department of National Defense (DND). As the CCC and the NDRRMC are the two most important and most active bodies of climate adaptation policymaking. They have thus fused the rhetoric of adaptation with that of disaster preparedness (de Leon, 2017). There are two significant implications for this.

First, the fusion of climate change adaptation and disaster preparedness reflects the larger international consensus on capitalist climate governance. That is, climate adaptation is approached from the perspective of adjusting current economic and social practices to be more

\(^4\) Republic Act 9729, Section 4. This act was also amended with the People’s Survival Fund, which meant to signal the state’s long-term interest in financing adaptation mechanisms.
sustainable, so that those practices themselves may remain unchallenged. The state’s national strategy for climate change was premised on the IPCC’s definition of adaptation in 2007: “Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (AccBio, 2009: 5). The GPH continues to pursue adaptation according to this principle, echoing this exact definition in the Climate Change Act. It is also reinforced in the Philippines’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which was recently submitted in 2021, saying, “The Philippines shall undertake adaptation measures…to preempt, reduce and address residual loss and damage” (GPH, 2021: 5). Implying its use as a precautionary principle, adaptation is applied through the “transformation of its socio-economic sectors towards a climate and disaster-resilient and low-carbon economy” (Ibid.: 1). Lastly, the Philippines’ National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP), mandated to operate from 2011 to 2028, further describes adaptation as “a mechanism to manage risks, adjust economic activity to reduce vulnerability and to improve business certainty” (CCC, 2011: 2).

Second, the emphasis on disaster preparedness in Philippine adaptation depoliticizes social conditions and crises that are political in nature. That is, overly technical measures of adaptation and “sustainable development” are celebrated as efforts to eradicate poverty, reduce vulnerability, and induce “inclusive growth,” which serve as a smokescreen to the structural causes of impoverishment. This contradiction is responsible for and reflected in the dominance of “resilience” as a policy narrative in Philippine climate litigation. Like sustainable development, resilience is a complicated and ambiguous concept, and its presumption as an ideal is susceptible to manipulation by those in power. As I have gained from the literature on the
critique of sustainable development and resilience as a tool for discourse (Bankoff, 2001; Tadgell et al.,

2017; Curato, 2018; Yee, 2018; Eadie, 2019), these concepts present yet mystify the larger paradox that is prevalent in capitalist climate governance: the recognition that our current system of alienation between humanity and nature is not conducive to ecological and social stability, but its overwhelming grip on structures of governance keep it in place. In other words, the Philippine state is one of many that is grappling with the forces that demand preservation of the status quo, and those that demand its transformation.

**The National Climate Change Action Plan 2011-2028**

As outlined in the NCCAP, the state’s ultimate goal is to “build the adaptative capacities of women and men in their communities, increase the resilience of vulnerable sectors and natural ecosystems to climate change, and optimize mitigation opportunities towards gender-responsive and rights-based sustainable development” (CCC, 2011: 5). To pursue this goal, the state has laid out seven priority sectors (Figure 1) to which it will focus its policies of adaptation and mitigation. It should be clear that the lens through which adaptation is achieved is vulnerability and risk reduction to natural disasters. While this is the backbone to all priorities of the NCCAP, those of food security and human security demonstrate the state’s recognition of the intersection between climate change and structural poverty.

Adaptation measures for food security mainly concern “enhancing resilience” of agriculture and fishing production and distribution. As of 2021, this sector employed just over twenty-four percent of the Philippines’ labor force (less than 44 million people) and contributed over ten percent of the country’s GDP (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2022). The last twenty years has seen employment and value-added from the agriculture sector cut in half, as it now
stands to be the least productive, least valuable, and most vulnerable sector in the Philippine economy. The state recognizes that agriculture bears the largest costs of natural disasters,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIORITIES</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Food security</td>
<td>The objective of the national strategic priority on food security is to ensure availability, stability, accessibility, and affordability of safe and healthy food amidst climate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Water sufficiency</td>
<td>In light of climate change, however, a comprehensive review and subsequent restructuring of the entire water sector governance is required. It is important as well to assess the resilience of major water resources and infrastructures, manage supply and demand, manage water quality, and promote conservation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ecological and Environmental stability</td>
<td>Ecosystem resilience and environmental stability during the plan period is focused on achieving one immediate outcome: the protection and rehabilitation of critical ecosystems, and the restoration of ecological services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Human security</td>
<td>The objective of the human security agenda is to reduce the risks of women and men to climate change and disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Climate-friendly industries and services</td>
<td>NCCAP prioritizes the creation of green and eco-jobs and sustainable consumption and production. It also focuses on the development of sustainable cities and municipalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sustainable energy</td>
<td>NCCAP prioritizes the promotion and expansion of energy efficiency and conservation; the development of sustainable and renewable energy; environmentally sustainable transport; and climate-proofing and rehabilitation of energy systems infrastructures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 7. Knowledge and capacity development     | The priorities of the NCCAP on knowledge and capacity development are:  
- Enhanced knowledge on the science of climate change;  
- Enhanced capacity for climate change adaptation, mitigation and disaster risk reduction at the local and community level; and  
- Established gendered climate change knowledge management accessible to all sectors at the national and local levels. |

Figure 1. National Climate Change Action Plan 2011-2028 (CCC, 2011:11)
specifically citing U.S. $852 million worth of damages from the two successive typhoons in October and November 2020 (GPH, 2021: 3). Massive damages and yield losses incur scarce food supply, food price inflation, disrupted supply chains, and so on, that can exacerbate the already existing poverty gap. The state has implemented adaptive mechanisms along the lines of vulnerability and risk assessments, climate resilient crop varieties, dissemination of “best practices” for farm and fishery management (integrated farming, water harvesting technologies, alternative feeds, etc.) and disaster preparedness trainings for farming communities (CCC, 2011: 10). Figure 2 indicates the desired implementation of some key adaptive measures planned for food security in Metro Cebu, aligned with the guidelines from the NCCAP.

The NCCAP promotes human security with three main outcomes: ensuring multi-sector implementation of CCA and DRR policy, providing climate-resilient social protection programs, and developing adaptive settlements and services. The human security aspect of the NCCAP certainly gives the state a well-rounded perspective of climate change consequences—it acknowledges that a worsening climate “has multiplied the vulnerability of the poorest households and communities whose daily struggle is to access and secure basic needs and services.”41 Subsequently, it has prioritized adaptive activities such as, “capacity-building” of LGUs that is integrated with national CCA-DRR policy, early warning systems, health surveillance platforms, and socio-economic post-disaster recovery efforts (Cash-for-Work projects, emergency employment, Housing Program for Informal Settler Families, etc.) (CCC, 2011: 18-19).

This glimpse into the NCCAP—and our earlier discussion of sustainable development—reveals an adaptation strategy of technocratic hyper-optimism. The result is the obscurity of the

Figure 2 Key adaptive measures that emphasize efficient, sustainable land use and farming techniques for food security, balanced with the growing urban population. *2020 Risk Resiliency Roadmap and Investment Portfolio: Metro Cebu* (DENR, 2020: 103).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Ensure sustainable use of land resources and achieve environmental balance |...
| • Improve agricultural practices |...
| • Reduce potential damages of rain-induced landslides to agricultural areas |...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Decrease exposure of agricultural areas to rain-induced landslide |...
| • Reduce flooding and other hazards affecting production areas |...
| • Enhance support facilities for agriculture |...
| • Establish crop production areas and support infrastructure |...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Measures</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1-3</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>Estimated Cost (PhP)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy on flood plains for agriculture – update CLUP and integrate in ZO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded financing programs for farmers and fisherfolks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,700 per farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of climate and sustainable farming techniques (crop rotation, varietal adoption, climate forecasting, adoption of PAGASA &amp; other climate database)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000,000 per LGU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice varieties and crops suitable for flood-prone areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Measures</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1-3</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>Estimated Cost (PhP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development and maintenance of vegetative slope stabilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of EWS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000,00 for 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting buffer strip plants to wetlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,000 per ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small farm reservoir and water impounding facilities; Rainwater harvesting facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,200,000 per unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of irrigation canals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000,000 to 7,500,000 per communal irrigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of farm-to-market roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,300,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil analysis and determine appropriate crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200,000</td>
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</table>
Philippine’s historical condition of continuous struggle against the forces of colonialism and imperialism. Indeed, it is as if the Filipino occupies two opposing identities: ontologically vulnerable, yet inherently resilient. These two positions are at odds, yet they go hand-in-hand, reflected in three ways: the necessity of disaster risk reduction as a pillar of climate adaptation, its subsequent legitimization of apolitical measures of resilience-building in the name of sustainable development, and—by way of both—the minimization of the historical and inherently political context of Philippine adaptation. The state’s adaptation strategy aims to enhance the ability of social, physical, and economic practices to withstand more intense and irregular disasters. It does not question the fundamental reasoning behind these practices, nor the political economic logic of accumulation—it could not dare. And so, as the Philippines continues to be devastated by ecological disaster, the masses are increasingly stripped of their social power to change this iron dynamic. What if the key to ‘resilience’ is to tear the whole dynamic down?

The Political Economy of Typhoon Response: Haiyan

Typhoons curse the Philippines. More tropical cyclones enter the Philippines’ Area of Responsibility than anywhere else in the world, and an average of eight to nine typhoons make landfall each year.\(^{42}\) They are the largest source of agricultural damage and livelihood destruction (CCC, 2011: 7). The havoc they wreak on food security, infrastructure, and life could never be wished upon anyone. However, there is the smallest silver lining. As the literature suggests, the post-disaster recovery period serves as a window of opportunity for social change; rehabilitation efforts test social cohesion and structures of power, thus the unequal and oppressive nature of

disasters is revealed (Eadie, 2019: 98) However, it also tests the power and legitimacy of the state, both on the international stage and within its natural boundaries (Uson, 2017: 417).

How does the Philippine state balance the opposing forces of a natural disaster? It is concerned with maintaining its legitimacy. Recall that the Capital-Nation-State is so formidable because each component is afforded their own demands and powers that ensure the survival of all, primarily that of Capital. If one component falls away, the entire Borromean knot is undone. Therefore, if Capital is weak, the State comes to its aid with unrelenting force, which may come at the expense of the Nation. Such is the case amidst natural disasters. The materially based efforts to build resiliency can entrench exclusionary practices, even amidst humanitarian crises because above all, Capital must survive. This is the power of the CNS logic, and the propensity of adaptation efforts to obscure it. As such, a discussion of post-disaster recovery efforts after the notorious Typhoon Haiyan is crucial to realizing the incapacity of the state’s ability to adapt.

Ten years ago, Typhoon Haiyan, internationally known as Yolanda, devastated the Philippines. With a death toll of at least 6,000 people, displacement of at least 4.1 million, and damage amounting to about US $5.8 billion, Haiyan was the deadliest and costliest typhoon in recorded history.\(^{43}\) The intense, long-term crisis that resulted had turned into a spectacle for the international community—over a year after the disaster, unemployment, homelessness, and unsafe settlements continued to plague the Filipino people.\(^{44}\) It was a massive window of opportunity, as it put existing relations of power and exchange under significant stress and scrutiny, making structural issues of poverty and inequality completely unavoidable to the naked eye.


eye. It is therefore reasonable that a considerable literature has examined the rehabilitative efforts of Typhoon Haiyan.

After Haiyan, the state’s immediate response was concisely presented in its Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY). It was a strategic, top-down, outcome-based plan, coordinated by the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR), that aimed to address primarily the immediate and medium-term needs for recovery and reconstruction of the Philippine economy. Of course, it was contextualized by its longer-term goal of “building back better” in terms of inducing higher growth in the poorest areas, legitimizing the increase of sustainable development measures. It could be said that the state attempted to acknowledge the inherently political demands of adaptation by emphasizing the role of LGUs in disseminating recover information and aid—to the Philippine state, this is how “bottom-up,” participatory democracy is achieved. Despite this provision, the framework provided by RAY and the results of its implementation demonstrate that recovery and reconstruction relied heavily on public-private partnerships (NEDA, 2013: 19), enabling a stronger influence of local elites to guide the rehabilitation process (Uson, 2017: 420).

As such, I view RAY as the embodiment of the State’s reliance on Capital to ‘empower’ the Nation and enhance its legitimacy. One gets a glimpse at this through RAY’s assessment of recovery and resilience, which is based primarily on output. For instance, one of its main priority areas, “housing and resettlement,” defined rehabilitative progress along the lines of, “percent of partially damaged [and totally damaged] houses that are rebuilt…percent of new houses built to disaster-resilient standards…percent of households resettled to government-assisted resettlement areas” (NEDA, 2013: 20) and so on. An action plan along the likes of RAY seems
comprehensive, and indeed, the international community praised the Philippines’ recovery after Haiyan; I demonstrate, however, that there was much left to be desired.

In the wake of the disaster, there was a massive, uncoordinated flow of humanitarian aid from NGOs, UN agencies, families, charity foundations, and private companies. It took a myriad of forms from thousands of aid workers, millions of dollars in loans, grants, or remittances, food relief, construction of schools and homes, livelihood initiatives, medical assistance and so on (Curato, 2018; Walch, 2018; Eadie, 2019; Frago-Marasigan, 2019). The appearance of international solidarity was cause for celebration. However, as fast as relief was received, they had just as quickly disappeared (Walch, 2018; Eadie, 2019). Furthermore, in 2015—two years after the disaster hit—it was reported that the total amount of foreign aid to be received by the GPH was ₱73.3 billion; as of November 2015, it had only received ₱2.4 billion (Abad, 2015.)

Even with the amount that the state did receive, it was unequally distributed and did not seem to address the root causes of vulnerability that exacerbated the effects of the disaster.

“Quick Response Funds,” budgetary allocations for respective departments of the state, also demonstrated a gross inequality: the GPH’s Office of Civil Defense (OCD) had been allocated a total of ₱692.77 million whereas the NDRMMC had to rely on donations that reached only ₱48.82 million. Worse, the OCD had disbursed 98 percent of its funds to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) “for petroleum, oil and lubricants” as a reserve for disaster operations (Commission on Audit, 2014: 75). Inequities in relief funds were also demonstrated in personal aid. For instance, remittances for Haiyan victims reached US $600 million, however in many cases, this meant that they were not prioritized to receive aid packages from NGOs (Curato, 2018).
Table 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash advances for Operational requirements of the NDRRMC Operations Center</td>
<td>1,600,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash advances for Operational requirements of ROVIII Operations Center</td>
<td>200,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Supplies</td>
<td>56,445.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund transfer to AFP for petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) reserve for disaster operations, subject to liquidation</td>
<td>118,645,912.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various groceries and medicines intended for daily subsistence of duty personnel at Command Center and RDRRMC VIII Operations Center</td>
<td>680,193.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>121,182,550.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3 Report on the Audit of Typhoon Yolanda Relief Operations (COA, 2014: 75)
The inadequacies of relief efforts after Haiyan characterized a “double process of dispossession,” (Eadie, 2019) wherein pre-existing forms of vulnerability and poverty were exacerbated, rather than eliminated. In the year following the disaster, the private sector had become the fastest and thus, the most indispensable actor enabling rehabilitation. Recall that a reliance on public-private partnerships was a major focus in RAY, coordinated by the OPARR. At the end of 2014, committed funds from the private sector equated to only about 15 percent of government-committed funds. However, more than half of it had been utilized in concrete recovery measures such as, reconstruction, social programs, and livelihood projects, which was more than what could be said about disbursement of state funds. In fact, some corporations took a more proactive approach: SM, a large integrated property developer, prepared more than fifty thousand packs of food two days in advance of Yolanda and distributed it all, two days after. Although an efficient and early recovery is necessary and admirable, it does not always mean it is just.

Through RAY’s “Adopt-a-City” (National Resilience Council, 2021) mechanism, there were nine corporations that led the rehabilitation effort for two-thirds of the area devastated by Haiyan. One such private entity was the Ayala Corporation, responsible for the rehabilitation of the Sicogon island in Iloilo. However, instead of using RAY’s framework of ensuring education, health, shelter, and livelihood resilience, its approach to recovery was entirely centered on resettling the community to the Iloilo mainland, where it built two hundred to three hundred homes. Resettlement was “optional,” that is, the Sicogon fisherfolk could either accept a cash payout of P150,000 (roughly U.S. $2,670), or they could relocate to the mainland at no cost. If

46 Ibid.
they chose either offer, they had to agree that “[Ayala Corp.] is the registered owner of the 809 ha and the fisherfolk acknowledge that they have no right to stay on the island.” (Uson, 2017: 423) The fisherfolk had no other choice but to lose their livelihoods, for Ayala Corp. limited their access to relief, and the state had not enforced a rehabilitation plan for the island.

The state entrenched existing relations of unequal power through its apolitical and ambiguous language on disaster relief and adaptation as a whole. Though it stresses an effort to achieve ‘cross-cutting measures’ of gender equality and attention on the poor, its tools allow the capitalist class to solidify their domination of the social surplus. As we saw with Ayala Corp., this may culminate in the land-grabbing of the disenfranchised, but we can also see this with ‘no-dwell zone’ (NDZ) policies, which ban habitation in delineated risk-prone areas, which are usually along the coastline. These policies clearly reflect the sustainable development mantra of “building back better” in ways that enhance resilience and reduce vulnerability. On the surface, NDZs (and its counterpart, ‘no-build zones’) reflect a logical state strategy of assessing risk of acting accordingly. At its core, however, it tends to enforce ontological vulnerability and risk, making these areas ripe for practices of “disaster capitalism” (Klein, 2007) and “bourgeois environmentalism” (Yee, 2018) to take hold. Forced relocation tends to accompany NDZs and NBZs, the results of which enforce landlessness, destroy livelihoods, and disrupt social cohesion and power. Furthermore, resettlement sites designated for residents that were forcibly relocated do not ensure adequately equipped housing (See, 2020; Tatebe, 2021).

Policies like NDZs are unjust. Though they operate under the guise of ‘building resilience,’ they often enable the penetration of capitalist visions and enhanced the power of the local elite. Areas along the coast may well be risk-prone; however, the enforcement of these policies have failed to address the roots of poverty, whether it is through the outright neglect of
safe housing, or the bureaucratic loopholes of defining eligibility for Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) or Cash-for-Work programs.

This was essentially the story of Tacloban City, one of the most devastated and slowest cities to recover after Haiyan. Tacloban itself was a rapidly growing and urbanizing city, thereby producing its own internal dynamic of core and periphery, with growing competition for urban spaces. It was estimated to have about thirty-two thousand informal settlers living on coastal areas (Eadie, 2019: 96). Inciting the “Water Code,” (GPH, 1976) an NDZ prohibited any habitation within forty meters of the coastline, in both forest and urban areas. Humanitarian officials and government agencies were barred from providing ESAs or temporary shelter assistance to the families who lived in these areas. If they wanted to provide shelter assistance, it had to be in the Tacloban North area. Yee recalls this statement from a local social welfare official:

These people need to understand, [that] if they are living in an unsafe area, they will not receive ESA…Because if we are going to give money to those who are living in unsafe areas, then they will return to these danger zones, they will die again because these areas are already unsafe…why would they return there? (Yee, 2018: 110-111)

As a result of this thinking, families were forced to relocate—the process of which itself reflected unequal power dynamics, reminiscent of historical exchanges of clientelism. Housing at the resettlement sites differed in terms of quality, stability of utilities, and access to employment and aid, depending the NGO or private entity that had offered to provide shelter and on the political coherence of the corresponding LGU. As it turned out, wealthier households were more likely to be resettled in homes with higher quality, either due to personal connections of barangay officials or to their ability to service loans for the NGO (See, 2020: 6).
As of today, more than fifteen thousand residents occupy the relocation sites of Tacloban North (Mangada and Cuaton, 2022). These families continue to struggle with livelihood opportunities, access to potable water, and sanitation issues, though it has been nine years since Haiyan struck. Statements from resettled residents reveal Haiyan’s persistent double process of dispossession: “We’ve been staying here for eight years now,” one survivor said, “although our lives are safe whenever there is a typhoon, because of the lack of opportunity to earn [daily survival] is really a big problem of us” (Leyte Samar Daily Express, 2022). Another survivor said, “our income now could barely buy food for three meals” (Su et. al, 2018). However, this struggle is occluded from view by stories that romanticize the Filipinos’ spirit of bayanihan and ability to bounce back (e.g., Bracamonte, 2015). In some cases, these stories’ desperation to cover up the inadequacy of resettlement lack discretion. Indeed, resilience is an endearing and admirable quality, but its utility masks the political and material fight of the Filipino people against the forces of ecological imperialism that has riddled their archipelago for centuries.

The nature of adaptation in the Philippines should now be clear. In Figure 4, I give a concrete image of the three pillars to climate adaptation. Individually, these pillars are weak and could not uphold the capitalist nation-state’s logic of adaptation. But altogether, they are mutually reinforcing.

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47 The “Happiness Campaign” initiated in Tacloban City involved building a memorial site on the Anibong barangay; it was one of the most devastated barangays due to the influx of large cargo ships running into the neighborhood. Now, the memorial site is treated as a fun, tourist destination.

48 I do not aim to overemphasize the “profit-seeking” nature of the state, per the language of “disaster capitalism.” Rather, it is the historicity of the CNS structure and the totalizing devastation of the logic of capital accumulation.
**Figure 4.** The logic of adaptation to the Philippine capitalist nation-state.
This brief investigation of the Philippines’ adaptation policies and its response to Typhoon Haiyan reveals that the climate crisis is a social crisis. As I reflect in figure 4, the Philippine capitalist nation-state occupies a contradictory position wherein it recognizes the systematically disadvantaged position of the Filipinos, be it from ecological destruction or dispossession by accumulation. Yet, by way of its inherently ecologically imperial nature, the union and logic of CNS empowers the Philippine state to maintain that position, to sustain the paradox. At this conjuncture, adaptation to climate change in the Philippines reflects a U.S. oriented, capitalist vision of development preconditioned on ecological injustice.
Conclusion

Just a few months ago, the IPCC released a synthesis report saying that global warming will exceed 1.5° (IPCC AR6: 10). Despite the expansive policies and multi-lateral frameworks on adaptation and mitigation that arose after AR6, our once radical vision for climate justice has once again been vanquished. It is clear: life itself is under fire, and Capital-Nation-State cannot save us. No matter how ‘resilient’ we may adapt to be, nor how ‘sustainable’ development is, we cannot challenge the social power and division that is dominated by CNS.

Although nature’s absolute limits materialize with intensifying wrath and clarity, capital cannot cease to challenge it. But that is only one part of the condition for capitalism’s survival. The other is the artificial scarcity (Saito, 2022: 226, 230) of humanity’s social wealth—the limited capacity for humans to realize their total political development and the fruitfulness of life. This social scarcity is only possible because of the prior condition, the subordination of our relations of exchange to capital’s valorization. Multilateral and liberal frameworks of sustainable development and climate-resilient adaptation obfuscates this second, fundamental condition, addressing only the natural limits to capital accumulation. Above all, these strategies inherently prioritize economic growth for the sake of humanity so it cannot repair the metabolic rift. Rather, it only seeks to shift it temporally and materialistically. CNS can only shift this irreparable rift for so long and in so many capacities before the world completely crumbles. Eventually, it must come face to face with the conditions of its own demise (Saito, 2022).

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49 At the time of this writing (May 2023), the Philippines has faced yet another typhoon, Betty (Mawar), making it the 14th major typhoon in the last six years (Mishra, 2023). It is not a revelation that climate emergencies are the norm in the Global South, much less in the Philippines. But with every new article, it only becomes more tiring to hear. Something must be done, but CNS counts on our exhaustion to limit our political imagination. Anger drains us, but hope can liberate us.
Herein lies the paradox of the Philippines’ current situation: the Philippine state has embraced capitalist climate governance, but it also recognizes its peripheral position in the ecologically imperial world system that values its ontological vulnerability and impoverishment. This enigma can be paralyzing, and the political and economic context of the Philippines is dire: beyond a never-ending climate emergency, domestic capital arrests the state’s capacity for action, leaving it only competent for political violence and intimidation; and the economy seems permanently stagnant, with ranks of the impoverished only growing. But there is no good from allowing our pessimism to devolve into a lack of political imagination.

In this thesis, I argued that the Philippines’ emergence as a capitalist nation-state was shaped by U.S. imperialism, with their interruption of the crucial 1896 Revolution and the subsequent occupation of what could have been a unified Filipino Nation. American economic and monetary dominance, as well as political and educational tutelage implicated the entrenchment of a post-colonial class regime and hierarchy, in the service of mode C. This has solidified the Philippines’ position in the periphery of our modern, polarizing world-system.

With the aid of Karatani Kojin and Kohei Saito’s theoretical frameworks, I attempted to present Philippine history as the result of the total forces of class, power, and social and natural relations. Only this form of analysis empowers us to fight for a better world that sustains the natural, realizes our full potential, and liberates us from the chains of capital. It necessitates a journey beyond the regular practice of history, where our current conjuncture, our past’s consequences, and the conditions of possibility are investigated as part of a whole. Because at the end of the day, our fight is not just political, it is historical. The chronicles of struggle inform our present, but the specificity of its structure informs our future.
References


